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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
NUMBER
TYPE
DATE
RESTRICTION
1
Note
The Situation Room to Haig
15 March
B
1969
DECLASSIFIED PER RAC 6/13/2008
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
National Security Council, Vietnam Subject Files
89
FOLDER TITLE
BREAKFAST PLAN
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S. GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRESIDENT'S COPY
Return Mr. duColttais
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
cument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla
Approximate Rocket Impact Points
Enemy Attack on Saigon-15 March 1969
ây Hôis
Bên Cát
Beacon
SAIGON
Tan Son Nhut
Vap
Air Base
Xôm Vào
Ap Dông Nhi(T)
Be
7X6m Thôn
Binn Hoa Xá
Watehtower
Xóm Câu Soih
Tan Son Nhut
10
Tan Son Hoa
Gia Dinh
olice
Local office
That
Ap Nhi(1)
Lang Cha Cál
Tân Binh
Phú Nhuân
OF
Chi Hòa
235
NNH GIA OIN
Da Kao
Thi NgRè
Ap Tân Phú
DOTH
SAI GON
US EMBASSY
Xóm Phu Trung
(SAIGOI.
An
K
Local offict
NEW
3
1
INDEPENDENCE
PHO Tho Hoa
PALACE
htowe
THE
CITY HALL
Ap Hôe Thahh
9
PHU THO
Xom
RACE TRACK
Hoa
(unusable
2
5
4
CHOLON
Khánh Hôi.
6
Distroyed
ocal office
Xóm Ong Dôil)
8
Xóm Câu Mât
*********
THE
Xóm Thái Phúc Ap Tân Chánh
BIR
Rocket Impact Points
Xóm Thái Binh
Saigon city limits
(approximate
Xom Chuôi
Police precinct
Chánh Hung
Cholon district
SAI GON
Xóm Phuóc Thói
0
1
(SAIGON)
Xóm Rach Ngang
Miles
Xóm Ngü Phuóc
91254 7-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 16, 1969
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
HK
SUBJECT:
Breakfast Plan
I. Major Political/Psychological Reasons for Action
A. Failure to take action in response to Saigon/Hue shellings --
especially after repeated Presidential warnings -- would appear to Hanoi
as a demonstration of weakness.
B. Failure to act would encourage Hanoi to use shellings and
other military pressures in an effort to force major concessions at
the Paris negotiations.
C. The GVN will be more willing to agree to private talks, and
less suspicious about our statements on the conditions for a bombing
halt. Indeed, the Thieu/Bunker conversation is likely to be sticky if
we respond to the latest shelling of Saigon with a request to initiate
private talks.
D. Retaliatory action, if combined with a proposal for private
D
talks, will serve as a signal to the Soviets of the Administration's
determination to end the war. It would be a signal that things may get
out of hand.
II.
Arguments Against
A. Domestic critics of the Vietnam war could seize on this to
renew attacks on war and pressure for quick U.S. withdrawal.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRESERVATION COPY
- 2 -
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
B. Hanoi could try to buttress domestic critics with attacks
aimed at gaining large U.S. casualties.
C. Could start escalatory cycle.
III. Some Possible Consequences of Breakfast Plan
A. Minimum Possible Consequences
1. Pro-forma Cambodian protest.
B.
Larger Possible Consequences
1. If attack on COSVN is formally announced as "appropriate
response" major protest by Cambodia is probable, cutting off prospect
of resuming diplomatic relations for the present. (NVN will probably
try to pressure Sihanouk on this point.)
2. Soviets could feel compelled, probably under Hanoi
pressure, to register strong protest which might affect our other
talks with them.
3. Hanoi will feel compelled to retaliate, should our public
statements indicate action is retaliatory.
IV. Scenario
A.
