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LEBANON Vol. I January 1969-January 31, 1970 [2 of 3]
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LEBANON Vol. I January 1969-January 31, 1970 [2 of 3]
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OF STATE
*
$
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 585
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09670 01 OF 02 221515Z
50
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
051886
R 211745Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9140
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
'69 NOV 22 PM 1:09 09
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR ET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 9670
EXDIS
SUBU: RACHID KARAME'S VIEWS ON ME SETTLEMENT
1) FOLLOWING OUR DISCUSSION NOVEMBER 2-6, LEBANESE INTERNAL
SITUATION (SEPTEL-NOTAL) , a PRIMIN DESIGNATE KARAME SAID IT WAS
IMPERATIVE a IF LEBANON IS TO BE PRESERVED a THAT DRAMATIC AND
RAPID PROGRESS BE MADE TOWARDS A ME SETTLEMENT IN PRECISE
APPLICATION OF THE TERMS OF NOVEMBER 1967 UN RESOLUTION. WE
WERE WRONG IF WE THOUGHT THAT MUCH TIME REMAINED. HE BELIEVED A
WAR COULD BREAK OUT AS EARLY AS NEXT YEAR. THIS WOULD BE A WAR
THAT THE ARAB LEADERS MIGHT NOT WANT AND KNEW THEY WOULD LOSE,
BUT WOULD BE UNABLE TO STOP.
21 IMMEDIATELY AFTER JUNE 1967 WAR, AND EVEN AFTER NOVEMBER
UN RESOLUTION, ISRAEL, THROUGH UNILATERAL ACTIONS OF WITHDRAWAL,
COULD HAVE SECURED HER PERMANENT NEGOTIATED SECURITY. NOW THAT
OPPORTUNITY WAS LOST FOREVER, AND SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE
IMPOSED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF UN RESOLUTION.
31 A NEW GENERATION OF ARABS HAD ARISEN = ONE THAT WAS PREPARED
TO DIE. THIS WAS A SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT WHICH ISRAEL SURELY MUST
HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE TO UNDERSTAND. ARAB PSYCHOLOGY WAS
BECOMING TOTALLY COMMITTED TO THE LONG WAR AND, AS HE HAD
WARNED ME IN PAST, ALL ARAB STATES WERE BEING DRAWN IN. WHILE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
EXEL EXCES
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09670 01 OF 02 221515Z
NASSER AND HUSSEIN CLEARLY WANTED PEACE ("ANY ARAB LEADER STILL
PREFERS PEACE IF HE COULD JUSTIFY IT TO HIS PEOPLE"), THERE
WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF EITHER OF THEM SUING FOR PEACE.
4.) ISRAEL, UNLESS SHE SHOWED A WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE THE
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES TO HERSELFOF NOT RETURNING TO HER FORMER
TERRITORY, NOW FACED AN ARAB PEOPLE IMBUED WITH THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF LONG-TERM ATTRITION AND COMBAT. ISRAEL WOULD FACE CONSTANT
HARASSMENT AND ULTIMATELY THE DEMOGRAPHIC EQUATION WOULD BE BOUND
TO GO AGAINST HER. "EVEN IF 95 MILLION ARABS WERE LOST, THERE
STILL WOULD BE TWO ARABS FOR EVERY ISRAELI." THE US MUST RECOGNIZE
THESE NEW DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM IN THE ME AND CONVINCE
ISRAEL OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES. IN TEN YEARS ISRAEL WOULD BE ON HER KNEES. I RE-
MONSTRATED THAT THE ARABS SURELY MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THEY MUST
GIVE ASSURANCES OF PEACE TO EXPECT ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW AND THAT
HE WAS DEMANDING THAT US EXERT MORE INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL THAN
WAS PERHAPS POSSIBLE. REFERRING TO THE MANY FRANCO-GERMAN WARS,
KARAME SAID IT WAS RIDICULOUS TO ASSUME THAT PEACE IN ME COULD
COME FROM THE EXISTENCE OF A PEACE TREATY. PEACE COULD ONLY COME
WHEN ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THOSE CONDITIONS WHICH COULD
MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ARABS TO COEXIST WITH HER. AS FOR US
INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL, KARAME SAID HE UNDERSTOOD IT WOULD NOT BE
EASY a BUT THE US AND ONLY THE US HAD THE NECESSARY LEVERAGE,
IF IT DESIRED TO USE IT.
51 I ASKED KARAME IF HIS RECENT CONTACTS WITH SOVS LED HIM TO
BELIEVE THAT SOVS WANTED PEACE. HE RESPONDED OBLIQUELY BY SAYING
THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO TEST THEM. FIRST WE SHOULD START DEALING
DIRECTLY WITH THE ARABS. IF WE COULD ESTABLISH WITH NASSER AND
HUSSEIN A BASIS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, SOVS WOULD HAVE TO
ACCEPT. IF THEY DID NOT, PRESENT FAVORABLE BALANCE OF POWER FOR
SOVS IN ME WOULD BE REVERSED. SYRIA WAS NOT IMPORTANT, SAID
KARAME. IF HUSSEIN AND NASSER CAME TO AGREEMENT, SYRIAN REGIME
WOULD HAVE TO GO ALONG. AT MOMENT OF COURSE SYRIANS WERE ABLE TO
CREATE MISCHIEF BECAUSE ARABS COULD SEE NO HOPE FOR AN ACCEPTABLE
SETTLEMENT AND NASSER WAS FORCED TO ASSUME A PUBLIC MILITANCY,
AS CONTRASTED TO HIS PRIVATE HOPES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
NASSER, SAID KARAME, IS THE KEY. OTHER RADICAL ARAB LEADERS WERE
SMALL POTATOES WITH NUISANCE VALUE ONLY, AND WE SHOULD NOT
WORRY ABOUT THEM.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION O THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 09670 01 OF 02 221515Z
61 1 SAID 1 FOUND HIS REMARKS VERY DISTURBING. USG WAS DEEPLY
CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN ME. WE WERE EXERTING TREMENDOUS
EFFORT TO START THE MOMENTUM FOR A SETTLEMENT AND OUR POSITION RE
THE UAR= ISRAELI AGREEMENT WOULD RETURN TO NASSER SOVEREIGNTY OVER
HIS FORMER TERRITORY. ALL WE ASKED IN RETURN WAS RHODES STYLE
TALKS AND AN ARAB COMMITMENT OF PEACE, IN EXCHANGE FOR WHICH WE
WOULD EXERT OUR INFLUENCE TO GET ISRAEL (AND THERE NO ASSURANCE
WE COULD) TO GO ALONG. KARAME SAID IN RESPONSE MY QUESTION THAT
HE HAD STUDIED US-USSR DRAFT WHICH PRES. HELOU HAD SHOWN HIM.
IN HIS VIEW WE HAD MADE A FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE IN APPEARING TO
SEPARATE UAR ASPECT OF THE SETTLEMENT FROM THE TOTAL PACKAGE.
REGARDLESS OF OUR MOTIVES (WHICH I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL), THIS
WAS SOMETHING NASSER COULD NOT ACCEPT. KARAME URGED THAT WE
DRAW UP A TOTAL PACKAGE AND THEN PRESENT IT TO NASSER AND
HUSSEIN SIMULTANEOUSLY. ALSO, HE SAID, WE WERE MAKING A GRAVE
MISTAKE IN SUGGESTING THAT NASSER WOULD HAVE TO BARGAIN WITH
ISRAEL OVER QUESTION OF UAR SOVEREIGNTY AT SHARM ASH SHAYKH.
NEITHER COULD WE ASK NASSER TO NEGOTIATE ON QUESTION OF GAZA STRIP.
NASSER WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO GET RID OF GAZA PROBLEM, BUT HE
COULD NEVER ADMIT TO BARGAINING AWAY RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS
GAZA QUESTION, TOO, COULD NEVER BE SETTLED EXCEPT IN OVER-ALL
UAR=JORDAN PACKAGE.
PORTER
EXCLUS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AUGUST
TELEGRAM
SECRET 574
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09670 02 OF 02 221500Z
54
ACTION SS=45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
051851
R 211745Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9141
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR ET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 9670
EXDIS:
SUBU # RACHID KARAME'S VIEWS ON ME SETTLEMENT
71 KARAME, IN CLOSING, URGED ME REQUEST WASHINGTON TAKE THIS
"PERHAPS LAST CHANCE" TO MOVE OFF OUR PRESENT POSITION HE FELT
PRES. NIXON SHOULD UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS AT STAKE IN TERMS
US SELF-INTEREST IN AREA US WAS PUTTING ITSELF (OR BEING PUSHED)
INTO POSITION OF TOTAL EXCLUSION FROM ARAB WORLD, WITH
RESULING TOTAL IDENTIFICATION WITH ISRAELI POLICY OF
RETENTION OF CONQUERED ARAB TERRITORY. DEMANDS ON US FROM
ISRAEL WOULD GROW AS ARAB CONTINUED BATTLE. HE WONDERED HOW
LONG US PEOPLE, AFTER VIET NAM EXPERIENCE, WOULD BE ABLE ACCEPT
SUCH A DANGEROUS INVOLVEMENT. HE SAID HE AWARE HE HAD TOLD ME
OFTEN BEFORE THAT WAS AGAINST A SETTLEMENT. HE HAD BEEN
RIGHT, HERREGRETTED: AND NOW THERE WAS VERY LITTLE TIME INDEED.
IF A SOLUTION COULD NOT BE IMPOSED, TIME HAD ALREADY
RUN OUT.
PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE DRP
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AUTHORIZED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 874
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09635 201731Z
46
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 W
0 201635Z NOV 69
$69 NOV 20 PM 5:08
SITUATIONSOM WHITE HOUSE
039219
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9129
SECR ETT BEIRUT 9635
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING
REF : STATE 194183
1. OUR DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN DAMASCUS REPORT FOLLOWING FROM
ICRC DELEGATE ON PROPOSED EXCHANGE: A
ORIGINAL INITIATIVE ON
EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS CAME FROM THE GOI SO AS TO RECOVER
THEIR TWO PILOTS NOW IN UAR: B) IN RESPONSE UAR REQUESTED
EXCES EXCES
THAT ALL EGYPTIANS NOW IN ISRAELI HANDS, BE FREED, THAT IS
ABOUT 50 PERSONS. GOI ACCEPTED UAR REQUEST: C) WHEN SARG
LEARNED OF THIS (METHOD UNKNOWN) ATTASI REPORTEDLY TELEPHONED
NASSER TO ASK TWO SYRIAN MIG PILOTS NOW HELD BY ISRAEL BE
INCLUDED IN PACKAGE: D) GOI AGREED TO RELEASE OF SYRIAN
PILOTS ON CONDITION THAT 48 HOURS BEFOREHAND TWO TWA PASSENGERS
WERE AUTHORIZED TO LEAVE SYRIA: AND E) AT THIS POINT SARG
THEN ASKED ICRC FOR RELEASE OF ALL SYRIAN PRISONERS IN ISRAEL,
ABOUT 10, AND FURTHER REQUESTED SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE.
ACCORDING TO ICRC REP GOI PROBABLY WILL NOT ACCEPT THESE
DEMANDS ON GROUNDS TWO ISRAELIS IN SYRIA WERE AIRCRAFT
PASSENGERS NOT PRISONERS OF WAR.
2. WILSON OF TWA IS AWARE OF PLANS FOR THESE EXCHANGES
AND OF ICRC INVOLVEMENT, HAVING LEARNED OF IT FIRST THROUGH
ALKHANI SYRIAN DCGA. HE ALSO REALIZES POSSIBILITY UNILATERAL
SYRIAN RELEASE OF PASSENGERS NO LONGER EXISTS. PLANE WAS
TESTED NOV. 19 AND FOUND SATISFACTORY. THERE REMAIN IN
DAMASCUS 13 TWA PERSONNEL 4 CREWS 7 TECHNICIANS, PROJECT MANAGER
GEIZER AND WILSON.
3. COMMENT: SYRIAN DECISION TO RAISE DEMANDS IS TYPICALLY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EXEMS EXCES
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09635 201731Z
SYRIAN BAZZAR HAGGLE. ICRC DELEGATE REPORTEDLY HAS DISCUSSED
LATEST SYRIAN POSITION WITH GOI ( AN ASSISTANT OF GEN. DAYAN)
TODAY NOV. 20 RETURNING TO DAMASCUS SAME DAY FOR FURTHER TALKS
WITH SARG.
4. IN VIEW OF STRONG EGYPTIAN INTEREST IN SEEING THIS EXCHANGE GO
AHEAD WE THINK THAT UAR PRESSURES MIGHT WELL BE INVOKED TO
CONVINCE SYRIANS THAT THE HAVE SUDDENLY RAISED THEIR PRICE
ABOVE ACCEPTABLE LEVEL IN TERMS PERSONNEL INVOLVED
AND ESPECIALLY SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE.
5. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT COMPROMISE HAS BEEN PROPOSED
WHEREBY EXCHANGE OF ISRAELIS FOR SYRIANS WOULD TAKE PLACE
IN SOME THIRD COUNTRY WITH SYRIAN AMBASSADOR THERE VERIFYING
PRESENCE SYRIAN EXCHANGEES. THEIR ACTUAL RELEASE WOULD THEN FOLLOW
48 HOURS AFTER ISRAELI PASSENGERS LEFT SYRIA.
PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION Or E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
450/40/0290
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 364
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09582 191747Z
42
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
'69 NOV 19 PM 4:21
ROOM SITUATION
WHITE HOUSE
032203
R 191509Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9112
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUDALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR EFT BEIRUT 9582
EXDIS:
SUBU: GOL-FEDAYEEN 8 AGREEMENT
REF: JERUSALEM 758
EXCES EXPIS
1. WE SOMEWHAT PUZZLED BY UNTSO REPORT OF LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN a
AGREEMENT DESCRIBED REFTEL. SECGEN FONOFF SADAQA INFORMED DCM
NOVEMBER 18 THAT CAIRO AGREEMENT WAS "VERY SHORT, " CONCERNED
ONLY PRINCIPLES AND CONTAINED NO DETAILS. HE SPECIFICALLY
STATED THAT AGREEMENT DID NOT DECIDE SUCH MATTERS AS THE NUMBER
OF FEDAYEEN WHO WOULD BE PERMITTED TO ENTER LEBANON, THE TERMS
UNDER WHICH THEY WOULD BE PERMITTED TO REMAIN HERE AND WHERE
THEY WOULD BE STATIONED. HE MAINTAINED THAT LEBANESE MILITARY
HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING SINCE THE CAIRO AGREEMENT WITH PLO
REPRESENTATIVES IN LEBANON TO WORK OUT SUCH DETAILS AND THAT WHEN
SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WERE COMPLETED YASIR ARAFAT WOULD PROBABLY COME
TO LEBANON TO RATIFY FINAL ARRANGEMENTS.
2. COMMENT : WE BELIEVE SADAQA, WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
IN CAIRO, IS ONE OF THE FEW LEBANESE OFFICIALS WHO REALLY KNOWS
THE PRECISE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE CURRENT STATUS OF
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT UNITED STATES OF AUTHORIZED STATE #
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
EXETS EXCL
FITH
SECRET 285
HOUSE
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09561 182248Z
92
ACTION SS=45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 - CCO-00 1046 W
027110
OR 182238Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9104
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECR ET BEIRUT 9561
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING
REF: STATE 193557
1. WE HAVE OPEN CODE WITH USINT DAMASCUS WHICH WOULD PERMIT
THEM NOTIFY US BY TELEPHONE OF ANY PLANE DEPARTURE PLANS.
2. SO FAR WE HAVE RECEIVED NOTHING THIS CHANNEL ON NOVEMBER
NINETEEN AS "MAGIC DATE".
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
EXE-S
DIPARTMENT UNITED DEP * OF STATE #
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET 875
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09553 181728Z
47
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO=00 1046 W
025425
'69 NOV 18 PM 4:24 24
02 ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
OR 181700Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9097
INFO USMISSION USUN
SECR ET BEIRUT 9553
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 9540
FOREIGN OFFICE SECRETARY GENERAL SADAKA HAS JUST CALLED US
EVENING NOVEMBER 18 TO REPORT THAT GENERAL BOUSTANY IS MEETING
WITHIN THE NEXT TWO DAYS IN BEIRUT WITH THE NUMBER TWO IN THE PLO.
HE HOPES THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO SETTLE THE UNRWA PROBLEM.
MEANTIME, HE EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF NGC
PUBLICITY CONCERNING POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT AS SUCH
COULD DESTROY CHANCE OF SUCCESS FOR NEGOTIATIONS.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SEGREORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXCES
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 776
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09540 181542Z
2
42
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 1046 W
024850
o 181506Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9093
USMISSION USUN
SECRET BEIRUT 9540
EXDIS
SUBJ: UNRWA
REF : USUN 4220 AND BEIRUT 9512
1. DCM PRESENTED PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO
BLOCK US FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF UNRWA TO SECGEN FONOFF SADAQA THIS
MORNING. SADAQA RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY THAT ACTION SUCH AS
THAT CONTEMPLATED WOULD BE "EXTREMELY EMBARRASSING TO THE GOL
BOTH INTERNALLY IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS AND
EXTERNALLY IN ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES. HE STATED
THAT BOTH PALESTINIANS AND HOSTILE ARAB STATES WOULD VIEW SUCH
ACTION AS CONFIRMING ALLEGATIONS THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S
STATEMENT LAST MONTH INDICATED THE GOL WAS CONNIVING WITH THE USG
TO SUPPRESS THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. HE PREDICTED
THAT THE PLO, WITH WHICH GENERAL BOUSTANY WAS NOW NEGOTIATING,
WOULD ATTACH SAME INTERPRETATION TO SUCH ACTION, WITH POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCE BEING ABROGATION OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT. THE END
RESULT COULD BE EVEN MORE SERIOUS THREAT TO COUNTRY'S INTERNAL
STABILITY THAN RECENT TROUBLES.
2. SADAQA DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL FACT THAT SECURITY IN MOST
OF THE UNRWA CAMPS IS NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE PALESTINIANS,
ALTHOUGH HE CONFIRMED THAT UNRWA OPERATIONS NONETHELESS PROCEEDING
NORMALLY. HE, BOUSTANY, AND PRES HELOU WERE ALL TREATING PROBLEM
AS TOP PRIORITY AND WERE ALL CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN SEEKING A WAY
TO RESTORE FULL LEBANESE AUTHORITY OVER THE REFUGEE CAMPS. BOUSTANY
AND HIS STAFF HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THIS AND OTHER MATTERS WITH
PLO OFFICIALS HERE, AND, WHEN DETAILS HAD BEEN WORKED OUT,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THEATHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXE-S EXCES
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09540 181542Z
YASIR ARAFAT WAS EXPECTED TO COME TO LEBANON TO CONCLUDE
AGREEMENT ON MODUS VIVENDI. THE GOL WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, BUT TIME AND CALM WERE
NEEDED TO WORK OUT DETAILS FOR THE RETURN OF THE CAMPS TO GOL
AUTHORITY. HE NOTED ALMOST PARENTHETICALLYA HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS
NATURAL THAT HENCEFORTH THE REFUGEES WOULD WANT A ROLE IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR CAMPS SADAQA PROMISED TO CONVEY OUR
APPROACH TO PRESIDENT HELOU TODAY AND TO INFORM US IF THERE WAS
ANYTHING FURTHER TO ADD ON THIS SUBJECT.
3. SADAQA HAS JUST TELEPHONED TO CONFIRM THE FOREGOING. HE
ADDED THAT, AS LONG AS US ACTION TO CUT OFF FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF
UNRWA REMAINED A HYPOTHETICAL THREAT RATHER THAN A FACT, IT COULD
BE USEFUL TO THE GOL IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS.
HOWEVER, ANY PUBLICITY THAT SUCH ACTION WAS BEING CONSIDERED BY
CONGRESS WOULD UNDERMINE THE GOL POSITION. HE CONCLUDED BY
NOTING THAT IT WAS THE OIL PRODUCING STATES OF THE MIDDLE EAST
WHICH WERE GIVING THE MOST AID TO THE FEDAYEEN.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
8/9/40/0290
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 472
22
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 10#6 W
69 NOV 18 AM 9:37
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09512 181117Z
ACTION SS=45
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
023532
O 181045Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9086
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
COMSIXTHFLEET
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECRET BEIRUT 9512
EXDIS
EXCES
SUBU: UNRWA
REF : USUN 4220 (NOTAL)
DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
1. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF A DRAFT AMENDMENT TO SUSPEND
AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA WOULD DO THE AMERICAN POSITION
HERE GRAVE DAMAGE AND FUEL THE CURRENT RADICAL PROPAGANDA
CAMPAIGN TO REPRESENT THE USG AS PRO=ZIONIST AND IRREVOCABLY
HOSTILE TO THE ARABS.
2. SUSPENSION OF US CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD HAVE A DESTRUCTIVE
EFFECT HERE. QUITE APART FROM DISRUPTING GOL'S DESPERATE
EFFORTS TO REESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER, IT WOULD EXPOSE AMERICAN
PROPERTY AND LIVES IN LEBANON TO THE GRAVEST THREAT SINCE JUNE
1967. REACTION IN LEBANON WOULD I BELIEVE CAUSE MORE DAMAGE THAN
DID PHANTOM DELIVERIES. THE ARMED MEN IN REFUGEE CAMPS ARE AT
MOMENT MUCH LESS A THREAT TO ISRAEL THAN TO LEBANON. ALSO, IT IS
ALMOST INCONCEIVABLE CONTEMPLATE THAT THEY WOULD NOT REAGT TO A
US: CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION OF THIS NATURE. WE BELIEVE THEY
WOULD STRIKE BACK AT AMERICAN TARGETS HERE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
GRANTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09512 181117Z
3. IF SPONSORS OF REPORTED AMENDMENT INTEND TO PROCEED, I
REQUEST WARNING SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO PERMIT EMBASSY TAKE
STEPS TO PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY HERE, AND TO ALERT
AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN LEBANON TO A PROSPECTIVE EMERGENCY.
RORTER
00
UE
AM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SAUTORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
650/40/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 552
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09505 01 OF 02 171825Z
47
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 1046 W
019262
0 R 171719Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9081
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
S E R ET SECTION I OF 2 BEIRUT 9505
EXDIS
SUBU: FEDAYEEN AND UNRWA CAMPS IN LEBANON
EXCES
REF : STATE 191882
SUMMARY. ALL LEBANESE SECURITY AND OTHER OFFICIALS WERE WITHDRAWN
FROM UNRWA REFUGEE CAMPS OCT 23. UNRWA SERVICES WERE INTERRUPTED
FOR FEW DAYS DURING HEIGHT OF RECENT CRISIS, BUT ARE NOW OPERATING
NORMALLY. UNITS FROM VARIOUS FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS ARE NOW PRESENT
IN MOST CAMPS AND HAVE ASSUMED LIMITED RESPONSIBILITY FOR
SECURITY. GOL CLAIMS CAIRO AGREEMENT ENDORSES ITS INTENTION TO
REESTABLISH CONTROL OVER CAMPS, THOUGH IN FUTURE THERE WILL BE
REPRESENTATIVES OF PALESTINIAN ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND (PASC)
IN CAMPS WHO WILL COOPERATE WITH LEBANESE AUTHORITIES IN MAIN-
TAINING LAW AND ORDER. THIS RELATIONSHIP IS ONE WHICH UNRWA, GOL,
AND PALESTINIANS WILL HAVE TO WORK OUT FOR THEMSELVES. ANY INTER-
VENTION BY USG WILL TRIGGER IMMEDIATE AND VIOLENT RESPONSE
AGAINST US INTERESTS. AT THIS JUNCTURE ANY CUTBACK OF SUPPORT FOR
UNRWA ACTIVITIES
IN LEBANON WOULD ABET THOSE ELEMENTS SUCH AS
EXTREME RADICAL REGIME IN SYRIA WHO WOULD LIKE TO DESTROY LEBANON
WE ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED, AS IS PRES HELOU, BY TREND TOWARDS CRE
ATION STATE WITHIN STATE AMONG PALESTINIAN POPULATION, BUT IT IS
OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HELOU AT THIS POINT TO REFER MATTER TO
UN END SUMMARY.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THIS AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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1. EXTENT OF FEDAYEEN PRESENCE. SINCE WITHDRAWAL OF LEBANESE MILI-
TARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES FROM UNRWA REFUGEE CAMPS OCT 23,
VARIOUS FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS HAVE ASSUMED DE FACTO CONTROL OVER
SECURITY AND RELATED MATTERS WITHIN THE CAMPS. THEY ARE CONTROL
LING ACCESS TO CAMPS, AND RECENT VISITORS REPORT SEEING ARMED
FEDAYEEN PATROLLING INSIDE. WHILE RELIABLE DETAILED INFORMATION
NOT AVAILABLE, UNRWA SOURCES TELL US THAT PLF AND GEORGE HABASHSS
PFLP NOW PRESENT IN ALMOST ALL CAMPS. IN AYN AL HILWAH CAMP NEAR
SIDON, ELEMENTS OF EIGHT DIFFERENT FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS HAVE
BEEN IDENTIFIED. EACH HAS ESTABLISHED ITS OWN COMMAND POST TO DI-
RECT RECRUITMENT AND OTHER ACTIVITIES. IN NAHR AL BARID CAMP NEAR
TRIPOLI, SEVEN ORGANIZATIONS ARE PRESENT, WITH SYRIAN-CONTROL-
LED SAIQA DOMINANT.
2. SIZE AND PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THESE FEDAYEEN GROUPS ARE DIF-
FICULT TO DETERMINE. IN MOST INSTANCES THEY CONSIST OF CAMP
RESIDENTS RECRUITED AND SENT TO SYRIA, JORDAN OR IRAQ FOR TWO-
THREE MONTHS OF COMMANDO TRAINING AND RETURNED TO FORM FEDAYEEN
CADRES WITHIN THE CAMP. A FEW FEDAYEEN "OFFICERS" OR "INSTRUCTORS"
HAVE RETURNED WITH THESE MEN TO SUPERVISE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES.
