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JORDAN Vol. V July 1- September 30, 1970 [2 of 2]
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JORDAN Vol. V July 1- September 30, 1970 [2 of 2]
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 445
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03740 080538Z
19
ACTION NEA 15
INFO OCT 01 AF 12,10 13,CIAE 00,DODE 00.JPM 04 , H 02,INR 070L 33.
NSAE 00.NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,PRS 01 SS 20 : USIA 12,ACDA 16 AID 28,
EUR 17,RSR 01/167 W
043449
R 0714352 AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8461
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
CONFIDENTIALAMMAN3740
SUBJ: JORDANIAN VIEWS RE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCES
REF: AMMAN 3684 NOTAL)
1. IN STATEMENT SUPPLIED MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY AUGUST 6,
KING HUSSEIN HAS CONFIRMED THAT IN AUGUST HE WILL BE MAKING AN EXTEN-
SIVE TOUR TO CERTAIN ARAB CAPITALS. HE SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS WITH ARAB
LEADERS THE PROSPECTS OF AN ARAB SUMMIT
CONFERENCE. POLITICAL EFFORTS TO SETTLE THE MIDDLE EAST
PROBLEM, HE SAID, HAVE BROUGHT NO RESULTS SO FAR. HE
DECLARED IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO CONVENE AN ARAB
SUMMIT MEETING TO DECIDE ON SOME OTHER COURSE OF ACTION
20 BEHIND THIS PUBLIC ORATORY, HOWEVER, THERE IS LITTLE
JORDANIAN ENTHUSIASM FOR AN EARLY ARAB SUMMIT. THE CONSENSUS OF
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
UNANTMENT BE OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
CILLCE
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 AMMAN 03740 080538Z
JORDANIAN THINKING, BASED ON OUR SOUNDINGS OF PALACE AND GOVERNMENTAL
SOURCES, INCLUDING FORMIN ON 7TH, IS THAT:
(A) A SUMMIT NOW IS UNLIKELY IN ANY EVENT BECAUSE FAISAL OF
SAUDI ARABIA REMAINS OPPOSED: (B) A SUMMIT IN THE AUTUMN WOULD'
HOWEVER, BE ALMOST INEVITABLE IF THE EXPECTED MAJOR PEACE-MAKING
EFFORT BY THE GREAT POWERS DURING THE FORTHCOMING UNGA FAILED TO
ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS: (C) KING HUSSEIN IS OPPOSED TO A MINI-
SUMMIT OF THE FOUR ARAB STATES ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE
STRUGGLE WITH ISRAEL, WHICH REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN PROPOSED
BY THE UAR, ON GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD RESTRICT STILL FURTHER
JORDANS SHRINKING FIELD OF MANEUVER YET FAIL TO GUARANTEE
THE ADDITONAL MATERIEL HELP WHICH HUSSEIN BELIEVES HE
NEEDS (AND WHICH HE WILL BE SEEKING ON HIS TRIP).
3. IN THIS CONNECTION PRIME MINISTER RIFAI ON AUGUST 6
SAID PUBLICLY THAT JORDAN DID NOT OBJECT TO A SMALL SUMMIT
CONFERENCE BUT THOUGHT THAT BETTER RESULTS WOULD BE ACHIEVED
IF ALL ARAB STATES WERE REPRESENTED THIS APPEARS TO US AS
JORDANIAN PLOY TO ENSURE THAT NO SUMMIT, OF ANY DIMENSION,
OCCURS PREMATURELY, I.E., BEFORE JORDAN IS READY TO ACCEPT
THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MUCH HARDER ARAB POSITION. GP = 3 .
ODELL
LETECKVW
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
601/10/5199
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT LOW OF STATE
SUMMARY
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 137
PAGE 01 AMMAN 04333 041545Z
46
ACTION NEA-15
INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00
NSC-10 P=03 RSC.01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 10-13 0-03
OPR-02 SY-03 OC-06 CCO-00 SSO-00 EUR-20 RSR-01 /130 W
039701
0 R 041525Z SEP 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 924
CO NFIDENTIAL AMMAN 4333
SUBJECT: JORDAN SITUATION
REF: GENEVA 3032: STATE 145223
1. FOLLOWING DISTURBANCES OF PAST WEEK IN AMMAN, KING, GOJ,
POLITICIANS
AND RESPONSIBLE FEDAYEEN SEEM TO REALIZE THE NEED
TO SEEK - AT LEAST EMPORARILY 0 PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THEIR
DIFFERENCES. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS A CONSIDERABLE NEGOTIATING
EFFORT WILL BE MADE BOTH IN CAIRO AND AMMAN, PROBLEM, HOWEVER,
IS THAT DISTRUST BETWEEN GOVT AND FEDAYEEN INCREASING: LINES
BETWEEN GOVT AND FEDAYEEN HAVE BECOME MORE SHARPLY DRAWN, AND
BOTH SIDES LIABLE TO PRESSURES AND PROVOCATIONS STEMMING FROM
RESPECTIVE EXTREME FACTIONS. DIFFICULTIES IN THE PEACE T.ALKS,
FINALLY, COULD RAISE FEDAYEEN THREAT TO GOJ TO NEW LEVELS OF
SERIOUSNESS.
20 FOR THE TIME BEING, HOWEVER WE THINK THAT ALTHOUGH OCCASIONAL
ACTS OF LAWLESSNESS MAY CONTINUE TO TAKE PLACE a LIKELIHOOD OF OUT-
and
BREAK OF VIOLENCE ON A LARGE SCALE IS DIMINISHING. GP-3.
ODELL
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon residential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUMMARY
Department of Sta
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 834
PAGE 01 AMMAN 04300 0322492
84
ACTION NEA-15
INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05
H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03: RSC-01 PRS-01
SS-20 IO-13 ACDA-19 USIE-00 EUR-20 AID-28 SY-03 OPR-02
RSR-01 /156 W
034032
0 R 032040Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 914
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
C ONFICENTIAL AMMAN 4300
SUBJECT: KING HUSAIN ADDRESSES NATION
REF: AMMAN 3245
AT 2100 LOCAL KING HUSAIN DELIVERED 15 MINUTE ADDRESS TO NATION
ON SUBJECT RECENT DISTURBANCES IN AMMAN. ASSUME TEXT AVAILABLE
FBIS. SYNOPSIS AND COMMENTS FOLLOW:
1. SPEECH MARKED BY POPULAR TOUCH WITH KING EXPRESSING HIS
PARTICULAR UNDERSTANDING AND SORROW FOR HARDSHIPS AND DANGERS
ORDINARY PEOPLE OF AMMAN HAVE ENDURED THESE PAST FEW DAYS
ESPECIALLY INTOLERABLE HE INDICATED, MUST BE SIGHT OF ARMED
MEN WANDERING THROUGH STREETS WITHOUT pretext OR JUSTIFICATION.
KING THEREAFTER INVITED COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO TAKE ALL MEASURES
SITUATION REQUIRED TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER AND AFFIRMED HIS
GREAT CONFIDENCE IN IT. THIS PARAGRAPH IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED
BY EQUALLY GREAT EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE IN CHIEF OF STAFF.
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS THEN ADJOURNED TO WORK WITH CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TO IMPLEMENT GOJ-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT OF JULY 10.
IT APPEARS KING HAS SOUGHT TO PLACE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ITALIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
II 10 LOB
CONFIDENTIAL 10"
СОЛИСТГ 10 INGrewent 10 MOBK MILH COWNTILEE
PAGE 02 AMMAN 04300 032249Z IN at
RESTORING LAW AND ORDER SQUARELY ON COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. (AN
EARLIER DIFFICULT DECISION FACING IM-ACCEPTANCE OF ROGERS
PROPOSAL WAS DEALT WITH SAME WAY.)
OL
3. MINISTERS NOW HAVE UNENVIABLE TASK OF IMPLEMENTING JUNE 70
AGREEMENT, AMONG THOSE CHIEF PROVISIONS WAS PROHIBITION OF ARMED
FEYDAYEEN, DEMONSTRATIONS, PRESENCE OF ARMED FEDAYEEN IN
PUBLIC PLACES AND PRESENCE OF FEDAYEEN ZDSES#IN CITIES. GIVEN
INENSE#FEDAYEEN-GOU DISRUS#IT SEEMS UNLIKELY AT THIS TIME THAT
FEDAYEEN COULD BE PERSUADED TO ABANDON ETREE CANOPYE#OF URBAN
SETTINGS.
ГОСУГ
4. IF CABINET HOWEVER CANNOT DO THE JOB, THERE MAY BE IMPLICATION
IN HM'S PRAISE OF ARMY AND CHIEF OF STAFF THAT MORE DIRECT
PRESSURES COULD THEN BE RESORTED TO (WITH POPULAR JUSTIFICATION
GP = 3.
ODELL
#300
NOTE: AMMAN 4300 AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.
THEMBVESA BETBNI
vwconanr ПЕВПЕУГЕН
THEO nainl CVIBO
10 PECEIVIE MVSHDC are
EW УННАМ
O K so
824-01 1129 M
22-50 10-13 VCDV-13 021E-08 ENB-5Q VID-58 068-05
H-Q5 INK*08 r-e* игс-10 5*03 688*01
THEO OC1-01 CCO-00 220-00 ИССЕ-00 CIVE-00 6W*02
УСТОЙ MEV-12
8⑈
BVGE 01 УИНУЙ 0⑇389 0355#85
COMETOENITY
83⑈
STATE
LEFECKVW
Reproduce DaNthel DXBINPresidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ee1/10/5199
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 694
PAGE 01 AMMAN 04205 311513Z
53
ACTION NEA-15
INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04
NSAE-00 NSC-10 P=03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 IO=13
ACDA-19 RSR-01 /135 W
006460
R 311445Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 873
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 759
CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN 4205
SUBJECT: ISRAELI CHANGES TO CHARACTER OF JERUSALEM
REF: STATE 1405931 AMMAN A-118, AUG 19
POINT MADE BY AMB SHARAF IN DEPT'S REFTEL MADE ALSO TO EMBOFF
(HORAN) AUG 27 BY AM AL-FARRA. CLAIMING THAT GOI WAS IN PROCESS
OF MAKING A NUMBER OF
UNILATERAL CHANGES IN THE STATUS OF EAST
jerusalem, FARRA SAID HE BELIEVED THESE REPRESENTED ISRAELI
VIOLATIONS OF THE SPIRIT OF THE CEASEFIRE. HE ADDED THAT SUCH
ACTIONS BY GOI COULD ONLY MAKE ALREADY DIFFICULT PROBLEM MORE
COMPLEX. GP = 3 .
ODELL
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
womanh
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET 499
EXE-S EXETS
PAGE 01 AMMAN 04145 271609Z
45
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
114951
R 271502Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 844
70 AUG 27 PM 9:09
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
S E COR ET AMMAN 4145
EXDIS
DEPT PASS JERUSALEM
SUBJECT: RECENT AMERICAN STATEMENTS ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS
1. DURING CALL AUG 27 BY EMBOFF (HORAN) ON MFA DIRECTOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS WALEED SADI, BOTH LATTER AND AMB AL FARRA
EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN RECENT AMERICAN STATEMENTS ON ME
(EMBOFF LEFT WITH SADI COPY OF DAVID BRASHEARS! ARTICLE
THAT APPEARED IN USIA WIRELESS FILE AUG 26, 19701.
20 BOTH SADI AND AL-FARRA APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT SENATOR
FULBRIGHT SPEECH AND RECENT BRIEFINGS BY "ADMINISTRATION
OFFICIALS" LINKED TOGETHER. AL-FARRA POINTED OUT THAT WHEREAS
FULBRIGHT SPOKE OF NECESSITY THAT GREAT POWERS IMPOSE A PEACE
SETTLEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST, "ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS" WERE
SPEAKING OF NECESSITY THAT GREAT POWERS ACT TO PRESERVE IT.
SADI HAD NO OBJECTION TO CONTENTS OF FULBRIGHT SPEECH AND
THOUGHT THAT SENATOR'S PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE ARABS EVERYTHING
THEY REALLY NEEDED. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DIDNOT BELIEVE
THAT US-GOI BILATERAL TREATY, WHICH ALSO MENTIONED BY FULBRIGHT,
WOULD REALLY GIVE ISRAEL ANYTHING IT DID NOT ALREADY HAVE.
3. SPEAKING AS AN ARAB AND AS A POLITICAL SCIENTIST, SADI WENT
ON TO WONDER IF RECENT AMERICAN STATEMENTS WOULD RROMOTE MAXIMUM
NEGOTIATING RESOLUTION ON PART OF ARABS. SADI SAID THAT ANY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EXPIS EXETS
PAGE 02 AMMAN 04145 271609Z
PEACE SETTLEMENT WOULD REQUIRE THAT ARAB STATESMEN MAKE SOME
POLITICALLY DIFFICULT AND POTENTIALLY EMBARRASSING DECISIONS.
HE BELIEVED THAT IF ARABS PRESENTED WITH ALTERNATIVE TO SUCH
DECISIONS - SUCH AS POSSIBILITY OF IMPOSED SOLUTION ARABS
MIGHT BE INCLINED TO TAKE IT. AL-FARRA EXPRESSED HIS AGREEMENT
WITH SADI AND BELIEVED THAT PROSPECTS GREAT POWERS'
APPLYING AND POLICING A SETTLEMENT MIGHT FURTHER REDUCE MOMENTUM
JARRING TALKS. (SADI HAS JD FROM UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO AND HAS
SERVED IN JORDANIAN MISSION TO UN).
40 AL-FARRA EMPHASIZED HIS FEELING OF FRUSTRATION THAT so LITTLE
OF SUBSTANCE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN ALMOST THREE WEEKS THAT HAVE
PASSED SINCE BEGINNING OF CEASEFIRE. HE THOUGHT THAT CHANCES WOULD
BE GOOD FOR EXTENSION OF CEASEFIRE AT END OF 90 DAYS ONLY IF GOJ
COULD AT THAT TIME POINT TO RECORD OF SOLID ALBEIT PARTIAL
ACHIEVEMENTS. HE CRITICIZED AMB TEKOAH'S DEPARTURE FOR TEL AVIV.
5. REPORTING OFFICER ASSURED SADI AND AL-FARRA THAT US
DID NOT BY ITS EFFORTS ENVISAGE PROFERING ALTERNATIVE TO
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BOTH SIDES. INSTEAD WE HOPED
TO USE OUR GOOD OFFICES IN CONJUNCTION WITH THOSE OF OTHER
MEMBERS OF BIG FOUR TO BE OF MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE TO AMB
JARRING. TO BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE AS WELL SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S
SPEECH NOT CONNECTED WITH MOST RECENT ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS.
TO THIS AL-FARRA REPLIED THAT HE WASN'T SURE BUT IT SOUNDED TO
HIM AS IF US MIGHT BE LOOKING BEYOND PRESENT TALKS To THE
SITUATION IT WOULD FACE IF JARRING MISSION UNSUCCESSFUL. GP-3.
ODELL
NOTE: NOT PASSED JERUSALEM BY OC/T.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
her/10/5190
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SUMMARY
CONFIDENTIAL 316
PAGE 01 AMMAN 04114 2611532
47
ACTION NEA-
INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00
NSC-10 P=Ø3 RSC.01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 I0-13 ACDA-19
AID-28 RSR-01 /142 W
103592
P R 261045Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 83Ø
INFTNRUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3146
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
C ONFIDENTIALAMMAN4114
SUBJECT: AMMAN ON EVE OF PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS
1. THERE IS AN AIR OF EXPECTANCY AND SOME TENSION IN AMMAN
ON EVE OF 8TH MEETING OF PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS. WE
HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS TODAY OF SOME SHOOTING DOWNTOWN NEAR
AL-HUSSEIN MOSQUE AND TRAFFIC IN THAT PART OF CITY MUCH LESS
THAN NORMAL. IN PAST FEW DAYS AS WELL, SHOOTING INCIDENTS
INVOLVING FEDAYEEN IN OUTLYING AREAS SUCH AS AIRPORT AND
TOWNSHIP OF NAUR HAVE OCCURRED. CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT RIFA'I
TOLD EMBOFF (AUG 25 (HORAN) THAT GOJ WAS WATCHING SITUATION
WARILY AND THAT IT HAD TAKEN NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TO DEAL
WITH ANY CONTINGENCY. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT GOJ WOULD
CONTINUE TO DO ALL IT COULD TO AVOID CLASH WITH FEDAYEEN.
HE ADMITTED HE WAS DISTURBED BY INDICATIONS THAT FEDAYEEN
WERE PRESSURING JORDANIAN CIVILIANS TO OPPOSE ROGERS PLAN
THROUGH SETTING UP "PEOPLES" COURT" AND REQUESTING SIGNATURES
TO PETITIONS. BUT HE FELT THAT FOR MOMENT AT LEAST GOJ
10
HAD TO LIVE WITH THE SITUATION AND AVOID GIVING FEDAYEEN
THE PROVOCATION THEY MIGHT BE SEEKING. RIFA'I THOUGHT, BE
MOREOVER, THESE FEDAYEEN ACTIONS WERE AN INDICATION THAT
FEDAYEEN STRENGTH ON THE WANE AND THAT TIME WAS CONTINUING
TO PLAY IN HANDS OF GOJ.
DEPARTMENT
CONF IDENTIAL
LETECKVW
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
10 БГУЛ IN Ot
PAGE 02 AMMAN 04114 261153Z MVS соилтиптие
yn
INDICATION
THAT
WM RIFA'I WAS NOT VERY OPTIMISTIC THAT FEDAYEEN WOULD BE
WON OVER TO CAUSE OF GREATER MODERATION FOLLOWING MEETINGS
WITH NASSER IN CAIRO. SIMILAR PESSIMISM WAS EXPRESSED TO EMBOFF
AUGUST 26 BY JORDANIAN AMB AL-FARRA.
MEBE
10
30 GOU, HOWEVER, STILL UNCERTAIN AS TO MODALITIES OF PALESTINE
CONFERENCE. RIFA'I BELIEVED CONFERENC WOULD HAVE ONLY
SINGLE SESSION IN WHICH DELEGATES WOULD BE ASKED TO EXPRESS
THEIR OPPOSITION TO ROGERS PROPOSAL. IT WAS HIS BELIEF THAT
fedayeen WOULD WISH TO AVOID ADDITIONAL SESSIONS SINCE THESE APT
TO MAKE LATENT DIVISIONS IN PALESTINIAN RANKS APPARENT. ON
OTHER HAND, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SECURITY MAJOR GENERAL MATAR
NOT CONVINCED THAT CONFERENCE WOULD BE HELD AT ALL. HE
POINTED OUT THAT ARAFAT AND COMPANY STILL IN CAIRO AND STATED
THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR OPENING OF CONFERENCE STILL NOT FIRM.
IF CONFERENCE DID MEET HE, TOO, THOUGHT DELEGATES WOULD
SKATE OVER THIN ICE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. GP=3. In
ananeci: ODELL on ЕЛЕ OE Соиекега
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пелит CVI80
10 BECELVIE МУЗНОС 830
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#1
ЬУСЕ 01 УННАИ Q#11# 5811235
STATES LIVIES OF
CONFIDENTIAL
LETECKVW
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
SCI/10/5192
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
Department of States
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SITUATION R00
TELEGRAM
70 AUG 13 PM 4:25
SECRET 989
2
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03887 131847Z
3
41
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
020705
R 131515Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 761
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
SECRE T AMMAN 3887
EXDIS
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR JORDANIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF CEASE-FIRE
EXCES
REF: (A) AMMAN 3816: (B) AMMAN 3604
SUMMARY: EXTENT TO WHICH HUSSEIN WILL BE ABLE TO RESTRICT FEDAYEEN
VIOLATIONS OF CEASE-FIRE WILL DEPEND ON PROGRESS OF PEACE INITIATIVE
AND REASONABLE DEGREE OF ISRAELI TOLERANCE AS WELL AS INTERNAL
FACTORS. FEDAYEEN ARE STILL OFF BALANCE AND MAY NOT BE CAPABLE OF
INCREASING OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL TO EXTENT THREATENED. AT
PRESENT WE SHOULD RE-EMPHASIZE PRIVATELY TO KING AND PRIMIN
IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING CEASE-FIRE LINES REASONABLY QUIET, KEEPING
OUR FOCUS ON WHAT GOJ AND FEDAYEEN ACTUALLY DO, NOT WHAT THEY SAY.
FEDAYEEN WILL NATURALLY EXAGGERATE THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENT. END SUMMARY.
1 - FOLLOWING HUSSEIN'S STATEMENTS OF INTENT (AMMAN 38161, A CRUCIAL
ISSUE IN NEXT FEW WEEKS WILL BE
THE EXTENT TO WHICH JORDAN REALLY IS
GOING TO BE ABLE TO RESTRICT FEDAYEEN VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE.
FACTORS OUTSIDE JORDAN OF COURSE, CAN HELP THUS, THE MORE PROGRESS
IS ACHIEVED IN PEACE TALKS, THE MORE ACTIVELY WE CAN EXPECT THE
JORDANIANS TO ENFORCE THE CEASE-FIRE WE SHOULD BE AWARE, HOWEVER,
THAT GOJ ENFORCEMENT WILL NEVER BE TOTALLY PROPHYLACTIC ISRAELIS
ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE PREPARED FOR SOME LEAKAGE, BUT WE BELIEVE
IT CAN BE KEPT WITHIN THEIR LIMITS OF TOLERANCE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order/13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXCES
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 AMMAN 03887 131847Z
WM ALTHOUGH LOGICAL PURSUIT OF FEDAYEEN OBUECTIVES WOULD DICTATE
INCREASED ACTIVITY ACROSS CEASE-FIRE LINES IN ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE
MULLITY OF CEASE-FIRE AND PROVOKE HARSH ISRAELI REACTIONS, WE ARE
NOT CONVINCED THAT SUCH AN INCREASE WILL IN FACT OCCUR TO ANYWHERE
NEAR THE DEGREE THREATENED. BASIC REASON FOR THIS IS THE IMPROVED
TACTICAL POSITION OF KING B AS REPORTED AMMAN 3604 5. WITH RELATION
TO FEDAYEEN ISSUE. AS RESULT, FEDAYEEN WILL PROBABLY FEEL IT
NECESSARY TO "DEFEND THE BACK OF THE REVOLUTION" BY KEEPING A PORTION
OF THEIR ARAMAMENT AND FORCES IN AMMAN, ZARQA AND IRBID, THE EAST
BANK TOWNS WITH SOLID PALESTINIAN MAJORITIES WHICH ARE THEIR ONLY
REAL SANCTUARIES. THEY FEAR BEING LURED INTO THE OPEN AND RISKING A
CONFRONTATION WITH THE ARMY ON ITS TERMS RATHER THAN THEIRS.
MOREOVER, SOME GROUPS WERE RECENTLY INVOLVED IN INTERNECINE
FIGHTING WHICH DEFLECTED THEIR ATTENTION FROM CEASE-FIRE LINES.
(WE DO NOT CONSIDER DIVISIONS WITHIN FEDAYEEN CAMP CLOSED DESPITE
SUPERFICIAL RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED FRONT IN PLO CENTRAL
COMMITTEE RELEASE OF AUGUST 10. WE ASSUME TEXT AVAILABLE TO DEPT
VIA FBIS). MANY FEDAYEEN MAY BE RELUCTANT TO FACE THE INCREASINGLY
EFFECTIVE ISRAELI DEFENSE MEASURES WHICH, COUPLED WITH THE PROSPECT
OF NO JORDANIAN COVER FIRE, WILL MAKE CROSS-RIVER OPERATIONS LESS
AND LESS ATTRACTIVE. SOME FEDAYEEN GROUPS, FINALLY ARE REPORTED
STILL TO BE SHORT OF AMMUNITION AS RESULT OF JUNE CONFRONTATION.
3. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THRUST OF FEDAYEEN ACTION NORMALLY WOULD TAKE
FORM OF MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS ON BEISAN TARGETS FROM EAST BANK
SITES USING BOTH MANUAL AND MECHANICAL -TIMED FIRING SYSTEMS. WHILE
LESS ACCURATE AND DESTRUCTIVE THAN CROSS-RIVER OPERATIONS, LONG-
RANGE ROCKET ATTACKS OFFER GREATER MARGIN OF SAFETY TO ATTACKING
FORCES. MOREOVER, FEDAYEEN STOCKS OF KATIUSHA ROCKETS WERE NOT
DEPLETED DURING JUNE CRISIS IN AMMAN. FORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, THIS IS
PRECISELY THE SORT OF OPERATION HUSSEIN STATES HE INTENDS TO RESTRICT.
4. BELIEVE OUR MOST EFFECTIVE COURSE WITH THE JORDANIANS AT THIS
POINT WOULD BE TO RE-EMPHASIZE IN PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH PRIMIN AND
KING HUSSEIN (AND THROUGH HIM TO ARMED FORCES) IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH
TO GOU LIVING UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS. so LONG, THOUGH, AS GOU IN
PRACTICE SEEMS TO BE DOING WHAT WE WANT, WE SHOULD NOT BE TOO
CONCERNED THAT IT DOES NOT IN ITS STATMENTS PUBLICLY CONTRADICT
POPULAR BELIEF THAT FEDAYEEN ARE SUBSTANTIALLY EXEMPTED FROM
CEASE-FIRE OPERATION. OUR FOCUS SHOULD BE ON WHAT REALLY HAPPENS
IN NORTH JORDAN VALLEY AND OTHER PRESSURE POINTS AND NOT WHAT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the residential Library
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF MEMBER
TELEGRAM
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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03887 131847Z
FEDAYEEN MAY CLAIM IS HAPPENING
5 . IF IT APPEARS THAT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IS TRULY INCREASING, OR THAT
US GENERAL REPRESENTATIONS ON THIS ISSUE ARE REACHING POINT OF
DIMINISHING RETURNS, EMBASSY MAY SUGGEST TO DEPT CERTAIN SPECIFIC
PROPOSALS WE COULD MAKE TO HUSSEIN TO TIGHTEN UP CEASE-FIRE.
6. WE MUST EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING
PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN CONSIDERING THE ABILITY OF
GOU OVER LONG LANE TO ENFORCE MEASURES OUTLINED AMMAN 3816° CING WAS
ABLE TO PROFER THIS POSITION BECAUSE INITIATIVE HAD PASSED TO HIS
SIDE AND PUBLIC OPINION WAS SHIFTING TOWARD HIM. HOPES IN AMMAN
NOL#ARE HIGH - PERHAPS TOO HIGH = THAT JUST CONCLUSION TO 20 YEAR
STRUGGLE MAY BE IN SIGHT. IF AT THE END OF 90-DAY 8. CEASE - FIRE (EVEN
THOUGH THIS PERIOD APPLIES SPECIFICALLY ONLY TO UAR AND NOT JORDAN)
THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING TO SUSTAIN EARLIER MOMENTUM's THE FEDAYEEN
WILL FIND AN INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE AUDIENCE FOR THEIR CLAIMS
THAT ARAB PEOPLES BEING LED DOWN GARDEN PATH BY PEACE INITIA-
TIVE.
EXCES
GP = 3.
ODELL
NOTE: #AS RECEIVED.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
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SECRET 912
EXPIN EXCES
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03821 091135Z
11
ACTION SS-45
2
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 1046 W
119443
A
0 R 091101Z AUG 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 746
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
SECRE T AMMAN 3821
EXDIS
SUBU: DISCUSSIONS UNDER AUSPICES AMBASSADOR JARRING
DURING CALL BY CHARGE ON PM RIFA'I AUGUST 9, PM STATED THAT HE
HAD RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR JARRING ABOUT FORTHCOMING
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. JARRING, HE SAID, SEEMED INCLINED TO HAVE
TALKS START IN NEW YORK, AND SUBSEQUENTLY SHIFT TO CYPRUS. HE
ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT JARRING NOT YET CERTAIN WHEN EXACTLY TALKS
SHOULD START OR LEVEL AT WHICH PARTIES SHOULD BE REPRESENTED.
ODELL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXCESS
*
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TELEGRAM
SECRET 754
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03710 041235Z
02
41
ACTION SS-45
/3
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
084425
R 041100Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 712
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECRET AMMAN 3710
EXDIS
'70 AUG 4 AM 11: 40
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: SAUDI ROLE WITH FEDAYEEN
REF: BEIRUT 6382
1. FONMIN MAJDALANI'S COMMENTS TO AMB PORTER ABOUT SAUDI SUB-
SIDIES TO FEDAYEEN (REFTEL) WERE INTRIGUING. IT HAS OCCURRED TO
US IN AMMAN THAT SAUDIS COULD PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE AT THIS TIME.
EVEN IF THEY DID NOT ACTUALLY CUT SUBSIDIES TO FEDAYEEN,
THEY COULD PERHAPS DELAY PAYMENTS AND INDICATE IN VARIOUS
OTHER WAYS THAT THEY WOULD STRONGLY OBJECT TO ANY FEDAYEEN
CHALLENGE TO JORDANIAN REGIME.
20 SAUDI AMB ON AUGUST 2 TOLD US THAT 90 PERCENT OF PALESTINIANS
IN JORDAN WANTED TO GIVE PEACE PROPOSALS A CHANCE TO WORK.
HE SAID THAT HE WAS REPORTING IN THIS VEIN TO JIDDA. GP-3.
ODELL
EXPIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 913
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03690 021655Z
02
421
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 1046 W
074195
0 P 021430Z AUG 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 703
INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
EVAMEMBASSY BEIRUT 393
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN NY
SECR AMMAN 3690
EXDIS
CORRECT EDCO PY (TEXT)
'70 AUG 3 AM 10: 13
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
DEPT PASS OTHER POSTS
SUBJECT: ARAB COMMENTS ON ISRAELI REPLY
REF: STATE 124298
1 - HAD OPPORTUNITY AUGUST 2 TO ASK CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT ZAID
RIFAI ABOUT FORMIN 'ATTALLAH'S COMMENTS RE ISRAELI REPLY TO
USG INITIATIVE (FORMIN 'ATTALLAHI HAD LEFT AUG 1
FOR LIBYAN MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN AND DEFMINSI.
2. RIFAI SAID THAT HE TOO HAD INITIALLY HAD BEEN PUZZLED
BY FORMIN'S REMARKS TO EFFECT USG INITIATIVE HAD BEEN STILLBORN.
HE subsequently HAD BEEN ABLE TO SATISFY HIMSELF THAT FORMIN
HAD ONLY INTENDED TO EXPRESS HIS WORRIES THAT ISRAELI PUBLIC
ACCEPTANCE, NOT BEING AS SIMPLE AND AS FREE OF CONDITIONS AS HE
WOULD HAVE PREFERRED, MIGHT SLOW THE CURRENT MOMENTUM FORMIN DID
NOT THINK IT HAD BEEN STOPPED, BUT HE WAS SUSPICIOUS AND FEARFUL.
ZAID EXPLAINED THAT FORMIN WAS DOING NO MORE THAN EXPRESSING A
MODEST CONCERN THAT ISRAELI REPLY "MIGHT HAVE LEFT THE USG
INITIATIVE STILLBORN", NOT THAT IT ACTUALLY HAD BEEN STILLBORN.
ZAID FELT USG SHOULD NOT BECOME TOO CONCERNED OVER THESE COMMENTS.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03690 0216552
3. RIFAI RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY TO QUESTION: DID FORMIN AND GOVT
NOW RPT NOW AGREE THAT ISRAEL HAD ACCEPTED USG INITIATIVE. ZAID SAID,
HOWEVER, THAT GOVT HAD GOOD IDEA OF KIND OF FORMULATIONS ISRAELI
WOULD PUT IN THEIR DETAILED REPLY. DECLARING THAT JORDAN IN ANY
EVENT INTENDED TO PUBLISH TEXT OF ITS REPLY TO SECRETARY ROGERS
WITHIN A FEW DAYS, HE ASKED WHETHER WE COULD PROVIDE TEXT OF
ISRAELI FORMULATIONS BEFORE THEN. CHARGE ANSWERED BY EXPLAINING
THAT HE AUTHORIZED TO SAY WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH UAR AND JORDAN
WHEN DETAILED ISRAELI REPLY WAS RECEIVED. HE REMINDED RIFAI AT THIS
JUNCTURE OF PRESIDENT'S JULY 31 STATEMENT TO EFFECT MODERATION,
FLEXIBILITY, AND WILLINGNESS BY BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT SOMETHING
LESS THAN THEIR MAXIMUM POSITIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY. HE DREW ON
STATE 124298 TO STRESS OUR STRONGLY HELD VIEW THAT THIS WAS TIME
FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY AND THAT PARTIES SHOULD WITHHOLD JUDGMENTS AND
AVOID PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT WOULD MAKE PRESENT DELICATE PROCESS
MORE DIFFICULT.
40 ZAID SAID HE APPRECIATED THE POINT. PUBLIC STATEMENTS SHOULD
EXCES
BE AVOIDED HE AGREED: HOWEVER, THERE WERE MANY COMPLICATIONS
TO BE FACED. HE ONLY HOPED THAT THE EXPECTED ISRAELI RESERVATIONS
AND CONDITIONS WOULD NOT BECOME TOO PROMINENT TO OVERCOME. IN THIS
CONNECTION, HE SAID, IN JORDAN THERE WAS MUCH REAL HOPE AND EVEN
FAITH THAT MOMENTUM WOULD CONTINUE FORWARD UNDER THE URGINGS OF
THE US AND THAT US WOULD PRESS ISRAEL TO GO IN RIGHT DIRECTION. FOR
ITS PART, JORDAN WAS TAKING STEPS TO CARRY OUT ITS OWN RESPONSI-
BILITIES AS REGARDS CEASE-FIRE (SEE SEPTEL). GP = 3 .
DRAPER
EXPIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED W OUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF
7
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
081/10/5190
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 810
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03624 3008172
2
19
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 1046 W
053009
OPP 300800Z JUL 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
70 JUL 30 AM 8:21
SITUATION SITUATION ROOM
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 677
ROOM HOUSE
S El ENT AMMAN 3624
EXDIS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI AIR ACTIVITY OVER JORDAN IN COMING DAYS
REF: TEL AVIV 40148 AMMAN 3620
T. WE NOTE THAT ISRAELIS HAVE ASSURED EMBASSY TEL AVIV (TEL AVIV 40141
THAT THERE WILL BE NO INTERFERENCE WITH "TRANSFER" OF HAWKER HUNTERS:
JULY 30-31.
2. THIS ASSURANCE IS NOT RPT NOT AS COMPREHENSIVE AS KING HUSSEIN HAD
DESIRED. HE WOULD LIKE ISRAELIS TO KEEP THEIR AIRCRAFT CLEAR OF
GENERAL AMMAN AREA THROUGH AT LEAST AUGUST 1, AFTER TIME HAWKER
HUNTERS PRESUMABLY WILL HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED.
ODELL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRE
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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*
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2
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03620 292056Z
83/41
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 1046 W
049967
o 291610Z JUL 70 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 675
DECLASSIFIED
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-86/15156 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
By RJ WI H NARA, Date 10/19/2016
SECRET AMMAN 3620
EXDIS:
COORRREERCOT END COOPY (TO TEXT PARAS ONE, TWOD THREE AND FIVE)
SUBJECT: HUSSEIN'S PREPARATIONS FOR JULY 30- AUGUST 1 PERIOD
i. KING HUSSEIN ADVISED EMBASSY ON JULY 29 THAT COMBINATION OF
FACTORS COMING TO HEAD ON JULY 31 AND AUG 1 WERE CAUSING HIM SOME
CONCERN, OF WHICH HE WISHED TO APPRISE THE USG. HE EXPLAINED THAT
EXCES EXEMS
SOME TIME AGO THE IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN HAD SCHEDULED MANEUVERS
IN THE DESERT EAST OF AMMAN. THESE HAD COMMENCED ON JULY 28 AND
WERE PRESENTLY UNDERWAY. THE MANEUVERS INVOLVED ONE IRAQI ARMORED
BRIGADE. THE EXERCISE IS TO BE JOINED BY IRAQI AIR FORCE PLANES
FLYING MOCK COVER ON JULY 31 AND AUG 1 FROM H-3. COINCIDENTALLY,
FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS HAD ANNOUNCED THEY PLANNED PEACEFUL
DEMONSTRATIONS IN CITY OF AMMAN ON JULY 31.
2. AS A PRECAUTION THE KING HAD DECIDED TO TRANSFER
MOST OF JORDAN'S HAWKER HUNTERS FROM MAFRAQ AND H-5 ON JULY 29 TO
AMMAN AIRPORT. HE DECIDED TO DO THIS FOR TWO REASONS: FIRST,
MAFRAQ AND H-5 ARE SURROUNDED BY IRAQI TROOPS AND HE FELT THE
PLANES WOULD BE SAFER IN AMMAN8 SECONDLY, HE INTENDED TO USE
SOME OF HIS AIRCRAFT TO OVERFLY THE AMMAN AREA IN A MINOR SHOW OF
FORCE ON THE 31ST AND 1ST IF THE SITUATION SEEMED TO WARRANT IT.
AT THE TIME WHICH THE HAWKER HUNTERS WERE SCHEDULED TO MOVE FROM
MAFRAQ AND H=5 TO AMMAN ON JULY 29, ISRAELI AIR FORCE ATTACKED
SEVERAL FEDAYEEN BASES NEAR ZERKA OUTSIDE AMMAN. (PROBABLY ATTACKS
DESCRIBED USDAO TEL AVIV 15021 AS A RESULT HE HAD TO CALL OFN THE
TRANSFER OF I THE HAWKER HUNTERS TO AMMAN FOR FEAR OF A CONFRONTATION
WITH ISRAELIS. HE FELT THER WAS LITTLE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
EXEIS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 AMMAN 03620 292056Z
ISRAELI ATTACK THIS DEEP INTO JORDAN TERRITORY AT THIS TIME AND
COULD NOT HELP BUT FEEL THE ISRAELIS MIGHT HAVE KNOWN OF THE
MOVEMENT OF THE JORDAN AIR FORCE AND INTENDED TO INTERRUPT IT.
30 THE KING STILL WISHES TO BRING THE HAWKER HUNTERS TO AMMAN IN
THE NEXT TWO DAYS (JULY 30-3110 HE WOULD LIKE USG TO OBTAIN
ASSURANCES FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY WILL KEEP THEIR AIRCRAFT
CLEAR OF THIS AREA IN THE COMING DAYS IN ORDER TO AVOID A
CONFRONTATION WITH JORDAN PLANES.
40 KING CLEARLY IS CONCERNED THAT IRAQIS AND FEDAYEEN WHO ARE
OUTSPOKENLY AGAINST CURRENT PEACE MOVES MAY ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT
THIS COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN SOME MOVE AGAINST THE
REGIME. HE FURTHER CONCERNED THAT PRESENCE IDF AIRCRAFT DEEP
INSIDE JORDAN COULD AGGRAVATE AND COMPLICATE THIS SITUATION.
5. WE ADVISED THE KING WEI WOULD TRANSMIT HIS REQUEST TO WASHINGTON.
WE RECOMMEND THAT ISRAELI COOPERATION BE SOUGHT IN THIS INSTANCE.
ANY RESPONSE SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE.
60 ADDENDUM TO FOREGOING RECOMMENDATION: WE EXPECT TWO MAC
C-141 ACFT JULY 30, ONE BEING REGULAR WEEKLY FLT CARRYING 25 TONS
7.62 AMMO. RUAF ALSO HAS ON PARKING RAMP 25 TONS MUNITIONS
(AERIAL BOMBS) FOR BACKHAUL TO RAMSTEIN AFB. WE TRIED TO GET THESE
OUT ON TODAY'S FLT BUT AIRCRAFT
COMMANDER REFUSED TO OUTLOAD
HAVE SENT MESSAGES To LINDSAY AS AND INCIRLIK REQUESTING THESE
MUNITIONS BE BACKHAULED ON SAAM 3865/05 ON 30 JULY AS MATTER OF
URGENCY. GP = 3 ·
ODELL
'70 JUL 29 PM 7:17
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential/Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
Declassified
10
0615
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ORIGIN/ACTION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
W
REP
AIRGRAM
to
RM/R
AF
FOR RM USE ONLY
ARA
EUR
FE
A-111
SECRET NODIS
NEA
NO.
CU
INR
HANDLING INDICATOR
TO
: Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF OF STATE
E
P
10
L
FBO
AID
AUG 3 3 26 PM 1970
RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH
AGR
COM
FRB
FROM : Amembassy AMMAN
DATE: July 28, 1970
INT
LAB
TAR
SUBJECT : U.S. Peace Proposals: Government of Jordan Response
TR
XMB
AIR
REF
: Amman 3533
ARMY
CIA
NAVY
OSD
USIA
NSA
1. Enclosed are the following documents:
A) Original English language letter from Foreign Minister
Atallah to Secretary of State Rogers dated July 26, 1970;
B) Original Arabic language letter from Foreign Minister
Atallah to Secretary of State Rogers dated July 26, 1970.
2. Foreign Minister Atallah has stated that the Arabic language
version of his letter should be considered the authentic version.
ODELL
(Hro)
Enclosures as stated.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLU11-86/15157 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
By RS MIH NARA, Date 10/19/2016
SECRET/NODIS GROUP 3
FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
FORM
DS-323
In
Out
4-62
Drafted by:
Contents and Classification Approved by:
Charge: HIOdell:1 bp 7/27/70
Clearances:
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
it
Amman
26 July, 1970
Dear Mr. Secretary of State,
On 20th of June 1970, the American Charge d'Affaires
at Amman handed His Excellency Abdul Monem Rifa'i, then
Minister of Foreign Affairs and now Prime Minister, your
letter containing your new initiative for a peaceful
settlment to the Middle East Crisis.
The present impasse in the way of the peaceful set-
tlment to which you refer, and, which we are glad to
note you are endeavoring to overcome, would not have
arisen had it not been for Israel's intransigence,
militant attitude induced by the military superiority
it commands, its continued rejection of implementing
the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967, and
its refusal to accept withdrawal from all the Arab
territories which it occupied since June, 1967.
I feel I must point out also, that it is the
continued United States support, in various forms, which
secures to Israel its present military superiority,
that renders it intransigent in its attitude. Further-
more, Israel's territorial expansionist policy at the
cost of the surrounding Arab Countries is at the root
of its refusal to implement the Security Council
Resolution, thus raising obstacles in the way of
Ambassador Jarring and preventing him from carrying
/2
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Declassified
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- 2-
out his mission i.e. the implementation of the said
Resolution.
My Government has considered your new
proposal with special care and it is clear to it that
this proposal does not vary in substance from that of
the Security Council Resolution 242, except that it
calls for some procedural measures calculated to
implement the Resolution.
The Jordan Government has always proclaimed
its acceptance of the Security Council Resolution and
called for its implementation. Furthermore, it
demonstrated its full sincerity in dealing with the
representative of the Secretary General of the United
Nations, Dr. Gunnar Jarring , in pursuing a positive
and constructive course in the discussions with him
As regards these aspects, therefore, my Government
finds nothing new in your letter to preclude it from
accepting your proposal, its object being the
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242
and the resumption by Ambassador Jarring of his
mission to contact the parties with a view to implementing
the aforementioned Resolution.
Nevertheless, my Government in considering
the Resolution of the Security Council and the
discussions with Ambassador Jarring regarding its
implementation has always proceeded from two basic
starting points:
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
-3-
First :
The Necessity of Israel's acceptance of the
principle of withdrawal from all the Arab
territories which it occupied since the
fifth of June 1967 without exception , in
accordance with the Security Council Resolut-
ion 242 which affirms the inadmissibility of
aquisition of territory by war.
Second : The Necessity to recognise the Palestinian
people's full and lawful rights, which have
been repeatedly affirmed and reaffirmed by
resolutions of the United Nations, and the
imperative necessity for the exercise of their
rights to ensure peace based on justice and
stability in the area.
Accordingly , it is natural for my Government
to continue to maintain its position regarding these two
basic principles, in the firm belief that no progress
towards a peaceful settlement is possible if these two
sound principles are not fully respected
.
As regards acceptance of the ceasefire for a
period of three months, this is in line with what my
Government has always observed and still continues to
observe scrupulously. However my country throughout the
period following the Israeli aggression of June, 1967, has
been the object of armed aggression, attacks and raids by
Israel. The numerous Resolutions that the Security
/4
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
4-
Council has repeatedly passed condemning Israel for
these aggressions stand as vivid testimony that is is
Israel that has repeatedly violated the ceasefire.
Furthermore, escalation in the military activities on
the Jordan Israeli front is in truth due to the Israeli
continued military occupation of the Arab areas, the
ippressive measures it perpetrated against the Arab
population, their persecution, ill-treatment and
expulsion from their own homeland; in addition to arson,
destruction of villages, cities, plantations and other
damage to our national economy as well as the killing
of civilians and military personnel on the East Bank
of Jordan resulting from air raids, bombing and shelling
by Israel. It is these acts of aggression and oppression
that have led the Palestine Resistance movement to
resort to their lawful and acknowledged right of self
defence and resistance against the occupation.
Accordingly my Government, in its keen desire to
maintain peace, based on justice, agrees to the
proposal contained in your letter of 20th June, 1970.
With the expression of my highest consideration and
respect.
Yours sincerely
Ahilla
Minister for Foreign Affairs
The Honourable
Mr. William Rogers
U.S. Secretary of State,
Washington D.C.