Basic Plan of Action
1. NVN military concentrations in the DMZ will be attacked
12 hours prior to Breakfast Plan. This attack, in response to currently
well publicized NVN buildup in the DMZ, will be acknowledged as the
"appropriate response" to the shelling of Saigon and Hue. This would
have the following advantages: (a) it would indicate a response; (b) it
would divert public attention; (c) it would therefore enable Cambodia
to play down the Breakfast Plan and; (d) it would still show restraint.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2. Breakfast Plan will be treated as a routine military
operation within the framework of our current military actions in
Cambodian territory and not publicly or in any messages identified
as a retaliatory action against the shelling of Saigon and Hue. Hanoi
is likely to recognize the action as our response, without a public
statement. Any public statement identifying it as a retaliatory action,
on the other hand, would be more likely to induce retaliatory actions
by Hanoi, a major protest by Cambodia, a Soviet protest, and major
domestic criticism in the press.
3. The military action will be combined with an effort in
Paris to initiate private talks.
B. Press Scenario
1. The attacks on the DMZ will be publicly announced with
no additional comment. If the press asks whether these attacks are the
"appropriate response" mentioned by the President, the spokesman will
state that the press can draw its own conclusions.
2. Breakfast Plan would be announced routinely by Saigon
as a normal B-52 operation against targets along the Cambodian border.
The targets would not be specifically identified.
3. Press briefing and backgrounders would in no way
directly identify the action as the "appropriate response" to the
Saigon/Hue shellings.
4. All press queries should be referred to the Saigon
spokesman who will neither affirm nor deny reports of attacks on
Cambodia but state that this is under investigation. With respect to
any attacks against Cambodia, we will take the same public position
of "no comment" as in the case of bombing attacks on Laos, with the
additional statement that reports of such attacks are under investigation.
5. If the Cambodians protest publicly, we will state
publicly that we are investigating the Cambodian protest.
6. At no point will attacks against Cambodia be officially
denied. When we reply to a Cambodian protest, we will state that we
have apologized and have offered compensation.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 4 -
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
C.
Diplomatic Scenario
1. On March 18, Ambassador Bunker will inform President
Thieu privately about DMZ strike and Breakfast Plan and seek Thieu's
immediate agreement to the initiation of private talks on this basis.
2. On March 18, following Thieu's agreement, Ambassador
Lodge will be authorized to initiate a request immediately for private
talks with the North Vietnamese.
3. If Cambodia makes its normal routine protest, we will
agree to investigate and subsequently confirm that the raid took place
in Cambodian territory, apologize, and offer compensation.
4. If Cambodia makes a major protest, we will acknowledge
responsibility, offer compensation, explain that incidents along the
Cambodian border occur due to the extensive VC use of military
exploitation of Cambodian territory in this area, and request an ICC
investigation of the area.
5. If the Soviet Union privately makes a major protest
against our action, we will point out the military reasons for the
action, the fact that both Saigon and Hue were shelled afat er
rning,
that more provocative options were available but not undertaken, and
that we would now like to get down to serious negotiations and have
initiated a request for private talks as suggested by them.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
3/17/69
Mildred:
There were limited numbers of
copies on these. I have given you
a set of everything we did yesterday.
Sally
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
INFORMATION
March 17, 1969
STOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Breakfast Plan
At Tab A is a report received yesterday concerning
the diversion of a Soviet ship from Haiphong Harbor.
At Tab B is an analysis I had made of the status
blackbore) black
of Soviet ships in Haiphong Harbor as a result of the
diewi
report at Tab A.
At Tab C is a copy of a message sent last might ngith
through back channels to General Abrams for Ambassador
Bunker.
At Tab D is a press guidance worked out yesterday
afternoon in conjunction with the Breakfast Plan.
Typed by: SDehler
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Press Guidance in Conjunction with Implementation
of Breakfast Plan and Allied Attacks by Fire in DMZ
In conjunction with implementation of the Breakfast Plan on
March 18 and concurrent military operations in northern and southern
portions of the DMZ, the following press guidance will be strictly
adhered to.
Part I covers DMZ attacks and Part II the Breakfast Plan.
Part I
1. There will be absolutely no reference to strikes provided
for in the Breakfast Plan.