IN OTHER INSTANCES CAMP RESIDENTS HAVE VOLUNTARILY AFFILIATED
WITH PLO OR FATAH WITHOUT BENEFIT OF FORMAL TRAINING OUTSIDE CAMP
MOST OF THE FEDAYEEN IN THE LEBANESE CAMPS ARE ORIGINAL RESI-
DENTS OF THOSE CAMPS.
30 FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN CAMPS. IN ABSENCE OF GOL REPRESENTATIVES,
FEDAYEEN HAVE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR PATROLLING, MAINTAINING
LAW AND ORDER, AND CONTROLLING ACCESS TO CAMPS. THEY HAVE ESTAB-
LISHED RECRUITMENT CENTERS AND DIRECT SOME BASIC MILITARY TYPE
TRAINING, INCLUDING SMALL-AMRS HANDLING, WITHIN THE CAMPS. A
SPOKESMAN OF THE PLO OFFICE IN BEIRUT HAS DELCARED THAT ARMED
FEDAYEEN IN THE UNRWA CAMPS ARE NECESSARY TO PROTECT RESIDENTS
FROM POSSIBLE ISRAELI PARATROOPER ATTACK, SINCE CAMP RESIDENTS
ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT GOL CAPABILITY TO REPEL IDF ATTACK,
AND SINCE THEY ENVISAGE POSSIBLE CLASH BETWEEN GOL AND PALESTI
NIANS FOR CONTROL OF CAMPS, THEY WELCOME PRESENCE OF FEDAYEEN.
40 IMPLICATIONS FOR UNRWA ACTIVITIES. EXCEPT FOR BRIEF PERIOD
DURING HEIGHT OF OCT CRISIS, UNRWA HAS BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE ITS
PROGRAM OF WELFARE ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES IN ALL 15 CAMPS WITHOUT
INTERFERENCE FROM FEDAYEEN. HOWEVER, ABSENCE OF OFFICIAL LEBANESE
REPRESENTATIVES FROM CAMPS HAS AFFORDED RESIDENTS OPPORTUNITIES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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OF STATE
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of STATES MARK AMERICA OLINO
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EXE™ EXCES
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 09505 01 OF 02 1718252
TO CONSTRUCT NEW HUTS NAD UNDERTAKE "IMPROVEMENTS" HERETOFORE
FORBIDDEN. ALSO, DEPARTURE OF LEBANESE RERRESENTATIVES REMOVED
THE AUTHORITY MOST INTERESTED IN PREVENTING "OUTSIDERS" FROM MOV =
ING INTO CAMPS OR RESIDENTS FROM SELLING "OCCURANCY RIGHTS" TO
REFUGEE QUARTERS. CLASHES OCCURRING IN SOME CAMPS BETWEEN RIVAL
FEDAYEEN GROUPS SUGGEST OLD SCORES ARE BEING SETTLED. A FEW
KNOWN G-2 - INFORMANTS HAVE ALSO BEEN ELIMINATED.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THSEOREHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon M Presidential Library
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DIPARTMENT
4'
STATE
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UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 578
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09505 02 OF 02 171847Z
2
42
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 1046 W
019353
0 R 171719Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9082
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
S ERC R ETT SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 9505
EXDIS
SUBJ: FEDAYEEN AND UNRWA CAMPS IN LEBANON
REF: STATE 191882
5% UNRWA HAS COME UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE FROM PALESTINIAN EM-
PLOYEES EMBOLDENED BY SUPPORT THEY NOW RECEIVE FROM FEDAYEEN OR =
GANIZATIONS * DIRECTOR OF UNRWA AFFAIRS FOR LEBANON WAS INFORMED
RECENTLY THAT THE AGENCY'S "TEACHERS' STAFF ASSOCIATION HAS
BEEN REPLACED BY A NEW PLO-SPONSORED "ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINIAN
TEACHERS." THE LATTER GROUP HAS ALREADY ADOPTED MORE BELLIGERENT
POSITION IN DEMANDING CHANGES IN EDUCATION PROGRAM SUCH
AS NEW SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND SMALLER CLASSES, FOR WHICH ADEQUATE
FUNDS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. THE NEW ASSOCIATION HAS ESPOUSED CAUSE
OF TEACHER APPLICATIONS FOR WHOM UNRWA/UNESCO HAD NOT FOUND JOBS®
IMPLIED THREATS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST UNRWA'S PALESTINIAN
EMPLOYEES WHO RESIST FEDAYEEN "DIRECTIVES." AGENCY OFFICIALS FEAR
ADMINISTRATIVE CHAOS MAY ENSUE IF GOL DOES NOT REGAIN SOME MEASURE
OF CONTROL OVER CAMPS FROM FEDAYEEN.
6. GOL POSITION. FONOFF SEC GEN SADAQA, WHO PARTICIPATED IN CAIRO
GOL-PLO TALKS, HAS ADVISED UNRWA THAT CAIRO AGREEMENT ENDORSES
GOL'S INTENTION TO REESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE REFUGEE CAMPS.
THERE ARE ALSO TO BE PASC REPRESENTATIVES IN EACH CAMP TO CO-
ORDINATE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES AND COOPERATE WITH GOL IN MAINTAINING
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SUCRORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09505 02 OF 02 171847Z
ORDER SADAQA STRESSED THAT UNRWA WILL CONTINUE DEAL EXCLUSIVELY
WITH THE GOL, AS PROVIDED BY GOL/UN AGREEMENT RELATING TO UNRWA,
AND GOL WILL RETAIN EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY
UDDL#WITH ALL PALESTINIAN
ORGANIZATIONS. SADAQA ALSO ASSERTED TO UNRWA THAT CAIRO AGREEMENT
ENDORSES GOL BAN ON ARMED FEDAYEEN IN UNIFORM IN CAMPS HE STRESSED
IT WILL TAKE GOL TIME TO WORK OUT DETAILS AND COUNSELED PATIENCE.
7. GOL EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER CAMPS, IN COOPERATION
WITH PASC, ARE HAMPERED BY DEFIANT POSITION TAKEN BY PFLP, WHOSE
SPOKESMAN HAVE DECLARED PFLP, ACTING INDEPENDENT OF PLO, IS NOT
BOUND BY CAIRO AGREEMENT. SINCE PFLP IS WELL INSTALLED IN SOUTH
LEBANESE CITIES, SUCH AS RASHIDIYYAH, REESTABLISHMENT OF GOL
SOVEREIGNTY WILL RISK FURTHER CLASHES WITH FEDAYEEN.
80 COMMENT. IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WHAT THE CAIRO AGREEMENT
MAY ULTIMATELY MEAN FOR GOL POSITION IN UNRWA CAMPS. SPECIFIC
NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP WILL HAVE TO BE HAMMERED OUT IN ACTUAL
SITUATIONS. DESPITE SADAQA'S ASSURANCES, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT GOL
WILL AT BEST BE CONSTRAINED TO SHARE SUPERVISION OVER CAMPS WITH
PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES IMPRESSIVE QUANTITY OF ARMS IN REFUGEE
HANDS PLUS RECOGNITION GOL ACCORDED PALESTINIAN CAUSE THROUGH
CAIRO AGREEMENT HAVE ENHANCED PALESTINIANS' ABILITY TO RETAIN
SOME OF THEIR RECENTLY ACQUIRED AUTONOMY.
9. THESE QUESTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN GOL AND
PALESTINIANS. ANY ATTEMPT BY ANOTHER GOVERNMENT, EVEN INCLUDING
THE MAJOR DONOR, THE US, TO IMPOSE ITS VIEWS WOULD PROVOKE A
VIOLENT PALESTINIAN REACTION THAT COULD FURTHER WEAKEN THE POSI-
TION OF THE GOL. IF UNRWA IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE ITS WELFIARE
PROGRAM WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, WE BELIEVE THE FEDAYEEN
WILL BE MORE LIKLY TOO TEMPER THEIR DEMANDS ON UNRWA AND GOL so
AS NOT TO PROVIDE CAUSE FOR TERMINATION OF UN AID. BELIEVE AGENCY
IS IN BEST POSITION TO JUDGE WHETHER IT CAN CONTINUE TO FUNCTION,
AND IF NOT, WHAT ACTION UN MIGHT PROBABLY TAKE
10. IF, AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE US WERE TO CUT OFF AID OR IN ANY
OTHER WAY ACT AGAINST REFUGEES LIVING ON LEBANESE SOILD WE WOULD
BE PENALIZING GOL AND AIDING RADICAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS BAATH WHICH
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 09505 02 OF 02 171847Z
SEEK TO DESTROY LEBANON. THERE WOULD ALSO, OF COURSE, BE AN
IMMEDIATE AND VIOLENT ANTI-I RESPONSE TO ANY SUCH ACTION. IN
ANY EVENT, UNLESS OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON SHOULD
FURTHER DETERIORATE, WE SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT UNRWARS ABILITY
TO PROVIDE ALL WELFARE SERVICES TO NEEDY REFUGEES AS IN
THE PAST, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE RELATIONSHIP ULTIMATELY ESTABLISHED
BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE FEDAYEEN. FROM US POINT OF VIEW, ONE
OF THE WORST ASPECTS OF PRESENT SITUATION IS THAT SOME RECIPIENTS
OF UN RATIONS ARE TRAINING AS FEDAYEEN. HOWEVER, UNRWA HAS IN-
FORMED US FLATLY THAT THEY HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF ANY DIVERSION OF
UN RATIONS TO ANY FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION PER SE. IF DONOR STATES
WERE TO SUSPEND CONTRIBUTIONS ON THIS POINT OF PRINCIPLE, RESULT
COULD BE DELETERIOUS TO THE EFFORT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND
DESTRUCTIVE TO LEBANON.
EXCESS
11. WE ARE OF COURSE DEEPLY DISTURBED, BY THE PRESENT TREND IN
LEBANON. THE DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT HELOU HAS REPEATEDLY
DRAWN OUR ATTENTION TO THE MENACE TO LEBANON OF THE PALESTINIAN
"FIFTH COLUMN." IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE HAS LONG SOUGHT
A MORE EFFECTIVE UN PRESENCE TO HELP PRESERVE LEBANONS SOVEREIGN-
TY AND INTEGRITY. HOWEVER, IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HELOU
TO TAKE THE MATTER TO THE UN HIMSELF: HE IS CONSTRAINED BY THE
TERMS OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT, AND SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE AN ACT
OF POLITICAL SUICIDE.
12. AS LONG AS US POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB- ISRAEL CONFLICT IS BASED
UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNSC RESOLUTION OF NOV 22, OUR INTER-
ESTS REQUIRE US TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT UNRWA. THE ARGUMENT THAT
UNRWA SHOULD SEVER ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS, BECAUSE
THEY HAVE REJECTED THE UN RESOLUTION, CAN BE MET BY THE COUNTER
ARGUMENT THAT ISRAEL, HAVING FAILED TO ACCEPT PREVIOUS UN REFUGEE
RESOLUTIONS, IS EQUALLY AT FAULT. IF DEPARTMENT MUST COMMENT
ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON WE
BELIEVE THAT COMMENT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ASKING THE UNSYG TO
INVESTIGATE SITUATION AND TO MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS.
PORTER
NOTE: #AS RECEIVED: CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SUCRORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon residential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
X
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
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SECRET 076
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09480 171112Z
'69 NOV 17 AM 10:
SITUATE HOUSEM SITUATION WHITE HOUSE ONROOM
21
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 1046 W
017000
0 171040Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9072
S RESCRIBERT BEIRUT 9480
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING
FOR DELIVERY ACTION OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS NOV 17.
1. MSG CONTAINED DEPTEL 192904 PASSED WILSON VIA SAFE HAND NOV
16 AT 1430Z. AT THAT TIME WE WERE INFORMED WILSON HAD MET SARG
AIR FORCE G-2 MAJOR KHOULY AND THAT WILSON REGARDED CALL AS
SUCCESSFUL IN THAT KHOULY "UNDERSTANDING" AND WILLING ARRANGE
APPOINTMENT FOR WILSON WITH HAFEX ASSAD. WILSON LATER INFORMED
BY DR. ZAYYAT THIS WOULD BE NOT LATER THAN MONDAY (NOV 17). WILSON
STILL PURSUING LINE OF HAVING TWO PASSENGERS FLY OUT WITH BOEING.
2. IN PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT ICRC DELEGATE DAMASCUS INFORMED AMB
RICCARDI NOV 16 THAT ISRAELIS HAD NOW AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO EX-
CHANGE TWO SYRIAN MIG VI95S#AGAINST ISRAELI PRISONERS BEING
HELD BY UAR, POSSIBLY INCLUDING TWO ISRAELI PILOTS RECENTLY CAP -
TURED. ICRC DELEGATE IS NOW APPROACHING SARG TO EXPLORE POSSIBI
LITIES. STILL UNCLEAR IF ICRC OR SARG WILL THEN TAKE INITIATIVE
WITH UAR. THEREAFTER SARG WOULD LET TWO ISRAELIS LEAVE WITH TWA
PLANE, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD NOT FORMALLY FIGURE IN EXCHANGE.
3. BOEING NOW REPARED AND READY TO DEPART ALMOST IMMEDIATELY.
WILSON WILL ACCOMPANY TWO ISRAELIS OUT ON PLANE IF RELEASED.
OTHERWISE HE WILL STAY. PLANE CREW OF FOUR AND SIX TECHNICIANS
WILL BE ABOARD, LEAVING FIVE OTHER TECHNICIANS AND TWA PROJECT
MANAGER JOHN GAIQER# TO FOLLOW.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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EXPIS EXCE EXQ-0
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09480 171112Z
4. WE ARE MAKING NO LATERAL DISTRIBUTION THIS MESSAGE AT SPECIFIC
REQUEST OUR SOURCES WHO WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS IN EMPHASIZING TO
US THAT ICRC DISCUSSIONS NOW AT EXTREMELY SENSITIVE STAGE. WE
NOTED TO OUR SOURCE SUBSTANCE OF TEL AVIV'S 4290 WHO COMMENTED
THAT IN VIEW ISRAELI RESPONSE TO ICRC (PARA 3 ABOVE) THAT HE SAW
NO PRESENT LIKLIHOOD OF ANY HASTY ACTION BY ISRAELIS. HE DID AC-
CEPT SUGGESTION THAT DEPT MIGHT NOTE BRIEFLY TO TEL AVIV ONLY
THAT ICRC CONTINUES ACTIVE AND TO STRESS DEEP CONCERN FOR NEED
OF ABSOLUTE SECRECY AND FOR AVOIDANCE HASTY ACTION BY GOI. AT
SAME TIME HE THOUGHT ANY INFO TEL AVIV HAS ON ICRC ACTIVITIES
WOULD BE HELPFUL.
5 . COMMENT: WITH RESPECT TO TEL AVIV'S REQUEST FOR LATERAL DIS-
TRIBUTION ON MSGS ON TWA HIJACKING, WE CAN UNDERSTAND DESIRE
TO KEEP GOI FULL INFORMED OF PROGRESS BEING MADE TOWARD RELEASE
ISRAELI PASSENGERS. ON OTHER HAND, NEGS FOR RELEASE APPEAR REACHING
ENCOURAGING BUT SENSITIVE STAGE. ANY ISRAELI LEAK TO PRESS WOULD
KILL CURRENT NEGS. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT
INFORM GOI ANY MORE THAN ICRC AND TWA ACTIVELY PURSUING PROBLEM
AND THAT AT THIS STAGE ABSOLUTE SECRECY BY GOI IMPREATIVE IF
ANY CHANCE SUCCESS.
PORTER
NOTE: (#)AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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€90/40/0290
DEPARTMENT
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09484 03 OF 03 171535Z
82
2
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
018374
171220Z NOV 69
FMI AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9075
INFO RYAOBWB/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3551
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
S ECR ET SECTION 3 OF 3 BEIRUT 9484
EXDIS
9. I THEN ASKED HELOU WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS WOULD
GO ALONG WITH HIS PLAN AND WHAT HE CONSIDERED THEIR PRESENT
AIMS. HELOU SAID HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE AGREEABLE. HE IS
CONVINCED THEY DO NOT WANT WAR IN THE MIDEAST. SOVIET POLICY
AT PRESENT HAS THREE AIMS: 11 1 TO CHANNEL THE ARABS TO THE BRINK
OF WAR BUT STOP THEM THERE: 21 TO SUBSTITUTE SOVIET INFLUENCE FOR
THAT OF THE US AND THE WEST: AND 3) TO FORESTALL THE GROWTH OF
CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE AREA. ELABORATING ON THIS LAST POINT,
AND REVERTING TO AN EARLIER THEME, HELOU SAID UNLESS THE PRESENT
TREND IS ARRESTED, THE ARAB WORLD IS HEADED TOWARD TOTAL RADICAL-
IZATION. HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS WILL SEE
US AND WESTERN INFLUENCE TOTALLY SUPERSEDED BY THAT OF THE USSR AND
THE SUBSEQUENT FEW YEARS WILL SEE THE SOVIETS ECLIPSED BY COMMUNIST
CHINA. THE PRESENT TREND IN THE AREA IS AGAINST ALL ESTABLISHED
GOVERNMENTS BE THEY CAPITALIST, SOCIALIST, OR COMMUNIST AND IN
FAVOR OF PEOPLES REVOLUTIONS.
10. COMMENT: WHILE HELOU'S CURRENT STATE OF MIND MAY HAVE INDUCED
AN OCCASIONAL EXAGGERATION, I FIND HIS ANALYSIS OF THE TREND OF
EVENTS VERY SIMILAR TO MY OWN. IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS HE HAS SEEN
HIS EARLIER DIRE PREDICTIONS COME TO PASS. HE HAS ALSO SEEN HOW
POWERLESS HE WAS TO ALTER THE COURSE OF EVENTS - AND HOW AT THAT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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RAGE 02 BEIRUT 09484 03 OF 03 171535Z
TIME USG AND WEST IN GENERAL WERE UNABLE TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE AID
AND SUPPORT. HE IS MOST GRATEFUL FOR WHAT WE HAVE
DONE BUT KEENLY AWARE LIMITATIONS ON OUR CAPACITY TO ASSIST IN
LIGHT OUR OVERALL AREA POSTURE.
11. HELOU HAS BEEN PROPOSING UN INTERVENTION TO SEPARATE THE
COMBATANTS IN HIS TALKS WITH ME DURING THE LAST YEAR. THIS IN HIS
VIEW IS ONLY POSSIBLE FIRST STEP TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
HE HAS NEVER BELIEVED THAT UN RESOLUTION COULD BE OTHERWISE
IMPLEMENTED SO AS TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH ISRAEL AND ARABS.
WHETHER OR NOT WE CONCUR WITH HIS PROPOSAL, IT IS HARD TO QUARREL
WITH HIS PREMISE THAT SOME NEW APPROACH IS NOW REQUIRED, AND
THAT IT MUST INCLUDE MEASURES TO STOP THE FIGHTING BEFORE IT IS
TOO LATE.
PORTER
EXCESS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C- THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 09484 02 OF 03 171452Z
8. IN SUPPORTING HIS ARGUMENT, HELOU CLAIMED NOT HAVE ALL WISDOM
BUT SAID, THOUGH HE IS WESTERN-EDUCATED/ HE IS ENOUGH OF AN ARAB
TO APPRECIATE THE ARAB MENTALITY. I INTERUECTED THAT ISRAELI LEAD-
ERS ARE ALSO WESTERN-MINDED. WHAT THEY WILL ACCEPT IS GOVERNED
BY THIS FACT. HELOU OBJECTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE TRUE FOR A FEW
ISRAELI LEADERS SUCH AS GOLDA MEIR, BUT NOT FOR MOST, AND CERTAINLY
NOT FOR THE YOUNG. HE IS CONVINCED THE ISRAELIS ARE SUFFICIENTLY
"ORIENTAL" TO APPRECIATE HIS PROPOSAL AND PERHAPS ACCEPT IT. I
ASKED WHETHER HELOU HAD BROADENED HIS IDEAS ON THIS SUBJECT TO
THE FRENCH. HE SAID THAT HE HAD, BUT THAT THE PREVIOUS FRENCH
AMBASSADOR HERE HAD NOT SEEMED TOO ENTHUSIASTIC. HELOU ADDED THAT,
THOUGH HE IS CONVINCED HIS PROPOSAL IS THE ONLY REALISTIC ONE,
HIS OWN DELICATE POSITION WITHIN LEBANON AND THE ARAB WORLD DOES
NOT PERMIT HIM TO ESPOUSE IT PUBLICLY.
PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09484 02 OF 03 171452Z
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ACTION SS=45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
018053
PRR 171220Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9074
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
S SECORD ET SECTION 2 OF 3 BEIRUT 9484
EXDIS
40 TURNING FINALLY TO THE US PEACE PROPOSAL, HELOU SAID HE
THOUGHT IT WOULD RECEIVE A BLUNT REJECTION FROM CAIRO AN OBVIOUS:
OBJECTION TO IT IS THAT IT DOES NOT GUARANTEE TOTAL ISRAELI WITH-
DRAWAL FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE FATAL FLAW AS HE SEES
IT, HOWEVER, IS THAT DESPITE SPECIFIC STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY
CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSAL, IT WILL BE INTERPRETED AS AN ATTEMPT
TO DIVIDE THE ARABS. BY REJECTING THE PROPOSAL ON THIS GROUND,
IN SPITE OF WHAT MIGHT SEEM TO BE BENEFITS FOR THE UAR, NASSER
WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY PUBLICLY TO AREAFFIRM HIS DEDICATION TO
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE LIBERATION OF ALL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
AND TO ENHANCE HIS CLAIM
TO BE SPOKESMAN OF ALL THE ARABS.
5. ELABORATING ON THIS POINT, HELOU SAID THAT NASSER PROBABLY
WANTS PEACE BUT FINDS IT EASIER TO OPT FOR WAR. PEACE WOULD RE-
QUIRE IMMEDIATE DECISIVE ACTION WITH UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES
CHOOSING WAR DOES NOT INVOLVE MAKING HARD DECISIONS AND ANY AD-
VERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS CHOICE MIGHT BE YEARS IN COMING.
6. I THEN ASKED HELOU IF HE THOUGHT SOME SLIGHT MODIFICATIONS TO
THE US PROPOSAL WHICH WERE ACCEPTABLETO THE USSR MIGHT INFLUENCE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
STA
8
EXCES
Department of State
UNITED
ADDITIONAL
TELEGRAM
SEATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09484 02 OF 03 171452Z
NASSER'S ATTITUDE. HELOU WAS EXTREMELY DUBIOUS. HE SAID THAT IT
MIGHT MAKE A DIFFERENCE IF THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN WORKING
PAPERS WERE BOTH AVAILABLE TO JORDAN AND EGYPT AT THE SAME TIME.
HELOU WAS SIMILARLY PESSIMISTIC THAT A MEETING OF THE FOUR POWERS
WOULD HAVE MUCH CHANCE OF IMPROVING THE SITUATION, THOUGH HE
THOUGHT IT MIGHT PROVIDE A FORMULAFORINTRODUCING SOME HENPFUL
AMENDMENTS. A WEAKNESS OF THE FOUR POWER TALKS, AS HE SEES IT,
IS THAT FRANCE IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE ANY IMPORTANT INITIATIVE FOR
FEAR OF DAMAGING ITS PROFITABLE COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN THE ARAB
MIDDLE EAST.
7. HELOU THEN TURNED TO WHAT HE CONSIDERED THE ONLY REALISTIC
HOPE FOR A SOLUTION, I.E., THE PRIOR SEPARATION OF THE COM-
BATANTS BY STATIONING OF UN TROOPS. I INTERPOSED THAT IT WAS
HARDLY REALISTIC TO EXPECT THE UN TO USE FORCE TO IMPOSE A SOLU-
TION. HELOU REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT ENVISAGE USE OF FORCE (NOR OF
TROOPS FROM THE GREAT POWERS! BUT THAT SOME CLEVER PSYCHOLOGY
WOULD BE NECESSARY IF THE REASON FOR STATIONING TROOPS WAS STATED
AS SIMPLY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION, HELOU WAS
SURE THE ARABS WOULD ACCEPT IT. THE MANNER IN WHICH THE RESOLU-
TION WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED NEED NOT BE SPECIFIED. FROM THE ARAB
POINT OF VIEW, THE IMPORTANT THING WOULD BE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ISRAEL FOR ITS PART "MIGHT TAKE
SOME CONSOLATION" FROM THE FACT THAT THE TERRITORY FROM WHICH IT
WITHDREW WOULD NOT REVERT IMMEDIATELY TO THE ARABS THE MOST
IMPORTANT THING IS THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD BUY TIME ARAB PASSIONS
WOULD COOL AND INTEREST WANE. BLOOD WOULD STOP FLOWING WITH TIME,
THE ARABS WOULD FIND IT EASY TO ACCEPT SOLUTIONS THEY NOW RE-
JECT 00 PERHAPS EVEN LESS THEY NOW DEMAND BY WAY OF EXAMPLE,
HELOU CITED THE PROVISION IN THE US WORKING PAPER FOR NEUTRAL-
IZING SHARM ASH SHAYKH AND TIRAN. IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT THE
ARABS WILL VIEW THIS AS A POSITIVE US=SPONSORED ACT LIMITING ARAB
SOVEREIGNTY BUT KEEPING US FORCES IN THESE AREASAFTER A GENERAL
UN WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. "WHEN THE TIDE RE-
CEDES, WHO IS BOTHERED IF IT LEAVES A FEW ROCKS BEHIND? HELOU
SAID SEPARATING THE COMBATANTS WOULD ALSO FACILITATE SETTLING OTHER
ASPECTS OF THE MIDEAST PROBLEM IT IS TRUE HE SAID, THAT ARAB
LANDS MUST BE RETURNED TO ARABS, BUT NOT NECESSARILY TO THE
SAME ARABS WHO GOVERNED THEM BEFORE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE UN HELD
A PLEBISCITE IN GAZA AND THE PEOPLE OPTED TO BECOME PART OF JOR-
DAN, WHO COULD OBJECT?