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
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jos
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Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
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Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
20161 250, Yi iKlali
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Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXE-S
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 130
PAGE 01 AMMAN 04107 251829Z
a Date
02
43
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
097895
P R 251430Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 824
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
EXCES EXCES EXCES
AMCONSUL jerusalem
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 754
'70 AUG 25 PM 6:24 24
SITUATION ROOM SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
SECRET AMMAN 4107
EXDIS
SUBJECT: CAIRO CONFERENCE
REF: CAIRO 1904
1. CHIEF
MRTWAL DIWAN ZAID RIFA'I INFORMED EMBOFF
(HORAN) AUG 25 THAT HE WAS PLEASED WITH RESULTS OF KING
HUSSEIN'S CONSULTATIONS IN CAIRO. HE SAID THE DISCUSSIONS
HAD been OF A GENERAL NATURE AND THAT BOTH SIDES NOW IN
GOOD POSITION CLOSELY TO COORDINATE COMMON VIEW ON
NEGOTIATING ISSUES AS THEY ARISE.
2. HE AFFIRMED THAT STATEMENT PUBLISHED IN "AL-AHRAM (REFTEL)
GNERALLY ACCURATE EXCEPT WITH REGARD TO IRAQI TROOPS IN
JORDAN. STATUS OF IRAQI TROOPS, HE SAID, WAS STILL ANOMALOUS
AND WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED SOONER OR LATER. DESPITE RECENT
ACTION BY UAR GENERAL FAWZI, IRAQIS WERE MAINTAINING THAT
EASTERN FRONT STILL EXTANT AND THEIR GENERAL IN COMMAND.
RIFA'I STATED THAT GOJ AND GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ INVOLVED
IN A WAITING GAME. GOJ WAS HOPING FOR IRAQIS TO WITHDRAW
THEIR TROOPS AND IRAQIS WERE WAITING DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL
FROM GOJ. RIFA'I SAW ONLY TWO POSSIBLE CONCLUSIONS: EITHER
IRAQIS WOULD ACCEPT JORDANIAN COMMAND OR THEY WOULD BE FORCED
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 AMMAN 04107 251829Z
TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM JORDAN. ON WHOLE, HE THOUGHT
SECOND CONTINGENCY MORE PROBABLE. GP-3.
ODELL
JO vne 8:51
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
781/10/5198
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
*
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 975
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03384 190835Z
22
3
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
112140
P R 181520Z JUL 70 ZFG
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 585
SECDEF
INFO CSAF
CINCSTRIKE
SECRET AMMAN 3384
EXDIS
JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MSG
SUBU: F-104 AIRCRAFT
REF 8 STATE 112920
1. ON 18 JULY ZAID RIFAI INFORMED CHARGE, IN PRESENCE OF
BRIGADIER SALAH KURDI COMMANDER RUAF THAT GOJ ACCEPTS
PROPOSAL AS OUTLINED IN PARA 2 REF MSG THAT IS, THEY DESIRE
SHORTER DELIVERY SCHEDULE WITH CONCOMITANT ADDITIONAL COST.
2. REQUEST LETTER OF OFFER BE DISPATCHED AT EARLY DATE IT
OCCURS TO DATT THAT PERHAPS THIS LVO COULD BE HAND CARRIED
TO AMMAN BY LTC STUART USAF WHO IS LEAVING CONUS 21/22 JULY.
STUART IS NEW CHIEF MAP AUGMENTATION TEAM AND DUE AMMAN 25 JULY.
HE PROBABLY ON LEAVE NOW BUT STRIKE MAY BE ABLE CONTACT HIM.
30 RIFAI AND KURDI QUERIED CHARGE ON TYPE ENGINE. DATT WILL
INFORM GHQ ON MONDAY 20 JULY THAT ENGINE IS J=79=11 SIMILAR
THAT NOW IN INVENTORY (REFER PARA 5 REF MSGI. POINTS MENTIONED
SECDEF MSG 5257 WILL ALSO BE ADDRESSED AT THAT TIME.
ODELL
NOTE: LIMDIS CAPTION DELETED EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O
MR. MCGAFFEY.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
625
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03594 281249Z
50
ACTION NEA-15
INFO OCT-01 SS-20 PM-05 NSC-10 RSR-01 IO-13 EUR-20 L-04
OPR-02 DODE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 P=03 RSC-01 USIA-12
PRS-01 CIA-04 /119 W
039005
R 281225Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 663
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 3594
SUBJECT: FATAH PUBLICATION OF AMERICAN "PEACE PLANS"
REF: STATE 120026
1. DAILY PAPER FATAH IN ISSUE JULY 26 PRINTS TEXTS ARABIC VER-
SIONS OF SECRETARY'S OCT 28 AND DEC 19 PROPOSALS TO UAR AND
---
JORDAN RESPECTIVELY. PROPOSALS APPEAR UNDER HEADLINE "DOCUMENTS
OF SOLUTION BY SURRENDER."
2. COMPARISON WITH ORIGINAL ENGLISH TEXTS REVEALS TRANSLATIONS
TO BE ACCURATE. EMBASSY NOTED ONLY ONE SUBSTANTIVE DEPARTURE
FROM TEXTS: IN PURPORTING TO GIVE TEXT OF PARA TWO US-UAR
PROPOSAL, PAPER PRINTS INSTEAD SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT LANGUAGE
WHICH IDENTICAL WITH PARA 2 US-GOJ PROPOSAL.
3. TWO DIFFERENT ARABIC TRANSLATIONS INVOLVED - WHERE ENGLISH
TEXT OF TWO PROPOSALS IDENTICAL, ARABIC TRANSLATORS RENDERED IT
IN DIFFERENT THOUGH IN EACH CASE ACCURATE TERMS.
4. ARABIC TEXTS BEING ROUCHED DEPARTMENT. EXEMPT
ODELL
USE
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 344
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03494 241044Z
16
ACTION NEA-15
INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM=05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE=00
NSC- 10 P=03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS=20 USIA=12 10.13 AID-28
ACDA=19 RSR=01 /142 W
016057
R 241000Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 624
INFC AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 1737
S E C R ET AMMAN 3494
SUBJECT: INCREASED FEDAYEEN-JAA COOPERATION
REF 8 TEL AVIV 37448 STATE 116105
1. MAJOR ZUBI'S COMMENTS STRIKE US SIMPLY AS EDUCATED GUESS. WE
HAVE NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ANY USEFUL INFORMATION ON
THE KING OF UNDERSTANDING RE FEDAYEEN MILITARY ACTIVITIES ALONG
BOUNDARIES AND CEASE-FIRE LINES, TACIT OR OTHERWISE, THAT MAY HAVE
EMERGED FROM GOVT-FEDAYEEN DISCUSSIONS NATURE OF RESPONSE
TO OUR INQUIRIES ON SUBJECT SUGGESTS NO DETAILED UNDERSTANDING HAS
BEEN CONCLUDED BUT RATHER, ONLY GENERAL ONE OF GREATER FREEDOM OF
ACTION. PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER JAFFAR AL-SHAMI INCIDENTALLY DENIED
ON JULY 16 THAT HE HAD EVER CLAIMED EXISTENCE OF SECRET AGREEMENT
BETWEEN ARMY AND FEDAYEEN DIVIDING FRONT LINES BETWEEN THE (#)
2. WE STRONGLY DISCOUNT THE SPECULATION REPORTED BY MAJOR ZU'BI
THAT KING MIGHT HAVE DECIDED ALLOW FEDAYEEN TO OPERATE AGAINST
FLASH POINTS OF EILAT OR SDOMo ON OTHER HAND, ONE COULD INFER
FROM ACCELERATED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN BEISAN AREA THAT JORDAN ARMY
UNITS THERE ARE PREPARED TO BE MORE TOLERANT OF SUCH ADVENTURES.
FATAH NEWSPAPER ON ONE OCCASION CLAIMED THAT JORDAN ARMY IN THIS
AREA HAD ASSISTED FEDAYEEN IN REPULSING ISRAELI ATTACK® IN ABSENCE
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
THE
on
ONE
SECRET
EBOW
VCCEFEBVIED
10
CONFO
PAGE 02 AMMAN 03494 241044Z
FORMAL GOU-FEDAYEEN 00 AGREEMENT's THIS SEEMING COOPERATION COULD BE
EXPLAINED BY TWO FACTORS: (A) SECOND DIVISION WHICH COVERS NORTHERN
JORDAN VALLEY FRONT REPORTEDLY IS LESS RELIABLE FROM VIEWPOINT
LOYALTY THAN OTHER ARMY ELEMENTS: AND (B) KING HIMSELF HAS INDICATED
IN PAST THAT DEFENSE AGAINST POTENTIAL IDF ATTACK IS PRIMARY
CONCERN OF JAA UNITS IN THAT AREA AND THAT, THEREFORE, NO
EXTRAORDINARY TROOP DISPOSITIONS WOULD BE MADE TO POLICE FEDAYEEN
ACTIVITIES.
CEV8E-LIBE
3. AME WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN SOME JAA-FEDAYEEN COOPERATION IN
PAST FEW WEEKS MAY SOON BE LESS IMPORTANT QUESTION's ESPECIALLY ME NOW
THAT NASSER HAS PUBLICLY ACCEPTED USG PROPOSALS. PERHAPS
ANTICIPATING THAT JORDANIAN RESPONSE TO USG PEACE INITIATIVE
WOULD BE POSITIVE, JULY 23 ISSUE OF FATAH NEWSPAPER CARRIED
STRONG ATTACK AGAINST USG INITIATIVE, PINPOINTING CONCEPT OF
CEASE-FIRE. A POSITIVE JORDANIAN RESPONSE INEVITABLY WILL
TRANSFER ALWAYS UNCERTAIN GOVERNMENT-FEDAYEEN RELATIONSHIP
INTO FAR MORE DELICATE ARENA o GP-30
ODELLI
ЛОВК
NOTE: (#) SENTENCE AS RECEIVED. VERIFICATION TO FOLLOW.
петил CVIVD
THEC
10 BECEIVIE MYSHDC PS#
LW: YWEWGYBEA УННУЙ
15 5#18005 nor so
vcov-la 11#5 M.
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VOLION: MEV-12
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SPHQIAS ИАММА to 30A9
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STATED
YWEEICY
J.EFECKVW
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declass ifled
LE1/10
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 806
PAGE 01 STATE 160674
EXPIS EXQIC EXPIC
87
2
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 /046 R
66635
DRAFTED BY: NEA/UAR:GSBROWN
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGERP.DAVIES
S/S-ELIOT
EUR/BMI-INFO
R 292352Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
SITUAT WHIT 10N ROOM 125521 ROOM
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
HOUSE
'70 SEP 30 AM 8:23 23
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
S E COR E T STATE 160674
EXDIS
1. UK MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS GODBER CALLED
ON DEP ASST SECY DAVIES SEPT 28 (BEFORE NEWS: OF NASSER
DEATH) TO REVIEW MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND PROSPECTS: FOR
FUTURE. DAVIES SAID MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION FORI USG
IN AFTERMATH JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR WAS TO HELP HUSSEINI MAIN-
TAIN HIS POSITION AND AT SAME TIME RETAIN HIS CREDENTIALS
IN ARAB WORLD. WORLD ATTENTION HADI FOCUSED ON repressive
NATURE JAA ACTIONS AGAINST PALESTINIANS IN RECENT DAYS,
BUT FACTS WEREI THAT GOJ HAD BEEN OBLIGED RESPOND TO CON-
TINUING CHALLENGES AND FLOUTING OF JORDANIANI SOVEREIGNTY
BY LEFT WING EXTREMISTS WITHIN PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT. USG
CONCERNED TO PUT PICTURE IN PERSPECTIVE, AND TO ASSIST KING
WITHOUT WEAKENING HIM. US WOULD THEREFORE FOCUS WORKI ONI
HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AMMAN, THOUGH WE ALSO PLANNED SOME AID
TO JAA AS IT REMAINED KEY TO STABILIZATION OF SITUATION'S
2. GODBER SAID UK AGREED WITH US ESTIMATE OFI JORDANIAN SITUA
TION BUT FELT THAT HUSSEIN HAD MADE MISTAKE OF LMING PASSIVE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE H OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 160674
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
TOO LONG BEFORE MOVING AGAINST PALESTINIANS. HE HAD NOW AS
CONSEQUENCE OPENED HIMSELF TO BEING WHIPPING BOY FORI OTHER
ARABS. UK CONCERNED THAT CHANCES OF ASSASSINATION HUSSEIN
GREATLY INCREASED. DAVIES SAID USG EQUALLY CONCERNEDI AND
NOT SANGUINE THAT ANY SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT WHETHER RADI-
CAL PALESTINIAN OR MILITARY WOULD HAVE STABILITY ENOUGH TO
PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST. FOR PRESENT HOWEVER,
HUSSEIN'S POLITICAL BASE NOT NECESSARILY WEAKER AS RESULT
RECENT FIGHTING, EVEN THOUGH IT NARROWED CONSIDERABLY.
HUSSEIN OBLIGED AT THIS POINT TO PROVE TO PALESTINIANS THAT
THEIR AIMS COULD BE OBTAINED BY MEANS OTHER THAN ARMED
STRUGGLE CALLED FOR BY FEDAYEEN. THIS MADE ALLI THE MOREI
ESSENTIAL RENEWED EFFORTS TO RESTART US PEACE INITIATIVE.
3. IN RESPONSE GODBER'S QUESTIONS, DAVIES SAID THAT USG
NOW CONSIDERING STEPS WHICH WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE RESUMPTION
OF US INITIATIVE AFTER JORDANIAN SITUATION SETTLED DOWN.
USG HAS SOME OPTIMISM, BASED ON HINTS IN RECENT UAR UNOFFI-
CIAL STATEMENTS, THAT FORMULA CAN BE FOUND WHICH SATISFAC-
TORY TO BOTH UAR AND ISRAELIS ON RECTIFICATION. IN RESPONSE
GODBER'S QUESTION DAVIES SAID THAT UAR/SOVIET MISSILE
DEPLOYMENTS NEVERTHELESS CONTINUING AT ACCELERATED PACE,
AND ISRAELI LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN UAR INTENTIONS JUSTI-
FIED TO LARGE EXTENT. GODBER SAID HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO
SHARE USG OPTIMISM IN VIEW OF CONTINUED UAR/SOVIET ACTIVITY,
BUT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IMMENSELY PLEASED IF INITIATIVE
COULD BE RESTARTED.
4. GODBER ASKED HOW LONG US EXPECTED ISRAELIS TO ALLOW
CURRENT SITUATION ON CANAL TO CONTINUEI WITHOUT TAKING
ACTION. DAVIES SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE ISRAELIS WOULD BE
FIRST TO BREAK CEASEFIRE. USG HAS TAKEN ACTION IN SUPPLY
OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL WHICH WOULD COMPENSATE FOR
UAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS, BUT WAS NOT MAKING ANY PUBLIC
ANNOUNCEMENT. US RETAINS COMMITMENT TO POLICY ARMS RESTRAINT
HOWEVER.
GP-1 IRWIN
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
041/10/5190
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED
WHCA
CONFIDENTIAL
HCE5 18
PAGE 01 STATE 159075
1970 SEP 26 22 35
80
ORIGIN NEA-15
INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 DOT-12
E- 15 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 0-03
0C-06 PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-20 USIE-00 USSS-00 SY-03
SSO-ØØ SCA-01 /140 R
66637
DRAFTED BY: NEA ALATHERTON JR
APPROVED BY: NEA ALFRED L ATHERTON JR
NEA/ARN TWSEELYE
Z 0 262203Z SEP 70 ZFF6
077193
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 159075
1. UK MINISTER MILLARD HAS JUST PASSED FOLLOWING INFO TO
DEPT: IN NAME OF NASSER, MINISTER OF INFORMATION HEYKAL
APPROACHED BRITISH EMBASSY CAIRO EARLIER TODAY TO SAY THAT
UAR BELIEVED IT COULD SECURE RELEASE OF ALL REMAINING
HIJACK HOSTAGES IF BRITISH, SWISSAND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS
GAVE UNDERTAKING THEY WOULD RELEASE 7 FEDAYEEN PRISONERS
ON THEY HOLD. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY WHETHER EXCHANGE CONDITIONAL
EXCHANGE ANY ACTION BY ISRAEL, HEYKAL REPLIED THAT OFFER TO
THE THREE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.
ALL HOSTAGES FOR ALL FEDAYEEN PRISONERS HELD WAS BY
2. MILLARD SAID UK WANTS TO GIVE POSITIVE RESPONSE TO
URGENTLY SEEKING USG'S VIEWS.
UARG, IS NOW CONSULTING SWISS AND GERMANS TO THIS END AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 STATE 159075
3. AFTER INFORMING MILLARD OF LATEST INFO FROM AMMAN RE
REPORTED RELEASE OF 32 OF 38 HOSTAGES, WE TOLD HIM WE
PREFERRED THAT UK HOLD OFF FOR COUPLE OF HOURS ON REPLYING
TO UARG UNTIL SITUATION CLARIFIED IN AMMAN; IT POSSIBLE
THAT JORDANIANS COULD EFFECT RELEASE OF ALL 38 WITHOUT ANY
EXCHANGE DEAL.
4. MILLARD SAID HE WOULD REPORT THIS TO LONDON AND ALSO
ASCERTAIN WHAT REACTIONS HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM SWISS AND
GERMANS. IN HIS VIEW, LONDON WOULD WANT TO CLINCH DEAL
QUICKLY AND WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO DELAY REPLY TO NASSER.
BRITISH APPEAR CONCERNED THAT FAILURE TO MAKE DEAL AND
RETENTION OF LELIA KHALED WOULD EXPOSE BRITISH TO PFLP
REPRISAL ACTIONS.
5. WE EMPHASIZED TO MILLARD THAT WE ARE SIMPLY ASKING
THAT THEY HOLD OFF FOR COUPLE OF HOURS UNTIL SITUATION
CLARIFIED AND AGREED TO CONVEY IMMEDIATELY TO BRITISH
ANY FURTHER INFO RECEIVED FROM AMMAN RE STATUS OF HOSTAGES.
6. ASSUMING JAA HAS IN FACT SECURED CUSTODY OF 32 HOSTAGES,
WHAT IS AMMAN' S BEST JUDGMENT THAT REMAINING HOSTAGES CAN
BE EFFECTED WITHOUT EXCHANGE DEAL BRITISH ARE PRESSING
FOR?
7. MILLARD SAID THAT, IF DECISION IS TO CONVEY POSITIVE
RESPONSE TO DEAL OFFERED BY UARG, BRITISH WOULD EMPHASIZE
THAT ALL HOSTAGES MUST BE DELIVERED TO SAFE PLACE BEFORE
FEDAYEEN PRISONERS ARE TURNED OVER. BRITISH WOULD PROBABLY
SUGGEST THAT EXCHANGE TAKE PLACE IN NEUTRAL CITY SUCH AS
GENEVA OR POSSIBLY AT BRITISH BASE ON CYPRUS, THOUGH THEY
PROBABLY NOT OPPOSE TO CAIRO IF UARG SO SUGGESTED. ROGERS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 135
PAGE 01 STATE 156092
EXCIS EXCLUS EXPIS EXPIC
85
ORIGIN SS-45
SITUATION ROOM WHITE WHITE HOUSE HOUSE
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-ØØ 1046 R
'70 SEP 23 AM 3
66633
DRAFTED BY:TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY:NEA:ALATHERTON
S/S-MR. MALONE
043184
O 230251Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
SECRE T STATE 156092
EXDIS
SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KING
1 . YOU SHOULD AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY CONVEY
FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN
THROUGH SECURE-NOT OPEN- CHANNEL.
2. BEGIN TEXT. AMBASSADOR BROWN WILL HAVE ALREADY
TOLD YOU THAT YOUR REQUESTS ARE BEING URGENTLY AND
SYMPATHETICALLY DISCUSSED.
MEANWHILE, I WANT YOU TO HAVE THIS PERSONAL WORD
SAYING HOW MUCH I ADMIRE WHAT YOU ARE DOING TO preservei
JORDAN'S INTEGRITY IN THE FACE OF BOTHI INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL THREATS. YOUR COURAGEOUS STAND HAS IMPRESSED
THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD.
I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL NOT WAVERI IN YOUR
DETERMINED EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE AND STABILITY
TO YOUR KINGDOM.
RICHARD M. NIXON END TEXT
3. THE FOREGOING PERSONAL MESSAGE IS OFCOURSE
CONFIDENTIAL AND WE DO NOT INTEND EITHER TO PUBLISH ITS:
SECRET
8
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
OF UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 156092
TEXT OR ACKNOWLEDGE ITS EXISTENCE. HOWEVER, IFRIT
WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THE COMING DAYS TO DO SO, WEI AREI
PREPARED TO RECONSIDER OUR POSITION. ROGERS
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
en1/10/5190
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXCES
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 910
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03691 021619Z
02
50
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
074157
PI 021431Z AUG 70
FMI AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 704
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USMISSION USUN NY
USINT CAIRO
S EICOR ETT AMMAN 3691
EXDIS:
DEPT PASS KUWAIT, JIDDA, TRIPOLI, LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW
SUBU: CEASE-FIRE: IRAQI FORCES
1. CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT ZAID RIFAI ON AUGUST 2 EXPLAINED TO CHARGE
THAT NINETY PERCENT OF JORDAN'S CONCERNS COULD BE ELIMINATED THROUGH
WITHDRAWL OF IRAQI FORCES. IRAQIS POSED POTENTIAL THREAT TO
REGIME'S SECURITY IN SENSE THAT THEY MIGHT ALLY THEMSELVES
WITH EXTREMIST FEDAYEEN GROUPS IN COUP EFFORT IN ADDITON, HOW-
EVER, THESE FORCES COULD JEOPARDIZE MAINTENANCE OF CEASE FIRE,
SINCE IRAQ HAD REFUSED TO ACQUIESCE IN ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF USG
PEACE INITIATIVE.
2. ZAID WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT LIBYAN MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN
AND DEFENSE MINISTERS, SCHEDULED BEGIN AUGUST 3, OFFERED
OPPORTUNITY TO INDUCE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. JORDAN INTENDED TO SEIZE IT.
EXCES
ALGERIA AND IRAQ HAD DECIDED BOYCOTT CONFERENCE, HE OBSERVED. IRAQ
WAS DOING THIS BECAUSE IT SENSED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS WOULD ENDORSE
THE UAR/JORDAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE USG PEACE INITIATIVE, AND AT IRAQ'S
EXPENSE. IRAQ HAD IN FACT LEARNED OF THE SCHEME, PROMOTED BY THE
"NASSER-HUSSEIN AXIS" AND SUPPORTED BY SYRIA FOR ITS OWN REASONS,
WHEREBY THE IRAQIS WOULD BE FROZEN OUT OF THE AUTHORITY THEY NOW
ENJOY IN THE EASTERN FRONT COMMAND
30 THE MINIMUM JORDANIAN OBJECTIVE, WHETHER ACHIEVED THROUGH
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 AMMAN 03691 021619Z
THIS CONFERENCE OR ELSEWHERE, WAS TO REMOVE THE TWO IRAQI ARTILLERY
BATTERIES STATIONED NEAR THE FRONTLINES IN THE NORTHERN JORDAN
VALLEY. THESE BATTERIES, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR LOCATION, WERE ABLE TO
COMPROMISE JORDANIAN COMMITMENTS RE CEASE-FIRE AT ANY TIME. ZAID
SAID ARMY WAS CONFIDENT THAT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES COULD BE KEPT
DOWN TO TOLERABLE LEVELS, BUT THE TASK WOULD BE MADE EASIER IF ARMY
DID NOT HAVE TO LOOK OVER ITS SHOULDER AT IRAQI FORCES IN ITS REAR.
40 ZAID SAID EVERYONE IN JORDAN HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH NASSER'S
DETERMINATION TO ISOLATE THOSE IN THE ARAB WORLD OPPOSED TO HIS
STAND. HE HAD STAKED HIS PRESTIGE ON THIS STAND. THE RESULT HAD
BEEN THE BEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE UAR. ZAID
WAS HOPEFUL THAT IRAQI PROBLEM COULD BE CONTAINED THROUGH THIS
COOPERATION.
DRAPER
NOTE: NOT PASSED LISTED ADDRESSEES BY OC/T.
EXCES
NOT TO BE REPRODU D WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATIC
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
181/10/5190
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 590
PAGE 01 STATE 154300
EXELS EXPIS EXPIC
11
ORIGIN SS-45
3/3
INFO OCT-01 /046 R
66633
DRAFTED BY:NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
APPROVED BY:NEA:JOSPH J. SISCO
NEA:ALFRED L. ATHERTON JR *
TASK FORCE: TWSEELYE
S/S=O:BRIMS
WOODY SITUATION
OH
016016
P 190311Z SEP 70
'70 SEP 19 AM 8:54
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECRE T STATE 154300
EXDIS
SUBJ: PM MEIR DISCUSSION OF HOSTAGES SEPT. 18
FOLLOWING EXCERPTED FROM MEMCON SECRETARY-MRS. MEIR
MEETING MORNING SEPT. 18. IT IS UNCLEARED, NOFORNI AND
FYI ONLY, SUBJECT TO REVEISION ON REVIEW.
1. TURNING TO HOSTAGE PROBLEM, SECRETARY SAID WE WERE
TRYING TO KEEP OUR BRITISH, SWISS AND GERMANI COLLEAGUES
TOGETHER. WE DID NOT KNOW WHY THEY WERE SO FRENETIC AT
TIMES. SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE ANDI OTHER DEPT. OFFICERS:
HAS BEEN RECIPIENTS OF MIDDLE-OF-NIGHT CALLS FROM CONVERNED
DIPLOMATS. MRS. MEIR SAID US POSITION HAD BEEN VERY GOOD,
THAT WE HAD HELD OUT BEAUTIFULLY. ISRAELIHADI BEEN ASKEDI WHAT
ITS CONTRIBUTION WAS. SHE SAID OTHERS SEEMED READY TO CON
TRIBUTE PEOPLE WHO HAD TRIED TO KILLI ISRAELIS. MRS. MEIR
DESCRIBED CRIMES AGAINST ISRAELIS COMMITTED BY FEDAYEENI
IN BRITISH, GERMAN AND SWISS HANDS. SHE SAID SWISS WEREI
GOOD IN THIS AFFAIR BUT GERMANS AND BRITISH WERE AWFUL.
SECRET
6
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EXQIN EXPIN EXQI
PAGE 02 STATE 154300
2. SISCO SAID PREVIOUS NIGHT THERE HAD BEEN
MEETING IN BERN AND BRITISH HAD PUT FORWARD DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.
WE HAVE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO PARTIALI DEALS. OUR CONCERN
IS GREATER THAT OTHERS MAY EVENTUALLY WANT TO GO OWNI WAY.
BRITISH WOULD HAVE FIVE COUNTRIES INCLUDING ISRAELI SAY
STRONGLY IT WAS QUESTION OF TOTAL DEALI AND THAT WE AS A.
GROUP WOULD CONSIDER WHAT PFLP PUT FORWARD PROVIDED IT WAS
A TOTAL DEAL. ISRAELIS WERE FAMILAR WITH FEDAYEEN POSITION
THAT ISRAELIS SHOULD HAND OVER TWO ALGERIANS: AND MIXED BUNCH
INCLUDING LEBANESE AND AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO RELEASEI IMPRISONED
FEDAYEEN BEFORE FEDAYEEN WOULD GIVE LIST THOSE THEY WANTED. THIS
WAS PIG IN A POKE. BRITISH COMMUNIQUE WOULD LAY DOWNI POSITION
REGARDING TOTAL EXCHANGE. SISCO SAID HE HOPED MRS. MEIRI
WOULD LOOK AT THIS PROPOSAL. OUR CONCERN WAS THAT IFI WEI COULD
NOT PROCEED ON UNIFIED BASIS THERE WOULD BE TENDENCY TOWARD
SEPARATE DEALS.
3. SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED STATE OUR POSITION! IN DETAIL
FIRST, THERE WOULD BE NO DEAL WITH FEDAYEEN UNLESS ALL HOSTAGES
WERE GIVEN OVER SECOND, WE DID NOT LIKE IDEA OF DEMANDI ON
ISRJAEL TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE EXCHANGE OF ITS: PASSENGERS: AND
WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS THIRD, WE WERE URGING THAT ISRAEL
DO NOTHING UNDER PRESSURE.
4. MRS. MEIR SAID BRITHIS COULD NOT SEND OUT THE GIRL
(LELIA KHALED) WITHOUT ISRAELI CONSENT. ISRAELI HAD TREATY
OF EXTRADITON. IT WAS QUESTION WHETHER WHEN
HIJACKED, EL AL PLANE WAS LEGALLY IN BRITISH TERRITORY OR
ISRAELI TERRITORY. SISCO COMMENTED BRITISHI COMMUNIQUE WOULD HELP
AVOID BUSINESS OF ISRAEL COMMITING ITSELF TO PRINCIPLE OF
EXCHANGE.
5 € MRS. MEIR SAID SHE DID NOT LIKE MAKE PROMISES ISRAELI
DID NOT INTEND TO KEEP. ISRAEL WOULD NOT RELEASE THESE
PEOPLE. THEY AREI IN JAIL because THEY ARE MURDERERS WHO HAD
BLOWN UP CAFETERIA AND DONE OTHER THINGS. ISRAEL WOULD NOT
BE TOLD LATER BY WORLD OPINION THAT IT HAD AGREED TO FREE
THESE PEOPLE. SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED WITH THIS. NOW WE
ARE TRYING TO AVOID SPLIT IN FIVE MRS. MEIR SAID SHE WAS
NOT SURE ABOUT THE BRITISH BUT SHEI WAS SURE THAT THEI GERMANS
WOULD NEVER AGREE TO A SEPARATE EXCHANGE FORI THEIR PEOPLE,
SECRET
6
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 154300
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
WHICH LEFTJEWS STILL AS HOSTAGES* THIS WOULD BE TOO MUCH AND THEY
WOULD NOT DO IT.
6. SECRETARY ASKED IF ISRAELIS HAD ANY INFORMATION ON
WHERE HOSTAGES WERE. RABIN SAID GOI DID NOT. MRS. MEIR COMMENTED
THAT SHE THOUGHT ISRAEL AGREED TO THE RELEASE OF THEI TEN LEBANESE.
POLITICAL SECRETARY DINITZ SAID GOI HAD ANNOUNCED THE TWO
ALGERIANS WOULD NOT BE THE STUMBLING BLOCK THERE WAS UN-
CERTAINTY AMONG ISRAELIS IN ROOM THAT GOI ACTUALLY HAD SAID
IT READY TO GIVE UP TEN LEBANESE. SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT
ISRAEL NOT SAY ANYTHING REGARDING LEBANESE UNTILI IT WAS SUREI
OF GETTING SOMETHING IN RETURN SECRETARY AGAIN EMPHASIZED
GETTING TOGETHER ON SOME LANGUAGE TO KEEP BRITISH AND GERMANS
CALM.
GP=3. ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SITUATI
WHITE
3
SEPT
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
wog
SECRET 322
PAGE 01 STATE 152504
2/3
EXPIS EXPIC EXSIS EXPIS
42
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 R
66602
DRAFTED BY: NEARPDAVIES
APPROVED BY: S/S:THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR.
NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE:
WHITE HOUSE GEN. HAIG (SUBSTANCEI
001776
0 171501Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
SECRE T STATE 152504
EXDIS
FOR PURPOSES OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING, WEI REQUEST, WHEN-
EVER SITUATION PERMITS, REPORTS ON STATUS OF AMMAN AIRPORT
AND H-5. ANY INFORMATION ON GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF ROUTES:
OF ACCESS WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL
GP=3. ROGERS
SECRET
55
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ed
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 108
PAGE 01 STATE 148939
42
ORIGIN PRS-01
INFO OCT-01 AF = 12 EUR-20 NEA-13 10-13 NSC=10 SS-20 SSO-00
P=Ø3 USIE-00 CIAE-00 INR-08 NSAE-00 RSC=01 DODE-00
DOT-12 E-15 H-02 L=04 NSCE - 00 0-03 PM-05 OPR=02 OC-06
/151 R
DRAFTED BY&S/PRS&RWBECKER
APPROVED BY:S/PRS:RJMCCLOSKEY
CLEARANCES&NEA/P-GSMITH
WHITE HOUSE RHOUDEK (BY PHONE
NEA/TF-TWSEELYE
S/S-MR LEVITSKY
091174
0 111800Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMCONSUL jerusalem
USINT CAIRO
USINT KHARTOUM
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PAGE 02 STATE 148939
USMISSION GENEVA
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 148939
REF: BEIRUT 7617
SUBJECT PRESS GUIDANCE ON 6TH FLEET MOVEMENT
1 e FOLLOWING STATEMENT ISSUED BY ZIEGLER AT WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING
12830 LOCAL TIME SEPTEMBER 118
20 QUOTE THE PREPOSITIONING OF THE SIX 130'S AND THE MOVEMENTS OF
THE SIXTH FLEET ARE ONLY NORMAL ROUTINE PRECAUTIONS IN SUCH SIT=
UATIONS FOR EVACUATION PURPOSES. IN THIS CONNECTION, 1 CALL TO
YOUR ATTENTION THE SWISS GOVT - STATEMENT JUST PUT OUT ON
BEHALF OF THE FIVE (WEST GERMANY SWISS, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED
STATES AND ISRAEL) THAT THEY HAVE AUTHORIZED MR. ROCHAT TO IN=
FORM THE FEDAYEEN INNER QUOTE THAT NO ARMED INTERVENTION IS
CONTEMPLATED UNQUOTE INNER QUOTE. THE U.S. JOINED IN THIS STATE-
MENT WITH THE OTHERS. UNQUOTE
3. FYI: IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ZIEGLER REFUSED TO GO BEYOND
STATEMENT. ROGERS
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
901/10/5199
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 830
PAGE 01 STATE 155207
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
17
ORIGIN SS-45
02
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
66664
DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP8JWTWINAM
APPROVEDBY NEA/RODGER P. DAVIES
S/S=O:B.A. FLATIN
POR 220530Z SER 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
SITUATION ROOM WHITCHOUSE WHIT 036857 CHOUSE
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
'70 SEP 22 PM 4:45 45
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USINT CAIRO
SECRET STATE 155207
EXDIS
CORRECTE D COPY (TO READ WORD "NOW" RPT "NOW" VICE
WORD NOT RPT NOT IN LINE 8 RPT 8 OF PARA 4 RPT 4.1
STATE 155207
EXDIS
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR'S CALL SEPTEMBER 21
To AMBASSADOR SHARAF CALLED ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
DAVIES AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 21 TO INQUIRE RE U.S. THINKING
ON PRESENT SITUATION IN JORDAN AND SPECIFICALLY WHAT CAN BE
DONE TO OBTAIN SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. SHARAF AND DAVIES EX-
CHANGED INFORMATION ON CURRENT SITUATION JORDAN.
2. SHARAF STRESSED MAIN GOJ PROBLEM IS THAT SYRIAN FORCES
ARE IN CONTROL IRBID AND OUTSIDE PRESSURE NECESSARY TO GET
THEM OUT. SHARAF STATED AMMAN HAD URGED HIM INQUIRE WHAT USG
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 155207
EXPIN EXPIS EXCLUS
IS DOING AND WHAT MORE MAY BE DONE TOWARD THIS END
30 DAVIES REPLIED USG FROM PRESIDENT DOWN CONCERNED RE
SITUATION IN KINGDOM AND FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE
CLOCK® SECRETARY ROGERS HAS ISSUED PUBLIC WARNING TO SYRIANS
TO END INTERVENTION. WE DOING WHATEVER POSSIBLE THROUGH
DIPLOMATIC MEANS TO BRING PRESSURE ON SYRIA® DIFFICULTY IS
THAT USG HAS LITTLE INFLUENCE ON SYRIAN REGIME AND THAT IN=
FLUENCE OTHER GREAT POWERS, POSSIBLY EVEN SOVIETS, IN DAMASCUS
PROBLEMATIC. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SOVIETS
AND OTHERS AND, AS KING HUSSEIN HAD REQUESTED: ARE ENGAGING
IN FOUR-POWER TALKS IN NEW YORK IN EFFORT OBTAIN STATEMENT
CALLING FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL
40 IN RESPONSE SHARAF'S QUERY RE PROSPECTS FOUR-POWER
STATEMENT, DAVIES SAID PATTERN WAS OF LONG DISCUSSION BEFORE
AGREEMENT REACHED DAVIES NOTED FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE
STATEMENT AGAINST OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN JORDAN AND CALLED
FOR FOUR-POWER SETTLEMENT CURRENT PROBLEM. SOVIET CHARGE
SEPTEMBER 19 PRESENTED NOTE WARNING AGAINST OUTSIDE IN-
TERVENTION AND INDICATED USSR HAD URGED UAR, IRAQ, AND SYRIA
TO TAKE CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS TO END FIGHTING. WE HAVE NOW CALLED
ON SOVIETS TO INFLUENCE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW.
5° DAVIES NOTING WE ALSO IN TOUCH WITH UAR ASKED
SHARAF'S VIEW LIKELY RESULTS OF ARAB LEAGUE MEETING CALLED
FOR SEPTEMBER 22% SHARAF REPLIED HE NOT OPTIMISTIC ANYTHING
HELPFUL COULD COME FROM ARAB MEETING QADHAFI AND ATASI
APPLYING PRESSURE ON NASSER TO TAKE STRONGER PRO-FEDAYEEN
STAND. SHARAF EXPLAINED THAT JORDAN HESITATION APPEAL TO
SECURITY COUNCIL WAS BASED ON INABILITY TO ASSURE RESULTS.
FOR INSTANCE, SYRIA ON SECURITY COUNCIL AT MOMENT AND STILL
DENYING OFFICIALLY THAT SYRIAN TROOPS PRESENT IN JORDAN.
ALSO SECURITY COUNCIL APPROACH RAISED POSSIBILITIES SOVIETS
MIGHT TAKE OBSTRUCTIVE STAND OR THAT ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE
MIGHT MAKE REMARKS UNHELPFUL TO GOU.
60 SHARAF SAID IRAQI POSITION UNCERTAIN DAVIES QUERIED
WHETHER IRAQI CONCERN ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS MIGHT PROMPT
IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN TO BLOCK SYRIAN ADVANCE. SHARAF
NOTED IRAQIS UNPREDICTABLE BUT DOUBTED THEY WILL TAKE
ACTION PLACING THEM EVEN INDIRECTLY ON SIDE OF GOJ IN CONFLICT.
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified E
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TH ORIZ ATION OF THE EXECUTIVEd SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined
OF STATE
*
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 155207
7. CONJECTURED THEY WOULD MOVE TO PREEMPT SYRIA IN SOUTH
EXCES EXQIC EXQIC
BY THROWING SUPPORT TO PALESTINIANS THERE SHARAF AGREED
SYRIAN OBJECTIVE UNCERTAIN AT THIS TIME. DOES SYRIA INTER-
VENTION AIM AT OVERTHROWING GOJ OR IS IT LIMITED TO SECURING
POSITION IN NORTH AROUND IRBID? ADDITIONAL imponderable
IS ISRAELI REACTION SYRIAN PRESENCE. SHARAF SAID POSSIBILITY
ISRAELI INTERVENTION WORRIES GOJ AND ARABS DEEPLY.
80 DAVIES NOTED PRESS REPORTS OF U.S. CONTINGENCY MOVES
WHICH seem TO CONCERN UAR AND SOVIETS GREATLY MAY HAVE
SOME INFLUENCE ON SYRIANS. SHARAF AGREED THAT REPORTS
THAT USG MIGHT INTERVENE ARE NOT unhelpful, BUT COMMITTED
THAT SYRIANS CANNOT BE COUNTED ON TO BE "REASONABLE" IN
THEIR REACTION.
9. DAVIES ADDED THAT USG IS READY RESPOND KING HUSSEIN'S
request FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE'o ROGERS
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED W.ITHOU.T IE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
w H
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 310
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIN
PAGE 01 STATE 143451
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
'70 SEP 3 M
41
ORIGIN SS-10
INFO OCT-01 /011 R
8:40 40
DRAFTED BY:NEA:TDBOYATT
APPROVED BY:NEA-RODGER P DAVIES
CLEARANCES:S/S-1 MR CURRAN
022497
R 021540Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USINT ALGIERS
USINT KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECRET STATE 143451
EXDIS
SUBJECT: NE HIGHLIGHTS REPORT AUGUST 21-28.
EXPIS
1. ARAB- ISRAEL: JARRING OPENS TALKS: TEKOAH LEAVES FOR CON-
SULTATIONS. JARRING MOVED WITH DISPATCH TO BEGIN TALKS ON
AUGUST 25. AT FIRST DAY'S SESSIONS, JARRING TOLD TEKDAHI (AND
PRESUMABLY ARAB REPRESENTATIVES) THAT HE INTENDED TO TAKE UPI ONE
BY ONE POINTS IN RESOLUTION 242 AND THAT HE WOULD FROM TIME TO
TIME PUT FORWARD HIS "THOUGHTS" WHILE WE UNDERSTAND THERE MAY
HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIABLE REASONS FOR ISRAEL'S RECALL OFI TEKOAH
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduc Leed ed the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF MEMBER
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 143451
EXPIS EXAIS EXPIS EXPIS
FOR CONSULTATIONS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING FIRST SESSION, WE
HAVE EXPRESSED TO GOI OUR CONCERN AND HAVE STRONGLY URGED THAT
HE RETURN TO NEW YORK IN VERY FEW DAYS.
2. UAR: ARAFAT IN CAIRO. ARAFAT HAS BEEN MEETING WITH NASSERI IN
EFFORT TO SORT OUT DIFFERENCES CAUSED BY UAR ACCEPTANCE! OF US
PROPOSAL. ACCORDING TO ONE INTELLIGENCE REPORT NASSER NOT ONLY
DEPRIVED AL-FATAH OF USE OF UAR RADIO FACILITIES, BUT ALSO
SUSPENDED ARMS AND FINANCIAL AID.
3. UAR: UAR-IRANIAN RELATIONS RESUMED. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REA-
CHED BETWEEN UAR AND IRAN FOR RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
(SEVERED IN 19601. ACCORDING TO IRANIANS, THE IMPETUS COMES
MAINLY FROM UAR AND IS DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH UAR'S RIFT WITH
BAGHDAD OVER US PEACE INITIATIVE.
4. LEBANON: FEDAYEEN-LEBANESE CLASH. THERE HAVE BEENI SEVERALI IN-
CIDENTS IN LEBANON IN PAST WEEK INVOLVING COMMANDO ELEMENTS
AND NASSER SUPPORTERS.
5. MUSCAT AND OMAN: U.S. RECOGNITION. WHITE HOUSE APPROVED AND
CONSUL GENERAL IN DHAHRAN FORWARDED TO NEW SULTAN QABUS AUGUST
26 THE ACTING SECRETARY'S MESSAGE WELCOMING HIS ACCESSION TO
POWER AND INDICATING U.S. DESIRE TO CONTINUE EXISTING U.S.
TREATY RELATIONSHIPS AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH SULTANATE.
6. GULF: CRUDE OIL SHORTAGE. DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY SAMUELS
MET AUGUST 26 WITH ESSO'S EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND WILL MEET
AUGUST 28 WITH VICE PRESIDENTS OF FOURI ARAMCO OWNERS: TO DISCUSS
POSSIBLE WAYS OF RELIEVING CURRENT OIL SHORTAGE IN MEDITERRANEAN.
FIRST MEETING FOCUSED MAINLY ON POSSIBILITY OF REOPENING SUEZ
CANAL: SECOND WILL DISCUSS POSSIBILITY OF REOPENING TAPLINE.
GP-3.
JOHNSON
ITAUTIE
ZEb
NOT TO BE REPRODU D WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATIO OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
&41/10/5190
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CONFIDENTIAL
Samlers
NNNNVV EHA824
Sentte I.C.
RR RUEHEX
RECEIVED
DE RUEHC 140595 2400118
WHCA
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280034Z AUG 70
TO FM RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY SECSTATE WASHDC TEL AVIV 6631970 AUG 28 01 27
INFO RUFNRS/USINT ALGIERS 1888
RUEIVC/USINT CAIRO 5479
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9184
RUEHDT/SMISSION USUN NY 2368
RUEHEX:WHITE HOUSE
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 40595
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR ASST SECY SISCO
SUBJ: ISRAELI POWS IN UAR AND TWO ALGERIAN PRISONERS
1. IN COURSE CONVERSATION WITH ATHERTON (SEPTEL) AND
COUNTRY DIRECTOR STACKHOUSE AUGUST 27, ARGOV REFERRED TO
PWO MATTER AND TO CONVERSATION PREVIOUS DAY WITH
STACKHOUSE WHEN LATTER DESCRIBED BERGUS DEMARCHE RE POWS.
ARGOV SAID HE SUSPECTED IF BERGUS HAD SPOKEN TO UARG WITH AS
MUCH THRUST AS DCM ZURHELLEN HAD WITH GOI RE TO TWO
ALGERIAN DETAINEES HE WOULD HAVE COVERED MORE POINTS AT
ISSUE THAN SIMPLY VISITS TO POWS. STACKHOUSE REMINDED
ARGOV THAT HE HAD TOLD HIM THAT BERGUS COVERED VISIT TO
PRISONERS ISSUE AND ALL OTHER POINTS WHICH ISR ELIS HAD
RAISED. ATHERTON EMPHASIZED THAT OUR INSTRUCTION HAD BEEN
TO COVER ALL POINTS; BERGUS HAD DONE SO AND WE EXPECT AN
ANSWER FROM UARG.
2. ATHERTON NOTED THAT HE HAD IMPRESSION FROM ARGOV
MENTION OF OUR APPROACH RE TWO ALGERIAN DETAINEES THAT
THIS DID NOT GO DOWN WELL IN GERUSALEM. HE REMINDED ARGOV THAT
USG MERELY SUGGESTED THAT GOI WEIGH CAREFULLY
POINT WE HAD RAISED.