2. Announcement will be made on March 18 in Saigon along
the following lines: "U.S. forces are attacking enemy troop concen-
trations and supply caches in the northern and southern portions of the
DMZ today (Tuesday, March 18) through combined B-52 and tactical
air strikes, as well as, artillery and naval bombardment. This
action was undertaken in view of continuing violations in the de-militarized
zone by North Vietnamese forces which are threatening U.S. and allied
positions in the I Corps Tactical Zone. " If the press asks whether these
attacks are the "appropriate response" mentioned by the President,
spokesmen will state the press can draw its own conclusion.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
2. In addition to the basic press coverage, the Department
of Defense should prepare press backgrounders to be given both in
Saigon and Washington which outline in detail the nature of the recent
abuses of the DMZ by North Vietnam forces as well as a list of the
Saigon and Hue shellings. Backgrounders are to be prepared and
available at the time of the release of Tuesday, March 18 announcing
the attacks.
Part II
Breakfast Plan
1. In conjunction with the routine release made by MACV
covering B-52 operations in South Vietnam on March 18, MACV
spokesman will issue a statement along the lines of the attached draft.
2. In the event press inquiries are received following the
execution of the Breakfast Plan as to whether or not U.S. B-52's have
struck in Cambodia, U.S. spokesman will confirm that B-52's did
strike on routine missions adjacent to the Cambodian border but state
that he has no details and will look into this question.
3. Should the press persist in its inquiries or in the event of
a Cambodian protest concerning the possibility of U.S. strikes in
Cambodia, U.S. spokesman will neither confirm nor deny reports of
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
attacks on Cambodia but state this is under investigation. With respect
to any attacks against Cambodia, we would take the same public
position of "no comment" as in the case of bombing attacks on Laos
with the additional statement that reports of such attacks are under
investigation.
4. After delivering a reply to any Cambodian protest, we will
inform the press that we have apologized and offered compensation.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Checklist for Meeting with President
March 16, 1969
1.
Two substantive points should be covered at meeting:
a. All messages to the field on Breakfast Plan should
emphasize that (a) there will be no publicity given
specifically to the attacks on Cambodia, (b) the public
announcement will be provided separately, and
(c) Breakfast Plan should in no way be linked in
classified messages or publicly with the "appropriate
response. "
e.
b. Breakfast Plan is not a precident for other similar
operations in Cambodia.
2.
Checklist of necessary actions after Breakfast Plan
and DMZ attack are decided upon
a. March 16, 1969
(1) Eyes only message to Bunker informing him to
inform Thieu about DMZ attack (but not Breakfast
Plan) and urge him to get Thieu on board immediately
regarding private talks -- State.
b. March 17, 1969
(1) Text of press announcement on Breakfast Plan -- NSC.
(Attached)
(2) Press guidance on DMZ attack -- OSD
(3) Preparation of press backgrounder on enemy
utilization of DMZ -- OSD
(4) Instructions to Lodge to make initial call for private
talks on receipt of report from Bunker of agreement
by Thieu -- State.
(5) Inform Lodge of DMZ attack -- State.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Draft Press Announcement for MACV Spokesman
B-52 missions in 6 strikes early this morning bombed these
targets:
"Enemy activity base camps and bunker and tunnel
complexes 45 kilometers northeast of Tay Ninh city;
Enemy troop concentrations and supply caches in
the DMZ. "
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Sihanouk on Cambodian Border Incidents
Sihanouk's Recent Actions
In recent months, Prince Sihanouk has modified his position on
border incidents and on NVN/VC use of Cambodian territory as a
sanctuary. The modified Sihanouk position has been indicated by the
following steps, principally:
1. A more moderate reaction to recent border incidents,
with the protests taking a pro-forma character even when Cambodian
lives were lost.
2. The relatively early release of four American pilots
recently.
3. Increasingly forthright public statements on Viet Cong
and Viet Minh infiltration, particularly in his March 6 press conference
when he flashed, but did not show, a. map of Communist concentrations
in Cambodia.
4. Public and private recognition that incidents will occur
along the border but inferring the U.S. should attack the Communists in
non-populated areas.
-- The Australian Ambassador reported Sihanouk as stating
privately: "As for frontier incidents, he was fully aware that so long as
fighting went on in Vietnam, and so close to the border, it would not be
possible to prevent such incidents completely or the loss of life on the
Cambodian side that they involved. But as things stood at the moment,
Cambodia could not even get compensation."