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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UNITED ADDRESS
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 09484 01 OF 03 171547Z
STOP A REVOLUTION AT KERENSKY. EITHER KERENSKY BECOMES LENIN OR
A LENIN ARISES." HELOU FELT THAT THIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST PRO-
WESTERN ARAB STATES, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY AGAINST THE US ITSELF,
WOULD GREATLY ACCELERATE IN THE FIRST PART OF NEXT YEAR.
3. HELOU SAID THAT THE DECEMBER 20 ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE AT
RABAT WILL BE A WATERSHED AND THAT HE IS NOT AT ALL OPTIMISTIC
ABOUT THE OUTCOME. THE "NOT VERY INTELLIGENT" GENERAL BUSTANY,
WHO HAD REPRESENTED LEBANON AT THE ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE COUNCIL
MEETING IN CAIRO WHICH ARRANGED THE SUMMIT, HAD FAILED TO SEE
SEVERAL TRAPS WHICH HAD BEEN LAID FOR LEBANON, AND APPARENTLY
CERTAIN DECISIONS WERE NOT DISCUSSED WITH HIM. HELOU SAID THAT
DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN AT RABAT WHICH MIGHT NOT AT FIRST SEEM
DECISIVE BUT WHICH WOULD BE NONETHELESS IRREVERSIBLE. HE FEARED
THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD ADOPT A DECISION SPECIFYING THAT ALL ARAB
COUNTRIES PROVIDE A MILITARY CONTINGENT TO BE PUT UNDER ARAB
JOINT COMMAND. EVEN MORE GRAVE, HE FEARED A DECISION CALLING
FOR THE STATIONING OF ARAB FORCES WHEREVER THE JOINT COMMAND
THOUGHT NECESSARY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL. THIS WOULD BE
A DEMAND THAT LEBANON COULD NOT EASILY REFUSE. FROM THE ROINT
OF VIEW OF THE OTHER ARAB STATES, IT IS NOW NATURAL THAT LEBANON
SHOULD ACCEPT THE STATIONING OF ARAB TROOPS ON ITS SOIL IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE GENERAL ARAB PREPARATION FOR WAR. ACCORDING TO THIS
REASONING, THE SUEZ, GOLAN AND JORDANIAN FRONTS ARE NOT SUITABLE
FOR ATTACK ON ISRAEL. WHY SHOULD THE MORE SUITABLE LEBANESE FRONT
BE EXEMPTED?
PORTER
EXPLA
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECREORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Ya Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 391
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09484 01 OF 03 171547Z
47
ACTION SS-45
2
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
018385
PR 171220Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9073
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
SECR ENT SECTION I OF 3 BEIRUT 9484
EXDIS:
BEGIN SUMMARY. NOVEMBER 14 I SAW PRES HELOU
WHO DEEPLY PESSIMIS-
TIC ABOUT TREND OF EVENTS IN ME. HE CONVINCED PROCESS OF RADI-
CALIZATION IN THE REGION PROCEEDING UNCHECKED AND THAT THE CAM-
PAIGN AGAINST US INTERESTS AND STATES FRIENDLY TO US WILL AC-
CELERATE GREATLY IN MONTHS JUST AHEAD. HE PARTICULARLY MENTIONED
CONCERTYB CAMPAIGN AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA OF LAST FEW WEEKS. HELOU
WORRIED ABOUT FORTHCOMING RABAT SUMMIT WHICH HE THINKS WILL BE
WATERSPLD FOR LEBANON AND ARAB WORLD. HE FEARS DECISION WILL BE
TAKEN AT MEETING THAT ALL ARAB STATES CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO JOINT
ARAB COMMAND AND ACCEPT STATIONING OF TROOPS ON THEIR TERRITORY
IF DEEMED NECESSARY BY ARAB COMMAND. LEBANON WOULD FIND SUCH A
DEMAND DIFFICULT TO REFUSE. TURNING TO US PEACE PROPOSAL, HELOU
SAID HE THOUGHT CAIRO WOULD BLUNTLY REJECT IT. OBVIOUS OBJEC-
TION IS THAT IT DOES NOT SPECIFY TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, BUT FATAL FLAW IS THAT IT WILL BE INTERPRETED
AS ATTEMPT DIVIDE THE ARABS. BY REJECTING IT ON THIS BASIS AND
IN SPITE OF APPARENT BENEFITS TO THE UAR, NASSER WILL BE ABLE TO
REAFFIRM HIS DEVOTION TO FREEING ALL
OCCUPIED LANDS AND ENHANCE
HIS CLAIM TO BEI THE SPOKESMAN FOR ALL THE ARABS. HELOU DID
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
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#
Department of State
ORLINO
ARE
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
EXPIS EXCES
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09484 01 OF 03 171547Z
NOT THINK ANY MINOR MODIFICATIONS LIKELY MAKE PROPOSAL MORE
PALATABLE TO NASSER. HELOU CONVINCED THAT ONLY REALISTIC WAY TO
PEACE IS TO FIRST SEPARATE THE COMBATANTS WITH UN TROOPS. ARABS
WOULDACCEPT THIS IF IT IN CONTEXT IMPLEMENTING NOVEMBER 22
RESOLUTION.
SPECIFICS NEED NOT BE SPELLED OUT. IMPORTANT THING IS
THAT IT WOULD STOP FLOW OF BLOOD AND BUY TIME FOR PASSIONS TO
COOL. HELOU BELIEVES ARABS WOULD EVENTUALLY ACCEPT SOLUTIONS
THEY NOW REJECT AND THAT PRESENTLY THORNY PROBLEMS SUCH AS SHARM
ASH SHAYKH, TIRAN, AND GAZA WOULD BECOME MUCH MORE TRACTABLE.
HE BELIEVES SOVIETS WOULD GO ALONG WITH SUCH A PLAN BECAUSE
THEY DON'T WANT WAR IN ME THOUGH THEY CHALLENGING THE ARABS TO
THE BRINK OF WAR, SEEKING THEREBY TO SUBSTITUTE OWN INFLUENCE
FOR THAT OF US AND WEST AND FORESTALL GROWTH CHINESE INFLUENCE.
CONCLUDING ON PESSIMISTIC NOTE, HELOU SAID HE BELIEVES UNLESS
PRESENT TREND ARRESTED, NEXT SEVERAL YEARS WILL SEE US COM-
PLETELY SUPERSEDED IN THE REGION BY USSR AND IN SUBSEQUENT FEW
YEARS USSR WILL IN TURN BE ECLIPSED BY COMMUNIST CHINA. END
SUMMARY.
1. PRES HELOU RECEIVED ME AT 11:00 A.M. NOV 14 TO GIVE ME HIS VIEWS
ON THE US PEACE PROPOSALS, A COPY OF WHICH I HAD SENT HIM THE
DAY BEFORE. HE PREFACED HIS REMARKS ON THE PROPOSALS WITH HIS VIEW
OF THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE MIDEAST.
2. HE SAID THAT THE BASIC FACTOR IS THAT 80 MILLION ARABS HAVE
BEEN UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE REALITY OF DEFEAT AT THE HANDS OF TWO
MILLION JEWS AND THEY THEREFORE CONSOLE THEMSELVES WITH THE FIRM
BELIEF THAT IT WAS REALLY THE US WHICH DEFEATED THEM. STARTING
FROM THIS PREMISE, AND GIVEN THE PREMISE THAT THE ARABS CANNOT
WAGE WAR ON THE US OR WIN A WAR WITH ISRAEL, THE PROCESS OF
REHABILITATING ARAB MORALE DICTATES
AN ATTACK ON US INTERESTS:
IN THE AREA AND ON THOSE GOVERNMENTS FRIENDLY TO THE US. THIS
IS ALREADY TAKING PLACE, ASWITNESS LEBANON'S TROUBLES, DEMANDS
ON KUWAIT FOR MORE ASSISTANCE, AND THE STRONG CAMPAIGN AGAINST
SAUDI ARABIA WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. THE LIBYAN
MONARCHY WAS THE FIRST VICTIM OF THIS TREND, AND THE US IS
DELUDING ITSELF IF IT THINKS THAT THE REVOLUTION THERE WILL STOP
SHORT OF COMPLETE REJECTION OF THE WEST. "IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AUTHORIZED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 441
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09501 171642Z
41
ACTION SS=45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
018719
R 171604Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9080
S: ENC R ETT BEIRUT 9501
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING
REF 8 BEIRUT 9480
10 ONE OF THE CONTINUING SYRIAN INTERESTS HAS BEEN TO SEEK FROM
USG EXPORT LICENSE 1000 RCA TRANSCEIVERS. MOST RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS ON THIS QUESTION WERE CONTAINED IN AN OFFICIAL- INFORMAL
FROM PRATT TO BAAS NEA/ARN DATED NOV 40
20 RCA AGENT DAMASCUS EL YUSSEF AGAIN RAISED QUESTION NOV 17
DURING VISIT BEIRUT WHICH WAS DISCUSSED AGAINST BACKGROUND DE-
TENTION ISRAELI PASSENGERS. EL YUSSEF REITERATED HOW DIFFICULT
ANY DECISION FOR RELEASE WAS FOR ANY SYRIAN HEAD OF GOVT TO MAKE
BECAUSE IF HE DECIDED FOR RELEASE HE FACED RISK BEING OVERTHROWN.
OBVIOUS CONCLUSION WAS HE HAD TO DEFEND HIMSELF BY HAVING SOME=
THING IN HAND TO SHOW AS PRICE FOR RELEASE.
30 IN THIS CONNECTION, WE BELIEVE POT COULD BE SWEETENED FOR
SARG DECISION MAKERS BY USG DECISION TO LICENSE THIS EXPORT AND
EXPIS
TO COMMUNICATE THIS DECISION TO SYRIANS WHILE DISCUSSIONS MEN-
TIONED REFTEL ARE STILL UNDERWAY. THIS GESTURE WOULD COST US
NOTHING AND YIELD TWO MILLION DOLLARS IN EXPORTS AND MIGHT POS-
SIBLY TIP SCALES FAR ENOUGH FOR SARG TO DECIDE FAVORABLY ON
RELEASE TWO ISRAELIS. LICENSE COULD ALWAYS BE RECONSIDERED IF
SITUATION TURNED SERIOUSLY SOUR LATER ON.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES MAKE AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 666
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09505 02 OF 02 1720092
2/3
47
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 NSCE-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 1046 W
019814
OR 1717192 NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9082
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECRET T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 9505
EXDIS
CORRECTEDCOPY(TEXT)
SUBJ: FEDAYEEN AND UNRWA CAMPS IN LEBANON
REF: STATE 191882
50 UNRWA HAS COME UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE FROMPALESTINIAN EM-
PLOYEES EMBOLDENED BY SUPPORT THEY NOW RECEIVE FROM FEDAYEEN OR-
GANIZATIONS. DIRECTOR OF UNRWA AFFAIRS FOR LEBANON WAS INFORMED
RECENTLY THAT THE AGENCY'S "TEACHERS" STAFF ASSOCIATION HAS
BEEN REPLACED BY A NEW PLO-SPONSORED "ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINIAN
TEACHERS." THE LATTER GROUP HAS ALREADY ADOPTED MORE BELLIGERENT
POSITION IN DEMANDING CHANGES IN EDUCATION PROGRAMs SUCH
AS NEW SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND SMALLER CLASSES, FOR WHICH ADEQUATE
FUNDS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. THE NEW ASSOCIATION HAS ESPOUSED CAUSE
OF TEACHER APPLICATNS FOR WHOM UNRWA/UNESCO HAD NOT FOUND JOBS.
IMPLIED THREATS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST UNRWA'S PALESTINIAN
EMPLOYEES WHO RESIST FEDAYEEN "DIRECTIVES" AGANCY OFFICIALS FEAR
ADMINISTRATIVE CHAOS MAY ENSUE IF GOL DOES NOT REGAIN SOME MEASURE
OF CONTROL OVER CAMPS FROM FEDAYEEN.
60 GOL POSITION. FONOFF SEC GEN SADAQA, WHO PARTICIPATED IN CAIRO
GOL=PLO TALKS, HAS ADVISED UNRWA THAT CAIRO AGREEMENT ENDORSES
GOLMS INTENTION TO REESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE REFUGEE CAMPS.
THERE ARE ALSO TO BE PASC REPRESENTATIVES IN EACH CAMP TO CO -
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
ORLINED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09505 02 OF 02 172009Z
ORDINATE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES AND COOPERATE WITH GOL IN MAINTAINING
ORDER. SADAQA STRESSED THAT UNRWA WILL CONTINUE DEAL EXCLUSIVELY
WITH THE GOL, AS PROVIDED BY GOL/UN AGREEMENT RELATING TO UNRWA,
EXATE
AND GOL WILL RETAIN EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY DEAL WITH ALL PALESTINIAN
ORGANIZATIONS. SADAQA ALSO ASSERTED TO UNRWA THAT CAIRO AGREEMENT
ENDORSES GOL BAN ON ARMED FEDAYEEN IN UNIFORM IN CAMPS . HE STRESSED
IT WILL TAKE GOL TIME TO WORK OUT DETAILS AND COUNSELED PATIENCE.
70 GOL EFFORTS TO REESTABLISH CONTROL OVER CAMPS, IN COOPERATION
WITH PASC, ARE HAMPERED BY DEFIANT POSITION TAKEN BY PELP, WHOSE
SPOKESMAN HAVE DECLARED PFLP, BEING INDEPENDENT OF PLO's IS NOT
BOUND BY CAIRO AGREEMENT. SINCE PFLP IS WELL INSTALLED IN SOME
LEBANESE CAMPS, SUCH AS RASHIDIYYAH, REESTABLISHMENT OF GOL
SOVEREIGNTY WILL RISK FURTHER CLASHES WITH FEDAYEEN
8. COMMENT. IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WHAT THE CAIRO AGREEMENT
MAY ULTIMATELY MEAN FOR GOL POSITION IN UNRWA CAMPS SPECIFIC
NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP WILL HAVE TO BE HAMMERED OUT IN ACTUAL
SITUATIONS. DESPITE SADAQA'S ASSURANCES, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT GOLI
WILL AT BEST BE CONSTRAINED TO SHARE SUPERVISION OVER CAMPS WITH
PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES. IMPRESSIVE QUANTITY OF ARMS IN REFUGEE
HANDS PLUS RECOGNITION GOL ACCORDED PALESTINIAN CAUSE THROUGH
CARIO AGREEMENT HAVE ENHANCED PALESTINIANS ABILITY TO RETAIN
SOME OF THEIR RECENTLY ACQUIRED AUTONOMY.
9. THESE QUESTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN GOL AND
PALESTINIANS ANY ATTEMPT BY ANOTHER GOVERNMENT, EVEN INCLUDING
THE MAJOR DONOR, THE US, TO IMPOSE ITS VIEWS WOULD PROVOKE A
VIOLENT PALESTINIAN REACTION THAT COULD FURTHER WEAKEN THE POSI-
TION OF THE GOLD IF UNRWA IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE ITS WELFARE
PROGRAM WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, WE BELIEVE THE FEDAYEEN
WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO TEMPER THEIR DEMANDS ON UNRWA AND GOL SO
AS NOT TO PROVIDE CAUSE FOR TERMINATION OF UN AID. BELIEVE AGENCY
IS IN BEST POSITION TO JUDGE WHETHER IT CAN CONTINUE TO FUNCTION,
AND IF NOT, WHAT ACTION UN MIGHT PROFITABLY TAKE.
10. IF, AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE US WERE TO CUT OFF AID OR IN ANY
OTHER WAY ACT AGAINST REFUGEES LIVING ON LEBANESE SOIL, WE WOULD
BE PENALIZING GOL AND AIDING RADICAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS BAATH WHICH
SEEK TO DESTROY LEBANON THERE WOULD ALSO OF COURSE, BE AN
IMMEDIATE AND VIOLENT ANTI-US RESPONSE TO ANY SUCH ACTION IN
ANY EVENT, UNLESS OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON SHOULD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
GRING STATES OF
TELEGRAM
EXCES EXPIS
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 09505 02 OF 02 1720092
FURTHER DETERIORATE, WE SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT UNRWA'S ABILITY
TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL WELFARE SERVICES TO NEEDY REFUGEES AS IN
THE PAST, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE RELATIONSHIP ULTIMATELY ESTABLISHED
BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE FEDAYEEN. FROM US POINT OF VIEW, ONE
OF THE OWRST ASPECTS OF PRESENT SITUATION IS THAT SOME RECIPIENTS
OF UN RATIONS ARE TRAINING AS FEDAYEEN. HOWEVER, UNRWA HAS IN-
FORMED US FLATLY THAT THEY HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF ANY DIVERSION OF
UN RATIONS TO ANY FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION PER SE ° IF DONOR STATES
WERE TO SUSPEND CONTRIBUTIONS ON THIS POINT OF PRINCIPLE, RESULT
COULD BE DELETERIOUS TO THE EFFORT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND
DESTRUCTIVE TO LEBANON.
11. WE ARE OF COURSE DEEPLY DISTRUBED, BY THE PRESENT TREND IN
LEBANON. THE DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT HELOU HAS REPEATEDLY
DRAWN OUR ATTENTION TO THE MENACE TO LEBANON OF THE PALESTINIAN
"FIFTH COLUMN." IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE HAS LONG SOUGHT
A MORE EFFECTIVE UN PRESENCE TO HELP PRESERVE LEBANONS SOVEREIGN-
TY AND INTEGRITY. HOWEVER, IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HELOU
TO TAKE THE MATTER TO THE UN HIMSELF: HE IS CONSTRAINED BY THE
TERMS OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT, AND SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE AN ACT
OF POLITICAL SUICIDE.
12. AS LONG AS US POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB. ISRAEL CONFLICT IS BASED
UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNSC RESOLUTION OF NOV 22, OUR INTER=
ESTS REQUIRE US TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT UNRWA. THE ARGUMENT THAT
UNRWA SHOULD SEVER ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS, BECAUSE
THEY HAVE REJECTED THE UN RESOLUTION, CAN BE MET BY THE COUNTER-
ARGUMENT THAT ISRAEL, HAVING FAILED TO ACCEPT PREVIOUS UN REFUGEE
RESOLUTIONS, IS EQUALLY AT FAULT. IF DEPARTMENT MUST COMMENT
ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON, WE
BELIEVE THAT COMMENT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ASKING THE UNSYG TO
INVESTIGATE SITUATION AND TO MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS.
PORTER
NOT TO REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT DEPA OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AUTHORIZED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
429
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09461 150557Z
19
ACTION SS=45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
009856
EXCES
R 141734Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9066
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
,'69 NOV 15 AM 7:59
BITUATION ROOM WHITE HOUSE WHITE HOUSE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
SECRET BEIRUT 9461
EXDIS:
CORRECTEDCO PTY (PARA 101
10 IN THE COURSE OF MY NOVEMBER 14 INTERVIEW WITH PRES-
IDENT HELOU, HE VOLUNTEERED THAT GENERAL BUSTANI HAD
DONE A POOR JOB NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO IN CAIRO.
SAYING THAT HE DIDN'T WANT TO PASS JUDGMENT ON
BUSTANI'S MOTIVES, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT AT THE VERY
LEAST BUSTANI HAD FALLEN FOR THE FLATTERY OF HIS
ADVERSARIES AT CAIRO. PERHAPS HE HAD BEEN PROMISED
ARAB SUPPORT FOR HIS POLITICAL AMBITIONS IN LEBANON.
IN ANY CASE, THE RESULT WAS THE INCLUSION IN THE
AGREEMENT OF SEVERAL PROVISIONS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN
DISCUSSED AND AGREED UPON IN BEIRUT PRIOR TO THE
NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EXCLUSION OF ONE (UNSPECIFIED)
PROVISION WHICH WAS TO HAVE BEEN INCLUDED HELOU
SAID THAT THE MOST DANGEROUS OF THE INCLUDED PRO-
VISIONS CONCERNED THE STATUS OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS.
HE DID NOT ELABORATE. HELOU SAID HE WAS NOT SURE
THE GOL COULD HAVE RESISTED THE PRESSURES AT CAIRO
IN ANY CASE BUT BUSTANI, ACTING ON HIS OWN WITHOUT
SECURING INSTRUCTIONS FROM HELOU CERTAINLY HAD NOT
BEEN THE BEST MAN TO SAFEGUARD LEBANON® INTERESTS
20 HELOU OBVIOUSLY HAS DOUBTS ABOUT HOW EFFECTIVE IS
CONTROL HE NOW EXERTS OVER THE MILITARY. AT ONE
POINT HE POSED THE QUESTION "WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO
LEBANON IF TOMORROW WE HAVE A PRIME MINISTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Department of State
EXEMS
UNITED DIPARTMENT DEP # OF STATE
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09461 150557Z
WHO IS UNWILLING TO USE FORCE TO CONTROL THE FEDAYEEN AND
AN ARMY WHOSE LEADERSHIP MAY BE SIMILARLY UNWILLING
OR UNABLE"?
PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
690/40/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNITED DIRACTMENT STATES OF OF AMERICA STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET 098
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09444 141443Z
50
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00, NSCE 00,CCO 00,/046 W
004860
Z 141425Z NOV 69
''69 NOV 15 AM 8:00 00
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9061
SECR ET BEIRUT 9444
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 9442
IN PASSAGE OF WILSON MESSAGE TO WISER TWA PRESIDENT PLEASE
INFORM WISER HE SHOULD DELAY MEETING WITH SYRIAN AMBASSADOR
UNTIL REFTEL RECEIVED. MEETING THOUGHT SCHEDULED 10 AM NY TIME.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
WH H
STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 150
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09411 132233Z
82
ACTION SS 45
2/3
INFO OCT 01/046 W
000391
R 131646Z NOV 69 ZFG
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9052
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECRET BEIRUT 9411
EXDIS
EXCES
CORRECTEDCOPY (NUMBERED PARAGRAPH 21
DEPARTMENT PASS INFO USINT CAIRO
REF: STATE 191141
SUBU: JOINT US-USSR WORKING PAPER
ON RECEIPT REFTEL NOV 13 WE HANDED TEXT DRAFT US-USSR
WORKING PAPER TO MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT), WITH FIRM STRICTURES
TO HOLD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. EXPLAINED THAT TEXT ALREADY
GIVEN TO AMMAN AND CAIRO, AND AS WELL TO AMB KABBANI IN
WASHINGTON. WE REVIEWED SALIENT FEATURES OF DRAFT WITH
KHOURY WHO DELIVERING TO PRES HELOU THIS EVENING.
21 KHOURY TOOK CAREFUL NOTES. HE WAS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE
BY PROBLEM CREATED BY NEGOTIATING UAR-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT
APART FROM JORDAN-ISRAELI ASPECTS. HE WAS SOMEWHAT REASSURED
BY SECOND PAR POINT 7 AND ADMITTED NEGOTIATIONS HAD TO
START SOMEWHERE. HE OBVIOUSLY FEARS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS
MAY BE WEAK POINT IN TERMS OF SECURING UAR ACCEPTANCE,
PARTICULARLY IF NASSER WANTS EXCUSE FOR REJECTING PROPOSAL.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF
STATE *
EXCES
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AUTHORIZED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09411 132233Z
31 KHOURY SAID LEBANON OF COURSE GRATEFUL FOR ANY STEPS
WHICH MIGHT PRODUCE QUICK ME SETTLEMENT, BUT HE ALSO EXPRESSED
CONCERN (WHICH WE NOW HEAR FOR MANY LEBANESE) THAT EVIDENCE
OF PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD PRODUCE
VIOLENT REACTION FROM FEDAYEEN AND IN TURN CAUSE THEM CREATE
NEW INTERNAL TROUBLES IN LEBANON. HE THOUGHT PERIOD AHEAD
WOULD BE ONE OF MAXIMUM DANGER FOR LEBANON. WHEN WE SUGGESTED
DANGER MIGHT BE SHORT-TERM AND CONTROLLABLE IF PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT WAS IN OFFING, HE RESPONDED THAT HE HOPED LEBANON
WOULD NOT BECOME A FATALITY IN THE PROCESS.
PORTER
NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
990/80/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
for
SECRET 145
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09366 121726Z
EXPIS EXPIS
2
47
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 W
122564
PR 121537Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9036
hE Wd 21 AON 69
SITUA ION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY RABAT
S EMC R E T BEIRUT 9366
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 9244 (NOTAL)
1. IN CONVERSATION WITH DCM NOVEMBER 12 MICHEL KHOURY,
PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT (PROTECT) GAVE FOLLOWING INSIGHTS
INTO THE RECENT ARAB LEAGUE MEETING IN CAIRO. KHOURY SAID THAT
HE HAD READ REPORTS ON THE MEETING AND TALKED WITH SEVERAL
OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATES.
2. HE SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF US GUARANTEES TO LEBANON
DID NOT ARISE. THE SYRIANS, HOWEVER, DID SUBMIT TO THE
COUNCIL A VIOLENT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE SEVERANCE OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE US BY ALL ARAB COUNTRIES.
KHOURY SAID THAT THE LANGUAGE WAS so VIOLENT THAT IT WAS HARD
TO BELIEVE THE SYRIANS WERE SERIOUS. APPARENTLY THE SYRIAN
RESOLUTION WAS NEVER DISCUSSED AS THE SUDANESE DELEGATION
HAD SUBMITTED A RESOLUTION EARLIER AND THE CHAIRMAN GAVE IT
PRECEDENCE. ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THE SUDANESE RESOLUTION
DESCRIBED THE US AS NUMBER ONE ENEMY OF THE ARABS BUT RECOM-
MENDED SOMETHING LESS THAN A BREAK IN RELATIONS. THE
LEBANESE AND KUWAITI DELEGATIONS SECRETLY DRAFTED AN AMENDED
SUDANESE RESOLUTION WHICH MODERATED ITS TONE AND WHICH WAS
APPARENTLY ADOPTED.