3. ARGOV COMMENTED THAT IN WAR ONE SOMETIMES HAS TO RESORT
TO TACTICS USED BY OTHER SIDE. HE NOTED THAT ARABS STILL
BLD SERIOUSLY WOUNDED PRISONERS AND INNOCENT
BORDER GUARD GOLDWASSER. IF GOI CANNOT GET THEM BACK ONE
WAY, MAYBE ANOTHER WAY WILL WORK. IF ISRAEL'S GOOD
NAME IS AT STAKE, PERHAPS WE SHALL HAVE TO RISK IT.
ATHERTON OBSERVED THAT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS CLOSE
D BREAKDOWN OF STANDARDS OF CONDUCT IN CIVIL AVIATION FIELD.
USG IS CONCERNED AND IS TRYING TO SUPPORT MAINTENANCE OF SOME
STANDARDS. WE RECOGNIZE DILEMMA ISRAELIS FACE AND THAT GOI
HAS TO MAKE ITS OwN DECISION.
WE MERELY HAVE POINTED OUT AND URGED CONSIDERATION OF
LONGER RUN FACTORS.
Reproduc Nixon Library
GP-3 JOHNSON
BT
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Samders.
CONFIDENTIAL
Sent to s.
NNNNVV EHA823
RR RUEHEX
RECEIVED
DE RUEHC 140594 2400118
WHCA
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280033Z AUG 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
1970 AUG 28 01 22
TO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 6631
INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 5860
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 6691
RUEIVC/USINT CAIRO 5478
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9707
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8724
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY 2367
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1710
RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 140594
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR ASST SECY SISCO
SUBJ: JOINT US-SOVIET OBSERVER FORCE
1. IN COURSE CONVERSATION WITH ATHERTON (SEPTEL) AUGUST 27
ARGOV INQUIRED ABOuT PRESS REPORTS FROM BACKGROUNDER BY
US OFFICIALS AT SAN CLEMENTE AND ASKED IF ATHERTON COHLD
THROW ANY LIGHT ON REPORT CONCERNING ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT
US-SOVIET OBSERVER FROCE IN MIDEAST.
2. ATHERTON SHOWED ARGOV TEXT OF RELEVANT PROTION OF BACKGROUNDER
AND OBSERVED THAT PRESS HAD PLAYED UP ONE SMALL PART OF LENGTHY
EXCHANGE. HE NOTED THAT CONTEXT RELATED TO US RETAINING SOME ROLE
IN THE AREA AFTER A SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. WHILE USG
DOES NOT HAVE FORMULATED PROPOSALS AND HAS REACHED NO
JUDGMENTS ON THIS POINT, AT THIS STAGE WE WOULD NOT
EXCLUDE USG PARTICIPATION AS DESCRIBED BY THE PRESS. ARGOV
OBSERVED THAT THIS REPORT HAS CREATED QUITE A STIR IN
JERUSALEM AND NOTED ATHERTON'S ASSERTION THAT USG HAS NOT
BEGUN FORMULATING PREACEKEEPGIN PROPOSALS. ATHERTON ADVISED THAT
RGOV KEEP IN MIND THAT JOINT OBSERVER FORCE IS ONLY ONE OF
MANY POSSIBILITIES.
3. ARGOV NOTED THAT ISRAELI EMBASSY IS TELLING PRESS THAT
ISRAEL HOPES THIS REPORT IS NOT AN INDICATION THAT USG IS
WILLING TO ACCEPT SOME SORT OF SETTLEMENT SHORT OF PEACE.
ATHERTON SAID SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD NOT BE MADE SHORT OF
PEACE, BUT IN SUPPORT OF PEACE. ARGOV OBSERVED THAT IF
ISRAEL OBTAINS KIND OF PEACE WHICH IT HAS IN MIND SUCH
OBSERVER ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. JOHNSON
BT
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Sent to S.C.
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED
for
WHCA
1970 AUG 28 01 20
VV EHA822
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DE RUEHC 140593 2400117
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RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1350
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 6630
INFO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 6690
RUEIVC/USINT CAIRO 5477
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4826
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY 2366
RDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9706
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1709
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8723
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 8754
RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 140593
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR ASST SECY SISCO
1 DURING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH DEPT OFFICER ON AUGUST
2 JORDANIAN AMBA SSADOR SHARAF STATED THAT ON
PREVIOUS DAY, AUGUST 26, HE HAD, AMONG OTHER THINGS,
PASSED MESSAGE FROM HIS GOVERNMENT TO JARRING WHICH
EXPRESSED IN STRONG TERMS GOJ'S GRAVE CONCERN ABOuT
CONTINUING, ACTIVE, LARGE-SCALE ISRAELI CHANGES TO
SHARACTER OF JERUSALEM. ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR, THESE
INCLUDE EXPROPRIATION AND DEMOLITION OF ARAB PROPERTIES
AS WELL AS DEMORGRAPHIC DISPLACEMENTS. AMBASSADOR
CONTINUED THAT OBVIO₁₁S ISRAELI PURPOSE THESE CHANGES IS
ACHIEVEMENT FAITS ACCOMPLIS AS BASIS ON WHICH ADVANCE
UNWARRANTED ISRAELI CLAIMS TO OLD CITY AND OTHER OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES.
2. AMBASSADOR SHARAF STATED GOJ REGARDS THIS DEVELOPMENT
IN JERUSALEM AS WELL AS OTHER ISRAELI CHANGES IN OCCUPIED
ARAB TERRITORIES AS DANGEROUS AND VERY SERIOUS WHICH, IF
PERMITTED TO CONTINUE, WILL HINDER CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS
AND HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON PEACE INITIATIVE. SHARAF
INDICATED HE INTENDS BRING THIS SUBJECT TO ATTENTION USG
IN NEAR FUTURE AND ALSO THAT GOJ WILL VERY SHORTLY PROPOSE
TO JARRING THAT STANDSTILL BE EFFECTED NOT ONLY ALONG
CEASEFIRE LINES BUT ALSO WITHIN ISRAELI OCCUPIED ARAB
TERRITORIES.
3. WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS ACTION ADDRESSEES. JOHNSON
BT
CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced Nixon Presidential Library
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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*
*
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OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 021
PAGE 01 STATE 140255
EXPIS EXPIC EXATE
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ORIGIN SS-45
2/3
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
66641
DRAFTD BY: NEA/UAR8 GSBROWN
APPROVED BY: NEA- ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR
NEA=UAR= MR STERNER
S/S MR CURRAN
117026
R 272059Z AUG 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
'70 AUG 28 AM 9:54 54
WHITE HOUSE
S E C R E T STATE 140255
EXDIS
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR ASST SECY SISCO
1 0 UAR MINISTER GHORBAL CALLED ON DEPT ASSIST SECCY ATHERTON
AUG 26 FOR REVIEW MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. BURDEN GHORBAL'S
PRESENTATION WAS ON NEED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM OF US INITIATIVE
AND NECESSITY THAT US CONTINUE IN GUAR EYES TO PLAY
NEUTRAL ROLE RATHER THAN ACT AS ADVOCATE OR ARSENAL FOR ISRAEL®
2. GHORBAL SAID HE DID NOT YET HAVE REPORT ON AUG 26 JARRING-
ZAYYAT MEETING HE SAID GUAR WORRIED ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS
AND CONCERNED THAT RECALL OF TEKOAH INDICATED GOI UNWILLINGNESS
TO MOVE FORWARD OR CREATE FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE TO KEEP UP WHAT
MOMENTUM EXISTED. ISRAELI TACTICS WERE EATING INTO CEASEFIRE
PERIOD, OF WHICH ONLY 70 DAYS REMAINING, ATHERTON SAID YOST
HAD SPOKEN TO TEKOAH AUG 24, STRESSING USG CONVERN THAT ISRAEL
NOT APPEAR TO BE CAUSING A PAUSE IN PEACEMAKING EFFORT. NONETHELESS
USG CONSIDERED TEKOAH'S RETURN TO TEL AVIV TO RECEIVE NEGOTIATING
INSTRUCTIONS AS LEGITIMATE, AND FELT THAT EACH SIDE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
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TELEGRAM
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EXPIC EXQIC EXPIC
PAGE 02 STATE 140255
SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE BENEFIT OF DOUBT TO OTHER.
GHORBAL EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT YOST HAD SPOKEN TO TEKOOAH,
AND SAID GUAR HAD ACCEPTED US INITIATIVE IN EFFORT SEEK
IMPLEMENTATION SCRES 242 AND WOULD WORK TOWARD THAT END.
3. GHORBAL, IN ELABORATING ON NEED FOR MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND
COMMITMENTS, REMARKED THAT US HAD NOT YET ANSWERED LATEST SOVIET
FORMULATIONS ON NATURE OF PEACE. ATHERTON SAID WE CONSIDERED
SOVIET FORMULATIONS HAD BEEN DELAYED RSPONSE TO OUR OCTOBER
AND DECEMBER FORMULATIONS ON TERRITORIAL ASPECTS. IN ANY EVENT,
MORE IMPORTANT POINT NOW THAN US - USSR EXCHANGES IS ENUNCIATION
OF RESPECTIVE POSITIONS BY
PARTIES THEMSELVES
4. ATHERTON SAID USG INTERESTED IN
ESOLUTION OF PRESENT
UNCERTAINTIES CONCERNING TERMS OF STANDSTILL. WE GRATIFIED THERE
HAD BEEN NO SHOOTING ON SUEZ FRONT AND HOPED THAT VARYING
INTERPRETATIONS AND SUSPICIONS OVER TERMS OF STANDSTILL COULD
BE WORKED OUT SATISFACTORILY IN COURSE OF PRESENT EXCHANGES
IN CAIRO AND TEL AVIV. WE BELIEVED GOI CONCERN WAS JUSTIFIED
OVER UAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN PERIOD IMMEDIATELY SURROUNDING
INCEPTION CEASEFIRE. ALTHOUGH THIS INCIDENT NOW PAST HISTORY, IT
NOT HELPFUL IN CREATING FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR FORWARD
MOVEMENT.
5. GHORBAL RAISED US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL, POINTING TO PRESS
INDICATIONS THAT US INTENDED SUPPLY MORE SOPHISTICATED ELECTRONIC
EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS SUCH AS SHRIKE AND WALLEYE. HE OWED
IT TO US, GHORBAL SAID, TO POINT OUT THAT SUPPLY OF SUCH
WEAPONRY WOULD NOT HELP US PEACESEEKING EFFORTS AND WOULD ONLY
ENCOURAGE ISRAELI OBSTINACY, AS WELL AS REINFORCE GUAR
SUSPICIONS ABOUT USG ROLE AS ISRAEL'S ADVOCATE. ATHERTON
SAID THAT USG CONTINUING TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN ARMS SUPPLY,
BUT HAD PLACED NO EMBARGO ON ARMS TO ISRAEL AND WAS CONTINUING
NORMAL SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP IN LIGHT OF US APPRAISAL GOI
EXPIS
NEEDS. RESTRAINT COULD NOT BE ONE SIDED, AND THERE HAD BEEN
NO RESPONSIVENESS FROM THE OTHER SIDE ON ARMS LIMITATION IDEA.
GP-3. JOHNSON
NOT TO BE REPRODU
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATIO
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
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e51/10/5190
E:PARTMENT
OF
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*
Department of Smite
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SUMMARY
SECRET 827
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03130 01 OF 02 041107Z
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ACTION NEA=15
INFO OCT-01 AF-12 EUR-20 I0-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02
INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20
USIA-12 RSR-01 AID-28 /155 W
020588
R 040945Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 487
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SSE COR E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3130
DEPT PASS OTHER POSTS
SUBU: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT JORDANIAN SITUATION:
PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE
SUMMARY COMMENT: WITHIN NEXT TWO TO THREE WEEKS, THE EVOLVING
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REGIME AND THE FEDAYEEN WILL PROBABLY
BE DETERMINED, HOWEVER UNTIDILY, IN SOME INTERIM FORMULA. ALL
OTHER ISSUES STILL AT QUESTION (E.G., NATURE OF KING'S AUTHORITY,
JORDAN'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY, TEMPO OF NATIONAL MOBILIZATION,
ETC.) ARE SUBORDINATE TO AND DEPENDENT ON FINDING THIS FORMULA
AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IMPLEMENTING IT. CURRENT ENVIRONMENT FAVORS
FINDING COMPROMISE SOLUTION OR FORMULA. RISKS OF FURTHER CON-
FRONTATION ARE HIGH, OF COURSE, BUT IT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE TOUCH-
ED OFF ACCIDENTALLY THAN DELIBERATELY. ASSUMING RELATIONSHIP
IS AGREED UPON, TIME OF TESTING WILL TAKE PLACE, DURING WHICH
FEDAYEEN WILL ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE (AND PERHAPS EVEN IN-
STITUTIONALIZE: SHARED CONTROL OVER COUNTRY. SHORT-TERM RESULT
COULD BE SUPERFICIAL STABILITY (WITH OPPORTUNITIES FOR USG TO
OPEN DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP OF ALL COLORS), BUT
LONG-TERM PROSPECTS FOR JORDAN BECOMING MAJOR BATTLEGROUND IN
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT WOULD BE ENHANCED, WITH DREARY IMPLICATIONS
FOR AREA PEACE AND FOR JORDANIAN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY. END
SECRET
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DEPARTMENT
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TELEGRAM
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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03130 01 OF 02 041107Z
SUMMARY COMMENT.
1. QUIET COMPROMISE LIKELY - SIFTING THROUGH ELEMENTS IN CURRENT
PICTURE, PATTERN SEEMS TO BE FORMING WHICH FAVORS FINDING A COM-
PROMISE FORMULA FOR FEDAYEEN-REGIME RELATIONSHIP RATHER THAN
ANOTHER AND, THIS TIME, FULL-SCALE CONFRONTATION FACTORS FRIENDLY
TO QUIETLY-NEGOTIATED INTERIM SOLUTION INCLUDE: (A) INTRODUCTION
OF QUADRIPARTITE MEDIATING COMMITTEE, REPRESENTING GOVERNMENTS
(UAR, ALGERIA, SUDAN, LIBYA) WHICH FOR MOST PART HAVE NO IMMEDIATE
VESTED INTEREST IN FURTHER UNDERMINING A LEGITIMATE ARAB GOVERN-
MENT, AND WHOSE OBJECTIVES PROBABLY PARALLEL THOSE OF KING HUSSEIN
IN MAJOR RESPECTS (E.G., UNIFYING FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS, PRE-
SERVING INTERNAL LAW AND ORDER): (B) THE NEW JORDANIAN CABINET
WHICH, BECAUSE IT INCORPORATES STRONGLY PRO-FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS,
HAS ALREADY INSPIRED GREATER FEDAYEEN (FATAH) CONFIDENCE
AND COOPERATION: (C) PUBLIC WEARINESS OR FEAR OF THE ENDLESS IN-
TERNAL TURMOIL, COUPLED WITH WILLINGNESS OF MANY ORDINARY CITI-
ZENS TO ACCOMMODATE THEMSELVES TO SHARED SOVEREIGNTY: AND (D)
THE DETERMINATION OF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL MASHUR
HADIITHA AL JAZI TO HEAD OFF FURTHER CONFRONTATIONS AND PRO-
VOCATIONS BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND ARMY, PAYING INEVITABLE PRICE OF
LOWERED AUTHORITY FOR REGIME.
2. EMERGENCE OF THIRD PARTY? MASHUR HADIITHA'S ROLE IS POTENTIALLY
EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT: THERE ARE SIGNS HE ENVISAGES HIMSELF BE
COMING A DOMINANT POLITICAL POWER IN THE COUNTRY, TAKING INITIATIVE
WHENEVER VACUUMS APPEAR AND EXPLOITING APPARENT FEDAYEEN CONFIDENCE
IN HIM. HUSSEIN REPORTEDLY HAS CALLED HIM AN ASPIRING DICTATOR:
AND PAKISTANI AMB, WHO HAS KNOWN HIM FOR MANY YEARS, CONSIDERS
HIM EXTREMELY AMBITIOUS AND QUIETLY AGGRESSIVE. TO DEGREE HE TAKES
REAL AS OPPOSED TO NOMINAL CONTROL OF ARMY, HE MAY INDEED BE
FORCE TO RECKON WITH. BUT HUSSEIN STILL CLEARLY CONTROLS ARMY.
3. POSSIBLE ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION NOT REMOTE THE KING, STILL
SMARTING FROM THE SUCCESSIVE HUMILIATIONS METED OUT TO HIS AUTH-
ORITY THIS YEAR, AND REALIZING THAT LATENT ANIMOSITIES BETWEEN
PALESTINIANS AND SOME TRANS-JORDANIANS HAVE AGAIN SURFACED, IS
BIDING HIS TIME. HE HAS TOLD CHARGE AND OTHERS THAT HE WILL
STRIKE FEDAYEEN HARD AND SEND ARMY INTO AMMAN IF SATISFACTORY
ARRANGEMENT IS NOT ACHIEVED. WE STRONGLY DOUBT THIS WILL OCCUR,
BUT IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT. TEMPERS AMONG CERTAIN ARMY OFFICERS
AND TRANS-JORDANIANS ARE
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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03130 01 OF 02 041107Z
IMPRESSIVELY HIGH, AND COULD GET OUT OF HAND. MEANWHILE, MILITARY
FORCES HAVE BEEN STATIONED AT ENTRY POINTS INTO AMMAN, ALTHOUGH
WE DOUBT THAT TOTAL FORCE SURROUNDING CITY IS AS LARGE AS FEDAYEEN
PROPAGANDISTS ALLEGE. HIGH VISIBILITY THESE FORCES AT CHECK
POINTS MAY SERVE AS PRESSURE TACTIC IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS.
THERE IS, HOWEVER, REAL DANGER IN ACCIDENTAL PROVOCATIONS OF
EITHER FEDAYEEN OR ARMY : AND EXTREMIST FEDAYEEN GROUPS, KNOWING
FLASH POINTS, COULD EASILY IGNITE A AFIRE.
4. IRAQI ROLE A MYSTERY - PROBABLY IRAQI ROLE IN PRESENT NEGO-
TIATIONS OR IN FUTURE CRISIS IS AMONG MOST DIFFICULT QUESTIONS
TO ANSWER. IF, INDEED, THREAT OF IRAQI ARMY INTERVENTION WAS ONE
REASON THAT JORDAN ARMY DID NOT ENTER AMMAN LAST TIME, SAME CON-
SIDERATION PRESUMABLY WOULD APPLY IN FUTURE. IT IS NOW RPT NOW
OUR JUDGMENT THAT IRAQIS DID NOT MASTERMIND PLOT AGAINST REGIME
BUT, RATHER, TOOK ADVANTAGE OF CONFUSION TO REAP ADVANTAGES FOR
THEMSELVES AND FEDAYEEN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO
POSITION IN JORDAN OF SYRIA AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AS-SA'IQAH.
IRAQI AMB HERE INDICATED JUNE 20 TO FRENCH AMB THAT IRAQIS WERE
PREPARED TO INTERVENE IF TROUBLES BROKE OUT AGAIN. YET HIS REMARK
FAILED TO MAKE CLEAR WHETHER IRAQI INTERVENTION WOULD ASSIST
REGIME IN KEEPING ORDER OR WHETHER THEY WOULD BE SUPPORTING FED-
AYEEN CAUSE. ALLEGATIONS THAT IRAQIS MAY BE PRESSURING PFLP BY
WITHHOLDING ITS MONTHLY SUBSIDY, IF TRUE, MAY BE SIGNIFICANT CLUE
TO FUTURE IRAQI BEHAVIOR.
5. POSITION OF FEDAYEEN EXTREMISTS: - BOTH REGIME AND SO-CALLED
MODERATE FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS RECOGNIZE THE SPOILER'S ROLE THAT
PFLP OR OTHER EXTREMISTS MIGHT PLAY.BEFORE JUNE CRISIS, A
WORKING RELATIONSHIP OF SORTS BETWEEN PLO/FATAH AND GOVT SEEMED
TO BE DEVELOPING, WITH REPORTED ENCOURAGEMENT OF UAR EMBASSY.
HOPES ARE STILL VOICED BY SOME THAT PLO/FATAH WOULD STAND BY
QUIETLY WHILE ARMY MOPPED UP PFLP, OR EVEN ASSIST OPERATION. WE
CONTINUE, HOWEVER, TO CONSIDER THIS AMONG THE REMOTEST OF
POSSIBILITIES.
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
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TELEGRAM
SUMMARY
SECRET 828
PAGE 01 AMMAN 03130 02 OF 02 041134Z
17
ACTION NEA-15
INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00
NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 IO-13 EUR-20
AF-12 AID-28 RSR-01 /155 W
020695
R 040945Z JUL 70
FM ANEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 488
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 3130
6. GOALS OF RESPECTIVE PARTIES # REGIME EASILY SHOULD BE ABLE TO
AVOID FURTHER MAJOR SURRENDERS OF AUTHORITY DURING NEGOTIATIONS.
IT WILL SEEK UNIFICATION OF THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT UNDER PRIME
LEADERSHIP OF PLO/FATAH, BELIEVING THAT FUTURE FEDAYEEN-GOVT PROB-
LEMS COULD THEREBY BE IRONED OUT MORE EASILY AND THAT LAW AND
ORDER COULD BE PRESERVED MORE SATISFACTORILY. MOST THAT REALIS-
TICALLY COULD BE EXPECTED FROM FEDAYEEN, HOWEVER, WOULD BE A
COLLECTIVE KIND OF FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP a A COORDINATING BODY
B
SIMILAR TO BUT MORE AUTHORITATIVE THAN THE PLETHORA OF COMMITTEES
ALREADY FORMED.
7 o REGIME ALSO seeks WITHDRAWAL OF FEDAYEEN CONCENTRATIONS FROM
AMMAN AND MAJOR TOWNS. THESE URBAN AREAS ARE ARMED CAMPS, WHICH
ARE AT MERCY OF FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS ACCUSTOMED TO TAKING
QUICKER INITIATIVES THAN ARMY OR GOVT. AGAIN WE THINK LIKE-
LIHOOD IS REMOTE THAT ALL FEDAYEEN ORGAINIZATIONS, BUT PARTICULARLY
THE PFLP, WOULD WILLINGLY LIVE UP TO PROMISE TO EVACUATE: YET
THIS ISSUE WILL PROBABLY BE QUESTION ON WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WILL
FOUNDER OR SUCCEED, AND SOME TOKEN EVACUATION BY FATAH MAY THERE-
FORE BE POSSIBLE, EVEN LIKELY.
8. HUSSEIN REPORTEDLY WANTS REMOVAL FROM JORDAN OF FEDAYEEN
ORGANIZATIONS UNDER EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS (I.E.D
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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03130 02 OF 02 041134Z
SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AS-SA'IQAH). THIS MAY NOT, HOWEVER, BE MAJOR
OBJECTIVE.
90 MOST FEDAYEEN SHORT-TERM DEMANDS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MET IN SOME
FORM OR ANOTHER. JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF AL JAZI HAS DONE MUCH
TO CONCILIATE THEM, AND MAY HAVE ABOLISHED COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
"SPECIAL BRANCH." WITHIN ARMY. DESPITE CURRENT RHETORIC CALLING
FOR ASSUMPTION INTO POWER OF"PATRIOTIC ELEMENTS EMPOWERED TO MAKE
DECISIONS,' PRESENT CABINET'S MILITANT POLICY AND CALL FOR NATIONAL
MOBILIZATION PRESUMABLY WILL BE TO FEDAYEEN LIKING ALONG WITH
WHAT PRESAGES WARMER APPROACH TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. THE MAJOR
SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVE OF FEDAYEEN WILL BE ADEQUATE GUARANTEES
THAT FEDAYEEN FREEDOM OF ACTION IN JORDAN VALLEY AND SECURITY
OF THEIR BASE AREAS OUTSIDE AMMAN WILL BE PRESERVED, WITHOUT FEAR
OF CONTROL OR INTERDICTION BY ARMY.
10. COMPROMISE MEANS SHARED AUTHORITY OVER COUNTRY a ASSUMING
AS WE DO THAT SOME KIND OF COMPROMISE WORKING ARRANGEMENT WILL
BE HASHED OUT, IT IS LIKELY TO HOLD TOGETHER FOR AT LEAST A FEW
MONTHS, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE BLESSING THAT PRESUMABLY WOULD BE
GIVEN TO IT THROUGH THE FOUR-POWER MEDIATING COMMITTEE. DURING
SUBSEQUENT TIME OF TESTING, FEDAYEEN WILL SEEK TO CONSOLIDATE
THEIR SHARED DE FACTO CONTROL OF COUNTRY, AND SOME KIND OF INFOR-
MAL COORDINATING MACHINERY MAY DEVELOP THAT WOULD
INSTITUTIONALIZE IT. MANY SUCH IDEAS ARE NOW BEING EXAMINED.
EVEN THOUGH THIS PROMISES AN UNEASY AND SUPERFICIAL STABILITY
WITHIN COUNTRY, CERTAIN OTHER IMPLICATIONS CAN BE FORESEEN, AS
FOLLOWS:
(A) THE AUTHORITY AND PRESTIGE OF HASHEMITE REGIME WILL CONTINUE
TO DECLINE, BUT KING STILL HAS CONSIDERABLE RESIDUE. ARMY SEEMS
TO HAVE REMAINED SOLIDLY BEHIND HIM, WITH ONLY ONE EXAMPLE OF
TEMPORARY DISOBEDIENCE IN WHICH TANK COMMANDER SOUGHT TO GO AFTER
FEDAYEEN AGAINST ORDERS. IT MAY BE REVEALING, HOWEVER, THAT DURING
CRISIS HE REPORTEDLY THREATENED TO LEAVE COUNTRY, SOMETHING HE
HAS DONE ONLY RARELY. IN ADDITION, ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON
HUSSEIN SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS ROUTINE: WHILE LIVING WITH EVER
PRESENT THREAT OF ASSASSINATION, THERE ACTUALLY HAVE BEEN REL=
ATIVELY FEW ATTEMPTS ON HIS LIFE IN RECENT YEARS.
(B) JUNE CRISIS ALREADY HAS UNLEASHED NATIONALIST FORCES (OTHER
THAN FEDAYEEN) WHO WANT BASIC CHANGES IN JORDAN'S POLITICAL
STRUCTURE AND SHIFT OR POLITICAL POWER ELSEWHERE (NOT NECESSARILY
TO FEDAYEEN). THEY MIGHT BE CONTENT WITH MONARCHY, BUT NOT AB-
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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PAGE 03 AMMAN 0313Ø 02 OF 02 041134Z
SOLUTE MONARCHY OPERATING UNDER GUISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ONE.
NEW CABINET, IF IT LASTS MAY PROMOTE THIS TREND: AND WE MAY
SEE MORF. REAL GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
THAN GOVT'S POLICY THEMES SUGGEST.
(C) DURING TIME OF TESTING, INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY OF JORDAN
WILL BE FURTHER COMPROMISED. JORDAN EVEN NOW CAN ONLY FOLLOW
THE UAR'S LEAD AS REGARDS ANY NEW PEACE INITIATIVES. MEANWHILE,
FEDAYEEN WILL SEEK FOR LONG-TERM NOTHING SHORT OF PUTTING JORDAN
ON FULL WARTIME FOOTING 3 ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLY AS WELL AS
MILITARILY - CLEARLY REJECTING ALL ROUTES TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
(D) IN THIS SITUATION, THE US WILL BE MORE AND MORE A SCAPEGOATs
AND PUBLIC WILL BE FURTHER CONDITIONED TO FOCUSING WRATH ON US o
SAFETY OF INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS OCCASIONALLY WILL BE IN JEOPARDY.
CONTINUING PUBLIC AND PERHAPS CABINET PRESSURES TO ACCEPT SOVIET
ARMS MUST BE EXPECTED. MOST EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION TO GOING SOVIET
MAY IN THEEND BE CONCENTRATED AMONG KEY ARMY COMMANDERS. MEAN-
WHILE, SUCH GESTURES AS RECOGNIZING EAST GERMANY SHOULD BE
ANTICIPATED. WHETHER SOVIETS WILL BE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING
CLOSER TIES WITH WHAT MAY APPEAR TO THEM TO BE A BANKRUPT MON -
ARCHY IS AN INTERESTING QUESTION. YET, IRONICALLY, USG MAY FIND
IT EASIER AND ALMOST ROUTINE TO OPEN UP DIALOGUE WITH MORE
MILITANT AMONG PALESTINIAN NATIONALISTS. OPPORTUNITIES ARE ALSO
PRESENT FOR USG, THROUGH CONTINUED ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSIS-
TANCE, REINVIGORATED CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION.
AS WELL AS TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATIC MEANS, TO RETARD AND OFFSET
THESE ANTI-AMERICAN TRENDS.
(E) ENDORSING GREATER FEDAYEEN FREEDOM OF ACTION WILL INEVITABLY
RESULT IN MORE SERIOUS BREACHES OF CEASE-FIRE IN JORDAN VALLEY.
MORE FORCEFUL ISRAELI RETALIATIONS SHOULD THEREFORE BE EXPECTED.
THEY MAYD HOWEVER, HAVE RESULT OF UNITING COUNTRY BEHIND TRUE
MOBILIZATION EFFORT. IF ISRAELIS DID NOT INVADE COUNTRY IN MEAN=
TIME, WE VISUALIZE A DAY COMING WHEN JORDAN MIGHT BECOME LITTLE
MORE THAN A CONVENIENT BATTLEGROUNG INTO WHICH VARIOUS FEDAYEEN
ANDI ARAB FORCES, BUT ESPECIALLY IRAQI, WOULD MOVE FROM TIME TO
TIME.
(F) FURTHER LEAKAGE OF PEOPLE AND CAPITAL FROM JORDAN MUST BE
EXPECTED. FIRST FRIGHTENED FLIGHT OUT OF COUNTRY MAY HAVE SLOWED:
HOWEVER, SOME SERIOUS DAMAGE ALREADY HAS BEEN DONE . SOME OF JOR-
DAN'S MOST SOLID CITIZENS ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING MOVING OUT®
GP3:
ODELL
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executiv ORIER T3526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXPIS
Department of State
OF STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 110
PAGE 01 STATE 135488
41
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
66602
DRAFTED BY8 AF/N:CWBRAY
APPROVED BY: AF/N8CHARLES Wo BRAY
E/FSE:MRO AKINS
AF 8 AMB . PALMER
S/S:MR. BREWSTER
70 AUG 20 PM 6:10 10
SQUATION ROOM WHITE HOUSE WHITE HOUSE
066587
R 201606Z AUG 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
INFO AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI
S. SECRET STATE 135488
EXDIS
SUBJECT: LIBYAN INTENTION TO JOINT VENTURE WITH AMERICAN
OILI SERVICE COMPANIES
REF: TRIPOLI 1945
1. WE SEE LARG OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO OIL TO BE THE
FOLLOWING:
(A) IN SHORT TERMis TO GAIN AT LEAST LIMITED ACCESS TO ITS
OWN CRUDE SUPPLIES IN ORDER TO START LNOC IN BUSINESS ON
THE ALGERIAN PATTERN
(B) TO DETERMINE RATES OF OIL PRODUCTION YIELDING MAXIMUM
ECONOMIC BENEFITS LIBYA CAN ABSORB OVER TIME. BEYOND SUCH
RATES' LIBYANS MAY BELIEVE OIL IS WORTH MORE TO THEM IN THE
GROUND THAN IN THE PIPELINE: GIVEN LIBYA'S VERY LARGE
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES, IT HAS AN INTEREST IN CONSERVA-
TION AS A POSITIVE, NOT NEGATIVE GOAL.
(C) OVER LONGER TERM, TO GAIN NATIONAL CONTROL OVER OIL
AND GAS INDUSTRY FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GOALS OF LESSEN-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 135488
ING FOREIGN VISIBILITY AND LIBYAN DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGNERS.
EXPIS EXAIS EXPIC
IN ACHIEVING THIS, LARG WILL PROBABLY MOVE TOWARDS SOME
DEGREE OF EQUITY PARTICIPATION IN PRODUCING COMPANIES.
2. WE WOULD WELCOME EMBASSY COMMENTS ON FOREGOING.
30 IN THIS CONNECTION WE SEE PRESENT POSTED PRICE NEGOTIA-
TIONS NOT AS THE ULTIMATE ISSUE AND BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICI-
PATE FURTHER LIBYAN MOVES IN THE DIRECTION OF ITS OBJECT-
IVES OUTLINED ABOVE. QUESTION OF JOINT VENTURES HAS ALREADY
ARISEN IN CONNECTION WITH SERVICE COMPANIES. WE TEND
TO AGREE WITH BECHTEL MANAGEMENT'S ASSESSMENT THAT LEAST
UNSATISFACTORY COURSE IS TO AGREE TO JOINT VENTURES WHERE
ECONOMIC COUNTER ARGUMENTS: ARE NOT OVERWHELMING. IT WILL
BE IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN OIL INTERESTS IN
LIBYA, AS WELL AS TO BROADER STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN-
CLUDING THE POSITION OF US OIL COMPANIES IN MARKETING AND
DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS IN EUROPE AND EUROPEUS OWN NEED FOR
SECURE SOURCES OF CRUDE, THAT AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES AND
LARG ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS WHERE THEY
REASONABLY CANo
40 WE WOULD WELCOME EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF WHAT SPECIFIC
MOVES THE LIBYANS MAY TAKE IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS WITH RESPECT
TO AMERICAN OIL INTERESTS (E.G. PIPELINES, PORTS, NATIONALIZA-
TION OF INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES, ETC.) AND ANY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS EMBASSY MAY HAVE AS TO HOW WE DEAL WITH LIBYAN MOVES
AND AMERICAN OIL COMPANY REACTIONS%
JOHNSON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE
WIREHOUT
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
051/10/5190
OF STATE
WH
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 833
PAGE 01 STATE 128252
85
/3
ORIGIN SS-45
EXQIC EXCIS EXCES EXCLUS
INFO OCT-01 /046 R
DRAFTED S/S:TMTRACY
8/7/709 X28063
APPROVED BY S/S:RCBREWSTER
OC/T:WNAEHER
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
"70 AUG 7 PM 11:22 22
WHITE
112892
R 072336Z AUG 70
3SNOH
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
amembassy TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSTATE128252
EXDIS
SUBJECT: LATERAL TRANSMISSION OF NODIS TELEGRAMS
REF : STATE'S 127226, TEL AVIV'S 4207, AND STATE'S 127434
1 . DEPARTMENT AGREES WITH TEL AVIV'S REFTEL THAT ADDRESSEE
POSTS SHOULD HAVE CAPACITY TO TRANSMIT LATERALLY NODIS
MESSAGES AMONG THEMSELVES WITHOUT NEED FOR WASHINGTON RE-
ENCRYPTION.
2. DEPARTMENT IS SENDING NECESSARY CRYPTO MATERIALS TO
AMMAN, CAIRO, AND TEL AVIV TO PROVIDE NODIS CAPABILITY.
THESE CRYPTO MATERIALS SHOULD BE RECEIVED AT LATTER THREE
POSTS BY TUESDAY AFTERNOON, AUGUST 11. MOSCOW AND USUN WILL
RECEIVE NODIS CABLES VIA DEPARTMENT RELAY WITHOUT SUPER-
ENCRYPTION. ROGERS
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TH eORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
SECRET 224
2
PAGE 01 STATE 148073:
2/3
54
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
66609
DRAFTED BY:EUR:SOV:A DUBS
APPROVED BY*NEA*JOSEPHIJ. SISCO
S/SIMR. CURRAN
EUR:MR. DAVIES
R 101752Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
'70 SEP 10 858 PM 9:36
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S ECR E T STATE 148073
EXDIS
REF: STATE 143328
SUBJECT: SOVIET APPROACHES TO IRAQ AND JORDAN
1 = SOVIET CHARGE VORONTSOV CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON ASSISTANT
SECRETARY SISCO SEPTEMBER 9 TO REPORT THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT
HAD MADE APPROACHES IN AMMAN AND BAGHDAD REGARDING SITUATION
IN JORDAN (THESE APPROACHES PRESUMABLY MADE IN RESPONSE TO
OUR REQUEST THAT SOVIETS INTERCEDE WITH IRAQIS -- REFTEL.)
2. READING FROM RUSSIAN NOTES, VORONTSOV SAID FOLLOWING
REPRESENTATIONS HAD BEEN MADE IN AMMAN AND BAGHDAD BY SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVES TODAY: QUOTE CONCERN HAS BEEN CREATED IN
MOSCOW BY INFORMATION THAT THE SITUATION IN JORDAN HAS BECOME
AGGRAVATED IN RECENT DAYS. THIS CONCERN IS CAUSED BY THE FACT
THAT A FRATRICIDAL FIGHT AMONG ARABS COULD CAUSE HEAVY DAMAGE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nix SrEPresidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 148073
EXPIS EXPIS EXQIN EXATE
TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS, FIRST OF ALL AND SECONDLY, TO THE
CAUSE OF ESTABLISHING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THIS
ADVANTAGES COULD ONLY ACCRUE TO THE ENEMIES OF THE ARAB NATIONS, CASE,
THE ISRAELI AGGRESSORS AND THE IMPERIALIST FORCES BEHIND THEM.
JORDAN TO DEMONSTRATE FARSIGHTEDNESS AND REASONABLE RESTRAINT AND
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT APPEALS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAQ
JORDAN. A FURTHER AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION SHOULD NOT
so THAT AN END CAN BE BROUGHT TO THE DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS IN
ALLOWED SINCE THIS WOULD ONLY WORSEN THE GENERAL SITUATION BE
THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH IS ALREADY COMPLICATED ENOUGH. THE SOVIET IN
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT WAYS WILL BE FOUND TO SOLVE
BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE ARAB NATIONS AND CAUSE NO DAMAGE
THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE ARISEN BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THIS WILL
TO THE UNIFICATION OF ARAB STATES, THE FIGHT FOR LIQUIDATION
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND THE SECURING OF THE
NATIONAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL PROGRESS BY THE ARAB NATIONS. END QUOTE
3. SISCO REPLIED THAT WE CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED BY THE
SITUATION IN JORDAN. WE ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED BY IRAQI
SUPPORT OF THE FEDAYEEN. THE PRESENCE OF IRAQI TROOPS INCO
JORDAN POSES SPECTER OF THEIR DIRECT INTERVENTION IN THAT
COUNTRY. U.S. HOPES THAT THIS PRIVATE soviet MESSAGE TO
IRAQIS WILL HELP TO UNDERSCORE DESIRABILITY OF RESOLVING
SITUATION IN JORDAN PEACEFULLY. WE HOPE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S
SOME questionable LANGUAGE.
APPEAL WILL BE HELPFUL IN THIS CONNECTION, DESPITE USE OF
2Eb
GP-3. ROGERS
.10
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED HOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
111/10/5190
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET "8ØØ
PAGE 01 STATE 124298
47
hp
ORIGIN SS*45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 R
66609
DRAFTED BY:NEA:AL ATHERTON
APPROVED BY:NEA:AL ATHERTON
NEA:MR. SISCO (DRAFT)
S/S:M LEVITSKY
072089
0 011904Z AUG 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
'70 AUG 3 AM 8:32 32
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE house
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
amembassy JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
S E C R E T STATE 124298
EXDIS
1. WE NOTE ARAB PUBLIC OMMENT (E.G., FON MIN ATALLAH'S
STATEMENT ABOUT U. S. INITIATIVE BEING STILLBORN) TO EFFECT
THAT ISRAELI REPLY IS CONDITIONAL, GOES BEYOND TERMS OF OUR
PROPOSAL AND RESOLUTION 242, ETC.
2. WE RECOGNIZE CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PUBLIC POSTURING AND
BELITTLING OF EACH OTHER'S INTENTIONS BY BOTH SIDES IS INEVIT-
ABLE AT THIS TIME. YOU SHOULD, HOWEVER, GET FOLLOWING POINTS
ACROSS TO HOST GOVTS IN MANNER AND AT LEVEL YOU DEEMI APPROP-
RIATE: (A) WHATEVER ISRAELIS MAY SAY PUBLICLY, FACT IS THAT
GOI CABINET VOTED TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL, AT COST OF SPLIT
WITHIN GOVT. (B) ON RASIS INFO RECEIVED SO FAR, WE INTERPRET
THIS AS AGREEMENT TO OBSERVE CEASEFIRE AND ENTER DISCUSSIONS
UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES ON BASIS OF LANGUAGE IN REPORT
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 124298
FROM JARRING TO SYG WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED, SO LONG AS UAR
AND GOJ DO LIKEWISE. IT NOT SURPRISING THAT ISRAELIS SHOULD
AT SAME TIME RESERVE THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS JUST AS
EGYPTIANS AND JORDANIANS HAVE DONE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS IS
MOMENT TO PRESS FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS AND HAVE, FOR
EXAMPLE, REFRAINED FROM PRESSING GOJ FOR GREATER PRECISION
RE APPLICABILITY OF CEASEFIRE TO FEDAYEEN DESPITE FACT MANY
HAVE INTERPRETED JORDANIAN REPLY AS CONDITIONAL IN THIS RESPECT.
(C) WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH UAR AND GOJ WHEN DETAILED ISRAELI
EX@I& EXCLUS
REPLY RECEIVED, PROBABLY EARLY NEXT WEEK. MEANWHILEIWE
URGE ALL CONCERNED TO RESERVE JUDGMENTS AND AVOID STATEMENTS
OR POSITIONS THAT COULD MAKE PRESENT DELICATE PROCESS MORE
DIFFICULT. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THIS IS TIME FOR QUIET
DIPLOMACY.
GP3,
JOHNSON
.10 vnc M 8:35
SECRET
251/10/5190
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
**
Department of Stare
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SUMMARY
SECRET 400
PAGE 01 STATE 116105
81
ORIGIN NEA-15
INFO OCT-01 10=13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM=05 H=Ø2 INR-07 L-Ø4
NSAE-00 nsc-iø P=Ø3 RSC-01 PRS-01 S$=20 USIA-12 AID=28
ACDA=19 /141 R
66645
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN PJGRIFFIN
APPROVED BY:NEA/ARN TALCOTT W SEELYE
NEA/IAI MR MUNN
NEA/UAR MR STERNER
119758
R 202154Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECRE T STATE 116105
SUBJECT: INCREASED FEDAYEEN-JAA COOPERATION
REFERENCE: TEL AVIV 3744
10 MAJOR ZUBI (PROTECT) MEMBER OF VISITING JAA ARMS
NEGOTIATING TEAM, COMMENTED TO DEPTOFF THAT, WHILE HE
NOT CONVERSANT WITH FULL DETAILS OF RECENTLY CONCLUDED
GOJ-FEDAYEEN COEXISTENCE AGREEMENT, HE ASSUMES PACT WILL
ALLOW COMMANDOS GREATER FREEDOM OF ACTION IN CONDUCTING
OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. SPECIFICALLY HE THOUGH
THAT AS RESULT OF AGREEMENT WE WILL NOW WITNESS MUCH
CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN COMMANDOS AND FRONT-LINE
JORDANIAN UNITS, ESPECIALLY IN NORTHERN JORDAN VALLEY.
ALTHOUGH GOJ REALIZES THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENT CAN ONLY
LEAD TO INCREASE IN FREQUENCY AND INTENSITY OF IDFI
ATTACKS WITH RESULTANT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES,
SECRET
48
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE
"
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED STATES Of
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 116105
GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS THIS PHILOSOPHICALLY AS PRICE THAT MUST BE
PAID FOR EFFECTING REMOVAL OF ARMED FEDAYEEN FROM CITIES
AND FOR REDIRECTING FEDAYEEN ENERGIES AWAY FROM UNDER-
MINING GOJ AND TOWARD FIGHTING ISRAEL, FROM WHAT ZU'BI
SAID IT ALSO IMPLICIT GOJ EXPECTS THAT FEDAYEEN WILLI SUFFER
GREATER PERCENTAGE OF CASUALTIES AS RESULT IDF ATTACKS
ZU'BI SUGGESTED THAT GOJ ALSO HOPES DERIVE EXTRA BENEFIT
FROM JAA FEDAYEEN OPERATIONAL COOPERATION BY BEING IN
POSITION CITE THIS AS PROOF GOVERNMENT FULLY HONORING
ITS COMMITMENT OF SUPPORT FOR COMMANDO MOVEMENT.
2. IN REPLY DEPTOFF'S QUESTION, ZU'BI STATED HE UNCER-
TAIN WHETHER NEW AGREEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO RESTRICT
FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES SOUTH OF DEAD SEA AND IN AQABA REGION,
HOWEVER, HE NOTED THERE CONSIDERABLE SEPCULATION IN
AMMAN THROUGH JULY 12 (DATE HIS DEPARTURE) THAT KING
PURPOSELY DID NOT RESTRICT FEDAYEEN FROM OPERATING IN
THESE TWO SENSITIVE AREAS, AS HE HAD IN PAST, IN HOPE OF
GIVING THEM ENOUGH ROPE LITERALLY TO HANG THEMSELVES.
THUS, ATTACKS ON SDOM AND EILAT AREAS BY FEDAYEEN WOULD
INVITE CERTAIN DESTRUCTIVE ISRAELI REPRISALS,
INCLUDING POSSIBLE SEIZURE OF AQABAs WHICH KING COULD
THEN CITE TO ARAB LEADERS AS PROOF FEDAYEEN DOING MORE
HARM THAN GOOD TO ARAB CAUSE. KING WOULD THEN SEEK
PAN-ARAB SUPPORT FOR LONG AWAITED CRACKDOWN,
3 ᵒ REQUEST EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF FOREGOING.