-- In his March 6 press conference, Sihanouk said:
"I told Mr. (name indistinct) that there are Vietnamese infiltrating
Cambodia. I am deeply worried about it, but the Americans have
never bombed them. Instead, they bomb only the areas where there
are, so to speak, neither isolated Vietnamese nor Vietnamese units
which have infiltrated.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
"Dear friends, do you realize the importance of what I have said?
This is very important to international opinion. This means that people
will ask whether there are Viet Cong and Viet Minh infiltrating the
country of the Prince. Yes, there are. But the Americans have not
bombed the areas where there are Viet Cong and Viet Minh; they bomb
only the areas where there are Cambodians."
5. A receptivity to an early resumption of relations with
us, despite recent incidents.
Nevertheless, Sihanouk has made it clear that he cannot publicly
condone these incidents and that he must protest them and seek
compensation in order to preserve his neutrality.
Implications of Sihanouk's Actions
Sihanouk is genuinely concerned by Communist infiltration
through his territory and use of it as a sanctuary. He recognizes that
there is little he can do militarily to stop it and is apparently not
adverse to very limited actions against the Communists in Cambodia.
On the other hand, to condone publicly U.S. action would vitiate his
neutral stance and invite even more serious difficulties for him with
the Communists.
Sihanouk, therefore, appears to be seeking a set of tacit ground
rules which preserve his neutrality and yet allow for an occasional
incident inside Cambodian territory. In this, he may be moving toward
a position somewhat analogous to Laos' Souvanna Phouma, who permits
us to bomb the Communists, acknowledges the attacks privately, but
insists that we not publicly state that we are taking these actions.
From what Sihanouk has indicated, the following ground rules may
be inferred:
1. Very occasional U.S. attacks just inside the Cambodian
border are anticipated, but should be kept to an absolute minimum
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2. The U.S. attacks should be in non-populated areas,
particularly the tri-border area. Such attacks will not be in the
presence of Cambodians or result in Cambodian casualties, and
thus less likely to embarass Sihanouk. In these circumstances,
protests by Hanoi are more difficult since they would only
acknowledge its use of Cambodian territory.
3. The U.S. should not publicly state that incidents
inside Cambodia are deliberate since this would put Sihanouk on the
spot. Rather, they should be characterized ambiguously, with a
public "no comment" investigation, and an apology and compensation
for an implied mistake.
4. Cambodia reserves the right to protest and seek
compensation and to take other public steps to demonstrate its
indignation and ergo its neutrality.
It is quite likely that such ground rules may never be more than
tacit. A key, however, for Sihanouk will always be the public face
given to border incidents.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Tab D
Press Guidance
1. In conjunction with the routine release made by MACV
covering B-52 operations in South Vietnam on March 18, MACV
spokesman will issue a statement along the following lines: "B-52
missions in 6 strikes early this morning bombed these targets:
'Enemy activity, base camps and bunker and tunnel complexes 45
kilometers northeast of Tay Ninh city. (List two or more other B-52
targets struck as above)'"
2. In the event press inquiries are received following the
execution of the Breakfast Plan as to whether or not U.S. B-52's have
struck in Cambodia, U.S. spokesman will confirm that B-52's did
strike on routine missions adjacent to the Cambodian border but state
that he has no details and will look into this question.
3. Should the press persist in its inquiries or in the event of
a Cambodian protest concerning U.S. strikes in Cambodia, U.S. spokes-
man will neither confirm nor deny reports of attacks on Cambodia but
state this will be investigated.
4. After delivering a reply to any Cambodian protest,
Washington will inform the press that we have apologized and offered
compensation.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 16, 1969
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRE SIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Breakfast Plan
I. Major Political/Psychological Reasons for Action
A. Failure to take action in response to Saigon/Hue shellings --
especially after repeated Presidential warnings -- would appear to Hanoi
as a demonstration of weakness.
B. Failure to act would encourage Hanoi to use shellings and
other military pressures in an effort to force major concessions at
the Paris negotiations.