3. BY AND LARGE KHOURY FELT THE LEAGUE MEETING CAME OUT SOMEWHAT
BETTER THAN THE LEBANESE HAD EXPECTED AND PERHAPS LESSENED A
SECRET
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PRANTMENT OF STATE
*
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STATES AMERICA UNITED
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EXPIS EXPIS
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09366 121726Z
BIT THE CHANCES FOR EXTREME ACTION IN THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING
DECEMBER 20. THE DCM MENTIONED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE
SAUDIS AND MOROCCANS HAD BEEN HELPFUL AS A MODERATING INFLUENCE
AT THE CONFERENCE. KHOURY AGREED BUT WAS QUICK TO
ADD THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALSO BEEN BOTH MODERATE AND HELPFUL.
4. MAKING CLEAR THAT HE WAS SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF AND NOT
FOR PRESIDENT HELOU, KHOURY STATED THAT THE PERIOD BETWEEN
NOW AND THE SUMMIT MEETING WAS CRUCIAL. THE FUTURE OF
MODERATE REGIMES IN THE AREA WAS VERY MUCH IN BALANCE. IN
THE INTEREST OF THE SURVIVAL OF SUCH REGIMES, IT WAS OF
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE THAT THE US MAKE SOME KIND OF A PRO-
NOUNCEMENT OR TAKE SOME KIND OF ACTION WHICH WOULD PUBLICLY
INDICATE SOME US DISENGAGEMENT FROM ITS APPARENT ALIGNMENT WITH
ISRAEL. HE QUOTED PRESIDENT HELOU AS DESCRIBING NASSER'S
LAST SPEECH AS "THIS DECLARATION OF WAR IS THE LAST ATTEMPT
FOR PEACE". HE APPRECIATED FULLY THAT US POLICY AND THAT OF
ISRAEL WERE NOT THE SAME BUT THE USG HAD TO DISPEL PUBLICLY
THIS IMPRESSION WHICH WAS NOW FIRMLY HELD IN THE ARAB
WORLD.
PORTER
NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. POSZ S/S-O.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE A THORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
L90/E0/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 115
EXETS EXCESS
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09293 0910062
10
2
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01,000 00,SSO 00, NSCE 00/1046 W
105787
0 0909452 NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9024
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
S SECOR ET BEIRUT 9293
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 9244
DELIVER DEPARTMENT ACTION OFFICER 0800 NOV 9.
AT RECEPTION LAST NIGHT, NOV 8, MICHEL KHOURY, PRESIDENTIAL
CONFIDANT (PROTECT) TOLD DCM LEBANON HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY INFORMED
BY ARAB LEAGUE THAT SERVICE BY US CITIZENS IN ISRAELI ARMY WILL
BE AGENDA ITEM CURRENT MEETING ARAB DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS*
MEETING CAIRO. HE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT EXTREMISTS WOULD MAKE
US POLICIES AND RELATIONS WITH US MAJOR TOPIC AT LEAGUE MEETING.
KHOURY ADDED LEBANESE DELEGATION WOULD DO ITS BEST TWART SUCH
EVENTUALITY BUT MAINTAINED UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES LEBANESE
IN NO POSITION EXERT MUCH INFLUENCE. KHOURY EXPLAINED NAUIB SADAQA,
SECRETARY GENERAL FOREIGN OFFICE, HAD BEEN ASSIGNED DELEGATION
STRENGTHEN BACK BONE LEADER LEBANESE DELEGATION, GENERAL BOUSTANI
IN WHOM KHOURY HAD NO CONFIDENCE.
PORTER
EXCES
SECRET
I
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 056
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09178 042231Z
85
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01/1046 W
072475
R 041746Z NOV 69
2
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHOC 8997
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
S E CRET BEIRUT 9178
EXDIS
DEPT PASS INFO USINT CAIRO
1. DCM DISCUSSED CAIRO NEGOTIATIONS ON LEBANESE CRISIS NOON
NOVEMBER 4 WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT).
KHOURY WAS CAUTIOUS ABOUT DETAILS OF NEGOTIATIONS BUT INDICATED
HE WOULD PERHAPS HAVE MORE INFORMATION TOMORROW.
2. ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THE LEBANESE ACHIEVED MORE OR LESS
WHAT THEY EXPECTED IN CAIRO. THEY COMPROMISED BUT DID NOT
CAPITULATE. ALTHOUGH VAGUE AS TO DETAILS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT
BOUSTANY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ARAFAT FOR THE PLO
"AGREED" TO A DOCUMENT APPARENTLY CONTAINED GENERAL PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDAYEEN AND THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCLOSE THE DETAILS OF THE
AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH HE AGREED THAT IT OBVIOUSLY GAVE THE FEDAYEEN
MORE FREEDOM OF ACTION THAN PREVIOUSLY. GENERAL BOUSTANY RETURNED
FROM CAIRO THIS NOON AND HAS BEEN CONFERRING WITH THE PRESIDENT.
ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE TO BE WORKED
OUT IN LEBANON BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER ARAFAT OR SOMEONE ELSE
IN THE PLO ORGANIZATION WOULD REPRESENT THE FEDAYEEN.
3. KHOURY FELT THAT NASSER HAD BEEN HELPFUL WITHIN LIMITS. HE
OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT WILLING TO SACRIFICE ANY PRESTIGE ON LEBANON'S
BEHALF. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LEBANESE TRIED TO CHANGE THE COMMUNIQUE
WHERE IT REFERRED TO THE ARAB NATION. PREVIOUS COMMUNIQUES HAVE
ALWAYS REFERRED TO THE ARAB PEOPLES PERMITTING INDIVIDUALITY TO EACH
ARAB COUNTRY. NASSER REFUSED TO MAKE THIS ADJUSTMENT. KHOURY ALSO
MENTIONED THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AMMASH OF IRAQ (BEIRUT 90691 WHO
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09178 042231Z
REMAINED HERE FOR SEVERAL DAYS, HAD OFFERED TO MEDIATE BUT THE
LEBANESE INTERPRETED THE PRICE TO BE MORE FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR THE
PRO=IRAQI BAATH PARTY IN LEBANON. FURTHERMORE, AS WE HAVE
PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THE GOL WAS COMMITTED TO UAR MEDIATION
AND DID NOT WANT TO JEOPARDIZE UAR EFFORTS. AMMASH HAD TWO LONG
CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT HELOU.
4. KHOURY JUDGED THAT ARAFAT WENT TO CAIRO FROM DAMASCUS FOR
THREE PRINCIPAL REASONS: (A) COMMANDOS WERE SUFFERING
SIGNIFICANT LOSSES, (B) ARAFAT WAS SENSITIVE TO POSSIBLE CHANGES
OF SUBSERVIENCE TO THE SYRIAN REGIME, AND (C) HE COULD SEE
ADVANTAGES IN LEGALIZING PRESENCE OF THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON
AND ALSO IN HAVING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOL. CURIOUSLY ENOUGH,
ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THE FATAH AND LEBANESE AUTHORITIES HAD ALMOST
CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT AT THE TIME THE TROUBLE BEGAN.
5. KHOURY CONSIDERED THAT ALL THE DISADVANTAGES ANTICIPATED BY
HELOU IN COMING TO TERMS WITH THE FEDAYEEN PERSIST. THE FEDAYEEN
NOW HAVE THEIR "NOSE IN THE TENT". THEY CAN USE THE AGREEMENT
TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE AT SUCH A TIME AS THE LEBANESE
EXCES
ARMY HAS TO TAKE ACTION IN THE FACE OF A VIOLATION OF THE
AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGHT ARAFAT AGREED FOR THE PLO, THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT IS NOT SURE WHETHER ALL THE VARIOUS FEDAYEEN GROUPS
AND PAICULARLY THE SA'IQA (EVEN THOUGH NOMINALLY IN PLO) WILL
UPHOLD THE AGREEMENT. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN ONE VIOLATION OF
THE AGREEMENT IN THE SOUTH WHICH BOTH THE PLO AND THE GOL HAVE
TRIED TO CONCEAL. KHOURY FEELS THAT THE AGREEMENT HAS STRENGTHENED
THE LEFT AND ENHANCED THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN LEBANON.
HE NOTED THAT TWO PROMINENT LEBANESE POLITICIANS, ROYMOND
EDDE AND HENRI PHARAON, HAD, SINCE THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT,
ALREADY CALLED ON THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. HE ALSO BELIEVED IT WOULD
STRENGTHEN NASSER'S POSITION IN LEBANON. ALTHOUGH THE MODERATE
CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS APPEAR TO GO ALONG WITH WHAT THE GOVERNMENT
DID IN CAIRO, KHOURY ANTICIPATES TROUBLE FROM THE EXTREME RIGHT.
THE CHAMOUNISTS ARE ANGRY THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS COMPROMISED AND
MAINTAIN THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE A COMPROMISE, IT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN DONE SIX MONTHS AGO. LAST BUT PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT THE
AGREEMENT WILL GREATLY INCREASE THE RISK OF ISRAELI ACTION
AGAINST LEBANON AND CONSEQUENT FURTHER WEAKENING OF MODERATE
REGIME HERE.
6. AGREEMENT APPARENTLY HAS NOT MADE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 09178 042231Z
GOVERNMENT ANY EASIER. KHOURY BELIEVES THAT THE POLITICAL
CRISIS COULD WELL CONTINUE ALTHOUGH HE INDICATES THAT
"SOMETHING" MIGHT HAPPEN WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE EXPLAINED
THAT KARAMI WAS STILL SITTING ON THE FENCE AND INSISTED THAT ANY
GOVERNMENT WHICH HE FORMED MUST INCLUDE KAMAL JUMBLATT. THE
EXCLUS
PRESIDENT REMAINS RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT JUMBLATT BECAUSE THIS WOULD
INCUR THE WRATH OF THE CHAMOUNISTS. FORMER PRESIDENT, GENERAL FUAD
CHEHAB WANTS KARAMI BUT THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, GENERAL
SHUMAYYET FEELS THAT A KARAMI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE WISE AT
THE PRESENT TIME. PRESIDENT HELOU IS NOW CONSIDERING THE POSSI-
BILITY OF AN APOLITICAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD OFFEND NOBODY. THE
FORMATION OF SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO BE DIFFICULT.
7. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, KHOURY MAINTAINED THAT THE
GOVERNMENT WAS ABLE TO DO AS WELL AS IT DID IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
BECAUSE THE COUNTRY WAS UNIFIED AND THE ARMY WAS STRONG.
THEY DEALT FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. HE DESCRIBED ARMY MORALE
AS HIGH BUT EXPLAINED THAT THE ARMY OFFICERS ATTRIBUTED THEIR
STAUNCH EFFORT AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN TO THE EFFORTS OF GENERAL
SHUMAYYET, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND NOT TO EITHER BOUSTANY, THE
COMMANDER=IN-CHIEF, OR TO GENERAL CHEHAB.
8. COMMENT: IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE LEBANESE CAME OUT OF THE
EXCLUS EXPIS
CAIRO NEGOTIATIONS PRETTY MUCH AS THEY HAD EXPECTED. KHOURY WAS
PESSIMISTIC NOT BECAUSE OF THE RESULTS OF THE CAIRO NEGOTIATION
BUT BECAUSE HE KNEW BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED THAT THE
RESULTS COULD NOT BE FAVORABLE TO LEBANON. IT IS OBPIOUS FROM
THE CONVERSATION THAT THE TALKS HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETED. KHOURY
APOLOGIZED FOR HIS CAUTION BUT INDICATED THAT HE MIGHT HAVE A
CLEARER PICTURE TO PASS ON TOMORROW.
9. WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, THE EMBASSY WILL SUBMIT ITS
OWN ASSESSMENT OF LEBANON'S POSITION AS A RESULT OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS. THERE ARE TOO MANY LOOSE ENDS AT THE MOMENT
TO MAKE A VALID ASSESSMENT.
PORTER
NOTE: NOT PASSED
CAIRO BY OCT.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/08/28 NLN-NSC-620-3-2-1
GRANTMENT DER OF STATE
EXPES
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 191
file
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09138 041343Z
44
2
ACTION SS: 451
INFO OCT 01/046 W
068806
R : 0411032 NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8989
S ECRE T BEIRUT 9138
State Dept. review completed
EXDIS:
'69 NOV 4 PM 3:03
SITUATION ROOM SITUA ROOM
WHITE HOUSE WHITE HOUSE
REF: STATE 184502
SUBJ: BUSTANI-PLO AGREEMENT
1. YASIR ARAFAT AND HASSAN SABRY AL KHOL ARRIVED IN BEIRUT
ON OR ABOUT MAY 8, 1969, AND WENT SNTO A SERIES OF MEETINGS
ON THE FEDAYEEN-GOL DISPUTE - - FIRST ARAFAT WITH KHOLI, THEN
ARAFAT WITH KHOLI, HELOW AND KARAMI, THEN ARAFAT AND PARTY
WITH KHOLI AND LEBANESE ARMY OFFICIALS.
25X1
3. SUBSEQUENTLY (BEIRUT 3936, 4162, ETC.) WE LEARNED THAT
BUSTANI, UNDOUBTEDLY MOVED BY HIS PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS,
HAD REACHED WITH ARAFAT AN AGREEMENT WHICH ACCORDED THE PEDAYEEN
CONSIDERABLE FREEDOM OF ACTION AND MAY HAVE BEEN PUT INTO
WRITING. SOME OF THE ALLEGED ELEMENTS OF THIS AGREEMENT WERE
COMMUNICATED TO US BY YUSUF SAYIGH, WHO SAYS HE ATTENDED SOME
OFTHE MEETINGS (BEIRUT A-2571. WE ASSUME THAT THIS BUSTANI-
ARAFAT COMPACT IS THE ABORTIVE 15- POINT AGREEMENT" LATELY CITED
BY THE PLO.
4 - WITHIN A MATTER OF HOURS, THIS COMPACT WAS REPUDIATED
BY C/S SHUMAYYIT, WHO IS ALL SOLDIER, AND WHO HAD THE FULL
BACKING OF HELOU. AFTER ARAFAT HAD LEFT TOWN IN DISGUST (AROUND
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
No Objection To Declassification 2008/08/28 NLN-NSC-620-3-2-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
No Objection To Declassification 2008/08/28 NLN-NSC-620-3-2-1
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09138 0413432
EXE™S EXCES
MAY 121, CHEHAB CORROBORATED FOR THE AMBASS DOR THE ABOVE
ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEEDINGS (BEIRUT 621. MOREOVER, THE
EMBASSY LEARNED THAT HELOU DISCIPLINED BUSTANI BY SENDING HIM
TO COVENTRY FOR SEVERAL WEEKS ANDI DEALING DIRECTLY WITH SHUMAYYIT
INSTEAD (BEIRUT 42751.
5. CONSEQUENTLY, AS FAR AS THE GOL (I.E., HELOU) IS CONCERNED,
THERE WAS NO WRITTEN AGREEMENT WITH THE #EDAYEEN (BEIRUT 40351.
EVEN CHEHAB, WHO HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED KARAMI'S CALL FOR
"TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS" WITH THE FEDAYEEN, CONFIRMED TO THE
AMBASSADOR THAT THE GOL WILL NEVER MAKE THE MISTAKE OF GIVING
THE PLO ANY CONCESSIONS IN WRITING.
6. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT AT SOME POINT
THE PLO AND THE LEBANESE ARMY CAME TO SOME ORAL UNDERSTANDING,
POSSIBLY UNDER CHEHAB'S AUSPICES (NAJA-MCANDREW MEMCON 10/27/69).
OUR PRIMARY AUTHORITY FOR THIS CONCLUSION IS THE COMMUNIQUE
ISSUED BY THE LEBANESE ARMY ON OCTOBER 28. THE COMMU-
NIQUE TAKES THE FEDAYEEN TO TASK FOR ATTEMPTING TO
FORTIFY A POSITION IN A POPULATED AREA (MAJDAL SILIMI,
CONTRARY TO "AN UNDERSTANDING REACHED WITH THE REPRE-
SENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS" CLEARLY,
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE PLO IS A SUBTLE
ONE. IN FACT) IN HIS LATEST MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR,
CHEHAB WENT SO FAR AS TO ALLEGE THAT THE SHARP CONTRAST
BETWEEN THE SUSTANI AND SHUMAYYIT POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS
THE FEDAYEEN LAST MAY WAS ORCHESTRATED BY CHEHAB,
PRESUMABLY WITHOUT HELOU'S KNOWLEDGE, AND APPARENTLY
AS A MEANS OF THROWING THE PLO OFF-BALANCE.
7. CHEHAB'S COMMENT TO THE AMBASSADOR IMPLYING THAT BUSTANI
IS EXPENDABLE COULD ALSO REFLECT CHEHAB'S SIDE INTEREST
IN REDUCING BUSTANI'S PRESIDENTIAL PROSPECTS. OF COURSE)
SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CURRENT BUSTANI- ARAFAT
TALKS IN CAIRO MAY IN THE EYES OF MANY VINDICATE THE
POSITION BUSTANI TOOK LAST MAYO
PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OR HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
020/80/0290
No Objection To Declassification 2008/08/28 NLN-NSC-620-3-2-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
EXPIS
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 048
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09069 010128Z
81
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00/1046 W
050704
P 311600Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
'69 NOV I AM 9:50
SITUATION ROOM
2
WHITE HOUSE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8960
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBSSY JIDDA
USINT CAIRO
S E C R ET BEIRUT 9069
EXDIS:
1. NOON OCT 31 PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY, GAVE US
FOLLOWING REPORT ON COURSE CAIRO NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LEBANESE
DELEGATION AND EGYPTIANS ON LEBANESE CRISIS.
2. LEBANESE DELEGATION BRIEFED EGYPTIANS THOROUGHLY ON LEBANESE
POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION AND GOL POSITION FOR A SOLU-
TION. THE EGYPTIAN RESPONSE WAS "VERY COLD" AND UNCOMMUNICATIVE.
ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT YET INDICATED WHAT
THEY WANTED THE LEBANESE TO DO. THE LEBANESE WERE UPSET BY THE
ALMOST 100 PERCENT FEDAYEEN POINT OF VIEW EXPRESSED BY EGYPT'S
PUBLIC MEDIA AND REQUESTED EGHPTIANS TO BE MORE OBJECTIVE AND
CHANGE THEIR PUBLIC LINE. THE EGYPTIANS REFUSED. AT THE PRESENT
TIME NEITHER SIDE WANTS A COMMUNIQUE WHEN BOUSTANY RETURNS TO-
NIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING AS THERE IS REALLY NOTHING TO SAY.
3. GEN BOUSTANY HAS AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRES NASSER THIS EVENING.
THE LEBANESE ARE NOT SURE WHETHER NASSER HAS ANYTHING PARTI-
CULAR TO TELLI BOUSTANY OR NOT. AFTER THE LEBANESE DELEGATION
LEAVES CAIRO THE SCENARIO CALLS FOR THE EGYPTIANS TO TALK TO THE
FEDAYEEN. DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS OF THESE CONVERSATIONS, THE
PALESTINIANS WOULD COME TO LEBANON AND TALK DIRECTLY WITH THE
LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.
4. TO ADD TO THE COMPLEXITY OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS, DEPUTY
PRIMIN AMMASH OF IRAQ SAW PRES NASSER LAST NIGHT. HE ARRIVED IN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
DEP
STATE
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09069 010128Z
LEBANON TODAY AND, ACCORDING TO KHOURY, MADE A HELPFUL STATE-
MENT UPON HIS ARRIVAL. HE ASKED TO SEE PRES HELOU AND AN AP -
POINTMENT HAS BEEN MADE FOR HIM THIS EVENING MEANWHILE A MESSAGE
CAME FROM NASSER THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE NE-
GOTIATIONS WITH AMMASH. THE LEBANESE ARE MYSTIFIED AS TO WHAT
NASSER'S PROBLEM IS BUT ARE ANXIOUS TO HEAR WHAT AMMASH HAS TO
SAY ALTHOUGH THEY WILL OF COURSE BE CAREFUL NOT TO DO ANYTHING
WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE EGYPT'S MEDIATORY EFFORT.
5. KHOURY ALSO MENTIONED THAT CARETAKER PRIMIN KARAMI WILL PROB-
ABLY NOT GO TO CAIRO UNLESS PLO LEADER ARAFAT GOES. KARAMI FEELS,
ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THAT THERE IS NO POINT IN TALKING TO ANY-
BODY BUT ARAFAT AS IT IS ONLY WITH HIM THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY
CHANCE OF WORKING OUT A SOLUTION. KHOURY EXPLAINED THAT KARAMI
AGREES IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S NEGOTIATING POSITION,
AS LONG AS THE PALESTINIANS ACCEPT IT. WHERE HE DIFFERS IS THAT
HE IS PREPARED TO CONCEDE MORE TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT WITH THE
FEDAYEEN.
6. COMMENT. WHILE THE LEBANESE INTEND TO CONTINUE THE COURSE
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY MYSTIFIED AS TO WHAT
THE EGYPTIANS HAVE IN MIND. KHOURY EXPLAINED THAT THE MASS OF
CONFLICTING INFORMATION GOL RECEIVES ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM
IS STAGGERING* HE FEELS THAT THE PARTICIPANTS -- SYRIANS,
ARAFAT, EGYPTIANS -- ARE ALL FIGHTING TO BUILD UP THEIR OWN
PRESTIGE AT THE EXPENSE OF LEBANON. NEEDLESS TO SAY, AT THIS
POINT HE IS PESSIMISTIC.
PORTER
EXDIS ADDED PER ORIGINATOR
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the RichardNixonPlesidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
160/E0/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
12
0.R 301513Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
6949Q
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8948
1969 OCT 30 AM 10:36
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 9041
NODIS
DEPARTMENT PASS AMMAN, JIDDA, TEL AVIV, USUN
REFERENCE: STATE 182922
1. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PASS TO PRES HELOU GIST INFORMATION PARA
5 REFTEL. HELOU IS SO SORELY PRESSED AT MOMENT THAT A MORE DE-
TAILED BRIEFING WOULD NOT SINK IN. IN ANY CASE HE HAS NOT BEEN
KEPT ABREAST OF DETAILS US-SOV NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE.
2. I AM SEEING HELOU TOMORROW (OCT 31) 0900 LOCAL WILQ DAVID
ROCKEFELLER. AFTER ROCKEFELLER, I PROPOSE TAKE OPPORTUNITY BRIEF
HELOU PRIVATELY, UNLESS DEPT ADVISES CONTRARY.
PORTER
BT
NOTE: NOT PASSED AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JIDDA, USUN BY OC/T
Reproduced at the SECRET dential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
WH
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
12
P 301145Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
69240
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8940
BT
1969 OCT 30 AM 8:07
SECRET BEIRUT 9027
NODIS
1. MICHEL KHOURY, PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT, TOLD DCM OCTOBER
30 THAT GOL HAD A RELIABLE REPORT THROUGH THE VATICAN THAT
THE ISRAELI PRESS ATTACHI IN PARIS WAS TELLING MEMBERS OF
THE FRENCH THAT THERE WAS AN ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN
PRESIDENT HELOU AND THE ISRAELIS.
2. NATURALLY DISTURBED BY THE CRITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS
REPORT, KHOURY WONDERED IF THE US COULD DO ANYTHING TO SILENCE
THE PRESS ATTACHE. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED, HOWEVER, THAT NEITHER
THE GOL NOR HE BE MENTIONED TO THE ISRAELIS AS THE SOURCE. IF
THE ONLY WAY THE USG COULD RAISE THE ISSUE WITH THE ISRAELIS
WAS TO MENTION THE GOL AS THE SOURCE, KHOURY WOULD NOT WANT IT
RAISED AT ALL, DESPITE THE DISASTROUS EFFECT OF SUCH REVELATIONS
ON HELOU'S POSITION IN LEBANON.
3. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT RAISE THE
ISSUE WITH ISRAELI EMBASSY WASHINGTON. WITHOUT MENTIONING
THE LEBANESE AT ALL WE COULD POINT OUT THAT WE HAD
RELIABLE INFORMATION THE ISRAELI PRESS ATTACHE IN PARIS WAS
TELLING MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH PRESS THAT THERE WAS AN ARRANGE-
MENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT HELOU AND THE ISRAELIS.
PORTER
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
GRANTMENT OF STATE
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440
SUMMARY 42
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08981 281819Z
50
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 W
024543
P R 281708Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO ECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8925
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
S EICER El T BEIRUT 8981
EXDIS
DEPT PASS CAIRO
REF:BEIRUT 8922
EXPIS EXCES
1.IN CONVERSATION WITH DCM NOON OCT 28, MICHEL KHOURY DESCRIBED
STATUS UAR MEDIATION EFFORT AS CONFUSED AND INVOLVED.
2. GOL WAS EXTREMELY UPSET BY ALLEGED DAMASCUS STATEMENT OCT 27
OF LIBYAN, PALESTINIAN, SYRIAN AND UAR REPRESENTATIVES (EMBTEL
8947, PARA 61. GOL FELT THAT IF EGYPT GOING TO MEDIATE IT WOULD
BE MPROPER FOR IT ASSUME POSITION BEFORE MEDIATION PROCESS COM-
MENCED. CONSEQUENTLY IF STATEMENT REPRESENTED OFFICIAL UAR POSI-
TION, GOL DECIDED, ACCORDING TO KHOURY, NOT TO DISPATCH DELEGA-
TION TO CAIRO. THIS MORNING UAR AMBASSADOR ASSURED GOL THAT
STATEMENT DID NOT IN FACT REPRESENT OFFICIAL EGYPTIAN POSITION.
3. CONSEQUENTLY EMILE BOUSTANY( COMMANDER. CHIEF OF THE LEBANESE
ARMY, ACCOMPANIED BY SEVERAL STAFF OFFICERS LEAVING FOR CAIRO
THIS EVENING. ACCORDING KHOURY, PRES HELOU NOT HAPPY OVER CHOICE
OF BOUSTANY AS HE FEARS GENERAL WILL GIVE THE BALL GAME AWAY.