GP=3a
ROGERS
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
51/10/5190
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
*
*
Department of State
OF STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 706
PAGE 01 STATE 112920
42
ORIGIN SS-45
2/3
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
66605
DRAFTED BY: AFSMA : HAVILLAND:L/C: BOZEMAN
APPROVED BY: NEA: ALATHERTON
MA AND S 8 FTHEIBERGER
70 JUL 15 PM 32
EXCLUS EXCIS
IDA/NESA: MR BILLINGS
SAFUSI 8 MR HILBERT
NEA/ARN: MR SEELYE
WHITE HOUSE: MR SAUNDERS
PM: CCHAPMAN
S/S: MR. BROWN
088424
P R 151827Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO CINCSTRIKE
SECRET STATE 112920
EXDIS
SUBJ: AVAILABILITY OF F=104 AIRCRAFT
JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
1 . YOU AUTHORIZED SUBMIT TO GOJ PROPOSAL FOR LETTER OF
OFFER AS FOLLOWS NINE (9) F-104A AIRCRAFT AT DOLS
786,672 EACH, TOTAL DOLS 7,080,048$ ONE (1) F-104B AT
DOLS 837,789, TOTAL MATERIEL COST DOLS 7,917,837. FIRST
AIRCRAFT DELIVERY IN 15 TO 18 MONTHS FROM START OF USAF
CONTRACT WITH FOLLOW ON DELIVERY OF ONE AIRCRAFT EVERY
THREE WEEKS WITH FINAL DELIVERY IN APPROXIMATELY TWO
YEARS® THESE DELIVERY TIMES DO NOT INCLUDE TRANS-
PORTATION TIME.
2. YOU ARE ALSO AUTHORIZED TO INFORM GOU THAT AT
ADDITIONAL COST AND AT ITS OPTION DELIVERY TIME CAN BE
REDUCED TO 12 MONTHS. LETTER OF OFFER IN THIS INSTANCE
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Preside ential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT Declassified ONIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXPIS
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 112920
AS FOLLOWS: NINE (9) F-104A AIRCRAFT AT DOLS 806,672
EACH TOTAL DOLS 7.260,048: ONE (1) F-104B AT DOLS 857,789,
TOTAL MATERIEL COST DOLS FIRST AIRCRAFT DELIVERY
IN 12 MONTHS FROM START OF USAF CONTRACT WITH FOLLOW ON
DELIVERY OF ONE AIRCRAFT EVERY 3 WEEKS WITH FINAL
DELIVERY IN APPROXIMATELY THE 19TH MONTH. THESE DELIVERY
TIMES DO NOT INCLUDE TRANSPORTATION TIME. INCREASED COSTS
PER PLANE ARE FOR OVERTIME WORK TO ACCELERATE DELIVERY.
3. IN ADDITION TO MATERIEL COST, THERE WILL BE A CON-
TRACT ADMINISTRATION CHARGE OF DOLS 158,356.74 FORI THE
NORMAL SCHEDULE {PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE AND DOLS 167 157 FOR
THE ACCELERATED SCHEDULE (PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE). AIRCRAFT
TRANSPORTATION COSTS ARE ESTIMATED AT DOLS 350,000=
TOTAL IN ADDITION TO ABOVE®
4 ₱ THE ABOVE QUOTED PRICES ARE VALID ONLY THROUGH
1 AUGUST 1970. STANDARD CONDITIONS ON reverse SIDE OF
LETTER OF OFFER (FORM DD1513) SHALL APPLY.
5 * ALTHOUGH ORIGINAL LETTER OF OFFER INCLUDED ONE
SPARE ENGINE TO SUPPORT THE ASSEMBLY LINE, THIS IS NO
LONGER REQUIRED BECAUSE USAF INVENTORY OF J=79=11
ENGINES NOW ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE SUCH SUPPORT.
6.0 THE USAF WILL PREPARE AN APPROPRIATE LETTER OF
OFFER UPON BEING ADVISED OF WHICH SCHEDULE IS REQUIRED
BY GOJ© PLEASE NOTE PARAGRAPH 4.
7 # WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE FOREGOING WITH THE
JORDANIAN NEGOTIATIONS TEAM DUE TO ARRIVE WASHINGTON
14 JULY IF THE JORDANIANS SO DESIRE.
GP=3.
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODU
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified 2511
Declassified
29
06/15/01
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
WH
*
*
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 324
PAGE 01 STATE 109620
84
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
66644
EXCLUS
DRAFTED BY#NEA/ARN&SEELYE
APPROVED BY$NEA$SISCO
NEA/RA8BUNTE
01. JUL 10 AM 8:00 02/3
PM/MAS&SPIERS
OSD/ISA&PRANGER SUBS
WHITEHOUSE*KISSINGER
S/S₈BROWN
NEA&ATHERTON
THE ACTING SECRETARY
053756
P R 100014Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO CINCSTRIKE
SECRE T STATE 109620
EXDIS
SUBJ: JORDANIAN ARMS PACKAGE
1 ᵉ YOU AUTHORIZED INFORM JORDANIANS THAT WE PREPARED
RECEIVE JORDANIAN MILITARY TEAM JULY 13 OR
ANYTIME THEREAFTER FOR PURPOSE COMPLETING FORMALITIES
RELATING TO 1970 ARMS PACKAGE.
2. FYI. YOU SHOULD UNDERSTAND, WITHOUT INFORMING GOJ,
THAT WE ARE AGREEING TO MOVE AHEAD ON ARMS PACKAGE ON
CONDITIONAL BASIS. WE ARE DOING SO MAINLY IN ORDER AVOID
ANY ACTIONS WHICH COULD PREJUDICE ARAB REACTIONS TO OUR
CURRENT POLITICAL INITIATIVE. ALSO WE DO NOT WISH TO
ADD TO KING'S PROBLEMS IN HOLDING HIS OWN IN FACE OF
MOUNTING PRESSURES, AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR FAILURE
FULFILL OUR COMMITMENT MIGHT INDUCE HIM TO TURN TO SOVIETS
HOWEVER, WE SHALL MONITOR DELIVERY SCHEDULES CLOSELY AND
IF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE, WILL RETAIN OPTION TO CUT OFF
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon F residential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TH Declassified ORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
OF STATES UNITED MEDICAL MAKE AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 109620
EXEIS EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
PIPELINE AT ANY TIME. END FYI.
JOHNSON
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
/ 19 5190
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NODIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
OF STATE
Department of State
WH
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
10
6 29 8 Q
1970 SEP 24 PM
0 241830Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1521
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3497
BT
WOOM NOILVIS
HOUSE
24 3 PM 07 5:04
SECRET AMMAN 5150
EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS
SUBJ AMB-KING MEETING
1. IN AMB'S CONVERSATION WITH KING THIS MORNING, KING
EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO PRESIDENT FOR SUPPORT. HE, GRATEFUL
TO PRESIDENT AND TO PM GOLDA MEIR FOR EFFECTIVE SPOOKING
OPERATION AS EFFECTIVE AND MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO SYRIAN
WITHDRAWAL.
2. WISHES TO PASS THIS TO ISRAELIS AND SAY TO MRS. MEIR
HE VERY GRATEFUL BUT DOES NOT NOW NEED ASSISTANCE OFFERED.
PLANS COMMUNICATE WITH PRESIDENT AND WITH HER TOMORROW.
GP3
BROWN
BT
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-86/15158 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
By R) /MIH NARA, Date 10/19/2016
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
Department of State
U.S.TED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
SITUATION ROOM
Control: 61760
Recd WHITE
Z 241250Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1516
AM 11:38 AM
38 9 :
24Sep70
9:07 a.m.
BT
SECRE T AMMAN 5140
LIMDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)
REF: AMMAN 5132
1. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE DELIVERED BY ME TO KING. HM'S
REPLY BEING TRANSMITTED VIA BRITISH CHANNELS.
BROWN
BT
Note: Relayed White House by OC/T.
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
MENT OF STATE
W K
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF the MEMBER
TELEGRAM
SECRET
9
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1515
SEGRET AMMAN 5139
SITUATION ROOM
6171Q
Z. 241230Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
WHIT HOUSE
1970 24 AM 8 49
BT
70 SEP 24 SEP 38
EXDIS CTREAT AS NODIS)
REF: STATE 154482; AMMAN REPLY - REF NO. NOT
AVAILABLE HERE
1. FOLLOWING PASSED OPEN RADIO CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMB AND DCM
AND COMMUNICATION SOMEWHAT INHABITED BY THIS. HOWEVER, QUITE
CONFIDENT WILL REPRESENT ACCURATELY MESSAGE AMB WISHES CONVEYED.
2. AMB DISCUSSED SUBJECT REFTELS WITH HM THIS MORNING. KING WOULD
PREFER A DIFFERENT SOLUTION NOT RPI NOT INVOLVING STATIONING OF
US SPECIALISTS AT HIS END. UK PRESENTLY HAS COMMO LINK TO KING
PROVIDING SOME SECURITY VIA MECHANICAL DEVICE BOTH ENDS. KING
WOULD PREFER SIMILAR LINK TO US EVEN IF LESS SECURE AND LIMITED
TO LINE OF SIGHT.
3. KING SEES MANY PROBLEMS OUR PROPOSAL, INCLUDING POTENTIAL
EMBARRASSMENT IF ARRANGEMENTS BECAME KNOWN. HE WOULD FEEL
OBLIGED KEEP AMERICAN OPERATOR IN EXTREMELY CONFINED CIRCUMST-
ANCES WITH WIRTUALLY NO CONTACT LOCAL COMMUNITY OR EVEN WITHIN
PALACE. HE CONCLUDES THAT IF A LESS SECURE MECHANICAL SYSTEM
AS ABOVE NOT AVAILABLE WOULD LIKE SYSTEM OFFERED REFTEL ON
STRICTLY SHORT RPT SHORT TERM BASIS AND UNDER ABOVE RESTRICTIONS.
4. AMB RECOMMENDS THAT IF AVAILABLE WE PROVIDE LESS SECURE
SYSTEM NOT INVOLVING US OPERATOR JORDANIAN END, ON ASSURANCE
KING WOULD PROVIDE THOROUGHLY RELIABLE MAN ON HIS END OF LINK.
AMB RECOGNIZES THAT WHILE PROVIDING SOME SECURITY AGAINST
LOCAL LISTENERS, SUCH SYSTEM UNDOUBTEDLY NOT SECURE AGAINST
SOVIETS AND SIMILAR LISTENERS. BRITS OPERATING THIS ASSUMPTION NOW.
IF NOT SUCH ALTERNATIVE AVAILABLE AND WE PROCEED SHORT-TERM
WITH SYSTEM REFTEL. AMB REPEATS REQUEST THAT OPERATOR OUR END
BE DUAL CAPABLE, I.E., ALSO. ABLE SHARE WORK OF TELECOMM,
BORWN
BT
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-86/15159 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
By RS MIH NARA, Date 10/19/2016
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
PARTNEST PARTA OF STATE
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/08 : NLN-NSC-615-1-25-4 H
Department of State
OF STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
10
60080
SEP
SWHITE IE HOUSE
5:09 PM 1970
= 2321452 SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
ROOM
'70 SEP 23 PM 9:24
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1501
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5114
EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS
REF STATE 156384
SUBJ SYRIAN THREAT
1. HAVE TALKED TO RIFAI COUPLY OF TIMES DURING DAY. HE HAS
NOT MENTIONED SUBJECT. IN MID-AFTERNOON HE TOLD EMBOFF
25X1
25X1
THAT SYRIANS RETREATING TO NORTH. WHEN I
LAST TALKED TO HIM LATE IN AFTERNOON, WE DISCUSSED ONLY EVA-
CUATIOMKKF AMCITS.
2. COMBINATION OF JORDANIAN GUTS WHEN FACED WITH HEAVY ODDS
AND SYRIAN HESITATION WHEN FACED WITH DETERMINED FOE, OBJECTION
OF SOVIETS, THREATS OF INTERVENTION HAVE CHANGED SITUATION.
UNLESS SYRIANS RE-GROUP AND RETURN TO ATTACK OR SOME OTHER
UNFORESEEN EVENT HAPPENS, I THINK WE ARE OFF HOOK
AND WOULD RECOMMEND THAT UP REST ON LAURELS. AS J SAID EARLIER
TODAY TO RIFAI, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SEEMS TO HAVE SPOOKED
SYRIANS. HE AGREED.
BROWN
BI
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY QC/T 9/23/70
State Dept. review completed
SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/08 NLN-NSC-615-1-25-4
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
OF STATE wac
W/A
Department of State
UNITED STATE STATES OF
SECRET
TELEGRAM
12
Z 221840Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
Control: 5581Q
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1462
Recd
22Sep70
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3464
BT
3:31 p.m.
SECRET AMMAN 5065
EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS
1. RIFAI CALLED ME AT 2015. WE DOUBLE-TALKED AGAIN
WHITE HOUSE
BUT JUST TO MAKE SURE THE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS WHAT
SEP 22 PM 6:54
DOUBLE-TALK MEANS I AM QUOTING EXACTLY WHAT HE SAID.
2. REFERRING TO KING HE SAID, " HE PREFERS ACTION FROM UP HIGH.
IF ANYTHING IS TO BE DONE DOWN LOW IT SHOULD NOT BE HERE BUT
AWAY. WE AGREE IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS DETAILS. WE WILL
DISCUSS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT DO NOT KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL BE."
3. DISCUSSION OF DETAILS MEANS TALK WITH ABOUT ISRAELIS.
4. RIFAI SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT OF SUDAN, THE PRIME MINISTER
OF TUNISIA, THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF KUWAIT AND THE UAR CHIEF
OF STAFF HAD ARRIVED BY AIR AT MAFRAK. THEY ARE ON THEIR WAY
BY CAR TO SEE OHE KING.
5. RIFAI WAID IT IS IMPORTANT FOR USG TO KEEP UP PRESSURES
IT HAS ALREADY ASSERTED. I REPLIED THAT I WAS GRATIFIED TO
LEARN THAT JORDAN UNDERSTOOD WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO PSY-
CHOLOGICALLY IN THIS PART OF WORLD.
6. RIFAI SAID PRINCIPAL AIM MUST BE TO GET THE SYRIANS TO
WITHDRAW. IF THEY STAY, IT WILL COMPLICATE EVEN FURTHER
THE JOB THAT GOVERNMENT HAS IN AMMAN. PERHAPS EVEN
MORE IMPORTANT, HE CONCLUDED IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT
WILL GIVE IRAQIS IDEA THAT THEY T00 CAN GET AWAY WITH SOME-
THING IN JORDAN.
BROWN
BT
Note: Relayed White House by CC/T.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-86/15160 Per r.2/24/2016
By RJ /mith NARA, Date 10/19/2016
SECRETT Reproduced Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
$55 &62FV YBL JQUBFYBJ /90 )9!6. ;070?" $4959 4;
QFGIPA
X QFB GVV EHA204
....
ZZ RUEHEX
SECRET EXDIS
DE RUEHCR 5547Q 2651713
RECEIVED
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
WHCA
Z 221710Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
22 17 21
QSL
TO WHITE HOUSE FLASH
Z 221620Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
WWE 229
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1458
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3462
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5061
EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)
SUBJ: SYRIAN THREAT
1. UNABLE TO ARRANGE PRIVATE MEETING. IN TELCON USING DOUBLE
TALK ALL THE WAY I TOLD RIFAI THAT I NEEDED ANSWER TO URGENT
QUESTION AND THAT I WANTED HIM TO REFER IT TO KING IMMEDI
TELY
AND GET BACK IN TOUCH WITH ME. I SAID IT WAS ISRAELI BELIEF
THAT AIR ATTACK ALONE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO DO THE JOB. I
ALSO SAID THAT ISRAELIS STILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE ENTIRE MATTER
WITH JORDANIANS.
2. HE SAID HE AGREED THAT SUBJECT WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN
A DIRECT MEETING. (THIS IS HIS OPINION.)
3. I SAID THTE OTHER DAY WE HAD DISCUSSED GROUND AND AIR ATTACK.
HE HAD SAID THAT ISRAELI AIR ATTACK WAS ACCEPTABLE BUT GROUND
ATTACK. SHOULD BE ELSEWHERE THAN JORDAN HE SAID THIS WAS SIILL
CASE. I REPLIED THAT I WAS UNDER INSTRUCTION TO FIND OUT WHAT
HM THOUGHT ABOUT THIS PROBEEM, THAT I WOULD LIKE HIM TO GET IN
TOUCH WITH HM AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND THEN TO GET BACK TO ME.
4. HE SAID HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH KING SOONEST. ALSO
SAID HE CURRENTLY DISCUSSING WITH MILITARY HOW TO GET SAFE
TRANSPORT IN TO AND BACK TO EMBASSY.
5. I DID NOT BELABOR HIM WITH OTHER MATTERS OTHER THAN TO
SAY (A) THANKS FOR GETTING JOURNALISTS OUT SAFELY, (B) WE
HAVE TWO DAYS OF FUEL AND THEN WE ARE OUT OF COMMISSION.
WHEN HE SAID GOJ COULD NOT LET LATTER HAPPEN, I SAID IT
WAS UP TO HIM TO HELP US.
BROWN
BT
NNNN
SECRET EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/08 NLN-NSC-615-1-26-3
OF STATE
WH
Department of State
UNITED STATES STATEMENT OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
12
0 221438Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1452
BT
5507Q
SECRET AMMAN 5052
1970 SEP 22. AM 11 04
EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS
REF: STATE 154482
1. NSA OFFER IS VERY TEMPTING AFTER FRUSTRATIONS OF THIS
PAST WEEK. RIGHT NOW WE ARE TRYING TO SLIM DOWN STAFF
TO BARE MINIMUM.
2. YOU WILL NOTE I AM REQUESTING EXTRAS
25X1
COULD ONE OF PROPOSED OPERATORS BE EMPLOYED AS FULL-TIME
25X1
IS so, PROPOSITION IS MORE THAN
ATTRACTIVE.
BROWN
BT
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.
State Dept. review completed
SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/08 : NLN-NSC-615-1-26-3
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
PARTMENT
OF
STATE
with 10
is
Department of State
OF STATES USUNA AMERICA
TELEGRAM
ED
SECRET
Z 221205Z SEP 70
54560
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
1970 SEP 22 AM 8 22
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1446
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3457
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5045
EXDIS - - TREAT AS NODIS
SUBJ: SYRIAN THREAT
1. GOT THROUGH TO RIFAI AT 1355 LOCAL. SAID WE
HAD TO GET TOGETHER AS I DID NOT THINK WE COULD
DOUBLE-TALK SUBJECT.
2. HE WILL TRY TO ARRANGE TRANSPORT.
BROWN
BT
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 9/22/70.
SITUATION SITUATION ROOM WHITE ROOM
HOUSE
70 SEP 22 AM 9:43 43
DECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Separtment of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
SECRET
8
0 220722Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1435
CN-5405
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3449
Sept. 22, 1970
BT
4:10 a.m.
SECR E T AMMAN 5032
EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS
REF STATE 155202
1. BEFORE I APPROACH KING, WHICH I WILL TRY TO DO
THIS MORNING, WOULD LIKE TO KNOW STATE PLAY WITH BRITISH.
HOW FAR ALONG HAVE THEY BEEN BROUGHT?
2. IN MY MIND OF COURSE, IS THOUGHT THAT JOINT US/UK
APPROACH TO KING WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE.
3. NOTE THAT I HAVE NOT INCLUDED LONDON AS ADDRESSEE.
GP3
BROWN
BT
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.
NNNN
SITUATION SITUATION ROOM ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
70 SEP 22 AM 8:55
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
OF state
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SECRET
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
CN-5386
Sept STATE 22, 1970
22
AM
Z 210850Z SEP 70 ZDK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1407
SS:8
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3424
12:55 a.m.
BT
SECRETAMMAN4997
EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)
DEPT PASS LONDON FLASH
REF: STATE 154448
SUBJECT: SYRIAN THREAT
1. I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT BEST CHANNEL FOR
GETTING CONTINUOUS AND UP-TO-DATE INFO ON GROUND
SITUATION WOULD BE THROUGH BRITISH. I HAVE ONLY TWO
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION:
A. RADIO-PHONES FROM HOUSES. HERE PALACE CAN SEND
MESSENGER. MESSENGER GOES TO HOUSE. HOUSE PHONES ME. BUT
THIS MORNING FEDAYEEN WERE AGAIN ON LINE SAYING IN ENGLISH,
"HELLO, HELLO KING HUSSEIN. THIS IS AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
HOW IS PRINCE MOHAMMAD?" THIS NOT VERY GOOD.
B. TELEPHONE AT OTHER END OF COMPOUND. THIS PHONE CAN GET ME
THROUGH TO PALACE, IT'S A CERTAIN DISTANCE AWAY OVER
SOMEWHAT OPEN SPACE. I DO NOT MIND RUNNING BACK AND FORTH
BUT, OF COURSE, PHONE IS PROBABLY AS INSECURE AS RADIO-PHONE.
CONNECTION IS NOT TOO GOOD ANYWAY.
2. BRITISH HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET BACK AND FORTH TO KING WITH
SOME DIFFICULTY ALTHOUGH AT TIMES PALACE CANNOT
REACH THEM.
3. I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT BRITISH AMBASSADOR BE
DESIGNATED AS JOINT COLLECTOR AND THIS FACT BE MADE KNOWN
TO KING SOONEST. IT WILL PREVENT DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS
AND POSSIBLE CONFUSION.
4. I AM AWAITING CALL FROM RIFAI. IF HE DOES NOT PHONE
SOON I WILL TRY TO RAISE HIM. HOPE TO HAVE ANSWERS TO
QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT TO SAY ABOUT PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE.
BROWN
BT
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.
NOTE: NOT PASSED LONDON BY OC/T.
NOTE: DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION,
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
9
=
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICANT
TELEGRAM
SECRET
0 170615Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INCN: 40820
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1275
SEPTEMBER 17, 1970
BT
2:31 A.M.
SECRET AMMAN 4852
NODIS
REF STATE 152449
DEEPLY APPRECIATE REFTEL AND WILL CARRY OUT AS SOON >AS
SITUATION 00M
HQUE OWN WHITE
AT THIS MOMENT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE ANYWHERE IN
BECAUSE OF CONSTANT AND HEAVY FIRING.
'70 SEP 17 POSSESLE. AM 8:50
BROWN
BT
NNNN
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
#
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 751
EXCE EXCLUS EXCIS
2
PAGE 01 STATE 111811
84
ORIGIN SS=45
INFO OCT-01 /046 R
66645
DRAFTED BY:NEA:RALONG
APPROVED BY:NEA RODGER P DAVIES
NEA ALATHERTON
S/S W@LLOYD
075453
R 140009Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT ALGIERS
USINT KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
SECRI E T STATE 111811
EXDIS
SUBJECT: NE HIGHLIGHTS REPORT, JULY 3-10
10 ARAB-ISRAEL: UAR IMPROVIES AIR DEFENSE IN CANALI ZONE
ISRAEL CLAIMS SOVIET AIR DEFENSE MISSILES HAVE BEEN
EMPLACED WITHIN RANGE OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND ALLEGES
THAT SOVIET PERSONNEL ARE PROBABLY GIVING DIRECT GUIDANCE
IF NOT OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO THE SYSTEMS. WITHOUT
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED W Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 111811
COMMENTING IN DETAIL, THE DEPARTMENT'S SPOKESMAN HAS:
SAID WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
ISRAELI INFORMATION. WE ARE RAISING THIS QUESTION
AGAIN WITH THE SOVIETS IN STRONG TERMS. A MAJOR ISRAELI
PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE SOVIET THREAT.
AN ISRAELI EMBASSY "POLICY BACKGROUND" PAPER WARNED
THAT A CONTINUING "PASSIVE" RESPONSE TO SOVIET MOVES:
MIGHT BRING SOVIET PILOTS TO "THE CANAL ZONE PROPER
AND BEYOND." AN EARLY DETERMINED ISRAELI MOVE TO
NEUTRALIZE THE NEW MISSILE COMPLEX CANNOT BE RULED
OUT. (SECRET)
2 ᵉ PRESIDENT NIXON'S JULY 1 TV APPEARANCE
EXPIC EXPIS
PUBLIC REACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE PRESIDENT'S
REMARKS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT HAVE BEEN STRONG.
THE ISRAELI REACTION HAS BEEN ONE OF NEAR EUPHORIA,
COMPENSATING SOMEWHAT FOR THE EFFECTS OF THE CHANGING
MILITARY PICTURE ALONG THE CANAL. ARAB REACTIONS, ON
THE OTHER HAND, HAVE BEEN CRTICIAL, REFLECTING A FEAR
THAT U.S. POLICY HAS TAKEN A MAJOR SHIFT TOWARD ISRAEL.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
3. ARAB-ISRAEL: MAJOR POWER SETTLEMENT EFFORTS
AT THE DEPUTIES' MEETINGS THIS WEEK, THE U.S. MADE
CLEAR WE HOLD TO THE DEPUTIES' MANDATE NOT TO NEGOTIATE
NEW POSITIONS. IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR
LANGUAGE ON WITHDRAWAL OMITTING REFERENCE TO "MINOR
RECTIFICATIONS", WE WOULD HAVE TO CALL FOR AGREEMENT
ON THE EXISTING U.S. BOUNDARIES LANGUAGE RATHER THAN
CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO COOPERATE IN FINDING "COMMON
DENOMINATOR" FORMULATIONS. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE
BACKED OFF, SAYING "MINOR RECTIFICATIONS MIGHT BE
ACCEPTABLE, SEEKING A DEFINITION OF THE TERM, AND
REQUESTING WRITTEN COMMENTS ABOUT SHARM AL-SHAYKH AND
SYRIA. (SECRET/EXDIS)
40 ARAB=ISRAEL: U.S. INITIATIVE
THERE HAVE BEEN NO OFFICIAL RESPONSES so FAR TO OUR
INITIATIVE, WHICH HAS CLEARLY BEEN A MAJOR SUBJECT FOR
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT Declassified ORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
#
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 111811
DISCUSSION DURING NASSER'S MOSCOW VISIT. MEANWHILE,
WE CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO REASSURE THE FRENCH, BRITISH
AND SOVIETS THAT WE ARE NOT SEEKING TO SIDETRACK THE
MAJOR POWER TALKS OR THE LATEST SOVIET PEACE LANGUAGE,
BUT RATHER SEE OUR INITIATIVE AS SUPPORTIVE OF THOSE
TALKS. WE ATTACH PRIORITY AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, TO
GETTING POSITIVE RESPONSES TO OUR INITIATIVE, SINCE
WE BELIEVE THE MAJOR POWER EFFORTS CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE
AND RELEVANT IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THERE IS A CEASEFIRE
AND THE PARTIES HAVE BEGUN A NEGOTIATING PROCESS UNDER
JARRING'S AUSPICES. (SECRET/EXDIS)
5 ° PERSIAN GULF: IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF
EXPIS EXQIN
DURING FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI'S VISIT TO KUWAIT
(JULY 6-81, HE IMPRESSED UPON HIS HOSTS IRAN'S OPINION
THAT THE BRITISH MUST NOT REVERSE THEIR DECISION TO
LEAVE THE PERSIAN GULF, INFORMING THEM AT THE SAME
TIME THAT IRAN "WOULD HELP ALL ITS FRIENDS BY COOPERATING
WITH THEM ON MATTERS OF DEFENSE". THE COMMUNIQUE,
HOWEVER, FAILED TO MENTION THEIR POSITION ON THE
FUTURE OF THE BRITISH IN THE GULF. (CONFIDENTIAL)
60 FOR TEHRAN AND ADDIS ABABA: NE HIGHLIGHTS REPORT
HAS been SENT ON WEEKLY BASIS TO OTHER ADDRESSEES.
DEPT. WELCOMES YOUR COMMENTS ON USEFULNESS THIS REPORT
FOR YOUR PURPOSES.
ROGERS
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TH RIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 123:
PAGE 01 STATE 135423
82
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT=Ø1 1046 R
66632
DRAFTED BY8 NEA/ARN&TJSCOTES
APPROVED BY: NEA JOSEPH J SISCO
NEA/ARN MR o KILLGORE
70 AUG 20 AM 8:22
SITUATION ROOM
2 WHITE HOUSE
NEA/UAR MR o STERNER
NEA MR. ATHERTON
EXPIS EXBIC EXPIC
S/S - a 0 MR o EMMONS
061810
R 200207Z AUG 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S ECRET STATE 135423
EXDIS
BU8 JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR'S ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITUATION
IN JORDAN AND STATUS PEACE INITIATIVE
SUMMARY: DURING AUGUST 19 CALL JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SHARAF
TOLD ASST. SECTY. SISCO THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
PAGE 02 STATE 135423
ATMOSPHERE IN AMMAN OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORABLE TO KING'S ACCEPTANCE
OF US PEACE PROPOSALS. KING AND NASSER ALSO BEING SUPPORTED
BY VAST MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS ON WEST BANK GAZA AND
WITHIN JORDAN FEDAYEEN IN DISARRAY WITH NO LEADER
INCLUDING ARAFAT IN POSITION PUBLICLY ACCEPT PEACE INI-
TIATIVES IN SHORTS MOST PALESTINIANS WISH ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND JUSTICE FOR
REFUGEES. ON THIS BASIS THEY AND OTHER ARABS WILLING
WORK FOR PEACEFUL POLITICAL SOLUTION WITH ISRAELIS
ENVISAGING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ISRAELI=ARAB COEXISTENCE.
SHARAF STATED FOR FIRST TIME ARABS BEGINNING BELIEVE US
AT LAST PURSUING EVEN=HANDED POLICY IN AREA. ISRAELIS
MUST NOW CLEARLY COMMIT THEMSELVES TO WITHDRAWAL IF
PRESENT MOMENTUM IS TO BE MAINTAINED SISCO POINTED OUT
THIS ISRAELI COMMITMENT WAS GIVEN UPON THEIR ACCEPTANCE
OF US PEACE PROPOSAL, AT SAME TIME AS ARABS COMMITTED
THEMSELVES TO RECOGNITION AND COEXISTENCE WITH ISRAEL
REALIZING PAINFUL DECISIONS LIE AHEAD FOR BOTH SIDES,
US WILL PRESS FOR SOLUTION WHICH MEETS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS
OF BOTH SIDES SISCO EMPHASIZED NEED FOR COMPLETE
OBSERVANCE OF CEASEFIRE AND STANDSTILL AS WELL AS NEED
FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY TO HANDLE ALLEGATIONS OF ANY VIOLATIONS.
SHARAF INFORMED SISCO HE WOULD BE TEMPORARILY GO VO NoY. WHILE
FARRA ON TWO WEEKS LEAVE. IN AUGUST 18 TALKS
SHARAF SAID JARRING STATED HE INTENDS START TALKS USING
PARAGRAPH B FROM PROPOSALS AND ON THAT BASIS MAKE SPECIFIC
PROPOSALS DERIVED FROM VARIOUS PERTINENT UN RESOLUTIONS.
SISCO AGREED THIS WISE APPROACH SHARAF COMMENDED USG
FOR ITS EFFORTS IN PRESENTING AND GAINING ACCEPTANCE OF
ITS PEACE PROPOSALS WHICH MARK IMPORTANT TURNING POINT
IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT END SUMMARY.
To ON AUGUST 19 JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR ABDUL HAMID SHARAF
CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO FOLLOWING
EXPIS
HIS RETURN FROM VACATION AND CONSULTATIONS IN AMMAN®
2. IN RESPONSE TO MR. sisco's QUESTION CONCERNING MOOD
AT HOME, SHARAF INDICATED THAT DECIDED IMPROVEMENT IN
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN AMMAN IS NOW
NOTICEABLE. THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT CASE HOWEVER WHEN HE
RETURNED TO AMMAN IN LATE JUNE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING JUNE
CRISIS. AT THAT TIME TENSION WAS STILL HIGH DESPITE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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FORMATION OF NEW CABINET WHICH WAS BROADLY BASED, REPRE-
SENTATIVE AND WIDELY SUPPORTED AND WHOSE PURPOSE WAS TO
ACHIEVE NATIONAL UNITY AT CRITICAL TIME IN
JORDANS HISTORY. WHILE ALL AGREED IN AMMAN THAT KING
HADI BEEN WISE IN NOT RPT NOT ALLOWING ARMY TO MOVE IN
EXPIC
DURING CRISIS IT WAS GENERALLY APPRECIATED THAT ARMY
COULD HAVE EASILY CRUSHED FEDAYEEN EVEN PALESTINIANS
LIVING IN AMMAN TOLD HIM THAT ARMY SHOULD HAVE ENTERED
CITY AND PUT END TO TERROR AND ANARCHYOHICH UNDISCIPLINED
FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS WERE PERPETRATINGG IN ANY EVENT
THIS WAS TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE FOR PEOPLE OF AMMAN WHO AS RESULT
RALLIED TO SUPPORT OF NEW GOVERNMENT AND KING
3.0 SHARAF CONTINUED THAT NASSERS ACCEPTANCE OF US PEACE
PROPOSALS AS WELLI AS THAT OF JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT CAME AT
RIGHT MOMENT AND HAD IMMEDIATELY CALMING EFFECT ON THIS
HIGHLY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE WITH REGARD TO JORDANIAN
ACCEPTANCE SHARAF STATED THAT KING VERY ASTUTELY DID NOT
RPT NOT INVOLVEI HIMSELF IN THE FOUR CABINET DEBATES ON
PEACE PROPOSALS. THUS, IT WAS CABINET DECISION INDEPENDENTLY
EXPIS
AND UNANIMOUSLY ARRIVED AT INVOLVING AMONG OTHER THINGS,
EVENTUAL AGREEMENT BY SEVERAL MEMBERS OF CABINET WHO
INTIALLY HAD BEEN STRONGLY OPPOSED ONE NOW
SENSES IN AMMAN FEELING OF REAL MOMENTUM AND DESIRE ACHIEVE
PEACEFUL SOLUTION THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS VAST MAJORITY
AGREES THIS IS GENUINE OPPORTUNITY WHICH MUST BE SEIZED.
40 SHARAF NOTEDI THAT MANY OUTSIDE OBSERVERS AUTOMATICALLY
ASSUMEI THAT ALL PALESTINIANS OPPOSE PEACE INITIATIVES.
THIS NOT RPT NOT CASE.RELIABLE REPORTS INDICATE THAT
OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS ON WEST BANK GAZA
STRIP AND IN JORDAN SUPPORT JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT'S
ACCEPTANCE OF PEACE PROPOSALS ON UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY
WILLILEAD TO RETURN OF OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY AS WELL
EXPIC
AS JUSTICE FOR PALESTINIANS ALONG LINES OF PERTINENT UN
RESOLUTIONS
50 IN RESPONSE TO SISCO'S QUESTION ABOUT ARAFAT'S EVENTUAL
POSITION ON PEACE PROPOSALS, SHARAF EMPHASIZED THAT
NEITHER ARAFAT NOR ANY LEADER OF EXISTING PALESTINIAN/
FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS CAN SUPPORT CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVE
AND SURVIVE. SHARAF ALSO EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT IN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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HIS VIEW THESE ORGANIZATIONS NOT RPT NOT REPRESENTATIVE
OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, DESPITE WHAT WORLD PRESS SAYS TO
CONTRARY. SHARAF OBSERVED THAT WHILE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT
IS LEGITIMATE LIBERATION MOVEMENT, IT NOW FINDS ITSELF
IN INHERENTLY TRAGIC SITUATION IN EFFECT, IT CANNOT
EXPIS
RPT NOT BE REALISTIC ABOUT PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO
PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WITHOUT LIQUIDATING ITS RAISON DOETRE.
FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP FULLY REALIZES THEREFORE, THAT IF
THERUS PEACE PROPOSALS HAVE POSITIVE RESULTS, FEDAYEEN
WILL EVENTUALLY FACE CONFLICT WITH OVERWHELMING FORCES
OF UAR, JORDAN US USSR AND ISRAEL. IT IS FOR THIS
REASON THAT THAT ARE NOW CONFUSED PANICKY AND
FEVERISHLY TRYING TO GAIN SUPPORT BOTH FROM AMONG PALESTINIANS AND
FROM OTHER ARABS
60 SHARAF CONTINUED THAT PALESTINIANS PARTICULARLY THOSE
LIVING ON OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE MUCH MORE
REALISTIC THAN FEDAYEEN. THEY REALIZE THAT WHILE
LIBERATION OF THEIR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS POSSIBLE,
EXPIS
LIBERATION OF ALL OF "PALESTINE" HIGHLY UNLIKELY.
THEREFORE, FOR THESE PALESTINIANS LIBERATION FROM
ISRAELIS AND JUSTICE FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES CAN BE
ACCEPTABLE BASIS UPON WHICH BUILD PEACEFUL SOLUTION
INCLUDING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, COEXISTENCE WITH ISRAELIS.
7 ₱ ARABS OUTSIDE OF JORDAN AND PARTICULARLY THOSE IN
OUTLYING ARAB COUNTRIES DO NOT RPT NOT REALIZE DERTH OF
FEELING ON WEST BANK GAZA AND AMONG PALESTINIANS IN
JORDAN. IN THIS REGARD SHARAF REPORTED THAT PETITIONS HAVE
COME TO KING FROM WEST BANK SUPPORTING HIM FOR HAVING
ACCEPTED CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS GOJ HAS NOW CONTACTED
VARIOUS PEOPLE ON WEST BANK AND ASKED THEM TO WRITE DOWN
WHAT THEY WISH JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT INTENDS STUDY THESE
AND AT APPROPRIATE TIME PUBLISH AND ACT ON THEM. OF
EXPIS
COURSE's REFUGEES IN CAMPS ARE RAW MATERIAL FROM WHICH
fedayeen DERIVE THEIR STRENGTH BUT NASSER HAS MORE
STRENGTH AMONG THESE PEOPLE THAN DO FEDAYEEN, SYRIA OR
IRAQ. FOR THIS REASON FEDAYEEN FEAR NASSER BECAUSE THEY
KNOW THAT EVEN MAJORITY REFUGEES: SUPPORTS NASSER AND
KING'S CURRENT EFFORTS OBVIOUSLY, THERE IS HARD CORE
WHICH WILL NEVER ACCEPT PEACEFUL SOLUTION. UNFORTUNATELY,
UNTIL RECENTLY IT IS THIS HARD CORE WHICH HAS SET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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PAGE 05 STATE 135423
PACE SHOUTED SLOGANS, AND ATTEMPTED SPEAK FOR PALESTINIANS.
THIS GROUP, HOWEVER, CANNOT NOW OR EVER TAKE REASONABLE
POSITION BECAUSE OF NEED TO OUTBID OTHERS WITHIN THEIR
RANSK® IF MOMENTUM GENERATED BY PEACE INIVIATIVE
CONTINUES, POPULAR SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS WILL
EXQIC
CONTINUE TO DIMINSIH.
80 SISCO NOTED RECENT STATEMENT BY KING HUSSEIN REGARDING
POSSIBILITY OF EVENTUAL ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINIAN
ENTITY. SHARAF CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAS BEEN TALK ALONG
GENERAL LINES WITHIN GOU ABOUT SUCH ENTITY AND CERTAINLY
IN SHARAFIS VIEW THERE IS ADVANTAGE TO MAKING PUBLIC
THESE KINDS OF PROPOSALS IN ORDER INDICATE TO PALESTINIANS
THAT THERE ARE OPTIONS OPEN TO THEM OTHER THAN THOSE
PROPOUNDED BY FEDAYEEN's SHARAF ADDED HE DOUBTED HOWEVER,
THAT IF GIVEN CHANCE PALESTINIANS ON WEST BANK AND GAZA
WOULD OPT FOR SEPARATE ENTITY.
9'o SHARAF CONTINUED THAT GOU HAS BEEN REACTING IN LOW-
EXPIS
KEY FASHION TO FEDAYEEN CHARGES OF GOJJ COLLUSION WITH
US FOR EVENTUAL LIQUIDATION OF FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT. MEAN
WHILE THERE NOW MORE OPEN DEBATE IN AMMAN ABOUT IMPLICATIONS
OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND INDICATIONS THAT MOST JORDANIANS
FULLY APPRECIATE WHAT POLITICAL SOLUTION WILL EVENTUALLY
MEAN, PARTICULARLY WITH REFERENCE TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
WITH ISRAELL
100 SHARAF NOTED THAT ANOTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT WHICH
HE OBSERVED DURING HIS STAY IN AMMAN WAS THAT FOR FIRST
TIME US NOT RPT NOT BEING THOUGHT OF AS ENTIRELY IN
ISRAELI CAMP DESPITE DISCLAIMERS BY US OFFICIALS THAT
US POLICY HAS NOT RPT NOT CHANGED FOR ARABS AT LEAST
IT NOW EVIDENT THAT US HAS BEGUN PURSUING MORE EVEN-HANDED
POLICY. THUS, THERE IS MORE HOPE ABOUT AMERICA IN AREA
THIS HOPE GIVE$ MORE CREDIBILITY TO GOJJ EFFORTS WHICH HAVE
LONG TRIED TO COMBAT WHAT IS BASICALLY MARXIAN MYTH BEING
PROPAGATED IN AREA THAT US IS AGAINST LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS AND OTHER PROGRESSIVE FORCES. IN THIS
REGARD SHARAF MENTIONED THAT OVER PAST THREE YEARS IN
ADDITION TO TRADITIONAL ARABIC WORD FOR COLONIALISM
(ISTI MARI FOREIGN WORD IMPERIALISM (IMPERIALIYA) HAS
ALSO INCREASINGLY BECOME IN VOGUE THIS OBVIOUSLY RESULT
OF MARXIST INFLUENCE WHICH HAS TRIED WITH SOME SUCCESS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
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PAGE 06 STATE 135423
TO IDENTIFY US WITH BOTH OF THESE TWIN EVILS IN MINDS OF
ARABS
11. REAL PROBLEM NOW FACING UAR AND GOJ IS LINGERING
SUSPICION ABOUT REAL CHANCES FOR PEACE ALTHOUGH CURRENT
MOMENTUM IN AMMAN AND ELSEWHERE IN ARAB WORLD HAS HELPED
BOTH UAR AND GOU, NASSER AND KING CANNOT COMMIT THEMSELVES
FULLY TO PEACEFUL SOLUTION UNTIL THEY CERTAIN WHAT
ISRAELIS WILL DO OR AT LEAST WHAT US WILL MAKE ISRAELIS
DOG SHARAF SAID THAT WHILE MANY WITHIN GOU believes US
WANTS FAIR SOLUTION THEY MUST CONVINCE MANY MORE THAT THIS
ISSSO. MUCH DEPEND, THEREFORED ON DEVELOPMENTS OVER
NEXT WEEKS AS TO ISRAELI POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL AND RIGHTS
OF REFUGEES. EVEN REASONABLE ASSURANCES BY US ON THESE
ISSUES WILL GO LONG WAY TO STRENGTHEN HAND OF KING AND
NASSER IF THESE ASSURANCES FORTHCOMING, THEN BOTH KING
AND NASSER CAN COME OUT EVEN MORE CLEARLY AND STRONGLY
AND THEREBY FURTHER UNDERCUT EXTREMIST APPEAL ALREADY
BOTH JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND NASSER HAVE SPOKEN
OUT IN SURPRISINGLY STRONG TERMS GIVEN STILL UNCLEAR
PICTURE AS TO WHAT ISRAELI POSITIONS WILLIBER
120 SHARAF CONTINUED THAT IF ISRAELIS, HOWEVER TRY TO
BARGAIN IN THEIR usual COMMERCIALI WAY BY HOLDING THEIR
CARDS CLOSELY, THIS WILL BE BAD TACTIC WITH ARABS WHO
NURSE WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE REAL SENSE OF GRIVEVANCE.
ISRAEL MUST INITIALLY MAKE CLEAR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW
EITHER DIRECTLY OR AT LEAST INDIRECTLY THROUGH USo
13. SISCO POINTED OUT THAT ARABS ALREADY HAVE CLEAR
COMMITMENT BY ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW SPELLED OUT IN US
PEACE PROPOSALS THOUGH, OF COURSE, FINAL BORDERS WOULD HAVE TO
BE NEGOTIATED. THIS IS IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT IN HISTORY OF ARAB-
I SRAELI CONFLICT. FOR FIRST TIME ARAB SIDE HAS
GIVEN AN EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OR ISRAELRS EXISTENCE AND
ISRAELI SIDE HAS GIVEN EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF NEED TO
WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. IN ADDITION
SRAELIS HAVE ALSO AGREED TO GET ON WITH INDIRECT TALKS AT OUTSET.
THIS TOO VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT US REALIZES PAINFUL
DECISIONS NOW FACE BOTH SIDES IF PEACE IS TO BE
ACHIEVED. NEITHER SIDE CAN EXPECT TO REALIZE THEIR
RESPECTIVE MAXIMUM POSITIONS ARABS KNOW WHAT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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PAGE 07 STATE 135483
OUR POSITION IS' PRESIDENT NIXON HAS PUBLICLY INDICATED
THAT SOLUTION MUST RESULT IN MAP NOT RPT NOT TOO DIFFERENT
THAN THAT EXISTING BEFORE JUNE WAR, IN OTHER WORDS MAP
BASED ON INSUBSTANTIALI CHANGES. US APPRECIATES DIFFERENCES STILL
REMAIN WHICH WILLHHAVE TO BE BRIDGED US INTENDS,
EXQIC
HOWEVER» PRESS AHEAD TO REACH SOLUTION WHICHI MEETS
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES
140 SISCO INDICATED HEI DEEPLY ENCOURAGED BY WHAT SHARAF
TOLD HIM ABOUT CURRENT MOOD IN AREA SISCO EMPHASIZED
THAT THIS IS opportunity IN HISTORY OF LOST OPPORTUNITIES
WHICH HAS BEEN GRASPED AND THAT ACCEPTANCE BY PARTIES
CONCERNED OF us PEACE PROPOSAL HAS: UNLEASEHED POSITIVE
FORCES IN AREA WHOSE MOMENTUM CAN NOW LEAD TO PEACE IF
all PARTIES DO THEIR SHARE
15. SHARAF AGREED THAT US PRESENTATION OF US PEACE
PROPOSAL MARKED TURNING POINT IN HISTORY OF ARAB-ISRAEL
CONFLICT AND COMMENDED USG AND SPECIFICALLY PRESIDENT,
SECRETARY, AND SISCO FOR THEIR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO
DEVELOP US PEACE PROPOSALL TO NEGOTIATE SKILLFULLY
ACCEPTANCE BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND THEREBY TO
HALT DANGEROUS DETERIORATION WHICHH HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE
IN AREA EARLIER THIS YEAR
16. SISCO STATED THAT ENTIRE US CREDIBILITY NOW
INVOLVED IN CEASEFIRE AND STANDSTILL. US REALIZES THERE
HAVE BEEN SOME MINOR VIOLATIONS ON JORDAN-ISRAEL BORDER.