C. The GVN will be more willing to agree to private talks, and
less suspicious about our statements on the conditions for a bombing
halt. Indeed, the Thieu/Bunker conversation is likely to be sticky if
we respond to the latest shelling of Saigon with a request to initiate
private talks.
D. Retaliatory action, if combined with a proposal for private
talks, will serve as a signal to the Soviets of the Administration's
determination to end the war. It would be a signal that things may get
out of hand.
II.
Arguments Against
A. Domestic critics of the Vietnam war could seize on this to
renew attacks on war and pressure for quick U.S. withdrawal.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
B. Hanoi could try to buttress domestic critics with attacks
aimed at gaining large U.S. casualties.
C. Could start escalatory cycle.
III. Some Possible Consequences of Breakfast Plan
A. Minimum Possible Consequences
1. Pro-forma Cambodian protest.
B.
Larger Possible Consequences
1. If attack on COSVN is formally announced as "appropriate
response" major protest by Cambodia, is probable, cutting off prospect
of resuming diplomatic relations for the present. (NVN will probably
try to pressure Sihanouk on this point.)
2. Soviets could feel compelled, probably under Hanoi
pressure, to register strong protest which might affect our other
talks with them.
3. Hanoi will feel compelled to retaliate, should our public
statements indicate action is retaliatory.
IV. Scenario
A. Basic Plan of Action
1. NVN military concentrations in the DMZ will be attacked
12 hours prior to Breakfast Plan. This attack, in response to currently
well publicized NVN buildup in the DMZ, will be acknowledged as the
"appropriate response" to the shelling of Saigon and Hue. This would
have the following advantages: (a) it would indicate a response; (b) it
would divert public attention; (c) it would therefore enable Cambodia
to play down the Breakfast Plan and; (d) it would still show restraint.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2. Breakfast Plan will be treated as a routine military
operation within the framework of our current military actions in
Cambodian territory and not publicly or in any messages identified
as a retaliatory action against the shelling of Saigon and Hue. Hanoi
is likely to recognize the action as our response, without a public
statement. Any public statement identifying it as a retaliatory action,
on the other hand, would be more likely to induce retaliatory actions
by Hanoi, a major protest by Cambodia, a Soviet protest, and major
domestic criticism in the press.
3. The military action will be combined with an effort in
Paris to initiate private talks.
B. Press Scenario
1. The attacks on the DMZ will be publicly announced with
no additional comment. If the press asks whether these attacks are the
"appropriate response" mentioned by the President, the spokesman will
state that the press can draw its own conclusions.
2. Breakfast Plan would be announced routinely by Saigon
as a normal B-52 operation against targets along the Cambodian border.
The targets would not be specifically identified.
3. Press briefing and backgrounders would in no way
directly identify the action as the "appropriate response" to the
Saigon/Hue shellings.
4. All press queries should be referred to the Saigon
spokesman who will neither affirm nor deny reports of attacks on
Cambodia but state that this is under investigation. With respect to
any attacks against Cambodia, we will take the same public position
of "no comment" as in the case of bombing attacks on Laos, with the
additional statement that reports of such attacks are under investigation.
5. If the Cambodians protest publicly, we will state
publicly that we are investigating the Cambodian protest.
6. At no point will attacks against Cambodia be officially
denied. When we reply to a Cambodian protest, we will state that we
have apologized and have offered compensation.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2. Breakfast Plan will be treated as a routine military
operation within the framework of our current military actions in
Cambodian territory and not publicly or in any messages identified
as a retaliatory action against the shelling of Saigon and Hue. Hanoi
is likely to recognize the action as our response, without a public
statement. Any public statement identifying it as a retaliatory action,
on the other hand, would be more likely to induce retaliatory actions
by Hanoi, a major protest by Cambodia, a Soviet protest, and major
domestic criticism in the press.
3. The military action will be combined with an effort in
Paris to initiate private talks.
B. Press Scenario
1. The attacks on the DMZ will be publicly announced with
no additional comment. If the press asks whether these attacks are the
"appropriate response" mentioned by the President, the spokesman will
state that the press can draw its own conclusions.