GOL PREFERRED SEND CHIEF OF STAFF SHYMAYYIT BUT APPARENTLY
EGYPTIANS AND PALESTINIANS INSISTED ON BOUSTANY. KHOURY DID
NOT DESCRIBE IN DETAIL BOUSTANY'S INSTRUCTIONS EXCEPT TO EXPLAIN
THAT BOUSTANY NOT AUTHORIZED ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF "FREEDOM
OF ACTION FOR THE FEDAYEEN". IF GOL WERE WILLING
MAKE THAT CONCESSION THERE WAS REALLY NOTHING TO NEGOTIATE BE -
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08981 281819Z
CAUSE IT WOULD REPRESENT COMPLETE CAPITULATION. KHOURY MAIN-
TAINED GOL WOULD ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF FEDAYEEN ACTION IN
COORDINATION WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THE COMPROMISE WOULD HAVE
TO BE ON MILITARY TERMS AND NOT POLITICAL. THE LEBANESE GOVERN-
MENT MUST RETAIN THE RIGHT TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY. IF THE FEDAYEEN
WANT TO OPERATE IN THE SOUTH, THEY MUST OPERATE WITHIN CERTAIN
LIMITS AND WITHIN CERTAIN AREAS DEFINED BY THE LEBANESE ARMY.
THE INSTRUCTIONS, ACCORDING TO KHOURY, WERE ENDORSED BY FORMER PRES
FUAD CHEHAB.
5. THE EGYPTIANS WANTED BOUSTANY TO HAVE PLENIPOTENTIARY POWERS.
THE LEBANESE REFUSED. THEY AUTHORIZED BOUSTANY TO AGREE TO PRIN-
CIPLES CONSISTENT WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS BUT DETAILS HAD TO BE
NEGOTIATED IN LEBANON WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. IN CAIRO
BOUSTANY WAS TO MEET WITH BOTH THE PALESTINIANS AND EGYPT-
IANS BUT KHOURY DID NOT DESCRIBE THE PROCEDURES FOR THE
NEGOTIATION.
6. KHOURY EXPLAINED THAT PRIMIN KARAME'S PARTICIPATION IN THE
DELEGATION WAS BEING DISCUSSED AT THAT MOMENT KARAME HAD SEEN
HELOU TWICE THE DAY BEFORE. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT KARAME WANTED
TO BRING BACK A POLITICAL VICTORY FROM CAIRO AND APPARENTLY DID
NOT WANT TO BE HEMMED IN BY BOUSTANY INSTRUCTIONS HIS PARTI-
CIPATION WAS SUGGESTED BY CHEHAB AS A MEANS APPARENTLY OF STRENG-
THENING KARAME' POLITICAL BASE IN TRIPOLI. PRES HELOU ALSO
WANTS KARAME TO PARTICIPATE BUT ONLY IF HE IS WILLING TO ABIDE
BY THE AGREED INSTRUCTIONS. AS OF THE WRITING OF THIS CABLE WE
DO NOT KNOW WHETHER KARAME IS GOING OR NOT.
7. KHOURY DESCRIBED SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATION WITH PRES
EXPIS
HELOU OCT 27 AS CONTAINING NO PARTICULAR SURPRISES. AMBASSADOR
ASSURED HELOU THAT SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT THE DESTRUCTION
OF LEBANON. HE INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE DEMARCHES
TO THE SYRIANS ALTHOUGH THE AMBASSADOR DID NOT REVEAL THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE DEMARCHES. THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED THE LEBANESE PROBLEM
AS PART OF THE ARAB PROBLEM AND COULD NOT DISASSOCIATE LEBANON
FROM THE ARAB WORLD. THE SOVIET UNION OPPOSED ANY EXTERNAL
INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON.
8. ACCORDING KHOURY, HELOU RESPONDED IN GENERAL TERMS STATING
THAT AS LONG AS HE WAS PRES AND IS IN CONTROL, THERE WOULD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richa Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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:
STATE
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08981 281819Z
BE NO REQUEST FOR EXTERNAL INTERVENTION. HE IMPLIED THAT HE
COULD NOT PRECLUDE ANY COURSE OF ACTION IF SITUATION WERE OUT
OF CONTROL.
9. COMMENT: IN VIEW OF THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THE ABOVE IN-
FORMATION, WE HAVE RESTRICTED ITS DISTRIBUTION. NEEDLESS TO SAY,
A LEAK WOULD BE EXTREMELY EMBARRASSING AND END THE DIALOGUE
WITH KHOURY.
PORTER
NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.
EXCES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard livon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
file
2
SECRET
445
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08977 281731Z
47
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 W
024272
R 281605Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8923
S ERCOR ET BEIRUT 8977
REF: STATE 182026: BEIRUT 8967
EXDIS
'69 OCT 29 AM 8 AMI
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
1. BEIRUT'S 8967 EXPRESSES EMB'S REACTION STATE 182026. I
REFLECTING MORE PERSONAL COMMENTS IN THIS MESSAGE. FIRST I WOULD
EXCES
LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT 1 AM NOT "AVOIDING" DIRECT CONTACTS WITH
HELOU, KARAME, OR ANY OTHER PRINCIPAL LEBANESE LEADER. IT IS
RATHER THAT SOME OF THEM AT THIS POINT SEE NO VALUE IN HAVING
PUBLICIZED CONTACTS WITH ME AND ARE UNABLE ARRANGE MEET ME IN
PRIVATE. OUR OTHER MANY CONTACTS ARE W.E BELIEVE ADEQUATE TO KEEP
US WELL- INFORMED AND IN TOUCH WITH THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN THE
LEBANESE DRAMA.
2. HELOU HAS KNOWN SINCE CRISIS COMMENCED OF MY DESRIE TO SEE
HIM AND HE HAS SENT WORD THAT HE WILL DO SO WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE.
AS FOR KAREMI I HAVE SENT WORD TO HIM THROUGH SEVERAL CHANNELS
OF USG CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION, OUR DESIRE TO HELP, AND MY
WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH HIM. I DID THIS AS RECENTLY AS YESTER-
DAY (10/27) WITH HIS OLD MENTOR, FUAD CHEHAB. KARAME OF COURSE
HAS BEEN IN TRIPOLI DURING ALMOST ENTIRE CRISIS DOING HIS BEST
TO RESTORE ORDER AND TO GIVE MORAL BACKING TO THE MORE
MODERATE TRIPOLITANIANS WHO SUPPORT HIM. SINCE MUCH OF THE TROUBLE
IN TRIPOLI WAS BAATHIST AND COMMUNIST-INSPIRED IT QUITE UNDER-
STANDABLE THAT KARAME WOULD TRY TO TAKE PERSONAL PROFIT FROM WELL-
PUBLICIZED MEETING WITH SOV AMB. THERE NO INDICATION AS YET THAT
SOVS WERE ENGAGED IN PEACE-MAKING AND IF THEY WERE, KARAME WAS
USING THEM FOR LOCAL EFFECT, RATHER THAN BEING USED.
3. WE MAINTAIN GOOD INDIRECT CONTACTS WITH BOTH HELOU AND KARAME,
AND UNTIL EITHER OR BOTH OF THEM CAN ACCEPT THE VALUE OF A PUB-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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PRANTMENT BE OF STATE
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08977 281731Z
LICIZED MEETING WITH AMERICAN AMB I AM AFRAID THIS MUST CONTINUE
TO BE OUR MODUS OPERANDI. THE PROBLEM IS THEREFORE NOT THAT WE
HAVE ADOPTED A POLICY OF MAINTAINING LOW PROFILE BUT THAT WE
HAVE BEEN FORCED INTO IT BY CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS HAS BEEN A VERY
SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT AND I REGRET AS MUCH AS DEPT THAT IT HAS INTER-
FERED WITH MY FREQUENT AND CLOSE CONTACT WITH THESE TWO POLITICAL
LEADERS, BOTH OF WHOM ARE CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDS. THE SITUATION
WILL CHANGE, AND IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO RESUME A DIRECT RELATION-
SHIP, I HOPE RATHER SOON.
4. THE SOV ATTEMPT TO TAKE CREDIT FOR PEACE-MAKING IN LEBANON
WILL NOT FOOL THE CLEVER LEBANESE, BUT AT THIS POINT LEBANESE
READY TAKE AEVANTAGE OF ANY STABILIZING ELEMENT. SINCE THEY AS-
SUME SOV UNION HAS INFLUENCE IN DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD AND CAIRO
(AND USG DOES NOT) THEY WILL WELCOME WHATEVER RESTRAINT SOVS
ARE ABLE TO APPLY TO THE RADICAL ARABS. WHEN THEY THINK US CAN
DO THE SAME, OBVIOUSLY THEY WILL TURN TO US, AND EAGERLY.
EXPIS
5. IN ADDITION, DEPT SURELY UNDERSTANDS THAT HELOU IS BEING LABELLED
AMERICAN STOOGE WHOSE ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSITION WHILE WE KNOW DIF-
FERENTLY) STEMS FROM AMERICAN PRESSURE AND AMERICAN ASSURANCES
OF INTERVENTION. ALL FEDAYEEN AND MOST OTHER ARABS BELIEVE THIS
CANARD. ANY FIRM POSITION HELOU TAKES IN FEDAYEEN NEGOTIATIONS
WOULD BE DIRECTLY LAID AT OUR DOORSTEP IF HE HAD PUBLICIZED
DIRECT CONTACTS WITH US AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT AS NEGOTIATIONS
ARE ABOUT TO START. KARAME TOO IS STILL A MODERATE IN HIS THINKING
EVEN IF HE MUST NOW APPEAR A RADICAL IN HIS WORDS. HE WOULD FIND
HIMSELF UNDER SUFFOCATING PRESSURES IF ANYTHING HE DID AT THIS
POINT OPENED HIM TO ATTACK AS BEING AN AMERICAN AGENT. HIS ONLY
HOPE NOW, IF HE IS TO RETAIN HIS EFFECTIVENESS IS TO SECURE
THE EMBRACE OF NASSER.
6. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING ALL OF THE ABOVE MUST BE VIEWED IN
CONTEXT OF (A) AN UNPARALLELED WAVE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM WHICH
IS SWEEPING ARAB WORLD, (B) AN EXTREMELY DELICATE LEBANESE INTERNAL
SECURITY SITUATION WHICH COULD AT THIS POINT BLOW UP AT ANY EVIDENCE
OF AMERICAN "INTERVENTION", AND (C) MY CONCERN NOT TO PRECIPITATE
ATTACKS ON AMERICANS OR AMERICAN INTERESTS.
7. ONLY ONE MORE COMMENT. IT IS HARD FOR ME TO VISUALIZE WHAT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED V HOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08977 281731Z
NEW AND CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS IN US POSITION VIS-A-VIS LEBANON
OR THE ME WE CAN FIND TO DISCUSS WITH HELOU OR KARAME IN ANY
NEW ATTEMPT AT DIRECT CONTACT. IF EITHER LEADER THOUGHT I HAD
SOMETHING TO SAY WHICH COULD BE TURNED TO ADVANTAGE HE WOULD MOST
CERTAINLY BE EAGER RECEIVE ME IT IS ALSO HARD TO KNOW WHAT RE-
ASSURANCES I CAN GIVE HELOU (WHO WISHES TO OPPOSE FEDAYEEN) WITH-
OUT CLEAR- CUT COMMITMENTS OF US SUPPORT WHICH WE ARE UNABLE TO
GIVE. KARAME OF COURSE WOULD HAVE TO REACT DEFENSIVELY TO ANY
ALLEGATION OF USG "MEDDLING" IN LEBANESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF HELOU AND KARAME AGREEING BETWEEN THEMSELVES
ON A COMPROMISE, AND THENNEGOTIATING IT WITH FEDAYEEN, WOULD BE
FURTHER REDUCED. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT NOT ONE SINGLE
RESPONSIBLE LEBANESE IN OUR CONTACTS OF RECENT DAYS HAS SUGGESTED
THERE ANYTHING CONSTRUCTIVE USG CAN DO IN LEBANON AT MOMENT,
EXCEPT TO KEEP QUIET AND CONTINUE URGE RESTRAINT
ANDI MODERATION.
PORTER
EXCLUS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
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flu
2
SECRET 284
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08969 281621Z
50
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 W
023829
R 281422Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8921
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
'69 OCT 28 PM 4:21
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR ET BEIRUT 8969
EXDIS
1. IN CONVERSATION THIS MORNING (10/28) WITH FRENCH AMB DUFOURNIER
HE GENERALLY REFLECTED OUR ANALYSIS CURRENT SITUATION LEBANON.
ARMY DOING SURPRISINGLY WELL AND MAINTAINING MORALE. CON-
FESSIONAL DIVISIONS HAVE NOT GOTTEN OUT OF HAND AND LEBANESE PEOPLE
ARE SHOWING RESTRAINT. THERE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE INCIDENTS BUT
HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD NOT GET OUT OF HAND DURING PERIOD NEGOTIA-
TIONS UNDER WAY.
2. ON LONG TERM, HE WAS PESSIMISTIC FEELING THAT CONCESSIONS TO
FEDAYEEN WOULD HAVE UNSETTLING EFFECT INTERNALLY AND CAUSE GREAT
NERVOUSNESS IN ISRAEL. NEXT CRUNCH WOULD COME WHEN LEBANESE
CHRISTIANS WOULD HAVE TO MAKE DECISION WHETHER TO ACCEPT NEGOTIA-
TED AND AGREED FEDAYEEN PRESENCE.
3. FRENCH ARE NOT DOING MUCH HERE EXCEPT TO URGE CALMNESS AND
PREACH REASON TO BOTH SIDES. THEY OBVIOUSLY HAVE NO INFLUENCE
ON FEDAYEEN BUT UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS, AND ALSO IN
RESPONSE TO HELOU'S REQUEST, FRENCH AMBS IN OTHER ARAB CAPITALS
ARE URGING RESTRAINT AND EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER LEBANESE SITUATION
IT SEEMED RATHER CLEAR THAT FRENCH DEMARCHES NOT BEING PUSHED
WITH GREAT VIGOR NOR WAS MUCH EXPECTED OF THEM. AS DUFOURNIER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08969 281621Z
REMARKED, FRANCE HAS GOOD BUSINESS GOING WITH SYRIA AT THIS POINT.
IT OBVIOUS THAT FRENCH ARE NOT GOING TO POUND THE TABLE HARD
ENOUGH TO DAMAGE THEIR ECONOMIC POSITION. DUFOURNIER ADDED THAT
HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REPORTS OF OUTCOME OF DEMARCHE FROM
OTHER ARAB POSTS.
4. HE WAS AWARE OF US ATTEMPTS SECURE FOUR-POWER STATEMENT ON
LEBANON AND HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED (WITHOUT BEING GIVEN REASONS)
THAT GOF HAD REUECTED US PROPOSAL. HE GAVE IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD
LIKE TO SEE A LITTLE MORE GOF INTEREST IN LEBANON AT MOMENT BUT
HE GOT OPTIMISTIC IT WOULD HAPPEN.
5. HE MILDLY CRITICAL OF WHAT HE CONSIDERED GOL'S FAILURE TO HAVE
LAID BETTER DIPLOMATIC GROUNDWORK IN ADVANCE OF INEVITABLE CON-
FRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN, EVEN THOUGH HE ADMITTED THIS MADE MORE
DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF MONTH NO-GOVERNMENT PERIOD. FOR EXAMPLE
HE INDICATED THAT LEBANESE AMB TO FRANCE TAKLA WHO IS NOW HEADING
LEBANESE UN DEL HAD HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM
DEFEND GOL POSITION. TAKLA OPERATING IN EFFECT WITHOUT GUIDANCE.
NONETHELESS, HE THOUGHT HELOU HAD BOUGHT SOME TIME BY HIS NO-
GOVERNMENT POLICY, ALTHOUGH CRUNCH WAS NOW AT HAND. ONLY THE
ARMY HAD BEEN READY FOR IT.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
SLO/E0/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DERA OF STATE
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EXPIS EXCLUS
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SECRET 373
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08922 271310Z
50
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00, NSCE 00,CCO 00,1046 W
015645
O P 271225Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8900
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
'69 OCT 27 AM 11:35 11: 35
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
USMISSION USUN
S E CRR E T BEIRUT 8922
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 8904
1. DCM FOUND PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY ON OCT 27 IN
MUCH MORE FATALISTIC AND RESIGNED MOOD THAN HERETOFORE EXPERIENCED.
IT SEEMED CLEAR FROM CONVERSATION THAT UAR HAD TAKEN THE BALL AWAY
FROM GOL IN ITS MEDIATORY ROLE IN LEBANON AND GOL NOW TRYING TO
KEEP UP WITH UAR ACTIVITIES. KHOURY REPORTED SABRI HASSAN AL-
KHOLY MISSION JORDAN AND SYRIA WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY
GOL NOR HAD KHOLY BEEN INVITED TO LEBANON ALTHOUGH GOL OB-
VIOUSLY NOT IN POSITION REFUSE VISIT. GOL WANTS UAR ASSISTANCE
BUT IS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT BASIC INTERESTS OF LEBANON WILL
BE UPPERMOST IN NASSER'S MIND IN MEDIATORY EFFORT. KHOURY EX-
PLAINED THAT GOL RECOGNIZED THAT ARAB SOLUTION NOT IDEAL FOR
LEBANON BUT ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT ARAB SOLUTION THE ONLY REALISTIC
WAY OUT. GOL HAD NOT ASKED MAJOR POWERS FOR ANY SPECIFIC AS-
SISTANCE BECAUSE IT COULD NOT SEE WHAT SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION SUCH
POWERS COULD MAKE. DCM GAINED IMPRESSION THAT ALTHOUGH GOL
STILL DOES NOT WANT TO CAPITULATE IT COMING TO CONCLUSION IF IT
HAS NOT ALREADY REACHED IT THAT IN LAST ANALYSIS THERE NO OTHER
ALTERNATIVE TO SOME DEGREE OF CAPITULATION UNLESS IT WISHES FACE
CIVIL WAR.
2. TWO LEBANESE OFFICERS MENTIONED PARA 1 REFTEL DID NOT GO TO
CAIRO YESTERDAY PLAN NOW WHICH KHOURY DESCRIBES AS 90 PERCENT
CERTAIN IS FOR COMMANDER= IN CHIEF EMILE BOUSTANY AND POSSIBLY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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GRANTMENT OF STATE
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08922 271310Z
RASHID KARAMI TO FLY TO CAIRO TODAY. (FROM OTHER SOURCES, WE
UNDERSTAND G-2 CAPTAIN SAMI KHATIB MAY ACCOMPANY BOUSTANY.) KHOURY
INDICATED THAT KARAME MAY BE GOING AS A RESULT URGING BY BOTH
THE EGYPTIANS AND FORMER PRES FOUAD CHEHAB. KHOURY FELT THAT
KARAME'S INCLUSION MIGHT BE AN ADVANTAGE AS IT COULD STRENGTHEN
HIS POSITION IN TRIPOLI WHICH WOULD HEIGHTEN HIS POTENTIALITY
AS NEXT PRIMIN. KARAME WAS NOT ABLE TO COME TO BEIRUT BEFORE
EXCLUS EXCES
LAST EVENING. CONSEQUENTLY HE DID NOT SEE PRES HELOU ALTHOUGH
KHOURY THOUGHT HE MIGHT THIS MORNING.
3. SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT HIS OWN REQUEST WENT TO TRIPOLI YESTERDAY
TO TALK WITH KARAME. KHOURY HAD NO REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION
BUT STATED THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AGAIN AT HIS REQUEST WAS
SEEING PRES HELOU THIS MORNING. FORMER PRES CHEHAB HAS JUST IN-
FORMED AMBASSADOR THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR APPEARS TO BE TAKING
CONCILIATORY LINE DESIGNED TO REDUCE TENSION. CHEHAB ADDED HE
HAD HEARD SOVIET WORDS BEFORE AND HE WAS WAITING PROOF OF SOVIET
GOOD INTENTIONS IN TERMS OF BEHAVIOR LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY.
4. CHEHAB ALSO INFORMED AMB THAT GEN BOUSTANY IS DEFINITELY GOING
CAIRO, BUT HE GAVE NO CLEAR INDICATION KARAME GOING AT THIS
TIME. HE INDICATED BOUSTANY WOULD BE SEEING FEDAYEEN AS WELL AS
UAR OFFICIALS. HE WILL PRESUMABLY BEGIN FIRST ROUND OF NEGO-
TIATIONS WITH FEDAYEEN.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUTHE AUTHORIZATION : THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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DECLASSIFIED
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OF
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Department of State
UNITED STATES OF /
TELEGRAM
file
SECRET 381
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08921 2713222
2
50
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00/046 W
015729
P R 271217Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8899
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
'69 OCT 27 AM 11:35
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
S E C R ET BEIRUT 8921
EXDIS
1. IN CONVERSATION WITH DCM OCT 26, PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL
KHOURY NOTED AMBIVALENCE OF UAR'S ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON. BY
WAY OF EXAMPLE, HE EXPLAINED THAT BARRICADES IN STREETS IN LEBA-
NON CONSTRUCTED BY NASSERIST ELEMENTS. GOL HAD FOUND OUT THEY
BEING USED TO PUT PRESSURE ON GOL TO ACCEPT NASSER AS MEDIATOR
OF CURRENT CRISIS. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, UAR AMBASSADOR ALLEGEDLY
UNDERTAKING TO TRY ELIMINATE BARRICADES. UAR AMBASSADOR ALSO,
ACCORDING TO KHOURY, STILL EXERCISING MODERATING INFLUENCE AMONG
MOSLEM ELEMENTS. IN BALANCE, KHOURY AND PRESUMABLY HELOU, STILL
CONSIDER THAT UAR TRYING TO MAKE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO SOLU-
TION CRISIS BUT UAR STYLE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY AREA CURRENTS
AND PRESSURES.
2. IN CONVERSATION, KHOURY MOST INTERESTED IN STATUS USG PEACE-
MAKING EFFORTS AND WONDERED IF CRISIS MIGHT NOT IN sense CONTRI-
BUTE TO FOUR-POWER EFFORTS. DCM OUTLINED IN GENERAL TERMS STATE
OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR. IN REPLY TO SECOND POINT OF KHOURY'S,
DCM EXPLAINED THAT CRISIS HAD BOTHPOSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS
TO IT. ONE COULD ARGUE THAT CRISIS MIGHT MAKE POSITIVE CONTRIBU-
TION IN SENSE THAT IT WOULD ACCENTUATE URGENCY OF EFFORTS, AL=
THOUGH HE FELT MAJOR POWERS ALREADY MUCH AWARE TIME OF ESSENCE.
DCM EMPHASIZED "NO FOOT DRAGGING INVOLVED" AND SLOWNESS PRO-
GRESS IN PEACEMAKING EFFORT RESULTED FROM COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES
INVOLVED. ON NEGATIVE SIDE, DCM EXPLAINED THAT IF CRISIS CONTINUED
AND FEDAYEEN PERSISTED IN THEIR COMMANDO OPERATIONS, EMOTIONAL
LEVEL IN AREA WOULD BE HEIGHTENED EVEN FURTHER AND ABILITY OF
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EXE-S EXPIS
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08921 271322Z
PARTIES CONCERNED TO EXERCISE FLEXIBILITY WHICH SUCCESSFUL
NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED WOULD BE GREATLY DIMINISHED. KHOURY'S IN-
TEREST IN THIS REGARD REFLECTS PRES HELOU'S REALIZATION THAT ONLY
PERMANENT RESOLUTION OF FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN LEBANON IS AN OVERALL
ARAB ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. HELOU'S OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO PLAY FOR
TIME IN HOPES THAT SETTLEMENT WOULD BE REACHED BEFORE LEBANON DIS-
INTEGRATED OR SUCCUMBED TO CONTROL OF EITHER THE FEDAYEEN AND/
OR LEFTIST ELEMENTS.
3. ALTHOUGH AMBASSADOR MET WITH EX-PRES FUAD CHEHAB THIS MORNING
(SEE SEPTEL) STATE OF USG POSITION HERE SUCH THAT IT BECOMING
INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR AMBASSADOR TO MEET
WITH INFLUENTIAL LEBANESE LEADERS, CHRISTIAN OR MUSLIM, WITHOUT
SUBJECTING THEM TO PROPAGANDA ATTACKS. WE ARE, NONETHELESS,
MAINTAINING AS WIDE A CIRCLE OF CONTACTS AS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH
IT IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT FOR ANY OFFICER TO MEET WITH
IMPORTANT MUSLIMS.
PORTER
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DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET EXDIS
1969 OCT 26 14 27
SECRET
HCE750
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08907 261345Z
51
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00,000 00, NSCE 00,/046 W
012310
P 261314Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8894
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
SECRETBEIRUT 8907
EXDIS
REF: DHAHRAN 928
CHANDLER INFORMED SUBSTANCE REFTEL AND HE IS TAKING
NECESSARY SECRUITY MEASURES. HE WOULD APPRECIATE
DEPT NOTIFYING PARENT COMPANIES,
PORTER
SECRET
SECRET EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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OF
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*
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SECRET 815
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08896 251754Z
2
51
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT CCO 00,SSO 00, NSCE 00/046 W
010010
0 R 251645Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8887
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN
S ECR ET BEIRUT 8896
EXDIS
1. SITUATION IN LEBANON MOVING VERY FAST AND IT IS HARD TO GET
FACTS. IT CLEAR SYRIANS ARE NOT YET BACKING OFF AND THEY, TOGET -
HER WITH FEDAYEEN, ARE PRODUCING MAJOR CHALLENGE TO GOL. AS A
RESULT OF PRESSURE ON ALMOST ALL GEOGRAPHIC FRONTS ON LEBANESE
PERIMETER, LEBANESE FORCES HAVE LOST EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF CER-
TAIN AREAS. SYRIAN AND FEDAYEEN CONTINUE WAR OF NERVES THROUGH
MILITARY PROBING ACTIONS INTO LEBANON.
2. BULK OF LEBANESE ARMY STILL REMAINS ON SOUTHERN BORDER
BUT WILL INEVITABLY BE FORCED WITHDRAW TO OTHER SECTIONS
IN ORDER BOLSTER HARD=PRESSED SECURITY FORCES. THIS WILL OF COURSE
LEAVE FEDAYEEN OTHER OPTIONS FAZ EXPANDING THEIR HOLD IN SOUTH.