WITHOUT GOO'S FORMAL REQUEST WE HAVE ALREADY TOLD
ISRAELIS THAT KING WILLIDO WHAT HE CAN TO KEEP BORDER
QUIET BUT THAT ISRAELIS MUST ALSO APPROACH SiTUATION
ON THAT BORDER IN SENSIBLE MANNER AND IN SPIRIT WHICH
RECOGNIZES THAT BOTH SIDES WISH MAINTAIN CEASEFIRE
FOR ISRAELIS, OF COURSE, PRINCIPALI BELLWETHER OF GOU
INTENTIONS WILL BE WHETHER (A) JAA JOINS IN ANY ATTACKS
AND (B) REASONABLE EFFORT IS MADE TO INTERDICT ATTACKS
17. SISCO CONTINUED THAT SITUATION ON UAR-ISRAELI
CEASEFIRE LINE IS MUCH MORE CRITICAL AND
deeply DISTURBS USG SISCO INFORMED SHARAF THAT USG
INTENDED MAKE STATEMENT DURING AUGUST 19 NOON BRIEFINGS:
(COPY PASSED TO SHARAFI SEE SEPTELI FOR TEXT). SISCO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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EMPHASIZED USG BELIEVES THERE MUST BE STRICT
OBSERVATION OF STANDSTILLI BY BOTH SIDES. ANYTHING
GOU COULD DO IN ITS TALKS WITH UAR TO EMPHASIZE
NEED FOR SCRUPULOUS OBSERVATION OF STANDSTILL WOULD BE
helpful BECAUSE OTHERWISE ALL WHICH HAS BEEN BUILV UP
EXQIC
COULD BE DESTROYED IN ONE SWOOP IN MEANTIME,
IMPORTANT NOW IS TO GET TALKS STARTED
is. CONCERNING STANDSTILL, SISCO ALSO INDICATED THAT
USG DISTURBED so MUCH PUBLICITY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO
ALLEGED VIOLATIONSE USG FIRMLY believes THAT BEST WAY
FOR THIS MATTER TO BE ADMINISTERED IS THROUGH QUIET
DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS PERMITTING CALM STUDY AND EVALUATION
BEFORE DECISIONS ARE MADE AS TO HOW THEY SHOULD BE
HANDLED.
19. SISCO CITED HANDLING OF RECENT CHARGE MADE BY UAR
THAT ISRAELI PLANES HAD VIOLATED UAR SPACE OVER SUEZ,
AS EXAMPLE OF BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH PROBLEM
OF VIOLATION THIS CHARGE TRANSMITTED BY DIRECT PHONE
CALL FROM USINT CAIRO TO WASHINGTON. A WHILE USG WAS IN
PROCESS OF STUDYING CHARGE UAR INFORMED USG MISTAKE
HAD BEEN MADE AND MAYOR OF SUEZ PUT OUT RETRACTION
INCIDENT RECEIVED LITTLE COVERAGE IN PRESS
AND MATTER CLOSED TO SATISFACTION OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED
200 SISCO INDICATED USG DOES NOT RELISH MEDDLEMAN'S
ROLE IT UNDERSTANDS, HOWEVER IT HAS INTEREST IN SEEING
THAT CEASEFIRE AND STANDSTILL IMPLEMENTED BECAUSE USG ONLY
GOVERNMENT WHICH DRAFTED AND NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT AND
WHICH KNOWS ALL ITS DETAILS. IN PLAYING THIS ROLE,
QUIET DIPLOMACY IS VITALIO MOMENT CHARGES OF VIOLAVIONS
RELEASED TO PRESS ATTENDANT PUBLICITY RESTRICTS OPTIONS
EXPIS
OPEN TO DIPLOMACY IT IS FOR THIS REASON USG FELT
THAT REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS TO UN SHOULD BE PERMISSIVE
RATHER THAN MANDATORY IN HOPE THAT MOST OF THEM CAN BE
HANDLED QUIETLY. THIS IS NEW APPROACH WHICH USG SINCERELY
HOPES WILL BE GIVEN CHANCE TO WORK
21. SHARAF INFORMED SISCO THAT IN ABSENCE OF JORDAN'S
PERMANENT UN REPRESENTATIVE FARRAD HE WOULD BE GOING
TO NEW YORK OVER NEXT TWO WEEKS, ALTHOUGH
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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DEPARTMENT
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PAGE 09 STATE 135423
EXPECTS TO BE IN WASHINGTON MOST OF TIME WHILE IN
NEW YORK ON AUGUST 18,JARRING TOLD FARRA AND SHARAF THAT
HE STILL AWAITING ISRAELI REPLY GIVING ISRAELI POSITION
ON LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION TIME AND PLACETFOR TALKS
IN ABSENCE OF THIS REPLY JARRING SAID HE CAN DO NOTHING,
EXQI
JARRING DID NOT RPT NOT PRESS NEED FOR PRESENCE FOREIGN
MINISTERS AT THIS TIMED ALTHOUGHI HE OBVIOUSLY FAVORS IT.
SHARAF SAID THAT FARRA AND HE INFORMED JARRING THAT GOU
HAS NOTHING AGAINST EVENTUAL AND EARLY PARTICIPATION OF
FOREIGN MINISTERS IN TALKS, BUT BELIEVE CERTAIN PREPARA
TIONS MUST BE MADE PRIOR TO TALKS AT THAT LEVEL ALTHOUGH
GOU HAS SOME IDEAS IT WAITING FOR JARRING
PRESENT HIS VIEWS INASMUCH AS JARRING ALREADY KNOWS
GOU'S VIEWS.
2° SISCO INQUIRED JARRING INDICATED HOW HE INTENDED
TO PROCEED SHARAF SAID THAT JARRING APPARENTLY INTENDS
START WITH PARAGRAPH B FROM PROPOSALS AND ON THAT BASIS
MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DERIVED FROM VARIOUS PERTINENT
EXPIS
UN RESOLUTIONS SHARAF THOUGHT THIS WAS WISE APPROACH
AND SISCO AGREED
23.0 SHARAF CONTINUED THAT GOU WISHES GET DOWN TO CONCRETE
PROPOSALS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE THESE PROPOSALS MUST
FOCUS ON ISRAELIS WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES
AS WELL AS JUSTICE FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES» IF TALKS
ARE SUBJECTED TO EBANS RHETORIC AND SEMANTICS, NO
PROGRESS WILL BE ACHIEVED. IFD ON THE OTHER HAND
ISRAELIS WISH COEXISTENCE AND PEACE WITH ARABS THEY
MUST BE CLEAR ON WITHDRAWAL AND ON REFUGEES IN EXCHANGE,
NASSER AND HUSSEIN ARE PREPARED WORK OUT TERMS OF
COEXISTENCE WITH ISRAEL ON THESE TERMS ISRAEL MUST
UNDERSTAND HOWEVER, THAT BEST GUARANTEE FOR
COEXISTENCE WOULD BE IMPROVED PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE IN
EXPIS
AREAO IFb HOWEVER ISRAELIS INSIST ON PHYSICAL SECURITY
OR ABSTRACT CONCEPT OF PEACE OR ABSOLUTE GUARANTEES,
THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED.
ISRAELIS CAN ONLY ASSURE INVIOLABILYTY OF THEIR BORDERS
BY SATISFYING ARAB GRIEVANCES. IN ADDITION, NASSER AND
HUSSEIN MUST HAVENA CLEAR ALTERNATIVE QUICKLY IN ORDER
TO MAINTAIN PRESENT MOMENTUM IN AREA AND PERMIT DECISIVE
ACTION AT APPROPRIATE TIME.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
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EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
240 IN CONCLUSION SHARAF AGAIN COMMENDED PRESIDENT's SECRETARY AND
SISCO FOR THEIR ROLE IN CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVE AND STATED THAT
BASED ON RELIABLE INFORMATION SISCOMS VISIT TO CAIRO HAD BEEN
IMPORTANT TURINING POINT WHICH HAD STARTED BALL ROLLING
TO WHAT HOPEFULLY WILL RESULT IN A PEACEFUL AND JUST
SOLUTION. GP-3
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
191/10/5190
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
with
6
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
11
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
'70
SITUATIONROOM
WHITESHOUSE
881Q
SEP
P 031855Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
SEP 3 9:39
PM 1970
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 913
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4299
NODIS
SUBJ: FRENCH INTEREST IN WARNING AGAINST THIRD COUNTRY
INTERVENTION IN JORDAN
REF: AMMAN 4241
1. COUNSELOR FRENCH EMBASSY BERNARD (PROTECT) INFORMED EMBOFF
THAT GOF HAD SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN POSSIBLE BIG FOUR
COMMUNIQUE WARNING AGAINST THIRD COUNTRY INTERVENTION IN
JORDAN. GOF HE SAID WAS INSTRUCTING ITS UN REP
(KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET) TO RAISE MATTER WITH OTHER REPS BIG FOUR IN
NEW YORK.
2. BERNARD HAD HEARD FROM FRENCH EMBASSY MOSCOW THAT US HAD
REQUESTED USSR TO WEIGH IN WITH IRAQIS. FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN
BAGHDAD, HE SAID, HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DO THE SAME.
ODELL
18
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 9/3/70
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
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HAIG
O.E.
1
STATE
Department of State
of STATES ORLINA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 70 SEP 16 PM 7 13
CONTROL: 3992Q
⑆
RECD:
SEP 16, 1970
Z 1622052 SEP 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
D 6:29 P.M.
TO COSTATE WASHDC F ASH 1268
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4844
NODIS
1. RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTS THAT GOJ CABINET PRESETNLY
IN SESSION TO DEBATE CURRENT CRISIS. KING'S INCLINATION IS
TO MOVE VIGOROUSLY AGINST FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT; CABINET'S IS
LESS SO. TIMING BEING DISCUSSED AS EITHER DAYBREAK SEPT 17 OR
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS LATER.
2. KING'S CONCERN CENTERS ON POSSIBLE INTERVENTION BY SYRIA
ON SIDE OF FEDAYEEN. MORE REMOTE CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE
SIMILAR MOVEMENT BY IRAQI FORCES. ACCORDINGLY, CONTINGENCY
PLANS BEING DISCUSSED. QUESTION BROACHED CONCERNING POSSIBLE AIR
STRIKE SUPPORT FROM EITHER USG OR ISRAELIS SHOULD ARAB NEIGHBORS
INTERVENE.
So I REPLIED THROUGH SAME CHANNEL TO EFFECT THAT I HAVE BEEN
IN COUNTRY ONLY THRITY-SIX HOURS, BUT SINCE I HAVE JUST COME
FROM WASHINGTON AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT AND OTHERS.
I DESIRE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MEETING WITH KING TO DISCUSS
PROBLEM POSED FOR GOJ BY FEDAYEEN. I ALSO SAID KING SHOULD
BE MADE WELL AWARE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF REACHING DECISION ON
QUESTION OF SUCH GRAVITY (COMMITMENT OF US FORCES) ON SUCH
SHORT NOTICE. MY MEETING WITH KING TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED
FOR MORNING SEPTEMBER 17.
4. I DO NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER THIS TO CONSTITUTE FORMAL
REQUEST FOR US MI: ITARY INVOLVEMENT AT THIS TIME.
S. EMBASSY COMMENTS FOLLOW SEPTEL.
BROWN
BT
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive iDeclassified Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
OF
STATE
WH
Department of State
OF STATES LINE AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
12
0 2213252 SEP 70
Control: 5505Q
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1450
Recd : 22Sep70
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3459
10:54 a.m.
BT
SECRETAMMAN5049
EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)
SUBJ: ISRAELI AIR/LAND STRIKE
REF: STATE 155166
I NOTE FROM REFTEL THAT USG RESPONSE TO FIVE OF SEVEN ISRAELI
QUESTIONS HAS BEEN AFFIRMATIVE. THESE RESPONSES, MOREOVER,
ARE PROBABLY THOSE IN WHICH GOI IS MOST INTERESTED. I WILL SEEK
AN ANSWER TO REMAINING QUESTION - KING HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ON OPERAT-
ION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MEANWHILE, I THINK IT USEFUL TO PROFER
FOLLOWING VIEWS ON POSSIBLE IDF STRIKE AGAINST SYRIANS:
1. AT THIS POINT A MAJOR ATTACK BY IDF INTO JORDAN SEEMS LESS
IMPERATIVE FROM STANDPOINT JORDAN'S SECURITY NEEDS. JAA IS
NOW DOING BETTER AND I SUSPECT THAT GOVT INCREASINGLY OPTIMIS-
TIC THAT SYRIAN THREAT CAN BE DISPOSED OF WITHOUT RESORT
TO DRASTIC ISRAELI PURGE. JORDAN DOES BELIEVE, HOWEVER,
THAT AIR STRIKE IS VITAL.
2. IF OPERATION CARRIED OUT, WE ARE UNCERTAIN HOW SOME UNITS
OF JAA IN AREA WOULD RESPOND TO MAJOR ISRAELI LAND INVASION.
(AFTER ALL THESE YEARS, HOWEVER, JORDAN TOLERANCE TO AIRSTRIKES
FAIRLY HIGH).
SOME UNITS, AT LEAST, MIGHT DECIDE IDF THE GREATER THREAT;
PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT IN NORTH JORDAN, THEREFORE, BETWEEN
ISRAELIS ON ONE HAND AND JORDANIANS, SYRIANS (AND IRAQI
SALAH AL-DIN DIVISION) CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED.
3. IF FIGHTING BECAME MORE GENERAL IN AREA, ISRAELIS MIGHT FEEL
NEED TO EXPAND AND CONSOLIDATE THEIR FRONT. WHERE WE COULD
GO AT THIS POINT IN TERMS OF REACTIONS OF UAR AND OTHER ARABS
IS ANYONE'S GUESS. AT LEASE US ALLIES SUCH AS TUNIS, LEBANON
AND MOROCCO WOULD COME UNDER GREAT PRESSURE. THE RESPONSE FROM
RADICALS COULD BE HYSTERIA OR WAR, OR BOTH.
4. EVEN IF ISRAELI MOVE PROVES LIMITED IN SCOPE AND SUCCESS-
FUL, ITS AFTERMATH WOULD STRAIN KING'S PERSONAL STANDING WITH
SUBJECTS AND FELLOW ARABS. ISRAEL'S ACTION WOULD CONFIRM IN
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
-2- Amman 5049 dtd 22 Sep 70
Control: 5505Q
ARAB EYES LIBEL SPREAD BY RADICALS FOR TWENTY YEARS THAT JORDAN-
IAN MONARCHY CRYPTO ZIONIST AT HEART. KING'S POSITION WITH
ARMY WOULD BE WEAKENED AND HE WOULD BE MORE VULNERABLE TO CAMP-
AIGN OF VILIFICATION WHICH WOULD BE LAUNCHED FROM EVERY RADICAL
QUARTER IN ARAB WORLD. FEW ARABS, FURTHERMORE, WOULD RALLY TO
HIS SIDE.
5. I AM NOT SAYING THAT PLANNING FOR ISRAELI OPERATION TOWARD
JORDAN SHOULD STOP, BUT THAT IDF SHOULD ONLY BE UNLEASED AT TIME
AND IN MANNER THAT SUITS OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. IF IT APPEARS
THAT COMBINED THREAT FROM SYRIANS
AND FEDAYEEN MAY BE TOO MUCH FOR HUSSEIN, THEN I WOULD SAY
GIVE ISRAELIS THEIR HEAD. BUT IF HUSSEIN - BASICALLY ON HIS OWN
- CAN MAKE HIS WAY TO SHORE, I THINK THIS WOULD BE THE MOST
DESIRABLE RESULT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. OUTCOME OF
HUSSEIN'S CURRENT CRISIS, I AM AFRAID, IS NOT AS CLEAR AS I
WOULD WISH. BUT I DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD ELIMINATE MOST
PROMISING ALTERNATIVE BY A PREMATURE ISRAELI INTERVENTION.
6. I AM SKEPTICAL OVER REASONS GIVEN BY GOI FOR PREFERRING
STRIKE INTO JORDAN RATHER THAN SYRIA. FROM STANDPOINT OUR
OWN INTERESTS AND PROBABLE REACTIONS IN ARAB WORLD, I BE-
LIEVE BASH AGAINST SYRIA WOULD HAVE FEWER REPERCUSSIONS THAN
ONE TOWARDS IRBID. ISRAELIS MAY HAVE THEIR OWN REASONS FOR PRE-
FERRING A JORDAN TARGET TO A SYRIAN ONE, BUT I HOPE AMMAN'S
VIEWS WILL BE CONSIDERED BEFORE ANY DECISION ON VENUE IS REACHED.
7. FINALLY, AND I AM WRITING FROM PAROCHIAL VIEW OF AMMAN,
KING'S DESIRE IS TO SEE SYRIANS SO HURT THAT THEY WILL WITHDRAW.
ISRAEL'S DESIRE MAY BE BROADER: TO SO SMASH SYRIANS THAT THEY WONT
RISE AGAIN FOR LONG TIME. IF THIS IS INDEED ISRAELI AIM I
CAN SEE SHY THEY ARE MASSING FOR GRAND ATTACK AT IRBID WHERE
SYRIANS ARE STUPIDLY OPEN TO REAL DEFEAT. IF AIM, ON OTHER HAND,
IS TO GIVE HELP TO HUSSEIN, THEN EITHER FEINT OR SHORT ATTACK
INTO MUCH EASIER COUNTRY NORTH OF TIBERIAS WOULD HAVE SAME
EFFECT WITHOUT SIDE DANGERS HERE.
BROWN
BT
Note: Relayed White House conncir by OC/T.
SECOBIAA
2Eb 55 IS 38
BECEINED
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPT :TMENT OF STATE
11
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
CONTROL: 15 3 4Q
RECD: SEP 5, 240PM '70
R 0515522 SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 931
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4342
NODIS
SUBJECT: GOJ REQUEST FOR FOUR-POWER STATEMENT REGARDING IRAQIS
REF: AMMAN 4241
1. CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT ZAID RIFAI TOLD CHARGE SEPT 5 THAT
GOJ WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED USG HAD NOT ENDORSED IDEA OF BIG
FOUR POWER STATEMENT OPPOSING IDEA OF IRAQI INTERVENTION IN
JORDAN.
2. CHARGE DREW ON STATE 143328 AND EXPLAINED THAT US AMB IN
MOSCOW AND US MINISTER IN CAIRO HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE
REPRESENTATIONS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HOST GOVERNMENTS.
3. RIFAI SAID GOJ POINT WAS THAT S.C. RESOLUTION 242 AND
JARRING MISSION WERE AT STAKE. USG AND OTHER BIG POWERS
HAD ENDORSED THESE PROPOSITIONS WHICH NOW, AS FAR AS
JORDAN WAS CONCERNED, WERE IMPERILLED BY IRAQI THREATS.
GOJ THEREFORE THOUGHT BIG FOUR SHOULD TAKE FIRM STAND.
HE WELCOMED FRENCH INITIATIVE CAMMAN 4299). GP-3.
ODELL
BT
Passed W/House by OC/T
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
THE WHITE Hou
WASHINGTON
K
September 22, 1970
Henry:
You should focus on the attached
cable from Brown if you have
not done so.
Al
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been
determined to be declassified
CDXD AT
SITUATION ROOM
'70 SEP 22 PM 9:34
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been
determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
9
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
Z 162315Z SEP 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1269
BT
S ECRET AMMAN 4845
4008Q
NODIS
SEP 16, 7:57 PM 1970
1. I AM NOT SURE JUST HOW SERIOUS KING'S REQUEST IS, I
CAN'T SEE ANY REAL THREAT FROM SYRIA. IT HAS VIRTUALLY
SEP
NO TROOPS (ABOUT 600 MEN IN AA UNITS) IN JORDAN PLUS
A SYRIAN-DIRECTED FEDAYEEN GROUP. KING IS, OF COURSE,
CONCERNED BY RADIO REPORTS THAT SYRIA IS VOCALLY
ATTACKING HIS GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE AND IS VIGOROUSLY
SUPPORTING FEDAYEEN.
2. WE HAVE ALREADY GONE THROUGH AN EXERCISE CONCERNING
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTERVENTION ABOUT TEN DAYS AGAO.
3. I THINK KING WANTS HIS HAND HELD. THIS I PROPOSE TO
DO, SUBJECT TO DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL. I'LL TELL HIM
A) THAT WE WANT A STRONG, STABLE JORDAN CAPABLE OF
MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND TAKING A LEADING PART
IN JARRING TALKS AS PRESIDENT TOLD ME IN SAN CLEMENTE,
B) THAT WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY HOSTAGE PROBLE,
C) THAT IS IS BASICLY JORDANIAN DECISION AS TO HOW
IT WILL RESTORE CENTRAL AUTHORITY, D) THAT I WANT HIS VIEWS
ON OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM WHICH I WILL PROMPTLY REPORT
TO USG, AND E) THAT I WANT TO ASSURE HIM AGAIN OF OUR
DESIRE BE HELPFUL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC AND PLITICAL MEANS.
IF NECESSARY, I WILL DISABUSE HIM OF POSSIBILITY
OF IRAQUIS. DIRECT USG INVOLVEMENT IN INTERDICTING SYRIANS AND
4. FRANKLY, AND DESPITE ALL THE IMPLICIT DANGERS TO
HOSTAGES, I HOPE I WILL NOT BE TOLD TO DISCOURAGE HIM
FROM TAKING STERN MEASURES AGAINST FEDAYEEN. IF HE DOES
NOT, AFTER PUTTING IN OFFICE HIS OWN MILITARY, HIS
REGIME AND MODERATION WE HOPE FOR FROM JORDAN WILL BE
WEAKER THAN EVER BEFORE.
5. WE VE TURNED OVER QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ANYONE ELSE--
ESPECIALLY IN ARAB WORLD--CAN BE OF ANY HELP. IT DOESN'T
LOOK LIKE IT. nevertheless, I THINK I SHOULD URGEHIM TO
PROTECT HIS FLANKS BY ENLISTING WHATEVER SUPPORT HE CAN
FROM OTHER ARABS. I ALSO HOPE I CANTELL HIM THAT WE
WILL BE USEFUL WITH SAUDIS, MOROCCANS, TUNISIANS, AND
LEBANESE. FURTHERMORE, WE COULD ASK OTHER EUROPEAN STATES
AND PERHAPS USSR TO FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE. DEPARTMENT'S
ADVISE REQUESTED ON THIS PARAGRAPH.
BROWN
BT
SECRE at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
WH
OF SEATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
10
0 141530Z SEP 70
Control: 3266Q
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1193
Recd
: 14 Sep 70
BT
12:06 p.m.
CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN 4731
NODIS
REF: AMMAN 4691, STATE 149965
1. EMBASSY AMMAN'S CROSS REFERENCING OF REFIELS LEADS US
TO DISTURBING CONCLUSION THAT THERE ARE NO RPT NO
HOSTAGES WHO HOLD EXCLUSIVELY ISRAELI NATIONALITY. DIRE
CONSEQUENCES RE NEGOTIATING THEIR RELEASE ARE OBVIOUS.
2. REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S CONFIRMATION OF THIS INFORMATI ON.
EMBASSY ALSO NEEDS GUIDANCE ON HOW TO HANDLE PROBLEM ONCE
THIS BECOMES PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.
BRUBECK
BT
ROOM
HOUSE
'70 SEP 14 PM 4:40 40
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
NODIS
RECEIVED SAN CLEMENTE COMMCEN
EIA163
6:30 A. M. PDT 2 SEPTEMBER 70
00 WTE12
DE WTE 050 2451250
0 021239Z SEP 70
FM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO WINSTON LORD FOR DR. KISSINGER
ZEM
This being only
SECRET NODIS WH01662
P 020940Z SEP 70
did we flue 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
Did upl this
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 895
BT
SECRE T AMMAN 4257
K an
NODIS
SANDSTORM
SUBJ: POSSIBLE ISRAELI ROLE IF IRAQIS INTERVENE IN JORDAN
REF: AMMAN 4248, 4245, 3:07; STATE 144329
1. AS NOTED AMMAN 4248, IT NOW SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT I WILL
HAVE AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN TODAY. MOREOVER, URGENCY
ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR, AND POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE, SUBJECT
APPEARS TO HAVE SUBSIDED AGAIN AND WE THINK IT BEST TO LEAVE
THINGS WHERE THEY ARE FOR TIME BEING.
2. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHAT KING HUSSEIN MAY OR MAY NOT WAY
WHEN HE DOES RECEIVE ME, I WISH RECORD THAT I AM VERY BEARISH
ABOUT THE WHOLE IDEA OF GETTING USG INVOLVED IN POSSIBLE IDF
ASSISTANCE TO JAA AGAINST IRAQIS. SOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE
REASONS FOR THIS VIEW ARE SET FORTH IN AMMAN 4245. ANOTHER
REASON INVOLVES ROLE PLAYED BY CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT, ZAID RIFAI.
3. I HAVE COME TO REALIZE OVER PAST MONTHS THAT ALTHOUGH
ZAID IS CERTAINLY A POWERFUL FIGURE, AND OUR CLOSE CONTACTS
WITH HIM VERY VALUABLE, THE MESSAGES HE TRANSMITS ON HIS MAJESTY'S
BEHALF ARE FREQUENTLY NOT EXACTLY THE SAME IN EITHER CONTENT
OR MOOD AS THE MESSAGES ON SAME SUBJECT I GET DIRECTLY FROM
THE KING. TWO EXAMPLES COME TO MIND:
By
(A) JUST BEFORE JUNE TROUBLES, THIS EMBASSY AND TEL AVIV WERE
INVOLVED IN TRANSMITTING MESSAGES RELATING TO HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS
CONTROL FEDAYEEN ATTACKS ON BEISAN VALLEY. A KEY MESSAGE
INCLUDED ZAID'S ASSURANCE TO ME THAT JAA HAD BEEN GIVEN ORDERS
TO SHOOT TO KILL" FEDAYEEN WHO DISOBEYED KING'S ORDERS. THIS
"ROBUST LANGUAGE" (TEL AVIV' PHRASE) APPARENTLY WENT FAR IN
ASSUAGING THE ISRAELIS FOR THE TIME BEING. WHEN THE ATTACKS
WERE RESUMED, I WENT TO SEE KING, WHO HAD ZAID AND FONMIN RIFAI
PRESENT. KING WAS FORTHRIGHT, AND I BELIEVE HONEST, IN HIS
DECLARATION OF INTENT TO MONTROL FEDAYEEN WITHIN LIMITS HIS
NARA, Date 5-17-04
NLN01-19/32 letter 8-8-02
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 [2pages]
ABILITY. BUT HE DID NOT USE SUCH "ROBUST LANGUAGE" AND LEFT
SITUATION LESS CLEAR-CUT THAN ZAID'S VERSION HAD INDICATED
WAS THE CASE.
(B) IN OUR ARMS RELATIONS WITH JORDAN, ZAID HAS TAKEN SEVERAL
OCCASIONS TO COMPLAIN STRONGLY (IN KING'S NAME) ABOUT QUALITY
OF EQUIPMENT, DELIVERY SCHEDULES, QUANTITIES AVAILABLE, LACK
OF ADEQUATE CREDIT, ETC. INVARIABLY, WHEN I SUBSEQUENTLY
DISCUSSED THESE POINTS DIRECTLY WITH KING HE APPEARED MUCH
MORE RELAXED, UNDERSTANDING, AND WILLING TO ACCEPT OUR
ASSURANCES, THAN DID ZAID.
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
END PAGE ONE
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
851/10/2100
SEPDET
SECRET
NODIS
4. THERE COULD BE A NUMBER OF REASONS FOR THIS AMBIGUITY IN
OUR RELATIONS WITH PALACE. "LIFE STYLES" OF ZAID AND KING
ARE QUITE DIFFERENT. ZAID MAY FEEL NEED, IS KING'S FRONT MAN,
TO BE MORE CATHOLIC THAN THE POPE. ALSO HUSSEIN MAY
DELIBERATELY USE HIM ON OCCASION AS STALKING HORSE. WHATEVER
THE REASON OR REASONS, HOWEVER, IT LEADS ME TO ADVISE CONSIDER-
ABLE CAUTION IN HANDLING MESSAGES DELIVERED BY ZAID ON BEHALF
OF KING, PARTICULARLY WHEN THEY DEAL WITH A SUBJECT CARRYING
SUCH FORMIDABLE IMPLICATIONS IS IDF INTERVENTION AGAINST IRAQIS.
5. AS CHARGE, I WOULD RE RELUCTANT TO RECOMMEND DELIVERING
SUCH A MESSAGE UNLESS I HAD DISCUSSED IT DIRECTLY WITH KING.
6. DEPT MAY WISH CONSIDER PASSING THIS TELEGRAM TO TEL AVIV.
ODELL
700
SECRET
NODIS
NNNN
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
11
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
CONTROL: 253Q
RECD:
SEP 1, 1970
6:37 P.M.
Z 012130Z SEP 70
NOT
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 887
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4241
NODIS
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
SEP I PM 05
SeNT
S.C.
SAM %
SUBJ HUSSEIN REQUESTS BIG FOUR COMMUNIQUE IN VIEW
Has
POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION
SeeN
REF A) AMMAN 4216 B) DEPT 142836
1. AT 2140 LOCAL CHIEF OF ROYAL DIWAN ZAID AL-RIFA'I PASSED
FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO EMBOFF (HORAN): RIFA'I STATED THAT GOJ
HAD DERERMINED THAT PDFLP BEHIND ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON KING.
ATTACK FORTUNATELY UNSUCCESSFUL AND KING HAS RETURNED HOME.
2. RIFAI SAID GOJ HAS SINCE THEN RECEIVED ULTIMATUM FROM IRQIS
DEMANDING THAT THE GOVT STOP FIRING AT COMMANDOS AND STOP ANY
PROVOCATIVE ACTION AGAINST THEM. OTHERWISE THE GOVT OF IRAQ AND
THE IRAQI ARMY IN JORDAN WILL HAVE TO CHANGE THEIR PREVIOUS
ATTITUDE AND TAKE ACTION.
3. RIFA' I STATED THAT JORDAN HAD REJECTED THE ULTIMATUM AND
INFORMED THE GOI THAT THEY CONSIDERED IT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY
SITUATION THAT MIGHT ARISE AS A RESULT OF THE CONTENTS OF
ITS MESSAGE.
Do GOJ, MOREOVER, IS NOW MEETING WITH FEDAYEEN TO ADVISE THEM
THAT THEY HAVE TO GET OUT OF AMMAN IMMEDIATELY OR SUFFER CON..
SEQUENCES.
5. RIFA'I ARRIRMED HE HAD INFORMED THE ARAB GOVTS OF THIS
MEETING AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADORS OF THE BIG FOUR. HIS
MAJESTY BELIEVES THAT JOINT COMMUNIQUE FROM BIG FOUR, OR AT
LEAST US-USSR, WARNING AGAINST THIRD COUNTRY INTERVENTION
IMPORTANT AND IT APPROPRIATE THAT ACTION BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY.
RIFA' I. SAID HE WOULD KEEP IN. TOUCH IF THERE WERE ANY FURTHER
DEVELOPMENTS AND CLOSED BY SAYING THAT "WE ARE QUITE PREPARED
TO TAKE ON THE WHOLE LOT IF REQUIRED." WHEN ASKED IF ANY
PARTICULAR TIME FRAMEWORK IN MIND FOR FOUR POWER ACTION, RIFA'I
REPLIED THAT IT SHOULD BE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
-2- AMMAN 4241, SEP 1
6. COMMENT: FRENCH AMB HAS SPOKEN WITH US ON THIS MATTER AND IT
APPEARS THAT WHILE RIFA'I MESSAGE TO US IS IDENTICAL WITH THAT WHICH
HE RECEIVED, BRITISH VERSION SPEAKS RATHER OF "THREATENED"
ULTIMATUM FROM IRAQIS. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THIS
SLIGHT DISCREPANCY WITH BRITISH. FRENCH AMB ADDED HE BEMUSED
BY SOVIET AMB' STATEMENT - DESPITE RIFA IS CLAIM HE HAD SPOKEN
TO BIG FOUR REPS - TO HAVE HEARD NOTHING ON THIS MATTER FROM
PALACE. FRENCH AMB CONJECTURED "BUT, THEN, HE MIGHT BE LYING."
7. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR COMMUNIQUE
TO BE ISSUED ALONG LINES REQUESTED BY RIFA' I. SUCH EARLY ACTION
MIGHT SUFFICIENTLY STRENGTHEN GOJ'S POLITICAL STANCE VIS-A-VIS
ITS OPPOSITION AS TO CAUSE LATTER TO BACK DOWN AND NOT RISK
ARMED CONFRONTATION.
8. WITH REFERENCE TO STATE 142836 JUST RECEIVED, WE BELIEVE THAT
IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR ANY COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED IN CON-
JUNCTION WITH AT LEAST SOME MEMBERS OF BIG FOUR. SUCH MEASURE
WOULD TEND TO KEEP EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL NATURE OF OUTSIDE
SUPPORT WHICH IS WHERE EMPHASIS - PUBLICLY - FOR THE TIME BEING
SHOULD REMAIN. GP3
ODELL
BT
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TMENT
OF
STATE
11
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
WH
010945Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
5 7 Q
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 878
1970 SEPT 1 AM 7 30
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4216
NODIS
SUBJ: HUSSEIN SEEKS SUPPORT IN EVENT OF CONFRONTATION
1. KING HUSSEIN INFORMED EMBOFF EVENING AUG 31 THAT WHILE
HE WOULD TRY TO AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN, FURTHER
INCIDENTS SUCH AS THOSE THAT TROUBLED CAPITAL ON AUG 29 WOULD
MAKE THIS DIFFICULT. KING HAD FOUND HE COULD NOT PLACE TRUST
IN COMMITMENTS OF FEDAYEEN BECAUSE THESE TENDED TO BECOME
UNDONE BY THEIR UNDISCIPLINED SUBORDINATES. HE INDICA
HE WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM ARMY TO RESPOND VIGOROUSLY
RECENT FEDAYEEN PROVOCATIONS AND REMARKED FRANKLY THAT
CONTINUED DISORDER IN AMMAN, TOGETHER WITH THE HARDSHI
WOULD INFLICT ON CIVIL POPULATION, MIGHT AT SOME POINT
ONROOM
TO HOUSE FORCE THIS
HIS HAND.
'70 SEP 1 AM 9:45 45
2. KING WAS AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT A CONFRONTATION WITH
FEDAYEEN MIGHT RAISE POSSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION BY SYRIA
OR IRAQI TROOPS STATIONED IN JORDAN. KING SAW THIS AS
THREAT NOT ONLY TO HIMSELF OR TO HIS REGIME BUT ALSO TO
PROSPECTS US PEACE INITIATIVE IN MIDDLE EAST. AGAINST THIS
CONTINGENCY KING HOPED HE COULD RELY ON OUTSIDE SUPPORT.
EXPANDING ON THIS STATEMENT, KING SAID WHAT HE HAD IN MIND
WAS US MAKING STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT, IF NECESSARY, WARNING
AGAINST ANY HOSTILE INTERVENTION IN JORDAN, HE THOUGHT, ALSO,
THAT SUCH STATEMENT WOULD HAVE PARTICULAR BENEFIT IF ISSUED
JOINTLY WITH USSR AND, IN FACT, WOULD PREFER JOIN STATEMENT.
3. KING HAS ALSO DISCUSSED WITH SOVIETS HIS CONCERNS ABOUT
HOSTILE INTERVENTION IN JORDAN. SOVIETS ALLEGEDLY REPLIED
THEY ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT GOJ ANY WAY THEN CAN SHOULD IT
ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES.
CHUSSEIN DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ASK USSR'S VIEWS ON PUBLIC
STATEMENT). HE WOULD LIKE US, HOWEVER, TO GO TO RUSSIANS AND
INQUIRE IF THEY PREPARED TO JOIN US IN GNERAL STATEMENT OF
SUPPORT OF GOJ REGIME IF SITUATION WARRANTS. HUSSEIN ASSUMES
WE WOULD INFORM SOVIETS THAT IN THIS MATTER WE RESPONDING TO
PROPOSAL PUT TO US BY GOJ.
4. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION KING WAS NOT PREPARED COMPLETELY
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
TO EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT AT SOME POINT HE MIGHT BE DRIVEN
TO REQUEST AMERICAN MILITARY ACTION IN HIS BEHALF. HOWEVER,
NLN11-85/15161 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
By RJ /WIN NARA, Date 10/19/2016
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET.
-2- AMMAN 4216 NODIS
HE SEES THIS AS ONLY A "REMOTE POSSIBILITY. KING FELT THAT
JORDAN ARMY COULD COPE WITH DOMESTIC SITUATION THREATS - AS
THEY PRESENTLY STOOD. HE INDICATED ALSO THAT UAR PROMISE OF
SUPPORT COULD BE USEFUL IN MAINTAINING HIS ASCENDANCY OVER
POTENTIAL OPPONENTS, ALTHOUGH IN MATERIAL TERMS HE WAS AWARE
SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD NECESSARILY BE LIMITED.
6. KING URGED THAT THIS APPROACH TO US BE HELD IN STRICT CONFI-
DENCE. GP3
ODELL
BECEINED
OΓ' HA ⑈⑈ e 932
СОЛИСІГ SECONITA
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
STATE DEPARTMENT
WH
Department of State
UNITED THE STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
10
SECRET
5995Q
AUG 25, 4:12 PM 1970
R 251440Z AUG 80
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 880
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3118
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4101
NODIS
SANDSTORM
REF STATE 137360
'70 AUG 25 PM
1. EMBASSY CONCURS WITH DEPT VIEW THAT HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE NOW
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE house
NOT BE PASSED TO GOI. MOREOVER, WE SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN OURSELVES
REOPENING WITH HM A SUBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY
PASSAGE TIME AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES.
04
2. IF EITHER KING OR CHIEF OF DIWAN RIFA'I RAISE QUESTION
AGAIN WITH US WE WILL DRAW ON GUIDANCE PARA 2 DEPT'S REFTEL.
AT THAT TIME $ OR SOME OTHER MOMENT THAT SEEMS APPROPRIATE $3)
WE MAY SUGGEST TO ZAID RIFA'I OR HM THAT THEY CONSIDER REESTAB-
LISHING DIRECT CONTACT WITH ISRAEL THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS.
ODELL
BT
i
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 8/25/70
SECRET.
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
Int
12
P 081005Z AUG 70
CN:
18740
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
Rec d: August 8 1970
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 743
0:34 a.m.
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3817
NODIS
SUBJ ARAB- ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS UNDER JARRING AUSPICES
70 AUG 8 PM 12:
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
REF STATE 128249
1. GOJ PRIMIN RIFAI TOLD CHARGE AUGUST 7 THAT HIS GOVERNMENT
NOW FAVORED NEW YORK AS VENUE FOR DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID GOJ
THOUGHT JARRING WOULD QTE NEED A GREAT DEAL OF PRODDING UNQTE
AND THIS COULD BE BEST DONE IN NEW YORK BY BIG POWERS AND
UNSYG.
2. RIFAI SAID THAT IF DISCUSSIONS WERE TO BE AT FOREIGN MIN-
ISTER LEVEL (WHICH GOJ HOPED WOULD BE THE CASE) HE EXPECTED TO
BE RELIEVED OF ALL OTHER DUTIES TO DEVOTE HIS FULL TIME TO
DISCUSSIONS.
ODELL
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
13
DE THENT O STATE
"
*
Department of State
OF STATES CHECK AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
W 1d
R 061020Z AUG 70
1109Q
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 725
RECVD: 06 AUG 70
BT
7:31AM
SECRET AMMAN 3768
NODIS
SUBJECT: UAR-ISRAEL PRISONER EXCHANGE
REF: STATE 125459
1. A SWAP OF ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN POW'S AT THIS TIME MIGHT PROVOKE
CRITICAL RESPONSE IN AMMAN AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE IN THE ARAB
WORLD. ONLY A MONTH OR SO HAS PASSED SINCE A NUMBER OF ISRAELI
PILOTS FELL INTO UAR HANDS. THEIR CAPTURE WAS GIVEN MAXIMUM
PUBLICITY AT TIME AND MEMORIES THESE EVENTS STILL FRESH. ONLY
YESTERDAY JORDANIAN PAPERS SPOKE OF DOWNED PILOTS AS INDICATION
INCREASING ARAB ANTIAIRCRAFT PROWESS. THUS, FOR NASSER TO
RETURN IDF PERSONNEL (ESPECIALLY PILOTS) WOULD MAKE HIM NO
FRIENDS AMONG BROADER ARAB PUBLIC WITH WHOM WELFARE OF
EGYPTIAN POW'S IS NOT SIGNIFICANT ISSUE.
2. ON OTHER HAND, IF NASSER COULD BE PERSUADED TO TAKE SUCH
AN INITIATIVE, IT WOULD HAVE USEFUL EFFECT LOCALLY OF CONDITION-
ING OPINION TO PROSPECT OF GENUINE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AND
SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. GP-3.
ODELL
BT
NNNN
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT 0 STATE
O
WI
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
OL.
13
0 0509402 AUG 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 719
BT
SECR E T AMMAN 3735
AUG 5 6:28 AM 1970
AUG 5 AM 9: 55
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
809Q
NODIS
SUBJ: JORDANIAU ACCEPTANCE OF JARRING STATEMENT"
REF: STATE 125536
1. CHARGE TALKED WITH PRIME MINISTER RIFAI MORNING AUGUST 5.
PRIMIN SAID HE WOULD SEND IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM TO AMBASSADOR
AL- FARRAH IN NEW YORK INSTRUCTING HIM TO CONFIRM TO JARRING
THAT GOJ HAS ACCEPTED JARRING' STATEMENT CONTAINED IN U.S.
PROPOSAL AND IS AGREEABLE FOR SYG TO ISSUE JARRING STATEMENT.
ODELL
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT if State
12
Department of Stave
STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
W Id
SECRET.
CN: 6313Q
RECD: 27 JUL 70
448 AM
Page 1 of 2 Pages
P 270745Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 648
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3534
NODIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS OTHER POSTS.
SUBJECT: U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS, GOJ POSITIVE RESPONSE
'70 JUL 27 AM
REF: AMMAN 3532, 3533
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
AT 2030 (LOCAL) JULY 26 CHARGE WAS ASKED TO COME TO FONMIN STRY
AT 2100 (LOCAL) TO RECEIVE JORDAN REPLY TO U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS.
AFTER CHARGE (ACCOMPANIED BY EMBOFF HORAN) RECEIVED WRITTEN RES-
PONSE FROM FONMIN ATALLAH, FOLLOWING POINTS. WERE MADE BY FONMIN
IN BRIEF DISCUSSION:
1. FONMIN STATED THAT AFTER LONG DISCUSSIONS IN COUNCIL OF MIN-
ISTERS HE PLEASED TO SAY THAT GOJ HAD RESOLVED ON POSITIVE REPLY
TO U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS (REPORTED AMMAN 3532). THIS REPLY, HE
ADDED, WAS UNANIMOUSLY AGREED TO BY ALL MEMBERS OF COUNCIL,
DESPITE WISH OF SOME TO DELAY JORDAN'S REPLY UNTIL POSITIVE
REPLY FORTHCOMING FROM GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.
2. BEFORE TAKING THIS DECISION ATALLAM EXPLAINED GOVERNMENT HAD
CONSULTED WITH ELEMENTS REPRESENTATIVE OF POPULATION OF AMMAN
(EXCLUDING FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS. CONSENSUS WAS FOR PEACE,
WITH SOME STATING THAT IN THEIR OPINION GOJ WAS BEST INFORMED TO
MAKE DECISION IN POPULAR INTEREST.
3. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S QUESTION ATALLAH ADMITTED THAT FED-
AYEEN GROUPS DISPLEASED WITH GOJ DECISION BUT DID NOT BELIEVE
THEY WOULD MAKE TROUBLE. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, ME MIGHT BE WRONG,
AND FELT THAT NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS WOULD TELL STORY. (DURING
PHONE CONVERSATION EVENING 26TH WITH CHARGE, CHIEF ROYAL DIWAN
RIFA'I MADE SIMILAR REMARK AND SUGGESTED AMERICANS SHOULD
MAINTAIN LOW PROFILE FOR NEXT FEW DAYS).
SECRET,
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET.
CN: 6313Q AMMAN 3534 NODIS Page 2 of 2 Pages
4. HAD PREVIOUS CABINET TAKEN THIS DECISION ATALLAH REMARKED,
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT OF ARAB
CAUSE. SAME MIGHT HAPPEN TO PRESENT CABINET BUT ATALLAH CLEARLY
SUPPOSED ITS PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS WOULD MAKE IT LESS VULNER-
ABLE TO THIS SORT OF ATTACK.