2. Breakfast Plan would be announced routinely by Saigon
as a normal B-52 operation against targets along the Cambodian border.
The targets would not be specifically identified.
3. Press briefing and backgrounders would in no way
directly identify the action as the "appropriate response" to the
Saigon/Hue shellings.
4. All press queries should be referred to the Saigon
spokesman who will neither affirm nor deny reports of attacks on
Cambodia but state that this is under investigation. With respect to
any attacks against Cambodia, we will take the same public position
of "no comment" as in the case of bombing attacks on Laos, with the
additional statement that reports of such attacks are under investigation.
5. If the Cambodians protest publicly, we will state
publicly that we are investigating the Cambodian protest.
6. At no point will attacks against Cambodia be officially
denied. When we reply to a Cambodian protest, we will state that we
have apologized and have offered compensation.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 4 -
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
C.
Diplomatic Scenario
1. On March 18, Ambassador Bunker will inform President
Thieu privately about DMZ strike and Breakfast Plan and seek Thieu's
immediate agreement to the initiation of private talks on this basis.
2. On March 18, following Thieu's agreement, Ambassador
Lodge will be authorized to initiate a request immediately for private
talks with the North Vietnamese.
3. If Cambodia makes its normal routine protest, we will
agree to investigate and subsequently confirm that the raid took place
in Cambodian territory, apologize, and offer compensation.
4. If Cambodia makes a major protest, we will acknowledge
responsibility, offer compensation, explain that incidents along the
Cambodian border occur due to the extensive VC use of military
exploitation of Cambodian territory in this area, and request an ICC
investigation of the area.
5. If the Soviet Union privately makes a major protest
against our action, we will point out the military reasons for the
action, the fact that both Saigon and Hue were shelled after full warning,
that more provocative options were available but not undertaken, and
that we would now like to get down to serious negotiations and have
initiated a request for private talks as suggested by them.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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Sihanouk on Cambodian Border Incidents
Sihanouk's Recent Actions
In recent months, Prince Sihanouk has modified his position on
border incidents and on NVN/VC use of Cambodian territory as a
sanctuary. The modified Sihanouk position has been indicated by the
following steps, principally:
1. A more moderate reaction to recent border incidents,
with the protests taking a pro-forma character even when Cambodian
lives were lost.
2. The relatively early release of four American pilots
recently.
3. Increasingly forthright public statements on Viet Cong
and Viet Minh infiltration, particularly in his March 6 press conference
when he flashed, but did not show, a map of Communist concentrations
in Cambodia.
4. Public and private recognition that incidents will occur
along the border but inferring the U.S. should attack the Communists in
non-populated areas.
-- The Australian Ambassador reported Sihanouk as stating
privately: "As for frontier incidents, he was fully aware that so long as
fighting went on in Vietnam, and SO close to the border, it would not be
possible to prevent such incidents completely or the loss of life on the
Cambodian side that they involved. But as things stood at the moment,
Cambodia could not even get compensation."
-- In his March 6 press conference, Sihanouk said:
"I told Mr. (name indistinct) that there are Vietnamese infiltrating
Cambodia. I am deeply worried about it, but the Americans have
never bombed them. Instead, they bomb only the areas where there
are, so to speak, neither isolated Vietnamese nor Vietnamese units
which have infiltrated.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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- 2 -
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
"Dear friends, do you realize the importance of what I have said?
This is very important to international opinion. This means that people
will ask whether there are Viet Cong and Viet Minh infiltrating the
country of the Prince. Yes, there are. But the Americans have not
bombed the areas where there are Viet Cong and Viet Minh; they bomb
only the areas where there are Cambodians."
5. A receptivity to an early resumption of relations with
us, despite recent incidents.
Nevertheless, Sihanouk has made it clear that he cannot publicly
condone these incidents and that he must protest them and seek
compensation in order to preserve his neutrality.
Implications of Sihanouk's Actions
Sihanouk is genuinely concerned by Communist infiltration
through his territory and use of it as a sanctuary. He recognizes that
there is little he can do militarily to stop it and is apparently not
adverse to very limited actions against the Communists in Cambodia.