3. IT IS CLEAR, ALTHOUGH HARD TO PROVE, THAT SOME SYRIAN FORCES
ARE FIGHTING ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. THE PRETEXT OF COURSE IS THAT
FEDAYEEN ARE DOING THE FIGHTING, BUT PRESENCE OF MILITARY TRANS-
PORT AND ARMORED CARS CLEARLY ESTABLISH SYRIAN ARMY COMPLICITY,
AND WE BELIEVE SYRIAN ARMY PERSONNEL HAVE ALSO BEEN ENGAGED.
40 WE CANNOT ASSESS HOW FAR SYRIANS WILL CARRY THINGS. SO FAR
THEY WOULD APPEAR TO BE UNRESTRAINED BY SOVS OR ANY OTHER EXTERNAL
FORCE AND THEY MUST BE FLUSHED WITH THEIR EARLY SUCCESSES,
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*
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08896 251754Z
PARTICULARLY IN TRIPOLI ALSO, FEDAYEEN AND LEBANESE LEFTISTS
DO NOT YET APPEAR TO HAVE HAD SECOND THOUGHTS. IF THEY SUFFER MORE
LOSSES PERHAPS AN OPPORTUNITY CAN BE FOUND FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND
NEGOTIATIONS. FEDAYEEN ATTITUDES ARE HARDENED BY FIRM BELIEF
HELOU IS ACTING WITH US BACKING TO DESTROY THEM IN A MAJOR CON-
FRONTATION. THIS COMPLICATES HELOU'S ATTEMPTS TO REACH EFFECTIVE
COMPROMISE.
56 HELOU IS PREPARED FOR COMPROMISE BUT NOT FOR CAPITULATION. HE
IS DESPERATELY SEEKING TO FORM A REPRESENTATIVE GOVT BUT MAY FIND
IT IMPOSSIBLE SECURE MUSLIM COOPERATION. IF SUCCESSFUL He WILL
HAVE TO AGREE TO SOFT LINE POSITIONS RE FEDAYEEN WHICH UNTIL NOW
HE HAS FOUND UNACCEPTABLE. HE IS NOW BUYING TIME WHICH HE MEASURES
IN DAYS OR WEEKS RATHER THAN MONTHS. IN EFFECT, HE HAS HAD TO
MAKE DECISION THAT ISRAELI THREAT TO SOUTH LEBANON IS LESS IMMINENT
ONE TO EXISTENCE OF COUNTRY THAN ARE FEDAYEEN.
60 A FEAR OF CIVIL WAR IS UNDERSTANDABLY GROWING. EACH DAY MAKES
IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP ON BOTH SIDES TO
RESTRAIN HOTHEADS, ALTHOUGH BEIRUT DID REMAIN CALM DURING THE
DAY
7. ARMY MORALE SEEMS TO CONTINUE HIGH ALTHOUGH THERE ISLOATED IN-
STANCES INDICATING OTHERWISE. THE DEEPLY FELT LEBANESE CONTEMPT
FOR SYRIANS AND SYRIAN REGIME (FELT MUCH LESS IN TRIPOLI AND
THE MUSLIM NORTH) WILL CONTINUE HAVE POSITIVE EFFECT ON PUBLIC
OPINION ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT FOR PUBLIC OPINION TO EXPRESS IT-
SELF NOW EXCEPT THROUGH PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS.
8. BEST HOPE FOR SAVING SITUATION STLL LIES IN ARAB MEDIATION.
UAR SEEMS TO WISH TAKE ON THIS ROLE AND HELOU IS WORKING WITH
THEM. KUWAITIS AND LIBYANS WANT TO HELP BUT SEEM TO BE ELBOWED
OUT BY UAR.
9. WE ARE NOT YET ALERTING AMERICAN COMMUNITY. THERE NO INDI-
CATION YET THAT US OR WESTERN INTERESTS UNDER IMMINENT THREAT, AND
ANY INDICATION THAT US WAS PACKING UP TO LEAVE WOULD HAVE EXTREMELY
UNSETTLING EFFECT. IT WOULD SEND HELOU INTO DESPAIR AND LOWER THE
WILL OF THE MAJORITY OF LEBANESE TO RESIST FEDAYEEN-SYRIAN
TAKE-OVER ATTEMPT. WE HAVE OF COURSE GONE INTO ALERT PHASE AT
EMBASSY AND WILL BE READY MOVE QUICKLY IN E & E MATTERS. THERE
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08896 251754Z
YET NO INDICATION OF PANIC AMONG WESTERN COMMUNITY IN BEIRUT.
100 AS HELOU INFORMED US TODAY, THIS AFFAIR CAN ONLY BE SETTLED
BY ARABS. IT SEEMS TO US USG CAN EXERCISE WHAT INFLUENCE IT HAS
BY EXERTING ALLI POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON ARAB WORLD THROUGH THIRD
COUNTRIES. I WOULD HOPE FOR EXAMPLE, THAT NATO POWERS COULD
BE MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED TO PUT MAXIMUM INFLUENCE ON SYRIA AND
IRAQ. PERHAPS WE CAN HAVE SOME DIRECT INFLUENCE ON UAR ALTHOUGH
DEPT IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS WHETHER THIS CAN BE DONE. HELOU
SEES NO WAY TO TAKE PROBLEM TO UN NOW, WITHOUT EARNING ALL-OUT OUT
ENMITY OF REST OF ARABS. OF COURSE, HE WOULD WELCOME ANY EFFORTS
BY EXTERNAL POWERS (RULING OUT USG AT MOMENT) TO SEIZE THE UN
WITH THE LEBANESE PROBLEM AS A THREAT TO THE PEACE
110 ISRAEL MUST OF COURSE BE WATCHING EVENTS IN LEBANON VERY
CLOSELY. ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION AGAINST SYRIA TO DIVERT SYRIA'S
ATTENTION WOULD NOT IN OUR OPINION WORK. EVEN IF IT (DOUBTFULLY)
GAVE HELOU A FEW WEEKS GRACE IT WOULD TOTALLY ISOLATE HIM FROM
REST OF ARAB WORLD AND HE WOULD BE UNABLE HOLD COUNTRY TOGETHER.
ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST SOUTH LEBANON WOULD BE EVEN WORSE. IT
WOULD ONLY SERVE TO DESTROY LEBANESE ARMY, OR IMMOBILIZE IT
IN THE SOUTH, AND COUNTRY WOULD BE OPEN FOR SUBVERSION AND CIVIL
WAR.
PORTER
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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE THORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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DEPARTMENT PER OF STATE
Department of State
EXEM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
x
SECRET 734
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08846 241337Z
52
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00, NSCE 00,000 00,1046 W
002144
0 P 2412452 OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8861
'69 2 OCT 24 PM 12:27 27
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
MEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1968
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
SECR E T BEIRUT 8846
EXDIS
REF: STATE 180291
TO BE DELIVERED TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OSWBUSINESS OCT 24.
1. WE HAVE BEEN ENDEAVORING COME UP WITH IDEAS TO AMELIORATE
SITUATION IN LEBANON AND SHORE UP US POSITION IN AREA.SSO FAR
OUR SEARCH HAS NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN FRUITFUL AND ACCORDINGLY WE
RELUCTANT REACT NEGATIVELY TO DEPT'S POSITIVE APPROACH OUTLINED
REFTEL. NONETHELESS WE DO HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS WITH REGARD
DEPT'S INITIATIVE.
2. FIRST OF ALL WE MUST ASSUME THAT FEDAYEEN AND PROBABLY SYRIANS
WILL BE UNMOVED BY FACT DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LEBANON WOULD
ADVERSELY AFFECT PEACEMAKING EFFORTS. CONSEQUENTLY FEDAYEEN AND
SYRIANS LIKELY BE MOVED ONLY AS RESULT OF PRESSURE BY FRENCH OR
SOVS AND PRIMARILY BY LATTER.
3. CONSEQUENTLY OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT IF A STATEMENT IS TO HAVE
CHANCE FULFILLING ITS OBJECTIVE, UPARTICIPANTS: IN ISSUANCE STATE-
MENT MUST INCLUDE SOVIET UNION. WORSE COMBINATION OF POWERS WOULD
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08846 241337Z
BE US, FRENCH AND UK WHICH WOULD OF COURSE BE REMINISCENT OF OLD
TRIPARTITE DECLARATION POWERS AND WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY BE AT-
TACKED AS IMPERIALIST SUPPORT FOR LEBANON. US ROLE WOULD BE HELP-
FUL ONLY IN CONCERT WITH SOVS. SHOULD SOVS REFUSE PARTICIPATE,
OTHER POSSIBILITY WHICH HAS SOME CHANCE OF BEING HELPFUL WOULD
BE FOR FRENCH ALONE TO ISSUE STATEMENT.
4.WE ALSO URGE USG ASK ISRAEL TO AVOID ANY PUBLIC COMMENT ON
LEBANESE SITUATION, IF THIS IS POSSIBLE. EACH GOI COMMENTARY NOW
IS SIMPLY ATTRIBUTED BY ARABS TO WASHINGTON, AND TENDS TO INFLAME
SITUATION. NO MATTER WHAT IS SAID, HELOU AND MODERATES ARE INDIREC-
CTLY IDENTIFIED WITH ISRAELI EMBRACE, THROUGH ASSOCIATION
WITH US.
5. SUGGEST USG OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ON LEBANESE DEVELOPMENTS TRY
AVOID ANY IMPLICATION WE COORDINATING OUR ACTIONS WITH HELOU,
AND POINT OUT USG BELIEVES LEBANESE SHOULD BE LEFT ALONE TO SETTLE
THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. ALSO WOULD BE HELPFUL IF BACKGROUNDER COULD
LEAK FACT THAT PURPOSE OF SISCO STATEMENT WAS INTENDED RESTRAIN
POSSIBLE ISRAELI ACTIONS AGAINST SOUTH LEBANON, AND NOT TO INTER-
EXCES
FERE IN INTERNAL LEBANESE AFFAIRS.IN ANY CASE, THIS LAST POINT
MIGHT BE PASSED TO UAR IN WASHINGTON OR CAIRO. PORTER
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THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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GRANTMENT OF STATE
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701
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08845 241259Z
43
2
ACTION SS: 45
INFO OCT 01.CCO 00,SSO 00, NSCE 00,1046 W
001917
o PI 241220Z OCT 69
FMI AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8860
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TELNAVIV
'69 OCT 24 PM 12:27
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
USINT CAIRO
S ENCOR El T BEIRUT 8845
EXDIS
NOFORN
REF: BEIRUT 8844
1. MICHEL KHOURY OCT 24 WAS MUCH MORE ENCOURAGED BY ROLE THE UAR
WAS PLAYING IN LEBANON (REFTEL). KHOURY NOW FEELS THAT NASSER
SENT HIS MESSAGE TO HELOU (EMBTEL 8790) ONLY BECAUSE LIBYA WAS
SENDING ONE AND NASSER DID NOT WANT TO BE ANY LESS ARAB THAN ANY-
BODY ELSE. THE GOL NOW KNOWS THAT THE UAR AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN
ACTIVELY COUNSELLING MODERATION AMONG INFLUENTIAL LEBANESE SUNNIS
AND ACCORDING TO KHOURY, HAS MADE CLEAR NASSER DID NOT WANT
TROUBLE IN LEBANON KHOURY FELT THE UAR MAY HAVE BEEN HELPFUL
IN BRINGING ABOUT RELATIVELY MODERATE COMMUNIQUE WHICH SUNNI
MOSLEON ISSUED ON OCT 22.
2. IN ADDITION TO THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE REFTEN ON
PRES HELOU'S EFFORTS TO FORM CABINET, KHOURY INDICATED PRES HOPED
KARAME WOULD AGAIN AGREE BECOME PM WITH THE FORMATION OF A
GOVERNMENT, THEI STRATEGY OF PRES HELOU WAS TO HAVE LEBANON'S
EXPIS
CASE PRESENTED AT THE NOV 8 MEETING OF ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE MINIS-
TERS. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO HAVE NASSER MEDIATE
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN LEBANON AND THE OTHER ARAB STATES AND GROUND -
WORK FOR SUCH MEDIATION WOULD BE LAID BEFORE THE CAIRO MEETING.
KHOURY SPECIFICALLY ASKEDI THAT HELOU'S STRATEGY BE MOST CLOSELY
HELD BECAUSE WHATEVER CHANCE IT HAS OF SUCCESS WOULD BE DESTROYED
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08845 241259Z
EXQIN EXCES EXETS
IF SUBSTANCE LEAKED.
30 COMMENT: ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH KHOURY HAS
REPORTED ARE ENCOURAGING THE LEBANESE SITUATION REMAINS GRAVE.
IT> OF COURSE, WOULD HELP SITUATION CONSIDERABLY IF HELOU WERE
ABLE TO FORM A CABINET. BUT BASIC PROBLEM OF THE FEDAYEEN WOULD
STILL REMAIN. IT SEEMS FAIRLY CLEAR FROM RECENT EVENTS THAT AN
ARAB GOVERNMENT CANNOT MAKE A FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE FEDAYEEN AND
SURVIVE. CONSEQUENTLY IF A GOVERNMENT IS FORMED, IT WILL HAVE
TO BE BASED ON SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH FEDAYEEN AND OF NECESSITY
WILLI REPRESENT A CONSIDERABLE BACKTRACKING BY THE PRES FROM HIS
FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT OF MAY 31, 1969. ALSO, IF SITUATION IN LEB-
ANON BECOMES MORE UNSETTLED, WITH RIOTING AND MORE BLOODSHED
(AND THIS IS IN HANDS OF FEDAYEEN AND LEFTISTS), NASSER WILL
BE FORCED ASSUME MORE EXTREMIST a AND LESS HELPFUL POSITION.
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SECRET 918
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08792 01 OF 02 222230Z
88
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01/1046 W
121676
R 221926Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8843J
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 8792/1
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 8790
1) THE INEVITABLE CRISIS IN LEBANON HAS COME EARLIER THAN
WE THOUGHT. IN LARGE MEASURE THE CHALLENGE CREATED BY THE
REDAYEEN WITH SYRIAN BACKING, AND NOW SECONDED BY ALL OF THE
RADICAL ARAB STATES, IS A CHALLENGE TO THE
US AS MUCH AS TO LEBANON. NASSER'S PERSONAL INTERVENTION
SHOWS (A) THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE IS CAPTIVE TO THE EMOTIONAL
WAVE OF PUBLIC OPINION STIRRED UP BY PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE
MOVEMENT AND (B) HIS VINDICTIVE DESIRE TO HURT THE
US BY HURTING A COUNTRY WHICH HAS ONLY RECENTLY RECEIVED
A SPECIAL INDICATION OF US SUPPORT.
21 PRES. HELOU HAS FEW ASSETS AT THIS POINT. HIS PRINCIPAL
INTERNAL ASSET B THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS a CANNOT BE USED
WITHOUT TEARING THE COUNTRY APART. INDEED' ONE OF HIS
GREATEST CONCERNS IS TO AVOID MILITANT ACTION ON PART OF THE
CHRISTIANS ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTANDS THAT SOME OF THEM MAY BE
UNCONTROLLABLE.
3) LEBANON HAS SHOWN GREAT RESILIENCE AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL
CAPACITY IN THE PAST. IT COULD HAPPEN ONCE AGAIN, ALTHOUGH
IN THE PROCESS HELOU WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE TO BACK DOWN ON
THE FEDAYEEN ISSUE, TRYING TO STRIKE A TOLERABLE BARGAIN IN
THE PROCESS. BUT THE EXTERNAL OPPOSITION TO HIM IS so
FORMIDABLE AND OVERWHELMING THAT HE WILL BE LUCKY TO COME
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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DEPARTMENT
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08792 01 OF 02 222230Z
OUT OF IT WITH ANYTHING SHORT OF AN IGNOMINIOUS CAVE-UN.
IN THE PROCESS, HIS FRUSTRATED ARMY WILL LOSE EFFECTIVENESS
TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, THE LEFTISTS AND THE FEDAYEEN
WILL BE EMBOLDENED, AND THE SUPPORT THEY RECEIVE FROM THE
RADICAL ARAB WORLD WILL INTENSIFY AFTER THEIR INITIAL SUCCESS.
LEBANON HAS IN EFFECT LOST ITS CAREFULLY PRESERVED INDEPENDENCE
OF ACTION. IT CAN NO LONGER MAINTAIN THE FICTION THAT ITS WESTERN
TIES ARE STRONGER THAN THE FACT OF ITS GEOGRAPHY.
4) HELOU IN HIS ISOLATION FEELS THAT HIS ONLY EXTERNAL HELP
CAN COME FROM THE US AND HE HAS TURNED TO US FOR SUGGESTIONS
AND HOPE. GIVEN THE MARKED DETERIORATION OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE
IN ANY ARAB COUNTRY, IT SEEMS TO US THAT OUR OPTIONS ARE
VERY LIMITED INDEED. HELOU STILL HOPES THAT WE WILL BE
ABLE TO MUSTER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON THROUGH THE
UN OR OTHERWISE, EVEN THOUGH HE HAS BEEN INFORMED OF OUR
POSITION(STATE 168780 THAT WE CAN ONLY SUPPORT HIS
INITATIVES RATHER THAN TAKING INITIATIVES ON OUR OWN. HE
UNDERSTANDS THAT WE ARE NOT OFFERING OR CONSIDERING MILITARY
ASSISTANCE ALTHOUGH I AM SURE DEPT UNDERSTANDS THAT HE WILL
ASK FOR IT IN DESPERATION IF THE COUNTRY TURNS TO CIVIL WAR.
51 I AM SURE DEPT IS CONSIDERING POSSIBLE OVERTURES TO SOVIETS
AS WELL AS FRENCH AND BRITISH WE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT
THIS WILL BE OF MUCH HELP, BUT NEITHER DO WE WISH TO
SECOND GUESSANYTHING THAT MIGHT HAVE VALUE SOVS,
SMARTING FROM THE RECENT MIRAGE INCIDENT, MUST BE RUBBING THEIR
HANDS WITH GLEE OVER CURRENT DETERIORATION IN LEBANON WHICH
IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO DEMORALIZE MODERATE FORCES AND BRING
LEBANON NEARER TO A RADICALLY-ORIENTED SOCIETY. IF IN
FACT FABRIC OF PRESENT SOCIETY IS NOT TOTALLY DESTROYED.
FRENCH WILL MAKE SYMPATHETIC NOISES BUT WE (AND HELOU)SEE
NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE EXERCISE REAL INFLUENCE.
61 I KNOW DEPT ALSO AGREES WITH ME THAT SIXTH FLEET OR
EVEN AN ALLIED FLEET PRESENCE NEAR LEBANON WOULD NOT HELP.
IN FACT IT PROBABLY WOULD AGGRAVATE SITUATION AND I WOULD
NOT PROPOSE CONSIDERING USE OF FLEET UNLESS REQUIRED FOR
EVACUATION OF AMERICANS FOLLOWING A TOTAL BREAKDOWN OF
INTERNAL SECURITY.
7) WHETHER OR NOT A DRAMATIC STATEMENT OR ACTION BY USG
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08792 01 OF 02 222230Z
WHICH WOULD PROVIDE ARABS REAL HOPE FOR A REALISTIC PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT WOULD IMPROVE SITUATION IS NOT EASY TO ESTIMATE.
THERE WOULD BE INHERENT RISKS THAT WE WERE KNUCKLING UNDER
TO ARAB BLACKMAIL (AND NASSER WOULD OF COURSE TAKE
FULLI CREDIT) AND FEDAYEEN MIGHT REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS IN
FACE OF AN IMPENDING SETTLEMENT THE NATURE OF WHICH THEY
OPPOSE. ISRAELI ACTION WOULD ALSO BE UNPREDICTABLE. IN
FACE OF INEVITABLE INCREASE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY FROM
LEBANON ISRAELIS MIGHT SOONER OR LATER INCLINE TO A MAJOR
RETALIATION WHICH WOULD END ANY HOPES HELOU MIGHT HAVE OF
KEEPING THE SITUATION IN BALANCE FOR A WHILE LONGER.
81 ON OTHER HAND, MODERATES IN LEBANON INCLUDING MANY
FRIGHTENED MUSLIM LEADERS) WOULD GAIN STRENGTH TO HOLD OUT
AGAINST BOTH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PRESSURES IF A FIRM AND
ACCEPTABLE US POSITION ON THE SETTLEMENT WAS CLEARLY SET
FORTH. I THINK HELOU WOULD CONSIDER THIS THE ONE
IMPORTANT WEAPON WHICH WE COULD HAD HIM AT THIS TIME.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richare Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 893
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08792 02 OF 02 222221Z
91
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 W
121649
R 221726Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8844
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR ETT SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 8792/2
EXDIS
REF # BEIRUT 8790
91 EMB EXPECTS BE SWAMPED WITH RENEWED AND MORE DESPERATE
EXCES EXPIS
PLEAS FOR HELP FROM CHRISTIAN GROUPS DEMANDING ARMS AND
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR WHAT MANY OF THEM BELIEVE TO BE
UNAVOIDABLE IMPENDING SHOWDOWN IN THE STREETS. WE
WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST THESE REQUESTS AND TO CAUTION
RESTRAINT. WHETHER WE CAN ACHIEVE RESTRAINT WITHOUT
GIVING THE MODERATES ANY NEW HOPE FOR THE FUTURE IS
MOOT. FORTUNATELY, WE DO NOT YET SEE A GREAT RISE IN
MILITANCY ON PART OF EITHER CHRISTIAN OR MUSLIM LEBANESE
LEADERS BUT MATTER TRAGICALLY IS PARTLY OUT OF
THEIR HANDS AND IN THE HANDS OF THE SYRIANS AND fedayeen.
101 WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER POSSIBILITY THAT AT SOME POINT
CHRISTIANS, FACED WITH A CIVIL WAR, MAY IN DESPERATION BELIEVE
ISRAEL TO BE THEIR ONLY SALVATION. THIS WOULD HAVE TRAGIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE AREA AND FOR THE US,
11) FINALLY, I REGRET TO SAY THAT DECLINE IN US PRESTIGE
IN LAST FEW MONTHS MAKES IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR ME TO
EXERCIS A PERSONAL INFLUENCE ON THE TURN OF EVENTS THE
MUSLIM LEADERSHIP IS EITHER AFRADI TO TALK TO US OR NO
LONGER ACCEPTS THAT THE DIALOGUE IS WORTHWHILE. THE
CHRISTIANS WILL OF COURSE TURN TO US FOR SUPPORT BUT
THEY MAY NOT BE AMENABLE TO OUR PERSUASION I WILL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard-Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIRED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08792 02 OF 02 222221Z
CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE PERSONAL SUPPORT TO
HELOU WHOSE TENURE AS PRESIDENT IS OBVIOUSLY IN ITSELF
VERY MUCH AT STAKE.
PORTER
E80/20/0290
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard I ixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
EXEL
Department
of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
'69 SEP 27 AM 9:57
SECRET 271
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08009 261943Z
2
82
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
095727
R 261725Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8669
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
SECR E T BEIRUT 8009
EXDIS
SUBJ: INCREASED PROTECTION OF US PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY
REF: STATE 151166 AND 160291
1 - THE PROTECTION OF US PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY FROM
ATTACK HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH GOL SECURITY
OFFICERS BY THE POST'S SY OFFICER AND MEMBERS OF THE
COUNTRY TEAM. IT WAS FELT THAT APART FROM ISOLATED
ACTION ON PART OF INDIVIDUAL CRANKS OR FANATICS, PRIMARY
THREAT AT PRESENT EMANATES FROM PALESTINE COMMANDO ORGANIZATION
CALLED POPULAR FRONT FOR LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP),
WHICH HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR INTER ALIA SUCH ACTS AS
HIJACKING TWA BOEING TO DAMASCUS AND BLOWING UP TAPLINE
WITHIN ISRAEL-OCCUPIED SYRIA. WE CANNOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY
PFLP CONSIDERING KIDNAPPING OR SIMILAR ACTION HERE.
2. TO PROVIDE THE AMBASSADOR WITH GREATEST POSSIBLE SECURITY
AT HIS RESIDENCE WHICH IS LOCATED IN A RELATIVELY SECLUDED
WOODED AREA, AND ALSO WHEN BEING TRANSPORTED, THE FOLLOWING
MEASURES HAVE BEEN OR ARE BEING TAKEN-SOME IN CONJUNCTION
WITH GOL SY FORCES.
A º RESIDENCE
1 ° GOL GENDARME DETACHMENT OF TEN MEN IS BIVOUACKED AT
THE RESIDENCE WITH THREE MEN OF FOOT PATROL AROUND THE CLOCK:
2° POLICE MOTOR PATROLS IN THE AREA HAVE BEEN INCREASED:
30 WHERE NECESSARY, WE HAVE INSTALLED CURVED SPIKES AND
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THSEAREHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
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Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08009 2619432
EXCE EXCLU
RAISED LEVEL OF FENCE SURROUNDING RESIDENCE:
4. AN ALARM SYSTEM BETWEEN MAIN GATE GUARD POST AND GOL
GUARD DETACHMENT HAS BEEN INSTALLED:
5 ᵒ WE ARE INSTALLING ALARM FROM MAIN GATE TO AMBASSADOR'S
QTRS TO ALERT HIM OF ANY DISTURBANCES:
6. WE PLAN TO INSTALL ALARM SYSTEM ALONG FENCE TO ALERT MAIN
GATE GUARD POST OF ANY ATTEMPT TO ENTER PREMISES SURREPTITIOUSLY
(THIS WILL SUPPLEMENT FOOT PATROL COVERAGE).
B ᵒ PERSON OF AMBASSADOR
10 ROUTE TO OFFICE AND TIME SCHEDULES WILL BE ALTERED AT
IRREGULAR INTERVALS:
2. UNMARKED VEHICLE WILL BE USED FREQUENTLY AS SUBSTITUTE
FOR COM VEHICLE:
3° VEHICLE USED BY COM WILL NOT BE LEFT UNATTENDED AT ANY
TIME:
4. WE PLAN TO INSTALL ALARM SYSTEM IN VEHICLES
(SIREN) TO BE ACTIVATED IF ATTEMPT Is MADE TO BLOCK THEM:
5 ᵒ WE ARE CONSIDERING AND DISCUSSING WITH GOL DESIRABILITY
OF EITHER GOL SY OFFICER RIDING IN CAR WITH AMBASSADOR OR UNMARKED
SY CAR FOLLOWING COM VEHICLE, OR BOTH.
C ᵒ OTHER US PERSONNEL
WE ARE NOT RESTRICTING MOVEMENTS OF FMBASSY EMPLOYEES OR TAKING
ANY NEW MEASURES FOR TIME BEING. WE HAVE CAUTIONED COUNTRY
TEAM NEED EXERCISE MAXIMUM PRUDENCE BUT WE MAKING EVERY EFFORT
AVOID ACTIONS WHICH WOULD UNDULY ALARM AMERICAN COMMUNITY.
Do CHANCERY
PHYSICAL SECURITY OF CHANCERY ENHANCED BY INCREASE IN GOL SY
FORCES FROM EIGHT TO TWENTY-SEVEN MEN INCLUDING ONE LIEUTENANT.
WE ARE MAINTAINING PACKAGE CONTROLS: ESCORT PROCEDURES,
LIMITED ACCESS AREAS AND STRICT SY REGARDING GATES, DOORS,
SHUTTERS, ETC. TO REDUCE NUMBER LEBANESE ENTERING CHANCERY
LOBBY WE ARE CONSTRUCTING OUTSIDE STAIRWAY LEADING DIRECTLY TO
CONSULAR SECTION CHANCERY BY NO MEANS INACCESSIBLE TO HOSTILE
GROUPS AS EVIDENCED BY DAMAGE INFLICTED DURING 1967 CRISIS.
HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE SINCE THAT TIME FVERYTHING POSSIBLE HAS BEEN
DONE TO DENY ACCESS. BECAUSE OF LOCATION, STRUCTURE ETC, IT
VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE GUARANTEE ABSOLITELY SECURITY OF PREMISES.
ONLY SOLUTION TO THIS SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEM IS A NEW CHANCERY,
WHICH WE HOPE CAN BE MADE MATTER OF TOP PRIORITY BY DEPT.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE Reproduced the Richard Nixon P residential ibrary C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
EXETS EXCES EXCES
SEPRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08009 261943Z
3. KEY POST PERSONNEL AND GOL OFFICIALS KEENLY AWARE POTENTIAL
HAZARDS TO US PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS. COMMITTEE FORMED TO
REGULARLY REVIEW SY MEASURES AND DISCUSS IMPROVEMENTS WITH GOL
OFFICIALS.
PORTER
NOTE: SY CHANNEL CAPTION REMOVED PER INSTRUCTIONS S/S-O, MISS MUENCH.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAUREORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
EXCE
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SEPRET 260
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07966 251917Z
42
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00, NSCE 00,CCO 00/1031 W
'69 SEP 25 PM 8:38
2 SITUATION
WHITE WHITE HOUSE HOUSE
088109
0 R 2517472 SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8661
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECRET BEIRUT 7966
EXDIS
1. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR RICCARDI CALLED ON ME TODAY, SEP
25 TO REVIEW PRESENT SITUATION OF TWA PASSENGERS AND
EFFORTS FOR THEIR RELEASE. HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY
EXCES
FROM HIS VANTAGE POINT IN SYRIAND NOT OFFICIALLY FOR
HIS GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE HIS VIEWS MUST BE PROTECTED.
2. WHEN THE TWA FLIGHT LANDED IN DAMASCUS AUG 29 HE BE-
LIEVED THAT THE SYRIANS WERE BADLY EMBARRASSED. DURING
HIS INITIAL TALKS HE HAD POINTED OUT TO SYRIANS THAT THEY
WOULD GAIN MORE FROM WORLD OPINION BY IMMEDIATE RELEASE
THAN BY RETAINING THE ISRAELI PASSENGERS. MOREOVER WHILE
ORIGINALLY BARATH PARTY COUNSELS WERE DIVIDED ON THIS ISSUE,
THE SITUATION HAD NOW DEVELOPED TO THE STAGE WHERE THE
SYRIANS NO LONGER FEEL EMBARRASSED NOR, RICCARDI EMPHASIZED,
ARE THEY FRIGHTENED BY FEAR OF ANY ISRAELI REPRISAL. THE
SYRIANS REASON THAT IF THE REPRISALS WERE MINOR, SYRIA
COULD ABSORB THE DAMAGE AND LIVE WITH IT. HOWEVER IF SUCH
A REPRISAL WERE MAJOR IT WOULD BE SO DISPROPORTIONATE TO
THE DETENTION OF TWO PASSENGERS THAT SYRIA WOULD GAIN RATHER
THAN LOSE IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD. ADDITIONALLY, THE
SYRIANS BELIEVED THAT ANY MAJOR ATTACK WOULD HAVE TO BE
AGAINST MAJOR INSTALLATION SUCH AS THE SYRIAN PIPELINE, THE
HOMS REFINERY, OR THE DAMASCUS AIRPORT. ALL HAVE LARGE
NUMBERS OF FOREIGN ADVISORS AND TECHNICIANS. THUS ANY SUCH
ISRAELI REPRISAL WOULD RISK THE KILLING OR WOUNDING OF
SOVIET ADVISORS, AND IF THE DAMASCUS AIRPORT WERE HIT, EVEN THE
a
AMERICAN TECHNICIANS REPAIRING THE BOEING 707. FINALLY THE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TISE CRETHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT BEF OF STATE
*
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07966 251917Z
SYRIANS CONSIDER THAT THE RISK OF SOME ISRAELI REPRISAL IS
ALWAYS EXISTENT AND IS SOMETHING THAT THEY, THE SYRIANS,
HAVE TO LIVE WITH. THESE CONSIDERATIONS HAVE HARDENED
SYRIAN ATTITUDES TO THE POINT WHERE THEY NO LONGER FEEL
UNDER ANY PRESSURE TO LET THE TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS GO.
3. ON THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF THE TWO SYRIAN
POLOTS, RICCARDI FEARED THAT THE SITUATION HAD EVOLVED TO
THE STAGE WHERE THE SYRIANS MIGHT EVEN SAY THIS WAS YOUR
IDEA AND NOT OURS AND WE ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED. IMRICCARDI
ALSO WAS WMSRCIT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SYRIANS
MIGHT SUDDENLY ANNOUNCE THAT THEIR INQUIRY INTO THE BACK-
GROUND OF THE TWO PASSENGERS HAD BEEN TERMINATED: THAT IT HAD
BEEN "DISCOVERED" THEY WERE ISRAELI AGENTS AND COULD FACE
THE 10-15 YEARS PRISON SENTENCES.
4. HE THEN ASKED THE RHETORICAL QUESTION WHO WOULD PROTECT
THE ISRAELIS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE RECOGNIZED FULLY
THE POINT OF PRINCIPLE INVOLVED IN RELEASING THESE PASSENGERS
BUT SAID THAT THIS PRINCIPLE LOOKS QUITE DIFFERENT IN SYRIAN
EYES. HE QUOTED ONE SARG FONOFF OFFICIAL WHO HAD POINTED
OUT THE KIDNAPPING OF AN AFRICAN MINISTER FROM A PANAM
PLANE HAD NOT RAISED ANY COMPARABLE OUTCRY FROM THE USG.
THE SYRIANS BELIEVE THAT THIS US PRESSURE MERELY REFLECTS
THE IDENTITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE SU WHICH IS
CAUSED BY PRESSURES GENERATED BY ISRAEL AND INTERNAL
POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE US.
5 . RICCARDI EMPHASIZED THAT THERE MUST BE A FACADE, OR
SCHREEN, BEHIND WHICH THE BARGAINING AND MANEUVERS COULD
TAKE PLACE: IF THE SYRIANS WERE PUT UNDER OVERT PRESSURES
THEY WOULD NOT MOVE. HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH
NUMEROUS OTHER FOREIGN AMBASSADORS IN DAMASCUS, INCLUDING
THE CZECH, FRENCH, SOVIET, JAP AND PAKISTANI. ALTHOUGH THEY
HAD MADE DEMARCHES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR INSTRUCTIONS,
RICCARDI SAID IN FACT SUCH DEMARCHES WERE CARRIED OUT IN ONLY
A PRO=FORMA MANNER REFLECTING THEIR BELIEF THAT UNDER THE
PRESENT SYRIAN CIRCUMSTANCES LITTLE MORE COULD BE DONE.
60 RICCARDI RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLE BUT
THEN WENT ON TO COMPARE THIS EPISODE WITH THAT OF THE
ITALIAN PRISONERS IN BIAFRA AND THE PUEBLO INCIDENT WHERE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THISEAREHTORIZATION OF HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPA
STATE
*
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA MAZ UNITED
TELEGRAM
SEPRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 07966 251917Z
IN THE LAST ANALYSIS COMPROMISES HAD TO BE MADE TO SAVE
THE INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED. HE WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE
CHESS GAME BEING PLAYED BY THE GOI "ON THE SKIN OF TWO
INNOCENT MEN", ONE OF WHOM, MUALLEM, RICCARDI SAID, WAS
LIVING IN A STATE OF PATHETIC FEAR. THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR
MANEUVERINGS WERE IN HIS OPINION JEOPARDIZING THESE MEN.
7 ° WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE BEST APPROACH FOR HANDLING ANY
EXCHANGE OF PILOTS VERSUS PASSENGERS, RICCARDI THOUGHT MANY
DIFFERENT WAYS COULD BE ARRANGED EITHER THROUGH THE
ITAL EMBASSY OR THE ICRC. HOWEVER, HE HINTED AT A PREFERENCE
FOR THE ICRC BY NOTING THAT THE ICRC DELS HAD BEEN GRANTED
PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW THE PASSENGERS WHEN THEY CITED THE
FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION GOVERNING PRISONERS OF WAR.
RICCARDI SAID HIS APPEALS BASED ON THE TOKYO CONVENTION,
ETC. HAD FAILED.
8. IN BRIEF, RICCARDI SEES ONLY LONG CAREFUL NEGOTIATION
WITH SYRIANS IF RELEASE IS TO BE OBTAINED AND ASKED
RHETORICALLY HOW COULD WE DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT OTHER THAN
BY SENDING IN THE SIXTH FLEET. HE REITERATED THE NEED FOR
SECRECY ON THESE NEGOTIATIONS.
90 COMMENT: WE CAN ONLY NOTE THAT SHOULD AN EXCHANGE BE
PROPOSED TO THE SYRIANS AND THEN REJECTED BY THEM THE ISRAELIS
WOULD GAIN THE UPPER HAND BY EXPOSING WHAT HAD GONE ON.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
2
SECRET 963
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07955 2516492
53
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
EXCESS
'69 SEP 25 PM 8:38
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
087168
P R 251449Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8658
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY ROME
S ECR E T BEIRUT 7955
EXDIS
SUBJ $ TWA HIJACKING
REF : TEL AVIV 3588 RPTD BEIRUT AS DEPTEL 159345
10 WE HAVE NOTED ARGUMENTATION IN REFTEL THAT USG MUST BE PRE-
PARED TO MOUNT A "NEW HARD HITTING CAMPAIGN AIMED AT GETTING
ISRAELIS OUT OF DAMASCUS BY SOME SPECIFIC DATE" (A) TO FORCE
RELEASE TWO REMAINING PASSENGERS, AND (B) TO PROTECT PRINCIPLE
THAT USG WILL NOT STAND FOR KIDNAPPING AND ILLEGAL DETENTION OF
PASSENGERS ON US FLAG AIRCRAFT. WE NOTE ALSO TEL AVIV'S FEARS
EXPRESSED IN REFTEL THAT SHOULD GOI CONCLUDE THAT USG EFFORTS
UNAVAILING THEM VIOLENT ISRAELI ACTION DISTINCT POSSIBILITY.
20 THE ARGUMENTATION RESTS ON TWO ASSUMPTIONS (A) THAT THE
USG DOES IN FACT HAVE MEANS OF EXERTING GENUINE PRESSURE ON
SYRIA, AND (B) THAT SYRIA WILL REACT POSITIVELY TO THIS PRESSURE
30 THE FIRST ASSUMPTION RESTS ON THE USG'S ABILITY TO EXERCISE
STRONG OVERT PRESSURE ON ITS OWN ON SYRIA AND TO MOBILIZE
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST SYRIA ACTUALLY IN THE ABSENCE
OF ANY POLITICAL OR SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC TIES WITH SYRIA, WE
HAVE HARDLY ANY CAPACITY TO EXERT STRONG PRESSURE ON SYRIA. OIL
TRANSIT RIGHTS, OVERFLIGHTS AND LANDINGS ARE ALL THINGS THE USG
WANTS MORE THAN THE SYRIANS. WHILE SYRIA MAY FEEL SOMEWHAT
RESTIVE ABOUT THE CLOSENESS OF ITS SOVIET RELATIONS (WHICH ACCOUNTS
TO SOME EXTENT FOR ITS RECENT RELAXATION OF ANTI-US MEASURES) THIS
CLOSENESS IS MOST USEFUL BULWARK ESPECIALLY AGAINST STRONG OVERT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THEAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
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SEPRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07955 251649Z
PRESSURE BY US. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MOBILIZATION OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUPPLEMENT OUR BILATERAL EFFORTS HAS NOT AS YET
ENJOYED MUCH SUCCESS.
40 THE SECOND ASSUMPTION IS THAT SYRIA WILL CAVE UNDER STRONG
PUBLIC US "PRESSURE". UNFORTUNATELY THE SYRIAN MENTALITY JUST DOES
NOT WORK THIS WAY. AS WE HAVE OBSERVED BEFORE, PRESSURE WILL
ONLY STIFFEN SYRIAN RESISTANCE TO RELEASING PASSENGERS. THEIR
LIKELY REACTION TO OVERT PRESSURES WILL BE TO INDULGE IN HEROIC
POSES AND THE MORE PRESSURE, THE GREATER THE "HEROISM". THIS
REACTION IS IN FACT NOT UNTYPICAL OF ANY PROUD, IF CANTANKEROUS,
PEOPLE. STRONG ACTION BY ISRAELIS SUCH AS REPRISAL RAID LIKELY
HAVE EFFECT, AS DEPT POINTED OUT TO ARGOV, OF JEOPARDIZING
SERIOUSLY LIVES OF TWO MEN. IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY THE USG
LIKELY HAVE HARD TIME DISENTANGLING TTSELF FROM ARAB ACCUSATIONS
THAT IT MASTERMINDED THE ISRAELI ATTACK.
EXCES
5. THUS BECAUSE NEITHER OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS APPEAR VALID TO
US, WE MUST CONCLUDE THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY A CAMPAIGN SUCH AS
RECOMMENDED IN THE REFTEL WOULD PROLONG THE PERIOD OF DETENTION
RATHER THAN EFFECT THE RELEASE OF THE PASSENGERS.
6. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT HAVE STRONG LEVERAGE ON THE SYRIANS, WE DO
HAVE ASSETS WHICH CAN BE USED. FOREMOST IS SYRIAN EMBARRASSMENT
WITH HIJACKING AND DETENTION TWO MEN. MOST INDIVIDUALS INTIMATELY
INVOLVED WITH PROBLEM, AGREE SYRIA WOULD LIKE PROBLEM "GO AWAY".
IN ADDITION, SYRIA IS INTERESTED PANAM USE OF NEW AIRPORT, DOES
WANT EQUIPMENT FROM US SUCH AS RCA TRANSCEIVERS AND DOES WANT
INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITYY WE ALSO HAVE CARD WHICH WE HAVE
WISELY BEEN HOLDING I.E., THREAT TO PERMIT OTHERS TO RAISE PROBLEM
IN UN FORUM WHICH COULD EMBARRASS SYRIA'S CANDIDACY FOR
SECURITY COUNDIL. THIS IS NOT TO MENTION SYRIAN POLOTS HELD BY
ISRAELIS.
70 THE ISSUE IS ALMOST AS MUCH HOW YOU DO IT AS WHAT YOU DO AND
WE FIRMLY BELIEVE A CAMPAIGN SUCH AS TEL AVIV SUGGESTS WOULD BE
SELF DEFEATING. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT SLOW PATIENT PROBINGS
ARE IN ORDER SUCH AS THE DEPARTMENT AND THE ITALIANS ARE
NOW DOING. THE SARG APPEARS NOT TO HAVE ABANDONED HOPE OF CON-
CLUDING THIS AFFAIR ON A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY BASIS BUT TO
ACHIEVE THIS END WE WILL HAVE TO WORK IN THE SLOW UNHURRIED
ATMOSPHERE OF CAREFUL NEGOTIATION TYPICAL OF THE ORIENTAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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DEARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
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UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SE RET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 07955 251649Z
BAZZAR RATHER THAN IN THE BELLIGERENT ATMOSPHERE OF DRAMATIC
HEADLINES. MAARIV ARTICLE SEPT 21 ITEL AVIV 3629 IS TYPE OF
PUBLICITY WHICH IS NOT HELPFUL. IF ISRAELIS CANNOT OR WILL NOT
GRASP THIS POINT AND GUIDE THEIR ACTIONS ACCORDINGLY WE CANNOT
HAVE MUCH HOPE FOR THE RELEASE OF THE TWO PASSENGERS.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRANTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 017
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07808 191704Z
41
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,CCO 00,SSO 00, NSCE 00 W
051938
0 R 191639Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8630
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
S E R E T BEIRUT 7808
EXDIS
10 AT MAIOLINI'S URGENT REQUEST, EMBOFF PRATT MET HIM AT CHTAURA
SEP 19 REGARDING TWA ISRAELI PASSENGERS. MAIOLINE WAS WORRIED BY
INCREASED TENSION AND THREATS OF REPRISALS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE
BASED ON REPORTS HE WAS RECEIVING FROM ITALIAN POSTS AT JERUSALEM
AND TEL AVIV. HE HAD BEEN EXPLORING FURTHER MEANS OF RESOLVING
SITUATION AND THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES HE HAD LEARNED THAT TWO HIGH
BAATH PARTY OFFICIALS WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SITUATION FURTHER
PROVIDED STRICT SECRECY MAINTAINED. MAIOLINI NOTED THAT OUR
CONTACTS SO FAR HAD BEEN (A) WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WAS NOT,
HE SAID, A PARTY MEMBER AND (B) WITH GENERAL DAKAR, WHO AS A CHRIS-
TIAN, WAS INHIBITED FROM TAKING UNPOPULAR STAND WITHIN THE PARTY.
HE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN (A) THE SYRIANS WOULD WANT SOMETHING IN
EXCHANGE FOR PASSENGERS® RELEASE, AND (B) EFFORTS TO FORCE SYRIANS
TO GIVE IN BY THREAT LIKELY BE USELESS, EVEN THOUGH THREATS WERE
CARRIED OUT, BECAUSE OF INNATE SYRIAN STUBBORNESS.
2. MAIOLINI WANTED OUR CLEARANCE BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER. PRATT
AGREED THAT HE SHOULD CONTACT BAATH OFFICIALS IN EFFORT DETERMINE
WHAT IF ANYTHING THEY HAD IN MIND AND THEN REPORT BACK.
30 PRATT AND MAIOLINI REVIEWED QUESTION ADVISABILITY INFORMING
ISRAELIS ON MOST CONFIDENTIAL BASIS THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE CON-
TINUING WITH SYRIANS WITH IDEA OF FORESTALLING ANY HASTY ISRAELI
ACTIONS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER WE SHOULD AWAIT THE RESULTS OF THE
EXPLORATORY MEETING BEFORE ADVISING THE ISRAELIS. PRATT UNDERSTOOD
THAT MAIOLINI WOULD BE SEEING THE INTERMEDIARIES SOONEST.
40 IN CLOSING MAIOLINI ONCE AGAIN STRESSED CONCERN THAT ISRAELIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT BEA OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SEPRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07808 191704Z
EXPIS EXE EXEMS
WOULD TAKE PRECIPITOUS ACTIONANDI CONSEQUENT URGENCY FOR U.S. AND
SARG TO TALK® HE FURTHER EMPHASIZED NEED FOR ABSOLUTE SECRECY BE-
CAUSE THE TWO SYRIANS WERE DEATHLY AFRAID OF LEAKS. MAIOLINI BE-
LIEVES SYRIANS IN QUESTION HAVE SUFFICIENT STATURE TO TALK FOR
BAATH PARTY.
5° COMMENT: THIS HIGHLY CLANDESTINE METHOD OF OPERATION IS RE-
MINISCENT OF BAATHI HANDLING OF THE CRITICAL STAGES OF THE IPC/
SARG NEGOTIATIONS IN JANUARY 1967. NOTHING MAY RESULT FROM MAIOLINI'S
EXPLORATIONS BUT WE SEE NO HARM IN TRYING.
HOUGHTON
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
'69 SEP 19 PM 7:02
SECRET
L80/E0/0290
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at DECLASSIFIED ORIZATION Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
the Richard Nixon Presidential
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEP STATE or
Department of State
oF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
843
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07577 121311Z
41
ACTION SS 30
'69 SEP 12 PM 44
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
2
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00 NSCE 00/031 W
003553
0 P 121203Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8570
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN
S E C R ET BEIRUT 7577
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 7563
SUBU : CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON
1. EVENING SEPT 11 MICHEL KHOURY GAVE ME PRES HELOUS RESPONSE
TO DEPARMTNET'S PROPOSALS TRANSMITTED STATE 152733. KHOURY SAID
PRESIDENT WANTED TO EXPRESS HIS DEEP APPRECIATION TO USG FOR ITS
PROMPT AND COMPLETE RESPONSE TO HIS REQUESTS HE WAS REASSURED
AND DEEPLY GRATEFUL.
2. WITH RESPECT TO RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, SHAIKH
MICHEL SAID WITHIN THE LAST TWO DAYS PRES HELOU HAD SENT INSTRUC-
TIONS TO HIS AMBASSADOR IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE HEAD OF THE
LEBANESE INTERESTS SECTION IN THE MOROCCAN EMBASSY TEHRAN TO MAKE
VIGOROUS EFFORTS CONVINCE THOSE TWO GOVERNMENTS OF THE NECESSITY
OF ALLI MODERATES SETTLING THEIR DIFFERENCES AND MAINTAINING
EXQIN
A UNITED FRONT. THE SHAH (PRESUMABLY RECENTLY) HAD INDICATED
A WILLINGNESS TO RESUME RELATIONS WITH LEBANON PROVIDED THE
LEBANESE WOULD SEND A DELEGATION OR AN EMISSARY TO "MAKE EXCUSES".
KHOURY SAID THAT THESE WERE SORT OF CONDITIONS WHICH THE GOVERN -
MENT FOUND HUMILIATING (BEIRUT 74191. NONETHELESS GOL WAS STUDYING
THE MATTER AND ALSO THE QUESTION OF WHOM WOULD BE A SUITABLE EMIS-
SARY FOR SUCH A DELICATE MISSION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE CONFES-
SIONAL PROBLEM HERE MADE COMPOSITION OF SUCH A MISSION MORE DIF-
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DER OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXPIS
SEI RET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07577 121311Z
FICULT THAN IN MOST COUNTRIES. PRES HELOU HAD EXPECTED TO DISCUSS:
THE MATTER PERSONALLY WITH THE SHAH AT THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT MEETING
SEPT 22 BUT WE GATHER MEETING NOW POSTPONED SAUDI ARAIBA, HE
SAID, WAS LESS AGGRESSIVE THAN IRAN BUT HAD NEGATIVE POSTURE.
HE EXPLAINED THAT LEBANON COULD LIVE WITH POSTPONEMENT OF RENEWAL
OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT PENDING THE RESOLUTION OF THE REFINERY
ISSUE PROVIDED THE SAUDI ATTITUDE WAS LESS HOSTILE AND PROVIDED
SAG DID NOT CARRY OUT THE MYRIAD OF THREATS WHICH THEY HAD MADE
WITH RESPECT TO LEBANESE WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA, FREIGHT TRAN-
SITTING BEIRUT PORT, ETC. PRES HELOU FELT THAT DEMARCHES WOULD BE
MORE EFFECTIVE IF OUR MISSIONS IN IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA DID NOT
APPEAR TO BE COORDINATING THEIR APPROACHES WITH LEBANESE MISSIONS
THERE.
3. PRES HELOU WAS PLEASED WITH THE STATEMENT RE SECURITY AND WELL-
BEING OF LEBANON HE CAUTIONED THAT ALTHOUGH RESPONSIBLE LEBANESE
ELEMENTS WOULD BE REASSURED BY STATEMENT, THERE WOULD BE SOME WHO
WOULD CRITICIZE US FOR MAKING REMARKS. HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD
NOT DISTURB US.
40 KHOURY REPORTED THAT THE PRES REGRETTED THAT HE COULD NOT AGREE
EITHER TO OUR USING HIS NAME AS REQUESTING THE MORATORIUM OR TO
OUR STATING THAT HE INTENDED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT DURING THIS
PERIOD. THE PRES MAINTAINED THAT HIS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND THAT
OF SOME OF HIS FELLOW CHIEFS OF STATE SUCH AS KING HUSSEIN (WHO
NOW VISITING LEBANON) WITH ISRAELI DISCRETION AND SECURITY HAD
BEEN TOO BITTER FOR HIM TO RISK USING HIS NAME FOR THIS PURPOSE.
HE WOULD PREFER THAT A MORATIORIM NOT BE REQUESTED RATHER THAN USE
HIS NAME. IF THE DEPARTMENT FELT THAT IT COULD NOT MAKE SUCH A
REQUEST WITHOUT USING HIS NAME HE WOULD UNDERSTAND.