5. ATALLAH STATED THAT AMBASSADORS OF UK, FRANCE AND USSR
WOULD BE SUMMONED TO FONMINISTRY JULY 27 TO RECEIVE SAME REPLY
AS PRESENTED TO EMBASSY EVENING JULY 26. WORD OF POSITIVE GOJ
RESPONSE CARRIED LOCAL NEWS BROADCAST NINE AND ELEVEN P.M.
JULY 26.
6. ENGLISH AND ARABIC TEXTS OF JORDANIAN REPLY WILL BE POUCH-
ED. GP-3.
ODELL
BT
NOTE: PASSED WHITEHOUSE BY OC/T
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Swen to John Mitchell
Special Personnel Recommendations
by PMF
WINTON M. BLOUNT
President and Founder of Blount Brothers Construction
Company; current Chairman of United States Chamber of
Commerce; age - 48; home - Montgomery, Alabama;
Republican; active in Eisenhower 1952 and 1956 campaigns
and organizer for the South in 1960 Nixon campaign.
Recommended positions: Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Transportation.
Availability - unknown.
JAMES W. HARGROVE
Senior Vice President Texas Eastern Transmission
Corporation; age - 46; home - Houston, Texas;
Republican; very able organizer with substantial
background in the field of education;
Recommended positions: AssistantoUnder Secretary
of Health, Education & Welfare
Available.
RITA HAUSER
Partner of own New York Law firm; past lawyer in
Justice Department with outstanding record; member
of New York, Washington, and French Bar; Doctorate
in International Economics from University of
Strasbourg; Nixon staff in 1960 campaign and from
February 1968 in the 1968 campaign; must remain in
New York.
Recommended positions: Deputy Ambassador to U.N.
Ambassador for Economic and
Social Committee (UNESCO)
Available.
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
OF 86 STATE
12
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
W H
P 291840Z JUL 70
7139Q
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 676
1970 JULY 29 PM 3 15
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3621
NODIS
SUBJECT: U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS: VIEWS OF GOJ PRIMIN RIFAI
REF: STATE 120680
i. CHARGE CALLED ON PRIMIN RIFAI AT HIS HOME EVENING OF
70 JUL 29 PM 4:57
SITUATION ROOM SITUATION WHITE ROOM
HOUSE
JULY 29. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION PRIMIN, WHO WAS VERY
RELAXED AND PLEASANT, MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:
A) IT WAS TOO SOON FOR GOJ TO MAKE KNOWN ITS INTENTIONS
WITH RESPECT TO ENFORCING CEASEFIRE INSOFAR AS FEDAYEEN
WERE CONCERNED. AFTER ISRAELI RESPONSE HAD BEEN MADE AND
STUDIED, HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS POINT AGAIN WITH CHARGE.
B) HE RECOGNIZED THAT ISRAELI GOVT WAS FACING DIFFICULT
DECISION. NEVERTHELESS HE WAS "QUITE HOPEFUL" THAT ULTIMATE
GOI RESPONSE WOULD BE POSITIVE.
C) HE UNDERSTOOD THAT SOVIETS HAD INVITED IRAQI DELEGATION
TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS U.S. PROPOSALS. HE HOPED SOVIETS
WOULD "PUT MUCH PRESSURE" ON IRAQIS TO ADOPT REASONABLE
POSTURE.
D) SYRIANS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO ENDORSE PROPOSALS DESIGNED
IMPLEMENT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THEY HAD NOT ACCEPTED.
THEY WERE NOT, HOWEVER "BEING TOO NAUGHTY", AND
GOJ ANTICIPATED NO PARTICULAR TROUBLE FROM THIS QUARTER.
E) HE PREFERRED CYPRUS, SWITZERLAND OR AUSTRIA AS VENUE
FOR DISCUSSIONS UNDER JARRING AUSPICES. NEW YORK OFFERED
CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, CHIEFLY PROXIMITY TO BIG FOUR, BUT THESE
ADVANTAGES WERE OUTWEIGHED BY CONCENTRATION OF PRESS, PRESSURE
FROM ZIONIST GROUPS AND OTHER ARAB UN DELEGATIONS AND "GENERAL
EXCITEMENT". ALSO NEW YORK WAS TOO FAR FROM THE PARTIES'
CAPITALS FOR CONVENIENCE. GOJ WOULD, HOWEVER, NOT BAULK
AT ANY VENUE AGREEABLE TO THE OTHERS. AS FOR THE NEGOTIATING
LEVEL, GOJ HOPED IT WOULD BE NO LOWER THAN FOREIGN MINISTERS.
F) -HE WAS CONVINCED THAT "NINETY PERCENT" OF JORDANIAN PEOPLE
APPROVED OF GOJ POSITIVE RESPONSE TO USG.
2. DEPT PLEASE PASS OTHER POSTS.
ODELL
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
COMMITMENT OF STATE
12
Department of State
UNITED STATES or
TELEGRAM
SECRET
0 262100Z JUL 70
CONTROL: 62830
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RECD: Jul 26, 6 22PM'70
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 647
BT
GEORET AMMAN 3533
NODIS
SUBJECT: US PEACE PROPOSALS: POSITIVE GOJ RESPONSE
REF: AMMAN 3532
'70 JUL 27 AM 14
SITUATION ROOM SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
1. FULL ENGLISH TEXT OF LETTER DATED JULY 26, 1970 FROM
GOJ FONMIN ATALLAH TO SECSTATE FOLLOWS:
QTE CONFIDENTIAL, AMMAN 26 JULY 1970,
DEAR MR. SECRETARY OF STATE,
ON 20TH OF JUNE 1970, THE AMERICAN CHARGE D' AFFAIRES AI
AMMAN HANDED HIS EXCELLENCY ABDUL MONEM RIFA'I, THEN
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NOW PRIME MINISTER, YOUR
LETTER CONTAINING YOUR NEW INITIATIVE FOR A PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.
THE PRESENT IMPASSE IN THE WAY OF THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
TO WHICH YOU REFER, AND, WHICH WE ARE GLAD TO NOTE YOU
ARE ENDEAVORING TO OVERCOME, WOULD NOT HAVE ARISEN HAD IT
NOT BEEN FOR ISRAEL'S INTRASINGENCE, MILITANT ATTITUDE
INDUCED BY THE MILITARY SUPERIORITY IT COMMANDS, ITS
CONTINUED REJECTION OF IMPLEMENTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION OF 22 NOVEMBER 1967, AND ITS REPUSAL TO ACCEPT
WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE ARAB TERRITORIES WHICH IT OCCUPIED
SINCE JUNE, 1967.
I FEEL I MUST POINT OUT ALSO, THAT IT IS THE CONTINUED
UNITED STATES SUPPORT, IN VARIOUS FORMS, WHICH SECURES TO
ISRAEL ITS PRESENT MILITARY SUPERIORITY, THAT RENDERS IT
INTRANSIGENT IN ITS ATTITUDE. FURTHERMORE, ISRAEL'S TERRITORIAL
EXPANSIONIST POLICY AT THE COST OF THE SURROUNDING ARAB
COUNTRIES IS AT THE ROOT OF ITS REFUSAL TO MPLEMENT
THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, THUS RAISING OBSTACLES IN THE
WAY OF AMBASSADOR JARRING AND PREVENTING HIM FROM CARRYING
OUT HIS MISSION I.E. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAID RESOLUTION.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-86/15162 NLN Per Hr. 2/24/2016 2016
SECRET
By RJ 1mit NARA, Date 10/19/2016
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to bei declassified
SECRET
-2-3533 FROM AMMAN, JUL 26, 1970 (NODIS)
MY GOVERNMENT HAS CONSIDERED YOUR NEW PROPOSAL WITH
SPECIAL CARE AND IT IS CLEAR TO IT THAT THIS PROPOSAL DOES
NOT VARY IN SUBSTANCE FROM THAT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242, EXCEPT THAT IT CALLS FOR SOME PROCEDURAL
MEASURES CALCULATED TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION.
THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS PROCLAIMED ITS
ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND CALLED FOR
ITS IMPLEMENTATION. FURTHERMORE, IT DEMONSTRATED ITS
FULL SINCERITY IN DEALING WITH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DR. GUNNAR JARRING,
IN PURSUING A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE IN THE
DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. AS REGARDS THESE ASPECTS, THEREFORE,
MY GOVERNMENT FINDS NOTHING NEW IN YOUR LETTER TO PRECLUDE
IT FROM ACCEPTING YOUR PROPOSAL, ITS OBJECT BEING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND THE
RESUMPTION BY AMBASSADOR JARRING OF HIS MISSION TO CONTACT
THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO IMPLEMENTING THE AFOREMENTIONED
RESOLUTION.
NEVERTHELESS, MY GOVERNMENT IN CONSIDERING THE
RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DISCUSSIONS WITH
AMBASSADOR JARRING REGARDING ITS IMPLEMENTATION HAS
ALWAYS PROCEEDED FROM TWO BASIC STARTING POINTS:
FIRST: THE NECESSITY OF ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE
OF WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE ARAB TERRITORIES WHICH IT OCCUPIED
SINCE THE FIFTH OF JUNE 1967 WITHOUT EXCEPTION, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 WHICH
AFFIRMS THE INADMISSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR.
SECOND: THE NECESSITY TO RECOGNIZE THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S
FULL AND LAWFUL RIGHTS, WHICH HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY AFFIRMED AND
REAFFIRMED BY RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND
THE IMPERATIVE NECESSITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS TO
ENSURE PEACE BASED ON JUSTICE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS NATURAL FOR MY GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE
TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION REGARDING THESE TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES,
IN THE FIRM BELIEF THAT NO PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
IS POSSIBLE IF THESE TWO SOUND PRINCIPLES ARE NOT FULLY RESPECTED.
AS REGARDS ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE FOR A PERIOD OF
THREE MONTHS, THIS IS IN LINE WITH WHAT MY GOVERNMENT HAS
ALWAYS OBSERVED AND STILL CONTINUES TO OBSERVE scrupulously.
HOWEVER MY COUNTRY THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE
ISRAELI AGGRESSION OF JUNE, 1967, HAS BEEN THE OBJECT OF
ARMED AGGRESSION, ATTACKS AND RAIDS BY ISRAEL. THE NUMEROUS
RESOLUTIONS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS REPEATEDLY PASSED
CONDEMNING ISRAEL FOR THESE AGGRESSIONS STAND AS VIVID
TESTIMONY THAT IT IS ISRAEL THAT HAS REPEATEDLY VIOLATED THE
CEASEFIRE. FURTHERMORE, ESCALATION IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES
Reproduced CENDET at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
-3-3533 FROM AMMAN, JUL 26 1970 (NODIS)
ON THE JORDAN ISRAELI FRONT IS IN TRUTH DUE TO THE ISRAELI
CONTINUED MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE ARAB AREAS, THE
OPPRESSIVE MEASURES IT PERPETRATED AGAINST THE ARAB POPULATION,
THEIR PERSECUTION, ILL-TREATMENT AND EXPULSION FROM THEIR OWN
HOMELAND; IN ADDITION TO ARSON, DESTRUCTION OF VILLAGES,
CITIES, PLANTATIONS AND OTHER DAMAGE TO OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY
AS WELL AS THE KILLING OF CIVILIANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ON
THE EAST BANK OF JORDAN RESULTING FROM AIR RAIDS, BOMBING AND
SHELLING BY ISRAEL. IT IS THESE ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND
OPPRESSION THAT HAVE LED THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT TO
RESORT TO THEIR LAWFUL AND ACKNOWLEDGED RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE
AND RESISTANCE AGAINST THE OCCUPATION.
ACCORDINGLY MY GOVERNMENT, IN ITS KEEN DESIRE TO MAINTAIN
PEACE, BASED ON JUSTICE, AGREES TO THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN
YOUR LETTER OF 20TH JUNE, 1970.
WITH THE EXPRESSION OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND RESPECT.
YOURS SINCERELY,
ANTONE ATALLAH/S/
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
THE HONOURABLE
MR. WILLIAM ROGERS
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C. UNQTE
2. FONMIN SAID EMBASSY WOULD RECEIVE ARABIC TEXT IN A
FEW DAYS AND THIS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AUTHENTIC. HE SAID
HE PERSONALLY HAD PREPARED ENGLISH TEXT AND BELIEVED IT FULLY
REFLECTED SUBSTANCE OF MESSAGE GOJ WISHED TO CONVEY. HE DREW
CHARGE'S ATTENTION TO THIRD SENTENCE OF PARA (5) AND SAID HE
WISHED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WORDS "ITS OBJECT" REFERRED TO
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING WORD "PROPOSAL" AND NOT RPT NOT TO
WORDS "MY GOVERNMENT".
ODELL
BT
PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TMENT OF STATE
Department of State
12
*
OF STATES CANTED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
CONTROL: 6 2 7 8Q
RECD: JUL 26, 3 51PM'70
Z 261935Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
BT
SECRETAMMAN 3532
NODIS
SUBJECT: US PEACE PROPOSALS: POSITIVE RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM GOJ
REF: AMMAN 3530
1. AT 2100 LOCAL TIME FONMIN ATALLA HANDED CHARGE POSITIVE
RESPONSE TO US PEACE PROPOSALS. LENGTHY TEXT FOLLOWS IN SEPTEL.
2. FONMIN SAID CABINET DECISION TO MAKE POSITIVE RESPONSE WAS
UNANIMOUS.
3. DEPT PLEASE PASS OTHER POSTS.
ODELL
BT
PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NNNNVV EHA251
PP RUEHEX
SECRET
RECEIVED
NODIS
DE RUEHCR 6202Q 2061325
WHCA
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251310Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
1970 JUL 25 13 28Z
TO WHITE HOUSE
P 251205Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 642
BT
SECRE T AMMAN 3528
NODIS
SUBJ: GOJ RESPONSE TO US PEACE INITIATIVE
REF: AMMAN 3527
CHARGE INFORMED BY FONMINISTRY AT 1340 LOCAL THAT TONIGHT'S
MEETING WITH FONMIN SCHEDULED FOR 1800 LOCAL CANCELLED. FONMIN
OFFICIAL EXPRESSED HOPE THAT MEETING TO TRANSMIT GOJ REPLY COULD
BE RESCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW MORNING.
ODELL
BT
NNNN
NODIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
SECRET
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NNNNVV EHA244
PP RUEHEX
SECRET
NODIS
RECEIVED
DE RUEHCR 6178Q 2061125
WHCA
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251041Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
1970 JUL 25 11 32Z
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
P 250930Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 639
BT
SECRE T AMMAN 3524
NODIS
SUBJ: SOVIET ALLEGATION GOJ HAS ACCEPTED OUR POLITICAL INITIATIVE
REF: STATE 118965
1. WE TOO WERE BEMUSED BY DOBRYNINS FLAT ASSERTION THAT
GOJ HAD ACCEPTED US POLITICAL INITIATIVE. ALTHOUGH ZAID
RIFAI TOLD EMBOFF JULY 23 CAMMAN 3480) THAT HE BELIEVED GOJ
RESPONSE WOULD BE POSITIVE, WE HAVE HERD NOTHING FURTHER.
2. WE CONSIDERED CALLING ZAID ABOUT THIS, BUT KNOWING THAT
GOJ WAS IN CONSTANT SESSION CONSIDERING REPLY TO OUR PROPOSALS,
DECIDED TO WAIT.
3. IF WE DO NOT GET CALL FROM GOJ IN NEXT FEW HOURS, CHARGE
WILL SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH ZAID RIFAI.
ODELL
BT
NNNN
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has NODIS been determined to be declassified
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
WH
0 231020Z JUL 70 ZFF6
13
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
CN-5504
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 617
July 23, 1970
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3086
7:21 a.m.
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3480
NODIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS USUN, USINT CAIRO
JUL 23 AM 42
SITUATION ROOM SITUATION ROOM
SUBJ JORDANIAN POSITION ON US PEACE INITIATIVE
REF CAIRO 1614
1. EMBOFF (HORAN) JULY 23 CALLED ON CHIEF ROYAL DIWAN ZAID RIFAI
TO REVIEW LATEST ROUND OF ACTIVITY ON US PEACE PROPOSALS. IN
RESPONSE TO QUERY ABOUT RECENT VISIT UAR REP GOWHAR AND EGYPTIAN
REPLY TO US PEACE PROPOSALS, RIFAI REMARKED HE HAD SPOKEN TO
GOWHAR YESTERDAY, JULY 22, AND THAT LATTER HAD SUBSEQUENTLY
SEEN KING, PRIMIN AND FONMIN 'ATALLAH. RIFAI STATED HE WAS NOW
WORKING ON JORDANIAN REPLY AND WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE WORK ON
IT THROUGH TOMORROW. HE HOPED USG WOULD RECEIVE OFFICIAL JORDANIN
REPLY BY SATURDAY OR SUNDAY. HE ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED JORDANIAN
REPLY WOULD BE FAVORABLE.
2. RIFAI ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT PROVISION FOR CEASE-FIRE IN US
PROPOSAL WOULD BE HARDER PROBLEM FOR GOJ THAN UAR. THERE WERE
TWO PARTIES, HE OBSERVED, THAT HAD NO INTEREST IN A CEASE-FIRE,
ONE WAS THE FEDAYEEN AND THE OTHER, GOI (HE MENTIONED HAVING
HEARD OF ISRAELI PRESS REPORT ISSUED DAY BEFORE STATING THAT GOI
WOULD REJECT AMERICAN PROPOSALS). GOJ, HE REMARKED, WAS GIVING
CAREFUL ATTENTION TO ISSUE POSED BY FEDAYEEN. HE REALIZED,
FOR INSTANCE, THAT FEDAYEEN WOULD REGARD OBLIGATION TO ESTABLISH
CEASE-FIRE AS RUNNING CONTRARY TO AGREEMENT CONCLUDED THROUGH
AUSPICES OF FOUR-POWER COMMITTEE. HE AFFIRMED THAT IF GOJ AGREES
TO CEASE-FIRE IN VALLEY, IT MUST DO SO IN A SERIGSS MANNER AND
SEE THAT IT STICKS. (IN THIS REGARD SEE ALSO REFTEL, TEL AVIV 3744
AND STATE 116105.) GP3
ODELL
BT
NOTE: NOT PASSED USUN AND USINT CAIRO BY OC/T.
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
WH
DESTATE OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES or
TELEGRAM
SECRET
12
Control: 50100
Z 2118552 JUL 70 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
Recd : 21 July 70
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 604
3:13 p.m.
INFO RUQHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3082
RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO 745
BT
SECRE T AMMAN 3433
NODIS
REF STATE 116437
9 Wd 12 70Γ OL.
1. WE NOTE REFTEL SENT TO AMMAN AS WELL AS OTHER ADDRESSEES
ROOM
FOR ACTION. EMBASSY AMMAN CANNOT CONFIRM QUESTION POSSIBLE U.S.
CITIZENSHIP OF ISRAELI PILOT MENAHIM. MEANWHILE WE THINK IT
5
WOULD NOT BE USEFUL OURSELVES TO RAISE ISSUE WITH GOJ IN ABSENCE
FURTHER DETAILS OF CASE.
2. MENAHIM PICTURE PROMINENTLY DISCLAYED LAST-PAGE SEMI-OFFICIAL
NEWSPAPER AL-DUSTUUR JULY 21 BUT NO MENTION OF
HIS CITIZENSHIP.
3. IF RUETERS DESPATCH OF HAYICAL ARTICLE CORRECT WE CAN EXPECT
PRESS TO GIVE STORY FULL TREATMENT IN A.M. IMPACT COULD BE HARM-
FUL TO GOJ'S POSITION ON (A) UAR'S RESPONSE TO U.S. PEACE
INITIATIVE WHICH CARRIED BY UAR REP GOWHAR TO AMMAN TODAY;
AND (B) JORDANIAN-FEDAYEEN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH NOW IN PROGRESS.
FATER FOR INSTANCE HAS BEEN PRESSING GOJ TO DISAVOW UN RES 242
AND POSSIBILITIES PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT,
4. FOR THESE REASONS REQUEST INFORMATION REFUTING HAYICAL ACCOUNT
(IF APPROPRIATE) OR OTHER INSTRUCTIONS BE FURNISHED AMMAN ASAP.
ODELL
BT
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
COMMISSION OF state
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF STATE
TELEGRAM
SECRET
12
P 181535Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 586
004477
BT
SECRET EL AMMAN 3385
1970 JUL 18 PM 12 20
NODIS
SUBJECT U.S. PEACE INITIATIVE
REF: STATE 113298
1. CHARGE CALLED ON KING TODAY TO PASS ON CONTENTS
REFTEL. KING DID NOT SEEM CHEERFUL AND LISTENED
WITHOUT POSITIVE RESPONSE. AFTERWARDS ASKED IF HE COULD BE
PROVIDED WITH TEXT OF MESSAGE WHICH HE BELIEVED WOULD
BE USEFUL TO HIM IN HIS DISCUSSIONS.
2. EMBASSY BELIEVES WE SHOULD ACCEDE TO KING'S REQUEST AND
UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE WILL PROVIDE KING WITH MEMORANDUM
RE TODAY'S MEETING.
3. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE QUESTION KING SAID HE HAD NO IDEA
YET OF WHAT POSITION HAD BEEN REACHED ON PEACE SETTLEMENT
BY NASSER AND SOVIET LEADERSHIP DURING NASSER'S WEEKS IN
MOSCOW. CLOCAL PRESS REPORTS STATE MAHMUD RIYADH TO VISIT
AMMAN "SOON" TO BRIEF JORDANIANS.)
4. ON JULY 17 FONMIN ATALLAH COMMENTED TO CORRESPONDENT OF BEIRUT
DAILY AL-JARIDA ON UAR-USSR COMMUNIQUE. WHILE REPEATING DEMAND FOR
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORY, HE ALSO APPEARED
TO STRESS THAT UAR-USSR HAVE AGREED TO CONCERT EFFORTS TO
REACH PEACEFUL SOLUTION WITHIN UN FRAMEWORK.
ODELL
BT
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-86/15/63 Perltr. 2/24/2016
By RJ MIH NARA, Date 10/19/2016
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
WH 12
UNITED DEPARTMENT * STATES OF OF STATE AMERICANCE *
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET,
CONTROL: 3780Q
R 1611442 JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
JULY 16, 1970
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 571
8:44 AM
BT
SECRETAMMAN 3344
'70 16 AM 11:30 30
NODIS
ROOM
REF: STATE 113298
APPRECIATE HELPFUL GUIDANCE SUPPLIED REFTEL. WE ASKED FOR
APPOINTMENT FOR CHARGE TO SEE KING BUT, BECAUSE LATTER WILL BE
UNAVAILABLE JULY 16-17, EARLIEST TIME FOR SUCH MEETING WILL
OCCUR SATURDAY, JULY 18. GP-3
ODELL
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
STATE
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
'70
9
P. 150830Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
BT
JUL 15 AM 10:23 23
34350
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 552
SECRETAMMAN3307
JUL 15 5:17 AM 1970
NODIS
ROOM
DEPT PASS OTHER POSTS
SUBJ: USG PEACE INITIATIVES
REF: AMMAN 3291
1. WHEN CHARGE SAW KING HUSSEIN JULY 14 ON ANOTHER SUBJECT.
LATTER ASKED ABOUT STATUS RECENT US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS.
CHARGE RESPONDED IN GENERAL TERMS, STATING THAT SOVIETS
APPEARED INTERESTED IN KEEPING DIALOGUE GOING AND WE SAW
SOME SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR ATTITUDE. AT SAME TIME
WE WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN
UAR, AND HAD SO INFORMED SOVIETS.
2. CHARGE SAID MUCH DEPENDED ON WHAT NASSER BROUGHT BACK
FROM MOSCOW. DID KING HUSSEIN HAVE ANY IDEA OF WHAT THAT
MIGHT BE? KING SAID HE HAD "NOT A CLUE" REGARDING TENOR
OF NASSER TALKS WITH SOVIETS. HE WAS ANXIOUSLY AWAITING
WORD FROM NASSER, WHICH HAD BEEN PROMISED, AS SOON AS LATTER
RETURNED TO CAIRO.
3. KING SAID HE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE DETAILED
BRIEFING FROM CHARGE AS SOON AS CONVENIENT ABOUT US-SOVIET
DISCUSSIONS. CHARGE PROMISED TO DO SO AND WE ARE SEEKING
APPOINTMENT JULY 16 FOR THIS PURPOSE.
4. CHARGE PROPOSES TO DRAW DISCREETLY ON RECENT DEPT AND
MOSCOW TELEGRAMS IN BRIEFING KING, AND TRUSTS THIS IS AGREE-
ABLE WITH DEPT. IS THERE ANYTHING IN PARTICULAR WE SHOULD
STRESS? KING IS OBVIOUSLY EAGER FOR INFORMATION AND EMBASSY
BELIEVES WE SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING, ESPECIALLY IF WE CAN GET
IN OUR WORD JUST PRIOR TO AMMAN VISIT OF UAR FONMIN
RIAD. RIAD IS EXPECTED ARRIVE ANY DAY.
ODELL
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
STATE
WH
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
9
R 141400Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
Control: 3225Q
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 548
BT
Recd : 14 July 70
SECRET AMMAN 3291
10:58 a.m.
NODIS
DEPT PASS OTHER POSTS
REF ANNAN 2984
Wd hl 706 OL.
SUBJ SLIGHT CHANGE IN JORDANIAN ATTITUDES RE USG PEACE
INITIATIVE
1. CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT ZAID RIFAI ON JULY 14 EXHIBITED QUIET
CONFIDENCE TO EMBOFF (DRAPER) THAT REGIME WAS NOW RPT NOW IN
MORE ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION VIS-A-VIS FEDAYEEN AS RESULT RECENT
NEGOTIATIONS. FACT THAT HE DID NOT RPT NOT UNDERESTIMATE SERIOUS-
NESS OF PROBLEMS REMAINING, OR THE DANGEROUS FACTIONALISM WITHIN
THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, LENT AUTHORITY TO HIS WORDS. IN SHORT,
HE DID NOT RPT NOT CLAUT VICTORY, RATHER ONLY A COMPROMISE
SETTLEMENT FROM WHICH THE REGIME EVENTUALLY SHOULD EMERGE
STRONGER.
2. EMBOFF ASKED WHETHER THIS MORE CONFIDENT APPRAISAL OF SITUATION
MIGHT AFFECT JORDANIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS USG PEACE INITIATIVES.
ZAID INDICATED THAT HE PERSONALLY SENSED THAT JORDAN COULD NOW
RPT NOW AFFORD TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER,
THAT JORDAN WOULD NOT RPT NOT DETERMINE ITS POSITION UNTIL
HAR FONMIN RIAD ARRIVED IN AMMAN TO CONSULT WITH THE JORDANIANS
BOUT DECISIONS REACHED IN MOSCOW BETWEEN NASSER AND THE
RUSSIANS. HE ADDED ME FELT ONE COULD TAKE SOME MODEST ENCOURAGE-
MENT FROM FACT THAT NO RPT NO CLEAR-CUT STATEMENTS HAD YET COME
FROM NASSER WHILE HE WAS IN MOSCOW; AND WITHOUT MAKING CLEAR
HIS REASONS, ZAID REFLECTED THAT NASSER STAYING AS LONG AS HE
HAD IN MOSCOW WAS POSSIBLY A HOPEFUL SIGN THAT DOORS HAD NOT
BEEN CLOSED.
3. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THESE COMMENTS FROM ZAID RIFAI INDICATE
THERE MAY BE SOME LIGHT ON THE HORIZON, NOT TOO MUCH SHOULD BE
READ INTO THEM. IT WAS EVIDENT FROM HIS REMARKS THAT JORDAN WOULD
ALIGN ITSELF WITH WHATEVER FONMIN RIADA MIGHT PROPOSE. GP3
14 3.25.11.10
ODELL
BT
BECEINED
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
or
STATE
SECRET
162363
Classification
DRUNO
VOIMINY
Department of State
33฿
or
10
INDICATE:
STATES
O?
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
20ct
DISTRIBUTION
BASH IMMEDIATE STATE
ACTION:
AmEmbassy AMMAN
PM
162383
STATE:
IONROOM
HOUSE
NODIS
02:11
REF:
Amman 5511; State 161845
1.
Ambassador will wish to draw on material contained.
State REFTEL in his conversation with King. Unfortunately,
we cannot as yet give King any satisfaction re possibility
of USG grant aid. We can only tell him that we are studying
his financial problems and will try to be as responsive as
possible.
2.
Re helping King understand USG problems with regard to
military aid, we believe that King is fully conversant with
basic difficulties in locating and delivering equipment to him,
In this instance, you can assure him that we
are stretching ourselves to limit in effort to respond to his
urgent needs expeditiously. As we have informed you, 20
sorties as are scheduled in next couple of days and surface
shipments are being arranged. Top levels of USG are
DRAFTED BY:
of
DRAFTING DATE
tel. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
NEA:ARN:TWSeelye:jfo
10-1-70
22670
The Acting Secretary
CLEARANCES:
NEA: Mr. Davis
Atherton
P/M - Mr. chapmangus
DOD Gen. Brett
the
S/S Mr. Eliøt
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
2
AMMAN
Page
of telegram to
SECRET
Classification
focusing on this matter and we are doing best we can.
3)
While stressing that we are responding as rapidly as possible
to King's request, we wish to draw Embassy's attention to GOJ
equipment
propensity to make excessive military/demands in unreasonable time
frame.
ACTING SECRETARY
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC ?T 10/1/70
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
form
8.53
DS-322 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
of STATE
SECRET/NODIS
5 8 4 5
Classification
UNITED STATES of ?
Department of Siate
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
130
CHARGE TO
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
MASSACHUSETTS
OCT 70 18%
Wd
02:11
02
STATE 161845
NODIS
SUBJECT: Assistance for Jordan.
REF: Amman 5497
1. We can appreciate King's continued preoccupation
with threat from Iraq and Syria. You may inform
Rifai that we will remain alert to the need for
"psychological measures. "
2. Re King's expression of need for financial assistance,
you should know that in connection with special request
for supplemental appropriation we are proposing $30 million
of MAP Grant assistance to Jordan. This should not r-pt
not be communicated to GOJ as yet since this is still
only in form of request. However, you may inform
DRAFTED BY:
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rel. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
TASK FORCE: TWSeelye : dmk
10/1/70
21035
NEA - Joseph J. Sisco
CLEARANCES:
NEA/P - Mr. Smithî.
NEA/P 00.15 Mr. King
(info)
S/S - Mr. Eliot
PM/MAS - Mr. Chapman?
NEA/ARP se Mr. Murphy
SECRET/NOPUS
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
FORM
Declassified
16-322
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF 3
SECRET/NODIS
LOIRAR
Classification
UNITED STATES OF the
Department of State
INDICATE:
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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
PAGE 2
Rifai that we are studying King's financial needs.
3. You may also inform Rifai that our Ambassador in
Kuwait has weighed in with Kuwait SXXNX Government
we have been assured that
re resumption subsidy to Jordan and
GOK has no intention of permanently terminating aid.
We are also considering
what we might do further in nudging Saudi Arabia to
make further contribution.
4. We fully concur that we should endeavor minimize
publicity re our military airlift, : particularly during
period of relief assistance. We will do our best from
this end.
END
-*IRWIN
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 10/1/70
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
CLEARANCES:
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
FORM
68
DS-322 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
RTMENT OF DTATE
SECRET/BACES
Classification
Department of State
15638₫
INDICATE:
DEPARTMENT STATES OF I
TELEGRAM
collect
9
CHARGE TO
DISTRIBUTION
SITUATION ROOM
311HM
ACTION:
AMEMBASSY AMMAN - FLASH
STATE 156384
HOUSE
'70 SE PM 7:24 24
EXPRESX NODIS
In view of statement by Field Marshall Majalani today
with regard to improved situation in the North, please
ascertain by most expeditious means status of King's
request for Israeli air strikes against Syrian förces in
BECEINED
YTIRUQ32 JAH Jordan. TA
СОЛИСІГ
END
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 9/23/70
ROGERS
DRAFTED BY:
Ml.
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED
NEA:JJSisco:bg
9/23/70
29464
CLEARANCES:
The Secretary BY: JSB
S/S Mr. Eliot
The White House
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
port
$,322
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/EXDIS
M5525V
Classification
Department of State
AMERICA Canada
TE:
states OF
TELEGRAM
LECT
ARGE TO
22SEP70 1¥15z
7
STRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
IMMEDIATE
TEL AVIV
STATE 155251
EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)
REF: State 155203
Argov delivered questions and answers at 10:30 p.m. EDT
September 21 (correcting omission in State 155203.
GP-. 3
END
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
'70 SEP 22 PM 12 12:09 ROGERS
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 9/22/70.
DRAFTED BY: Will
MELIC
CODUCIE
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
approved BY:
NEA: RALong mob
9/22/70
22120
NEA - Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
206.55
CLEARANCES:
S/S - Mr. Curran
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential IS Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
and on STATE
15521
SECRET/EXDIS
Classification
INDICATE:
UNITED STATES OF OF
Department of State
TELEGRAM
8
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
22SEP70 00 44z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: - Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
95:8 AM 22 SEP
STATE 155211
EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)
REF: AMMAN 5032
1. British have not been brought fully into the
picture at this juncture.
2. Accordingly you should attempts to put question
through
to King/as secure means as may be available.
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOU SE BY oc/T.
[ROGERS]
DRAFTED BY:
BD.
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
am
NEA: RPDavies: wjv
9/22/70
23172
NEA - Rodger P. Davies
CLEARANCES:
s/s-o: B, Flatin
SECRET. / DIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
on
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT TMENT os state
SECRET/EXDIS
Classification
UNITED STATES OF the
Department of State
155208
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
12
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN FLASH
22SEP70 05-55z 5
INFO: Amembassy LONDON FLASH
Amembassy TEL AVIV
STATE 155208
EXDIS TREAT AS NODIS
REF: Amman 4997
Appreciate your problems in communicating with Palace
We have no rpt no objection to designation of British
Ambassador as joint collector and you may SO inform
King Hussein.
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY oc/T.
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
SEP 22 AM 8:55
[ROGERS]
DRAFTED BY:
NEA/EX:RPagañelli:wjv X
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
approved BY:
9/22/70
23172
NEA - Rodger P. Davies
byf
CLEARANCES:
S/S-0: B.A. Flatin
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
fora
1-322
Declassified
68
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
State STATE
SECRET/EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)
8
Classification
5202 0
1
Department of State
SEP
INDICATE:
STATES
OF
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
WHITE
22
CHARGE TO
AM
22SEP 70 18. 37 2
DISTRIBUTION
ROOM
SS
ACTION:
AMEMBASSY, AMMAN
IMMEDIATE
INFO: AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV
IMMEDIATE
STATE 155202
EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)
1. As you have been previously informa informed the Israelis have
under active consideration the question of air and ground
action in Jordan (repeat in Jordan). We have informed them,
as previously reported to you, that the US agrees in principle
to an Israeli a operation by air and land in Jordan, subject
light
to continuing review of this matter in kgxxh of the
evolving situation. Israelis have not taken any decision and
are awaiting reply to seven questions put to us reported
SEPTEL. One question is as follows: Will the King agree
to кц request our assistance and undertake to institute
methods of communication and coordination between us?
2. We are responding to Israelis we do not know GOJ views
on this point, having as only guide exchange of messages
between Allon and Hussein and Rifai's statement to you that
ground operations are x fine in the area as long as they
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
tel. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
NEA:JJSisco:mth
9/21/70
29588
Joseph J. Sisco
ARANCES:
white Hourse
Kissingèr
s/s-o SNølly
White House on Br. Kissånger (peri
DuviesNiA
SECRET/EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1970--389-033
DIPARTMENT DE OF STATE
SECRET/EXDIS (Treat as
DIS)
Classificátión
*
UNITED STATES OF ?
Department of State
INDICATE:
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ACTION:
PAGE 2 of TEL to Amman and Tel Aviv
are not here in Jordan.
question
Please ascertain King's views on questions posed by
GOI.
NOTE: Passed White House by OC/T 9-22-70
ROGERS
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
CI LEARANCES:
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Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1970-369-833
WH
PRIARTMENT or STATE
SECRET NODIS
Classification
155499
Department of State
12
INDICATE:
UNITED STATES of
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
charge TO
22SEP70 20 25z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN
INFO: AmEmbassy LONDON
AmEmbassy MOSCOW
AmEmbassy TEL AVIV
SITUATION RO ROOM
WHITE HOUSE HOUSE
USUN STATE 155499
XXXXXXXXX NODIS
SEP 22 PM 10: 10:33 33
NODIS
REF: State 154587
1. UK Counsellor Millard, in follow up on Secretary -
Freeman conversation reported reftel, briefed Dep Asst
Sécy Davies on latest report (0630 Z 22 Sept) from UK
Ambassador Amman re King Hussein's mood and plans. UK
Ambassador reported that King more relaxed and appeared
understand nonintervention US, UK, but was still thinking
in terms of Israeli strike based on "Israeli security
By NARA, Date 10/19/2016
NLN11-86/15164 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
DECLASSIFIED
considerations". King had informed British that he would
see Soviet Ambassador morning 22 Sept.
2, King had at same time informed UK that Iraqis had
told him movement of 24 Iraqi tanks toward Jerash had been
made "to secure own flank" (against whom apparently not
LRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
tel. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
JORDAN TASK FORCE : GBrównthz
9/22/70
23172
NEA - Mr. Davies
CLEAPANCES:
RPD
JORDAN TASK FORCE: TWSeelye
S/S - Mr. Curran
Threeings Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
RTC
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1970-389-839
DEPART DEPT ENT OF STATE
SE CRET/ EXXXXIXX NODIS
Classification
*
UNITED STATES 07 the
Department of State
INDICATE:
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--2-
7
specified). King said Iraqis were still within their
regular operating area but GOJ was watching situation
carefully.
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.
YTIRU
32 LM EIAED ,10
END.
ROGERS
DRAFTED BY:
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APPROVED BY:
clearances:
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:
REPARTMENT of STATE
9
SEGRET
Classification
152449
Depariment of State
INDICATE:
of STATE AMERICA
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
17 SEP 70 05 23z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH
STATE 152449
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
NODIS
'70 SEP 17 AM 8:50
REF:
Amman Xx$54 4845
1. We concur in your assessment that no real threat exists
from Syria and, while Iraqi intervention seems more likely,
our judgment continues to be that active Iraqi military
questionable.
intervention against King
2. Obviously King wants and needs his hand held. What
you propose telling him (para 3 reftel) is entirely
You should not rpt noť altogether preclude the
appropriate.
öncoxnge
possibility of direct USG invo lvement in form
and you can be encouraging
of interdicting Syrians and Iraqis,
your
cKaxa
about the prospects for material assistance.
You may inform King that
Jordan situation is subject of high-level USG attention
DRAFTED BY:
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DRAFTING DATE
tel. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
The Seelye
NEA : TASK FORCE: TwSeelye: bdf
9/17/70
23172
NEA/TASK FORCE Talcott W. /
CLEARANCES:
NEA Mr. Sisco
LY
DECLASSIFIED
NEA Mr. Athertors
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
White House - Dr. Kissing GM
NLU11-86/15165 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
S/S MP% 0 - GerrexMabonex GMal Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
By RJ/MIH NARA, Date 10/19/2016
SECRET
Declassified
FORM
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DS-322
H V.D. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:
OF STATE
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Department of State
INDICATE:
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PAGE 2
3. RM Re para 4 reftel, you should not rpt not
discourage King from taking stern measures against
fedayeen. This is course of action for him and him 80
alone to decide. As you note, one cannot help but feel
at this juncture that unless he asserts his authority
more effectively the chances of his regime surviving are
worse than if he were to continue to cater to fedayeen,
4. We agree that you should urge King to enlist all
possible support from XXMXXX other Arab states. We recall
Nasser's reported offer of assistance to King, made during
latter's last visit to Cairo, in event King faced with
critical internal situation. We take Nasser's assurances
of material help with grain of salt but seems to us King
should at this juncture at least test Nasser's earlier
undertaking. Saudis, Moroccans, Tunisians and Lebanese
are unable to be of any tangible assistance to King in
DRAFTED BY:
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APPROVED BY:
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CUPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET/NODIS
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PAGE 3
7
current situation and their moral support would be of
marginal value. XXXX Soviets cannot be expected to
play useful role although it is our guess Soviets
probably would like to see King win out over fedayeen
in any confrontation. Best we can look for in this
respect is avoidance of Soviet involvement.
5. We wish you the best of luck in your first meeting
£ with King and believe your talk with him will be
nsefnka useful at this juncture. King, as you know,
tends to be moody and at times somewhat headstrong. In
recent months he has demonstrated lack of determination
and consistency. Your advice and counsel could be
important at this point.
END
ROGERS
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4 68
THE WHITE HOUSE Jim inddletion you
in
WASHINGTON
Hair /HAH be files mill
Attached is the
outgoning cable I cleaned &
the incoming that
proupted it,
un
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLIU11-86/15166 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
By RS Milt NARA, Date 10/19/2014
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be
declassified
Lord peroned Malone
in s/s-o /100AM-
DEPARTMENT / on STATE
SECRET
Classificati on
9/17 +gave changes
the AMERICA
Department of State
as Dr.Kissingers
TE:
GTATLS or
TELEGRAM
personal instructions.
LECT
malone asswed Lord
VICE TO
that cable will qolite
this unless he calls back.
TRIBUTION
ACTION:
AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH
7
not not
STATE
You should not ^ altogether
NODIS
preclude the
REF:
Amman 4054 4845
1. We concur in your assessment that no real threat exists
from Syria and, while Iraqi intervention seems more likely,
our judgment continues to be that active Iraqi military
questionable.
intervention against King improbatex
2. Obviously King wants and needs his hand held. What
you. propose telling him (para 3 reftel) is entirely
appropriate While you should of course not rpt not
encourage
possibility of direct USG involvement in form
and you can be
of interdicting Syrians and Iraqis
you should not document
encomaging about the prospects for material assistance.
leave the impression that he is
being left out in the cold
You may inform King that
Jordan situation is subject of high-level USG attention.
ses on
TASK FORCE: TWSeelye: 505 bdf
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?,
NEA - Mr. Atherton
White House -
S/S -
RODUES
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Classification
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13520
determined
to
be
declassified
DEPARTMENT
on
MPATE
SECRET/NODIS
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UNITED
Department of State
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AmEmbassy AMMAN
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PAGE 2
3. RM Re para 4 reftel, you should not rpt not
discourage King from taking stern measures against
fedayeen. This is course of action for him and him as
Land told malone
alone to decide. As you note, one cannot help but feel
that this
at this juncture that unless he asserts his authority
be didn't sense fixed t it though exent'd
it wake should
more effectively the chances of his regime surviving are
worse than if he were to continue to cater to fedayeen.
this as the point
4. We agree that you should urge King to enlist all
is lear
possible support from MKHMXX other Arab states. We recall
Nasser's reported offer of assistance to King, made during
latter's last visit to Cairo, in event King faced with
critical internal situation. We take Nasser's assurances
of material help with grain of salt but seems to us King
should at this juncture at least test Nasser's earlier
undertaking. Saudis, Moroccans, Tunisians and Lebanese
are unable to be of any tangible assistance to King in
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17 V.V. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OSSICE,
DIPARTMENT 8394
SECRET/NODIS
Clossilication
VIXICS or THE
Department of State
IE:
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TELIGRAM
RGE TO
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ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN
FLASH
PAGE 3
current situation and their moral support would be of
marginal value. XXXX Soviets cannot be expected to
play useful role although it is our guess Soviets
probably would like to see King win out over fedayeen
in any confrontation. Best we can look for in this
respect is avoidance of Soviet involvement.
S. We wish you the best of Luck in your first meeting
E with King and believe your talk with him will be
usefula useful at this juncture. King, as you know,
tends to be moody and at times somewhat headstrong. In
recent months he has demonstrated lack of determination
and consistency. Your advice and counsel could be
important at this point.
END
:0 GY,
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05.322
ClassificatioDeclassified
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
L-H-H
9
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF the AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
Z 162315Z SEP 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1269
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4845
4008Q
SEP 16, 7:57 PM 1970
NODIS
1. I AM NOT SURE JUST HOW SERIOUS KING'S REQUEST IS. I
CAN'T SEE ANY REAL THREAT FROM SYRIA. IT HAS VIRTUALLY
NO TROOPS (ABOUT 600 MEN IN AA UNITS) IN JORDAN PLUS
SEP 16
A SYRIAN-DIRECTED FEDAYEEN GROUP. KING IS, OF COURSE,
CONCERNED BY RADIO REPORTS THAT SYRIA IS VOCALLY
ATTACKING HIS GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE AND IS VIGOROUSLY
SUPPORTING FEDAYEEN.
2. WE HAVE ALREADY GONE THROUGH AN EXERCISE CONCERNING
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTERVENTION ABOUT TEN DAYS AGAO.
3. I THINK KING WANTS HIS HAND HELD. THIS I PROPOSE TO
DO, SUBJECT TO DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL. I'LL TELL HIM
A) THAT WE WANT A STRONG, STABLE JORDAN CAPABLE OF
MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND TAKING A LEADING PART
IN JARRING TALKS AS PRESIDENT TOLD ME IN SAN CLEMENTE,
B) THAT WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY HOSTAGE PROBLE,
C) THAT IS IS BASICLY JORDANIAN DECISION AS TO HOW
IT WILL RESTORE CENTRAL AUTHORITY, D) THAT I WANT HIS VIEWS
ON OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM WHICH I WILL PROMPTLY REPORT
TO USG, AND E) THAT I WANT TO ASSURE HIM AGAIN OF OUR
DESIRE BE HELPFUL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC AND PLITICAL MEANS.
IF NECESSARY, I WILL DISABUSE HIM OF POSSIBILITY
OF DIRECT USG INVOLVEMENT IN INTERDICTING SYRIANS AND
IRAQUIS.