On the other hand, to condone publicly U.S. action would vitiate his
neutral stance and invite even more serious difficulties for him with
the Communists.
Sihanouk, therefore, appears to be seeking a set of tacit ground
rules which preserve his neutrality and yet allow for an occasional
incident inside Cambodian territory. In this, he may be moving toward
a position somewhat analogous to Laos' Souvanna Phouma, who permits
us to bomb the Communists, acknowledges the attacks privately, but
insists that we not publicly state that we are taking these actions.
From what Sihanouk has indicated, the following ground rules may
be inferred:
1. Very occasional U.S. attacks just inside the Cambodian
border are anticipated, but should be kept to an absolute minimum
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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- 3 -
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2. The U.S. attacks should be in non-populated areas,
particularly the tri-border area. Such attacks will not be in the
presence of Cambodians or result in Cambodian casualties, and
thus less likely to embarass Sihanouk. In these circumstances,
protests by Hanoi are more difficult since they would only
acknowledge its use of Cambodian territory.
3. The U.S. should not publicly state that incidents
inside Cambodia are deliberate since this would put Sihanouk on the
spot. Rather, they should be characterized ambiguously, with a
public "no comment" investigation, and an apology and compensation
for an implied mistake.
4. Cambodia reserves the right to protest and seek
compensation and to take other public steps to demonstrate its
indignation and ergo its neutrality.
It is quite likely that such ground rules may never be more than
tacit. A key, however, for Sihanouk will always be the public face
given to border incidents.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Tab A
1500 Report of attack on Saigon
Tab B
1515 Report of attack on Saigon
Tab C
1605 Report of attack on Saigon
Tab D
Tabulation of casualties as a result of enemy
rocket attacks since start of current
offensive; Saigon, Hue and Danang.
Tab E
Tabulation of casualties of rocket
attacks on Saigon only
Tab F
Summary of telephone conversations between
Henry Kissinger and the President;
3:35 p.m., 3:44 p.m., 3:45 p.m.
Tab G
Memo signed by the President advising officials
that there would be no comment on rocket
attacks
Tab H
Memo for the record signed by the President
summarizing actions to be taken in response
to rocket attacks
Tab I
Summary of telephone conversations between
Henry Kissinger and Secretary Laird
4:00 p.m. and 5:40 p.m.
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15 March 1969
1500 EST
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
FROM THE SITUATION ROOM
We have learned from the NMCC and the press that
the Viet Cong have fired at least four rockets into
downtown Saigon.
Two of the rockets, reportedly 122mm., landed in the
4th Precinct, one in the 1st, and one in the 9th. One
Vietnamese civilian has been wounded and one house
destoyed. (Press reports seven rockets, one hitting the
Newpoet Bridge over the Saigon River.)
About five miles from Saigon a fuel dump at Nha Be
was hit by three rockets and is on fire.
The attacks occured early Sunday morning local time.
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B
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CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OFFICER OF
THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
15 March 1969
STATE and
1515 EST
THE JOINT STAFF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Subject: Attack on Saigon/Nha Be
1. COMUSMACV informs that at 151332 EST, Saigon was hit
by four rocket rounds. Two impacted in the Fourth Precinct,
one in the First, and one in the Ninth. Initial fragmentary
reports indicate one house was damaged and one civilian was
wounded, More casualties are expected.
2. The POL dump at Nha Be, 5 nautical miles southeast of
Saigon, was hit by three rocket rounds. One round hit a
small POL tank starting a fire. The fire has been put out.
The other two rounds caused no damage. There were no casual-
ties reported.
BAUGHAN,
Admiral,
Distribution:
Deputy Director for
WHSR
Operations (NMCC)
SECSTATE
SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
ASD/ISA
ASD/PA
CJCS (3)
DJS (3)
SJCS
J- 30
J- 31
J- 32
J-33
J- 5
AOC
AFCP
NFP
MCCC
DDO
ADDO
CCOC
PAC DIV
PAC DESK
DIA REP
NSA REP
CIA REP
STATE REP
PA REP
CONFIDENTIAL
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C
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[89/5/1]
15 March 1969
1605 EST
NOTE FOR COLONEL HAIG
FROM THE SITUATION ROOM
Checks around the local ops ctrs were negative from
NMCC and State Dept. CIA has a report from their
station in Saigon with the only new information
giving the impact points of the rockets:
4th Precinct- - Two impacts damaging a residential
building and wounding one person (presumably
Vietnamese.
