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CYPRUS Vol. II July 1, 1974-
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
5
telegram
Nicosia to Secstate
8/3/74
B
7
telegram
Nicosia to Secsiate DECLASSIFIED 7/21/17
Hr
7/31/74
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-39/10882
19
telegram
Secstate to Nicosia
nL/EI/L
in
26
telegram
Nicosia to Secstate
7/25/74
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NIN 08-39/10884
30
telegram
SANITIZED
per
RAC peview
9/5/2008
Nicosia to Secstate
7/19/74
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC
592
FOLDER TITLE
21
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential and returned non-historical material.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
Ln
telegram
Nicosia to Secstate
8/3/74
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NIN 08-39/10881
DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 2/21/14
7
telegram
Nicosia to Secstate
7/31/74
B
101
telegram
Secstate TO Nicosia
7/13/74
w
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NIN 08-39/10883
26
DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 2/21/2014
telegram
Nicosia to Secstate
7/25/74
B
30
telegram
Nicosia 10 Secstate
7/19/74
CY
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NIN 08-39/10885
DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 2/21/2014
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC
592
FOLDER TITLE
C
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS, ADMINIST Reproduced at the Richard Nixon GPO: Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
national SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
INFORMATION
July 15, 1974 6 a.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
ROSEMARY NIEHUSS
in
SUBJECT:
Cyprus Coup by Greek-Officered National
Guard and Death of Makarios
According to late reports from embassy Nicosia:
The Greek-officered National Guard on Cyprus has taken
over the government and Archbishop Makarios is reported
dead.
--All reports coming from the National Guard forces have
stressed that this affair is purely internal to Cyprus and
within the Greek community and have urged calm. Among
the reports of sporadic firing associated with the coup are
none which yet allege any serious incidents involving Turk
Cypriots.
--A "Government of National Salavation'has been announced, based
on the following:
-The new government has been created'to restore
spiritual unity of Greek Cypriots, restore harmony
in the Church of Cyprus and prevent Armed Forces
from falling into the hands of 'anarchy and criminal
elements', ". Those responsible for the latter have
been removed.
--The new government will continue the intercommunal
talks.
--The foreign policy of Cyprus will remain unchanged,
in particular non-aligned aspects.
Thus far, the reaction of the Turk Cypriot community has been
a plea for calm by its leader Denktash and a call for UN intervention.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET 2
This situation is the "dynamic" solution to Athens concern about Makar-
ious that junta leader Ioannides, according to reliable intelligence, has
been speculating on in recent weeks. Makarios' efforts to remove the
Greek-officered National Guard, Athens main instrument of influence
on the island, provoked this turn of events.
The intelligence community is closely monitoring for reports of Turkish
and Soviet political and military reactions. As of this writing, neither
Ankara nor Athens has made any official statement about the coup.
There are two possibilities on the Turkish side: (a) If any fighting
associated with the coup begins to spill over into the Turk Cypriot
community and seriously threaten it, Turkey may move to fulfill its
promise of immediate military assistance and all the implications that
such a move would have for a broader Turkish-Greek confrontation.
(b) If the Turk Cypriot community remains relatively unaffected and its
needs met by the new government, Ankara may well acquiesce in these
developments. In that regard, it is worth noting that the coup leaders
have said all the right things about the coup -- that it is internal to
Cyprus, that the new government promises a continuation of the inter-
communal talks (and not enosis which would draw Turkey in) and that
foreign policy will remain unchanged.
The Soviets will be attentive to these developments. They have been
a staunch supporter of Makarios -- under whom a strong local communist
party has developed in the last decade -- and, according to reliable reports,
have been concerned about tensions brewing between Athens and Nicosia
and the prospect that Athens might move against Makarios. They do not
want Cyprus NATOized.
We will discuss our options at a WSAG meeting this morning.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
SECRET
July 16, 1974
1:00 p.m. Wash Time
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
The Cyprus Situation -- Today's
WSAG Meeting
The main new element in the Cyprus situation is that Makarios is alive,
thus further complicating the picture of yesterday's coup. A WSAG
meeting was held this morning to assess that situation and review our
overall strategy.
Information was conflicting on Makarios' intentions. USUN reported
that Makarios had touched base with the local UN representative on
Cyprus and sought formal UN support for his government; Waldheim
would call a UNSC meeting this afternoon to deal with the request.
The UK meanwhile indicated that they would respond positively to a
request they had from Makarios to evacuate him to some spot outside
Cyprus. We are seeking clarification. Late press reports that Makar-
ios has now been flown out of Cyprus. His intentions and the strength
of his ability to mount a meaningful opposition to current events are
relevent to determining a US response.
There are continued reports of some fighting in pockets on Cyprus,
though not seriously affecting the Turk Cypriot community -- a key
element to how events might unfold -- as yet. The Turks are taking
a strong public line on their treaty rights, with some reports they may
seek joint UK-Turk action to "counteract the threat to Cyprus¹¹ as guarantor
powers. The Greeks have been non-communicative. The Soviets are
attacking "outside" interference in Cyprus affairs and we are monitoring
Soviet fleet movements in the Mediterranean and keeping our own ships
in a holding pattern. Soviet reaction has been assessed as restrained
thus far.
There is general agreement that the Cyprus situation is still not clear,
and particularly Makarios' fate and any ability he might have to affect
the balance of forces on the island away from the coup leaders. Thus,
this morning's meeting focused on a US holding action while events sort
themselves out.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET 2
Specifically, it was agreed that
We need a much clearer picture of the situation on the ground
in Cyprus and the intelligence community has been tasked with
developing a better assessment, especially on the strength of
the hold the new government/military has and the prospects for
opposition by Makarios supporters, taking into account that the
Archbishop is alive.
- We need a precise reading of Turkish intentions in the current
situation and we need to urge restraint. McComber will be instruct-
ed to see Prime Minister Ecevit expeditiously.
- We need a firm reading of Greek intentions and a direct approach
to Ioannides for unambiguous assurances on a sovereign Cyprus (the
Turks see the newly installed Cypriot president as ''hidden enosis. '')
Tasca will be asked to make a direct approach to Iaonnides and not
through his political cabinet.
Until the situation clarifies, we need a holding operation at any
UNSC meeting that is convened. We will hue to our public line of
watching the situation and pressing our assumption on the sovereignty
and integrity of Cyprus. We will stick to our line that the issue of
recognition does not arise, not be positive about who we might
recognize and leave that open.
- We will do nothing with our fleet for the moment.
The main efforts today and overnight will be with Ankara and
Athens. Tomorrow we will consider the internal situation on
Cyprus and how to deal with our options of support, including
Makarios.
Our overall strategy will continue to reflect efforts to avoid any inter-
nationalization of the current Cyprus situation. We do not want to pro-
vide a context for the legitimization of Soviet intervention.
A WSAG meeting will be held tomorrow morning to review the situation
and the US response.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 29, 1974
SECRET
Mr. Ed Roberts
from
Hal Saunders
Attached is returned for your files.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
ument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been detern
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
July 17, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
Hal
SUBJECT:
Where Are We Going on Cyprus?
A central objective of the Sisco mission to London is to persuade the
Turks to hold off military intervention. At some point very soon, we
will have to tell the Turks what they can expect to happen on Cyprus if
they don't intervene. Thus, as part of our effort to keep the Cyprus
problem from becoming internationalized, we must give more detailed
thought -- as you began to do at the WSAG Wednesday -- to what can
be done to achieve an internal solution on Cyprus.
Also, with Makarios at the UN Thursday afternoon pressing for a
Security Council Resolution by Friday, we have to be prepared to take
a position on his legitimacy and the question of supporting his restora-
tion as President.
There are three subjects to be dealt with:
1.
What is the proper diplomatic framework within which we should
operate?
2.
What outcome should we aim for on Cyprus?
3. On the basis of answers to the above, what public position should
we take at the UN?
Diplomatic Framework
Although we will have to deal withthe Cyprus issue at the UN and may have
to discuss it bilaterally with the Greeks, Turks, and Soviets, the
appropriate diplomatic framework is that established by the London-
Zurich Accords -- the obligation of London, Athens, and Ankara to
consult as Guarantor Powers and their right to intervene when the
Accords are violated.
Using this framework gives us the opportunity of making our views
known directly as a NATO ally, working closely with the British, and
not involving the Soviets intimately.
Sisco's mission to London puts us in this context, but we will also
want to keep in mind that future actions can be given legitimacy by
staying within this framework.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2-
What this means is that we may want to concentrate on reaching a British-
Greek-Turkish understanding on a settlement of this crisis that will
justify a Turkish decision not to intervene, avoid civil war on Cyprus,
and prevent the Soviets from exploiting the situation.
If Mr. Sisco is not instructed to consult on these lines now, you may want
to consider asking him to sound out the Bri tish and Turks on what kind
of solution they would be willing to support and on how to persuade Greece
to cooperate. If his mission does not have this dimension, it seems to
me we will be missing the main opportunity it offers.
What Outcome on Cyprus?
The first issue is how to deal with Makarios himself. These are the
the considerations:
- --He has legitimacy as the deposed legally elected President
of Cyprus.
- He is anathema to the present Greek government, which has
just acquiesced in a move to oust and kill him.
- He has not been a favorite of the Turkish government, but
in present circumstances they would prefer his return to power
to continuation of the Sampson regime.
- .-Makarios will win wide international support at the UN,
including strong Soviet backing.
- --If Makarios is returned to power, he may be more dependent on
left-wing support.
In short, we should examine carefully the working assumption prevailing
today that Makarios can be written off. The one obstacle to his return
to power is the strong combined opposition of Ioannides and Sampson
and their supporters. This has to be taken into account in working
out a settlement, but it has no legitimacy.
The first questions to be taken up with the British and the Turks are:
- -whether they are committed to returning Makarios to power;
- -if so, how they propose to persuade Greece to agree;
- -if not, how they propose to provide a public rationale for
shifting to another candidate.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-3-
The second question to be discussed is what the alternatives are if the
Greeks adamantly oppose Makarios' return. Generally, thereaare two:
1. Try to negotiate a compromise solution. The logical constitutional
choice is Clerides as President. A variation of that has been suggested
in the past that -- although this would produce a murky and possibly
unstable situation -- Clerides could be President and Makarios
as Archbishop could be spiritual leader.
This would have to emerge from negotiations with Greece within
the framework of the London-Zurich Accords. There would also
have to be a commitment to renewed effort to conclude an inter-
communal agreement.
2. If the Greeks refuse to cooperate in removing the Sampson regime,
increased pressure on Greece would be necessary to produce a negotiated
solution. There are two possibilities:
a. Theoretically, there is the possibility which some will propose
that the US should force Greece into negotiation. That seems
unlikely to succeed and would make the US the scapegoat for
failure in any form.
b. The other possibility is tacit US-UK acquiescence in Turkish
military intervention. The image most people have of such
a move is a large-scale Turkish landing on Cyprus. As I
understand it, the main Turkish plan is to airdrop about 3,000
paratroopers to consolidate Turkish control of the Kyrenia-
Nicosia-Famagusta hold the 50, 000 Greek Cypriots elsewhere
on the island.
From Turkish intervention could come two results: (1)
partition of Cyprus ("double enosis") or (2) a negotiated
intercommunal solution other than partition to be followed
at some point by withdrawal of the Turkish forces.
In short, we need to:
--decide whether to go along with or oppose an effort to return
Makarios to power and
--discuss possible approaches with the British and Turks while
Sisco is in London.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-4-
A US Position at the UN
According to reports from London, Makarios will seek a Security Council
resolution which declares him to be the legitimate elected head of the
Cyprus government, calls on Greece to withdraw its officers from the
National Guard, and calls on Greece to withhold recognition of Sampson
and his regime. Or at a minimum, he might seek UN action that
implied that what happened on Cyprus was illegitimate and reflected
external intervention. Our mission in New York comments that it
knows of no Security Council member which would vote against such
a regime.
Our objectives in New York presumably are to:
--keep our options open on Makarios,
--maintain flexibility for the Guarantor Powers to work for a resolution,
--avoid a condemnation which would shut us off from the Greeks.
To achieve these objectives, we might consider taking the position that:
--it is inappropriate for the UN to certify who is the legitimate
elected head of any state;
--it is appropriate for the UN to call for measures to be taken that
will avoid a threat to the peace and perhaps call attention to the
importance of legitimate political processes in contributing
to civil peace;
--it might be appropriate for the UN to call on the Guarantor Powers
to consult on restoring peace (and constitutional government) on the
island.
I do not have before me the past record of UN actions in relation to the
Guarantor Powers, the London-Zurich Accords, or the Cypriot Constitution.
Therefore, the above position may be off base, but I present it as a general
proposition.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
иот
OF
STATE
THE
MOITASIROHTUA
7
2ECKFIVB
*
Department of State
OF STATE NAME AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 9617
PAGE 01 NICOSI 02171 051817Z
46
ACTION SS=30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
102159
P R 0517207 AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9370
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
USCINCEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
SECRE T NICOSIA 2171
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR MARR CY
SUBJECT: RUMORED PROPOSALS FOR NATO/SIXTH FLEET NAVAL FACILITY
IN CYPRUS
REF: STATE 151570
1. FOR THE RECORD, PROPOSAL REFTEL SOUNDS TOTALLY FAR-
FETCHED. PELAGHIAS IN U.S. OR UK, CANNOT CONTACT. CONCEIV-
ABLE THAT HE MAY HAVE ENTERTAINED SUCH AN IDEA (HE IS NOT
STRONG ON POLICY), BUT WE THINK IT OUT OF QUESTION FOR
MAKARIOS GOVT AND PROBABLY EQUALLY UNLIKELY FOR PRESENT
GOVT.
2. WE THINK WE SMELL AN EFFORT BY ZILENZNICK TO PUT SOME-
THING TOGETHER.
DAVIES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLAS SIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
тои
ARTMENT
of
THE
ИОIТАДIЯОНТUА
OE THE
EXECUTIVE
SECKETVBA
DEP
Department of State
STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 8104
PAGE 01 NICOSI 02138 032100Z
63
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 w
o 0320447 AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9350
SECRET NICOSIA 2138
'74 AUG 819868 5 AM 8:04 04
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
EXDIS
THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP: ARTHUR HARTMAN
SUBJECT: CYPRUS
REF: DEPTTEL 169662
1. CLERIDES IS DEPARTING 0700 AUGUST 4 FOR CONSULTATIONS IN
ATHENS. HE EXPECTS THAT HE WILL RETURN TO NICOSIA AUGUST 5.
CLERIDES SAW DENKTASH LAST NIGHT AND IT IS HIS IMPRESSION THAT
AFTER CONSULTATIONS IN ANKARA WHERE HW IS TONIGHT, DENKTASH
WILL PROCEED DIRECTLY TO GENEVA.
2. CLEARANCE REQUESTED FROM CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN INDICATES
HARTMAN PLUST TWO WILL ARRIVE AKROTIRI 061000 ZULU. IF THIS IS
ACTUAL ARRIVAL TIME CLERIDES WILL BE MOST PLEASED TO EXPLORE
THE FUTURE WITH HARTMAN ANYTIME DURING AFTERNOON OR EVENING OF
THE SIXTH, PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST WHETHER ACTUAL ARRIVAL IS
AUGUST 6 AND I WILL TRY TO SET UP WORKING DINNER WITH CLERIDES.
3. PLEASE NOTE NICOSIA AIRPORT INOPERABLE AND LIKELY TO BE so FOR
SOME weeks. WE WILL PICK UP AT AKORTIRI WHICH IS SOME TWO HOURS
DISTANT. ROAD CONDITIONS AS OF PRESENT ARE SAFE FOR TRANSIT.