4. FRANKLY, AND DESPITE ALL THE IMPLICIT DANGERS TO
HOSTAGES, I HOPE I WILL NOT BE TOLD TO DISCOURAGE HIM
FROM TAKING STERN MEASURES AGAINST FEDAYEEN. IF HE DOES
NOT, AFTER PUTTING IN OFFICE HIS OWN MILITARY, HIS
REGIME AND MODERATION WE HOPE FOR FROM JORDAN WILL BE
WEAKER THAN EVER BEFORE.
5. WE'VE TURNED OVER QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ANYONE ELSE--
ESPECIALLY IN ARAB WORLD--CAN BE OF ANY HELP. IT DOESN'T
LOOK LIKE IT. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK I SHOULD URGEHIM TO
PROTECT HIS FLANKS BY ENLISTING WHATEVER SUPPORT HE CAN
FROM OTHER ARABS. I ALSO HOPE I CANTELL HIM THAT WE
WILL BE USEFUL WITH SAUDIS, MOROCCANS, TUNISIANS, AND
LEBANESE. FURTHERMORE, WE COULD ASK OTHER EUROPEAN STATES
AND PERHAPS USSR TO FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE. DEPARTMENT'S
ADVISE REQUESTED ON THIS PARAGRAPH.
BROWN
BT
at the Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed SECRE Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Declassified
SAVIS DEPART
SECRET
WH
Classification
142836
OLLINO STATES OF
Department of State
11
INDICATE:
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ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN
IMMEDIATE
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
SEP 70 20 02z
INFO: The White House
'70 SEP PM 05
STATE 142836
NODIS
PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO
SUBJ: Possible Support for King Hussein in Event of
Confrontation with Fedayeen
REF: Amman 4216
1. Embassy should inform King Hussein that his views and
concerns contained in reftel have been received in Dept
and are under urgent consideration within USG, Strong
public warning by US has many implications which must be
carefully weighed, whether issued separately or jointly
with USSR.
2. We note King's statement that UAR has promised support
against potential opponents. Hussein may wish alert Nasser
te seriousness current situation in Jordan and urge Nasser
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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
S/S - Mr. Brewster
NLNIF -86/15167 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
By RJ /wit NARA, Date 10/19/2016
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1969-350-575
UNITED DEL STATES OF OF 8n STATE
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_________________________
do what he can to restrain Palestinian and fedayeen leaders
with whom he has influence, Less extreme fedayeen leaders
such as Arafat might try harder to control their more
undisciplined followers if encouraged to do SO by Nasser.
3. Dept also notes King's statement that Soviets have
offered to help him should he encounter difficulties. King
may wish to propose to Soviets that they make clear in
Damascus and Baghdad that Soviets would disapprove of any
possible action on part of Iraqi andSyrian troops stationed
in Jordan to make trouble for Hussein. Given leading
Soviet role in military supply picture for both countries,
Soviet word of caution might have some deterrent effect.
SON
4. In weighing King's request, it would be useful to
have Embassy's assessment of possible effect on situation of
unilateral rpt unilateral public statement by USG.
END
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TMENT or
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147107
$
of STATES AMERICA CHILD
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ACTION:
AMEMBASSY, AMMAN IMMEDIATE
'70 SEP 91 PM 56
15
INFO: AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV
USINT, CAIRO
STATE 147107
NODIS
1. While principal focus of world attention is on hijacking,
we are deeply concerned over continuing deterioration of
the situation in Jordan as a whole and in particular in
Amman. Based on your reporting it certainly appears that
King's position has been considerably weakened and that
Army on verge of taking matters in its own hands. Up to
now, we have been most reluctant to advise Hussein to take
more vigorous measures with the fedayeen. We are struck
with the fact that each crisis that has occurred has brought
Hussein's
with it a further weakening of position. Without
going to Jordanians we wish your judgment on following: If we were
to press Hussein to provoke major confrontation at. this time,
what is your assessment as to his willingness to do this.
Secondly, what would the outcome be in your judgment, arld
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PAGE 2 of TEL to AMMAN
could this be done in a way in which we would avoid any
Hussein request for direct military intervention?
2. We want Embassy's judgment immediately. Under no
circumstances discuss this matter with either Jordan
or any other government.
END
GP- 3
ROGERS
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: 68
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OF
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SECRET
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12
144458
of STATES AMER CA CALINO
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70 19 00%
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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
INFO: Amembassy BEIRUT
Amembassy JIDDA
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
Amembassy KUWAIT
SEP 3 PM 9:39
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN
USINT CAIRO
WHITE HOUSE
STATE 144458
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR SECRETARY ROGERS
NODIS
SUBJ: Missile Sites in Suez Canal Zone
REF: STATE 144257
1. You are authorized to draw on paras 15 thru 24 in reftel
(i,e. our representations to UAR ) in acquainting King Hussein
or Zaid Rifai with our conclusions regarding Soviet-UAR
missile movements to Suez standstill zone in violation stand-
still agreement. You may inform King that we have also made
representations in Moscow. You should state that we are
providing this information merely to keep King informed, but
if he feels that he can be helpful in supporting our representations
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NSA - Mr. Davies
S/S - Mr. Eliot
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2
in Cairo, we would welcome his efforts.
2. You might wish ascertain Jordanian views as to why UAR
and USSR have undertaken this activity, which is at such
variance with roles that UAR and Soviet Governments have
played in our joint effort to help Ambassador Jarring promote
agreement between the parties on the terms of a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East.
JOHNSON
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STATES or MEDICAL
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AUG
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STATE 125536
1. Jarring has asked al Farrah to confirm to him
Jordanian acceptance of Jarring statement contained in
U.S. proposal which Secretary General planning to issue,
perhaps on Wednesday. When Jarring raised this with al Farrah
instructions by
and
he said he expecting/pouch and/hoped to be in
a position to do so at that time. Suggest you talk to
Zaid Rifai or Prime Minister promptly and tell him al Farrah
needs, if pouched material does not already authorize him
to do so, to be instructed to inform Jarring orally of the
acceptance which the Jordanian Government has conveyed to
the U.S. and that goj is agreeable for the Secretary
General to issue the Jarring statement to which both the
UAR and GOJ have subscribed.
GP-3
END
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DIPARTMENT OF STATE
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Amembassy AMMAN
_________________________
STATE 123134
NODIS
SUBJECT: Jordanian Letter Containing Positive
Response to Peace Initiative
REF: Amman 3642
1. We reluctant show to others text of private GOJ
communication to us without first obtaining GOJ approval.
This should be left to GOJ for time being.
END
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mysis S/S - Mr. Levitsky
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PRPARTMENT OF STATE
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WASHINGTON HOUSE 01. SEP SEP 22. 8:55 03
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STATE 155203
EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)
REF:
STATE 155166
Following is text of questions and answers delivered to
Israeli Minister Argov at 10:30 EDT September 21:
QUOTE:
Q. Will the U.S. agrèe to approach Israel formally in
this matter?
A. We have indicated in our conversations our agreement
in principle to the operation under discussion. If
decisions are taken to conduct such an operation, they
should be on the basis of those conversations and the
fact that our common interests would be served.
Q.
Will the King agree to request our assistance and to
undertake to institute methods of communication and
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Kissinger
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coordination between us?
Л. We do not know the answer to this question. Israel is
aware of the informal exchange of messages between Deputy
Prime Minister Allon and the King which we conveyed. With
respect to ground operations, the only indication we have
of the Jordan attitude on this question was a statement by
Zaid Rifai to our Ambassador that Israeli QUOTE ground
operations are fine in the area as long as they are not
here in Jordan. UNQUOTE. We are seeking clarification
on this question from the King. Israeli air strikes have
been requested or approved on several occasions by the King.
Q.
How will the U.S. act to prevent Soviet participation
or involvement?
A.
On September 20 the U.S. Government called upon the
Soviet Government to take appropriate steps in Damascus
to bring about withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan.
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Secretary Rogers made a public statement to this
effect on September 20. We have and will continue to
make clear to the Soviets our support for Israel's
security and integrity and its right to live within
defensible borders. In the present crisis, the U.S.
has augmented the Sixth Fleet; it has also taken other
readiness measures. These clearly imply a decision not
to permit Soviet intervention against Israel in the
conditions under discussion. As for specific measures
the U.S. may take to prevent Soviet intervention, these would
depend on the circumstances and the situation that exists
at the time. We have contingency plans for these
eventualities.
Q. Is it understood that U.S. will side with us in the
international political arena including the use of the
veto in the Security Council on the grounds that the
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Syrian invasion of Jordan not only violates Jordan's
integrity but also threatens Israel's security and therefore
entitles Israel to take actions in her defense?
A.
We would be prepared to take the position publicly,
including in the Security Council, that such action by
Israel represented legitimate self-defense since the
Syrian invasion of Jordan threatened Israel's security.
While we cannot state precisely how we would vote in the
Security Council on any particular resolution in the
absence of precise knowledge of terms of that resolution,
we would be prepared to veto a resolution which condemned
Israel for this act of self-defense.
Q. Is it clear that Israel shall not be held responsible
for the fate of the hostages?
A.
The U.S. shall not hold Israel responsible for the
fate of the hostages resulting from Israeli action against
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Syrian forces in Jordan.
Q. Is it understood that U.S. public statements on
all matters pertaining to above questions shall be
made on highest levels and not lower than Secretary of
State?
A. We agree that major U.S. policy statements on this
matter would be made at the highest levels.
Q, Answers to above questions should be in the form of
a secret memorandum of understanding.
A. We believe that the oral answers to the above questions
are clear and should not be in the form of a secret
memorandum of understanding.
END
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.
(ROGERS)
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&
TEVAS
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123393
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Amembassy AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy ROME
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK
STATE 123393
NODIS
SUBJECT: US Middle East Initiative
'70 JUL 31 PM 28
situation ROOM
WHITE house
REF:
Paris 10046 (NOTAL)
1. We note expression concern by Pompidou to Ambassador
Watson that failure our initiative could produce worse
situation than before. Pompidou evoked specters of
breakdown ceasefire, military escalation in spite of
on-going political discussions, uncertainty about Soviet
good faith, trouble from Nasser and demise for Hussein
if Jerusalem problem not settled to their satisfaction,
etc.
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2.
2. In further response to Pompidou's remarks Embassy
Paris should speak along following lines at appropriate
gof level. Other addressee posts may draw on these
points if faced by similar hand wringing.
3. US initiative has come at point in evolution Arab-
Israel conflict when deterioration situation reaching
landslide proportions. Intensity of military conflict
had mounted steadily with new and most ominous note struck
by introduction of Soviet combat forcès into theater of
Arab-Israel struggle this spring, with all this implied
for Western interests in the area and in Europe itself.
Tide of radicalism in Arab World had risen, threatening
vitiate ability of Arab governments to settle on peaceful
terms. Progress on diplomatic front was barely perceptible.
Jarring's first mission had failed and Two and Four Power
efforts--while hopefully they may yet contribute to success
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of Jarring's XX second mission--were clearly inadequate
to stem political and military devolution.
4. In short, US initiative has come at critical juncture.
It is risky to make move; it is riskier to stand pat.
Obstacles ahead are formidable and there are risks in
failure. We do not believe, however, these risks are
greater than if the deterioration had been permitted to
go on without effective effort to break vicious circle
of events in area by. getting parties engaged in ceasefire
and negotiations under Jarring's auspices. Now there just
may be a way out of the vortexť of the Arab-Israel conflict.
We will be approaching our efforts to make Arab-Israel
peace a reality with full awareness of the dangers cf
failure but also an overriding appreciation of the
possibilities of success.
JOHNSON
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T
END
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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USUN
70 JUL 28 AM 9:30 30
SITUATION ROOM
WHITEHOUSE WHITE
STATE 120680
NODIS
SUBJECT: Positive GOJ Response to U.S. Peace Proposals
REF: Amman 3533 and 3534
1. In your further talks with GOJ officials on subject GOJ acceptance
our peace proposals, you should ascertain what measures Jordanians
plan to adopt re fedayeen in connection ceasefire undertaking. We
note that Al-Ahram out of Cairo contends on July 27 that fact GOJ,
unlike UARG, has never annulled original ceasefire undertaking
makes it unnecessary for GOJ take any action at this time re ceasefire.
While this no doubt intended to get GOJ off the hook view delicate
relations with fedayeen, fact remains that 3-month ceasefire
commitment applies to Jordanian-Israeli as well as UAR-Israeli
frontier.
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NEA - Mr. Atherton
NEA/UAR and Mr. Smith
W63
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S/S - MR. BREWSTER
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2. We encouraged by FonMin Atallah's view that fedayeen unlikely
make trouble (Amman 3534) but wonder whether reason for this
judgment may be that GOJ has agreed, despite its acceptance our
proposals, not RPT not to interfere with Palestinian "resistance"
activities along border. Whatever you can uncover in this regard
would be helpful. FYI. Realistically, we must recognize that
Jordan's ability to expack enforce ceasefire strictly is limited ххи
tolerance
END FYI.
END
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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN - PRIORITY
STATE 118965
TUATION ROUM
NODIS
SUBJECT: Soviet Allegations That GOJ Has Accepted Our
Political Initiative
REF: State 118624
We are frankly puzzled by Dobrynin's contention that Jordan
Government, like UAR, has accepted our political initiative,
Accordingly, Charge' should contact Zaid Rifa'i and call this to his
attention. Charge' should ask Zaid whether Jordanians have indeed
privately communicated their position to Soviets without informing
us or whether Soviets have merely assumed Jordanian acceptance.
END
ROGERS
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STATE 118624
NODIS
1.
Secretary, with Sisco and Dubs, present, saw Dobrynin
at latter's initiative to receive following oral statement,
text of which left in writing by Dobrynin. Statement
is Soviet acceptance of US peace proposal.
QTE The Soviet Union, as the Government of the United States
is well aware, from the very start of the Arab-Israeli
conflict in the Middle East has consistently sought a settle-
ment of this conflict through political means on the basis
of the UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.
With this aim in mind the Soviet Union repeatedly introduced
proposals directed towards practical implementation of this
Resolution.
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Joseph J. Sisco
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** QTE The U.S. Government declares now that it agrees
to a resumption of the mission of Ámbassador Jarring, Special
Representative of the UN Sexux Secretary General in the
Middle East. It is well known that the Soviet Government
has always insisted on the necessity of carrying out the
mission entrusted with Ambassador Jarring, that it put forward
appropriate proposals to this end and made efforts so that
his mission be effective enough.
QTE That is why the Soviet side not only holds no
objections to this effect but, on the contrary, it x reiterates
its position with regard to the necessity of resumption by
Ambassador Jarring of his mission. Positively evaluating the
possibilities in Ambassador Jarring's mission, we are ready
to go on making our contribution in the future as well so that
contacts between the sides through Jarring which could be
resumed in the nearest future could produce positive results
QTE As we know, the Governments of the UAR and Jordan
have expressed their readiness to cease fire for a definjte
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period of time if Israel also takes upon herself the same
obligation. The Soviet Government's attitude to this is
positive.
QTE Undoubtedly, the success of Ambassador Jarring's
activities requires that both sides unequivocally declare
their readiness to implement the above mentioned Rusexxx
Resolution of the Security Council in all its parts. The
Soviet side hopes that the American side is being guided by
the same motivations. The Governments of the UAR and Jordan
have repeatedly stated and are confirming now that they are
ready to implement the Resolution in all its parts. Therefere
it is necessary that Israel should also clearly state her
readiness to implement this Resolution. Otherwise the
sides would find themselves in an unequal position: one of
them does recognize the November Resolution of the Security
Council and expresses its readiness to implement it while the
other side ignores it.
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QTE are At the same time in the interests of success of
Jarring's mission it is important that he should have a
definite enough understanding as to the basis upon which
contacts should take place ЫК between the sides in search of
ways to implement the Resolution of the Security Council.
For the success of Jarring's mission first of all a
direction is required on the main questions of settlement --
the withdrawal by Israel from the Arab territories occupied
question
during the conflict of 1967, including кихą the quesiken
of secure and recognized boundaries along the lines which
existed prior to the conflict in June 1967, and the
simultaneous establishment of a just and stable peace in
the Middle East. The U.S. Government, on its part, has
also repeatedly emphasized the utmost importance of the
above-mentioned questions. Both of these questions are
organically connected with each other and should be
considered jointly. Appropriate proposals to this effect
have been put forward by the Soviet Government in the course
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of Soviet-American exchange of opinion
on June 2 and also
at the four-sided consultations in New York.
The ANKXX
Ask American side has not given so far its reply to the
above mentioned proposals --- neither in the course of bilateral
exchange of opinion nor at the four-sided consultations.
Yet these proposals are in complete conformity with the
Security Council Resolution and the Soviet Government is
expecting a reply from the U.S. Government.
QTE Parallel to the resumption of activities by
Jarring and the initiation through him of contacts between
the parties the four-sided consultations in New York should
be made more active to work out agreed
guidelines
for
Jarring. The Soviet Government on its
part will be doing its
best to facilitate it. END дих QTE.
2.
After reading above QTE Oral Statement UNQTE Dobrynin
made following additional points:
1. USSR statement has been made in expectation US will
make necessary efforts towards achieving a just political
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settlement-of Middle East peb problem and will exert its
influence upon Israel.
B.X. Soviets have taken into consideration US clarifications
that with Jarring's activities resumed, US-USSR bilateral
consultations on Middle East will continue and US will show
active and constructive approach both in Four and Two Power ***k
talks.
2. After thanking Dobrynin, Secretary recalled one of
important considerations in our proposal regarding ceasefire
was that each side would commit itself not to improve its
military position. Secretary said- we assume that a military
standstill as part of the ceasefire is also acceptable to the
Soviet Union. Dobrynin responded affirmatively adding
QTE Yes, of course UNQTE; it was his understanding that
Foreign Minister Riad's statement to the Secretary covered
this point.
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3. Secretary asked whether Soviet side saw any objections to
releasing Arab response to our initiative. Dobrynin replied
it was his understanding that UAR did not intend to publicize
its response; in any event, he suggested this matter be
raised with the Egyptians. Secretary said it would be
has helpful from our standpoint to make public simple
acceptance
of our proposal. He understood Dobrynin's
remarks to mean that pubkix publicizing response would be
acceptable to the USSR if this matter could be worked out
with the UAR. Dobrynin said that he did not anticipate
any objections from the Soviet side. Secretary added
that US would do its part in support of Jarring to bring about
a settlement, and he indicated our willingness to continue
Two and Four Power talks. Secretary said that he viewed
Sovieťs response as indication USSR was interested in a
peaceful settlement; such a settlement would be in mutual
US-USSR interest and in interest of world community.
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4. Dobrynin stressed USSR has no objections whatsoever
to having Jarring resume his mission in few days. He wanted-
to be sure that US understood that comment in Oral Statement
referring to absence of US reply to Soviet June 2nd proposals
was not meant to be a Soviet precondition for resumption
of Jarring's Mission. Dobrynin asked whether US. Government
had had any reply from Israel; Secretary indicated we would
inform Dobrynin as scon as we could regarding this question.
END
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OFFICE 969
11
SECRET
RECEIVED
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113395
JUL
15
epartment of State
34
PM
'70
$
NATIONAL SECURITY
TELEGRAM
33B
COUNCIL
GETR штол
ACTION: Amemassy AMMAN
PRIORITY
STATE 113298
NODIS
15 PM 43
SUBJECT: Charge's Meeting with King
REF: Amman 3307
We detect from your reporting that the King's tone and
mood and that of Zaid Rifai seem to be a bit better than they
have been during the recent weeks of crises. Your next
conversation, therefore, wiil afford an opportunity to bring
them back to focussing once again on efforts to achieve a
political settlement. We would suggest that you make the
following points:
A. The US. initiative represents a new opportunity based on
commitments of the parties. Our "stop-shooting and start-
talking" proposal would require Israelis to make three CC
cessions: limited rather than openhanded ceasefire, indirect
negotiations at outset, and explicit commitment to principle
of withdrawal from territories occupied during 1967 conflict,
as expressed in UN Security Council resolution of November, 19.
DRAFTED b
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Gätlerten 2
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U.S. PRINTING OFFICE 1969-350-575
STATEMENT Of 3,8 STATE
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In return, UAR and Jordan would be expected to reaffirm what
they have already told us many times ---
i.e., their commit-
ment to establish peace with Israel based on the recognition
of its right to exist within secure and recognized borders,
as also expressed in SC resolution.
B. We do not claim this proposal is the final answer. Its
purpose is to get the shooting stopped now and start the
talking now which would help to energize the major power talks
which over the past months have been proceeding more and more
in vacuo and less relevant to the views of the parties. King
therefore should understand that not only is our proposal
aimed at getting parties started on an indirect dialogue under
Jarring's auspices but he should bear in mind that we have
always said that U.S. will be in a better position to develop
more flexibility on Israeli side and to get them to take hard
and MENSSHKY necessary decisions in context of actual ongoing
talks under Jarring's auspices. We make this promise to King:
that if these talks get started US will be even more active
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diplomatically than it has in past in trying to achieve
requisite flexibility in the positions of both sides.
Therefore, he should view our proposal as one which is also
intended to breathe new life into major power talks,
particularly those between US and Soviet Union.
C. In last few weeks Sisco-Dobrynin talks have largely
focussed on full explanation of American initiative and its
relationship to future ongoing bilateral talks. Formulations
on peace given to us in June by Soviets and recently submitted
to Four Power talks represent an advance on part of USSR,
even though a very belated one. It was formulations along
these lines that we were looking for and were led to believe
would be forthcoming which led to our attempt to reflect
common US-USSR positions in October 28 document and subsequently
in closely related December 18th document dealing with
Jordanian aspect of settlement. Had these formulations come
in October, we might be in a much better position today than
we are in terms of our objective of a political settlement.
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4
Nevertheless, we took this Soviet formulation into account
in American initiative and if there is a positive reaction to
our initiative from UAR and Jordan, King should be assured
that we will try to build on these latest formulations in
regard ongoing talks with USSR.
D. You should be equally candid with King regarding possible
repercussions of a negative reaction. Regardless of all
of the speculative stories that he has read, we are still
awaiting a reply to our political initiative while continuing
our restraint with respect to military assistance for Israel.
What you conveyed to him regarding aircraft (notice we say
aircraft, do not elaborate) still stands, even in face of
increasing Soviet direct involvement and encroachments which
we do not consider purely defensive. We have also gone ahead
on Jordanian arms deal, and in this connection, you might
reflect to King our continuing confidence in him and in-his
leadership. If the reaction is negative, the options for all
concerned ---- the parties in the area as well as the major
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5
powers - - will become increasingly more circumscribed.
E. You should try to convey as best you can the firm
resolve which is reflected in this government in two ways:
our intention to exhaust all possible ways to achieve a
political solution; and our intention to remain engaged in
the area to cope with both the Soviet political and military
strategy in the area. We see a political solution as the
only sensible answer and we wish to avoid a confrontation
with the Soviet Union. However, it is well to remind all
concerned, that while we continue to consider the Arab-
difficulty
Israeli dispute as the fundamental and the
principal handle which the Soviet Union has utilized to
derive uniláteral advantage from turmoil in the area, we
nevertheless continue to have both substantian
and military assets in the area. We intend to contínue to
pursue a policy of non-provocative firmness vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union as well as flexibility in our approach to a
political settlement.
END СОЛИСӀГ СПӀДА
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DLA134
SANITIZED COPY
HAKH
Saunduz
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DE
9102 2732015
RECEIVED
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ZKZK 00 ZSL DE
0 302002Z ZYH
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1970 SEP 30 21 14
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER
EO 13526 SANITIZED 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
STATE (RCD
COMNAVINTCOM
CNO
SSO ACSI DA
SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION
AFSSO USAF
DIA/ ISIC
J CS
NIC
CIA-OCI
ZEM
SECRET
(ADVANCE)
COUNTRY: JORDAN
SUBJECT: 1. GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN PLANS FOR CONTROLLING
FEDAYEEN IN JORDAN.
2. EVIDENCE THAT FEDAYEEN INTENDED TO OVERTHROW
THE JORDANIAN REGIME.
1. HENCEFORTH THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN (GOJ) WILL DEAL
WITH ONLY ONE FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION. ALL SYRIAN AND IRAQI
FEDAYEEN, INCLUDING THOSE NOW BEING HELD BY THE JORDAN ARMY,
WULL BE DEPORTED FROM JORDAN ON THE GROUNDS THEY ARE IN THE
COUNTRY ILLEGAWLY. IN THE FUTURE THERE WILL BE RIGID CONTROLS
ON THE BORDERS AND NO ONE WILL BE ALLOWED INTO THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT PASSING THROUGH NORMAL PROCEDURES. THE FEDAYEEN
MILITIA PRESENT SOMETHING OF A SPECIAL PROBLEM IN THAT
THEY ARE NOT FULL-FLEDGED MEMBERS OF THE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS.
THEY WILL BE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN THE CITIES BUT THEIR ARMS ARE
TO BE TRANSPORTED TO THE VARIOUS GUERRILLA BASES OUTSIDE THE
CIT IES. IN THE EVENT OF A SERIOUS ISRAELY ATTACK, THE MILITIA
WILL GO TO THE BASES TO COLLECT THEIR ARMS. THEY WILL NOT BE
ALLOWED TO RETAIN THEM IN THE CITIES.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
By MIA NARA, Date 10/19/2016
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
# 12473
Declassified
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CU33ZII3U7E ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE SEVERELY CURTAILED IN THE FUTURE. OWED
GEORGE HABBASH AND 0 ERS LIKE HIM WILL NOT BE
IN JORDAN.
SANITIZED COPY
3. GOJ OFFICIALS WERE ASTONISHED AT THE EXTENT OF THE
PREPARATIONS THE FEDAYEEN HAD MADE PR IOR TO THE RECENT CIVIL
WAR IN JORDAN. THE NETWORK OF DEFENSES WITH CONCRETE BUNKERS
AND UNDERGROUND HEADQUARTERS, PARTICULARLY ON JEBAL HUSAYN,
FOUND BY THE JORDAN ARMY, PLUS THE VERY DETAILED PLANS AND
REPORTS THE FEDAYEEN HAD ON EVERY ARMY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
FORCE INSTALLATION IN AMMAN, CONVINCED GOJ OFFICIALS THAT THE
FEDAYEEN WERE BENT ON OVERTHROWING THE REGIME. ONE MAP WHICH
WAS CAPT URED DURING THE BATTLE SHOWED THE LOCATION OF EVERY
GUARD POST AND EVERY DEFENSIVE WEAPON DEPLOYED AROUND THE
J ORDANIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS. IN THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE
OUTBREAK OF HOST IL IT IES, THE FEDAYEEN WERE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE
IN TAKING UP POSITIONS IN STRATEGIC LOCATIONS IN THE CITY OF
AMMAN. AMONG THE PHOTOS CAPTURED BY THE ARMY WERE VERY
DETAILED AND PROFESSIONALLY PREPARED DAILY SITUATION REPORTS
SHOWING THE STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF ARMY FORCES IN AND AROUND
AMMAN. (
ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT SHOW INFORMATION
INDICATING THE FEDAYEEN INTENDED TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON
SANITIZED
THE GOJ AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME, GIVEN THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE
THIS WAS CERTAINLY THEIR LONG-RANGE INTENTION.)
3.3(6)(1)
4. CASUALTIES, INCLUDING BOTH DEAD AND WOUNDED, DURING
THE RECENT CRISIS PROBABLY TOTAL LESS THAN 2,000.
AS OF 27 SEPTEMBER THE CIVIL DEFENSE AUTHORITIES HAD RECORDED
SOME 476 DEAD AND 360 WOUNDED. THESE CASUALTIES CAME FROM
ONLY THE JEBAL HUSAYN AND JEBAL LUWEBDAH AREAS.
A ROUGH ESTIMATE OF TOTAL CASUALTIES MIGHT BE POSSIBLE BY
DOUBLING THESE FIGURES.)
5.
STATE ARMY CINCMEAFSA
GP-1
500
9102
650
50
730
SEGRET
NNNN
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SCORET
DLA088
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
00
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
DE
9027 2730155
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK 00 ZSL DE
RECEIVED
WHCA
0 292252Z ZYH
FM CIA
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER
1970 SEP 30 02 27
STATE (RCD
COMNAVINTCOM
CNO
SSO ACSI DA
SSO AHS, VIRGINIA
AFSSO USAF
DIA/ ISIC
JCS
NIC
CIA-OCI
ZEM
SECRET
COUNTRY: JORDAN CHINA
SUBJECT: INDICATION OF COMMUNIST CHINESE PRESENCE IN JORDAN TO
SUPPORT COMMANDOS
1. IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1970, THE JORDANIAN ARMY CAPTURED TWO
COMMUNIST CHINESE AND THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THREE OR FOUR MORE
CHINESE WERE "ON THE R JN." THE ARMY IS CURRENTLY SEARCHING FOR
THE ESCAPEES.
ALTHOUGH OTHER DETAILS OF THE
CAPT JRE WERE NOT SPECIFIED, THE JORDANIAN ARMY PRESUMABLY
ARRESTED THE CHINESE BECAUSE OF THEIR ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMANDOS
IN JORDAN.)
2 CHEADOUARTERS COMMENT: IN MID-MAY 1970.
WAS TOLD BY AN UNIDENT IFIED PALESTINIAN COMMANDO LEADER THAT THE CHIN-
ESE COMM JNISTS WERE ASSISTING THE PALESTINIAN COMMANDOS. THE COMMANDO
LEADER CLAIMED THAT COMMUNIST CHINESE PERSONNEL WERE LOCATED IN JORDAN
VALLEY WITH COMMANDO UNITS.
THE CHINESE
INFILTRATED JORDAN FROM "THE MUSCAT AREA" AND CAME DISGUISED AS TRADERS
AND BUSINESSMEN. THE COMMANDO LEADER CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN SEVEN CHIN-
ESE IN THE JORDAN VALLEY AREA, AND INFERRED THAT THE CHINESE WERE SERV-
ING AS INSTRUCTORS TO THETCOMMANDOS.
3.
GP-1
302
9027
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
SANITIZED
NLN11-79/12474
at the Nixon Presidential HNARA, see
3.3(b)(1)
7/12/2012
#12474
Hr.
Date
10/19/2016
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CU3341134
SANITIZED COPY
PRIORITY
SANITIZED
INTE
STATENCE
3.3(b) (1)
CENTRAL
AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
IN 166586
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
AME BIL >
STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS XXXXXXXX XXXXXXX
DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS
EXO DDI
This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Esplanage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP
Excluded from automatic
dewngreding and declassification
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
19SEP 70 20 482
DIST 19 SEPTEMBER 1970
COUNTRY JORDAN
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
SUBJECT SUSPICION OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN SENIOR JORDANIAN OFFICIALS
AND `FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN
1. RESPONSIBLE JORDANIAN LEADERS, INCLUDING KING
HUSAYN, ARE SUSPICIOUS THAT SEVERAL SENIOR JORDANIAN ARMY
OFFICERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONSPIRING
WITH THE FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP TO BRING ABOUT THE OVERTHROW OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN (GOJ). ONE OF THE SUSPECTS IS FORMER
PRIME MINISTER 'ABD AL-MUNIM RIFA'I, MAINLY BECAUSE HE PERMITTED
THE SITUATION TO DRIFT INTO CHAOS RATHER THAN TAKE FIRM MEASURES
AGAINST FEDAYEEN LAWLESSNESS EARLIER.
5
2. ANOTHER HIGH OFFICIAL WHO IS UNDER SUSPICION IS
4
3
2
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem controls)
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
Reproduced at the Nix ibrary 3. 3(b)(1) Hr. 7/12/2012
SANITIZED COPY
#12475
Declassified MIH NARA, Date 10/19/2016
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
IN 166586
SANITIZED
SANITIZED COPY
3.3(6)(1)
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
SECRET
(classification)
JORDANIAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL MASHUR HADITHA
AL-JAZI. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE ARMY
AND THE FEDAYEEN, IT APPEARED THAT THE FEDAYEEN KNEW. THE
ARMY'S MILITARY PLANS AND THUS WERE ABLE TO COUNTER SUCCESSFULLY
ANY ARMY EFFORT. BECAUSE OF THIS, ALL ARMY PLANS WERE SCRAPPED
AND NEW ONES WERE DEVISED AND PUT INTO EFFECT.
3. A BORAD OF INQUIRY WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO INVESTIGATE
THESE MATTERS AND SHOULD FACTS INDICATING A CONSPIRACY COME
TO LIGHT, ARRESTS WILL BE MADE AND THOSE SUSPECTED WILL BE
BROUGHT TO TRIAL.
4.
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
SECRET
(classification)
086/10/5190
SANITIZED.COPY
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CU3O21133
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
HAK SANITIZED
SANITIZED COPY
Polestinians sending
3.3(6)(1)
NNNN
representative to west
DLA444
SECRET
Germany to work out
segarate deal on release
3163 2611715
1970
ZNY MMORN
of hostages. 52
0 181700Z ZYH
FM CIA
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
DEPT OF STATE RCI
ZENDEPT OF ARMY
ZENDEPT OF STATE OCT
ZEWDIRECTOR FBI
ZEIV FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY
HK
CIA-OCI
ZEM
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE CATTN: SECRET SERVICE/ ID; TREASURY/ SAED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE RCI
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (SY)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY (SE-1)
DEPARTMENT OF ARMY AOC/ GRID SQUARE STAFF
COUNTRY: JORDAN UNITED KINGDOM WEST GERMANY
SUBJECT : PLANS OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT LONDON
AND BONN TO DISCUSS THE RELEASE OF ARAB PRISONERS
1.
GAZSAUDO
THE PALESTINIAN RED HALF MOON ORGANIZATION GOT IN TOUCH WITH
THE EMBASSY TO SAY THAT HE WAS LEAVING FOR LONDON ON 17
SEPTEMBER. HIS PURPOSE WAS TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL DETAILS
CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF TWO ARABS UNDER ARREST THERE. HE
INQUIRED WHETHER HE COULD GO TO BONN ON 18 OR 19 SEPTEMBER
TO DISCUSS THE RELEASE OF THE ARABS IMPR ISONED IN WEST GERMANY.
HE PROPOSED THAT HE SHOULD TALK WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY.
SPD GENERAL
MANAGER HANS JUERGEN W ISCHNEWSKIIS IN AMMAN AS
AN UNOFFICIAL EMISSARY.)
2.
GP-1
220.
8163
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
79/12476 7/12/2012
By N IMIH NARA, Date 10/19/2016
NNNN
REGRET
DEUILT.
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential OPY Library
#12476
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ARTMENT of STATE
SECRET/NODIS
Classification
152501
$
UNITED STATES OF ?
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
9 with
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
17SEP70 14 1 58 z 2
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV
STATE 152501
NODIS
SEP 02.
In Deptel 152449 we asked you to indicate general sympathetic
approach to possible requests from King for ma terie Paid.
00 1008 NO SITUA
WHITE HOUSE
Now that he has moved you can be more explicit. Indicate
we viewing his efforts sympathetically and would be prepared
be responsive to
if he sees need requests for
resupply or any special equipment needed.
GP-3
END
ROGERS
Note: Passed White House by OC/T,
DRAFTED 5Y:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL EXT.
NEA: JJSisco:slb M
ASP/R3 VEH Theodore L. Eliot
Jr.
9/17/70
29588
CLEARANCES:
NEA/ARN:TWSeelye
White Hoûse Gen. Haig (substance)
xâxâx
SECRET NODIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SANITIZED COPY
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
SANITIZED
ELLIGENCE
SPINE
PRIORITY
CENTRAL
AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
IN 163014
SNIDICAL
PAGE 1 OF 10 PAGES
DIA
NMCC/MC
ARMY
NAVY
AIR)
CIA/NMCC
SDO
DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS
STATE/DIR NIC(
ONLY) EXO DDI D/ONE
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the
transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person Is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
demingrading and declassification
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
151634Z
DIST
15 SEPTEMBER 1970
COUNTRY
JORDAN
SUBJECT
PRIME MINISTER ABD-AL-MUNIM RIFA'I'S VIEWS AND ACTIONS REGARDING
KING HUSAYN'S INTENTION TO BRING JORDAN ARMY INTO AMMAN
TO STATE:
NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO DR. CLINE
TO DIA:
EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL BENNETT
TO NMCC/MC:
EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL MCCHRISTIAN;
NAVY ACNO (INTEL), ADMIRAL HARLFINGER;
AIR FORCE AFNIN, GENERAL TRIANTAFELLU
TO NSA:
EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL GAYLER
CADVANCE COPIES TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE
ADDRESSEES SPECIFIED ABOVE.)
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem controls)
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
SANITIZED Reproduced at the Nixon NLN 10-79/12477 Presidential Library NARA, 3.3(b)(1) Date 10/19/2016 Hr. 7/12/2012
#12477
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SANITIZED
SANITIZED COPY
IN
163014
3.3(b)(1)
PAGE 2 OF 10PAGES
S-E-C-R-E-T
(classification)
(aissem CONTROLS)
COUNTRY: JORDAN
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER ABD-AL-MUNIM RIFA'I'S VIEWS AND ACTIONS
REGARDING KING HUSAYN'S INTENTION TO BRING JORDAN ARMY
INTO AMMAN.
1.
KING HUSAYN'S
JUDGMENT AS OF 12 SEPTEMBER THAT THE JORDAN ARMY WOULD TAKE MATTERS
INTO ITS OWN HANDS IF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT
AND THE FEDAYEEN RESTRICTING FEDAYEEN PRESENCE AND BEHAVIOR IN
URBAN CENTERS WAS NOT SATIFACTORILY IMPLEMENTED. IT ALSO REPORTED
THE KING'S BELIEF THAT THE FEDAYEEN WERE PROBABLY INCAPABLE OR
UNWILLING TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT IN A SATISFACTORY FASHION.
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
3.3(b)(1)
IN
163014
PAGE 3 OF 10 PAGES
S-E-C-R-E-T
(classification)
(dissem controls)
AS A RESULT, THE KING PLANNED TO BRING THE ARMY INTO AMMAN ON
A STRICTLY LAW ENFORCEMENT BASIS TO INSURE THAT LAW AND ORDER
WERE MAINTAINED AND TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT. IN CONJUNCTION
WITH THIS THE KING PLANNED TO MAKE WHATEVER SHIFTS IN THE CABINET
WHICH PRIME MINISTER ABD-AL-MUNIM RIFA'I THOUGHT WERE NECESSARY
TO INSURE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THIS MOVE, INCLUDING THE ADDITION
OF EX-PRIME MINISTER WASFI TAL, A KNOWN HARD-LINER REGARDING THE
FEDAYEEN, IN SOME MINISTERIAL POST.)
2. THE KING'S PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED TO PRIME MINISTER RIFA'I
THE EVENING OF 12 SEPTEMBER. RIFA'I DID NOT DISAGREE THAT FIRMER
MEASURES, INCLUDING THE USE OF FORCE, MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT
THE AGREEMENT WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND THAT CERTAIN CABINET CHANGES,
INCLUDING THE ADDITION OF TAL, MIGHT BE NECESSARY. HE ADMITTED THAT
FEDAYEEN PROMISES HAD FREQUENTLY PROVED HOLLOW AND THAT THE DIALOGUE
WITH THE FEDAYEEN HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY STERILE. HE CITED, AS A
RECENT EXAMPLE OF THIS, GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE
FEDAYEEN TO EVACUATE CERTAIN BUILDINGS THEY OCCUPIED IN AMMAN
WHICH WERE ADJACENT TO GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS. THE FEDAYEEN HAD
REPLIED THEY WOULD EVACUATE THEIR BASES IF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD
EVACUATE THE ADJACENT OFFICES. ON ANOTHER POINT THE FEDAYEEN
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CU3541134
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
3.3(6)(1)
IN
163014
PAGE 4 OF 10PAGES
1-3-8-0-7-S
(classification)
(dissem controls)
REGULARLY REQUESTED THE FIRING OF A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT AND
MILITARY OFFICIALS WHOM THEY CONSIDERED OPPOSED TO THE FEDAYEEN
MOVEMENT. AS A TACTICAL RESPONSE TO THESE REQUESTS, RIFA'I HAD
ASKED FOR THE REMOVAL OF A NUMBER OF EXTREMIST FEDAYEEN LEADERS
AND ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS GEORGE HABBASH AND THE POPULAR FRONT
FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP ) AND NA' IF HAWATHMAH AND
THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE
(PDFLP). THE FEDAYEEN REPLIED THAT THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE; THE
FORMER WERE TRAITORS AND THE LATTER WERE PATRIOTS. AS ANOTHER
EXAMPLE OF THE STERILITY OF THE DIALOGUE, RIFA'I SAID THAT HE
HAD WARNED THE FEDAYEEN THAT IF THEY DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
AGREEMENT WHICH THEY HAD SIGNED, THE KING WOULD BE COMPLETELY
JUSTIFIED IN USING FORCE AGAINST THEM. THE FEDAYEEN RESPONSE
TO THIS HAD BEEN THAT IF THEY WERE NOT KILLED TODAY, THEY WOULD
BE KILLED TOMORROW, AND IF THEY WERE NOT KILLED BY THE JORDANIANS,
THEY WOULD BE KILLED BY THE ISRAELIS, AND IT MADE LITTLE DIFFERENCE
TO THEM WHICH OF THESE ALTERNATIVES OCCURRED. DESPITE THE
DIFFICULTIES IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE FEDAYEEN, RIFA'I TOLD THE
KING THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE FEDAYEEN WANTED A CONFRONTATION,
WHICH WOULD PROBABLY DESTROY THEM AND THAT HE WOULD, THEREFORE,
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
IN
163014
3.3(b)(1)
PAGE 5 OF 10PAGES
S-E-C-R-E-T
(classification)
(dissem controls)
LIKE ONE MORE CHANCE TO MEET WITH THEM TO SEE IF HE COULD NOT
OBTAIN THEIR AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE RECENT AGREEMENT. RIFA'I
SAID ANOTHER REASON HE WANTED ONE MORE CHANCE AT THIS WAS
THAT HE BELIEVED THE UTILIZATION OF MORE FORCEFUL MEASURES AGAINST
THE FEDAYEEN HAD MORE CHANCE OF SUCCESS IF IT OCCURRED AFTER THE
PRESENT CRISIS HAD ABATED AND MUTUAL TENSIONS HAD DIMINISHED. THE
KING AGREED BUT TOLD RIFA'I THAT THIS WOULD BE THE LAST CHANCE.
3. RIFA'I, A FEW MINISTERS, AND CHIEF OF PUBLIC SECURITY
1
MET WITH THE FEDAYEEN LEADERS ON 13 SEPTEMBER. RIFA'I TOLD THE
FEDAYEEN THAT UNLESS IMMEDIATE STEPS WERE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT
THE AGREEMENT, HE WOULD STEP DOWN FROM THE PREMIERSHIP AND
OTHERS WHO WOULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM MORE EFFECTIVELY WOULD
REPLACE HIM. HE WARNED THAT THIS WOULD INEVITABLY INVOLVE THE
USE OF FORCE. THE FEDAYEEN REPLIED WITH THEIR USUAL COUNTER-
ARGUMENTS. WHEN RIFA'I THREATENED TO CLOSE THE MEETING AND REPORT
THEIR RESPONSE TO THE KING, THEY BACKED DOWN A BIT AND ASKED
WHAT PRECISELY IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT WANTED THEM TO DO AS OF THAT
MOMENT. RIFA'I LISTED THE FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH HE WANTED
IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY:
A. THE EVACUATION OF FIVE FEDAYEEN BASES ON JEBAL AMMAN
SECRET
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
STTZCC
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
3.3(b)(1)
IN
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PAGE 6 OF 10PAGES
S-E-C-R-E-T
(classification)
(dissem controls)
LOCATED NEAR GOVERNMENT OFFICES.
B. THE CESSATION OF FEDAYEEN PROPAGANDA ATTACKS ON THE
GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIME.
C. THE ELIMINATION OF ALL ARMED FEDAYEEN ON THE STREETS
OF AMMAN AND THE REMOVAL OF ALI. ROAD BLOCKS IN THE AREA.
D. THE CONVENING OF THE JOIN" GOVERNMENT-FEDAYEEN
COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE SYS EMATIC ELIMINATION OF ALL
FEDAYEEN BASES IN AMMAN.
THE FEDAYEEN LEADERS AGREED. IN TE PRESENCE OF THOSE ASSEMBLED
THE FEDAYEEN SUMMONED THE EDITOR OF THE AL-FATAH NEWSPAPER AND
THE DIRECTOR OF BROADCASTING FOR THE PALESTINE LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION AND INSTRUCTED THEM TO CEASE ALL PROPAGANDA AND
OTHER ATTACKS AGAINST JORDANIA AUTHORITIES. THEY ALSO FORMED
A JOINT CONTINGENT OF FEDAYEE AND SECURITY OFFICIALS UNDER THE
DIRECTION OF THE DIRECTOR OF FABLIC SECURITY WHICH PROCEEDED TO
THE FIVE FEDAYEEN BASES CITED ,Y RIFA'I AND EVACUATED ALL PERSONNEL.
THEY THEN TELEPHONED THE PALESTINE ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND
AND ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO INFORM ALL FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS
TO REMOVE ROAD BLOCKS AND TE PRESENCE OF ARMED FEDAYEEN ON
THE STREETS. FINALLY, THEY ARRANGED A MEETING BETWEEN THE
-SECRET
SANIZED.SANITIZED
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SANITIZED
SANITIZED COPY
3.3(6)(1)
IN 163014
PAGE 7 OF 10 PAGES
S-E-C-R-E-T
(classification)
(dissem controls)
FEDAYEEN AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES LATER IN THE DAY TO
WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTING THE REMAINING PROVISIONS
OF THE AGREEMENT.