9th Precinct--impacted in a rice paddy
1st Precinct--impacted in the Saigon River.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
Per RAC
NARA. Date 6/13/2008
By JMR
[plofi]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
D
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15 March 1969
NOTE FOR COLONEL HAIG
FROM THE SITUATION ROOM
SUBJECT: Casualties inflicted by Enemy Rocket Attacks
Since the Start of Current Offensive.
Following figures provided by NMCC/MACV:
Saigon
45 killed
82 wounded
Hue
2 =
5 "
The casualties in Danang are classified by MACV
as being an attack on a military installation but it
was in the city.
Danag
1 killed
13 wounded
Totals
48 killed
100 wounded.
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UN
SAIGON ATTACKS
Date
Weapons
Killed
Wounded
MARCH 5
7 rockets
22
29
MARCH 2
3 rockets
12
21
23 Feb
3 rockets
6
23
22 Feb
7 rockets
5
10
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F
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Dictated Summary of Telephone Conversations
Between Secretary Laird and Henry Kissinger
March 15, 1969 4:00 p.m.
I informed Secretary Laird of the President's wishes
to go ahead with COSVN. The President also wanted
to make sure no one in Defense or State made any
comment whatsoever regarding attack. Secretary
Laird was to stand by for further instructions from the
President.
March 15, 1969 5:40 p.m.
I confirmed the President's earlier wishes to go ahead.
In conversations with General Wheeler, two possibilities
arose: (1) only a breakfast plan and (2) split forces for
target. I instructed Secretary Laird to lay both on and
the decision would be made tomorrow (Sunday, March 16)
as to which one would be executed. Secretary Laird said
this would be done. The President wanted to have a
meeting on Sunday to include myself, Secretary Rogers
and Secretary Laird. The plan would go into effect
Monday afternoon our time which would be Tuesday morning
their time.
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Dictated Summary of Telephone Conversations
Between the President and Henry Kissinger
March 15, 1969 3:35 p.m.
The President ordered the immediate implementation of
the breakfast plan. State should be notified only after the
point of no return. The order is not appealable, therefore,
Lodge is to make no complaint and Bunker is to be told there
is to be no complaint -- only after the operation is beyond
recall.
March 15, 1969 3:44 p.m.
The President indicated that he wanted orders to go to the
following: Lodge, Bunker in Vietnam and Defense. The
order is that all officials of this Government are not to
comment on this attack "without my prior approval" for
72 hours. He indicated no comment, no warnings, no
complaints, no protests publicly or privately, on or off
the record.
March 15, 1969 3:45 p.m.
The President indicated that he wanted everything that
would fly on its way to North Vietnam and indicated that
there would be no appeal from that order.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
March 15, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
March 16 Rocket Attack on Saigon
The following directives were issued by the President at 1545,
March 15, as a result of the most recent rocket attack on Saigon:
1. The President ordered the immediate implementation
of the Breakfast Plan. (TOT - Tuesday morning, Saigon time;
Monday afternoon, Washington time.)
2. The Department of State (and Ambassadors Lodge and
Bunker) to be notified only after the point of no return in the imple-
mentation of the Plan.
3. Appropriate Government agencies and their field
representatives are to be instructed that they will make no comment
on the recent rocket attack on Saigon. (The President wishes to
personally sign such a directive.)
4. The President directed the following additional military
measures:
a. Maximum possible aerial reconnaissance over
North Vietnam.
b. Increased Naval activity in international waters
adjacent to North Vietnam.
And Nat
TOP SECRET
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G
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
March 15, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: March 16 Rocket Attack on Saigon
I want there to be absolutely no comment by any
Government official or military commander on the March 16,
local time, rocket attack on Saigon. Appropriate officials
should be informed immediately.
Richal Mit
CC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SECRET
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H
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