DAVIES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THECAHTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OA STATE
WHITE HOUSE
Departmentof of State
UNITED 1 STATES OF
TELEGRAM
'74 AUG 2 PM 7:39
WA
CONFIDENTIAL 4687
PAGE 01 NICOSI 02093 021322Z
53
ACTION SS-30
TNFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
078084
o R 0212582 AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9318
TNFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
CONFIDENTIA L. NICOSIA 2093
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CY GR TU
SUBJ: MAKARIOS' PROPOSALS
REF: STATE 167926
1. I DELIVERED MAKARIOS PROPOSALS TO CLAERIDES AUG 2,
NOTING THAT THEY HAD BEEN PASSED TO GREEK AND TURKISH
GOVTS AND THAT WE HAD NO POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THEM.
2, CLERIDES READ THROUGH THE PAPER AND THEN COMMENTED
THAT MAKARIOS WAS BADLY OUT OF TOUCH WITH REALITY. HE
HAD AT ONE OF THE LAST INTERCOMMUNAL MEETINGS PROPOSED
TO DENKTASH THAT THEY WIPE OUT EVERYTHING THAT HAD BEEN
AGREED TO AND RETURN TO 1960 ACCORDS. DENKTASH'S RESPONSE
WAS THAT THESE ACCORDS HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO
PREVENT INTERCOMMUNAL FIGHTING AND TURKS MUST HAVE
ABILITY TO PROTECT THEMSELVES IN A BICOMMUNAL STATE.
2. CLERIDES NOTED MAKARIOS RECENT STATEMENT WAS COUCHED
IN MORE CAUTIOUS TERMS AND GAVE HIM LESS PROBLEMS NOW THAN
RETTERATED STATEMENTS IN ATHENS THAT MAKARIOS IS LEGAL
PRESIDENT. HE HAD HAD DELEGATION OF EDKA LEADERS DESCEND
ON HIM LAST NIGHT WITH WARNING THAT THEY WOULD "BLOW UP
CYPRUS SKY HIGH" IF ANY ATTEMPT MADE TO PERMIT MAKARIOS
RETURN.
LETECKVW
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
2ECKELVK
UNITED
and
Department of State
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
STA
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 NICOSI 02093 0213222
3. CLERIDES SAID A MAJOR PROBLEM NOW WAS THAT NATIONAL
GUARD HAD TURNED OVER FIREARMS INDISCRIMINATELY TO PARTISANS
BOTH OF RIGHT AND LEFT WHEN TURKISH INVASION BEGAN, TOO MANY
GUNS NOW WERE IN THE HANDS OF TOO MANY IRRESPONSIBLE PEOPLE,
4, GEORGE MAVROS HAD TELEPHONED THURSDAY NIGHT INSIST-
ING THAT HE, CLERIDES, MUST GO TO GENEVA ON THE 10TH. ATHENS
SEEMED NOT TO REALIZE THAT IF HE LEFT THERE JUST NO ONE STANDING IN
THE WINGS WHO COULD BALANCE OFF THE FORCES WHICH THREATENED
TO THROW GREEK CYPRIOT CYPRUS INTO CHAOS AND TURMOIL.
DAVIES
5
LETECKVW
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUTON DEUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. ebs
FORM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
EXCES EXPIS EXATE
SECRET 2961
PAGE 01 STATE 156906
71
ORIGIN SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 1031 R
DRAFTED BY EUR :WSTABLER:EMB
APPROVED BY S/AM First AMB. MCCLOSKEY
S/S 3 MR. FRY
053080
0 191947Z JUL 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON IMMEDIATE
USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
CINCEUR IMMEDIATE
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR IMMEDIATE
COMSIXTHFLT IMMEDIATE
SECRE T STATE 156906
EXDIS TOSEC 35 TOPOL 32 ZFF LONDON AND '/H ONLY
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (MAKARIOS)
EXPIS
SUBJECT: MAKARIOS CALL ON THE SECRETARY
WHITEHHOUSE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR EAGLEBURGER FOR SECRE-
TARY
1. IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST TRANSMITTED BY CYPRUS EMBASSY
WASHINGTON THAT SECRETARY RECEIVE ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS,
SECRETARY HAS NOW AGREED TO RECEIVE HIM ON MONDAY AT A
TIME TO BE FIXED. PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE BY DE-
PARTMENT AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING TODAY AS FOLLOWS8 "THE
SECRETARY WILL RECEIVE ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS AT THE ARCH-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUSEDRE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED 1 STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 156906
BISHOP'S REQUEST ON MONDAY, JULY 22, IN WASHINGTON, THE
REQUEST WAS TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE CYPRIOT EMBASSY IN
WASHINGTON." IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES AS TO WHETHER
MAKARIOS IS BEING RECEIVED AS PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS, DEPART=
MENT SPOKESMAN WILL SAY THAT "HE HAS NOTHING TO ADD TO
WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ON THIS subject."
EXPIS EXPIS
2, DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT MAKARIOS HAS BEEN INVITED
BY SENATOR FULBRIGHT TO MEET WITH SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE AND THAT HE HAS BEEN INVITED TO MEET WITH HOUSE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. INGERSOLL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUSETHE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 21/00/ebs
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DER or STATE
*
Department of State
STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 8113
EXPIS EXPIS EXAIS EXPIS
PAGE 01 STATE 169718
63
ORIGIN SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 R
DRAFTED BY EUR/EX:JCLARK:KLH
APPROVED BY EUR - AAHARTMAN
S/S-0:R. ELTZ
091989
0 0321227 AUG 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE
S ELC R E T STATE 169718
EXDIS
'74 AUG 5 AM 8:04 04
SITUAT ON ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
E.O. 11652:
GDS
TAGS:
PFOR, CY
SUBJECT:
HARTMAN TRAVEL PLANS
REF: DEPTEL 169662
PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM HARTMAN
1. ROBERT OAKLEY WILL ACCOMPANY ME.
2. ARRIVAL PLANS GIVEN REFTEL.
3. DEPARTING CYPRUS (AKROTIRI) ABOARD USAF T-39 MONDAY,
AUGUST 5, 12 NOON OR 1300 HOURS FOR ANKARA ARRIVING ABOUT
1500 HOURS. (SEPTEL BEING SENT ANKARA.)
KISSINGER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
on
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED and STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET 8095
EXPIS EXQIN EXPIS EXPIRE
PAGE 01 STATE 169662
60
ORIGIN SS=30
TNFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 R
DRAFTED BY EUR:ROAKLEY/GS:AFM
APPROVED BY S - MR. EAGLEBURGER
FUR - MR. HARTMAN
S/S - MR. EALUM
091756
D 0319372 AUG 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECRE T STATE 169662
EXDIS
'74 AUG 5 AM 8.03
$ TUAT ON HOUSE ROOM
WHITE
E.O. 11652: GDS
SUBJECT: CYPRUS
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY
1. PLEASE GET MESSAGE TO CLERIDES SOONEST THAT I AM
SENDING ARTHUR HARTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN
AFFAIRS, TO EXCHANGE PERSONALLY WITH HIM OUR RESPECTIVE
ASSESSMENTS OF THE LONG-TERM SITUATION PRIOR TO THE NEXT
STAGE OF THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS, THIS WILL BE HELPFUL
TO BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS AS WE MOVE TOWARD AN EVENTUAL
SOLUTION. WHILE IN THE AREA ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN
WILL ALSO BE VISITING ATHENS AND ANKARA.
2. I BELIEVE HARTMAN SHOULD ALSO CALL UPON DENKTASH
WHILE HE IS IN NICOSIA.
3. HARTMAN TRAVELING BY USAF T-39 AIRCRAFT FROM ROME TO
NICOSIA. SHOULD ARRIVE AROUND EARLY AFTERNOON AUGUST 4,
ALTHOUGH us AIR FORCE ARRANGING CLEARANCES WITH BRITISH
FOR LANDING WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY COORDINATING WITH
BRITISH IN CYPRUS HIS ARRIVAL AKROTIRI.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
or STATE
*
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 169662
4, PLEASE SET UP APPOINTMENTS FOR EVENING AUGUST 4,
KISSINGER
EXPIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
L1/no/ebs
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
UNITED
name
Department of State
AMERICAN
WHITE HOUSE
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SITUATION ROOM
'74 JUL 18 PM 2:48
SECRET 6663
PAGE 01 NICOSI 01446 01 OF 02 172146Z
67
ACTION SS-30
EXETS
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /031 W
024553
0 172030Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8861
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE
USMISSION NATO NIACT IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NIACT IMMEDIATE
S F C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1446
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS USCINCEUR
DIA WASHDC //DI-5//
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY
SUBJECT: COUP: SHORT-TERM US POLICY AND MID-TERM CONSIDERATIONS
REF: NICOSIA 1371
SUMMARY: BEST HOPE WE SEE OF AVOIDING WAR IS NOT TO TRY TO
PERSUADE GREEK JUNTA TO UNDO WHAT IT HAS DONE, BUT RATHER TO
ENCOURAGE TURKEY TO COME TO BELIEVE THAT ITS INTERESTS ARE
BETTER SERVED BY DEALING WITH A WEAK AND COMPLIAT SAMPSON
REGIME THAN BY GOING TO WAR TO RESTORE A CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
WHICH INCLUDES RESTORATION OF THEIR ARCH-ENEMY MAKARIOS. ON
RECOGNITION, SUGGEST WE MADE CLEAR THAT WE CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE
MAKARIOS GOVERNMENT, BUT NOT FORECLOSE PROSPECT OF MOVING TO
RECOGNITION OF NEW REGIME (ON STRICTLY NON-MORALISTIC GROUNDS)
IF, AS SEEMS FAIRLY LIKELY, IT SUCCEEDS IN CONSOLIDATING ITS
POWER FOR A PERIOD ON CYPRUS. END SUMMARY
1. LET US UNDERSCORE ANKARAIS REMARK THAT THE KEY PRESENT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM DS-1652
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 NICOSI 01446 01 OF 02 172146Z
ISSUE IS TO KEEP GREECE AND TURKEY FROM WAR. LONGER-TERM
OBJECTIVE IS TO AVOID INTRA-GREEK CIVIL WAR ON ISLAND WITH
LIKELIHOOD THAT USSR WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN
SUPPORT OF LEFT.
2. ON RECOGNITION, WE BELIEVE USG SHOULD SAY QUITE FRANKLY
THAT WE CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT MAKARIOSI
WITHOUT GETTING TRAPPED INTO PREDICTIONS AS TO WHAT WE WILL
DO IN THE FUTURE. WE OWE ATHENS NOTHING FOR THIS LITTLE
FRACAS, AND WE ASSUME TURKEY WOULD BE EMBITTERED AND LESS
AMENABLE TO OUR SUGGESTIONS IF WE SEEM TO ABANDON ANKARA
BY ANY PRESENT WEAKNESS ON RECOGNITION. IN FORTHCOMING UN
DEBATES, EMBASSY WOULD PREFER TO SEE USG ON SIDE OF JUSTICE AND
INCIDENTALLY OF VAST MAJORITY,
3. ON INFORMAL LEVEL, WE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING PERSUADE NEW
REGIME OF EXTREME DANGER OF ITS POSITION AND TO ENCOURAGE IT
TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SHOW THEMSELVES AS NO THREA TO TURKS
(SEPTELS). WE EXPECT TO CONTINUE THOSE EFFORTS. NEW "FOREIGN
MINISTER"88 A VERY CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF EMBASSY AND HAS
BEEN ANXIOUS TO TALK PRIVATELY ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS WITHOUT SEEKING
ANY RECOGNITION. (HE TRIED TO CALL UK HICOM INTO FOREIGN
MINISTRY, BUT HAS NOT TRIED THIS PLOY WITH US.)
4. PRINCIPAL HOPE OF KEEPING ANKARA FROM TAKING UP ARMS
SFE NICOSIA 1442) SEEMS TO BE COMBINATION OF PERSUASION FROM
TURKISH ALLIES AND FROM NATO, COUPLED WITH SOME EVIDENCE FROM
CYPRUS THAT THIS NEW OUTFIT MAY BE EASIER TO DEAL WITH
THAN MAKARIOS. WE SUSPECT THAT ANY HOPE OF RESOLVING CONFLICT
BY PERSUADING ATHENS TO BACK DOWN CE.G., TO WITHDRAW ITS 600
OFFICERS, AS NATO REQUESTED) IS NOT IN THE CARDS. MOREOVER, WE
THINK THAT WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK OFFICERS AT THIS STAGE WOULD
LEAVE A HEAVILY-ARMED AND DISORGANIZED RABBLE IN CONTROL OF
TSLAND, WITH CATASTROPHIC RESULTS. AS TO LINE OF COMMAND, WE
WOULD PREFER EVEN IOANNIDES FINGER ON THE TRIGGER RATHER THAN
SAMPSON'S
5. WE AGREE WITH SYG LUNS CUSNATO 3911) THAT ATENS HAS GOTTEN
ITSELF INTO A SITUATION WHERE IT IS POLITICALLY DOOMED IF ITS
CYPRUS VENTURE IS A FLOP BUT WOULD BE MILITARILY DEFEATED BY
TURKEY IF ITS CYPRUS VENTURE SUCCEEDED. GREEK JUNTA HAS ALREADY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRAUTHORIZATION O THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM DS-1652
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
EXECUTIVE
2EC8ELV81
Department of State
SEALS AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 NICOSI 01446 01 OF 02 172146Z
DEMONSTRATED CONVINCINGLY THAT IT IS WILLING TO PUT PRIDE ABOVE
THJ RATIONAL PURSUIT OF ITS OWN INTERESTS. ON THE OTHE HAND,
TURKEY IS BEHAVING, SO FAR AT LEAST, WITH CIRCUMSPECTION: AS
SITUATION UNFOLDS, ANKARA MAY BEGIN TO FEEL ITS INTERESTS ARE
AS WELL SERVED BY APLIANT AND WEAK SAMPSON GOVERNMENT COR
POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT) AS BY SETTING IN MOTION AN INVASION
WHICH COULD RESTORE THE HATED MAKARIOS TO POWER,
PARTICULARLY WHEN TURKEY CONSIDERS THE INCALCULABLE
CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH AN EFFORT, INCLUDING THE LIKELIHOOD
THAT, AFTER THE ISLAND HAS BEEN FRACTIONED BY THIS COUP,
MAKARIOS WILL BE MORE THAN EVER DEPENDENT UPON THE LEFT IF
HE DOES RETURN TO POWER. FUTHERMORE, ANKARA MAY CONCLUDE
THAT RELATIVE STABILITY HERE IS BETTER THAN A LEFT/RIGHT
INTRA-GREEK CIVIL WAR WITH THE ATTENDANT PROSPECT OF DEEPER
SOVIET INVOLVEMENT.
DAVIES
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USCINCEUR.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DS-1652
of
STATE
EXPIS
UNITED
was
Department of State
AMERICANCE
TELEGRAM
STATES
or
SECRET 7060
PAGE 01 NICOSI 01446 02 OF 02 180030Z
67
ACTION $S=30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /031 W
026508
0 172030Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8862
INFG AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE
USMISSION NATO NIACT IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NIACT IMMEDIATE
S F C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 1446
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS USCINCEUR
DIA WASHDC //DI-5//
6. WE ASSUME THAT MAKARIOS WILL HAVE OVERWHELMING INTER-
NATIONAL SUPPORT, AT LEAST ORALLY. IF MALTESE PM MINTOFFIS
PERSONAL REACTION, EXPRESSED TO OUR AMBASSADOR, IS ANY
INDICATOR, THIS SUPPORT MAY BE MORE VEBAL THAN REAL, EXCEPT
FOR SOVIET BLOC.
7. AS TO SUPPORT ON THE ISLAND ITSELF, WE THINK A DISPASSIONATE
LOOK IS IN ORDER. THE GENERAL POLITICAL FLACCIDITY WHICH
HAMPERED GRIVAS! EFFORTS TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT AGAINST MAKARIOS
18 MONTHS AGO NOW SEEMS TO HAVE WORKED TO MAKARIOS' DIS-
ADVANTAGE IN THE CURRENT COUP. FROM WHAT WE CAN SEE, AND
FROM WHAT UNSYG REP WECKMANN TELLS us, IT APPEARS THAT ONLY IN
PAPHOS DID PRO-MAKARIOS NATIONAL GUARDSMEN TAKE CONTROL.
ELSEWHERE, DESPITE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THERE WAS SCATTERED
RESISTENCE AMONG NATIONAL GUARD ENLISTEES, THE CYPRIOT
SOLDIERS EITHER FOLLOWED THEIR GREEK OFFICERS OR WERE
NEUTRALIZED, (FALSE REPORT OF MAKARIOS' DEATH MAY HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO THIS.) MOREOVER, WE HAVE REPORTED THAT SOME
RIGHT-WING ORGANIZATIONS HAVE GOTTEN ON THE BANDWAGON WITH
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTSTHRAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
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TELEGRAM
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or
SECRET
EXPITS EXSIS EXC
PAGE 02 NICOSI 01446 02 OF 02 1800382
EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR SAMPSON. CLERIDES' POSITION IS
A MOST IMPORTANT ONE, AND HE SEEMS TO HAVE AGREED TO
CONTINUE TO SERVE AS INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATOR (THOUGH WE DO
NOT KNOW WHAT IF ANY CONDITIONS HE ATTACHED).
8. THE UPSHOT OF THIS VERY PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF LOCAL
ATTITUDES IS TO SUGGEST THAT THE FEARED POLARIZATION DID
OCCUR, AND THAT MUCH OF THE CENTER AND RIGHT LOOKED UPON THE
COUP WITH MIXED FEELINGS. (WE HAD EARLIER REPORTED GROWING
CONCERNS THAT MAKARIOS WAS MOVING AGAINST THE MOTHERLAND
AND THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO CONVERT THE POLICE, THE
BUREAUCRACY AND THE NATIONAL GUARD INTO SOMETHING OF A
PERSONAL INSTRUMENT.) WE ASSUME THAT THE NEW REGIME WILL
MOVE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS, AND THAT THEY WILL FIGHT BACK
WITH EVERY RESOURCE THEY HAVE. THE PROSPECT FOR DOMESTIC
INSTABILITY IS HIGH, AND THE LONG-TERM PROSPECT OF A DIVIDED
COMMUNITY RULED BY GREECE VIA SAMPSON IS A GLOOMY ONE. HOW-
EVER, THE REGIME MAY VERY WELL ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE CONTROL
OVER THE ISLAND FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD.
9. IF IN SOME WEEKS! TIME, THE REGIME DOES SEEM IN
EFFECTIVE CONTROL, AND IF THE MENACE OF TURKISH MILITARY
INTERVENTION HAS RECEDED IN THE FACE OF THE CALCULATIONS
SUGGESTED ABOVE, WE THINK THE USG SHOULD NOT HAVE CLOSED ITS
OPTION TO MOVE TOWARD RECOGNITION IN CIRCUMSTANCES CONDUCIVE
TO EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS. OVER THE LONG TERM,
THE USG HAS HAD ENOUGH PROBLEMS APPLYING MORAL STANDARDS TO
RECOGNITION. WE HAVE IN THE SENATE RESOLUTION OF 1969 AND
OUR RECENT OFFICIAL STATEMENTS A NATURAL RATIONALE FOR
EXPLAINING A DECISION TO RECOGNIZE ON A BASIS OF EFFECTIVE
CONTROL. AT THAT TIME, WE WOULD ASSUME THAT, STILL OWING
VERY LITTLE TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT OR TO ATHENS, WE COULD VERY
WELL ACCOMPANY OUR RECOGNITION WITH AN EXPRESSION OF
REGRET THAT FORCE WAS USED TO SUPPLANT AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT
AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE CONTINUE TO REGARD THE ARCHBISHOP
WITH RESPECT.
10. IN ANY CASE, THIS FENCE IS TO BE CROSSED LATER, NOT NOW.
DAVIES
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USCINCEUR.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 51/10/ess
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
6.H.
*
UNITED STATES AMERICA
Departmentof
State
TELEGRAM
OF
'74 JUL 18 PM 7:54
SECRET 9046
PAGE 0. NICOSI 01478 181417Z
43
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
034277
o 1813457 JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8885
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
SECRE T NICOSIA 1478
EXDIS
LONDON FOR UNDER SECY SISCO
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR CY
SUBJECT: E&E PLANNING
1. EMBASSY IS SOMEWHAT STRAPPED IN E&E PLANNING BY CIR-
CUMSTANCE THAT BASIC DECISION AS TO WHETHER THERE WILL BE
WAR IN CYPRUS RESTS IN ANKARA.
2. OUR PLAN IS TO KEEP AMERICANS IN PLACE WITH APPRO-
PRTATE INSTRUCTIONS RATHER THAN ATTEMPT TO MOVE THEM IF
INVASION OCCURS. GIVEN EXTREME SPEED WITH WHICH TURKS
COULD MOVE, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO HAVE CIVILIANS
ON ROADS AND AT AIRPORT WHEN ATTACK UNDER WAY.
3. CONSEQUENTLY, DECISION MUST BE MADE EITHER TO
PLAN TO RIDE OUT TURKISH INVASION OR TO START EVACUATION
WHEN ODDS ON INVASION SEEM HIGH.
4. HOWEVER, UNLESS INVASION SEEMS HIGHLY LIKELY, WITH
SUFFICIENT TIME AVAILABLE TO PERMIT MOVEMENT, WE ARE
INCLINED TO HAVE AMERICANS STAY HERE. FROM OUR ADMITTEDLY
AMATEUR VIEWPOINT, WE ASSUME TURKISH INVASION WOULD HAVE
SWEPT THROUGH AREAS OCCUPIED BY MOST AMERICANS WITHIN FOUR
OR FIVE DAYS.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE CHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FODECI ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
9-66
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF 2
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 NICOSI 01478 181417Z
5. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ESTIMATE ADDRESSEES CAN GIVE us
AS TO TURKISH INTENTIONS.
DAVIES
JV
a
20Γ
18
bW
1:21
LETECKVIN
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TSECROTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ebs
FORM 1838
PARTMENT OF STATE
SEALES AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
TELEGR
OF
SECRET 9882
RAGE 01 NICOSI 01663 231535Z
51
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
091783
0 P 2314307 JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9006
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS PRIORITY
USEUCOM PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY
USDOCOSOUTH PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC DI=5 PRIORITY
S E C R E T NICOSIA 1663
EXDIS
'74 JUL 23 PM 8:28
S TUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS : PINT PFOR CY
SUBJECT: CLERIDES SUCCESSION
1. I RECOMMEND DEPT CONSIDER MOVING VERY QUICKLY TO
RECOGNITION OF CLERIDES GOVERNMENT.
2. I BELIEVE THAT AT APPROPRIATE EARLY OCCASION USG SHOULD
ALSO INDICATE EXPECTATION THAT APPROPRIATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESSES WILL BE FOLLOWED FOR HOLDING OF ELECTIONS.
ECONSTITUTION SPECIFIES 45 DAYS IN PARA 4 ART. 44,) WE
MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER ENDORSING UN AUSPICIES FOR
HOLDING OF ELECTIONS IN VIEW OF RECENT TURBULENT HISTORY
OF ISLAND.
3. MY REASONS FOR RECOMMENDING EARLY ACTION ARE THESE:
(A) HE IS IDEAL PRESIDENT FROM OUR STANDPOINT,
BECAUSE OF MODERATE POLITICAL ORIENTATION, PROSPECT OF
ATTRACTING WIDEST SPECTRUM OF VOTES, AND BECAUSE HE IS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPA
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGR
STATES
OF
SECRET
EXPLES EXPIC
PAGE 02 NICOSI 01663 2315352
ONLY GREEK CYPRIOT LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE SUCCESSFUL
ARRANGEMENTS WITH TURKS. HIS VIEWS ON ENOSIS ARE VERY
MODERATE, AND FOR THIS REASON SOVIET BLOC MAY FIND HIM LESS
OBJECTIONABLE THAN ANY OTHER CANDIDATE WHO WOULD HAVE ANY
HOPE OF ACCEPTANCE BY NATIONAL GUARD.
(B) SWIFT MOVE BY USG MIGHT HAVE EFFECT OF DEVELOPING
INTERNATIONAL MOMENTUM FOR RECOGNITION, AT LEAST AMONG
WESTERN COUNTRIES, THUS AVOIDING QUAGMIRE OF MAKARIOS vs.
CLERDIES ARGUMENTATION.
(C) HE IS CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR, AND CONSTITUION
TS SUFFICIENTLY BROAD TO MAKE REASONABLE CASE THAT MAKARIOS
UNABLE TO PERFORM AND THAT IN FACT "SUCCESSION" QUESTION DOES
ARTSE,
4. I BELIEVE THAT GESTURE TOWARD ELECTIONS IS DESIRABLE IN ORDER
TO HELP HEAD OFF AN INTERNATIONAL STANDOFF BETWEEN WESTERN
COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING CLERIDIES AND SOVIET BLOC PLUS NONALIGNED
SUPPORT FOR MAKARIOS, STANDOFF WHICH WOULD BE REFLECTED IN INTRA-
CYPRIOT SCHISM WITH RESULTANT INSTABILITY. WITH PROSPECT
OF ELECTION, NONALIGNED AND LEFTISH MIGHT BE LESS UNITED AGAINST
CLERIDES THAN WOULD BE CASE IF IT WERE STRAIGHT FIGHT AS TO WHO
IN FACT IS PRESIDENT. AS ABOVE, CLERDES MIGHT NOT BE
ALL THAT OBJECTIONABLE TO SOVIETS BECAUSE HE AT LEAST
PROMISES ASSURANCE AGAINST ENOSIS.
5. WOULD BE MOST IMPORTANT FOR GREECE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT
"MOTHERLAND" ENDORSES CLERIDES, AND FOR ANKARA TO CONVEY--
NON APPROBATION, WHICH COULD BE KISS OF DEATH--BUT RATHER
CLEAR SIGNAL THAT CLERIDES OFFERED BEST PROSPECT OF AVOID-
ANCE OF WAR.
6, WE ARE FRANKLY NOT CERTAIN THAT CLERIDES WOULD WIN AN
ELECTION AGAINST ARCHBISHOP, BUT HIS CHANCES ARE BETTER
THAN EVER FOR SEVERAL REASONS. ARCHBISHIPIS CONFRONTATION
WITH ATHENS COST HIM DEARLY AMONG GREEK CYPRIORT WHO PLACE
HIGH VALUE ON SENSE OF UNITY WITH MOTHERLAND. FEAR OF WAR
IF MAKARIOS RETURNS AND/OR OF REVERSION TO CIVIL STRIFE,
LIKELY TO GIVE CLERIDES VOTE OF THOSE WHO ABOVE ALL WANT
TRANQUILLITY. THIS COULD CUT INTO AKEL VOTE.
7. WE COULD TAKE SOME RISK OF BEING WRONG. IN FINAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THERAUTHORIZATION O THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
МЦНОЛ1
THE
MOITASIROHTUA
OL
THE
EXECUTIVE
SECKEIVKA
SEXTS AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRA
OF
SECRET
RAGE 03 NICOSI 01663 231535Z
ANALYSIS, CLERIDES' PRESIDENCY DURING NEXT CRITICAL WEEKS IS
BEST HOPE OF MAKING REAL SOLUTION WHICH WILL HEAD OFF
GRECO-TURKISH WAR. THIS ALONE ACHIEVES OUR KEY PURPOSE.
IN FINAL ANALYSIS, AZ WOULD LIVE WITH EVENTUAL MAKARIOS
RETURN OF THAT PURPOSE ACHIEVED.#
8. PRINCIPAL COST OF PRECIPITATE RECOGNITION OF COURSE
IS LIKELIHOOD THAT RELATIONS WITH ARCHBISHOP WOULD BE
MUCH WORSE IF HE DID SOMEHOW RETURN, WE THINK HE WOULD
NEED us, HOWEVER, AND WOULD AVOID REAL RUPTURE. WE ALSO
HAVE STRONG ARGUMENT THAT BY RECOGNIZING CLERIDES AND
ADVOCATING ELECTIONS WE WERE INFACT ADVOCATING CONSTITUTIONALITY
AND GIVING MARKAIOS FAIR CHANCE.
DAVIES
NOTE BY OC/T: NICOSIA 1663, #LAST SENTENCE PARA, 7, AS RECEIVED.
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM - DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATES
*
EXPIS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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TELEGRAM
WH
SECRET 2454
PAGE 01 NICOSI 01678 241214Z
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CIAE-00 /031 W
102763
Z n 2322187 JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9020
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEY YORK IMMEDIATE
'74 JUL 24 PM
SECRET NICOSIA 1678
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
EXDIS
S E C 0 N D C 0 R R E C T E D C 0 P Y (PARA 7 CHANGED TO READ 6)
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, GR, TU, CYP
SUBJECT: TURKISH VIOLATIONS OF CEASEFIRE
1. UNFICYP AMBASSADOR WECKMAN AT 2230 TELEPHONED ME TO SAY
MOST DANGEROUS SITUATION ARISING. UNFYCYP HAD TAKEN POSSESSION
OF AIRPORT AT CONSIDERABLE RISK TO DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER.
TURKS FINALLY AGREED TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM AREA TO MPRPHOU ROAD.
NATIONAL GUARD EVACUATED AREA. NOW TURKISH MILITARY COMMANDER IS
CHARGING THAT UNFICYP HAS EXCEEDED MANDATE AND THREATENS TO
SETZE AIRPORT. UNFICYP FORCE STRENGTH AT AIRPORT ONLY SEVENTY
MEN. WECKMAN ALSO FEELS THERE IS EVIDENCE TURKS
INTEND TOMORROW TO MOVE INTO BELLAPAIS ABOVE KYRENIA.
2. WECKMAN SAYS THAT TURKISH MILITARY COMMANDER REFUSES TO TALK TO
UN DIRECTLY AND, INDEED, TURK AMBASSADOR INHAN ALLEGES HE HAS NEVER
SEEN HIM AND DENKTASH CLAIMS TO HAVE SEEN HIM ONLY ONCE. SOLE
CHANNEL INFLUENCE. TO HIM IS INDIRECTLY THROUGH INHAM WHO CLEARLY HAS LITTLE
3. WECKMAN SAYS SHOTS BEING CALLED BY TSG AND THAT EVEN
ECEVIT BEING DECEIVED AS EVIDENCED BY HIS BALD DENIAL OF TURK ATTACK
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUSETHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
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STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 NICOSI 01678 241214Z
ON AIRPORT AFTER YESTERDAY'S CEASE FIRE,
4. I TOLD WECKMAN THAT WASHINGTON ALREADY AWARE OF THREATS
CITED AND I HOPED COULD BRING SOME INFLUENCE TO BEAR.
5. WECKMAN FEARS SITUATION SUCH THAT DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION WITH
TURKISH CIVILIAN EDIFICE NOT LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE AND HOPES THAT
PRESSURE CAN BE BROUGHT DIRECTLY ON TSG THROUGH NATO ACTION.
6, I TOLD WECKMAN HIS REPORT AND VIEWS WOULD BE SENT DEPARTMENT
SOONEST. I ALSO CONGRATULATED HIM ON THE MAGNIFICENT JOB
BEING DONE BY UNFICYP IN THIS CHAOTIC SITUATION AND SAID WE
WOULD seek TO SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS AS WE COULD.
COMMENT: UNFICYPS INITIATIVES UNDER WECKMAN'S LEADERSHIP ARE
REFRESHING CHANGE FROM PAST POSTURES. HE STRIKES ME AS EXTREMELY
ABLE, TOUGH, AND UNFLAPPABLE. THIS IS TIME WHEN HE NEEDS FULLEST
SUPPORT IN TERMS OF GETTING TURKISH MILITARY UNDER CONTROL. MY
FEELING IS THAT TGS MORE LIKELY TO BE RESPONSIBLE TO U.S.
MILITARY CHANNELS THAN NATO.
DAVIES
Srt
ANT
⑇⑇
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
el/holebs
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
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UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 1099
PAGE 01 NICOSI 01680 232314Z
62
ACTION SS=30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /031 W
096406
o 232251Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9023
SECRET NICOSIA 1680
EXDIS
'74 STUATENOUSEM JUL 24 AM 8:24
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY, TU, GR
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CLERIDES FEARS FURTHER TURK MILITARY ACTION
FOLLOWING IN CONFIRMATION TELECON.
1. CLERIDES TELEPHONED ME EVENING JULY 23 ASKED THAT I INFORM
WASHINGTON THAT HE HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT THE TURKISH ARMY HAS
MOVED HEAVY ARMOR TOWARD BOTH KARAVAS AND BELLAPAIS ON KURENIA
SIDE AS WELL AS TOWARD YEROLAKOS OUTSIDE NICOSIA. HE SAID THIS MAY
SHOW EVIDENCE OF PLANNED DAWN OFFENSIVE.
2. HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT EARNESTLY DESIRE CEASE FIRE AND NEGOTIA-
TIONS. EARLIER THIS AFTERNOON HE HAD MET WITH DENKTASH IN THE
PRESENCE OF UN OFFICERS AND HAD AGREED TO MEET AGAIN TOMORROW TO
WORK OUT FIRM CEASEFIRE STANDSTILL AGREEMENT. DENKTASH AGREEMENT
THIS MOST IMPORTANT BUT THAT THE ENTIRE MATTER LIES
WITH TURKISH MILITARY COMMAND. HE TOLD CLERIDES HE WOULD HAVE
REPLY AS TO FURTHER MEETING BETWEEN 1900 AND 2000 HOURS
BUT HAD NOT CONTACTED CLERIDES AT TIME OF HIS CALL TO ME,
AROUND 21:20.
3. CLERIDES SAID THAT IF TURKS MOVE, CYPRIOTS WILL RESIST WITH ALL
THEIR RESOURCES. THEY DO NOT WANT TO BE ACCUSED OF BREAKING CEASE
FIRE, BUT IF TURKS SEEK TO EXPAND HOLDINGS BY VIOLATING CEASE FIRE
CYPRIOTS WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE.
DAVIES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECREUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM DS-1652
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 1089
PAGE 01 NICOSI 01681 232301Z
70
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /031 W
096262
C 2322087 JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9022
SECRE T NICOSIA 1681
EXDIS
'74 SITUATIONSEM WHITE JUL 24 AM 8:24
HOUSE
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CLERIDES ROLE AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT
THE FOLLOWING CONFIRMS TELECON.
1. DURING TELEPHONE CALL TO ME BY CLERIDES EVENING JULY 23
I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD BEEN SWORN IN AS PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OR ACTING PRESIDENT AND WHETHER
HE CONSIDERED HIMSELF NOW AS ACTING IN BELHALF OF DUSTED
PRESIDENT MAKARIOS.
2. CLERIDES SAID HE HAD BEEN SWORN IN AS PRESIDENT BUT THAT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSITUTION HE WAS, OF COURSE, ONLY ACTING
PRESIDENT. HIS ROLE WOULD BE DETERMINED BY FOLLOWING PROCEDURES
PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION. WITH RESPECT TO MAKARIOS STATUS
HE WOULD REPLY ONLY THAT CONSITITUTIONAL PROCEDURES WOULD BE
FOLLOWED.
DAVIES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRATUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
DS-1652
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
STATE AMERICA UNITED NAME
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 2891
PAGE 01 NICOSI 01723 241353Z
41
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W
EXATS
103780
D 2413302 JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9055
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE
SECRET NICOSIA 1723
EXDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS
'74 JUL 24 PM 13
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
FOREIGN MINISTER DIMITRIOU TELEPHONED EMBOFF AND ASKED
FOLLOWING BE PASSED:
1. MAKARIOS! STATEMENT THAT HE HOPES RETURN TO CYPRUS
IN TWO OR THREE WEEKS HAS HAD AN IMMEDIATE AND INCREASINGLY
ADVERSE REACTION WITH GREEK CYPRIOTS. GREEK CYPRIOTS
OF ALL STRIPES (STRONG ENOSISTS, EOKA-B, THE INDIFFERENT,
ETC.) OTHER THAN AKEL AND LYSSARIDES FOLLOWERS ARE ALREADY
SAYING THAT IF MAKARIOS COMES BACK BLOOD WILL FLOW AGAIN
AND THERE WILL BE CIVIL STRIFE ON ISLAND, GREEK WILL BE
FIGHTING GREEK AGAIN.
2. PRESENT GOVT, INCLUDING CLERIDES, ARE CONVINCED MAKARIOSI
RETURN, IF IT IS SOON, WOULD BE A DISASTER HERE, THE
TSLAND NEEDS TIME NOW FOR EMOTIONS TO SETTLE AND FOR A
RETURN TO SOME KIND OF STABILITY AND SANITY. GREEKS ARE
PULLING TOGETHER, AND HOPEFULLY UNDER CLERIDES LEADERSHIP
THEY CAN BE KEPT TOGETHER--UNITED AND READY FOR A SOLUTION TO
GREEK/TURK PROBLEM ON THE ISLAND.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECREUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
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*
name
Department of State
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AMERICAN
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STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 NICOSI 01723 2413532
3. GOVT FEELS THAT MAKARIOSI EARLY RETURN WOULD ONLY DIS-
RUPT ORDERLY RETURN TO NORMALITY HERE, PERHAPS IF
MAKARIOS INSISTS ON RETURNING, HE COULD PUT OFF HIS RETURN
FOR AT LEAST THREE MONTHS. BY THAT TIME THE COURSE HERE
COULD BE SET, EMOTIONS SOOTHED AND HIS RETURN WOULD NOT BE
TOO DISRUPTIVE. IF, HOWEVER, HE KEEPS SAYING HE WILL
RETURN IN TWO OR THREE WEEKS AND IF HE DOES COME BACK
THIS SOON, THEN CIVIL STRIFE IS ALMOST A CERTAINTY.
4. CLERIDES HAS RELAYED SUBSTANCE OF THE ABOVE TO KARAMANLIS
AS HAS DIMITRIOU TO GEN. BONANOS. THEY HAVE URGED THAT
MAKARIOS NOT BE PERMITTED TO RETURN FOR AT LEAST THREE
MONTHS. KARAMANLIS REPLIED HE WOULD THINK ABOUT IT.
BONANOS AGREED THAT MAKARIOS SHOULD NOT RETURN, AT LEAST
NOT FOR PRESENT,
5. CLERIDES GOVT, THROUGH DIMITRIOU, URGES U.S. TO EXERT
AVOID MAKARIOS' RETURN TO CYPRUS IN NEAR FUTURE.
11% 711 Sit bW 1
MOOR AUTIE
MHILE HONSE
ITS INFLUENCE, INDEED TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES, TO
6. COMMENT: CLERIDES IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THIS
MORNING PUBLICLY STATED ARCHBISHOP SHOULD NOT RETURN,
AND QUESTION OF HIS RETURN SHOULD BE DECIDED THROUGH
ELECTIONS. AS INCIDENTAL INFORMATION, DIMITRIOU SAID
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS TOLD CLERIDES THAT HE HAS A
FREE HAND TO RESHUFFLE THE CABINET AS HE WISHES.
DAVIES
NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS ADDED PER S/SO, MISS ELTZ.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
60/ho/TbS
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
BEF OF STATE
CHE
2ECKELVBA
EXE™
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Departmento ofState State
ROOM
TELEGRAM
'74 JUL 31 PM 4: 18
WH
CONFIDENTIAL 8342
PAGE 01 NICOSI 02011 3108382
15
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
048417
0 P 3108307 JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9265
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 2011
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CY TU GR
SUBJECT: MAKARIOS PROPOSAL
REF: STATE 166128
1. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SEEK CLERIDES VIEWS
ON THE SIX PROPOSALS PRESENTED TO THE SECRETARY BY ARCH-
BISHOP MAKARIOS IN THEIR RECENT MEETING IN WASHINGTON.
2, IN ADDITION TO OUR INTEREST IN HIS VIEWS ON WHAT
SEEMS TO us LIKELY TO BE CONSIDERED BY TURKS AS A GUILEFUL
APPROACH, CLERIDES UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE INFORMED BY
ATHENS AND I WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE PRACTICE OF CONTINUED
EXCHANGE WITH HIM. PLEASE ADVISE.
DAVIES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TRENZETHORIZATION OF THE-EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM DECL ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
9.66 DS-1652
29 JUL 742 18
53
0322 w
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
110F18
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
CA0975
S
PAGE 01 NICOSI 01968 2919382
44
ACTION CCO=00
INFO DCT-01 PASS-00 /001 W
030169
/
Z 291800Z JUL 74 ZEL
FM AMENDASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9238
CDD
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH
AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH
AMEMRASSY LONDON FLASH
USMISSION GENEVA FLASH
SECRET NICOSIA 1968
EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS
S
CORRECTEDCOPY # TEXT
GENEVA FOR BUFFUM
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CY
SUBJI GENEVA CONFERENCE
1 : CLERIDES PHONED TO REPORT THAT HE HAD TLAKED
WITH MAVROS, WHO SAID CALLAGHAN WORKING ON SOME SORT OF COM=
PROMISE LANGUAGE PROPOSING PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF TURKISH
FORCES.
2. CLERIDES UNDERSCORED THAT ME COULD NOT BE CITED
AS ADVOCATING PARTICULAR POSITION IN TALKS. HOWEVER,
HE HOPED WE WOULD CONVEY FOLLOWING THOUGHTS FROM NICOSIA (A)
ANXIOUS TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT CALLAGHAN PROPOSAL ISI (B)
IF TURKS ARE TAKING LINE THAT THEY ARE INTERVENING AS GUARANT
ORS, THAT THEY WILL NOT COMMIT THEMSELVES TO WITHDRAW UNTIL
CONVINCED THAT CERTAIN PURPOSES HAD BEEN MET, AND WHAT
THEY WANT TO SEE WHETHER AGREEMENT WORKS, THAT IT WOULD BE
TOLERABLE TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE SUGGESTING PHASED WITHORAWAL
FOLLOWING AGREEMENT, ALLOWING TIME FOR TURK PURPOSES
DESCRIBED ABOVE,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETA
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 NICOSI 01968 2919352
3. COMMENT: CLAR MESSAGE FROM CLERIDES IS THAT A COMPROMISE
IS PREFEREABLE TO ALLOWING TALKS TO FAIL. WE SUSPECT, THOUGH
CLERIDES DID NOT INDICATE, THAT MAVROS CALL TO CLERIDES WAS
INTENDED TO ELECIT SUPPORT FOR A COMPROMISE ON ABOVE LINES.
SUGGEST BUFFUM ATTRIBUTE VIEW 70 EMBASSY NICOSIA READING
RATHER THAN TO CLERIDES, BUT EXPRESSED SUPPORT EVEIN IF
LANGUAGE ON WITHDRAWAL IS AS HEAVILY QUALIFIED AS OUTLINED ABOVE,
DAVIES
NOTE BY OC/T: CCO DELIVER TO OFF-LINE FOR PROCESSING,
S
S
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
COPY 18 OF 18 COPIES
DEVERTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
Z 0523592 AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9375
CONTROL: 1137Q
BT
RECD: 05 AUG'74 9:41PM
SECR E T NICOSIA 2176
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN
N
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS
1. I AM SENDING A MORE DETAILED MESSAGE CONTAINING THE VIEWS
YOU ASKED ME TO OBTAIN FROM CLERIDES AND DENKTASH ON A
POSSIBLE SETLEMENT AND THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION
IN CYPRUS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO RECOUNT MY
FRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH CLERIDES AND TO REQUEST GUIDANCE
FOR USE IN ATHENS -- ASSUMING 1 GET THAT FAR.
S
2. I GAVE CLERIDES YOUR LETTER WHICH HE READ WITH EVIDENT
SATISFACTION. I TOLD HIM THAT YOU FELT STRONGLY THAT CLERIDES
WAS THE RIGHT MAN IN THE RIGHT JOB TO HANDLE THE PRESENT
SITUATION IN CYPRUS. I EXPRESSED OUR SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT
FOR THE MODERATE STANCE HE HAD TAKEN IN THE PAST AND HIS
EVIDENT SENSE OF REALISM. I SAID THAT WE FEARED THAT HIS
POLITICAL SKILLS AND PRESENCE COULD NOT BE SPARED FROM
CYPRUS AND THAT YOU HAD SAID "THAT AS HIS POLITICAL ADVISER", YOU
WOULD NOT RECOMMEND THAT HE GO TO GENEVA. BEFORE I COULD FINISH
EXPLAINING YOUR RATIONALE, CLERIDES DID IT FOR ME. HE SAID THAT HE
HAD EXACTLY THE SAME THOUGHT. IF HE WENT TO GENEVA HE WOULD BE
MADE TO ASSUME A RESPONSIBILITY WHICH WOULD WEAKEN HIM AT HOME.
ON THE OTHERHAND, OTHERS IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY WOULD NOT
GO WITHOUT HIM. MAVROS WAS PRESSING HIM TO GO BUT AT THE SAME TIME
MAVROS WOULD NOT TAKE ANY OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNPALATABLE
DECISIONS IN GENEVA. KARAMANLIS AND AVEROFF APPEARED MORE REALISTIC
BUT MAVROS DID NOT WANT TO SULLY HIS POLITICIAL REPUTATION BY BEING
THE ONE TO MENTION A FEDERAL (OR CANTONAL AS CLERIDES PREFERS)
SOLUTION.
3. LATER AFTER DINNER, CLERIDES MENTIONED TWO OTHER REASONS WHY
THE NEXT DAYS IN NICOSIA WERE CRUCIAL. FIRST, HE HAS ASKED HIS
CABINET TO RESIGN BY TOMORROW OR BE DISMISSED SO THAT HE CAN NAME
MORE MODERATE MEN. SECOND, THE NEW GREEK GENERAL IS ARRIVING
WITH THE FIRST GROUP OF REPLACEMENTS FOR OFFICERS IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT
NATIONAL GUARD. HE FEARED THAT THE RIGHT WOULD TAKE THIS AS THE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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SECRET
DUALTMENT OF STATE
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AMERICA
TELEGRAM
-2- STATES NICOSIA 2176, AUG'74
OF
FIRST STEP TOWARD RESTORATION OF MAKARIOS (WHICH MAVROS KEEPS
MENTIONING AS AN OBJECTIVE) AND THAT THIS GROUP MIGHT REACT
AGAINST CLERIDES BEFORE THEIR WINGS ARE CLIPPED BY THE OFFICERS
LOYAL TO KARAMANLIS. CLERIDES IS SUSPICIOUS OF MAKARIOS AND,
AS MY LONGER MESSAGE SHOWS, BELEIVES THAT A SOLUTION MUST BAR HIS
RETURN. 4. CLERIDES IS THERFORE THINKING THAT HE SHOULD GO TO GENEVA
JUST FOR THE OPENING DAY AND RETURN IMMEDIATELY. AS MY OTHER
MESSAGE OUTLINES, ME IS FEARFUL THAT ONLY HE COULD PUT FORWARD
POSITIVE IDEAS TO AVOID A STALEMATE. HE MUST WEIGH ALL THESE
ISSUES IN MAKING HIS FINAL CHOICE. BUT HE SAID THAT HE
VALUES VERY MUCH YOUR OPINION WHICH HE WILL CAREFULLY
5. CONSIDER. AGAIN IN MY PRIVATE CONVERSATION, CLERIDES RAISED THE
SPECTOR OF THE SOVIET UNION CAPITALIZING ON THE CONTINUED
PRESENCE OF TURKISH FORCES WHICH THE would PORTRAY AS A
VIOLATION OF THE UN RELOLUTION. THIS WOULD ATTRACT THE SUPPORT
OF THE COMMUNISTS, THE LEFT GENERALLY AND PRO-MAKARIOS FORCES
ON THE ISLAND. I CAUTIONED HIM STRONGLY THAT REGARDLESS OF
THE MERITS OF THE CASE FOR THE TURKISH PRESENCE, HE SHOULD
UNDERSTAND THAT WHOEVER PLAYS WITH THE SOVIETS WILL LOSE OUR
SUPPORT. 1 POINTED TO THE EXPERIENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO SHOW
THAT THIS WAS A WEAK REED TO LEAN ON. I SAID THAT THE SOLU-
TION TO THE CYPRUS QUESTION COULD ONLY COME ABOUT IN THE
CONTEXT OF BETTER RLEATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY AND THAT
THIS WAS NOT A RESULT THAT THE SOVIETS COULD HELP BRING ABOUT.
6. REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE: I AM DUE TO SEE MAVROS FIRST IN
ATHENS TOMORROW AT 5 PM. FROM WHAT CLERIDES SAYS, MAVROS' VIEW OF
HIS OWN POLITICAL FUTURE LEADS HIM. TO TAKE UNHELPFUL POSITIONS
ON TWO KEY ISSUES: FIRST, HE KEEPS MAKING STATEMENTS THAT
BUTTRESS THE LEGITIMACY OF MAKRIOS; AND, SECOND, HE REFUSES
AS YOU FORESAW, TO ACCEPT ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE UN-
PLEASANT DECISIONS ON CYPRUS. MAY 1 ADVISE MAVROS AND ANY
OTHERS IN ATHENS WHO SHARE THIS VIEW THAT, WHILE THEIR
POSITION MAY NOT BE STRONG, THE MODERATE GREEK CYPRIOT
LEADERSHIP IS INFINITELY WEAKER. LEADERS IN ATHENS AT LEAST
CAN BLAME THE OLD REGIME. CLERIDES HAS NO ONE TO HIDE BEHIND.
I WOULD DO THIS IN THE CONTEXT, AS YOU INSTRUCTED, OF
EXPRESSING OUR WARM SUPPORT FOR THE NEW GREEK REGIME AND OUR
DESIRE TO SEEM THEM SUCEED. I WOULD ADD, AS YOU SUGGESTED,
S
THAT OUR SUPPORT DOES NOT HOWEVER MEAN THAT WE ARE PREPARED
TO GANG UP ON TURKEY. WE DO NOT WISH TO SUPPORT ONE PARTY
AGAINST ANOTHER OR TO ISOLATE ANY PARTY. THE LONG-TERM
SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM CAN ONLY BE FOUND IN THE SEARCH
FOR A COMPROMISE AMONG THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.
PLEASE INSTRUCT.
DAVIES
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODU Reproduced at the Richard Nixon I Presidentiabl OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
COPY 18 OF COPIES
20 of STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES or AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
0 280752Z JUL 74
CONTROL: 8105Q
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9178
RECD: 28 JULY 74 -
INFO/RUEHCR/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 198
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 4071
4 30 AM
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4608
RUEHCR/AMENBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3612
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 171
BT
SECRET NICOSIA 1883
NODIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY, UR
SUBJ: SOVIETS SENDING OBSERVER TO GENEVA CYPRUS TALKS
REF: DEPTEL 163995
1. DURING CALL TO EMBASSY BY PRESIDENT CLERIDES TO COMPLAIN ABOUT
TODAY'S TURKISH CEASE FIRE VIOLATIONS, I INFORMED HIM THAT SOVIETS
WERE SENDING OBSERVER TO GENEVA AND THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ACTING ON
THEIR OWN AND NOT IN CONCERT WITH US.
2. CLERIDES THANKED US FOR INFORMATION AND SAID GOCYPRUS IN NO
WAY INVOLVED IN SUGGESTING SOVIET MOVE.
DAVIES
GEORNT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITH CLUISE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
18
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
Department of State
of STATES ORIGINAL AMERICA
TELEGRAM
0 270935Z JUL 74
CONTROL: 7969Q
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
JULY 27, 1974
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 9 15 1
6:54 AM
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 4063
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4599
RUEHCR/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 192
RUEHCR/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4367
RUEHCR/USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1999
BT
SECRET NICOSIA 1844
NODIS
GENEVA FOR BUFFUM
E.O. 11652: GOS
TAGS: PFOR CY TU
SUBJ: DEFINITION OF TURKISH OBJECTIVES
REF: USUN 2587
1. GREATLY APPRECIATE ALL THAT AMBASSADOR MACOMBER HAS DONE
TO MOVE TURKS TOWARD RESTRAINT IN PRESENT SITUATION. ON HIS
PERSUASIVENESS RESTS MUCH OF THE HOPE FOR BRINGING PRESENT
CRISIS UNDER CONTROL.
2. HOPE THAT WITH PASSAGE OF SOME TIME, CLIMATE MAY HAVE
MODERATED ENOUGH IN ANKARA TO BEAR LOAD OF APPROACH TO TURKS
TO MINIMIZE NEW MOVEMENTS AND, MORE IMPORTANT, TO DEFINE THEIR
OBJECTIVES. ASIDE FROM PROVIDING. A FRAMEWORK TO DAMP DOWN WILD
RUMORS RACING THROUGH GPCYPRUS WHICH MAKE CLERIDES'
PURSUIT OF MODERATION MUCH MORE DIFFICULT, GREATER ANKARA
PRECISION IN SAYING WHAT THEY WANT SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO
DEAL WITH GREEKS IN GENEVA, AND MAY HAVE IMPORTANT SIDE EFFECT
OF DISCOURAGING TURKS FROM RAISING THEIR OBJECTIVES AS THEY PROCEED.
WE HAVE REPORTED (NICOSIA 1836) THAT TURK ANGER BEGINNING TO
RISE OVER RUMORS OF ATROCITIES ELSEWHERE ON ISLAND AGAINST TURKS
CALMOST ALL SO FAR UNVERIFIED), AND OVER BELATED RECOGNITION THAT
THEIR ACTION IN NICOSIA ENCLAVE HAS RESULTED IN OVERRUNNING OF
S
OTHER ENCLAVES BY GREEKS. TURKS ARE ALREADY TALKING IN TERMS OF
RETALIATION IF GREEKS DO NOT MEET THEIR DEMAND FOR RESTORATION
STATUS QUO ANTE IN THOSE AREAS. IF TEMPERS CONTINUE TO MOUNT,
TURKISH MILITARY QUITE
CAPABLE OF CUTTING OFF TURKISH ENCLAVE IN FAMAGUSTA, CHATOS AND
VARIOUS KARPAS ENCLAVES, AND CREATING EFFECTIVE PARTION ALONG LINE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOSECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
STATES
-2 -NICOSIA 1844, JULY 27, 1974 (NODIS)
FAMAGUSTA/NI COS IA/MYRTOU. FORMAL DELIMITATION OF OBJECTIVES WOULD
ERECT SOME BARRIER TO SUCH ACTION.
3. REFTEL RAISES ANOTHER TURKISH MISCONCEPTION WHICH IT MIGHT BE
WELL TO ADDRESS. THEY ACCUSE CLERIDES OF REJECTING DEMAND FOR
FEDERALISM OUT OF HAND. PRIVATELY, HE RECOGNIZES FEDERALISM IS
PROBABLY ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO PARTIITION. HE CANNOT SAY THIS PUBLICLY
AND SURVIVE, BUT IS IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT CURIOUS INCIDENT OF
VAGUE CBC CITATION OF POSSIBLITY OF FEDERALISM IN HIS FIRST
-
PRESS CONFERENCE (NICOSIA 1734) WAS INTENDED AS SITNAL TO
TURKS THAT HE WOULD LATER BE OPEN FOR BARGAINING. IF IT WAS SIGNAL,
TURKS MISSED IT. WE POINTED IT OUT TO TURKISH DCM YESTERDAY: HE
WAS UNAWARE OF BROADCAST. DAVIES
NOTE: NOT PASSED ANKARA ATHENS GENEVA USUN, NATO BRUSSELS
OC/T 7/27/74.
S
SECRET
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PY 10 OF OF 18 COPIES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
fay-wh Jay
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
0 291112Z JUL 74
CONTROL: 8195Q
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
RECVD: 29 JUL 74
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9212
BT
8:35AM
SECRET NICOSIA 1932
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY
DEPT PASS INFO IMMEDIATE TO ANKARA ATHENS GENEVA AND USUN
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH CLERIDES
SUMMARY: GLAFCOS CLERIDES FEELS THAT CONTINUATION GENEVA
CONFERENCE UNTIL ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN
GREECE AND TURKEY ESSENTIAL. OTHERWISE ACTION COULD
SHIFT TO SECURITY COUNCIL WHERE SOVIETS AND NONALIGNED
WILL PURSUE THEIR INTERESTS AS AGAINST INTERESTS OF THOSE
ACTUALLY INVOLVED. HE FEARS THAT MAVROS IS PROVING WEAK REED IN
GENEVA BOTH BECAUSE OF HIS DESIRE TO RETURN TO POLITICAL ARENA IN
ATHENS AND RELUCTANCE TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH CONCESSIONS
THAT REALISTICALLY MUST BE MADE IN THE FACE OF TURKISH
POWER. CLERIDES URGES WE DO OUR UTMOST TO KEEP GREEKS
ENGAGED UNTIL REASONABLE ARRANGEMENT DEVISED AND, IF IT
SEEMS GENEVA TALKS LIKELY TO COLLAPSE, THAT YOU CONSIDER
FLYING VISIT TO ANKARA AND ATHENS IN ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE BASIS
FOR ENDURING CEASEFIRE AND FOR GREEK CYPRIOT /TURK CYPRIOT
TALKS TO RESTRUCTURE STATE. END SUMMARY
1. 1 CALLED ON PRES CLERIDES AT 1000 TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS
THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE DURING THE NIGHT IN CAPITALS AND IN
GENEVA. HE HAS MOVED OUT OF FOREIGN MINISTRY CAND AWAY FROM
DIMMY DIMITRIOU) INTO NEW PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE PREMISES
WHERE HIS ARMED POLICE GUARD IS MUCH IN EVIDENCE INSIDE AND
OUT. IT IS A MUCH MORE ORDERLY OPERATION. HE SEEMED RELAXED
S
AND MUCH MORE SELF-ASSURED. HE WENT OVER TURKISH DEMANDS AT
GENEVA AND I REVIEWED ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, MAKING
CLEAR THAT IF SOVIETS INJECTED THEMSELVES INTO SITUATION VIA
THIS ROUTE, WHOLE U.S. PERCEPTION OF AND POL CIES TOWARD THE
PROBLEM COULD CHANGE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITH SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET,
BEPARTMENT OF STATE
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UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
-2- - NICOSIA 1932, 29 JUL 74
2. CLERIDES SAID HE HAD HAD NO COMMUNICATION WITH ROSSIDES
WHO QUITE CLEARLY WAS TAKING HIS ORDERS FROM THE ARCHBISHOP.
IF ROSSIDES WERE MAKING COMMON CAUSE WITH SOVIETS, IT WAS
NOT AT THE BEHESTQF ANYONE IN CYPRUS.. HE THOUGHT SOVIET
INVOLVEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC AND FOR
THAT REASON GENEVA CONFERENCE HAD TO BE KEPT GOING UNTIL IT
RESULTED IN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ATHENS AND ANKARA.
3. CLERIDES SAID THAT GEORGE MAVROS FEARED THAT IN THE FAST
MOVING SITUATION IN ATHENS HIS OWN PERSONAL POLITICAL FORTUNES
MIGHT BE IMPAIRED AND FOR THAT REASON HE WAS ANXIOUS TO RETURN.
IN ADDITION, MAVROS, BECAUSE OF HIS POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS,
WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF WITH SUBSTANTIAL
CONCESSIONS TOO TURKS WHICH ANY REALIST WOULD RECOGNIZE MUST
BE MADE. HE HAD A LENGTHY TALK WITH AVEROFF DURING THE NIGHT
IN WHICH BOTH AGREED MAVROS HAD TO BE INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN.
IN A LATER TALK WITH KARAMANLIS, PM SAID SINCE CLERIDES AND
AVEROFF IN AGREEMENT, HE WOULD SEND ORDERS TO MAVROS TO REMAIN
IN GENEVA. DURING THE NIGHT HE HAD ALSO MAINTAINED CONTACT
WITH BITSIOS IN GENEVA AND, WHEN SESSION RECESSED, so THAT
PRINCIPALS COULD GET SOME SLEEP, WITH METAXAS.
4. ACCORDING TO CLERIDES, TURKS WANT TO MOVE FROM CEASEFIRE
AGREEMENT TO SECOND PHASE CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD BE BASED
ON 1960 ACCORDS AND WOULD SEEK TO ACHIEVE STRUCTURING OF
TWO SEPARATE ADMINISTRATIONS ON THE ISLAND. GREEKS ARE
OPPOSED SINCE THEIR AGREEMENT TO 1960 ACCORDS WOULD CONNOTE
THEIR AGREEMENT TO VETO RIGHTS OF TURKS OVER LEGISLATIVE
OR EXECUTIVE ACTS OF GOVT. CLERIDES LAMENTED THAT
ATHENS STILL DOES NOT APPRECIATE FACT THAT TURKISH
MILITARY POWER - -ALWAYS POTENTIAL AND NOW INVOKED BY
GREEK COUP ON ISLAND - HAS CHANGED ENTIRE BALL GAME. .
5. CLERIDES HAS PROPOSED THAT CYPRUS BE REPRESENTED IN
SECOND PHASE TALKS BY A SINGLE GOVERNMENT FOR BOTH TURKS
AND GREEKS, I.E., BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT
©ENKTASH) AS WELL AS BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF A PROVISIONAL
Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NODECLASS BERis Dmenthas been Reproduced/atithe d'pursuant to Executive Order-13526 and has THE been determined to be declassified.
SECRET,
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
ORLINO
AND
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
S
-3- NICOSIA 1932, 29 JUL 74
TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITY (COULD ALSO BE DENKTASH). THUS
GOCYPRUS READY CONCEDE PROVISIONAL STATUS RATHER THAN DE
FACTO STATUS TO TURK CYPRIOT AUTHORITY PENDING AGREEMENT
N
ON RESTRUCTURING CONSTITUTION. TO
MY QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THIS FORMULA WOULD NOT RAISE THE
MAKARIOS VS. CLERIDES ISSUE, HE SMILED AND NOTED THAT
ECEVIT SEEMED TO BE MOVING AWAY IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE
OF SUNDAY FROM PREVIOUS POSITION OF INDIFFERENCE TO MAKARIOS
RETURN TO ONE SUPPORTING NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING BOTH CLERIDES
AND DENKTASH.
6. TO PREVENT SOVIET MISCHIEF MAKING AND TO PROVIDE A BASIS
FOR BRINGING CYPRUS OUT OF PRESENT CHAOS, GENEVA CONFERENCE
MUST SUCCEED, IF IT SHOWS SIGNS OF BREAKING UP, CLERIDES
SUGGESTED THAT YOU MIGHT MAKE FLYING TRIP TO ANKARA AND
$
ATHENS TO PROVIDE BASIS FOR PRAGMATIC NEGOTIATIONS RECOGNIZING
TURKISH SECURITY INTERESTS AND BASIC RIGHTS OF BOTH PEOPLES
OF CYPRUS.
7. OTHER TOPICS COVERED IN OUR DISCUSSION WILL BE REPORTED
IN LOWER CLASSIFICATION MESSAGE.
DAVIES
BT
#1932
NOTE: NOT passed ANKARA, ATHENS, GENEVA, USUN by OC/T
$
SECRET
NOT DECLASSIFIED TO BE REPRODUCED This document has been Reproduced reviewed pursuant at the Richard to Executive Nixon Presidential Order A13526.al Library has been determined to A RY
Copy 12 of 12 copies
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
Z 270310Z JUL 74
NEWSSY NICOSIA
Control: 7964Q
T) SUGSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9149
Recd:
July 27, 1974
DI
6:25 AM
SECRET
NICOSIA 1842
LODIS
NODIS CHEROKEE
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
4
DEPT PASS INFO FLASH TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AND ATHENS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS. PFOR CY
SUBJ: CYPRUS
RCF: STATE 163905
CURMARY: PRES. CLERIDES SAID ON JULY 26 HE HAD ASKED!
SOVIET AMB. TO SEEK SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ADHERENCE TO THE CEASEFIRE AS WELL
AS FOR SOVIET DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION IN ANKARA TO BRING
A HALT TO FURTHER TURKISH MILITARY MOVES. FOLLOWING DELIVERY
OF SECRETARY'S MESSAGE EARLY JULY 72 AND DISCUSSION FULL IMPLICATIONS
THIS NOVE, CLERIDES SAID HE ACCEPTS THE POINTS MADE, THAT
THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER APPEALS OR CONTACTS ASKING FOR
SUPPORT, THAT WHEN THE SOVIET AMB RESPONDS, CLERIDES WILL
BE CAREFUL TO LISTEN ONLY AND DISENGAGE. END SUMMARY
1- PURSUANT TO YOUR INSTRUCTIONS, I MET WITH GLAFCOS
CLERIDES AT 0800. I TOLD HIM I HAD JUST RECEIVED A MESSAGE
FOR HIM WHICH WE WERE HOLDING MOST CLOSELY AND WHICH I
ASSUMED HE WOULD ALSO WISH TO BE BETWEEN US. I THEN GAVE
HIM YOUR MESSAGE IN AS NEAR VERBATIM FORM AS I COULD. DIMMY
DINITRIOU (WHO IS AN EMOTIONAL ANTI-COMMUNISTY APPEARED IN
THE MIDDLE OF MY PRESENTATION AND CLERIDES ASKED HIM TO
DEPART.
2. CLERIDES RESPONDED THAT GIVEN THE SITUATION YESTERDAY
HE HAD CONTACTED SOVIET AMB. ASTAVIN AND ASKED FOR SOVIET
SUPPORT FOR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION INTRODUCED BY MR.
ROSSIDES. SPECIFICALLY, HE HAD ASKED FOR SOVIET SUPPORT
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixo Presidential ibrar F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
Vicosia 1842
ADOUT TURKISH ADHERENCE TO THE CEASEFIRE. THE
I DIRED ABOUT THE SECOND PART OF THE RESOLU-
FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS CLERIDES
NID THAT FOR THE MOMENT FOR CYPRUS, THE ALL-IMPORTANT AND
ENT WAS TURKISH OBSERVANCE OF CEASEFIRE.
REPLIED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THAT SOVIET GOVI
0" APPLICATION OF BOTH PARTS OF THE RESOLUTION.
CLC IDES SAID HE HAD BEEN MOST CAREFUL TO INSIST ONLY ON
ST DSTILL. HE HAD ALSO ASKED FOR SOVIET
EMPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS TO TURKS IN ANKARA SEEKING
10 OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. SOVIET AMB. SAID
I.D WOULD CONVEY CLERIDES REQUEST TO ASCERTAIN WHAT HIS GOVERN-
POS TION WAS WITH RESPECT BOTH TO CEASEFIRE AND WITH-
MM 1. OF FOREIGN FORCES.
SOVIET AMB. ASKED IN WHAT CAPACITY CLERIDES WAS ACTING.
SAID HE WAS ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
C7 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.
9. X TOLD CLERIDES I THOUGHT THIS DEVELOPMENT HAD THE GRAVEST
OF IMPLICATIONS, PARTICULARLY FOR CYPRUS AND GREECE. AS I
UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION IN ATHENS, IT WAS NOT UNLIKE THE
ONE HE FACED IN NICOSIA. THE HARD-LINERS OR "PUTSCHISTS" AS
EAST BLOC DIPLOMATS WERE CALLING THEM WERE STILL IN PLACE
AND THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS FEARED TO MOVE TO LIMIT THEIR
POWER BASE LEST IT BRING THEIR OWN OVERTHROW. THE FACT THAT
PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS HAD SOUGHT SOVIET SUPPORT, I THOUGHT, IF
NOWN COULD PRECIPITATE TROUBLE FROM THE RIGHT NOT ONLY IN
VICOSIA BUT IN ATHENS. MOREOVER, THE TURKS HAD IN PART
JUSTINIED THEIR MILITARY ACTION AS ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT
THE RISE OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON THIS ISLAND SO VITAL TO
TURKEY'S NATIONAL SECURITY. TURKS COULD SEIZE ON THIS DEVELOP-
MENT AS A PROPAGANDA PLUM. (I THOUGHT CLERIDES PALED SOMEWHAT
DURING THIS PART OF OUR DISCUSSION.)
G, I ALSO TOLD CLERIDES THAT WE DID NOT COMMAND THE ABSOLUTE
POWER TO FORCE GOVERNMENTS TO DO OUR BIDDING. SUCH A POSITION
TAKEN WITH THE TURKS COULD WELL DISRUPT OUR RELATIONS TO THE
INCALCULABLE DISADVANTAGE OF ALL IN THIS AREA. WE DID COMMAND,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
-3- Nicosia 1842
OWEVER. CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE AND THIS WAS BEING USED TO
The UTMOGT IN EFFORT TO CONVINCE THE TURKISH GOVT THAT RE-
STRAINT IS IN THEIR LONG-TERM INTERESTS. IT WAS NOT ONLY
IN NICOSIA THAT WE WORKED THROUGH THE NIGHT, OUR EFFORT
WAS DW A CONTINUING BASIS ALSO IN WASHINGTON AND ANKARA.
10 LICEZING THESE FFFORTS. HOWEVER, COULD WELL HARDEN THE
POSITION OF THE TURK MILITARY. I URGED HIM TO HAVE
CC IDENCE AND EXERCISE PATIENCE. I RECOGNIZED THAT YESTER-
DA WEN T E RUMOR THAT THE TURKS WOULD TAKE NICOSIA LAST
HOME BROUG T A HEAVY EXODUS TO THE HILLS MUST HAVE BEEN
PARTICULARLY TRYING. I DID NOT KNOW PRECISELY WHAT TURKISH
OBJECTIVES VERE, BUT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD
AKE NC SINSE EITHER ON POLITICAL OR STRATEGIC GROUNDS.
FM ou SOU DINGS, WE THOUG IT TURKS STILL SOUG T AS WIDE A
SEACHIEAD AND CORRIDOR TO NICOSIA AS THEY COULD GET, SOME OF
THIS TO BE USED FOR BARGAINING WHEN INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS
CAME ABOUT. CLERIDES EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN AGAIN LEST THE
TJ $ MOVE THROUGH THE KYTHREA AREA THUS LINKING THE CHATOS
AND NICOSIA ENCLAVES AMK PARTITIONING THE ISLAND.
7. I ASKED WHETHEE HIS GOVT IN FACT THOUGHT THE SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS IN CYPRUS' INTEREST. OBVIOUSLY, THE
TRIMARY SOVIET INTEREST NOW WOULD BE ESTABLISHING A BASIS FOR
M.GISTING ON WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH FORCES WHOSE PRESENCE
0 CYPRUS HAD JUST TWO DAYS AGO BEEN SHOWN TO BE HELPFUL.
GIVEN THE POSITION OF CYPRUS SOME 40 MILES FROM TURKEY AND
INDREDS OF MILES FROM GREECE, DID GLAFCOS FEEL IT WOULD
GF IN THE INTEREST OF GREEK CYPRIOTS TO PROVIDE BASIS FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL DEMAND FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL?
C. CLERIDES SAID CLEARLY THE BRITISH PRESENCE WAS THE BEST
OSSIBLE INSURANCE FOR GREEK CYPRIOTS AND WITHDRAWAL WOULD
LEAVE E THEM HOSTAGE TO TURKISH MILITARY POWER. IN ANSWER
0 JY QUESTION AS TO WHETHER HE CONSIDERED ROSSIDES WAS
ACTIVE 0 BEHALF OF HIS GOVT, HE SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED AMB
PAPAPHILLIPOU NOT TO RAISE THIS ISSUE. IN ANY EVENT, PAPA-
PHILLIPOU HAD ONLY CREDENTIALS SIGNED BY SAMPSON AND HAD
ro ROLE TO PLAY.
9. CLERIDES SAID HE DEEPLY APPRECIATED YOUR CONCERN AND
COULD ACCEPT THE POINTS MADE. I COULD ASSURE YOU MUST
CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER APPEAL TO
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 3526 EXECUTIVE SECRE
Department of State
of
TELEGRA
SECRET
-4- - Nicosia 1842
SOVIETS OR CONTACTS SEEKING SUPPORT. IT IS LIKELY SOVIET
AMB WILL ASK TO SEE HIM TO BRING MOSCOW'S RESPONSE. IN
THIS EVENT, HE WILL LISTEN AND POLITELY DISENGAGE.
DAVIES
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to
NOT TO BE REPRO Reproduce d at the Richard Nixon Presidential ibrary TION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET
COPY 15 OF 15 COPIE
N
0-002
PEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
CONTROL: 62790
RECD: 23 JUL 74
Z 230435Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
1:00AM
S
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9890
BI
S E C R E T NICOSIA 1641
NODIS
DEPT PASS INFO FLASH ANKARA AND ATHENS
N
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS TU CY GR
SUBJECT: CYPRUS CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS
REF: STATE 159045
REFTEL MESSAGE PASSED THROUGH DIMITRIOU DEPUTY FRANGOS
AT 0605 LOCAL
DAVIES
S
ROBER
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COPY 18 OF 18 COPIES
29B
2
or STATE
SECRET
Department of State
STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
2 2401357 JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
CONTROL: 6666Q
S
TO SECSTATE WASHOC FLASH 9028
BT
RECD: 24 JUL'74 10:02PM
SECRET NICOSIA 1686
NODIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY
SUBJECT: MY APPROACH TO CLERIDES
288=5
REF: STATE 159994
STATE 160114
MAY I PASS WORD ON TURKISH ASSURANCES TO CLERIDES?
DAVIES
25
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential.Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Copy S- of 15 copies
OF STATE
Department of State
ONLY STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
0 200645Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
CONTROL: 5661Q
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8936
RECD:
July 20, 1974
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4518
3:14 AM
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 3980
BT
SECRET NICOSIA 1553
NODIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: GLAFCOS CLERIDES
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR, PLEASE PASS TO SISCO
REF: STATE 157921
1. I HAVE CONTACTED CLERIDES AND PASSED YOUR MESSAGE FOR
WHICH HE MOST GRATEFUL. HE WILL TAKE NO ACTION UNTIL SITUATION
IS CLARIFIED.
2 HE SAYS HE HAS URG ED THROUGH DIMITRIOU THAT NATIONAL
GUARD AND GREEKS PREVENT ANY FIRING AT TURK CYPRIOT AND
TO TRY TO AVOID REPRISALS IN MIXED VILLAGES. I TOLD HIM
WE ALSO HAD PASSED THIS RECOMMENDATION TO DIMITRIOU. DAVIES
SECRET
NOT to BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
WH LDX
12
ENITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
of
SECRET
0 181755Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
CONTROL: 5033 Q
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 8894
RECD: 18 JUL 742 18 27
NFO RUEHCR/ AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3505
8T
SECRET NICOSIA 1501
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
DEPT PLEASE PASS LONDON FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO
SE
E.O. 11652: GOS
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY
SUBJECT: DIMITRIOU S CALLS ON AMB. DAVIES
RCF: NICOS A 1463
PARA 3 OF REFTEL SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS:
1. ON QUESTION OF PUBLIC POSITION ON RECOGNTION,
WE HAVE NOTED ANDERSON'S REMARKS JULY 18. I AM FULLY
AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES OF COUNTERING PRESS BADGERING
ON THIS ISSUE, BUT HOPE WE CAN LIMIT OURSELVES TO SAYING -
IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ISSUE DOES NOT ARISE AND NO
DECISIONS IMMEDIATELY PENDING. ESSENTIAL CONTACTS FOR
SAFEGUARDING U.S. LIVES AND PROPERTY WILL BE MADE WHEN AND
IF NECESSARY.
FIRST SENTENCE PARA 4 SHOULD READ: IN NICOSIA 1441 AND 1446
WE ADVANCED OUR LATEST THINKING ON TAKING A POSITION THAT WE
CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE MAKARIOS GOVT.
DAVIES
BT
#1501
NOTE: Message passed Amembassy London for Undersecretary
Sisco, July 18.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
n ROX
10
Cp
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF 7
TELEGRAM
SERVET
Z 181055Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
CONTROL: 4 8 8 0 Q
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8874
RECD: 18 JUL 74Z 1131
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH 3497
BT
SECRE T NICOSIA 1463
NODIS
LONDON FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY
SUBJECT: DIMITRIOU'S CALLS ON AMBASSADOR DAVIES
REF: STATE 155397
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
1. I APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE AND HAVE IMMEDIATELY
INFORMED STAFF THEY ARE TO SEEK AUTHORIZATION FROM
WASHINGTON BEFORE FURTHER CONTACTS WITH DIMITRIOU. I
WILL ALSO HAVE WORD PASSED TO HIM THAT HIS PRESENCE IN
EMBASSY COULD LEND ITSELF TO MISCONSTRUCTION. I SHOULD
MAKE CLEAR THAT AT NO TIME HAS ANY OFFICER IN NEW REGIME
REQUESTED US TO SEE THEM, NOR HAS THERE BEEN ANY REQUEST
FOR RECOGNITION. DIMITRIONHAS SIJPLY ARRIVED AT
ENBASSY AS HE DID YESTERDAY AT BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION.
2. I WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE ON CONTACTS WITH CLERIDES.
HE APPEARS STILL TO BE KEY FIGURE AND IS PRESIDENT OF
PARLIAMENT RATHER THAN MEMBER OF EITHER GOVT. I DO NOT
FEEL SUCH CONTACTS WOULD BE CONSTRUED AS MOVE TOWARD RE-
COGNITION. I HAVE APPOINTMENT TO SEE DENKTASH AT 4:00 P.M.
(1400 GMT) WHICH I AM RELUCIANT TO CANEL BECAUSE OF NEED
TO RETAIN THIS LINK TO TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY.
3. ON QUESTION OF PUBLIC POSITION, WE HAVE NOTED ANDERSON'S
REMARKS JULY 18. I AM FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES OF COUNTER-
INC PRESS BADGERING ON THIS ISSUE, BUT WE CAN LIMIT OUR-
SELVES TO SAYING IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ISSUE DOES NOT
ARISE AND NO DECISIONS IMMEDIATELY PENDING. WE SHOULD
I THINK, MAKE ESSENTIAL CONTACTS FOR SAFEGUARDING U.S.
LIVES AND PROPERTY WILL BE MADE WHEN AND IF NECESSARY.
SABRET
NOT
TO
BE
REPRODUCED
THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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-NICOSTA 1463, July 18
4. IN NICOSIA 1441 AND 1446 WE ADVANCED OUR LATEST ON TAKING
A POSITION THAT WE CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE MAKARIOS GOVT.
SUCH A STATEMENT FROM WASH WOULD DAMPEN RUMORS WE MOVING
TOWARD RECOGNITION OF NEW REGIME AND REMOVE HEAT FROM
DIFFICULT-TO- AVOID OR NECESSARY CONTACTS. UNLESS TURKS
INTERVENE, THIS REGIME SEEMS TO HAVE BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE
OF BEING IN CHARGE FOR SOME TIME. OUR OWN INTERESTS MAY
RFQUIRE SOME CHANNEL FOR INFORMAL COMMUNICATION NOT ONLY
ON ROUTINE ADMINSTRATIVE MATTERS BUT IMPORTANT THINGS SUCH
AS AUTHORIZATION FOR E&E OR MEDEVAC FLIGHTS WHICH REQUIRE
FONOFF APPROVAL.
5. DCM' $ INFORMAL CHAT WITH DIMITRIOU YESTERDAY MAY HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO ONE OF THE FEW MOVES POSSIBLE HERE TO AVERT
TURKISH MILITARY MOVE AGAINST CYPRUS AND SUBSEQUENT
GRECO-TURKISH WAR. RATHER THAN ABANDONING THIS CHANNEL
INTO NEW REGIME, I REQUEST YOU GIVE THOUGH TO, AND IF YOU
CONCUR, AUTHORITY TO MOVE TOWARD HIGHLY DISCREET FORM OF
INFORMAL COMMUNICATION WITH HIM AT LESS THAN SENIOR OFFICER
LEVEL. SINCE HE WILL BE RESIDING AT HILTON HOTEL ADJACENT
ESTABLISH. TO EMBASSY, SUCH A PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO
DAVIES
BT
#1463
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Copy 8 12 copies
RTMENT
O.
STATE
Departi of State
CRIIN
STATES
OF
SECRET
Z 270339Z JUL 74 ZFF 4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
CONTROL: 78770
RECD:
July 26, 1974
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH 6118
1155 PM
INFO RUEHCR/AMFMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 7026
RUEHCR/AMEMDASSY ANKARA FLASH 7718
BT
SECRET STATE 163905
NOD IS CHEROKEE
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, CY
SUBJ: CYPRUS
FOR AMBASSADOR DAVIES FROM THE SECRETARY
1. I HAVE JUST SEEN ATHE IS 5097, WHICH HAS BEEN REPEATED
TO YOU.
2. YOU SHOULD SEE CLERIDES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TELL
HIM THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED WORD FROM SOURCES IN ATHENS
THAT HE HAS PEQUESTED SOVIET DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT. WE WANT
HIM TO KNOW THAT WE BELIEVE THIS TO BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE
WHICH CAN ONLY COMPLICATE AN ALREADY DIFFICULT SITUATION.
SOVIET PRESENCE IN CYPRUS OR AN ACTIVE SOVIET ROLE IN THE
DIPLOMACY NOW UNDERWAY TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS, MUST BE
AVOIDED. THUS, CLERIDES SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT SOVIET
INVOLVEMENT CAN ONLY FORCE US INTO POSITIONS WHICH, UDER
OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD NOT TAKE.
3. YOU SHOULD ALSO EXPLAIN TO CLERIDES THAT I HAVE PER-
SONALLY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PRIME MINISTERS ECEVIT AND
KARAMANLIS IN AN EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT STRICT OBSERVANCE
OF THE CEASEFIRE AND A COMINSUATION OF THE GENEVA
TRIPARTITE WEETINGS. THE UNITED STATES IS DOING, AND
WILL CONTINUE TO DO, ITS UTMOST TO RESORE PEACE ON
CYPRUS AND TO CONFINCE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT THAT RE-
STRAINT ON THEIR PART IS IN THEIR LONG-TERM INTERESTS.
ABOVE ALL, WE HAVE URGED THE GOT TO PUT AN END TO ITS
MILITARY OPERATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, CLERIDES SHOULD
UNDERSTAND THAT WF HAVE CONDUCTED THESE EFFORTS IN PRIVATE,
SINCE WE BELIEVE THEY HAVE FAI FROM CHANCE OF SUCCESS IF
NOI
TO
22
WITHOUT
1.
3
EXECUTIVE
SECTER
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Depresin of of State
OTHER
STATES
SECRET
-2 - State 163905
THEY ARE CARRIED OUT AWAY FROM THE GLARE OF PUBLICITY,
THUS AVOIDING THE HARDENING OF POSITIONS SUCH PUBLICITY
INEVITABLY ENGENDERS.
4. WE HAVE THE UTMOST SYMPATHY FOR THE SUFFERING AND
ANGUISH OF THE CYPRIOT PEOPLE, AND PECOGNIZE THE
DIFFICULT SITUATION IN WHICH CLERIDES FINDS HIMSELF.
NEVERTHELESS, WE MUST EMP IASIZE TO HIM THAT SOVIET
INVOLVEMENT IN CYPRUS CRISIS WILL INFVITAPLY MAKE
THAT CRISIS MORE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AND IN NO WAY SERVE
THE INTERESTS OF IS PEOPLE.
INGERSOLL
S/S-0: R. ELTZ:WS
7.26.74
21512
S/S-O: R. ELTZ
S: MR. EAGLEBURGER {SUBS}
SEGRET
NOI 10
HON OI THE CM CUTIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECL ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT or STATE
*
AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES of
SECRET 7697
EXCES EXPIS
PAGE 01 NICOSI 02122 0310242
13
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /031 W
089676
C P 0309267 AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSTA
'74 AUG 4 AM AM 9:07 07
SITUAT ON ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9336
TNFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS PRIORITY
USEUCOM
USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
DIA WASHDC DI-5
S F e R E T NICOSIA 2122
EXDIS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NOFORN
NLN08-39/10881 Per Hr. 2/21/2014
By RS/MIH NARA, Date 11/2/2016
F.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MPOS PFOR CY TU GR
SUBJ: TURKISH DEBATE OVER FUTURE OF CYPRUS
: TURKISH DCM (MUST BE FULLY PROTECTED) INDICATED AUGUST 3
THAT THERE CONTINUING DEBATE WITHIN MISSION IN NICOSIA OVER
FUTURE OPERATIONS. DCM WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE EXPLICIT BUT WAS
CLEARLY TRYING TO GET MESSAGE ACROSS THAT TURKISH MILITARY
DESIRES FURTHER MILITARY CAMPAIGN.
2. DCM AGREED WITH EMBOFFIS SUGGESTION THAT MILITARY WAS NOT
FAVORS PARTITION OF ISLAND. DID NOT DENY THAT MILITARY THINKING OF
LINE STRETCHED FROM MYRTOU TO NICOSIA TO NORTH OF FAMAGUSTA. (HE
REJECTED SERVERAL OTHER ALTERNATIVE LINES DURING DISCUSSION.)
3. FROM CONTEXT CONVERSATION, IT CLEAR DCM DID NOT RPT NOT
ANTICIPATE FURTHER SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING NEXT FEW
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DS-1652
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
or
SECRET
PAGE 02 NICOSI 02122 031024Z
DAYS. CTMT CONTACTS TOLD EMBOFF AUGUST 2 THEY WERE GIVEN TWO DAYS
LEAVE; TOLD THERE WOULD BE FURTHER FIGHTING AFTER THAT.) SUSPECT
ANY FURTHER MAJOR MILITARY ACTION WILL COME IF GENEVA TALKS
COLLAPSE OR FAIL YIELD FAVORABLE RESULT. INTERESTING POINT ES
THAT THIS INTERNAL DEBATE RE PARTITION IS STILL GOING ON WITHIN
LOCAL TURKISH OFFICIAL COMMUNITY.
4, DCM IS MODERATE (IN TURKISH CONTEXT); FAVORS FEDERAL SOLUTION
WITH "LARGE CANTONS MAY BE THAT HE WAS TRYING GET US WIGH EN
ANKAR BEFORE FIRM DECISIONS MADE. UNFORTUNATELY, HE WOULD NOT RPT
NOT BE EXPLICIT AND ALL OF ABOVE WAS VERY HEDGED. HE HAS BEEN PASSING
USEFUL AND ACCURATE INFO DURING PAST FEW WEEKS AND IS CLEARLY
NERVOUS THAT THIS WILL COME TO KNOWLEDGE HIS GOVERNMENT.
DAVIES
of vne How 01 8:01
LEFECKV
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
50/170/ebs
FORM
DS-1652 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
иот OF STATE KEBBODNCE
NOITASIROHTUA ЭНТ TUOHTIV
THE EXECUTIVE 2ECKELVKA
WHITE HOUSE
*
*
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES or
'74 JUL 31 PM 7:43
SECRET 9240
PAGE 01 NICOSI 02028 311313Z
51
ACTION SS=30
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
051040
R 3113002 JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9277
TNFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
SECRET R NICOSIA 2028
EXDIS
BETRUT FOR WEISS, FBIS DIRECTOR
E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PINR GR
SUBJECT: RELOCATION OF FBIS
GIVEN SUPERIOR RECEPTION CHARACTERISTICS HERE COMPARED TO CRETE,
SUGGEST WE NOT PREMATURELY WRITE OFF POSSIBILITY THAT KARAVAS
OPERATION CAN BE REOPENED WITH AGREEMENT OF TURKS, AFTER PRESENT
CRISIS SUBSIDES.
DAVIES
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN08-39/10882 Hr. 7/21/2017
By RS MIH NARA, Date 7/31/2017
[p.10f ]
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
STATE
EXPIS
Department of State
AMERICA
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
'74 JUL 13 AM 9:41
SECRET 7542
PAGE 01 STATE 151570
72
ORIGIN SS=30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1031 R
DRAFTED BY EUR/SESRWERDMAN:MJB
APPROVED BY EUR e WELLS STABLER
EUR/SE Said ROBERT S. DILLON
DOD/ISA D CHARLES QUINN
PM/ISO - J. DEWENTER (SUB)
EXPIS EXQIN EXPIS
EUR/RPM Smith R. G. THOMPSON (SUB)
S/S=0 as P.P. SARROS
107161
₱ R 130028Z JUL 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USCINCEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET STATE 151570
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN08-39/10883 Per Hr. 2/21/2014
By RS/WIH NARA, Date 11/2/2016
EXDIS
E.0.11652 8 GDS
TAGS: PFORD MARR, CY
SUBJECTIRUMORED PROPOSAL FOR NATO/SIXTH FLEET NAVAL
FACILITY IN CYPRUS
1. WASHINGTON LAW FIRM HAS PASSED ON INFORMATION FROM A
CLIENT CONCERNING DISCUSSIONS CLIENT REPORTEDLY HAD WITH
ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS AND FOREIGN MINISTRY DEPUTY DIRECTOR
GENERAL GEORGE PELAGHIAS, WHO IS PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT,
REGARDING PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTION OF DOCKING FACILITY
IN LIMASSOL WHICH WOULD BE MADE ACCESSIBLE TO US NAVY AND
NATO. FACILITY WOULD BE USED BY us NAVY VESSELS FOR
MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND SPARE PARTS.
2. CLIENT IS HAROLD ZILEZNICK, A UK CITIZEN FROM LONDON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TEAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED
time
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 151570
AND BUSINESSMAN WHO REPRESENTS CYPRIAN SHIPYARDS LIMITED--
FIRM WHICH IS REPORTEDLY NEGOTIATING FOR CONSTRUCTION OF
THIS DOCKING FACILITY. ZILEZNICK REPORTEDLY SAID THAT A
NATO FEASIBILITY STUDY ON THIS FACILITY IS IN THE FINAL
STAGES OF PREPARATION AND THAT "PELAGHIAS IS BEHIND THIS
SHIPBUILDING OUTFIT."
3. DEPT T,OFF. COMMENTED TO LAW FIRM REPRESENTATIVE,
JOHN J. MCGOVERN (PROTECT), THAT SUCH A PROJECT APPEARS
EXAIS EXPIS EXPIS
HIGHLY UNLIKELY OWING TO CYPRUS LONGSTANDING NONALIGNMENT
POLICY, ITS DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION, AND ITS NEED FOR
SOVIET BLOC SUPPORT IN THE EVENT OF AN ATHENS/NICOSIA
SHOWDOWN. nevertheless, SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, IF TRUE,
WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT AND THE DEPARTMENT WOULD WANT TO
FOLLOW UP THIS INFORMATION. PELAGHIAS WAS CLOSE TO
EMBASSY AND OUR PEOPLE THERE WOULD PROBABLY MAKE DISCREET
INQUIRIES.
4. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION D"PT OFF TOLD MCGOVERN
THAT CHECK WITH VARIOUS OFFICES IN DEPARTMENT AND WITH
DOD HAD TURNED UP NO INFORMATION, THAT NO ONE CONTACTED
WAS AWARE OF ALLEGED NATO FEASIBILITY STUDY REFERRED TO
BY ZYLEZNICK, AND THAT THERE WERE NO PLANS FOR USE OF
CYPRUS NAVAL FACILITIES BY THE US OR NATO. MCGOVERN
THEN SAID THAT ZILEZNICK HAD SPOKEN WITH THEODORUS
PIERIDES CAN OFFICIAL OF THE CYPRIAN SHIPYARDS LIMITED)
ON JULY 11. THAT PIERIDES ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE HAD
REPORTEDLY TOLD PELAGHIAS THAT THE EMBASSY WOULD BE
CONTACTING HIM ON THIS MATTER, AND THAT "PELAGHIAS WAS
WAYTING ON THE EDGE OF HIS SEAT" TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER
WITH US OFFICIALS.
5. COMMENT: RUMORED PLANS OF GOC TO CONSTRUCT DOCKING
FACILITY FOR NATO AND SIXTH FLEET APPEAR IMPROBABLE,
AND POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE (FOR MAKARIOS).
WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION EMBASSY MAY BE
ABLE TO PROVIDE ON ABOVE REPORT. KISSINGER
⑇⑇ 70Γ 13 W
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SHERELTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
61/no/ebs
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 NLN-NSC FILES-592-4-2-3
COPY 18
OF 18 COPIES
DEPARTMENT or STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SEQUET
SEORET
Contro1:7432Q
Receive d: July 25, 1974 610PM
R 2517202 JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHOC 9102
BT
SECRET NICOSIA 1778
NODIS
EXECUTIVE
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
E.O. 11652: GOS
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY
SUBJECT: RIGHT WING OPPOSITION TO MAKARIOS RETURN
REF: NICOSIA 1765
1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH REFLECTS VIEWS OF DR.
GLAFKOS CASSOULIDES, SECRETARY GENERAL OF ESEA, A
POLICICAL ARM OF EOKA-B, IN MY JUDGMENT CONFIRMS WHAT
GLAFCOS CLERIDES TOLD ME TODAY AND MEKES LESS RELEVANT
MY COMMENT AS TO POSSIBLE SELF-SERVING ASPECT OF
CLERIDES PRESENTATION.
25X1
3. EX-PRESIDENT MAKARIOS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO
CYPRUS, AS HIS RETURN WILL SPARK A BLOOD BATH BETWEEN RIGHT
AND LEFT THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. THE RIGHT WING TOOK WHAT IT
BELIEVES TO HAVE BEEN A VERY DRAMATIC STEP IN LEADING CYPRIOTS
OF MAKARIOS GOVT. DURING THE STRUGGLE TO REMOVE MAKARIOS
OUT FOR DRIP OF THE COMMUNISTS WHEN IT FORCED THE DOWNFALL
PRISONERS SUFFERED GREATLY AT HANDS OF MAKARIOS POLICE,
FROM OFFICE, RIGHT WING FAMILIES SUFFERED EXTREME HAROSHIP,
AND MEMBERS OF FAMILIES SUFFERED LOSSES OF LOVED ONES. NOW
THOSE WHO FOUGHT ARE GROWING INCREASINGLY DEJECTED AND FRUS-
DECLASSIFIED TRATED, BELIEVING THAT PERHAPS THEY HAVE BEEN BETRAYED. WHILE
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
State Dept. review completed
NLN308-39/10884 PER RAC REVIEW
By
AM
NARA. Date 5/8/2012
:
SEGRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 NLN-NSC FILES-592-4-2-3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library NIN 08-39/10884 tp.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 NLN-NSC FILES-592-4-2-3
PRINTANT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
PEODET
SECRET
-2 S E e R E I Nicosia 1778 July 25, 1974
ENTIRE RIGHT WING PRESENTLY SUPPORTS PRESIDENCY OF GLAFKOS
CLERIDES, IT WORRIES THAT PERHAPS CLERIDES IS IN FACT SERVING
ONLY AS "ACTING PRESIQENT", AND IS ARRANGING L TURN OF MAKARIOS.
THIS UST NOT BE ALLOWED. IF IN FINAL ANALYSIS, IT IS BELIEVED
THAT MAKARIOS MUST RETURN, THIS RETURN MUST BE DELAYED UNTIL
SUCH TIME THAT SOME SEMBLANCE OF NORMALITY AND PEACE HAS RETURNED
TO CYPRUS. MAKARIOS RETURN, IF PREMATURE, WILL SPARK CARNAGE
THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. MEMBERS OF MAKARIOS' GOVT, INCLUDING
CLERIDES, WOULD BE MAKRED FOR ASSASSINATION.
4. IT IS APPARENT THAT LEFT WING FULLY SUPPORTS MAKARIOS
RETURN AND THUS ACCEPTS CLERIDES ONLY AS "ACTING PRESIDENT"--
AS CLERIOES PRESENTS HIMSELF. LEFT WING I.S PREPARED TO MEET
IN OPEN, ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH RIGHT WING, IF NEED BE, TO
EFFECT MAKARIOS' RETURN. A LARGE NUMBER OF ARMS SEIZED AND
CONFISCATED AT TIME OF MAKARIOS FALL FROM POWER, HAVE BEEN
REDISTRIBUTED TO GREEK CYPRIOTS TO ARME THE COMMUNITY AGAINST
TURK INVADERS. IT IS KNOWN THAT MANY MEMBERS OF COMMUNIST
PARTY (AKEL) AND FOLLOWERS OF DR. VASSOS LYSSARIDES WERE
INSTRUCTED TO APPEAR AT NATIONAL GUARD POSTS WHERE THESE
ARMS WERE BEING DISTRIBUTED. IT IS ALSO UNDERSTOOD MANY
MEMBERS OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE NOT PROCEEDED TO THE FRONT
LINES, BUT REMOVED THEMSELVES INTO THE MOUNTAINS TO AWAIT
INSTRUCTIONS.
5. SITUATION BETWEEN GREEK AND TURK CYPRIOTS MUST BE DEFUSED
PROMPTLY. GREEK COMMUNITY IS BELIEVED TO BE OBSERVING THE
CEASEFIRE AS BEST IT CAN, BUT IT GROWS PROGRESSIVELY RESTLESS
WITH EACH ADDIT ONAL CEASEFIRE VIOLATION BY TURK SIDE, WHICH
HAS CONTINUED TO ADVANCE ITS POSITION UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF
THE CEASEFIRE. IT IS CLEAR THAT IF TURKISH ENCROACHMENTS AND
UTTER DISREGARD FOR CONDITIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE CONTINUE,
THE GREEK COMMUNITY, ACTING OUT OF FEAR, WILL STIKE TURK
VILLAGES THROUGHOUT ISLAND. MASSACRE AND CARNAGE WILL SPILL
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.
6. DR. CASSOULIDES STADO USG MUST MOVE URGENTLY TO BRING
S
ABOUT TURKISH/GREEK SETTLEMENT SO THAT THE SUTUATION IN
CYPRUS CAN BE MOVED T STABILITY.
DAVIES
BT
#1778
SECRET
NOT TO RF REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 NLN-NSC FILES-592-4-2-3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library NIN 08-39/10884 5.242
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
K 20X
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF SECURITY
TELEGRAM
SECRET
13
0 191250Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
CONTROL: 5340Q
(Vs)
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 8908
RECD: 19-JUL-14-112
BT
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1520
NODIS
DEPT FOR THE SECRETARY, PLEASE PASS ATHENS AND ANKARA CINFO
IMMEDIATE) FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652: GDS
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY
NLN08-39/10885 Per 2/21/2014
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: COMMENTS OF GLAFCOS CLERIDES
By RS milt NARA, Date 11/2/2016
1. FOR REASONS OF HIS PERSONAL SAFETY, CLERIDES' COMMENTS
ON PRESENT SITUATION SHOULD BE MOST CLOSELY HELO.
2. I CALLED ON CLERIDES AT HIS RESIDENCE MORNING JULY 19.
I STRESSED TO HIM OUR CONCERN BOTH THAT CONFLICT BETWEEN
S
OUR TWO ALLIES BE AVOIDED AND THAT CIVIL WAR ON CYPRUS
NOT GIVE ELEMENTS UNFRIENOLY TO THE FREE WORLD OPPORTUNITES
TO EXPLOIT. I NOTED CURRENT ACTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL
AND THE TALKS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND TURKEY, AS WELL AS JOE
SISCO'S EFFORTS IN ATHENS AND ANKARA. I CONCLUDED BY
SAYING IT SEEMED TO ME THAT ANSWER TO WHATEVER MIGHT HAPPEN
ON CYPRUS WOULD NOT BE FOUND NOW ON ISLAND BUT IN EFFORTS
WITH TWO POWERS MOST IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED, GREECE AND
TURKEY.
3. CLERIDES RESPONDED THAT HE WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT.
THERE MUST NOW BE CONCESSIONS ON PART OF BOTH ATHENS AND
ANKARA. GREEKS MUST BE BROUGHT TO REALIZATION THAT TURKS
NOW MUST HAVE SOMETHING FROM ATHENS, TO SAVE TURKISH FACE IN
A SITUATION PRECIPITATED BY ATHENS. TURKS MUST REALIZE
THAT THE JUNTA CAN MOVE ONLY SO FAR WITHOUT PRECIPITATING
ITS OVERTHROW AND POSSIBLE CHAOS IN GREECE.
4. IN RECALLING OUR CONVERSATION JULY 12, HE SAID IT WAS
S
CLEAR NOW THAT HIS FEAR WAS JUSTIFIED THAT THE ARCHBISHOP HAO
MISASSESSED THE JUNTA IN FEELING THAT ITS WEAKNESS PREVENTED ITS
MOVING IN CYPRUS. IT WAS THE FACT OF ITS WEAKNESS THAT CONTRIBUTED
TO THE MOVE. ALTHOUGH AGREEING THAT THE ANSWER TO PROBLEM
HERE MUST BE FOUND IN A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ATHENS AND
ANKARA, SUCH A SETTLEMENT WAS IMPOSSIBLE UNLESS IT INVOLVED
SEGRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTNORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET,
-2-SECRE T SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1520, JUL 19
REMOVAL OF, THE ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT NICOS
SAMPSON."
5. CLERIDES SAID NICOS SAMPSON WAS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE
COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO TURKS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HE WAS
COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO VAST MAJORITY OF GREEK
CYPRIOTS AND COULD BE MAINTAINED IN POWER ONLY BY MILITARY
FORCE. HE ELABORATED BY SAYING THE POLICE FILE ON SAMPSON
WAS THICKER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER CRIMINAL IN CYPRUS.
HE WAS GUILTY NOT ONLY OF MURDER BUT ALSO OF COMMON THEFT
AND BURGLARY, AND THIS IN THE DAYS AFTER THE TROUBLES WITH
THE TURKS. HE CITED INCIDENTS IN OMORPHITA IN 1963-64
TROUBLES WHEN SAMPSON WOULD ROUND UP TURK CYPRIOTS AND FORCE
THEM TO SHOUT "LONG LIVE MAKARIOS. IF THEY DID NOT HE SHOT
THEM; IF THEY DID, HE SHOT THEM AS TRAITORS TO THEIR TURKISH
FATHERLAND. SUCH WAS THE COMPLETELY DISREPUTABLE NATURE
OF SAMPSON THAT EVEN IF TURKS WERE TO SIT DOWN AT A TABLE
WITH HIM, HE, CLERIDES, WOULD REFUSE.
6. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. UNLESS
SAMPSON WERE REMOVED, HE, CLERIDES, WOULD ANNOUNCE HIS WITH-
DRAWAL FROM HIS POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND AS INTERLOCUTOR ININTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. HE HAD CONSENTED
TO DIMMY DIMITRIOU'S PLEA THAT HE GO ALONG WITH ANNOUNCEMENT
THAT HE WAS WILLING TO CONTINUE IN TALKS BECAUSE HE DID NOT
WISH TO ADD TO DIFFICULTIES OF CYPRUS DURING THIS TURBULENT
WEEK. SAMPSON, HE REPEATED, WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE AS
PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS. HIS ASSUMPTION OF THAT ROLE WAS IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH PRESCRIBED THAT PRESIDENCY
WENT TO NEXT IN LINE, I.E., PRESIDENT OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
THE TURKS WERE QUITE CORRECT IN THEIR STATEMENT
THAT SAMPSON S ASSUMPTION OF POWER WAS IN VIOLATION OF
CONSTITUTION AGREED TO IN 1960.
7. CLERIDES SAID HE BELIEVED MAKARIOS COULD NOT RETURN UNLESS
BY OUTSIDE INTERVENTION AND SHOULD NOT RETURN EITHER AS
PRESIDENT OR ARCHBISHOP. HE HAD BEEN OPPORTUNISTIC IN
SEEKING SUPPORT FROM LEFTISTS AND COMMUNISTS. FACT NOW
BEING DISCLOSED THAT HE HAD ACQUIRED AND HIDDEN LARGE
STORES OF ARMS ILLEGALLY WITH COOPERATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
AND, UNDOUBTEDLY, SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS THE POLITICAL
ORIENTATION OF THOSE HE HAD AROUND HIM WERE SUCH AS TO DIS-
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
-3 - SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1520, NODIS JUL 19
ILLUSION MANY WHO PREVIOUSLY HAD SUPPORTED HIM. VOCIFEROUS
SOVIET SUPPORT FOR HIM SINCE THE COUP WAS ANOTHER FACTOR.
IF HE RETURNED, IT WAS LIXELY HE WOULD RELY EVEN MORE HEAVILY
ON THE EAST. HIS RETURN ALSO WOULD REVIVE ECCLESIASTIC PROBLEM ON
ISLAND.
8. CLERIDES SAID THE ANSWER TO CYPRUS INTERNAL PROBLEM WAS
REMOVAL OF NICOS SAMPSON AS HEAD OF GOVT. HE DID NOT THINK
OTHER MEMBERS OF PRESENT GROUP NEED GO: INDEED HE THOUGHT
INVOLVEMENT OF THE DIMITRIOUS AND SEVERAL OTHERS WAS DE-
SIRABLE IN FUTURE POLITICAL EVOLUTION. IN RESPONSE TO MY
QUESTION, HE SAID REMOVAL OF SAMPSON COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE
THROUGH A DECISION TO 00 SO IN ATHENS. INTERNALLY THERE
COULD BE A PROCEDURE POSSIBLY INVOLVING PARLIAMENTARY ACTION
WHICH COULD RESTORE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER TO THE ISLAND.
HE FELT A COMMITMENT TO RETURN TO A CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
WOULD EAST PROBLEM WITH THE TURKS. REALISTICALLY, IT MUST
BE ACCEPTED THAT TURKS WOULD SEEK TO IMPROVE TURK CYPRIOT
POSITION ON CYPRUS. IF HE WERE A TURK HE WOULD MOST CERTAINLY
SEEK TO CAPITALIZE ON OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED BY COUP.
BT
#1520
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order, 13526 and has,been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
0 191250Z JUL 74
CONTROL: 5335Q
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
RECD: 19 JUL 14 06Z
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8909
ST
SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 1520
NOOIS
DEPT FOR THE SECRETARY, PLEASE PASS ATHENS AND ANKARA CINFO
IMMEDIATE) FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO
9. I TOLD HIM HIS VIEWS WOULD BE VALUED BY THE SECRETARY
AND JOE SISCO, AND THAT 1 WOULD ASSURE THEY WERE MOST CLOSELY
HELD. I SUMMED UP BY SAYING 1 UNDERSTOOD HIM TO FEEL PRESENT
SITUATION WAS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS, THAT NICOS SAMPSON WAS
COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO TURK CYPRIOTS AND TURKEY AS PRESI-
DENT OF CYPRUS, AND PROBABLY UNACCEPTABLE TO MAJORITY OF
GREEK CYPRIOTS, THAT THE RETURN OF ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS WAS PROBABLY
NOT IN INTERESTS EITHER O.F CYPRUS OR WEST, THAT A RETURN TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER ON CYPRUS WAS ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT
FOR DEFUSING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ATHENS AND ANKARA OVER
CYPRUS ISSUE, AND THAT HE, UNLESS SAMPSON WERE OUSTED,
WOULD NOT REMAIN AS PRESIDENT OF HOUSE OF REPS OR AS GREEK CYPRIOT
INTERLOCUTOR IN TALKS. CLERIDES AGREED WITH SUMMATION BUT
SUGGESTED I COULD DROP THE "PROBABLY" IN BOTH CASES ABOVE.
I TOLD HIM I HAD CALLED ON HIM WITH AUTHORIZATION OF THE
SECRETARY, THAT HIS VIEWS WERE VALUED AND WE WISHED TO STAY
CLOSELY IN CONTACT WITH HIM. HE SAID HE WAS ANXIOUS WE DO
SO AND HE COULD BE AVAILABLE ANY TIME AT, HOME BUT HAD NOT BEEN
AT HIS OFFICE SINCE HE DID NOT WANT TO FURTHER IMPRESSION HE
WOULD BE WILLING TO SERVE UNDER A. MAN SUCH AS SAMPSON.
10. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY SINCE HE WAS NEXT IN LINE OF
SUCCESSION, CUERIDES VIEWS COULD BE SEEN AS SELF-SERVING.
GIVEN REALITIES OF PRESENT SITUATION HWEVER I THINK MOST
DISINTERESTED OBSERVERS WOULD COME TO CONCLUSION SIMILAR TO
HIS. IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS PRESENTATION THAT HE
CONSIDERED RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSION PRE-
REQUISITE TO GREEK-TURKISH AGREEMENT AND THAT PARLIAMENTARY
ACTION AT SOME POINT DOWN THE ROAD COULD BE UTILIZED TO RESTRUCTURE
GOVERNMENT IF NECESSARY.
DAVIES
BT
#1520
NOTE: NOT PASSED BY OC/T - 7/19/74
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.