4. THE EVENING OF 13 SEPTEMBER, RIFA'I RETURNED TO THE
KING TO REPORT THE DAY'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS. THE FOLLOWING
ROYAL ADVISORS ATTENDED THE MEETING: PRINCE MUHAMMAD, CHIEF
OF THE ROYAL DIWAN ZAYD RIFA'I, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE KING
FIELD MARSHAL HABIS AL-MAJALI, EX-PRIME MINISTER WASFI TAL,
AND A MEMBER OF THE NEWLY-FORMED PRIVY COUNCIL, AHMAD TARAWANAH.
RIFA'I DELIVERED HIS REPORT, BUT ALL OF THE ADVISORS CONSIDERED
IT INSUFFICIENT IN TERMS OF FEDAYEEN PERFORMANCE TO WARRANT
ANY ALTERATION IN THE KING'S ORIGINAL PLAN TO BRING IN THE ARMY.
TAL WAS PARTICULARLY FORCEFUL IN INSISTING THAT THERE WAS NO
ALTERNATIVE TO WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS ADOPTING IMMEDIATELY A
"RED EYE" POLICY UNDER A "RED EYE" GOVERNMENT. THE MAJOR
ARGUMENT OF THE ADVISORS WAS THAT PAST EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN
THAT FEDAYEEN PROMISES WERE MEANINGLESS, THAT THEIR GESTURES
AT IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS WERE SUPERFICIAL AND THAT THIS WOULD
PROVE NO DIFFERENT. THEY, THEREFORE, URGED THAT THE KING PROCEED
WITH HIS ORIGINAL PLAN. RIFA'I REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT DEFEND
S.E.C.R.E.T
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CU3321134
SANITIZED
SANITIZED COPY
3.3(b)(1)
IN 163014
PAGE 8 OF 10 PAGES
S-E-C-R-E-T
(classification)
FEDAYEEN PROMISES OR PERFORMANCE: AND THAT HE WAS NOT OPPOSED
IN PRINCIPLE TO THE KING'S PLAN; HE COULD ONLY ARGUE THE WISDOM
OF THE TIMING. HE SAID HE FELT THAT HE COULD PROBABLY NEGOTIATE
A TEMPORARY RETURN TO NORMALCY WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE KING AND
OTHERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO THINK THROUGH THEIR PLANS AND THEIR
MOVES IN A NON-CRISIS ATMOSPHERE AND IMPLEMENT THEM, IF
NECESSARY, UNDER MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS. AFTER MUCH
DEBATE BETWEEN RIFA'I AND THE KING'S ADVISORS, THE KING
AGREED TO GIVE RIFA'I "A FEW MORE DAYS" TO SEE IF FURTHER
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED.
5. IN THE MIDST OF THIS RECONCILIATION EFFORT, ARMY UNITS
IN THE IRBID AREA ATTACKED AND KILLED A NUMBER OF FEDAYEEN.
THE FEDAYEEN CENTRAL COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, YASIR ARAFAT, IMMEDIATELY
PROTESTED TO RIFA'I, PLACING THE BLAME FOR THE FAILURE OF
ANY RECONCILIATION ON ANTI-FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS IN THE ARMY. AFTER
SOME DISCUSSION, RIFA'I AND ARAFAT AGREED THAT THE INCIDENT
SHOULD BE CONTAINED. RIFA'I AGREED TO ISSUE A GOVERNMENT STATE-
MENT REGRETTING THE INCIDENT AND PROMISING AN INVESTIGATION.
ARAFAT EXPLAINED THAT THESE INCIDENTS UNDERMINED HIM WITHIN
THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND SEVERELY RESTRICTED HIS ABILITY TO
S-E-C-R-E-T
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order been determined to be declassified
CU3321134
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
3.3(b)(1)
IN 163014
PAGE 9 OF10 PAGES
S-E-C-R-E-T
(classification)
(dissem controls)
COME TO ANY AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND STILL RETAIN ANY
INFLUENCE WITH THE OTHER FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER, HE
AGREED TO CONTINUE WITH. THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FURTHER COMMITTEE
MEETINGS TO IMPLEMENT THE BASIC AGREEMENT. A FEW SUBSEQUENT
CLASHES BETWEEN THE ARMY AND, FEDAYEEN HAVE SPOILED THE ATMOSPHERE
SOMEWHAT, BUT RIFA'I AND ARAFAT ARE STILL IN AGREEMENT THAT
THESE INCIDENTS SHOULD BE CONTAINED AND THAT THE ACCORD TO
PURSUE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASIC AGREEMENT CONTINUE. RIFA'I
IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS POLICY WILL RESULT IN
MAINTENANCE OF THE OVER-ALL CEASE-FIRE AND ACHIEVE A TEMPORARY
NORMALIZATION OF THE SITUATION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE
IS WORRIED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MORE HAWKISH OF THE KING'S
ADVISORS COULD STILL INDUCE THE KING TO BRING IN THE ARMY
ON short NOTICE.
6.
WHILE RIFA'I WAS WILLING TO FAVORABLY
CONSIDER A SHUFFLE IN THE CABINET WHICH WOULD INCLUDE WASFI TAL,
PRIOR TO RIFA' I'S MEETING WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND LATER
WITH THE KING AND HIS ADVISORS ON 13 SEPTEMBER, HE IS LESS
INCLINED TO DO so FOLLOWING THESE MEETINGS. HIS REASONS ARE
TWO-FOLD: FIRST, HE FELT THAT THE FEDAYEEN DID MAKE SOME
TANGIBLE CONCESSIONS IN HIS 13 SEPTEMBER MEETING WITH THEM.
S-E-C-R-E-T
SANITIZED.COPY
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CU3321134
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IN
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S-E-C-R-E-T
(classification)
(dissem controls)
SECONDLY, HE WAS QUITE SHOCKED BY TAL'S AGGRESSIVENESS
ON THE SUBJECT OF A HARD-LINE POLICY WHICH GAVE RIFA'I SECOND
THOUGHTS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT HE COULD COOPERATE WITH TAL IN
THE SAME CABINET. RIFA'I FEARS THAT TAL'S REPUTATION AS AN
ANTI-FEDAYEEN POLITICIAN AND THE POOR FAVOR IN WHICH HE IS
HELD IN CAIRO, DAMASCUS AND' BAGHDAD COULD TRIGGER A
CONFRONTATION BY THE MERE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS APPOINTMENT
TO THE GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY WHEN TENSIONS AND SUSPICIONS
ARE ALREADY so HIGH. ONE REASON FOR THE KING'S DESIRE TO
INCLUDE TAL IN A CABINET IS TO PLACATE THE ARMY. TAL IS
POPULAR WITH THE ARMY AND THE KING FEELS THAT HIS PRESENCE
IN THE GOVERNMENT COULD PROVIDE THE ARMY WITH SUFFICIENT
ASSURANCES TO CALM. THEM. RIFA'I BELIEVES THAT IF THE
KING GOES AHEAD WITH HIS PLAN, HE WOULD REPLACE CHIEF OF STAFF
MASHUR HADITHA AL-JAZI WITH FIELD MARSHAL HABIS AL-MAJALI, A
LOYAL BUT RELATIVELY IMCOMPETENT OLD-LINE BEDOUIN OFFICER.
MAJALI WOULD SERVE MAINLY AS A FRONT MAN AND THE ARMY WOULD
PROBABLY BE RUN BY THE PRESENT DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS
SHARIF ZAYD BIN SHAKIR.)
7.
REPORT CLASS SECRET
S-E-C-R-E-T
886/10/5190
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential COPY Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-79 [ID: 12478]
(2 pp.)
EXEMPTED per 3.5(d); ltr. 7/12/2012
3 3(b)(1)
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
224
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB /mith
11/7/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321136
SANITIZED COPY
EO SANITIZED
ELLIGENCE
PRIORITY
calls
CENTRAL
AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
IN 155625
ANERICA
PAGE 1:OF 2 PAGES
STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS XXXXXXXX
DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS
EXO DDI
OER OSR
transmission This material or contains revelation Information of which affecting In any the manner National to an Defense unauthorized of the United States is exchibited within the hu meaning low of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs, 793 and 794, the
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
DIST 3 SEPTEMBER 1970
COUNTRY JORDAN/IRAQ/ARAB STATES
03 17 SEP 70
SUBJECT ORDERS FROM BAGHDAD PLACING IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN UNDER THE
COMMAND OF FATAH LEADER YASIR ARAFAT
1. ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1970, THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE IRAQI FORCES
IN JORDAN, COLONEL FARUQ AL- HARIRI, SAID HE HAD JUST RECEIVED
ORDERS FROM BAGHDAD STATING THAT IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN ARE UNDER
THE COMMAND OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION CHAIRMAN AND FATAH
LEADER YASIR ARAFAT AND THAT HARIRI SHOULD ACCEPT NO ORDERS
FOR WITHDRAWAL OR ENGAGEMENT, EXCEPT FROM BAGHDAD OR ARAFAT.
2. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE ABOVE ORDERS ARE A FURTHER REFLECTION
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
Hr.7/12/2012
By RJ 1milt NARA, Date 10/19/2016
SECRET
(classification)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
#12479
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321136
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
IN 155625
3.3(b)(1)
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem controls)
OF IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT THE DECISION OF THE 5-6 AUGUST TRIPOLI
CONFERENCE AT WHICH THE UNIFIED ARAB COMMAND WAS DISSOLVED AND ALL
FOREIGN TROOPS IN THE THREE FRONTS (SYRIA, JORDAN AND UAR) WERE PLACED
UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE HOST COUNTRY. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ONLY THE
PLA FORCES ATTACHED TO THE IRAQI ARMY WERE COVERED BY THIS ORDER SINCE
THE PLA FORCES ARE TECHNICALLY UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE PLO.)
3.
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem contro
0615/01/225
Reproduced at
WILZED COPY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321137
DLA795 SANITIZED COR SECRET
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
SANITIZED
1467 2441405
ZNY MMORN
EYES ONLY,
RECEIVED
, 011400Z ZYH ZFF1
FM CIA
RECEIVED
WHCA
TO
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE, SAN CLEMENTE
ZEM
SECRET
15 02
SENIOR COMMUNICATION: OFFICER PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
TO RICHARD HELMS AND DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER IN A SEALED ENVELOPE
MARKED EYES ONLY.
MESSAGE FOLLOWS:
SECRET
DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1970
COUNTRY: JORDAN UAR/ USSR
SUBJ ECT: / KING HUSAYN' S INTENTIO TO INTERVENE WITH PRESIDENT NIXON
ON BEHALF OF UAR PRESIDENT NASIR AT NASIR' S REQUEST
TO DC I: EXCLUSIVE FOR RICHARD HELMS
WHITE HOUSE: ATTENTION DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, THE ASSISTANT
TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO DR. RAY S. CLINE
TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL BENNETT
TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL MCCHRISTIAN;
NAVY ACNO (INTEL), ADMIRAL HARLFINGER;
AIR FORCE AFNIN, GENERAL TRIANTAFELLU
TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL GAYLER
1. DURING KING HUSAYN' S VISIT TO CAIRO 20-23 AUGUST 1970, UAR PRESIDEN
JAMAL ABD- AL- NASIR ASKED THE KING TO INTERCEDE WITH PRESIDENT NIXON
ON NASIR' S BEHALF TO REASSURE PRESIDENT NIXON THAT NASIR WAS PREPARED
TO COMMIT HIMSELF COMPLETELY TO MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. NASIR TOLD THE KING TO
TELL PRESIDENT NIXON THAT IN NASIR' S OPINION, IF A MIDDLE EAST PEACE
SETTLEMENT WERE NOT ACHIEVED THE AREA WOULD INEVITABLY TURN INTO CHAOS
WITH EVERY BREED OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ALIEN POWER, INCLUDING THE
COMMUNIST CHINESE, INTERVENING AND COMPETING TO SERVE ITS OWN INTERESTS
NASIR SAID THIS EVENTUALLY WOULD BE A DISASTER FOR EVERYONE. NASIR
ADDED THAT THE KING COULD TELL PRESIDENT NIXON THAT THE DAY AFTER A
PEACE SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED, THE UAR WOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO
REMOVE THE SOVIET PRESENCE FROM THE UAR SINCE THERE WOULD NO LONGER
BE ANY NEED FOR THEM AND HE WAS NOT THAT HAPPY ABOUT HAVING THE SOVIETS
IN THE UAR EVEN UNDER THE CURRENT EMERGENCY SITUATION.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-79/12480 sec. 3(b)(1)(1) Hr. 7/12/2012
By RJ /MIH NARA, Date 10/19/2016
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
#112450
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321137 KING AGREED TO SEE PRESIDENT NIXON ON NASIR' $ BEHALF, AS WELL SA
JORDAN'S. THE KING ANS TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES DURING THE FORTH
COMING UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING. THE KING DOES NOT WISH TO BE IN
THE UNITED STATES AT THE SAME TIME ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER GOLDA MEIR
IS THERE,
SO HE PLANS TO ARRIVE IMMEDIATELY AFTER HER DEPARTURE FROM THE UNITED
STATES, THE LATTER PART OF OCTOBER 1970. THE KING EXPECTS TO MAKE AN
APPEARANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS BUT WILL NOT BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED
IN THE JARRING NEGOTIATIONS. THE KING HOPES TO SEE PRESIDENT NIXON AT
HIS CONVENIENCE AFTER THE KING' S APPEARANCE AT THE UN. THE VISIT
WOULD BE STRICTLY UNOFFICIAL. THE KING IS CONVINCED, AFTER SEVERAL
HOURS OF RENEWED TALKS WITH NASIR, THAT HE IS COMPLETELY SINCERE IN HIS
DESIRE FOR PEACE AND HE WILL GO TO EVERY REASONABLE LENGTH TO COOPERATE
IN ACHIEVING IT.
SANITIZED
3.
3.3(b)(1)
GP-1
450
1467
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321138
SANITIZED COPY
LIGENCE
PRIORITY
CENTRAL
AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
IN 150418
canada AMERICA
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
DIRECTORATE FOR
EXO
DDI
PLANS
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Lews, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the
transmission or revelation of which in any manner to on unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP
Eachadent from -
downgrading and declamitation
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
261741Z
DIST 26 AUGUST 1970
SANITIZED
COUNTRY: OCCUPIED JORDAN
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
SUBJECT: ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) BUILD-UP IN THE
SOUTHERN JORDAN VALLEY
1. THERE HAS BEEN LARGE BUILD-UP OF IDF IN SOUTHERN JORDAN
VALLEY FROM DEAD SEA TO DAMIYA BRIDGE BEGINNING 20 AUGUST 1970
CONSISTING OF TROOPS, TANKS, HALF-TRACKS, PERSONNEL CARRIERS,
AMMUNITION, LAND ROVERS AND COMMUNICATIONS VEHICLES.
THIS IS THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF IDF IN THE AREA SINCE THE 21 MARCH
-
IS
1968 STRIKE AGAINST KARAMAH.) IDF/PRESENTLY CONDUCTING
MANEUVERS IN AREA NABI MUSA (3147N-3526E) SOUTH TO DEAD SEA
IS
BUT BUILD-UP/NOT RELATED TO THESE MANEUVERS.
DECLASSIFIED
EXPLOSIONS FROM NIGHT TRAINING EXERCISES HAVE BEEN HEARD NIGHTLY
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-79 NLNII-79/12481 Hr.7/12/2012
By RS MIH NARA, Date 10/19/2016
SECRET
SANITIZE the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
12481
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321138
1.68 3007 - EDITIONS
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
3.3(b)(1)
IN 150418
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
SECRETI
(classification)
(dissem controls)
OF
SINCE 23 AUGUST IN OUTER LIMITS /EAST JERUSALEM.)
2. THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF JERICHO HAS BEEN MAKING DAILY
TRIPS THROUGHOUT THE VALLEY AND RECENTLY INFORMED JERICHO
RESIDENTS HE HAD NO TIME FOR SOCIAL AMENITIES. THE OTHER
MILITARY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN JERICHO HAVE ALSO BEEN
BUSIER THAN USUAL. THE MORNING OF 25 AUGUST 1970 A'HIGH-
RANKING IDF GENERAL WITH AN ESCORT OF TEN VEHICLES, INCLUDING
A COMMUNICATION VEHICLE, MADE AN INSPECTION IN THE ALLENBY
BRIDGE AREA. HELICOPTERS FLY OVER THE AREA SEVERAL TIMES
EACH DAY. TEN MOBILE BRIDGES FOR CROSSING THE RIVER JORDAN
ARE LGCATED IN THE VALLEY BETWEEN THE DEAD SEA AND THE
DAMIYA BRIDGE. THE AREA FROM JERICHO TO WAPI AL AWJA WAS
BRISTLING WITH IDF ACTIVITY ON 24 AUGUST.
3.
AS THE SOUTHERN JORDAN VALLEY HAS
BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET FOR THE PAST TEN DAYS EXCEPT FOR KATYUSHA
FIRE ON NAHAL KALIA AT THE NORTH END OF THE DEAD SEA THE
MORNING OF 22 AUGUST, THE BUILD-UP MUST BE RELATED TO
THE SITUATION IN JORDAN.
THE IDF WOULD PROBABLY
MOVE ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER IF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN AND THE FEDAYEEN RESULTED IN IRAQI
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321138
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
3.3(b)(1)
IN 150418
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
SECRET
.
(classification)
(dissem controls)
SUPPORT TO THE FEDAYEEN AND IT APPEARED THAT KING HUSAYN
WOULD LOSE.)
4.
REPORT CLASS SECRET
GP- 1
SECRET
Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-79 [ID: 12482]
(4 pp.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 7/12/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
228
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB IMCH
11/7/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321140
SANITIZED COPY
Intelligence Information Report
CENTRAL
AGENC
This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning
GROUP
Title 18 U.S.C. Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any
Excluded from automatic
dewagroding and
the
WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
DIRECTORATE OF
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
PLANS
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
DATE DISTR. 14 August 1970
COUNTRY Jordan/UAR
SANITIZED
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
SUBJECT King Husayn's Scheduled Meeting With UAR President Jamal Abd-
al-Nasir in Cairo on 20 August 1970
HX
1. King Husayn intends to visit Cairo on 20 August-for
discussions with UAR President Jamal Abd-al-Nasir before mov-
ing ahead with rigid implementation of the cease-fire agree-
ment and the related issues connected with fedayeen behavior
in Jordan. The King realizes that Nasir would not have accepted
the American peace proposal and the cease-fire agreement had
he not had some assurances of a favorable outcome. The King
is confident that Nasir has made some agreement or reached
some understanding with the Soviets about the specifics of a
settlement which, obviously, concern Jordan as much as anyone
else. The details of this, plus Jordan's future policy re-
garding fedayeen and Iraqi forces in Jordan, will be the main
topics for discussion during the Husayn/Nasir meeting.
2.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-79/12483 Ru sec 3. 3(6)(1) Hr. 7/12/2012
By R/M/H NARA, Date 10/19/2016
5
5
4
4
3
3
WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE
2
2
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
1
ISECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
SANITIZED COPY
#12483
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321140
SANITIZED COPY
INTE
Intelligence Information Report
T.E.T.
SANITIZED
CENTRAL.
ACERNCY
3.3(b)(1)
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning
GROUP ,
of the Espionage Lows, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In any
Included /
descripting
and
-
manner to on unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
DATE DISTR. 14 August 1970
TRANSMITTAL OF PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE REPORT
Distribution
The Director of Central
The Deputy Director of
Intelligence
Central Intelligence
The Assistant to the
The Deputy Director for
President for National
Intelligence
Security Affairs
The Director of National
The Director of Intelli-
Estimates
gence and Research
The Director of Current
The Director, Defense
Intelligence
Intelligence Agency
Director, National Indications
The Director, National
Center
Security Agency
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential
SANITIZED COPY
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321141
SANITIZED COPY
EO 135SANITIZED Yrs
PR. ORITY
ACENCY CENTRAL
Intelligence Information Cable
IN 139299
AVERCAT
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
&
STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
DIRECTORATE FOR
PLANS
EXO
DDI
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794,
transmission or revolation of which in any manner to on unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from
dewngrading and declassifice
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
101409Z
DIST 10 AUGUST 1970
COUNTRY:
JORDAN/UAR/SYRIA/IRAQ/ARAB STATES
H
SUBJECT:
1. UAR WRITTEN ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT TO JORDAN AGAINST
IRAQI OR PALESTINIAN COMMANDO AGGRESSION
2. ACTIVE UAR EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE IRAQI REGIME
3. COVERT SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS
1. IN A PRIVATE MEETING ATTENDED BY UAR MINISTER OF WAR
MUHAMMAD FAWZI, JORDANIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE 'ABD AL-WAHHAB
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-79/12484 3.3(b)(1) Hr.7/12/2012
IMIH NARA, Date 10/19/2016
...
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
#12484
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321141
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
IN 139299
3.3(6)(1)
PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem controls)
AL- MAJALLI, AND JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ANTUN ATALLAH,
WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING A RECESS IN THE CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN
AND DEFENSE MINISTERS OF ARAB STATES CONFRONTING ISRAEL HELD
IN TRIPOLI, LIBYA, 5-6 AUGUST 1970, FAWZI PRESENTED ATALLAH
WITH A WRITTEN GUARANTEE OF UAR MILITARY SUPPORT IN THE EVENT OF
IRAQI OR COMBINED IRAQI-PALESTINIAN COMMANDO AGGRESSION AGAINST
JORDAN OR ISRAEL. THE DOCUMENT URGED JORDAN TO CONFRONT, WITH ALL
ITS FORCE, ANY IRAQI OR JOINT TRAQI-COMMANDO AGGRESSION FROM
JORDANIAN TERRITORY AGAINST ISRAEL. IT PLEDGED THAT THE UAR WOULD
PROVIDE such LAND OR AIR FORCES REQUIRED BY JORDAN TO HALT THE
AGGRESSION. THE UAR GUARANTEE ALSO COVERED ANY AGGRESSION BY
IRAQI CR COMBINED IRAQI-COMMANDO FORCES AGAINST JORDAN.
FAWZI INTIMATED TO ATALLAH THAT THE UAR BELIEVED IRAQ
WOULD TRY TO WRECK THE CURRENT PEACE TALKS THROUGH SOME ACT OF
AGGRESSION.)
2. IN THE COURSE OF THE FAWZI-ATALLAH DISCUSSIONS ON THE UAR GUAR-
ANTEE, FAWZI SAID THE UAR WAS NOW WORKING WITH ANTI-REGIME FORCES IN-
SIDE IRAQ FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME.
IN THIS CON-
NECTION,
SECRET
Reproduced at SANITIZED.COPY
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321141
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
3.3(b)(1)
IN 139299
PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem controls)
FAWZI ADMITTED
THAT THE UAR DID NOT HAVE MANY ASSETS IN IRAQ AND ASKED ATALLAH AND
AL-MAJALLI TO USE THEIR RESOURCES TO SUBVERT IRAQI OFFICERS STATIONED
IN JORDAN. FAWZI SAID HIS INFORMATION INDICATED THAT THERE WAS DIS-
SENSION WITHIN THE RANKS OF THE IRAQI OFFICERS STATIONED IN JORDAN
AND SYRIA BECAUSE, IN FACT, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT INSISTED ON IRAQI
FORCES BEING HELD IN RESERVE STATUS RATHER THAN ON THE FRONT LINE,
AND UAR RADIO ATTACKS ON IRAQI RELUCTANCE TO FIGHT ISRAEL HAD STRUCK
HOME. FAWZI SAID A COMBINED EFFORT OF UAR ASSETS INSIDE IRAQ, AND
JORDANIAN SUBVERSION OF IRAQI TROOPS, WOULD AT BEST TOPPLE THE IRAQI
REGIME, CR AT LEAST PREVENT IRAQ FROM ATTEMPTING TO WRECK THE PEACE
TALKS. FAWZI PROMISED THAT THE UAR WOULD PROVIDE ANY MEANS JORDAN
MIGHT NEED FOR SUBVERSION.
3. DURING THE 5-6 AUGUST TRIPOLI CONFERENCE OF ARAB CONFRON-
PRIVATELY
TATION STATES, SYRIA ANNOUNCED /ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321141
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
3 3(b)(1)
IN 139299
PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem controls)
PEACE PROPOSALS.
DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER AND
8
CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL MUSTAFA T A L A S HEADED THE SYRIAN
)
DELEGATION TO THE TRIPOLI CONFERENCE.) THE SYRIANS SAID SYRIA COULD
NOT ANNOUNCE THIS PUBLICLY, FOR TWO REASONS, AND ASKED THE DELEGATES
1
TO REFRAIN FROM OVERT ANNOUNCEMENT OF SYRIA'S ACCEPTANCE. THE SYRIANS
)
SAID THE BASIS OF THEIR POLICY HAS BEEN HAIRED OF ANYTHING AND
EVERYTHING AMERICAN. THE SYRIAN MASSES AND THE MILITARY WERE
n
COMPLETELY BRAINWASHED IN THIS CONNECTION. THEREFORE, ACCEPTANCE OF
)
THE PROPOSAL, PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS A U.S. PROPOSAL, AND NOT A JOINT
SOVIET-U.S. PROPOSAL, WOULD CAUSE TURMOIL IN THE COUNTRY. SECONDLY,
)
THE SYRIAN DELEGATION SAID IRAQ WAS ACTIVELY PLANNING A COUP IN
) SYRIA. THE SYRIANS PRESENTED CAPTURED DOCUMENTS SHOWING A TWO-
PRONGED IRAQI EFFORT. ONE DOCUMENT SHOWED EVIDENCE OF CONTACTS
)
r
BETWEEN SYRIAN BA'TH PARTY DISSIDENTS AND DAMASCUS AND EX-SYRIAN
) BA'THI LEADER MICHEL "A F L A Q, AND ANOTHER SHOWED EVIDENCE OF
ATTEMPTS BY IRAQI TROOPS STATIONED IN SYRIA TO SUBVERT SYRIAN ARMY
)
OFFICERS. THE SYRIANS STATED THAT THEIR OVERT ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRO-
) POSAL MIGHT AID IRAQI PLOTS.
4.
)
GP-1
) REPORT CLASS:S
)
SECRET
Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321142
SANITIZED COP
LIGENCE
ROUTINE
CENTRAL
AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
IN 137244
UNIVERSITY
PAGE 1 OF2 PAGES
STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS CXEX
DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS
EXO DDI
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sees. 793 and 794, the
transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by low.
GROUP 1
Excluded from -
dewagrading and declassification
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
COUNTRY: JORDAN
DIST 6 AUGUST 1970
CS 15 Aug 70
SANITIZED
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
SUBJECT: DISORGANIZATION WITHIN THE VARIOUS FEDAYEEN GROUPS
AS A RESULT OF JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. PEACE
PROPOSAL.
1. AT THE MOMENT MANY FEDAYEEN IN JORDAN ARE DISORGANIZED AND
UNSURE OF WHAT COURSE OF ACTION THEY SHOULD TAKE. JORDAN'S ACCEPT-
ANCE OF SECRETARY ROGERS' PEACE PROPOSAL HAS BEEN WELCOMED BY
LEADING PALESTINIAN PERSONALITIES ON THE WEST BANK AS WELL AS IN
JORDAN ITSELF. THIS WIDE ACCEPTANCE IS HAVING ITS EFFECT, AND AL-
READY SOME FEDAYEEN ARE LEAVING THE FEDAYEEN RANKS IN SEARCH OF OTHER
EMPLOYMENT. THEY REALIZE THAT AS A POLITICAL SOLUTION IS PURSUED
IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO WAGE AN ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
SECRET
milt 10/19/2016
#12485
SANDIZED COPY SANTIZED COPY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321142
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
IN
137244
3.3(6)(1)
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
SECRET /
(classification)
BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND OTHER ARABS. AS AN INDICATION OF THEIR
GENERAL DISARRAY, ON 4 AUGUST ELEMENTS OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR
THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE WERE FIGHTING IN IRBID WITH MEMBERS
OF AHMAD ZARUR'S PRO-NASIR ARAB PALESTINE ORGANIZATION AND
ISSAM SARTAWI'S ACTIVE ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE.
THESE SAME FEDAYEEN WERE FIGHTING ONE ANOTHER AGAIN ON 5 AUGUST
IN THE AJLUN AREA.
2. THE CONSENSUS OF GOJ OPINION IS THAT THE NEXT THIRTY DAYS
WILL BE CRUCIAL FOR JORDAN IN TERMS OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE
FEDAYEEN. IT IS EXPECTED THAT AS THE PEACE TALKS GET UNDERWAY
FURTHER CRACKS WILL APPEAR IN THE FEDAYEEN RANKS. THIS WILL MARK
THE BEGINNING OF A SLOW BUT STEADY DISINTEGRATION PROCESS WHICH
WILL REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
GOJ AND THE FEDAYEEN.
3.
SECRET
126/10/9100
Reproduced at VIIZED COPY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321143
SANITIZED COPY
5-453
SECRET
dele
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
SANITIZED
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
28 July 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
Further Jordanian-UAR Discussions on the
American Peace Initiative
The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report
describes the 25-26 July visit of UAR Presidential envoy
Hasan Sabri al-Khuli to Jordan during which al-Khuli re-
layed a personal message from UAR President Nasir to King
Husayn regarding the UAR response to the recent American
peace initiative.
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
Enclosure:
NLIN11-79/12486 sec 3.3(b)(1) Hr. 7/12/2012
By RJ /mil NARA, Date 10/19/2016
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
#12486
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order determined to be declassified
Declassified D.COPY
C03321143
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
SECRET
3.3(6)(1)
Distribution: The Director of Central Intelligence
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of National Estimates
Director of Current Intelligence
The Director of Strategic Research
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Indications Center
SECRET
Reproduced
SANITIZED COPY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321143
SANITIZED
SANITZED COPY
3.3(b)(1)
ICENCE
CENTRAL
AGENCY
Intelligence Information Special Report
STATE
DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS
COUNTRY Jordan/UAR/USSR
DATE 28 July 1970
SUBJECT
Further Jordanian-UAR
Discussions on the American Peace Initiative
1. UAR Presidential advisor Hasan Sabri al-Khuli arrived
in Amman on 25 July with a message from UAR President Jamal
Abd-al-Nasir to King Husayn. The message was Nasir's response
to questions and comments which had arisen during discussions
between King Husayn and UAR Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs
Salah Gohar (Jawhar) on 22 July when the UAR response to the
American peace initiative was presented to the King. The
points which arose during the meeting with Gohar, to which
Nasir's message was directed, were the following:
a. Jordanian displeasure over Nasir's failure to
consult with Jordan in advance regarding the UAR reply to the
United States.
b. The relative roles of the UAR and the USSR in
framing the UAR response to the Americans.
C. Jordan's request for the UAR's support in the
event of a confrontation between Jordanian authorities and
the fedayeen over Jordan's positive response to the American
proposals.
GROUP
SECRET
Excluded from suppletic
dewngreding - declassification
SANIZED Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321143
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
SECRET
3.3(6)(1)
-2-
2. On behalf of Nasir, al-Khuli explained that there were two
reasons why the UAR did not consult with Jordan before giving the
UAR response to the United States. First, as Gohar had explained,
there was no time for consultation between Nasir's return from
Moscow and his 23 July speech at which he intended to announce his
decision. Second, Nasir had felt quite sincerely that the King
would be in a better position if Nasir made a unilateral declara-
tion of acceptance without consulting the Jordanians, since this
would permit the King to blame everything on Nasir. Nasir said
he was quite willing to let the King do this if it would help his
position with the fedayeen or with the other Arab states.
3. Regarding the relative roles of the Soviets and the UAR in
framing the UAR unconditional response, al-Khuli said Gohar had
described his discussions with the King on this subject to Nasir.
Gohar admitted to Nasir he had been evasive but had left the Jor-
danians with the impression that the Soviets had exerted pressure
on the UAR to give an unconditional acceptance to the Americans.
Al-Khuli told the King that Nasir wanted Jordan to know that he
had criticized Gohar for giving evasive answers on this subject
since this was no way to behave with the King. Al-Khuli went on
to tell the King that Nasir wanted him to know that actually the
Soviets had recommended amendments in the text of the American pro-
posal but that he, Nasir, had argued that the proposal should either
be accepted in toto or not at all. Nasir had argued that if the UAR
made amendments Israel would certainly do the same, and this process
could go on indefinitely until the proposal no longer had American
support. Nasir had, therefore, recommended that the proposal be
accepted unconditionally on the ground that this was the only way
the United States and Israel could be put to the test. According
to al-Khuli, the Soviets finally agreed.
At this
point the Jordanians are not sure whether the UAR's unconditional
acceptance of the American proposal was at Nasir's or at the Soviet's
initiative. In any event the Jordanians do not care that much and
they have the distinct impression that regardless of whose initiative
was involved, the Soviets and Nasir were not that far apart to begin
with. Whether the Gohar version that Soviet pressure was exerted is
true or not, it is obvious that Nasir wants the Jordanians to be-
lieve that the decision was his.)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential
ANITIZED COPY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321143
SANITIZED CODY
SECRET
SANITIZED 3. 3(b)(1)
-3-
4. Finally, al-Khuli said he wanted to give the Jordanians
Nasir's assurance that he would support Jordan publicly and in
any other way he could if a confrontation developed between the
fedayeen and Jordanian authorities. Al-Khuli stressed again that
the Jordanians had Nasir's approval to blame him for accepting
the American proposal, thereby leaving Jordan with the excuse it had
no choice but to follow suit.
The King and
Prime Minister Abd-al-Munim Rifa'i have, in fact, used this argu-
ment with the cabinet and the fedayeen leaders with whom it has
proved to be quite an effective and protective ploy.
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321144
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
SANITIZED COPY,
SANITIZED
INTELLIGENCE
PRIORITY
CENTRAL
AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
IN 129978
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
DIRECTORATE FOR
PLANS
EXO DDI
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Lows, Title 18, U.S.C. Socs. 793 and 794, the
transmission or revelation of which in any monner to on unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP -
Excluded
deumgrading
and
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
270941Z
DIST 27 JULY 1970
COUNTRY: JORDAN
SUBJECT: AL FATAH'S VIEWS ON JORDAN'S POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE OF
THE UNITED STATES' PEACE PROPOSALS FOR THE MIDDLE
EAST.
1. IF AL FATAH IS LEFT ALONE AND PERMITTED TO CONTINUE
GUERRILLA RAIDS INTO ISRAEL, THERE WILL BE NO CLASH WITH THE
GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN (GOJ) EVEN SHOULD IT ACCEPT SECRETARY OF STATE
4/30/2012
ROGERS' PEACE PROPOSALS. IF THE GOJ ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT RAIDS
INTO ISRAEL, IN ORDER TO EFFECT A CEASE FIRE, THERE WILL BE A
WAR BETWEEN ALL THE FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS AND THE FORCES OF THE GOJ.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
THE FEDAYEEN WOULD ; NOT WAIT FOR THE GOJ TO MOVE AGAINST THEM, BUT
By RJ WIH NARA, Date 10/19/2016
WOULD STRIKE FIRST.
SECRET
SANH at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
# 12487
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321144 EDITIONS
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
IN 129978
3.3(b)(1)
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem controls)
2.
DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCMEAFSA
REPORT CLASS SECRET
SECRET
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-80 [ID: 12488]
(7 pp.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 4/30/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
234
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB /mIH
10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321146
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
LICENSE
PRIORITY
CENTRAL
AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
IN 126574
AMERICAN
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
STATE/INAX
DIA
NMCC/MC
ARMY
NAVY
AIR)
CIA/NMCC
SDO
DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS
STATE (DIR) NIC (HENDRICKSON ONLY) EXO DDI D/ONE
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 19, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the
GROUP
Escluded from automatic
downgrating and doclarsification
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
21 14 4 N JUL 70
DIST 21 JULY 1970
COUNTRY JORDAN/UAR/ARAB STATES
SUBJECT FAILURE OF THE UAR TO CONSULT WITH JORDAN REGARDING REPLY TO
RECENT UNITED STATES PEACE INITIATIVE
TO STATE:
NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO DR. RAY S. CLINE
TO DIA:
EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL BENNETT
TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL MCCHRISTIAN;
NAVY ACNO (INTEL), ADMIRAL HARLFINGER;
AIR FORCE AFNIN, GENERAL TRIANTAFELLU
TO NSA:
EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL GAYLER
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN148012489 4/30/2012
By BS/WIN NARA, 10/19/2016
Date
SECRET
(classification)
dissem controls)
SANITL7ED Presidential Library
Declassified
H 12489
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321146
SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
IN 126574
3.3(b)(1)
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem controls)
1. THE UAR HAS JUST INFORMED JORDAN THAT UAR FOREIGN MINISTER MAHMUD
RIAD WILL NOT BE MAKING HIS EXPECTED VISIT TO AMMAN TO CONSULT ON
A JOINT UAR/JORDAN REPLY TO THE UNITED STATES RECENT PEACE INITIATIVE.
INSTEAD SALAH GOHAR WILL COME TO AMMAN ON 22 JULY TO PRESENT TO
THE JORDANIANS THE UAR'S UNILATERAL RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE,
WHICH THE UAR INTENDS TO DELIVER TO THE UNITED STATES THE SAME DAY
(22 JULY).
2. THIS SWITCH IN TACTICS AND PROCEDURE BY THE UAR, FROM PLANNED
CONSULTATIONS AND ISSUANCE OF A JOINT RESPONSE TO AN UNCOORDINATED
UNILATERAL UAR RESPONSE, HAS PERPLEXED AND SERIOUSLY ANNOYED KING
HUSAYN AND OTHER JORDANIAN OFFICIALS. THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY OFFENDED
AT BEING TAKEN FOR GRANTED ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT MATTER. ALTHOUGH THE
JORDANIANS AS YET HAVE NO SPECIFICS ON UAR PRESIDENT JAMAL 'ABD AL-
NASIR'S MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, THE FEW GENERAL REPORTS THEY HAVE RE-
CEIVED LEAD THEM TO BELIEVE THAT THE UAR REPLY TO THE UNITED STATES
WILL NOT BE UNFAVORABLE. THE JORDANIANS ARE SORELY TEMPTED TO BE AS
UNCOOPERATIVE IN ENDORSING THE UAR REPLY AS THE UAR WAS IN PREPARING
IT, JUST TO TEACH NASIR A LESSON. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE NASIR CAN GO
IT ALONE, ON A CONCILIATORY COURSE, ANY MORE THAN THE JORDANIANS CAN,
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
SECRET
1
(alassification)
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C03321146
SANITIZED COPY
IN 126574
SANITIZED
3.3(6)(1)
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem controls)
PARTICULARLY IF THE JORDANIANS CRITICIZE HIM FOR IT. HOWEVER, WHILE
THE JORDANIANS WILL MAKE THESE VIEWS KNOWN TO THE UAR IN PRIVATE THEY
WILL MAINTAIN A PUBLIC IMAGE OF UNITY AND REACT AS POSITIVELY AS THEY
CAN TO THE AMERICAN INITIATIVES.
3.
DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR ONLY) CINCMEAFSA ( FOR COMMAND-
ING OFFICER ONLY)
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem 3 ntrols)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
-
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-80 [ID: 12490]
(3 pp.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 4/30/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
236
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB IMIH
10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CODEWORD
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
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A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
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ON THE DOCUMENT
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OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB /mitt
10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
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(1 p.)
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A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
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OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB 1MCH
10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
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DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
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10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
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DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 240 ON THE DOCUMENT
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CB /MIH
10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-80 [ID: 12495]
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A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
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10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-80 [ID: 12496]
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A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
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CB /MIH
10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-80 [ID: 12498]
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A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
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A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
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CB /mitt
10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
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MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-80 [ID: 12501]
(1 p.)
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FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
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EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3); 3.5(f); ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
248
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB /MLH
10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-80 [ID: 12503]
(2 pp.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3); ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
249
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB 1 mH
10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-80 [ID: 12504]
(2 pp.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3); 3.5(f); ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 250 ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB /MCH
10/21/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12542]
(1 pp.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
251
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /WIH
10/14/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12543]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 252 ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /witt
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12544]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
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DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 253 ON THE DOCUMENT
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OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /mith
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12545]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 254 ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /MIH
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12546]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
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DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 255 ON THE DOCUMENT
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OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /mit
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12547]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 256 ON THE DOCUMENT
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OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /WIH
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12548]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
257
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /witt
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12549]
(2 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 258 ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /mitt
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12550]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 259 ON THE DOCUMENT
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OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /MIH
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12551]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 260 ON THE DOCUMENT
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OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /mitt
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12552]
(8 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
261
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /m/H
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12553]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 262 ON THE DOCUMENT
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OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM/M/H
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12554]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
263
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /WIH
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Flash
CONFIDE RECEIVED WHCA
1970 SEP 27 22 09
NNNN VV EHA543
.....
ZZ RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 159169 2702202
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
Z 0 272149Z SEP 70 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 6461
INFO RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 9384
RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1097
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 7182
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 9935
RUESXBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN 2569
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9725
RUEIVC/USINT CAIRO 5895
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 7299
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 159169
TOSEC 1
SUBJECT: HIJACKING HOSTAGES
1. UK AMBASSADOR FREEMAN INFORMED DEPARTMENT 1530 WASHINGTON-
TIME THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FOLLOWING INFO FROM LONDON WHICH
HE INSTRUCTED PASS USG:
A. HMG PREPARED RELEASE LEILA KHALED TO UAR CUSTODY ONCE SIX
REMAINING HOSTAGES ARE SAFELY OUT OF JORDAY. THIS DECISION TAKEN
BECAUSE OF LEGAL COMPLICATIONS FOR UK IF SHE RETAINED IN BRITISH
CUSTODY, BECAUSE OF EARLIER PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF BRITISH WILL-
INGNESS TO EXCHANGE HER AND BECAUSE OF ROLE PLAYED BY UARG IN
HELPING OBTAIN RELEASE OF REMAINING HOSTAGES.
B. UK AMBASSADOR CAIRO HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PASS FOREGOING
TO UARG.
C. BRITISH WILL MAKE NO REPEAT NO PUBLIC CONFIRMATION OF DECISION
RELEASE LEILA KHALED UNTIL SIX REMAINING HOSTAGES ARE>SAFELY
OUT OF JORDAN.
2. AMBASSADOR FREEMAN SAID HE HOPED USG WOULD UNDERSTAND REASONS
FOR THIS DECISION. IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S URGING DURING THEIR
CONVERSATION EVENING SPETEMBER 26 THAT THEY SHOULD HOLD OUT
TO SEE WHETHER UNCONDITNONAL RELEASE POSSIBLE, FREEMAN HAD WITH
SOME SUCCESS DONE WHAT HE COULD TO URGE DELAY ON LONDON AND
TO DISSUADE HMG FROM PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.
3. AMBASSADOR FREEMAN ADDED THAT HMG CONSULTING SWISS AND GERMAN
GOVERNMENTS WITH SUGGESTION THAT THEY MAY SIMILARLY WISH TO
DISPOSE OF FEDAYEEN PRISONERS THEY HOLD. IRWIN
BT
CONFIDENTIALI
NNNN
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12555]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
265
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM/WH
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12556]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
266
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM/WILH
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12557]
(2 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
267
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
DM /mith
10/8/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12558]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 268 ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB /MIH
10/17/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12559]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
269
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB /WILH
10/17/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12560]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
270
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB /WIH
10/17/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12561]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
271
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB /MIH
10/17/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12562]
(4 pp.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
272
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB /WI/H
10/17/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SAUNDENS
RECEIVED
CONFIDENTIAL
WHCA
1970 SEP 30 15 23
CONFIDENTIAL
HCD859
PAGE 01 AMMAN 05475 301457Z
51 42
ACTION NEA-15
INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 I0-13 SCA-01 SSO-00 CCO-ØØ CIAE-00
DODE-00 DOT-12 E-15 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10
NSCE-00 0-03 OC-06 PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-20 USIE-00
USSS-00 SY-03 SCS-04 P-03 RSR-01 /148 W
106089
P 301430Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1801
INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
CONFIDENTIALAMMAN 5475
SUBJECT: HOSTAGES
DURING AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH LAST SIX HOSTAGES OF
SEPTEMBER 29, VARIOUS DETAILS OF THEIR CAPTIVITY EMERGED. UNDER
CIRCUMSTANCES, OBVIOUSLY, NO SYSTEMATIC ATTEMPT TO DEBRIEF
WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE, BUT FOLLOWING GLEANINGS PASSED
ON FOR DEPARTMENT'S INFO:
1. SIX SEPARATED FROM REST OF PASSENGERS MONDAY EVENING, ON,
DAY AFTER HIJACKING. THEY TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO IRBID WHERE ON
WAY THEIR CAPTORS MANAGED SUCCESSFULLY TO GET THEM PAST ARMY
CHECKPOINT. REMAINED IN IRBID UNTIL LAST DAY OF CAPTIVITY,
ALTHOUGH FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY THEY WERE AFTER 3-4 DAYS
CAPTIVITY MOVED TO MORE SECURE AND PARTLY UNDERGROUND STRUCTURE.
SEVERAL TIMES THEY MENTIONED JAA ARTILLERY STRIKES AS FALLING
NEAR THEM.
2. PERSON IN COMMAND THEIR UNIT - AAACH IN IRBID APPEARED
TO NUMBER 100 WAS REGULAR OFFICER SECONDED FROM IRAQI
ARMY. ALL CAPTIVES APPEARED IMPRESSED BY HIS LEADERSHIP
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12563]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
274
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB 1m11t
10/17/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12564]
(4 pp.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
275
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB 1 mitt
10/17/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12565]
(2 pp.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
276
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB 1 WIH
10/17/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12566]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
277
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB 1 MIH
10/17/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12567]
(1 p.)
EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
278
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
CB /mith
10/17/2014
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library
Declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified