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    "ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n2\nmemo\nSonnenfeldt to HAK\n2/5/70\nB\n3\nmemo\nHAK to the President\nn.d.\nB\n4\nmemo\nHAK to the President\nn.d.\nB\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nNSC\n340\nFOLDER TITLE\n6\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nin\n*U.S.GPO:1989-235-084/00024\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nHAK\nhls you wantme\nto draft a mits to\nSisco from you- or\nwill fyour do do by note plane.\nId call-\nwhy\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nINFORMATION\nJuly 17, 1970\nSECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nK\nSUBJECT:\nSisco-Dobrynin Conversation\nAttached at Tab A is a memorandum from Joe Sisco reporting the\nsensitive aspects of his July 13 talk with Ambassador Dobrynin.\nYou will see that Sisco made some extremely useful points concerning\nrecent Soviet moves in the region, their unwillingness to explain\ntheir actions, and the nature of your personal approach and policy.\nI think Sisco's presentation should prove helpful and is another\nreason for you to compliment him when you see him.\nAttachment an Sisco up follow resent\nSECRET/NODIS/EYES\nHistorical File\nPRESERVATION COPY\nASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 13, 1970\nPERSONAL - EYES ONLY\nSECRET/NODIS\nMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY KISSINGER\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSubject: Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin\nI wrote a very brief telegram covering my last\nconversation with Dobrynin. What is not contained in the\ntelegram is that I gave the Ambassador some personal\nimpressions - strictly personal - of the atmosphere\nwhich the continuing increased Soviet military involve-\nment in the UAR is creating which increases the risks\nof possible confrontation with us. I said that it would\nbe well for Dobrynin to reflect that the President at\nthe outset of his Administration had declared an era of\nnegotiations. For seventeen months we had negotiated in\ngood faith, and we feel that the Soviets have not come\nhalf the way; and that our restraint on the military side\nhas not been met by restraint but rather by a fundamental\ndecision on the part of the Soviet Union to involve its\npersonnel in an operational capacity. This is a most\nserious decision for the Soviets to have taken, and\nour concern has increased not only because of the\ncreeping process in recent weeks, but also because of\nSoviet unwillingness to tell us quietly and confidentially\nwhat their intentions are and what the outer limits of\ntheir involvement may be as they see it.\nI said I had watched our President for months and felt\nthat he had offered political proposal after political\nproposal, and political option after political option in\nthe context of the United States exercising great restraint\nin the face of pressures for providing Israel with\nsubstantial numbers of additional aircraft. I hoped that\nDobrynin was not reporting to Moscow that our involvement\nin Vietnam reflected any lack of resolve in the Middle\nEast. The President was a man of peace, a man who wanted\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n- 2 -\na negotiated settlement, but also a man of firmness and\ntoughness, which it would be well for the Soviet Union\nto take fully into account as it develops Middle East\npolicy. He would not be pushed around in the Middle East\nor anywhere else. These were only personal judgments\nI was expressing; but I would advise Dobrynin to take\nvery, very seriously the words expressed by the President\nsome months ago that the United States would view with\ndeep concern any attempt by the Soviet Union to dominate\nthe Middle East.\nDobrynin responded critically of the recent \"tough\ntalk\" which he said would not force the Soviet Union to\nmake decisions of the kind it would not wish to make. He\nremonstrated several times that the emphasis on the Soviet\nrole was creating a crisis atmosphere, and that it was not\nmaking it easier for Moscow to take constructive initiatives\nduring the current discussions with Cairo. At the same\ntime, he was quick to say, these were personal remarks\nand we would be receiving the replies to our political\ninitiative at an early date.\nI concluded this portion of the conversation by\nsaying that I just wanted personally to get this off of\nmy chest, that I had no authority to say any of this.\nI wanted to say what I said because the Soviets in the past\nhave miscalculated regarding United States intentions and\nit was important he reflected to Moscow the resolve and\nthe fiber and the determination of the President, as I read\nthe situation.\nI have brought this memorandum to the attention of\nSecretary Rogers.\nJ.S.Sinso\nJoseph J. Sisco\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY\nJuly 14, 1970\nTO:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nFROM:\nWinston Lord\nSisco has sent you his promised memorandum\non the personal points he made to Dobrynin\non July 13. (At Tab 2 is Sisco's brief\nreporting cable.) I assume you will want\nto forward this to the President, particularly\nsince he is seeing Sisco tomorrow.\nAccordingly, attached at Tab 1 for your\nsignature is a memorandum enclosing Sisco's\npaper.\nRecommendation:\nThat you sign the memorandum at Tab 1.\nAttachments\nSECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY\nWL:ms:7/14/70\nIFORMATION\nSECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY\nJUL 17 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nHK\nSUBJECT:\nSisco-Dobrynin Conversation\nAttached at Tab à is a memorandum from Joe Sisco reporting the\nsensitive aspects of his July 13 talk with Ambassador Dobrynin.\nYou will see that Sisco made some extremely useful points concerning\nrecent Soviet moves in the region, their unwillingness to explain\ntheir actions, and the nature of your personal approach and policy.\nI think Sisco's presentation should prove helpful and is another\nreason for you to compliment him when you see him.\nAttachment\nSECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY\nASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 13, 1970\nPERSONAL - EYES ONLY\nSECRET/NODIS\nMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY KISSINGER\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSubject: Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin\nI wrote a very brief telegram covering my last\nconversation with Dobrynin. What is not contained in the\ntelegram is that I gave the Ambassador some personal\nimpressions - strictly personal - of the atmosphere\nwhich the continuing increased Soviet military involve-\nment in the UAR is creating which increases the risks\nof possible confrontation with us. I said that it would\nbe well for Dobrynin to reflect that the President at\nthe outset of his Administration had declared an era of\nnegotiations. For seventeen months we had negotiated in\ngood faith, and we feel that the Soviets have not come\nhalf the way; and that our restraint on the military side\nhas not been met by restraint but rather by a fundamental\ndecision on the part of the Soviet Union to involve its\npersonnel in an operational capacity. This is a most\nserious decision for the Soviets to have taken, and\nour concern has increased not only because of the\ncreeping process in recent weeks, but also because of\nSoviet unwillingness to tell us quietly and confidentially\nwhat their intentions are and what the outer limits of\ntheir involvement may be as they see it.\nI said I had watched our President for months and felt\nthat he had offered political proposal after political\nproposal, and political option after political option in\nthe context of the United States exercising great restraint\nin the face of pressures for providing Israel with\nsubstantial numbers of additional aircraft. I hoped that\nDobrynin was not reporting to Moscow that our involvement\nin Vietnam reflected any lack of resolve in the Middle\nEast. The President was a man of peace, a man who wanted\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n- 2 -\na negotiated settlement, but also a man of firmness and\ntoughness, which it would be well for the Soviet Union\nto take fully into account as it develops Middle East\npolicy. He would not be pushed around in the Middle East\nor anywhere else. These were only personal judgments\nI was expressing; but I would advise Dobrynin to take\nvery, very seriously the words expressed by the President\nsome months ago that the United States would view with\ndeep concern any attempt by the Soviet Union to dominate\nthe Middle East.\nDobrynin responded critically of the recent \"tough\ntalk\" which he said would not force the Soviet Union to\nmake decisions of the kind it would not wish to make. He\nremonstrated several times that the emphasis on the Soviet\nrole was creating a crisis atmosphere, and that it was not\nmaking it easier for Moscow to take constructive initiatives\nduring the current discussions with Cairo. At the same\ntime, he was quick to say, these were personal remarks\nand we would be receiving the replies to our political\ninitiative at an early date.\nI concluded this portion of the conversation by\nsaying that I just wanted personally to get this off of\nmy chest, that I had no authority to say any of this.\nI wanted to say what I said because the Soviets in the past\nhave miscalculated regarding United States intentions and\nit was important he reflected to Moscow the resolve and\nthe fiber and the determination of the President, as I read\nthe situation.\nI have brought this memorandum to the attention of\nSecretary Rogers.\nJ.Sinco J.\nJoseph J. Sisco\nSECRET/NODIS\nDEPOSIT\nall\nClassification\n2\nUnited STATES 0:\nDepartment of St. e\nINDICATE\nTELEGRAM\n9\nC1\nCHARCE TO\n13Juli0.21\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: KEMBX AMEMBASSY, MOSCOW\nPRIORITY\nTEL AVIV\n11\nAMMAN\n1:\nLONDON\n\"\nPARIS\n1:\nUSINT CAIRO\n\"\nUSUN NEW YORK\n11\nSTATE 111425\nNODIS\n1. Sisco had brief 30-minute meeting with Dobrynin to\nreview current state of play re US initiative. Nothing\nnew or startling emerged. Dobrynin said discussions\ncontinuing in Moscow and that he could not give Sisco any\nspecific date as to when reply would come. He expected\nthat we would receive a reply directly from UAR and a\nreply also from USSR.\n2. In reply to Sisco's expression of increasing concern\ncontinuation\nover of Soviet creeping process and unwillingness\nindicate outer\nof Soviets to limits of their involvement,\nDobrynin reiterated familiar arguments what they are\ndoing is defensive.\nROGERS\nEND\nGP-3\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nNEA:JJSiscoint5\n7/13/70\n29588\nJoseph J. Sisco\nCLEARANCES:\nS/S\nMr. Brown\nSECRET/NOD\nClassification\nFORM\nΓ\nOF\nSTATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassificati on\n05|25|\nSTATES ¥ UNITED AMERICA\nDepartment of State\n10\n'ND\nTELEGRAM\n14\n8 APR 70 01 22z\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nJ\nINFO: USINT CAIRO\nUSUN NEW YORK\nAmembassy TEL AVIV\nSTATE 051251\nNODIS\nSUBJECT: Sisco-Dobrynin Talk April 6\n'70 APR 8 AM 8:53 53\nSITUATION ROOM\nWHITE house\nREF: STATE 50459\n1. Sisco opened conversation by saying he first wanted to\nsay a word about tentative plans he had for a trip to the\nMiddle East. There was no firm decision as yet. In our\nminds the bilateral talks had priority. It was desirable,\nhowever, for him to take a trip to the area and get a\nreading on attitudes there. This would be helpful in terms\nof our joint efforts in both the Two and Four Power talks.\nWe were always ready to receive anything the Soviet govern-\nment had for us. Messages during Sisco's absence could be\nconveyed to Amb Beam, Ass't Sec Davies and the Secretary\n:\nDRAFTED BY:\nND\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nleg WS\nNEA/IAI:HHStackhouse:slb\n4/7/70\n20840\nNEA - Joseph J. Sisco\nEARANCES:\nNEA: ALAtherton, Jr. by AS\nEUR (info)\nIO (info)\ns/s-Mr. Brown\nB\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nDEP\nATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassificati on\nUNITED STATES OF\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE #2\n_________________________\nhimself. Dobrynin asked for definite confirmation that Sisco\ntrip was on since he said he was likely to go to Moscow for\nthis two week period. Sisco later confirmed to Dobrynin trip\ndefinitely scheduled.\n2. Sisco said he wanted to raise a subject that Atherton\nhad already mentioned to Vorontsov and that the Secretary\nhad mentioned to Dobrynin March 25, our concern regarding\nthe introduction of SA-3 missiles into the UAR and in\nparticular Soviet personnel to operate them. Dobrynin\nwould recall that the Secretary had stressed that we wanted\nthe Soviets to take our decision on Israeli arms as an\nindication of US willingness to exercise restraint. The\nSecretary had said that this arms decision had been made\nwithout reference to the bilateral talks and had expressed\nthe hope that the Soviets would act with restraint. He had\nunderlined our concern about the introduction of SA-3's and\nparticularly about the introduction of Soviet personnel iHKa\n*hexWAR in an operational capacity into the UAR. Based dn\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM DS-32\n4 68\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICAN\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE #3\n_________________________\nwhat Dobrynin had said at that meeting we had had the impression\nthat he would be reporting to Moscow these expressions of our\nconcern. Sisco expressed the hope that the Soviet Government\nhad given careful study to the Secretary's comments. We had\nexpected and were ready to receive any comment that Dobrynin\nmight have.\n3. Dobrynin said that he had reported to Moscow what the\nSecretary had said and that he had nothing to add. Sisco\ninquired whether we might expect any further comment or\nobservations on this matter from the Soviets.\n4. Dobrynin said the Soviet view was and is clear. There\nwas nothing to add about the SA-3's, which were a purely\ndefensive weapon and no threat to Israel. What kind of a\nthreat did we think they were for Israel? They were in the\nUAR to protect it from Israeli air attack. The Soviets did\nnot understand why the US used this kind of argument.\n5. Sisco said this was a matter of concern to us because\nit related to the war of attrition initiated by the UAR_]\nDRA ED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM DS-322\n4 68\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassificati on\nUNITED STATES OF\nDepartment of State\nNDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE #4\nlast year. It related as well more broadly to the dangers\nand risks in the area. The question of defensive and offensive\nweapons was a difficult one to answer. Clearly the efforts\nto achieve a ceasefire worked out by the UN or by the Powers\nwere related to the kind of climate present in the area.\nSisco said he would report Dobrynin's remarks to the Secretary.\n6. Dobrynin then referred to his remarks made at his last\nmeeting with Sisco concerning a de facto ceasefire. Sisco\nsaid we were studying this and would be giving further thought\nto it.\n7. Turning to the efforts to obtain a peace settlement Sisco\nsaid that we had reviewed carefully the Soviets' and our oral\nstatements and the record of his subsequent meeting with\nDobrynin April 1. He found both positive and negative\nelements in the exchanges of the past two weeks. We did\nnote a willingness on the Soviets' part to be more precise\non the points related to peace and we were generally\nencouraged by expressions of this willingness in Dobrynih's\nDRAFTE BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM\nDS-322\n2:38\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassificati on\nUNITED **** STATES OF\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE #5\noral statement and what he had said subsequently to Sisco.\nBut, Sisco said, in order to make progress it was essential\nto receive from the Soviets in writing their formulations.\nSisco recalled that for many weeks of discussion in meeting\nafter meeting Dobrynin had indicated to him that the Soviet\ngovernment would be more specific on peace if the US was more\nspecific on withdrawal. Dobrynin expressing similar line\nnow. We felt that we had met this specificity requirement\nin our October 28 document, which was intended to reflect\na common US and Soviet position. The October 28 document\nwas a Soviet-American baby. In particular it was very\nspecific on the question of withdrawal. We were encouraged\nwhen the Soviets expressed a readiness to be more specific\non the question of peace. But Soviets had failed to respond\nspecifically on peace whereas we had been specific on with-\ndrawal. If the language of point 2 of the October 28 document\nwas not satisfactory to the Soviets, then it was up to them\nto suggest precisely and in writing what formulation it\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nDRAFTED BY.\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET,NODIS\nClassification\nFORM\nDS-322\nEXPARTMENT OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nUNITED STATES OF\nDepartment of State\nNDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE #6\n_________________________\nwilling to accept. This was a practical point. We considered\nthese talks as a means of bringing the parties along. If\nthere were alternative Soviet proposals then we should have\nthem in writing. There was not a ghost of a chance of bringing\nthe Israelis along with the kind of general remarks the Soviets\nhad been making. We needed a precise text. Until now we\ndid not see anything different from the Soviet side than in\nthe past. What is meant when Soviets say they willing to\nbe more detailed and come closer to our formulation? This\nis not enough; we require a precise text from Soviets if\nit does find present point 2 in October 28 paper unsatisfactory.\n8. Another question, Sisco continued, was that of negotiations.\nBased on Dobrynin's remarks to the Secretary and to Sisco we\nhad understood that the Soviets did not see the Rhodes formula\nas viable, though it was a formula we had worked out together\nin the Waldorf Astoria. The Soviets had indicated that they\nhad some ideas regarding negotiations. In our view what is\nimportant is that any formula provide for both direct and\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM\nDS-322\n& 68\na PARTMENT OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nUNITED STATES OF\nDepartment of State\nDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE #7\n_________________________\nindirect negotiations. We appreciated as the Soviets did\nthe need for a formula of constructive ambiguity. We strongly\nprefer Rhodes formula and regret Soviet back-off. We were\nprepared to consider alternatives to the Rhodes formula,\nbut Soviets must provide precise text. In absence any\nto\nnew, specific Soviet text, we must hold/the formula expressed\nin our October 28 document.\n9. Sisco continued, for many weeks we had made the assumption\nthat we were trying to find common ground on the basis of the\nOctober 28 document. Thus, Sisco said, he was taken aback\nby Dobrynin's reference in their previous conversation to\nthe Soviets' June document. We had assumed and know that\nthe October document was an attempt to marry the Soviet June\ndocument and ours of July. Dobrynin's comment had cast doubt\nthat we were talking from the same document. Moving back\nto June 1969 Soviet document is a move backward.\n*. 10. Dobrynin said he would speak first to the last of\nSisco's points. He said the Soviets had never accepted the\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nDRAFTED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM\nDS-322\n& AR\nUNITED DEPARTMENT The STATES OF OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE #8\n_________________________\nOctober document as a joint document. There was nothing new\nin the Soviet position on this. In their view the October\ndocument was a US document. He did not understand Sisco's\nsurprise at this. There were two plans, that of the Americans\nand that of the Soviets. There was no question of the Soviets\naccepting the US plan as a basis for proceeding.\n11. There were several basic issues involved, Dobrynin\ncontinued. We should look at them and attempt to find a\nmutually acceptable formula. But the Americans would not\nsay anything new. The Soviets had indicated they were prepared\nto go further if the US was prepared to talk about Gaza and\nSharm a-Sheikh. It was a waste of time to argue whether the\nOctober document was joint or not. Let's have a look at the\nbasic issues.\n12. At this point Dobrynin passed over three pieces of paper\nin English and Russian versions. The three formulations\nconcerned (a) withdrawal procedures, (b) Gaza and (c) Sharm\nal-Shaykh. Item (b) is identical to Point 6 in the Soviet\nDRAFTED BY\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nDRM DS-322\n08\nDEPARTMENT\nSTATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nUNITED STATES OF\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE #9\n_________________________\nJune 17 paper. Item (c) is identical to Point 7 in the Soviet\nJune 17 paper. FYI. These papers are thin gruel; they are\nonly a slight variant on June 1969 Soviet document and call\nwithdrawal\nfor total GOI withdrawk from Sharm al-Shaykh, Gaza, Sinai,\nWest Bank, and Golan Heights. END FYI. Revised item (a)\nreads as follows:\nQUOTE. On the day of deposit with the UN of the\nconcluding document or documents recording the accord reached\n(Section IV), withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the\nterritories occupied during the conflict of 1967 shall begin.\nThe withdrawal shall be carried out under the observation of\nUN representatives, by stages during agreed periods, not to\nexceed a period of two months in all (or as agreed).\nDuring the first month (or as agreed) Israeli troops\nshall withdraw from a part of the Arab territories to certain\nintermediate lines on the Sinai Peninsula (as well as on the\nwest bank of the Jordan River and from Syrian territory out\nof the El Quneitra area).\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nDRAFTED ar:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM\nDS-322\na 68\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nUNITED STATES OF\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE #10 7\nThe international UN troops, excluding the Arab armed\nforces, shall take the positions on the territories from\nwhich the Israeli armed forces are being withdrawn.\nOn the day when Israeli armed forces reach the intermediate\nlines of the Sinai Peninsula which have been stipulated in\nadvance (for instance, 30 or 40 kilometers from Suez Canal),\nthe Government of the UAR shall bring its troops into the\nSuez Canal area and begin the clearance of the canal for\nresumption of navigation.\nDuring the second month (or as agreed) the withdrawal\nof Israeli armed forces to the lines they held prior to\nJune 5, 1967 shall be completed. During the second stage\nthe international troops would evacuate the territories on\nwhich they were deployed already on the first stage, and\nwould follow the outgoing Israeli armed forces. The admin-\nistration of the UAR (or the corresponding Arab country)\nshall be completely restored in the vacated territories and\nits troops and police forces shall be introduced. UNQUOTE\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM\nDS-322\n4 68\nDES TMENT OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassificati on\nUNITED STATES OF\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE #10\n13\nx2. Dobrynin noted that by the Soviet proposals Israeli\ntroops would still be in occupied territory at a time when\npeace was juridically established--i.e., peace would become\neffective at intermediate, stage of withdrawal on understanding\nthat second stage was brief. The Soviets were prepared to\nput on paper QUOTE at theprapex proper time UNQUOTE its\nformulation regarding peace. The Soviets would like to have\nUS comments on the formulations here presented.\n14.\nXXX Sisco said we would study the Soviet formulations\ncarefully. He welcomed the fact that the Soviets had submitted\nformulations in writing but he was disappointed to see the\nformulations related and were so close in substance to the\nJune document. He again asked that the Soviets submit language\nin writing on peace and negotiations. Then we could begin\nto focus on what the issues are. We had a common interest\nin making progress.\n15.\n1x4x Dobrynin said these points were clear. He reiterated\nthat the Soviets did not accept the October 28 document -ds\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nDS-322\nDEP OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nDepartment of State\nNITED STATE STATES OF\nINDICATE\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION:\nAmembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE #12 7\na basis for discussion. QUOTE Your paper is your paper. UNQUOTE\nThe Soviets wanted to understand better the US position on\nsecondary points, then we could proceed. The Soviets wanted\nto avoid retrogression.\n16\nxs. In subsequent informal, QUOTE off record UNQUOTE\ndiscussion, Sisco said US would be able to make specific\nsubstantive comment on the four critical issues: negotiations,\npeace, withdrawal and boundaries, once all talks on table\nin writing. Sisco told Dobrynin bluntly we unwilling to\nbuy a QUOTE pig in the poke UNQUOTE. What did Soviets mean\nby hinting they will come closer to our formulation on\npeace? We had heard this from Dobrynin before. Dobrynin\ninitially insisted he must first have US comments on\nlanguage he had just presented. When Sisco pressed Dobrynin\nas to whether he was saying Soviets would not give us\nlanguage on peace and negotiations in absence such prior\ncomments from us, Dobrynin backed down and said he would put\nSisco's request to Moscow.\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nDRAFTED BY\nGP-3\nCLEARANCES:\nEND\nROGERS\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\n13\n*\nU.S. government PRINTING OFFICE: 1969-3\n75\nDIPARTMENT OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\n¥47932\nClassification\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nHPower\n2 APR 70 3 01 15z\n'70\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nINFO : USUN NEW YORK\nSTATE 047932\nAPR 2 AM 13\nSITUATION ROOM\nWHITE house\nNODIS\n1. At working lunch April 1, Dobrynin and Sisco agreed that\nin this first follow-up meeting after Dobrynin's session\nwith Secretary March 25 it would be well to examine as\nprecisely as possible where we are and to try to determine\nwhat possibilities of agreement were. Principal results\nof meeting were:\n(a) Soviets continue unwilling to join appeal to\nparties to restore ceasefire, but propose as alternative\nthat US and USSR work quietly with Cairo and Tel Aviv to\nachieve an informal understanding on de facto ceasefire;\n(b) Soviets continue adamant against arms limitation\ntalks on ground Arabs feel this would only result in freezing\na military balance clearly favorable to Israel;\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nDRAFTED BY:\nNEA: JJSisco: lab\n4/1/70\n29588\nNEA - Joseph J. Sisco\nCLEARANCES:\nEUR/SOV - Mr. Dubs Ao\nS/S - WLloyd ML\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1969-\n575\nUNITED DUARTMENT STATES OF OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE 2\n_________________________\n(c) Soviets are willing to consider a formulation on\npeace along lines proposed by US to include explicitly\nobligation that there be QUOTE a ********* cessation of\nwar and establishment of peace UNQUOTE provided we are\nwilling to commit ourselves to Kax total withdrawal.\nDobrynin explicitly specified this included Israeli withdrawal\nfrom Sharm al-Shaykh and Gaza, with latter to be explicitly\ndesignated as an Arab territory.\n(d) Soviets propose a slight variant of past USSR\nproposal on relationship between timing of withdrawal of\nIsraeli forces and entry into effect of peace obligations.\nVariant was described by Dobrynin as follows: (1) Once\nagreed document was deposited with UN, both sides would be\nobligated not to take any actions contrary to agreement;\n(2) Withdrawal would proceed by stages, and UN forces would\nbe introduced at the end of the first stage during which\nUAR personnel would be limited to clearing Suez Canal\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nU.S. govErnment PRINTING OFFICE:1961\n)-575\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nUNITED STATES OF the AMERICA\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION:\nAmembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE 3\nrather than be introduced in area initially evacuated by\nIsraeli forces. (3) At the end of the first stage there\nwould be a de jure acceptance by UAR of both cessation of\nwar and the state of peace. (4) With the understanding that\nthe second stage of withdrawal would not be a long one\n(a month or two), UN forces would occupy the additional\nterritories evacuated in that stage, and UAR forces would\nreturn to the Sinai with a UN buffer retained between the\nopposing sides. Dobrynin refused to be drawn out on the\narea of demilitarization or on whether UN buffer was to\nbe on one side or on both sides of the border.\n(e) Dobrynin refused to agree to the formulation on\npeace contained in Point 2 of the October 28th document\nbut insisted that the formulation USSR has in mind is close\nto that of the US. When asked whether he agreed to US\nformulation as it related to the fedayeen, he did not accept\nthis formulation but maintained Soviets had language\n_________________________\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1969 60-575\nUNITED DEPARTMENT STATES made 1218 OF the OF HEREBY STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE 4\nin mind that might approximate this.\n(f) On the question of negotiations, Dobrynin XX said\nSoviets no longer can accept present formulation on Rhodes\nformula, reiterating argument made previously that\ninterpretation given to it by the parties has made this\nunacceptable. When pressed by Sisco for an alternative\nformula, Dobrynin said something roughly along the following\nlines: The parties will have contact between themselves\nthrough Jarring with the understanding he could use various\nforms.\n(g) On Sharm al-Shaykh, Dobrynin insisted that there\nbe explicit reference to UN force, its removal being subject\nto major power veto, and indicated willingness to suggest\nXXXMXX that UN Secretary General consult with the parties\non question of composition and command of that force. He\ncategorically precluded any Soviet troops being involved\nin such a UN force.\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:196\n0.575\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nSECRET/NODIS\n1718\nClassification\nUNITED STATES OF the AMERICA\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE 5\n2. Sisco pressed Dobrynin on two procedural points without\nsuccess: (a) Sisco suggested that while Dobrynin exposition\nwas useful and helpful in understanding Soviet position,\nbest vehicle for making progress would be for Dobrynin\nemendation\nto offer specific new language as/amandaxxxx to October 28th\ndocument which we consider to be a joint US-USSR effort and\nnot solely an American product; and (b) Sisco хиђух suggested\nthat in next session, which now set for afternoon April 6,\nhe and Dobrynin discuss all other points in order to be\nsure that there are not other significant areas of\ndisagreement. With respect to first point, Dobrynin insisted\nthat he was under instructions to talk in terms of emendation\nof the Soviet June 1969 paper. Re (b), Dobrynin refused\nto focus on these other points unless and until US reacted\nto latest concrete Soviet suggestions. Sisco pointed out\nthese gave rise to difficulties since (1) there were a\nnumber of points of difference between June and October\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1969-\n575\nUNITED DEPARTMENT STATES OF OF THE STATE AMERICA\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE 6\n_________________________\ndocuments, (2) October document was based on a precise\nformat in which obligations were undertaken between parties\nin relationship to one another, whereas Soviet June document\nwas considerably less so, and (3) Soviets were asking us to\nreact and to make concession on concrete points of particular\ninterest to them in circumstances where US did not even\nknow whether common ground could be found on these decisive\npoints or just where we stood on other matters such as\nfreedom of passage through Suez Canal, Straits of Tiran,\nrefugee question, etc.\n3. During meeting, Sisco also said he wished to raise one\nbroad question which he thought more fundamental than any\nother in determining whether common ground can be achieved:\nWould Soviets be willing to agree to guidelines for Jarring\nbased on assumption of other than total withdrawal? Dobrynin\nsaid he could not reply to this question and suggested he and\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1969-360-575\nUNITED DEPARTMENT STATES OF OF AMERICA STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION:\nAmembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE 7\n_________________________\nXX\nSisco concentrate on concrete points they have been\ndiscussing.\nCOMMENT: Above exposition by Dobrynin represents no\nappreciable advance in Soviet position. It does contain\nappearance of greater oral flexibility and a few additional\nBECEIAED\nenticements (e.g., timing of peace, possible new formulation\non negotiating procedures). Our inclination is to continue\nefforts smoke Dobrynin out and press for written counter\nlanguage from Soviets, and, meanwhile, to show no signs of\ngive in our position. Would appreciate Ambassador Beam's\ncomment on this tactic.\nEND\nGP-3\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassificati on\n036977\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nDepartment of State\n14\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\n13 MAR 70 00 39 Γ\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION:\nAmembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY\nINFO: Amembassy LONDON\nPRIORITY\nAmembassy PARIS\nPRIORITY\nAmembassy MOSCOW\nPRIORITY\nUSUN NEW YORK\nPRIORITY\nSTATE 036977\nNODIS\nSUBJ: Dobrynin-Secretary Rogers Meeting March 11\n1. Asst Sec Sisco informed Israel Ambassador Rabin\nMarch 12 that during Dobrynin meeting with Secretary\nprevious day Soviets proposed resumption of bilateral.\nstatement\nconversations and, as follow-up to Malik/at March 5\nFour Power meeting, Dobrynin indicated willingness to\nconsider kind of precise formulations re peace\ncontained in Oct 28 and Dec 18 proposals.\n2. Secretary told Dobrynin USG will study procedural\nsuggestion re resumption bilaterals as well as what\nlatter said about substance.\n3. Sisco urged Rabin to hold above very closely and\nnoted that Soviets had complained to Secretary about\na number of recent leaks. Rabin said he understood. END\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nDRAFTED BY:\nNEA/IAI:MCLissfelt:hml Mill\n3/12/70\n22294\nAPPROVED NEA BY: Joseph Jos J.\nSisco\nCLEARANCES:\nNEA/IAI:ALAtherton\n$\nROGERS\nS/S - Mr. Eliot MR\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM DS-322\n4 68\nOF\nSECRET/NODIS\n036337\nUNITED DEPARTMENT STATES OF and STATE AMERICA\nClassificati on\nDepartment of State\nHak\nBook(1)\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\n12 MAR 70\nMAR 12\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION:\nAmembassy MOSCOW\nINFO.: USUN NEW YORK\n4-Pawn\nPM 5:01\nSITUATION ROOM\nhite house\nSTATE 036337\nNODIS\nNOFORN\nNO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT\n1. Amhassador Dobrynin called at his request on Secretary\nmorning March 11 and made detailed presentation, main thrust\nof which was that Soviets would like to resume US-Soviet\nMiddle East talks and are prepared meet US wishes for more\ndetailed formulation on question of peace providing US will\nbe more forthcoming on question of withdrawal, particularly\nre Sharm al-Shaykh, Gaza and Syria.\n2. Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov subsequently called on\nNEA/IAI Country Director Atherton with copy of Dobrynin's\ntalking points. Vorontsov declined leave text but let\nAtherton read it and take full notes, on which following\nparagraphs are based.\n3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS. Further aggravation of Middle East\nDRAFTED BY:\nX\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nNEA/IAI: ALAtherton, Jr:mob\n3/11/70\n20840\nNEA - Joseph 425 J. Sisco\nCLEARANCES:\nS/S - Mr. Eliot\nAR\nEUR - Mr. Swank\n(INfo)\nIO - - Mr. Greene (INfo)\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM DS-322 Row\n4 68\nUNITED DEPARTMENT STATES OF OF STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassificati on\nDepartment of State\nNDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE 2\n_________________________\nsituation makes it urgent that energetic steps be taken to\narrest increasing tensions in area. Soviet Government\nbelieves that, in addition to ending barbaric Israeli bombings\nof UAR civilian centers, there is need for new effort by\nmajor powers to achieve political settlement.\n4. Soviet Government continues to believe that Middle East\nsettlement should result in just and lasting peace, not\njust unstable and temporary armistice. Given tense Arab-\nIsraeli relations, there is need for cautious, protracted\nand serious work to bring positions of parties closer.\n5. Soviet Government intends to continue seeking settlement\nthrough exchange of views with USG, although US January reply\nwas far from constructive. Just and lasting peace is possible\non basis of earlier Soviet proposals but, to facilitate\nagreement, Soviet Government has additional considerations to\noffer.\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM DS-322\n4 68\nSECRET/NODIS\nUNITED DEPARTMENT STATES the OF STATE AMERICA\nClassification\nDepartment of State\nOF\nDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE 3 7\n6. Taking into account questions raised by USG, Soviets\nare prepared to discuss those questions, including establish-\nment of peace, in bilateral talks. Preamble of Soviet plan\nrecognizes need for just and stable peace in Middle East.\nUSG has stressed that this question is of prime importance\nreadiness\nand has said that if Arabs show /\nto establish peace\nthis would remove serious barriers to agreement. Soviet\npoint. Nevertheless,\nplan is sufficiently clear on with\nview to achieving understanding, Soviet Government would\nbe ready to supplement provisions in its plan on cessation of\nstate of war by provision on establishing, as result of\nsettlement, a state of peace.\n7. Soviet plan has sufficient concrete provisions about\nobligations of parties resulting from cessation of state of\nwar and establishment of peace. USG, however, seeks more\ndetail on these points as is clear from its October 28\nRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM\nDS-322\n4\nUNITED DEPARTMENT STATES in OF OF the STATE AMERICA\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassificati on\nDepartment of State\nDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPage 4 7\nand December 18 papers.\n8. Soviet Government is prepared to meet US wishes on this\nquestion if US side shows due understanding of questions\nwhose solution is of interest to Soviet side, first and\nforemost those questions concerning the unequivocal recording\nof provisions for the withdrawal of troops.\n9. USG has still not indicated that it shares Soviet view\nthat sovereignty over Sharm al-Shaykh belongs to UAR. USG\nhas also given no assurances that Israeli troops are to\nwithdraw from Gaza sector and that this Arab territory is\nto be restored to its pre-June 1967 borders with the previous\nsituation there re-established. Soviet Government raised\nthese questions in its December 23, 1969 document and USG\nhas still not replied.\n10. Replies on these points are important since Soviet\nGovernment is convinced that principal issue of settlement\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM\n4 68\nDS-322\nUNITED DEPARTMENT :-8 STATES OF OF AMERICA STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPage 57\nis withdrawal of troops and establishment of secure and\nrecognized boundaries. Without exact formulations on these\nquestions, there can be no possibility of moving on whole\nquestion of settlement.\n11. In addition to agreement on withdrawal of troops from\nall occupied territories and status of peace, it would be\nuseful to consider and agree on other unresolved provisions\nof UAR-Israeli settlement. Soviet Government proceeds from\nassumption that both our sides will strive to broaden area\nof agreement between them.\n12. Question of Jordan-Israel settlement being considered by\nFour Powers in New York, but problem of Syria remains\nuntouched in both Two and Four Power talks. Soviet Government\nnotes that USG has avoided taking position on this question,\nciting as reason Syrian rejection of SC Resolution 242. In\nSoviet view, position of Syrian Government does not reliejve\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM\nDS-322\n* no\nOF\nUNITED DEPARTMENT STATES OF STATE AMERICA\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassificati on\nDepartment of State\nIDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE 6\nus of task of working out concrete aspects of Syrian-\nIsraeli settlement. If just solution found, Soviet Government\nis convinced difficulties stemming from Syrian position\nwould disappear. Principal aspects of Soviet June 17, 1969\nplan relate to all countries directly involved in conflict.\nSoviet Government expects USG to express concrete views on\nquestions touching directly on problem of Syrian-Israeli\nsettlement.\n13. Soviet Government wishes to raise another matter which\nit does not consider unimportant. Soviet Government expects\nUSG to take measures to prevent leaks of information about\nconfidential US-Soviet discussions, which adversely affect\ncourse of our consultations. Examples have been publication\nof text of Kosygin letter and Estabrook report in Washington\nPost of February 19 Four Power meeting.\n14. Soviet Government wishes to stress that it assumes\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM\nDS-322\nÀ 00\nOF\nUNITED DEPARTMENT STATES OF AMERICAN STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassificati on\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE 7\n_________________________\nUSG will be guided by broad interests of international\nsecurity and of development of relations between our two\nstates. US and Soviet interests will be served by Middle\nEast not becoming arena of unwanted confrontation. Soviet\nGovernment believes this can be achieved and will continue\nits efforts in this direction in hope USG will do the same.\nEND TALKING POINTS.\nХОРЖАВХ\n15. Secretary responded that we XENDY would study both the\nsuggestion to resume bilateral discussions and the substantive\nSoviet proposals. He made clear that if we should agree to\nresume bilateral talks, there would have to be an understanding\nof what the resumption of those talks signifies. Our\nwillingness to resume talks could not be interpreted to mean\nan acceptance of the Soviet proposals or that we were willing\nto make concessions going beyond our present position as\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM DS-322\n4 68\nUNITED STATES OF OF HOMELAND STATE\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassificati on\nDepartment of State\nNDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\nPAGE 8\n_________________________\nreflected in the October 28 and December 18 documents.\nEND\nGP- 3\nROGERS\n_________________________\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nFORM DS-322\n4 58\nDD\nDepartme\n13\nAmembassy MOSCOW\n4 Pours\nTO:\nUSINT CAIRO\nCASK\nAmembassy TEL AVIV\nUSUN NEW YORK\nATE 050459\nCDIS NOFORN\nSisco-Dobryniň Meeting April 6\nFollowing is summary Sisco Dobrynin meeting April 6.\nDetailed report by septel.\n1.\nIn = meeting with Dobrynin April 6, Sisco suggested\nUSSR.\nthat the Soviets submit in writing any formulation, has\nn mind on peace and negot ations if it finds unsat fac\nie presen formulations\nt\ntwo key points in Oct.\ner\n)C\nbrynin was\n21\n0 doing so, but agreed\nput this reque to Moscow. At the same\nsering Dob in submitted a text, calling for total\nJusisco\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL\nAPPROVED BY:\nthakackhowse\n4/6/70\n20840\nNEA: Joseph J. Sisco\nALATherton, Jr.\nyou\nS/S: S Mr. Morton\n(subs )\nan (subs.\n'NC\nDEPARTMEN\nOF\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nORLINO\nDepartment of State\nSTATES\nto\nTELEGRAM\nSTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW\n2\nIsraeli withdrawal from the Sinai, Sharm el-Sheikh, Gaza,\nWest Bank\n/and Golan Heights. The slight difference between this\nroposal and the June 1969 Soviet position is that it calls\n(not precisely defined)\nfor a UN buffer/to be established by stages as Israeli\nforces withdraw. Sisco indicated that while we would study\nthe latest Soviet formulations, it is of critical importance\nthat US know precisely and in writing just what the Soviets\nvill accept insofar as commitments to peace and negotiations\nare concerned. Once this is made clear by the Soviets, the\nUS would be in a position to make specific substantive\ncomment on four critical issues being currently discussed:\nnegotiations, peace, withdrawal and boundaries. Dobrynin\nexpressed dissatisfaction with Sisco's unwillingness to\nalter the US substantive position on Sharm el-Sheikh and\nGaza and his insistence that the Soviets either accept\nlanguage on peace and negotiations in the Oct. 28 document\nor submit precisely an alternative for our consideration.\nOur assessment is that Moscow will take some time before\nDRAF BY\nDRAFTING DATE\ntel. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nSECRET/NODIS\nClassification\nSECRET NODI\nAMERICA\nDepartment of State\nOF\nTELEGR MA\nSTRIBUTION\nCTION\nAmembassy MOSCOW\n3\neacting.\nearlier\nAs for Dobrynin's /indications of a possible Soviet\nillingness to work with the parties to achieve a de facto\nceasefire, Sisco indicated the matter was under study.\nAs a follow up to Secretary's recent conversation with\nobrynin, Sisco pressed the Soviet Ambassador for Moscow's\nreaction to our expression of concern over the introduction\nof SAM-3's and in particular introduction of additional\n25\nSoviet personnel into the UAR. Dobrynin refused to make\nEIAED\nany commitment, saying only that SAM-3's were of a defensive\nnature. He gave no encouragement that anything further\nwould come from Moscow on this point.\nxasled\nGP-S.\nOGENS\nEND\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nSECRET/NODIS\nlassifi\nation\nSISCO - DOBRYNIN, II\nSUMMARY\nTAB A\nMay 6 - Sisco-Dobrynin Meeting\nSisco presented part of our proposed Arab-Israeli agreement. He\nexplained the following U.S. proposals:\n-- A settlement would be based on the UN resolution, the settlement\nwould be a package, a formal state of peace would exist, all\nclaims or states of belligerency would end including terrorist\nraids, and the parties would agree to abide by the UN charter\nin settling future disputes.\nDobrynin did not comment directly on any single item and said Moscow\nwould have to examine our entire document before giving a positive\nreply.\nDobrynin felt U.S. may have misunderstood Soviet position on borders.\nThey want withdrawal to pre-war lines, but have no objections if the\nparties want to change their borders.\nTAB B Mtr 8 MEETING\nTAB C MAY 12 M76\nTab D May 19utq.\nPRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n2\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 O?. NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN For 101 (revised 6-85)\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nFeb. 24, 1970\nTo General Haig\nCopies of the attached will not\nbe made available through the\nSecretariat.\nHAR I showed Hal\nПлиндив comments\non you mino smill\nW pupand id. 2\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nmilzat\nSECRET/NODIS\nACTION\nFebruary 24, 1970\nAK\nMEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nHelmut Sonnenfeldt\nSUBJECT: The President's Comment on your Memorandum of February 4\n(Log 7124) on the Kosygin Letter\nIn rereading the memorandum (which, you recall I originally sent to you\nand which you then forwarded to the President with slight modifications),\nI felt that the President's disagreement with one of the paragraphs might\nhave been based on a misunderstanding.\nI don't know whether you may have already discussed the issue with the\nPresident or whether you wish to pursue it further. It is actually quite\nan important one: the risks attendant on Moscow's undoubted progress\nin building their own role and further eroding ours in the Middle East.\nI have tried in the attached (Tab A) to clarify the thoughts in the paragraph\nat the bottom of page 2 of your memo of February 4.\nRECOMMENDATION\nThat if you wish to pursue this matter with the President, you sign the\nmemorandum at Tab A\nSECRET/NODIS\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET/NODIS\nINFORMATION\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nth\nSUBJECT: Soviet Position in the Middle East\nWhen I sent you a memorandum earlier this month commenting on\nKosygin's Middle East letter, you noted your disagreement with one\nof the paragraphs. You noted that far from suffering a defeat in 1967\nthe Soviets succeeded in further cementing their friendship with the\nArabs while we ended up as their enemy and that in the long run this serves\nSoviet interests.\nI am sorry that the point I was trying to make did not come through\nclearly. It was that at present the Arabs were suffering from Israeli\nmilitary action and that the Soviets by identifying us so closely with\nIsrael were making it appear as though we do better by our client than\nthey do by theirs. My conclusion was that since it was unlikely that a\ncease-fire would take place, the pressure on the Soviets to provide more\neffective aid to the Arabs would rise. I felt that Kosygin himself, by\nsending you the letter, had contributed to those pressures. This was why\nI described the letter as \"disturbing. 11 In other words, while the Soviets\nare undoubtedly advancing their long range objective of further alienating\nus from the Arabs, they are also committing more and more of their own\nprestige and at some point might find it necessary to do something dramatic\nto counteract Israeli military actions.\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\nINFORMATION\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT: Soviet Position in the Middle East\nWhen I sent you a memorandum earlier this month commenting on\nKosygin's Middle East letter, you noted your disagreement with one\nof the paragraphs. You noted that far from suffering a defeat in 1967\nthe Soviets succeeded in further cementing their friendship with the\nArabs while we ended up as their enemy and that in the long run this serves\nSoviet interests.\nI am sorry that the point I was trying to make did not come through\nclearly. It was that at present the Arabs were suffering from Israeli\nmilitary action and that the Soviets by identifying us so closely with\nIsrael were making it appear as though we do better by our client than\nthey do by theirs. My conclusion was that since it was unlikely that a\ncease-fire would take place, the pressure on the Soviets to provide more\neffective aid to the Arabs would rise. I felt that Kosygin himself, by\nsending you the letter, had contributed to those pressures. This was why\nI described the letter as \"disturbing.\" In other words, while the Soviets\nare undoubtedly advancing their long range objective of further alienating\nus from the Arabs, they are also committing more and more of their own\nprestige and at some point might find it necessary to do something dramatic\nto counteract Israeli military actions.\nHSonnenfeldt:mm:2/24/70\nSECRET/NODIS\nHIAUT PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 3\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 O?. NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN For 101 (revised 6-85)\nPRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 4 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 0?. NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN For 101 (revised 6-85)\nMEMORANDUM\nSECRET/NODIS\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nACTION 7054\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 3, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM: Henry A. Kissinger\nIK\nSUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin\nAttached are a draft reply to Kosygin's message and Secretary\nRogers' recommendation. The Secretary's memo makes essentially\nthe points made in my earlier memo to you but adds these:\n1.\nThe Kosygin message may have been designed to delay our\nresponse to Israel's arms requests, since Nasser has\nprobably asked the Soviets for more and the Soviets know\nthe UAR problem is lack of trained manpower and not lack\nof equipment.\n2.\nWhile it might be tempting to stand back and let pressure\non the UAR and USSR mount further, this carries an element\nof risk. Soviet prestige is involved, and they might see\nthemselves under increasing pressure to do something\nvisible to reverse the present trend. It is, on balance, in\nthe U.S. interest to restore the cease-fire.\nI agree and the draft reply is written with this in mind.\nThe Secretary urges an early response. I understand your view to\nbe that we should deliver our reply Wednesday, mainly not to reply\nin a time frame suggested by Dobrynin. I agree because the onus for\ndelay cannot be placed on us; our response says we have already\nbeen in touch with both sides about restoring the cease-fire. More-\nover, Nasser delivered a strongly anti-American speech Monday,\nand there is some advantage in ignoring him.\nRecommendation: That you approve the attached text and delivery\nto Dobrynin by Sisco Wednesday morning.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nSECRET/NODIS FEB 3 1970\nHistorical File\nSECRET/NODIS\n7054\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 2, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nSUBJECT: Soviet Message of January 31 on the Middle East\nAttached is a suggested reply to the Kosygin message of\nJanuary 31 on the Middle East. We will discuss our proposed\nreply, after your approval, with the UK, France and with the\nIsraelis, whose cooperation is essential in restoring cease\nfire conditions in the area. Your reply would then be\nhanded to Dobrynin.\nA prompt reply would have the advantage of informing\nKosygin of the current efforts we started on our own several\ndays ago to help bring about restoration of the UAR-Israeli\ncease fire. We agree with the argument that we should not\nappear to be excessively hurried and in fact we would not be\nready to respond before Tuesday.\nOn the other hand, undue delay in informing the Soviets\nof our efforts would play into their strategy to place the\nonus for the current situation on the United States and to\ngarner credit in the Arab world for applying pressure on the\nUnited States and Israel.\nThere are several observations regarding the Kosygin\nletter which are worth mentioning.\nFirst, its principal thrust seems to be to get us to get\nthe Israelis to lift the military pressure on Nasser. It\ncould possibly signal that Nasser may be about ready to give\nup for the time being his war of attrition tactics and he may\nbe looking for a way out. The Rabat Conference has helped\nfree Nasser's hands in this regard, since he can always say\nhis attempt to mobilize Arab resources fell far short of what\nSECRET/NODIS\nGROUP 3\nDowngraded at 12-year intervals;\nnot automatically declassified\nSECRET/NODIS\n2\nhe needs. He is also freer after Rabat to pursue a poli-\ntical solution if he so decides. This is why I feel it is\nso important to continue to stand firm on our two United\nStates peace proposals and to maintain our efforts to convince\nCairo and Moscow to adopt a positive stance toward them, as\nhas Hussein.\nSecond, the inability of Cairo to respond effectively\nto the Israeli deep penetration raids is no doubt embarrass-\ning to Moscow. We surmise, though we are not sure, that\nKosygin's letter stems from Nasser's reported trip to Moscow\nwhich must also have involved further UAR arms requests. As\na minimum, we are reasonably certain that Nasser encouraged\nMoscow to come forward with a concrete arms proposition to\nJordan. The reference in the message that the Soviets would\nbe \"forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at\ntheir disposal\" could signal that the Soviets have taken a\ndecision to give more arms to Nasser, though there is nothing\nto indicate any change in their policy of providing measured\namounts, or that they have decided provide more sophisticated\nweapons. It may also be intended to discourage us from pro-\nviding Israel with additional arms. Moreover, short of nuclear\nweapons, the Soviets know as we do, that more materiel to the\nUAR cannot have an immediate effect on the arms balance or\nresult in a sharp increase in UAR effectiveness, since the\nproblem is not hardware but Egyptian lack of training and over-\nall qualitative capacity. In short, the Soviets are in some-\nwhat of a squeeze at the moment, and it should not be precluded\nthat in time a more responsive reply to our two peace proposals\nwill come forth.\nThird, while it might be tempting to make only pro-forma\nefforts to achieve restoration of the cease fire and let\npressure mount on the Soviet Union and Nasser, this carries\nwith it elements of risk. Since Soviet prestige is involved,\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n3\nthey might see themselves under increasing pressure to do\nsomething visible and concrete to reverse the present trend.\nThe Israeli attacks have made their point psychologically\nand have achieved the military objective of reducing their\ncasualties on the Suez front. Much of the UAR military\ncapacity in the Suez area has been destroyed. If Nasser as\na quid pro quo is ready to abide by the UN cease fire\nresolutions and let up for the time being on his declared\nwar of attrition, it is in the Israeli and United States\ninterests to restore observance of the cease fire. More-\nover, as long as the deep penetration raids go on, it is\nunlikely that Nasser can take any positive moves toward a\npeace settlement. This is not to say that the converse is\ntrue; even if Israel relaxed its military pressure, there\nis no assurance Nasser would move toward a settlement.\nFourth, there are some important tactical considerations\non how to handle the Kosygin letter.\nThe letter has propagandistic overtones seeking to pin\nresponsibility exclusively on Israel and the United States.\nOur reply must be framed on the assumption we may find it\nnecessary and desirable to make it public if the Soviets play\ntheir message that way.\nThe Soviet letter is firm, one sided, and is confined\nexclusively to the Middle East; but it has an element of\nthreat to us in that it first implies we are in collusion\nwith Israel and then warns of giving the Arabs more means to\nrebuff the Israelis. Our response on this point in parti-\ncular should be firm.\nIt is important to note that Kosygin does not propose\nthat the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist\nRepublics bring joint influence to bear on both sides to\nrestore the cease fire; his focus is primarily on Israeli\nresponsibility for the situation, American collusion, and\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n4\nthe need for total Israeli withdrawal. For this reason, I\nsuggest that your reply inform Kosygin of the steps we have\ntaken and are taking through diplomatic channels to ensure\ncompliance with the UN cease fire resolutions. We believe\nthat joint action by the Four Powers is undesirable since\nit would offer more opportunity for the Soviets to exploit\nthis as responsive to their pressure. We therefore should\ntell the UK and France that we agree that the UN cease fire\nshould be restored, that our own efforts have been in train\nfor some time, and that each should do what he can through\ndiplomatic channels to help bring about a mutually respected\ncease fire.\nFinally, we believe your reply should place consider-\nable emphasis on the need for a positive reaction by the\nSoviets to the two United States peace proposals.\nWm\nWilliam P. Rogers\nAttachment\nSuggested reply to Soviet Premier Kosygin\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\nSuggested Reply\nDear Mr. Chairman:\nYour message of January 31 has been studied care-\nfully. For its part, the United States intends to\ncontinue its efforts to promote a stable peace between\nthe parties in accordance with the UN Security Council\nResolution of November 22, 1967 and to encourage the\nscrupulous adherence by all concerned, not just one\nside, to the cease fire resolutions of the United Nations.\nI can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is the steadfast\npolicy of the United States.\nWe do not accept the views expressed by the Soviet\nGovernment in explanation of the current situation in\nthe Middle East. We have been using our influence with\nboth sides urging strict observance of the cease fire.\nThus any implication that the United States has been a\nparty to or has encouraged violations of the cease fire\nis without foundation. 9 Moreover, your attempt to place\nSECRET/NODIS\nGROUP 3\nDowngraded at 12-year intervals;\nnot automatically declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n2\nresponsibility on one side is not supported by the facts;\nthere have been repeated violations of the UN cease fire\nresolutions by both sides. Full compliance with these\nresolutions on all fronts, including the prevention of\nfedayeen attacks against Israel, would help establish a\nmore favorable atmosphere for progress towards a settle-\nment.\nAs I have pointed out, the United States, just\nshortly before the receipt of your letter, discussed\nthis matter with both Israel and the UAR and urged both\nsides to adhere strictly to the UN cease fire resolutions.\nWe intend to continue these discussions in order to\nbring about early restoration of the cease fire between\nIsrael and the UAR. It will be recalled that in early\n1969 the UAR announced and initiated a policy of non-observance of\nthe cease fire. An early indication by the UAR that it\nwill abide by the UN cease fire resolutions if Israel\nwill do the same would contribute to a reduction of\ntension and violence and facilitate a political solution.\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n3\nWe are prepared to continue our efforts in that direction.\nWe are not aware of any recent Soviet efforts to this\nend.\nWe have noted the reference in your message to the\neffect that \"the Soviet Union will be forced to see to\nit that the Arab states have means at their disposal\n\"\nThe United States has always opposed steps which could\nhave the effect of drawing the major powers more deeply\ninto the Middle East conflict. This could only com-\nplicate matters further.\nFor this reason, the United States: (1) supports\nthe prompt restoration of the cease fire; and (2) favors\nan understanding on limitations of arms shipments into\nthe area. The question of arms limitations was raised\ndirectly with Mr. Gromyko in July of last year, our\nwillingness to discuss this important subject was reaf-\nfirmed in my speech before the General Assembly this\nlast fall and subsequently was again taken up with\nMr. Gromyko by Secretary Rogers, and our strong prefer-\nence for limitations was reiterated as recently as\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n4\nJanuary 25. Our proposals for discussion of this matter\nwere rejected by the Soviet Union.\nWhile preferring restraint, as I indicated on\nJanuary 25, the United States is watching carefully the\nin the Middle East\nrelative balance/there and we will not hesitate to\nprovide arms to friendly states as the need arises.\nOn the broader question of a peace settlement, the\nUnited States remains committed to help achieve a peace\nagreement between the parties as called for by the UN\nResolution of November, 1967. We have noted your\npoint to the effect that if the question of withdrawal\nwere resolved, there would be no serious obstacles to\nagreement on other questions. As you know, there can\nbe no withdrawal unless there is full agreement between\nthe parties on all of the elements of a peace settlement.\nIn this connection, the proposals of October 28 and\nDecember 18, 1969, meet the legitimate concerns of both\nsides on all key questions, including withdrawal. We\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n5\nbelieve these proposals constitute reasonable guide-\nlines which would provide Ambassador Jarring the means\nto start the indispensable process of negotiations\nbetween the parties under his auspices. It is a matter\nof regret that Soviet unresponsiveness to these pro-\nposals is holding up this process; a more constructive\nSoviet reply is required if progress towards a settle-\nment is to be made.\nWe note your desire to work with us in bringing\npeace to this area. We do not believe peace can come\nif either side seeks unilateral advantage. We are\nwilling to continue our efforts to achieve a stable\npeace in the Middle East in a spirit of good will.\nWe are providing copies of this communication to\nPrime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.\nSECRET/NODIS\nDispatched by Special Messenger on 2/4\nat 12:30 a.m. to be held in State Operations\nCenter for Delivery to Ted Eliot opening of\nbusiness 2/4/70 per General Haig.\nFlorence Gwyer 2/4/70\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET/NODIS\nFebruary 3, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nAl Haig\nSUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin Note on the Middle East\nAttached is a memorandum for your signature to the Secretary\nof State enclosing the original of the President's reply to\nthe Kosygin note on the Middle East, together with copies of\nthe letter to be furnished by the Department of State to the\nAmbassadors of France and Great Britain.\nI have coordinated this package with Hal Saunders who is also\nfurnishing you a separate memorandum containing guidance to\nJoe Sisco for handling the necessary press backgrounder on this\nsubject. I believe you will want to call Joe Sisco this evening\nand inform him of the action taken with respect to the reply and\nmention to him that Hal will be in touch with him to provide\nguidance on the background.\nAttachments\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\nFebruary 3, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nSUBJECT:\nResponse to Chairman Kosygin's Message\nof January 31, 1970\nAttached is the response to Chairman Kosygin's message of\nJanuary 31, 1970 on the Middle East.\nThe President has approved Assistant Secretary Sisco's delivering\nthis repponse, in person, to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin some\ntime Wednesday morning.\nAdditional copies of the President's reply are attached for delivery\nto the Ambassadors of France and Great Britain, following delivery\nof the original.\nHenry A. Kissinger\nAttachments\nSECRET/NODIS\nDispatched 2/4/70, Rept. #1039\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 4, 1970\nDear Mr. Chairman:\nYour message of January 31 has been studied carefully. For\nits part, the United States intends to continue its efforts to\npromote a stable peace between the parties in accordance with\nthe UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 and\nto encourage the scrupulous adherence by all concerned, not\njust one side, to the cease-fire resolutions of the United\nNations. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is the stead-\nfast policy of the United States.\nWe do not accept the views expressed by the Soviet Govern-\nment in explanation of the current situation in the Middle East.\nWe have been using our influence with both sides urging strict\nobservance of the cease-fire. Thus any implication that the\nUnited States has been a party to or has encouraged violations\nof the cease-fire is without foundation.\nMoreover, your attempt to place responsibility on one side\nis not supported by the facts; there have been repeated viola-\ntions of the UN cease-fire resolutions by both sides. Full\ncompliance with these resolutions on all fronts, including\nthe prevention of fedayeen attacks against Israel, would help\nestablish a more favorable atmosphere for progress towards\na settlement.\nAs I have pointed out, the United States, just shortly before\nthe receipt of your letter, discussed this matter with both\nIsrael and the UAR and urged both sides to adhere strictly\nto the UN cease-fire resolutions. We intend to continue these\ndiscussions in order to bring about early restoration of the\ncease-fire between Israel and the UAR. It will be recalled\nthat in early 1969 the UAR announced and initiated a policy\n-2-\nof non-observance of the cease-fire. An early indication by\nthe UAR that it will abide by the UN cease-fire resolutions if\nIsrael will do the same would contribute to a reduction of\ntension and violence and facilitate a political solution. We\nare prepared to continue our efforts in that direction. We\nare not aware of any recent Soviet efforts to this end.\nWe have noted the reference in your message to the effect\nthat \"the Soviet Union will be forced to see to it that the Arab\nstates have means at their disposal\n\"\nThe United States\nhas always opposed steps which could have the effect of\ndrawing the major powers more deeply into the Middle East\nconflict. This could only complicate matters further.\nFor this reason, the United States: (1) supports the prompt\nrestoration of the cease-fire; and (2) favors an understanding\non limitations of arms shipments into the area. The question\nof arms limitations was raised directly with Mr. Gromyko\nin July of last year, our willingness to discuss this important\nsubject was reaffirmed in my speech before the General\nAssembly this last fall and subsequently was again taken up\nwith Mr. Gromyko by Secretary Rogers, and our strong pre-\nference for limitations was reiterated as recently as\nJanuary 25. Our proposals for discussion of this matter\nwere rejected by the Soviet Union.\nWhile preferring restraint, as I indicated on January 25, the\nUnited States is watching carefully the relative balance in the\nMiddle East and we will not hesitate to provide arms to\nfriendly states as the need arises.\nOn the broader question of a peace settlement, the United\nStates remains committed to help achieve a peace agreement\nbetween the parties as called for by the UN Resolution of\nNovember, 1967. We have noted your point to the effect that\nif the question of withdrawal were resolved, there would be\nno serious obstacles to agreement on other questions. As\nyou know, there can be no withdrawal unless there is full\nagreement between the parties on all of the elements of a\n-3-\npeace settlement. In this connection, the proposals of\nOctober 28 and December 18, 1969, meet the legitimate con-\ncerns of both sides on all key questions, including withdrawal.\nWe believe these proposals constitute reasonable guidelines\nwhich would provide Ambassador Jarring the means to start\nthe indispensable process of negotiations between the parties\nunder his auspices. It is a matter of regret that Soviet un-\nresponsiveness to these proposals is holding up this process;\na more constructive Soviet reply is required if progress\ntowards a settlement is to be made.\nWe note your desire to work with us in bringing peace to this\narea. We do not believe peace can come if either side seeks\nunilateral advantage. We are willing to continue our efforts\nto achieve a stable peace in the Middle East in a spirit of\ngood will.\nWe are providing copies of this communication to Prime\nMinister Wilson and President Pompidou.\nSincerely,\nRichard nifer\nHis Excellency\nAleksey N. Kosygin\nChairman of the Council of Ministers\nof the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics\nMoscow, U.S.S. R.\nKissinger Lake\nEges Only\nSECRET/NODIS\n- 3 -\nThe strategy of our reply that I propose is:\n-- to come down very hard on the Soviet threat;\n-- to relate Israeli observance of the cease-fire to\ncorresponding observance by the other side, including\nirregular forces;\n-- to press the Soviets to spell out their views on what\nthe Arabs would commit themselves to if Israel withdrew.\nBecause this message is going to both Prime Minister Wilson and\nPresident Pompidou, I believe State must be brought in. I have\ntalked to Secretary Rogers and given him the memorandum at Tab B\nsuggesting the elements of a reply based on our conversation from\nNew York. I have also talked to Joe Sisco who agrees with this\ngeneral approach.\nI have also told Ambassador Freeman that we have a message and\nwill talk to him before replying. I will reach Ambassador Lucet\ntonight. These small gestures of consultation are worth the effort\nsince they will have the letter anyway. After we have a draft reply,\nwe should seriously consider telling the Israelis.\nWe will have a Idraft reply for your consideration on Monday. My\nrecommendation is that we should hold it, however, until at least\nWednesday and preferably Thursday.\nAttachments\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n- 3 -\nThe strategy of our reply that I propose is:\n-- to come down very hard on the Soviet threat;\n-- to relate Israeli observance of the cease-fire to\ncorresponding observance by the other side, including\nirregular forces;\n-- to press the Soviets to spell out their views on what\nthe Arabs would commit themselves to if Israel withdrew.\nBecause this message is going to both Prime Minister Wilson and\nPresident Pompidou, I believe State must be brought in. I have\ntalked to Secretary Rogers and given him the memorandum at Tab B\nsuggesting the elements of a reply based on our conversation from\nNew York. I have also talked to Joe Sisco who agrees with this\ngeneral approach.\nI have also told Ambassador Freeman that we have a message and\nwill talk to him before replying. I will reach Ambassador Lucet\ntonight. These small gestures of consultation are worth the effort\nsince they will have the letter anyway. After we have a draft reply,\nwe should seriously consider telling the Israelis.\nWe will have a Idraft reply for your consideration on Monday. My\nrecommendation is that we should hold it, however, until at least\nWednesday and preferably Thursday.\nAttachments\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\nFeb. 2, 1970\n7054\nMEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER\nnle.\nFROM:\nHarold H. Saunders\nSUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin\nPresident Nasser's speech was delivered\nthis afternoon. I have taken this into account\nin the covering memo to the President. Hal\nSonnenfeldt has no problems with the attached.\nSECRET/NODIS\nHHSaunders:tmt 2/2/70\nSECRET/NODIS\nACTION 7054\nFEB 3 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM: Henry A. Kissinger\nHK\nSUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin\nAttached are a draft reply to Kosygin's message and Secretary\nRogers' recommendation. The Secretary's memo makes essentially\nthe points made in my earlier memo to you but adds these:\n1.\nThe Kosygin message may have been designed to delay our\nresponse to Israel's arms requests, since Nasser has\nprobably asked the Soviets for more and the Soviets know\nthe UAR problem is lack of trained manpower and not lack\nof equipment.\n2.\nWhile it might be tempting to stand back and let pressure\non the UAR and USSR mount further, this carries an element\nof risk. Soviet prestige is involved, and they might see\nthemselves under increasing pressure to do something\nvisible to reverse the present trend. It is, on balance, in\nthe U.S. interest to restore the cease-fire.\nI agree and the draft reply is written with this in mind.\nThe Secretary urges an early response. I understand your view to\nbe that we should deliver our reply Wednesday, mainly not to reply\nin a time frame suggested by Dobrynin. I agree because the onus for\ndelay cannot be placed on us; our response says we have already\nbeen in touch with both sides about restering the cease-fire. More-\nover, Nasser delivered a strongly anti-American speech Monday,\nand there is some advantage in ignoring him.\nRecommendation: That you approve the attached text and delivery\nto Dobrynin by Sisco Wednesday morning.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nSECRET/NODIS\nHAK;DRY;jlp;2/2/70\nRetyped HHSaunders:rn:2/2/70 5 p.m.\nSECRET/NODIS\n7054\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 2, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nSUBJECT: Soviet Message of January 31 on the Middle East\nAttached is a suggested reply to the Kosygin message of\nJanuary 31 on the Middle East. We will discuss our proposed\nreply, after your approval, with the UK, France and with the\nIsraelis, whose cooperation is essential in restoring cease\nfire conditions in the area. Your reply would then be\nhanded to Dobrynin.\nA prompt reply would have the advantage of informing\nKosygin of the current efforts we started on our own several\ndays ago to help bring about restoration of the UAR-Israeli\ncease fire. We agree with the argument that we should not\nappear to be excessively hurried and in fact we would not be\nready to respond before Tuesday.\nOn the other hand, undue delay in informing the Soviets\nof our efforts would play into their strategy to place the\nonus for the current situation on the United States and to\ngarner credit in the Arab world for applying pressure on the\nUnited States and Israel.\nThere are several observations regarding the Kosygin\nletter which are worth mentioning.\nFirst, its principal thrust seems to be to get us to get\nthe Israelis to lift the military pressure on Nasser. It\ncould possibly signal that Nasser may be about ready to give\nup for the time being his war of attrition tactics and he may\nbe looking for a way out. The Rabat Conference has helped\nfree Nasser's hands in this regard, since he can always say\nhis attempt to mobilize Arab resources fell far short of what\nSECRET/NODIS\nGROUP 3\nDowngraded at 12-year intervals;\nnot automatically declassified\nSECRET/NODIS\n2\nhe needs. He is also freer after Rabat to pursue a poli-\ntical solution if he so decides. This is why I feel it is\nSO important to continue to stand firm on our two United\nStates peace proposals and to maintain our efforts to convince\nCairo and Moscow to adopt a positive stance toward them, as\nhas Hussein.\nSecond, the inability of Cairo to respond effectively\nto the Israeli deep penetration raids is no doubt embarrass-\ning to Moscow. We surmise, though we are not sure, that\nKosygin's letter stems from Nasser's reported trip to Moscow\nwhich must also have involved further UAR arms requests. As\na minimum, we are reasonably certain that Nasser encouraged\nMoscow to come forward with a concrete arms proposition to\nJordan. The reference in the message that the Soviets would\nbe \"forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at\ntheir disposal\" could signal that the Soviets have taken a\ndecision to give more arms to Nasser, though there is nothing\nto indicate any change in their policy of providing measured\namounts, or that they have decided provide more sophisticated\nweapons. It may also be intended to discourage us from pro-\nviding Israel with additional arms. Moreover, short of nuclear\nweapons, the Soviets know as we do, that more materiel to the\nUAR cannot have an immediate effect on the arms balance or\nresult in a sharp increase in UAR effectiveness, since the\nproblem is not hardware but Egyptian lack of training and over-\nall qualitative capacity. In short, the Soviets are in some-\nwhat of a squeeze at the moment, and it should not be precluded\nthat in time a more responsive reply to our two peace proposals\nwill come forth.\nThird, while it might be tempting to make only pro-forma\nefforts to achieve restoration of the cease fire and let\npressure mount on the Soviet Union and Nasser, this carries\nwith it elements of risk. Since Soviet prestige is involved,\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n3\nthey might see themselves under increasing pressure to do\nsomething visible and concrete to reverse the present trend.\nThe Israeli attacks have made their point psychologically\nand have achieved the military objective of reducing their\ncasualties on the Suez front. Much of the UAR military\ncapacity in the Suez area has been destroyed. If Nasser as\na quid pro quo is ready to abide by the UN cease fire\nresolutions and let up for the time being on his declared\nwar of attrition, it is in the Israeli and United States\ninterests to restore observance of the cease fire. More-\nover, as long as the deep penetration raids go on, it is\nunlikely that Nasser can take any positive moves toward a\npeace settlement. This is not to say that the converse is\ntrue; even if Israel relaxed its military pressure, there\nis no assurance Nasser would move toward a settlement.\nFourth, there are some important tactical considerations\non how to handle the Kosygin letter.\nThe letter has propagandistic overtones seeking to pin\nresponsibility exclusively on Israel and the United States.\nOur reply must be framed on the assumption we may find it\nnecessary and desirable to make it public if the Soviets play\ntheir message that way.\nThe Soviet letter is firm, one sided, and is confined\nexclusively to the Middle East; but it has an element of\nthreat to us in that it first implies we are in collusion\nwith Israel and then warns of giving the Arabs more means to\nrebuff the Israelis. Our response on this point in parti-\ncular should be firm.\nIt is important to note that Kosygin does not propose\nthat the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist\nRepublics bring joint influence to bear on both sides to\nrestore the cease fire; his focus is primarily on Israeli\nresponsibility for the situation, American collusion, and\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n4\nthe need for total Israeli withdrawal. For this reason, I\nsuggest that your reply inform Kosygin of the steps we have\ntaken and are taking through diplomatic channels to ensure\ncompliance with the UN cease fire resolutions. We believe\nthat joint action by the Four Powers is undesirable since\nit would offer more opportunity for the Soviets to exploit\nthis as responsive to their pressure. We therefore should\ntell the UK and France that we agree that the UN cease fire\nshould be restored, that our own efforts have been in train\nfor some time, and that each should do what he can through\ndiplomatic channels to help bring about a mutually respected\ncease fire.\nFinally, we believe your reply should place consider-\nable emphasis on the need for a positive reaction by the\nSoviets to the two United States peace proposals.\nWm\nWilliam P. Rogers\nAttachment\nSuggested reply to Soviet Premier Kosygin\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\nSuggested Reply\nDear Mr. Chairman:\nYour message of January 31 has been studied care-\nfully. For its part, the United States intends to\ncontinue its efforts to promote a stable peace between\nthe parties in accordance with the UN Security Council\nResolution of November 22, 1967 and to encourage the\nscrupulous adherence by all concerned, not just one\nside, to the cease fire resolutions of the United Nations.\nI can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is the steadfast\npolicy of the United States.\nWe do not accept the views expressed by the Soviet\nGovernment in explanation of the current situation in\nthe Middle East. We have been using our influence with\nboth sides urging strict observance of the cease fire.\nThus any implication that the United States has been a\nparty to or has encouraged violations of the cease fire\nis without foundation. Moreover, your attempt to place\nSECRET/NODIS\nGROUP 3\nDowngraded at 12-year intervals;\nnot automatically declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n2\nresponsibility on one side is not supported by the facts;\nthere have been repeated violations of the UN cease fire\nresolutions by both sides. Full compliance with these\nresolutions on all fronts, including the prevention of\nfedayeen attacks against Israel, would help establish a\nmore favorable atmosphere for progress towards a settle-\nment.\nAs I have pointed out, the United States, just\nshortly before the receipt of your letter, discussed\nthis matter with both Israel and the UAR and urged both\nsides to adhere strictly to the UN cease fire resolutions.\nWe intend to continue these discussions in order to\nbring about early restoration of the cease fire between\nIsrael and the UAR. It will be recalled that in early\nannounced and\n1969 the UAR initiated a policy of non-observance of\nthe cease fire. An early indication by the UAR that it\nwill abide by the UN cease fire resolutions if Israel\nwill do the same would contribute to a reduction of\ntension and violence and facilitate a political solution.\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n3\nWe are prepared to continue our efforts in that direction.\nWe are not aware of any recent Soviet efforts to this\nend.\nWe have noted the reference in your message to the\neffect that \"the Soviet Union will be forced to see to\nit that the Arab states have means at their disposal\n11\nThe United States has always opposed steps which could\nhave the effect of drawing the major powers more deeply\ninto the Middle East conflict. This could only com-\nplicate matters further.\nFor this reason, the United States: (1) supports\nthe prompt restoration of the cease fire; and (2) favors\nan understanding on limitations of arms shipments into\nthe area. The question of arms limitations was raised\ndirectly with Mr. Gromyko in July of last year, our\nwillingness to discuss this important subject was reaf-\nfirmed in my speech before the General Assembly this\nlast fall and subsequently was again taken up with\nMr. Gromyko by Secretary Rogers, and our strong prefer-\nence for limitations was reiterated as recently as\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n4\nJanuary 25. Our proposals for discussion of this matter\nwere rejected by the Soviet Union.\nWhile preferring restraint, as I indicated on\nJanuary 25, the United States is watching carefully the\nin the middle East\nrelative balance there and we will not hesitate to\nprovide arms to friendly states as the need arises.\nOn the broader question of a peace settlement, the\nUnited States remains committed to help achieve a peace\nagreement between the parties as called for by the UN\nResolution of November, 1967. We have noted your\npoint to the effect that if the question of withdrawal\nwere resolved, there would be no serious obstacles to\nagreement on other questions. As you know, there can\nbe no withdrawal unless there is full agreement between\nthe parties on all of the elements of a peace settlement.\nIn this connection, the proposals of October 28 and\nDecember 18, 1969, meet the legitimate concerns of both\nsides on all key questions, including withdrawal. We\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n5\nbelieve these proposals constitute reasonable guide-\nlines which would provide Ambassador Jarring the means\nto start the indispensable process of negotiations\nbetween the parties under his auspices. It is a matter\nof regret that Soviet unresponsiveness to these pro-\nposals is holding up this process; a more constructive\nSoviet reply is required if progress towards a settle-\nment is to be made.\nWe note your desire to work with us in bringing\npeace to this area. We do not believe peace can come\nif either side seeks unilateral advantage. We are\nwilling to continue our efforts to achieve a stable\npeace in the Middle East in a spirit of good will.\nWe are providing copies of this communication to\nPrime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.\nSECRET/NODIS\nUnofficial translation\nfrom Russian\nDear Mr. President,\nAccording to information now available the Israeli leaders,\nignoring the decisions of the Security Council have in fact\nresumed anew military actions against the Arab states, including\nbombings of population centers of the UAR in the immediate\nvicinity of Cairo. Not only military installations of the UAR\nand Jordan are being attacked but also civil population, destruc-\ntion is being brought to towns, villages, industrial and other\ninstallations. The aims of these adventurist actions are clear -\nto force the neighbouring Arab countries into accepting the\nare\ndemands which put forward by Israel. All this takes place at a time\nwhen the UAR and other Arab countries, honoring decisions of the\nSecurity Council, are not so far striking back at Israel.\nIn this instance as in determiningtheir position in Middle\nEastern affairs in general the Israeli leaders are evidently\nproceeding from the assumption that the US will go on supporting\nIsrael and that under these circumstances the four great powers\nwill fail to come to a common view on the implementation of the\ndecisions of the Security Council.\nThere is danger that in the immediate future the military\nactions may become widescale while the decisions of the Security\nCouncil and the UN General Assembly will be loosing weight in the\neyes of world public.\n2.\nWe are now studying the question to what extent the\nIsraeli counting on political and other support from outside\nhas ground and has been coordinated with the diplomatic actions\nby certain powers. We consider it our duty however to draw\nyour attention, Mr. President, to the highly risky consequences\nthe course chosen by the Israeli leaders may have both from\nthe point of view of the situation in the Middle East and inter-\nnational relations as a whole.\nWe proceed from the conviction that stable peace can and\nshould be established in the Middle East. The Soviet Union\nhas persistently strived for this and has influenced its\nfriends accordingly. If on the other hand the US Government\nsupported its pronouncements in favor of peace in the Middle\nEast by practical steps, and in the first place -- vis-a-vis\nthe Israeli leaders, then there would not have been such a\nsituation in which for two years and a half the occupier continues t\nhold the occupied lands, hundreds of thousands of Arabs are\nforced to abandon their homes and people continue to perish.\nAdherence by Israel to its present course may only\nwiden and deepen the conflict, perpetuate tension in one of the\nmost important areas of the world since it is impossible to\nforce the Arab countries to reconcile themselves to the\naggression, to the seizure of their territory.\n3.\nIt is in the interests of universal peace and internationa\nsecurity to warn the Government of Israel against adventurism,\nto undertake urgent and firm actions, which will help in\nstopping the growth of military tension and will make Israel\nlisten to the voice of reason. We believe that this would also\ncorrespond to the national interests of the United States.\nWe would like to tell you in all frankness that if Israel\ncontinues its adventurism, to bomb the territory of UAR and of\nother Arab states, the Soviet Union will be forced to see to\nit that the Arab states have means at their disposal, with the\nhelp of which a due rebuff to the arrogant agressor could\nbe made.\nThe situation in the Middle East urgently dictates the\nnecessity of immediate cessation by Israel of its dangerous\narmed attacks and sorties against the UAR and other Arab states.\nThe four powers are capable and must compell Israel to\nabandon its policy of military provocations and to see to it\nthat a lasting peace be established in the Middle East.\nWe believe that now it is necessary also to effectively\nuse the mechanism of bilateral and four-power consultations\nin order: 1) to ensure speediest withdrawal of Israeli\nforces from all the occupied Arab territories, 2) to ensure\nestablishment of peace in theMiddle East.\n4.\nWithdrawal of forces is the key question for establishing\npeace. If it is solved then there would hardly be any parti-\ncular difficulties on the way to agreement on other questions.\nWe would like you, Mr. President, to appraise the situation\nfrom the viewpoint of special responsibility for the maintenance\nof peace which lies on our countries. As for the Soviet\nGovernment, there is no lack of goodwill on our part as well\nas resolution to act in the interests of peace in the Middle\nEast.\nAppropriate communications have been sent by us to\nPrime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.\nSincerely,\nA.Kosygin\nORMA TOTAL\nSECRET/NODIS\nFebruary 1, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT:\nMessage from Kosygin\nThe key points in the message from Kosygin which Ambassador\nDobrynin gave me last night (Tab A) are:\n1. The Israelis have in effect resumed military action\nagainst the Arab states.\n2. The USSR is studying to what extent Israeli action\nhas been coordinated with [U.S.] diplomatic action.\n3. If Israel continues, this will widen the conflict with\nhighly risky consequences for the situation in the Mid-\nEast and international relations as a whole. If Israel\ncontinues, \"the USSR will be forced to see to it that the\nArab states have means at their disposal\" to rebuff\nIsrael.\n4. The Four Powers must compel Israel to stop and to\nsee that a lasting peace is established. Withdrawal of\nIsraeli forces is key; if this is solved, there would hardly\nbe any difficulty on other questions.\nMy thoughts about this message are as follows:\n1. The tone is relatively moderate, but nevertheless this\nis the first Soviet threat to your Administration, so the\ntone of your reply will be important. The Soviets avoid\ndirectly threatening action of their own. So far, it would\nseem that they are loath to make this a US-USSR con-\nfrontation.\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n- 2 -\n2. There is evidence that the combination of our firmness\nand the Israeli raids are hurting Nasser.\n-- There is a strong likelihood that Nasser made a\nsecret visit to Moscow January 22-27. That may\nbe the background for this note.\n-- Nasser told the Jordanian Foreign Minister that\nhe cannot accept our position\n(a) because the USSR won't let him, and\n(b) because he would appear to be capitulating if\nhe negotiated while the Israeli bombing continues.\n3. The Soviets seem to have become increasingly concerned\nabout a peace plan with a U.S. label on it.\n-- This document suggests action by the Four Powers,\nand Kosygin has sent it to Wilson and Pompidou.\n-- It implies that we can compel the Israelis to settle.\n4. The letter holds out the bait that if the cease-fire could\nbe restored and withdrawal achieved, other issues would fall\ninto place. It does not spell out a view on the other issues\nand therefore leaves the Soviet view vague. What is worse,\nthe position that Israel must withdraw before other issues\nare settled is a return to the Soviet position of 1967, which\nseems to negate much of the progress made in the US-USSR\ntalks last summer.\n5. The overall conclusion from the message and the\ncircumstances surrounding it is that they are not in the\nstronger position vis-a-vis us. Our policy of holding firm\ncreates the following dilemma for them: If they do not agree\nto our proposals, they get nothing, the onus for escalation\nfalls on them and their client will lose if the escalation leads\nto a major clash. If they do agree, they would have to\ndeliver their client on our terms.\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n- 3 -\nThe strategy of our reply that I propose is:\n-- to come down very hard on the Soviet threat;\n-- to relate Israeli observance of the cease-fire to\ncorresponding observance by the other side, including\nirregular forces;\n-- to press the Soviets to spell out their views on what\nthe Arabs would commit themselves to if Israel withdrew.\nBecause this message is going to both Prime Minister Wilson and\nPresident Pompidou, I believe State must be brought in. I have\ntalked to Secretary Rogers and given him the memorandum at Tab B\nreflecting your views on the elements of a reply. Assistant Secretary\nSisco is drafting an answer.\nI have also told Ambassador Freeman that we have a message and\nwill talk to him before replying. I will reach Ambassador Lucet\ntonight. These small gestures of consultation are worth the effort\nsince they will have the letter anyway. After we have a draft reply,\nwe should seriously consider telling the Israelis.\nWe will have a draft reply for your consideration on Monday. My\nrecommendation is that we should hold it, however, until at least\nWednesday and preferably Thursday.\nSECRET/NODIS\nJanuary 31, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nSUBJECT:\nSoviet Message on the Middle East\nThe President wishes the numbered points below to be used as\nguidelines in drafting a response to the Soviet message. He also\nwishes the response to take into account consultations with the\nBritish and French.\n1. We will use our influence to bring about restoration\nof the cease-fire provided that the Soviet Union will use its influence\nin the same direction, in particular as regards Fedayeen attacks.\n2. The situation could only be complicated if outside powers\nbecame involved directly or indirectly. At the same time, we have\nmade clear that if necessary we will take steps to correct any im-\nbalance in armaments in the region.\n3. We are prepared to continue working toward a peaceful\nsettlement. We have noted your statement that if the question of\nwithdrawal were resolved, agreement on other issues would fall\ninto place. We made detailed and fair proposals including with-\ndrawal on October 28. We believe that a response from you --\nespecially on the other elements -- in the same spirit could provide\na basis for the parties to begin negotiating.\n4. It is our assumption that an effective cease-fire,\nincluding irregular forces, would have to exist for negotiations to\nproceed in good faith. At the same time, the existence of such\nnegotiations will provide an incentive to maintain an effective\ncease-fire.\nThe attached communications and all other documents connected\nwith them should be given distribution exclusively on a need-to-\nknow basis.\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nFebruary 2, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nAttached is a copy of the letter I mentioned to you\non the phone this morning. It is, of course,\nfurnished strictly for your eyes only.\n/s/\nHenry A. Kissinger\nAttachment\nCy of incoming Kosygin note dated Jan 31, 1970\nHAK:AMH:ms:2/2/70\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nUnofficial translation\nfrom Russian\nDear Mr. President,\nAccording to information now available the Israeli leaders,\nignoring the decisions of the Security Council have in fact\nresumed anew military actions against the Arab states, including\nbombings of population centers of the UAR in the immediate\nvicinity of Cairo. Not only military installations of the UAR\nand Jordan are being attacked but also civil population, destruc-\ntion is being brought to towns, villages, industrial and other\ninstallations. The aims of these adventurist actions are clear -\nto force the neighbouring Arab countries into accepting the\nare\ndemands which put forward by Israel. All this takes place at a time\nwhen the UAR and other Arab countries, honoring decisions of the\nSecurity Council, are not so far striking back at Israel.\nIn this instance as in determiningtheir position in Middle\nEastern affairs in general the Israeli leaders are evidently\nproceeding from the assumption that the US will go on supporting\nIsrael and that under these circumstances the four great powers\nwill fail to come to a common view on the implementation of the\ndecisions of the Security Council.\nThere is danger that in the immediate future the military\nactions may become widescale while the decisions of the Security\nCouncil and the UN General Assembly will be loosing weight in the\neyes of world public.\n2.\nWe are now studying the question to what extent the\nIsraeli counting on political and other support from outside\nhas ground and has been coordinated with the diplomatic actions\nby certain powers. We consider it our duty however to draw\nyour attention, Mr. President, to the highly risky consequences\nthe course chosen by the Israeli leaders may have both from\nthe point of view of the situation in the Middle East and inter-\nnational relations as a whole.\nWe proceed from the conviction that stable peace can and\nshould be established in the Middle East. The Soviet Union\nhas persistently strived for this and has influenced its\nfriends accordingly. If on the other hand the US Government\nsupported its pronouncements in favor of peace in the Middle\nEast by practical steps, and in the first place - vis-a-vis\nthe Israeli leaders, then there would not have been such a\nsituation in which for two years and a half the occupier continues to\nhold the occupied lands, hundreds of thousands of Arabs are\nforced to abandon their homes and people continue to perish.\nAdherence by Israel to its present course may only\nwiden and deepen the conflict, perpetuate tension in one of the\nmost important areas of the world since it is impossible to\nforce the Arab countries to reconcile themselves to the\naggression, to the seizure of their territory.\n3.\nIt is in the interests of universal peace and international\nsecurity to warn the Government of Israel against adventurism,\nto undertake urgent and firm actions, which will help in\nstopping the growth of military tension and will make Israel\nlisten to the voice of reason. We believe that this would also\ncorrespond to the national interests of the United States.\nWe would like to tell you in all frankness that if Israel\ncontinues its adventurism, to bomb the territory of UAR and of\nother Arab states, the Soviet Union will be forced to see to\nit that the Arab states have means at their disposal, with the\nhelp of which a due rebuff to the arrogant agressor could\nbe made.\nThe situation in the Middle East urgently dictates the\nnecessity of immediate cessation by Israel of its dangerous\narmed attacks and sorties against the UAR and other Arab states.\nThe four powers are capable and must compell Israel to\nabandon its policy of military provocations and to see to it\nthat a lasting peace be established in the Middle East.\nWe believe that now it is necessary also to effectively\nuse the mechanism of bilateral and four-power consultations\nin order: 1) to ensure speediest withdrawal of Israeli\nforces from all the occupied Arab territories, 2) to ensure\nestablishment of peace in the Middle East.\n4.\nWithdrawal of forces is the key question for establishing\npeace. If it is solved then there would hardly be any parti-\ncular difficulties on the way to agreement on other questions.\nWe would like you, Mr. President, to appraise the situation\nfrom the viewpoint of special responsibility for the maintenance\nof peace which lies on our countries. As for the Soviet\nGovernment, there is no lack of goodwill on our part as well\nas resolution to act in the interests of peace in the Middle\nEast.\nAppropriate communications have been sent by us to\nPrime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.\nSincerely,\nA. Kosygin\nУважаемый Γ-H Президент,\nПо известным B настоящее время данным, израильское\nруководство, игнорируя решения CoBeTa Безопасности, фак-\nтически вновь начало военные действия против арабских\nгосударств, B TOM числе И бомбардировки населенных пунк-\nToB OAP, находящихся B непосредственной близости oT Ka-\nира. Удары наносятся He только по военным объектам OAP\nи Иордании, Ho и по мирному населению, подвергаются pa3-\nрушению города и населенные пункты, промышленные и дру-\nгие сооружения. Цели этих авантюристических действий яс-\nны - вынудить соседние арабские страны принять выдвига-\nемые Израилем требования. Bce это происходит B TO время,\nкогда OAP и другие арабские страны, выполняя решения Co-\nBeTa Безопасности, He предпринимают пока ответных ударов\nпо Израилю.\nB данном случае, KaK И вообще при определении своей\nпозиции B ближневосточных делах, израильские руководите-\nли, очевидно, исходят из ToΓo, что США будут и впредь\nподдерживать Израиль И что B этих условиях четыре вели-\nкие державы He сумеют прийти K единому мнению насчет ВЫ-\nполнения решений CoBeTa Безопасности.\nСуществует опасность, что военные действия B ближай-\nшее время MoΓyT приобрести широкие масштабы, a решения Co-\nBeTa Безопасности И Генеральной Ассамблеи OOH B глазах\nмировой общественности будут терять авторитет.\nМы изучаем сейчас вопрос 0 ToM, B какой Mepe расче-\nты Израиля Ha политическую и иную поддержку извне оправ-\nданы и скоординированы C дипломатическими акциями HeKo-\nторых держав. Однако мы считаем своим долгом привлечь\nВаше внимание K B высшей степени рискованным последствиям,\nкоторые может иметь Kypc действий, избранный израильским\nруководством, KaK C точки зрения положения Ha Ближнем Boc-\n2.\nToKe, TaK и международных отношений B целом.\nМы исходим из ToΓo, что Ha Ближнем BocToKe может И\nдолжен быть установлен прочный мир. Советский Союз неиз-\nMeHHo стремится K этому и cooTBeTcTBeHHo влияет Ha своих\nдрузей. Если бы, C другой стороны, правительство США свои\nзаявления B пользу мира Ha Ближнем BocToKe подкрепило\nпрактическими шагами, и B первую очередь перед израиль-\nскими руководителями, TO He было бы TaKoΓo положения, что\nдва C половиной года захватчик удерживает оккупированные\nземли, сотни тысяч арабов вынуждены покинуть свои дома и\nпродолжают погибать люди.\nПродолжение Израилем eΓo нынешнего Kypca способно\nлишь расширить и углубить конфликт, увековечить напряжен-\nность B одном из важнейших районов мира, TaK KaK невозмож-\nHo заставить арабские страны смириться c агрессией, C 3a-\nxBaToM их территорий.\nB интересах всеобщего мира и международной безопас-\nности - предостеречь правительство Израиля oT авантюриз-\nMa, предпринять безотлагательные и твердые действия, Ko-\nторые помогут пресечь нарастание военной напряженности и\nпобудят Израиль прислушаться K голосу pa3yMa. Мы думаем,\nчто это отвечало бы и национальным интересам Соединенных\nШтатов.\nМы хотим co всей откровенностью сказать BaM, что ec-\nли Израиль будет продолжать свой авантюризм, бомбить Tep-\nриторию OAP и других арабских государств, TO Советский\nСоюз вынужден будет позаботиться o ToM, чтобы арабские\nгосударства располагали средствами, при помощи которых\nможно было бы дать достойный отпор зарвавшемуся aΓpeccopy.\nОбстановка Ha Ближнем BocToKe срочно диктует необхо-\nдимость ToΓo, чтобы Израиль немедленно прекратил свои\nопасные вооруженные нападения И вылазки против OAP и дру-\nгих арабских государств.\n3.\nЧетыре державы B состоянии И обязаны заставить Израиль\nотказаться OT проведения политики вооруженных провокаций\nи сделать TaK, чтобы Ha Ближнем BocToKe был установлен\nпрочный мир.\nМы полагаем, что сейчас необходимо также эффективно\nиспользовать механизм двух- И четырехсторонних консультаций,\nчтобы: I/ добиться скорейшего вывода израильских войск\nCO Bcex оккупированных арабских территорий, 2/ добиться\nустановления мира Ha Ближнем BocToKe.\nВывод войск - ключевой вопрос для установления мира.\nЕсли OH будет разрешен, TO вряд ЛИ встретятся особые труд-\nности Ha пути K договоренности по другим вопросам.\nМы хотели бы, Γ-H Президент, чтобы Вы оценили поло-\nжение под углом зрения особой ответственности 3a поддержание\nмира, лежащей Ha наших cTpaHax. Что касается CoBeTcKoΓo\nправительства, TO y HeΓo HeT недостатка B доброй воле и\nрешимости действовать B интересах мира Ha Ближнем BocToKe.\nСоответствующие обращения направлены нами премьер-\nминистру Вильсону и президенту Помпиду.\nC уважением\nА.Косыгин\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary nile 2, 1970\nSECRET/NODIS\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin\nAttached are a draft reply to Kosygin's message and Secretary\nRogers' recommendation. The Secretary's memo makes essentially\nthe points made in my earlier memo to you but adds these:\n1. The Kosygin message may have been designed to delay our\nresponse to Israel's arms requests, since Nasser has probably\nasked the Soviets for more and the Soviets know the UAR problem is\nlack of trained manpower and not lack of equipment.\n2. While it might be tempting to stand back and let pressure on\nthe UAR and USSR mount further, this carries an element of risk.\nSoviet prestige is involved, and they might see themselves under in-\ncreasing pressure to do something visible to reverse the present trend.\nIt is, on balance, in the U.S. interest to restore the cease fire.\nI agree and the draft reply does so.\nThe Secretary urges an early response, perhaps Tuesday. His\narguments are:\n1. An early reply would inform Kosygin of the efforts we launched\nseveral days ago to urge Israel and the UAR to restore the cease fire.\n2. Undue delay in replying would play into Soviet strategy of\nplacing onus for the current situation on the U.S. and of garnering\ncredit in the Arab world for applying pressure on the U.S. and Israel.\nI believe the original idea of a Thursday reply would be prefer-\nable. The parties involved already know what we are doing. A hurried\nreply makes it look as if we feel vulnerable.\nThere is one immediate operational problem. The Four Powers\nwill meet today (Monday), and we will have to instruct Ambassador\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n- 2 -\nYost to stand off any Soviet effort to turn this into a Four Power\nexercise. The fact is that we have already (last Thursday to\nSaturday) urged Israel and the UAR to return to observance of the\ncease fire. What we want now is comparable action by the USSR.\nRECOMMENDATIONS:\n1. That, as soon as you have approved the attached text, Sisco\ninform the British, French and Israelis.\nApprove\nDisapprove\n2. That, when you have received a report on their responses,\nyou authorize delivery of our response by Sisco to Dobrynin Thursday.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nSECRET/NODIS\nNot yet seen by\nsecretary Ragers.\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nSUBJECT: Soviet Message of January 31 on the Middle East\nAttached is a suggested reply to the Kosygin message of\nJanuary 31 on the Middle East. We will discuss our proposed\nreply, after your approval, with the UK, France and with the\nIsraelis, whose cooperation is essential in restoring cease\nfire conditions in the area. Your reply would then be\nhanded to Dobrynin.\nA prompt reply would have the advantage of informing\nKosygin of the current efforts we started on our own several\ndays ago to help bring about restoration of the UAR-Israeli\ncease fire. We agree with the argument that we should not\nappear to be excessively hurried and in fact we would not be\nready to respond before Tuesday.\nOn the other hand, undue delay in informing the Soviets\nof our efforts would play into their strategy to place the\nonus for the current situation on the United States and to\ngarner credit in the Arab world for applying pressure on the\nUnited States and Israel.\nThere are several observations regarding the Kosygin\nletter which are worth mentioning.\nFirst, its principal thrust seems to be to get us to get\nthe Israelis to lift the military pressure on Nasser. It\ncould possibly signal that Nasser may be about ready to give\nup for the time being his war of attrition tactics and he may\nbe looking for a way out. The Rabat Conference has helped\nfree Nasser's hands in this regard, since he can always say\nhis attempt to mobilize Arab resources fell far short of what\nSECRET/NODIS\nGROUP 3\nDowngraded at 12-year intervals;\nnot automatically declassified\nSECRET/NODIS\n2\nhe needs. He is also freer after Rabat to pursue a poli-\ntical solution if he so decides. This is why I feel it is\nso important to continue to stand firm on our two United\nStates peace proposals and to maintain our efforts to convince\nCairo and Moscow to adopt a positive stance toward them, as\nhas Hussein.\nSecond, the inability of Cairo to respond effectively\nto the Israeli deep penetration raids is no doubt embarrass-\ning to Moscow. We surmise, though we are not sure, that\nKosygin's letter stems from Nasser's reported trip to Moscow\nwhich must also have involved further UAR arms requests. As\na minimum, we are reasonably certain that Nasser encouraged\nMoscow to come forward with a concrete arms proposition to\nJordan. The reference in the message that the Soviets would\nbe \"forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at\ntheir disposal\" could signal that the Soviets have taken a\ndecision to give more arms to Nasser, though there is nothing\nto indicate any change in their policy of providing measured\namounts, or that they have decided provide more sophisticated\nweapons. It may also be intended to discourage us from pro-\nviding Israel with additional arms. Moreover, short of nuclear\nweapons, the Soviets know as we do, that more materiel to the\nUAR cannot have an immediate effect on the arms balance or\nresult in a sharp increase in UAR effectiveness, since the\nproblem is not hardware but Egyptian lack of training and over-\nall qualitative capacity. In short, the Soviets are in some-\nwhat of a squeeze at the moment, and it should not be precluded\nthat in time a more responsive reply to our two peace proposals\nwill come forth.\nThird, while it might be tempting to make only pro-forma\nefforts to achieve restoration of the cease fire and let\npressure mount on the Soviet Union and Nasser, this carries\nwith it elements of risk. Since Soviet prestige is involved,\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n3\nthey might see themselves under increasing pressure to do\nsomething visible and concrete to reverse the present trend.\nThe Israeli attacks have made their point psychologically\nand have achieved the military objective of reducing their\ncasualties on the Suez front. Much of the UAR military\ncapacity in the Suez area has been destroyed. If Nasser as\na quid pro quo is ready to abide by the UN cease fire\nresolutions and let up for the time being on his declared\nwar of attrition, it is in the Israeli and United States\ninterests to restore observance of the cease fire. More-\nover, as long as the deep penetration raids go on, it is\nunlikely that Nasser can take any positive moves toward a\npeace settlement. This is not to say that the converse is\ntrue; even if Israel relaxed its military pressure, there\nis no assurance Nasser would move toward a settlement.\nFourth, there are some important tactical considerations\non how to handle the Kosygin letter.\nThe letter has propagandistic overtones seeking to pin\nresponsibility exclusively on Israel and the United States.\nOur reply must be framed on the assumption we may find it\nnecessary and desirable to make it public if the Soviets play\ntheir message that way.\nThe Soviet letter is firm, one sided, and is confined\nexclusively to the Middle East; but it has an element of\nthreat to us in that it first implies we are in collusion\nwith Israel and then warns of giving the Arabs more means to\nrebuff the Israelis. Our response on this point in parti-\ncular should be firm.\nIt is important to note that Kosygin does not propose\nthat the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist\nRepublics bring joint influence to bear on both sides to\nrestore the cease fire; his focus is primarily on Israeli\nresponsibility for the situation, American collusion, and\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n4\nthe need for total Israeli withdrawal. For this reason, I\nsuggest that your reply inform Kosygin of the steps we have\ntaken and are taking through diplomatic channels to ensure\ncompliance with the UN cease fire resolutions. We believe\nthat joint action by the Four Powers is undesirable since\nit would offer more opportunity for the Soviets to exploit\nthis as responsive to their pressure. We therefore should\ntell the UK and France that we agree that the UN cease fire\nshould be restored, that our own efforts have been in train\nfor some time, and that each should do what he can through\ndiplomatic channels to help bring about a mutually respected\ncease fire.\nFinally, we believe your reply should place consider-\nable emphasis on the need for a positive reaction by the\nSoviets to the two United States peace proposals.\nWilliam P. Rogers\nAttachment\nSuggested reply to Soviet Premier Kosygin\nSECRET/NODIS\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nACTION\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET/NODIS\nFebruary 2, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin\nAttached are a draft reply to Kosygin's message and Secretary\nRogers' recommendation. The Secretary's memo makes essen-\ntially the points made in my earlier memo to you but adds these:\n1. The Kosygin message may have been designed to delay our\nresponse to Israel's arms requests, since Nasser has probably\nasked the Soviets for more and the Soviets know the UAR problem\nis lack of trained manpower and not lack of equipment.\n2. While it might be tempting to stand back and let pressure on\nthe UAR and USSR mount further, this carries an element of risk.\nSoviet prestige is involved, and they might see themselves under\nincreasing pressure to do something visible to reverse the present\ntrend. It is, on balance, in the U.S. interest to restore the cease\nfire. 2 agere +th eliaft reply does n.\nThe Secretary urges an early response, perhaps Tuesday. His\narguments are:\n1. An early reply would inform Kosygin of the efforts we launched\nseveral days ago to urge Israel and the UAR to restore the cease fire.\n2. Undue delay in replying would play into Soviet strategy of\nplacing onus for the current situation on the U.S. and of garnering\ncredit in the Arab world for applying pressure on the U.S. and\nIsrael.\nI believe the original idea of a Thursday reply would be prefer-\nable. The parties involved already know what we are doing. A\nhurried reply makes it look as if we feel vulnerable.\nThere is one immediate operational problem. The Four Powers\nwill meet today (Monday), and we will have to instruct Ambassador\nSECRET/NODIS\nRETURN THIS RECEIPT IMMEDIATELY TO\nREGISTRY NO.\nHenry A. Kissinger\nHAK-10\nUNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION\nDATE\n(Serial No., File No., Subject)\n1/31/70\nSecret/Nodis/Sensitive Memo,\nINCLOSURES\nSMOTME\n2 -- 2 cys ea.\nADDRESSEE\nThe Honorable William P. Rogers\nThe Secretary of State\nWashington, D. C.\nReceipt for communication(s) described above is hereby acknowledged by:\nADDRESSEE'S SIGNATURE\nDATE RECEIVED\nTO BE RETURNED TO THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE\nCLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT\n16-70499b-1 GPO\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET/NODIS\nFebruary 3, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nHelmut Sonnenfeldt\nSUBJECT: Guidance to Ziegler on Kosygin Middle East Message\nI note in General Haig's memorandum on this subject that Ziegler is\nto say that it would be erroneous to categorize the message in terms of\ncontaining a threat.\nThe fact is that\n1. the note does contain a threat;\n2. you said it did in your memo to the President and Secretary Rogers\nsaid so in his;\n3. you told Ambassador Freeman -- and I subsequently told Lucet - -\nthat it was moderately threatening;\"\n4. any one who reads the note, when it becomes fully public will see\nthat it contains a threat;\n5. our proposed response, at least in the version that I saw and on the\nbasis of which Sisco is consulting the allies, contains a passage that warns\nagainst major powers getting drawn in more deeply and of our intention to\nmaintain the balance; i.e., it responds to a threat and when our reply\nbecomes known it will be so interpreted.\nIt seems to me that we should either conform our public posture to our private\none or refuse to give any characterization whatsoever, even one that rejects\nsomeone else's.\nWhatever one may think of the purposes and nature of the Soviet move --\nand I am increasingly impressed with its stupidity and shortsightedness\n(see my forthcoming memo on this) -- the Soviets knew very well that they\nwere making a threat. And Dobrynin tried to accentuate it by trying to hustle\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n-2-\nyou into an immediate answer. It will do us no good in our relations with\nthe present Soviet leaders to turn the other cheek to what is plainly a\nthreat -- which is what we are doing by explicitly denying that it is one.\nConsequently, I strongly urge you to change the guidance to Ziegler\nso that the answer to the \"threat\" question is identical to the one immediately\nfollowing, on whether the letter contained a \"warning, \" that is, make no\ncomment on contents, and say we are studying the note and will reply in\ndue course.\nSECRET? NODIS\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET/NODIS\nFebruary 3, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nHelmut Sonnenfeldt\nas\nSUBJECT: Guidance to Ziegler on Kosygin Middle East Message\nI note in General Haig's memorandum on this subject that Ziegler is\nto say that it would be erroneous to categorize the message in terms of\ncontaining a threat.\nThe fact is that\n1. the note does contain a threat;\n2. you said it did in your memo to the President and Secretary Rogers\nsaid so in his;\n3. you told Ambassador Freeman -- and I subsequently told Lucet - -\nthat it was moderately threatening;\"\n4. any one who reads the note, when it becomes fully public will see\nthat it contains a threat;\n5. our proposed response, at least in the version that I saw and on the\nbasis of which Sisco is consulting the allies, contains a passage that warns\nagainst major powers getting drawn in more deeply and of our intention to\nmaintain the balance; i.e., it responds to a threat and when our reply\nbecomes known it will be so interpreted.\nIt seems to me that we should either conform our public posture to our private\none or refuse to give any characterization whatsoever, even one that rejects\nsomeone else's.\nWhatever one may think of the purposes and nature of the Soviet move --\nand I am increasingly impressed with its stupidity and shortsightedness\n(see my forthcoming memo on this) - - the Soviets knew very well that they\nwere making a threat. And Dobrynin tried to accentuate it by trying to hustle\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n-2-\nyou into an immediate answer. It will do us no good in our relations with\nthe present Soviet leaders to turn the other cheek to what is plainly a\nthreat -- which is what we are doing by explicitly denying that it is one.\nConsequently, I strongly urge you to change the guidance to Ziegler\nso that the answer to the \"threat\" question is identical to the one immediately\nfollowing, on whether the letter contained a \"warning, \" that is, make no\ncomment on contents, and say we are studying the note and will reply in\ndue course.\nSECRET? NODIS\nFebruary 4, 1970\nDear Mr. Chairman:\nYour message of January 31 has been studied carefully. For\nits part, the United States intends to continue its efforts to\npromote a stable peace between the parties in accordance with\nthe UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 and\nto encourage the scrupulous adherence by all concerned, not\njust one side, to the cease-fire resolutions of the United\nNations. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is the stead-\nfast policy of the United States.\nWe do not accept the views expressed by the Soviet Govern-\nment in explanation of the current situation in the Middle East.\nWe have been using our influence with both sides urging strict\nobservance of the cease-fire. Thus any implication that the\nUnited States has been a party to or has encouraged violations\nof the cease-fire is without foundation.\nMoreover, your attempt to place responsibility on one side -\nis not supported by the facts; there have been repeated viola-\ntions of the UN cease-fire resolutions by both sides. Full\ncompliance with these resolutions on all fronts, including\nthe prevention of fedayeen attacks against Israel, would help\nestablish a more favorable atmosphere for progress towards\na settlement.\nAs I have pointed out, the United States, just shortly before\nthe receipt of your letter, discussed this matter with both\nIsrael and the UAR and urged both sides to adhere strictly\nto the UN cease-fire resolutions. We intend to continue these\ndiscussions in order to bring about early restoration of the\ncease-fire between Israel and the UAR. It will be recalled\nthat in early 1969 the UAR announced and initiated a policy\n-2-\nof non-observance of the cease-fire. An early indication by\nthe UAR that it will abide by the UN cease-fire resolutions if\nIsrael will do the same would contribute to a reduction of\ntension and violence and facilitate a political solution. We\nare prepared to continue our efforts in that direction. We\nare not aware of any recent Soviet efforts to this end.\nWe have noted the reference in your message to the effect\nthat \"the Soviet Union will be forced to see to it that the Arab\nstates have means at their disposal ...\". The United States\nhas always opposed steps which could have the effect of\ndrawing the major powers more deeply into the Middle East\nconflict. This could only complicate matters further.\nFor this reason, the United States: (1) supports the prompt\nrestoration of the cease-fire; and (2) favors an understanding\non limitations of arms shipments into the area. The question\nof arms limitations was raised directly with Mr. Gromyko\nin July of last year, our willingness to discuss this important\nsubject was reaffirmed in my speech before the General\nAssembly this last fall and subsequently was again taken up\nwith Mr. Gromyko by Secretary Rogers, and our strong pre-\nference for limitations was reiterated as recently as\nJanuary 25. Our proposals for discussion of this matter\nwere rejected by the Soviet Union.\nWhile preferring restraint, as I indicated on January 25, the\nUnited States is watching carefully the relative balance in the\nMiddle East and we will not hesitate to provide arms to\nfriendly states as the need arises.\nOn the broader question of a peace settlement, the United\nStates remains committed to help achieve a peace agreement\nbetween the parties as called for by the UN Resolution of\nNovember, 1967. We have noted your point to the effect that\nif the question of withdrawal were resolved, there would be\nno serious obstacles to agreement on other questions. As\nyou know, there can be no withdrawal unless there is full\nagreement between the parties on all of the elements of a\n-3-\npeace settlement. In this connection, the proposals of\nOctober 28 and December 18, 1969, meet the legitimate con-\ncerns of both sides on all key questions, including withdrawal.\nWe believe these proposals constitute reasonable guidelines\nwhich would provide Ambassador Jarring the means to start\nthe indispensable process of negotiations between the parties\nunder his auspices. It is a matter of regret that Soviet un-\nresponsiveness to these proposals is holding up this process;\na more constructive Soviet reply is required if progress\ntowards a settlement is to be made.\nWe note your desire to work with us in bringing peace to this\narea. We do not believe peace can come if either side seeks\nunilateral advantage. We are willing to continue our efforts\nto achieve a stable peace in the Middle East in a spirit of\ngood will.\nWe are providing copies of this communication to Prime\nMinister Wilson and President Pompidou.\nSincerely,\nHis Excellency\nAleksey N. Kosygin\nChairman of the Council of Ministers\nof the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics\nMoscow, U.S.S.R.\nRN:HAK:mlh:2-4-70\nSENT STATE:\nLDY'd\nWHITE HOUSE\nSITUATION ROOM\n'70 FEB 4 AM II: 38\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET\nFebruary 4, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nSUBJECT:\nU.S. -Soviet Exchange on the Middle East\nThe President has asked that U.S. officials refrain from\ncommenting on the recent exchange of notes between himself\nand Chairman Kosygin on the Middle East situation.\nI would be grateful if you would disseminate the President's\ndesires on this matter to the appropriate members of your\nstaff and have already taken steps here to insure that my staff\nis fully cognizant of the President's wishes.\nHenry A Kissinger\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nFebruary 4, 1970\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nSUBJECT:\nReply to Note from Chairman Kosygin\non the Middle East\nAttached is a copy of our reply to the Kosygin note, the text\nof which I furnished to you via this channel on Monday.\nHenrynA. Kissinger\nAttachment\nXeroxed copy of Ltr to Chairman Kosygin\nsigned by President Nixon 4 Feb 70\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nINFORMATION\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT:\nFurther Background on the Kosygin Letter\nIn an earlier memorandum I speculated on the inept position adopted\nby the Soviets in the Kosygin letter. At the time I thought that perhaps\nthe Soviet reaction reflected internal strains and frustrations in the\nwake of an exasperating visit with Nasser. The full text of the inter-\ncepted conversation between Brezhnev and Defense Minister Grechko\nseems to confirm this.\nBrezhnev was obviously bitter about the Israeli raids, and especially\nthe accuracy of the strike on the house of the Soviet advisers, which\nhe implied was deliberate. His concern, however, was mainly on how\nto keep the incident quiet and out of the public eye. The conversation\nalso indicates that top Soviet military leaders had been meeting on the\nMiddle East and that Brezhnev had a personal hand in the drafting of\nthe letter to you. Thus, the raid of January 28 may have triggered a\nSoviet decision to send the letters to you, Pompidou and Wilson to\njustify a new shipment of Soviet arms.\nBrezhnev refers to sending \"a system\" after first sending \"means of\ndefense. \" The conversation sheds no further light on what kind of\nweapons might be involved. One interpretation could be that the new\nsystem will be offensive weapons (more advanced aircraft or even\ntactical missiles) but that new radars or surface-to-air missiles will\nhave to be installed first. It could be that both systems are defensive,\nhowever. We will watch this closely and prepare a more extensive\nreview of the possibilities in the next few days.\nAs I noted, the ill-timed demand for a cease-fire played into our hands\nquite nicely, in view of our efforts in Jerusalem and Cairo. This may\nbe explained by the fact that Brezhnev expected the letters to go forward\non that same day (January 29), when in fact they were not delivered\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n- 2 -\nuntil January 31, that is, after we had initiated our soundings on a\ncease-fire. The desire of the top leaders to fire off an immediate\ndemarche may also explain the little thought given to whether a call\nfor a cease-fire would put Nasser in an untenable position either to\nagree under pressure or turn down Israeli agreement to mutual\ncessation.\nIn short, the Soviets seem to be responding emotionally to the killing\nof Soviet advisers and out of frustration over their inability to do much\nabout the entire state of affairs. This, of course, could have some\nominous implications for future moves, since as I noted in my earlier\nmemorandum, the Middle East was a source of internal tensions within\nthe Soviet leadership at the time of the June war. Brezhnev may be\nworried that his own position is vulnerable to charges of softness, and\nthe letter could have been for the record to protect himself against any\nnew Kremlin debate over Middle East policy. On the other hand, a\nfailure of his initiative may make him even more vulnerable. In this\nconnection, Brezhnev referred to the \"nervous strain\" of his job, and\nsome trouble with his throat. This is the second time in the last two\nmonths that we have noted Brezhnev having health problems.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nINFORMATION\n7108\nSECRET/NODIS\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nK\nSUBJECT:\nReflections on the Middle East\nIn view of our current efforts to restore the cease-fire, Kosygin's\nmessage and the active discussion between Hussein and Nasser of our\ndocuments in Cairo this weekend, you might be interested in a few\nreflections on the forces at work.\nIt is an oversimplification, but the two following propositions do help\nsharpen thinking on the present situation:\n1. the Israelis hold the key to war;\n2. Nasser holds the key to negotiations.\nThe Likelihood of War\nIt is mainly the Israelis who will determine whether or not there will\nbe another full-scale military clash. While the Arabs could provoke\nIsrael, they cannot now sustain a coherent military operation. The\nIsraelis control the air and have the power and ability to intensify and\nsustain a conflict to any degree they choose within obvious limits.\nThe Israelis have tried to walk the fine line between escalating their\nattacks on the UAR enough to put pressure on Nasser but not enough to\nhave the major powers call them for renewing the war. By bombing\nmilitary targets around Cairo, they have gone just a little too far and\nhave provoked independent responses from both the US and the USSR.\nThe question now is whether they will be satisfied that they have made\ntheir point by sending Nasser running to Moscow or whether they will\nfeel compelled--lured by the taste of success- to follow through and\nsee if they can accomplish what two previous wars have not achieved--\ntoppling Nasser.\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n- 2 -\nThey say their official policy is willingness to return to the cease-fire\nprovided Nasser indicates his willingness. Since Nasser publicly disavowed\nthe cease-fire, some Israeli diplomats have said he would have to reaffirm\nhis adherence to it publicly. This at least leaves open the question whether\nwhat they really want is not to bring Nasser to restore the cease-fire or to\nnegotiate--but to bring him down.\nThe Israelis may recognize that by bringing the USSR into direct communi-\ncation with the US they have gone too far for the moment. They may reduce\nthe intensity of their raids, though they are unlikely to stop unilaterally lest\nthat be read as bowing to Soviet pressure. However, the possibility cannot\nbe rules out that the Israelis may still seek the right time to strike one very\nsharp blow to try to bring Nasser down.\nThe Limits on Nasser\nWe know less about Nasser's state of mind, but it holds the answer to\nfollowing question: Can the combination of our firmness and Israeli\npressure produce a negotiation from the present situation, or should we\nbe content with renewed observance of the cease-fire to await a further\nchange of Egyptian and Soviet thinking?\nThe present situation and recent reports give us a closer look at Nasser's\nmind than we have had for some time. Jordanian Foreign Minister Rifai\nhas recently returned from talks with Nasser and Foreign Minister Riad,\nand we have full reports from those conversations. Eugene Black has also\nseen Nasser. And now we have Kosygin's message giving indirect evidence\nof the concern Nasser must have communicated to the Soviets.\nNasser's main objective is not to get the Sinai back but to stay in power.\nHis dilemma is that there has been enough dissatisfaction with his leader-\nship over the past five years that, even if he makes peace he may be eased\naside. Until now he seems to have judged that he was better off in a no-peace,\nno-war situation. Now that option is being narrowed as the war moves to\nthe outskirts of Cairo.\nThe following seem to represent the main elements in Nasser's thinking\nas they emerge from recent reports:\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n- 3 -\n1. He is deeply concerned over the recent series of Israeli air\nattacks around Cairo and feels under considerable pressure to do\nsomething about them.\n- He has apparently been concerned enough to turn to Moscow.\n- He has tried to give the impression of not appearing concerned\nthat he will be toppled. But the Jordanian Foreign Minister did\nreport that the raids had created confusion among Nasser's\nadvisers, that his enemies were using the raids against him and\nthat Nasser himself had said he had to retaliate or he would be\n\"dragged from office. 11\n- He may be less concerned about what has happened to date\nthan about what could happen. If there were large numbers of\ncivilian casualties, he says he would be forced into retaliatory\naction (unspecified).\n2. He knows he does not have the option of a real military response.\nAt the Rabat summit he was open in acknowledging that he\ndoes not have the capability to inflict more than pinprick retaliations.\nTherefore, his first objective must be to try to call off the\nIsraeli attacks (i. e. restore the cease-fire).\n- If he feels he cannot pay the price of a public statement that\nthe UAR will observe the cease-fire, he will face the choice between\ncontinued attacks at some level and trying to achieve an overall\nsettlement.\n3. Nasser still seems to be hoping for a political settlement, but\nhe seems to see this more as something the US and USSR do for\nhim than as the result of compromises he himself makes.\n- He has been very careful not to close the door on our proposals.\nHe must know we alone can press Israel.\n- He has encouraged the Jordanians to see what they could get\nout of us.\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n- 4 -\n- He may even desire to talk directly with us, but feel constrained\nto avoid this because of the short rein the Soviets may have on him.\nThis being the case, he has put the Soviets on the spot where they\nfeel they must press us.\n- But so far he seems to prefer the choice of going down in an\n\"honorable\" battle with the Israelis to that of negotiating with them\non their or our terms. This would be a repudiation of his own\npolicy of almost twenty years.\n4.\nIn the long run, he has no interest in cutting himself or the Arabs\noff from the U.S. - but only because he needs us.\n- - At the Rabat summit, he opposed a resolution requiring all\nArabs to break with the U.S.\n- - He has apparently urged the Libyans to look to Paris and not\nMoscow for arms.\n- - He has often told American visitors that he wants a U.S.\npresence to balance the Soviet presence in Egypt.\n- At the same time, he is deeply suspicious of the U.S. He may\nwell feel that, in a crisis, he can depend only on the USSR. He\nsays the Soviets are sensitive about his talking with us. He may\nsuspect that our proposals are really aimed at driving a wedge\nbetween him and Soviets.\nConclusion\nThese reflections point up the shortcomings of Egyptian and Soviet policy.\nThe Israelis have demonstrated Nasser's impotence, and he has put\nhimself in a political position where it is difficult for him even to return\nto observance of the cease-fire without appearing to bow to Israeli\npressure, let alone negotiate. Now that he has turned to Moscow to lean\non us to press Israel to stop the bombing, he is about to demonstrate\nSoviet inability to get him out of his box.\nAt the same time, the Israelis have demonstrated what a fine line\nit is they are walking. They have made their political (and military)\npoints - that Nasser is incapable of defending Egypt and that Moscow\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n- 5 -\n(so far) seems unable to bail him out. But their attacks have now struck\nso close to raw Soviet nerves that Moscow has felt it necessary to\napproach us at the highest level and at least apparently to think (though\napparently rejecting for now) about intervention in some form to help\nNasser.\nThe advantage to us is that the Arabs will come to realize that it is the\nUS and not the USSR that holds the key to what they want. The problems,\nof course, are (1) that we cannot move Israel unless Nasser himself\nmakes the difficult decision to compromise and (2) that the harder Israel\npresses, the greater becomes the danger of direct Soviet involvement.\nThere are two schools of thought on how we should deal with the situation:\nOne is that we should conciliate the Arab radicals insofar as\npossible. This would mean not supplying more arms to Israel now,\ndiluting somewhat our position and squeezing Israel to accept.\nThe problem with this is that, even in the unlikely event that we\nsucceeded, the situation may be enough out of control that Nasser\n(and Hussein) may fall and there will be no one left to make peace.\nThe other is to let Israel keep the pressure on, with the assumption\nthat the only way to peace is for Nasser and the Soviets to come to\nterms with the reality of Israeli power. The two question marks in\nthis approach are (1) whether Nasser could survive politically if he\ncould ever bring himself to negotiate peace and (2) whether, if he\njudges that he cannot, the Soviets can stand aside in the face of\ncontinuing Israeli pressure.\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\nINFORMATION\nFEB 4 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nHK\nSUBJECT: Further Thoughts on Kosygin Middle East Message:\nAn Inept Performance\nThe more I reflect on the Kosygin letter, the more inept, and for that\nreason, disturbing a performance I find it.\nRegardless of whether it was intended as a serious diplomatic move\nor as a pressure play -- and the simultaneous and ostentatious trans-\nmittal of the letter by Soviet Ambassadors suggests that it was intended\nto become public -- the purpose of the operation presumably was to get\nthe Israelis to desist. In addition, the Soviets no doubt would have wanted\nto keep the three Western powers off balance and arguing with each other\nand to maintain the gulf that has been opening between us and the Israelis.\nBeyond this, they must be anxious to keep their reputation as an effective\nprotecting power of the Arabs alive.\nIt is doubtful whether any of these purposes will in fact be accomplished,\nat least with any degree of permanence; meanwhile certain other effects\nof the letters would appear to be distinctly to Soviet disadvantage.\nIt should not have taken much intelligence to expect at least the US (if not\nFrance and the UK) to reply that it favors restoration of the cease-fire\non a reciprocal basis. Moreover, the Soviets must have known by\nJanuary 31 that we were already busy diplomatically in both Cairo and\nJerusalem to this end; and that the Israelis have already said that they\nwill abide by a reciprocally observed cease-fire.\nThus the upshot of the Soviet move will be to place the onus for getting\nthe cease-fire restored on Nasser and the Arabs, and through them on\nthe Soviets themselves, rather than on us and the Israelis. But this pro-\nduces a situation for which Nasser can hardly be grateful: if he gives any\nkind of positive response, he will be seen as doing so under pressure of\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n-2-\nIsraeli military action. In addition, it would also point up Nasser's,\nand Soviet, impotence since they seem unwilling or unable to control\nthe Fedayeen whose activities will presumably wreck any cease-fire\nafter a period of time.\nIf the cease-fire is not restored, as seems likely in view of Soviet inability\nto deliver their clients, the Soviets are stuck with their threat to provide\nmeans for a rebuff. But merely sending more equipment, even if it is\nmore advanced, is unlikely to accomplish anything, at least if the past\nis any guide. So the onus of escalation is on the Soviets and the Kosygin\nletter has added to its weight.\nIf one of the letter's purposes was to keep the Western powers at odds\nwith each other, or at least not to drive them more closely together, its\ntone and content will tend to have the opposite effect. True, there will\nbe continuing differences about the utility of the four-power forum, and\nto that extent the Soviets did not calculate incorrectly. But the threat\nelement has also produced a quickening of Western consultation and efforts\nto attune the responses.\nAnother effect, which cannot be in Moscow's interest, is to dissipate what\nhad threatened to become a US-French confrontation on arms shipments.\nThe new, explicit Soviet threat to increase arms deliveries has now,\ninevitably, drawn a response from us which explicitly ties the arms issue\nback into the US-Soviet context (even though the French angle remains as\nwell).\nSome have argued that whatever else the Soviets were attempting to do,\ntheir main political purpose was to re-emphasize US identification with\nIsrael by (1) implying actual US-Israeli collusion, and (2) drawing from\nthe US a new statement of support for and defense of Israel which will\noffset the impression of the last few weeks that we were drifting apart.\nEven if it is granted that when the exchange is complete we will again\nlook to be somewhat more firmly on Israel's side, the ultimate effect of\nthis may well not be in Moscow's interest: if Nasser is prepared to\npromise reciprocal observance of the cease-fire he will, as noted above,\nbe doing so in response to Israeli military pressure for which we will\nalso get some of the credit; if the fighting goes on despite the Soviet\nthreats, we will be credited with having faced down the Soviets. Moreover,\nif there turns out to be some Soviet or Arab flexibility with respect to our\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET/NODIS\n-3-\nOctober proposals, we will get the credit both for having made those\nproposals and for having induced Soviet/Arab flexibility by standing\nfirm in the face of Soviet threats. While the ensuing situation would\ninvolve us in problems with the Israelis, the net effect would be to make\nus appear as the most influential outside power in the region.\nBut if for some or all the above reasons the Soviet move in inept, it is\nalso disturbing. Since it is unlikely to produce a cease-fire, except\nunder conditions little short of humiliating for Nasser, the pressure on\nthe Soviets to make good on their threat will rise. This basic danger is\nnot a new one; but the Soviets have engaged more of their prestige and\nthus stand to lose more of it if the Israeli attacks continue, and if our\nanswer is widely interpreted as a rejection of their threats. The Middle\nEastern problem has frequently lurked beneath the surface of Soviet\nleadership politics and in 1967 was used by a rebellious faction in an\nindictment against the present leaders. This could happen again under\npresent internal conditions in Moscow and lead the leaders to do some-\nthing brave to recoup.\nHSonnenfeldt:mm:2/4/70\nSECRET/NODIS\nUnder instructions from Moscow I would like in\nconfidence to express some considerations in connection\nwith the aggravation of the military situation in the Middle\nEast.\nGuided by special responsibility of our countries\nfor the maintenance of peace A.N. Kosygin has already\ndrawn the attention of President Nixon to the dangerous\nescalation by Israel of military actions against the UAR\nand other Arab countries and called upon the US Government to\nuse its influence so that Israel stop its armed attacks,\ndangerous for the cause of peace. The head of the Soviet\nGovernment stated at the same time that on its part the\nSoviet Union would show good will and determination to act\nin the interests of peace in the Middle East.\nIt has been noted in Moscow that the American side,\npersistently putting forward the proposal on the cessation\nof fire on both sides, gives as its reasons the need to\ncreate a favorable situation for the search of political\nsettlement. At the same time the United States ignores the\nfact that Israel not only occupied by means of aggression\nsubstantial Arab territories for the liberation of which the\nArab peoples are now fighting but continues barbaric air\nraids against areas deep in the UAR and other Arab countries.\nWe would like to draw the attention of the American side to\nthe need for a realistic approach towards this question with due\nregard to the political situation in the Arab countries caused by\n2.\nthe people's indignation at the Israeli aggression. In order to have\nthe escalation of military operations in the Middle East\ndiscontinued it is necessary first of all that Israel take\npractical steps in this direction. We have reason to count that\nif the Israelis stop their bombings of the UAR, the UAR on its\npart will display restraint in its actions, without, of course,\nany official statements to that effect.\nI would like to ask you, Mr. Kissinger, to bring the\ncontext of this conversation to the attention of President\nNixon. I would like to receive a reply to this communication.\nRETURN THIS RECEIPT IMMEDIATELY TO\nREGISTRY NO.\nHenry A. Kissinger\nHAK- 10\nUNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION\nDATE\n(Serial No., File No., Subject)\n1/31/70\nSecret/Nodis/Sensitive Memo,\nINCLOSURES\nSMOTME\n2 -- 2 cys ea.\nADDRESSEE\nThe Honorable William P. Rogers\nThe Secretary of State\nWashington, D. C.\nNOTE.-This sheet to be retained in Originator's suspense file until receipt has been\nsigned and returned; then this sheet should be destroyed.\nTITLE\nCLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT\n16-70499a-1 GPO"
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