5% I EXPLAINED TO KHOURY THAT IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT FOR US
TO TRY TO OBTAIN A MORATORIUM UNLESS THE ISRAELIS COULD SEE THAT
THERE WAS AT LEAST SOME PROSPECT OF AN IMPROVED SITUATION AT THE
END AS A CONSEQUENCE WE WORKED OUT THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTED GENERAL
LINES OF AN APPROACH TO THE ISRAELIS TO WHICH KHOURY SAID THE PRES
WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS RAPIDLY DE-
TERIORATING. MODERATE FORCES WITHIN THE COUNTRY NEED A PERIOD OF
CALM IN WHICH TO TRY AND RESTORE STABILITY. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION
THAT THEY WANT TO FORM A GOVERNMENT BUT CANNOT FORM AT LEAST A
MODERATE GOVERNMENT WHILE THE COUNTRY IS BEING FREQUENTLY SUB=
JECTED TO ISRAELI ATTACKS. WE HAVE ASSURANCES FROM THE GOVERNMENT
SECRET
29
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduce at the Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 07577 121311Z
THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO CONTAIN
THE FEDAYEEN.
EXPIS EXPIS EXIC
(FOR DEPARTMENT'S INFO ONLY. KHOURY INFORMED ME THAT PRES WAS
CURRENTLY ENDEAVORING TO FORM A CABINET)
6. PRES HELOU WAS ALSO PLEASED WITH THE ASSURANCES WE GAVE HIM WITH
RESPECT TO OUR POSITION TOWARDS LEBANON'S SOUTHERN BORDER.
HOUGHTON
NOTE: SYSTEMS FOR CCO.
SE RET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCEI Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
*
*
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED MMZ
TELEGRAM
SECRET 311
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07563 111717Z
45
ACTION SS 30
EXPIS EXPIC
INFO OCT 01/031 W
128389
PR 111529Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
'69 SEP 11 PM 8:34
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8566
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN
SECRE T BEIRUT 7563
EXDIS
REF: STATE 152733
SUBJ: CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON
1. I INFORMED MICHEL KHOURY THIS MORNING (SEPTEMBER 11)
INFORMATION CONTAINED STATE 152733 WHICH I HAD JUST RECEIVED.
KHOURY WAS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR PROMPT, POSITIVE REPLY
TO GOL'S REQUEST AND SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT TO PRESIDENT
WHEN HE SAW HIM THIS AFTERNOON .
2. HE WAS CONCERNED HOWEVER BY SUGGESTION THAT USG TELL
ISRAELIS THAT PRESIDENT HELOU HAD REQUESTED MORATORIUM. HE, OF
COURSE, WAS NOT ARGUING THAT HELOU HAD NOT MADE REQUEST BUT ON
THE BAIS OF PAST EXPERIENCE HE FEARED THAT WHEN IT SUITED THEIR
PURPOSES ISRAELIS WOULD LEAK THE INFORMATION TO HELOUS GREAT
HARM. IT IS ALSO FOR THIS REASON THAT HE PREFERS NOT TO HAVE
MENTION MADE OF HELOU'S PLAN TO FORM CABINET. I ARGUED
THAT I WAS SURE DEPARTMENT HAD HIS POINT IN MIND BUT WAS
ENDEAVORING TO MAKE AS STRONG AND AS EFFECTIVE AN APPROACH AS
IT COULD TO ISRAELIS. THE PROBLEM WAS TO CONVINCE
ISRAEL TO FORSWEAR ACTION IN AN AREA IN WHICH IT CONSIDERED
ITS SECURITY WAS INVOLVED. IN THIS CONTEXT ISRAEL MUST BE ABLE
TO SEE ADVANTAGE TO HER OF MORATORIUM. HE NOTED THAT IN RECENT
WEEKS SOME NEWSPAPERS IN ISRAEL HAD DEPICTED HELOU AS FRIEND OF
SECRET
24
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT BE OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
OF SEALS AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SE RET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07563 111717Z
ISRAEL BECAUSE OF HIS MODERATE POLICY AND EFFORTS TO CONTROL
FEDAYEEN. THIS, OF COURSE, NOT HELPFUL TO HELOU'S POSITION
LEBANON. HE SAID HE WOULD REPORT DEPT'S REQUEST AND WOULD GIVE
ME A REPLY SOONEST.
EXPIS
3. WITH RESPECTTO THE PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH KHOURY APPRECIATED,
WE HOPE THAT THE DEPARTMENT WILL NOT DILUTE THE REMARKS REPORTED
PARA 3 REFTEL. WE FEEL THAT A STATEMENT BASED ALONG THOSE LINES
WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN REASSURING LEBANESE OUR INTEREST AND CONCERN
THEIR COUNTRY.
HOUGHTON
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
680/E0/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TRANTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
38
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07201 301107Z
19
ACTION NEA 15
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00, CIAE 00,DODE 00,JPM 04,H 02, INR 07,L 03. NSAE 00,
NSC 10.P 03RRSC 01 / PRS 01,SS 20, USIA 12,CAB 09,COM 08,DOT 12,
El 15,10 13,EUR 170 ACDA 16,MC 02, RSR 01/172 W
056199
P 301010Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8464
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 7201
SUBJECT: PFLP ON TWA HIJACKING
1. PFLP WEEKLY AL HADAF, PUBLISHED SATURDAY MORNING BEIRUT,
CARRIED LONG POLITICAL DECLARATION STATING PFLP WAS INTENSIFYING
CAMPAIGN OF STRIKING AGAINST US INTERESTS IN AREA AND CONCENTRATING
ON US SUPPLY OF PHANTOMS AS LATEST US MOVE TO TURN ISRAEL INTO
ARSENAL TO PROTECT US INTERESTS. DERIDED THOSE ARABS WHO
CONTINUED BELIEVE IN US FRIENDSHIP AND CALLED ARAB MASSES TO
DECLARE WAR OF POPULAR LIBERATION AGAINST IMPERIALISM, ZIONISM
AND FORCES WHICH SUPPORT COUNTER-REVOLUTION
20 PFLP AMMAN COMMUNIQUE WAS EVEN MORE SPECIFIC IN LABELLING
HIJACKING AS RETALIATION FOR PHANTOM DELIVERY.
3. COMMENT: PFLP LINE NOT NEW EXCEPT IN LINKING HIJACKING
DIRECTLY TO PHANTOMS. INTERESTINGLY BEIRUT RUMOR MILL FRIDAY
NIGHT HAD SIX NEWLY TRAINED ISRAELI PHANTOM PILOTS ABOARD.
HOUGTON
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 2a
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DERA OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
147
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06806 151619Z
45
ACTION NEA 15
INFO OCT 01 AF 12, EUR 17.10 13,AID 28,CIAE 00,DODE 00, JPM 04.H 02,
INR 07 L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,P 04, RSC 010 PRS 01,SS 20, USIA 12,
ACDA 16, NIC 01, RSR 01/168 W
093746
R 151515Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8387
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUEHDTMGUSMISSION USUN 1006
CONFIDENTIA L BEIRUT 6806
SUBJECT: AFTERMATH OF THE 'ARQUB RAID
1. LEBANESE AND FEDAYEEN ALIKE MUST HAVE BEEN SOBERED BY THE AUG
11 ® ARQUB RAID SINCE THE FEDAYEEN HAVE APPARENTLY DENIED THE
LEBANESE AUTHORITIES ACCESS TO THE AFFECTED
AREAS, THE EXTENT
OF THEIR LOSSES IN UNKNOWN. HOWEVER, WELL-PLACED DEPUTIES LIKE
KHALIL KHOURY AND KAMIL AL AS.AD TELL US THEY UNDERSTAND A SAIQA
GROUP LUNCHING IN THE OLD FRENCH FORT IN SHUWAYYAH SUFFERED
HEAVY CASUALTIES. ACCORDING TO NAHAR, FATAH HAD ALREADY EVACUATED
ITS POSITIONS IN ® AYN QINYAH AND ALF UNITS IN RASHAYYA AND PFLP
UNITS IN SEVERAL "ARQUB VILLAGES WERE NOT BADLY HURT.
2. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED THAT SO VIOLENT A RAID WOULD
ACT AS A CATALYST IN UNITING THE VARIOUS SHADES OF LEBANESE
OPINION BEHIND SOME COMMON POLICY.
T SUCH LINK. IN BEIRUT, AT
AT LEAST, MOST CHRISTIANS ARE CITING THE RAID AS VINDICATION OF
HELOUS ANTI=FEDAYEEN POSTURE, WHILE MOST MUSLIMS ARE CITING IT
AS PROOF OF ISRAEL'S FUNDAMENTAL MALEVOLENCE TOWARD LEBANON.
SPEAKING FOR THE LATTER ELEMENT, DEPUTY JUMBLATT TOLD THE PRESS
AUG 14 THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH LEBANON ARE DISGUSTED WITH THE
GOL FAILURE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH ARMS OR EVEN PERMIT THEM TO AC-
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06806 151619Z
CEPT FEDAYEEN OFFERS TO HELP BUILD SHELTERS. JUMBLATT SAID HE
TOLD THEM: "WHEN THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON HAVE THEIR OWN
GOVERNMENT, THEN THE RULERS WILL BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND YOU.
HE WAS ASHAMED TO CALL HIMSELF LEBANESE.
3. WHILE MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS GLARE AT EACH OTHER ACROSS THE
CONFESSIONAL FENCE, THE GOL HAS ALREADY MOVED LEB
MON A BIT CLOSER
TO THE MUSLIM POSITION BY TELLING THE SECURITY COUNCIL IT CANNOT
ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF PALESTINIANS RESIDENT
ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. AS A LEBANESE OFFICER TOLD ARMA, THE GOL
HAD TO SHOW SOME DEFERENCE TO ARAB NATIONALIST OPINION HERE AND
ABROAD. MOREOVER, THE GOL WAS ON ITS METTLE TO REFUTE THE SUGGES-
TION BY SOME ILL-ADVISED ISRAELI SPOKESMAN THAT THE GOL WAS SE =
CRETLY PLEASED BY THE RAID. IT IS TRUE THA MANY INDIVIDUAL LEBANESE
WERE PLEASED, BUT THE GOL HAS TO EXPLAIN THE FAILURE OF A THEORE-
TICALLY SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT TO REPEL AN ATTACK ON ITS TERRITORY.
4. MANY LEBANESE COMMENTATORS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO PLACE THE BLAME
ON THE USG. SAWT AL ®URUBAH'S AUG 13 HEADLINE WAS "US ROLE IN THE
AGGRESSION ON LEBANON: WASHINGTON ENCOURAGES TEL AVIV TO CONTINUE
LARGE-SCALE AGGRESSION AND SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH NEW ARMS." ALL
RADICAL PAPERS ADVANCED THE ARGUMENT THAT THE US SUPPLY OF PHANTOMS
TO ISRAEL IS TANTAMOUNT TO US APPROVAL OF ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION AND
REPRISAL POLICIES. SIMILAR SENTIMENTS WERE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED BY
SEVERAL DEPUTIES, NOTABLY SAMIH OSSEIRAN, SECRETARY GENERAL OF
KARAME'S PDF, AND HABIB MITRAN, MAINSTAY OF CHAMOUN'S NLP. MOST
LEBANESE BLITHELY ASCRIBE TO THE USG THE CAPABILITY OF OUSTING
ISRAEL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AT WILL. A CARTOON IN THE
AUG 14 SHA'B SHOWS AN ARMED ARAB COMMANDO EYEING AN AMERICAN PIPE-
LINE CROSSING GROUND LABELED "ARAB REACTION" AND SPEWING OUT
AMERICAN ARMS FOR ISRAEL
5. THE RECENT REMARKS BY KARAME (BEIRUT 66241, WHO HAS A KEEN
NOSE FOR POLITICAL CURRENTS, POINTS UP THE TREND AMONG MUSLIMS
TOWARD GREATER HOSTILITY TOWARD ISRAEL IT IS DIFFICULT FOR
CHRISTIANS TO OPPOSE THIS TREND WITHOUT LOOKING LIKE PRO-ZIONIST
QUISLINGS. IN FACT, THE RECENT PRO-SUMMIT STATEMENT BY THE LEADING
LEBANESE CHRISTIAN, CAMILLE CHAMOUN, WAS RECEIVED BY THE MUSLIMS
AT LEAST AS FAVORABLY AS BY THE CHRISTIANS. IN THIS SAME VEIN,
WE NOTE THAT CHAMOUNS ASSOCIATE, JOSEPH MUGHABGHAB, HAS NOT
ACTED ON HIS PRIVATELY DISCLOSED INTENTION TO ISSUE A REBUTTAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT BEB OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06806 151619Z
TO KARAME'S REMARKS. ON THE POLITICAL SCENE, WE HEAR JUMBLATT IS
PLANNING TO BUILD A PRO-FEDAYEEN RALLY ON A CEREMONY IN MEMORY
OF A LEBANESE DRUZE WHO DIED WITH THE FEDAYEEN. ON THE MILITARY
SCENE, WE HOPE THAT THE IDF WILL STEER CLEAR OF ANY CLASH WITH
LEBANESE ARMY FORCES (AS OPPOSED TO THE FEDAYEEN), SINCE SUCH
A DEVELOPMENT, IN TPS JUDGMENT OF ARMA DSOURCE, WOULD COMPEL
LEBANON TO RETALIATE AND TEND TO UNITE THE LEBANESE AGAINST THE
THESIS THAT LEBANON CAN AND MUST AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO OPEN
CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL.
MAK
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department-ofState
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
'69 JUL 11 PM 4:29
SE-RET 590
2
EXPLU EXE™ EXCLUS
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05818 111612Z
40
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
061737
R 111445Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8160
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
S ECR E T BEIRUT 5818
EXDIS
REF: STATE 114029
1. WE HAVE ALWAYS TOLD INTERESTED LEBANESE: A ) USG OPPOSES BY
ALL APPROPRIATE MEANS SARG DESIGNS ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY: B) USG
DOES NOT INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF POLITICAL FACTIONS IN LEBANON,
SYRIA OR ANY OTHER STATE OF THE AREA
2. UNFORTUNATELY, EACH LEBANESE OFFICIAL SERVES TWO LOYALTIES 09
GOL AND HIS OWN RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY -- AND INTERPRETS USG POLICY
FROM THIS PAROCHIAL VIEWPOINT. PHARAON HAS NOTED THE CONSERVATIVE
-
COMMUNITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND RIYADH (JIDDA
2317 1. SAUDIS MAY HAVE MISINTERPRETED THE TENUOUS ASSOCIATIONS
BETWEEN JADID AND THE LEBANESE PRO-US RIGHT AS REPRESENTED
BY CHAMOUN AND BOULOS, AS EVIDENCE OF A US-LEBANESE ALLIANCE
AGAINST ASADO
3. FACT IS, OF COURSE, THAT EVERY SYRIAN REGIME IS BOUND TO
SALIVATE AT THE SIGHT OF FAT VULNERABLE LEBANON. SAIQA, THE
CURRENT SPEARHEAD OF SYRIAN SUBVERSION, IS REPORTEDLY DIRECTED
BY BAATHIST WHEELHOURS ZUOAYYIN, WHO IS CLOSER TO JADID THAN TO
ASAD. ANY LEBANESE TALK OF CONSTRUCTIVE COLLABORATION WITH EITHER
MUST BE DISMISSED AS SELF-DELUSION.
40 WE SHARE DEPARTMENT'S IMPRESSION THAT,FOR PRAGMATIC MILITARY-
MINDED REASONS, ASAD IS ONE OF THE MORE APPROACHABLE ELEMENTS IN THE
SYRIAN POWER STRUCTURE. DURING COURTESY CALL TODAY, GREEK
AMBASSADOR KALAMIDAS, WHO APPEARS TO BE A STAUNCH ANTI CGNMUNIST
AND A GREAT ADMIRER OF THE US, REPORTED A STRONG DESIRE AMONG THE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
EXPIC EXPIS
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05818 111612Z
PEOPLE OF
SYRIA AND IRAQ FOR RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH US. KALAMIDAS REINFORCED OUR READING THAT ASAD'S EFFORT TO
DEVELOP AN OPENING TO THE WEST WAS BLOCKED BY BLATANT
ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR.
5. AT THE SAME TIME, KALAMIDAS AGREES WITH US THAT ASAD AND JADID
ARE WELL AWARE THEY WILL SINK OR SWIM TOGETHER, AND THAT THE
ASAD-JADID COMBINE IS FIRMLY IN THE SYRIAN SADDLE. THEIR MINORITY
BASE OF POWER MAKES THEM ALL THE MORE RESPONSIVE TO MAJORITY
OPINION. SINCE THE SYRIAN PUBLIC IS OBSESSED BY THE THEMES OF
SOCIALISM AND ARAB NATIONALISM, WE EXPECT THAT MODERATION WILL
BE IN SHORT SUPPLY IN SYRIA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HOWEVER,
EXCESSES OF DOCTRINARIRE SOCIALISM HAVE ALREADY PRODUCED THE
PRAGMATIC REACTION WHICH ASAD SYMBOLIZES AND WHICH THE USG COULD
EXPLOIT IN THE INTEREST OF DETENTE WITH SYRIA -- PROVIDED THE USG
DESIRES AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT PERMITS.
MAK
SEPRET
560/40/0290
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 598
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06524 051445Z
69 AUG 5 PM 4:37 37
SITUATION
52
ACTION SS 30
WHITE HOUSE
INFO OCT 01/031 W
022686
R 0513202 AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8318
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMENIASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR ET BEIRUT 6524
EXDIS
BELGRADE FOR SISCO
SUBJECT: SISCO VISIT TO MIDDLEREAST
REF: STATE 129609
1. SUGGESTED VISIT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIS-O TO ME IN EARLY
SEPTEMBER IS AN EXCELLENT IDEA. ASIDE FROM PRESENTING OPPORTUNITY
FOR USEFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN SISCO, HELOU AND PERHAPS
PRIMIN KARADJ, SUCH VISIT WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT AT THIS
TIME WHEN ARABS ARE BEGINNING BELIEVE THAT USG IS HOPELESSLY
COMMITTED TO ISRAELIS AND DISINTERESTED IN ARAB "RIGHTS" AND POINT
OF VIEW.
2. IN PLANNING ITINERARY WESVSEE SOME VALUE IN MAKING ISRAEL
EITHER FIRST OR INTERMEDIARY STOP RATHER THAN LAST AS IS CUSTOMARY.
WE HAVE DETECTED SOME IRRITATION AMONG ARABS, WHO CLAIM THAT
MOST US OFFICIALS AND OTHER IMPORTANT US PERSONALITIES MAKE
ISRAEL THEIR FINAL STOP AND RETURN TO US WITH ISRAELI PROPAGANDA
"RINGING IN THEIR EARS".
MAK
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESMUREHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of Siate
OF STATE AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 339
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06708 121454Z
44
ACTION NEA 15
INFO OCT 01 , EUR 17,SSO 00,CCO 00, NSCE USIE 00s CIAE 00,DODE 00,
JPM 040H 02 INR 070L 030NSAE ØØ, NSC 100P 04,RSC 1PRS
IO 13, ACDA 16,RSR 01/15 W
069157
OR 121345Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8360
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
CONFIDENTIALBEIRUT678
REF: BEIRUT 6688
10 FONMIN YUSEF SALEM SUMMONED CHARGE TO FONOFF MORNING AUGUST
12 TO "PROTEST" ISRAELI BOMBARDMENT, INCLUDING USE OF NAPALM,
OF LEBANESE VILLAGES IN VICINITY HASBAAYA ON WESTERN SLOPES MT
HERMON EVENING AUG 110HONMINe WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SECRETARY
GENERAL SADAKA, HANDED CHARGE COPY OF AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH HE
SAID WAS BEING DELIVERED TO REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH OF "BIG
FOUR" EMBASSIES BEIRUT (SUMMARY BEING TRANSMITTED SEPTEL).
20 AFTER EXPRESSING GOL'S OUTRAGE OVER ISRAELI ATTACKs WHICH HE
TERMED AS UNPROVOKED, ILLEGAL BREACH OF CEASEFIRE AND BARBARIC
BY REASON USE OF "ILLEGAL" NAPALM, SALEM SAID GOL SOUGHT ON URGENT
BASIS USG'S ADVICE AS TO HOW GOL PROTEST SHOULD BE HANDLED IN
SECURITY COUNCIL AND INFO AS TO WHAT USG WOULD BE WILLING DO TO
PREVENT ANY FURTHER ISRAELI AGGRESSIVE ACTS AGAINST LEBANON.
CABINET HAD MET LAST EVENING SALEM SAID, TO DISCUSS HOW MATTER
SHOULD BE HANDLED, AND IT WAS THEN DECIDED THAT FOR TIME BEING
GOL WOULD PROTEST IN LETTER TO SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS ISRAELI
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06708 121454Z
ATTACK AND SEEK ADVICE OF BIG FOUR AS TO WHAT FURTHER ACTION
SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT FURTHER ISRAELI ATTACKS.
3. SALEM ASKED FOR CHARGE'S PERSONAL OPINION ON WHAT USG RE -
COMMENDATION WOULD BE . CHARGE SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MIS-
TAKE TO REQUEST MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL ON THIS ATTACK. WHILE
EVERYONE WOULD DEPLORE THIS ATTACK AND RESULTANT LOSS OF LIFE,
IT BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT ALL WOULD AGREE THAT ATTACK WAS UN-
PROVOKED. ISRAELIS HAD RECENTLY CLAIMED 21 COMMANDO ATTACKS ON
ISRAEL EMANATING FROM LEBANON WITHIN PAST THIRTY DAYS INVOLVING
NUMEROUS INJURIES AND SEVERAL DEATHS. HE FEARED THAT TO TAKE AT-
TACK TO SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD ONLY RESULT IN DRAWN OUT INDECI-
SIVE DEBATE. CHARGE SAID HE FELT SURE USG WOULD RECOMMEND CONFINE
ACTION TO PROTESTING ISRAELI ATTACK VIA LETTER TO SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMBERS. THERE SHOULD BE NO MISTAKE, HOWEVER, RE USG'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD SUCH ATTACKS. USG DEPLORED ANY HOSTILE ACTIONS ALONG
ARAB/ISRAELI FRONTIER AND PARTICULARLY IF THEY RESULTED IN IN-
JURIES OR DEATHS. FURTHERMORE, AS GOL KNOWS, USG HAS CONSTANTLY
DEPLORED HEATING UP OF THE HERETOFORE RELATIVELY QUIET LEBANON/
ISRAEL BORDER.
40 FONMIN SAID HE EXPECTED THIS WOULD BE USG'S ADVICE, BUT HE
WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING OFFICIAL USG RECOMMENDATION QUICKLY,
HOPEFULLYBY 10 AM (LOCAL) AUG 13 WHEN CHARGE HAD APPOINTMENT
TO PAY FAREWELL CALL ON FONMIN. JUST AS IMPORTANT HE SAID WAS
SOME INDICATION OF WHAT USG WOULD BE WILLING TO DO VIS-A-VIS
ISRAEL TO PREVENT FURTHER ISRAELI ATTACKS. ANY FURTHER ES-
CALATION OF BORDER ACTIVITY COULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR
LEBANON°S INTERNAL SITUATION WHICH WAS ALREADY HIGHLY UNSTABLE.
CHARGE REPLIED HE WOULD SOLICIT DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS VIA PRIORITY
CABLE.
5° COMMENT: CHARGE GATHERED IMPRESSION FROM MEETING AND FROM
SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH THE FONOFF UN AFFAIRS OFFICER SUHAIL
CHAMAS THAT GOL WAS NOT, REPEAT NOT, INCLINED TO REQUEST
EMERGENCY SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AND WOULD NOT DO SO IF USG AND
OTHER BIG FOUR POWERS ISSUED STATEMENTS CONDEMNING ISRAELI RAID
AND WERE WILLING TO PUT SOME HEAT ON ISRAELIS TO PREVENT RECUR-
RENCE SUCH ATTACKS. THIS WOULD RELIEVE PRESSURE ON GOL TO "DO
SOMETHING", WHICH USUALLY MEANS ASK FOR EMERGENCY SESSION OF
SECURITY COUNCIL USG STATEMENT CONDEMNING THIS RETALIATORY RAID
WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, . BE USEFUL IF DONE QUICKLY. IT WOULD ALSO BE
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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DEPARTMENT STATE to
*
*
Department of Siate
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06708 121454Z
USEFUL IF CHARGE COULD TELL FONMIN AUG 13 THAT USG WAS MAKING
REPRESENTATIONS TO ISREAL. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY IF POSSIBLE
BY EARLY AM AUG 13.
MAK
CONFIDENTIAL
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A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOYED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 92 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
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the Richard Nixon Presidential
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05470 301843Z
27
53
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
058144
R 705Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8065
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
S EXCIRENT BEIRUT 5470
REF 8 BEIRUT 5469 (NOTAL)
EXDIS
SUBU: PRESIDENT HELOU'S DEMARCHE RE POSSIBILITIES US ASSISTANCE
1. DURING CONVERSATION WITH HELOU JUNE 28, IN WHICH HE GAVE ME
DETAILS PRESENTATION HIS ANALYSIS LEBANON'S POLITICAL SITUATION
(SEE REFTEL) HELOU MADE FORMAL DEMARCHE CONCERNING POSSIBILITIES
US ASSISTANCE AND HANDED ME FOLLOWING INFORMAL SET OF QUESTIONS.
20 BEGIN TEXT WHAT WOULD BE POSITIONOF USG IF (A) THERE WAS AN
ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON (B) LEBANON WAS THE VICTIM OFFFORM
EIGN INTERVENTION (I.E., SARG), EITHER OVERT OR COVERTS (C)
INTERNAL UNREST AND DISORDER ERUPTED IN LEBANON END TEXT
3. HELOU POINTED OUT HE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN LEARNING
USG'S VIEWS RE POINT C. I REITERATED POINTS MADE IN PAST CONVER-
SATIONS AND PREVIOUSLY REPORTED REI POSSIBLE UNI INTERVENTION AND
DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN COOPERATION WITH FRANCE AND OTHER FRIENDS
OF LEBANON. IN RESPONSE HIS SPECIFIC QUESTION 1 DID NOT RULE OUT
USE OF UNEF FORCES ALTHOUGH I REMINDED HIM OF INHERENT DIFFICULTIES:
THIS APPROACH. I MADE NO COMMENT WITH REGARD POSSIBLE USE FORCES:
ALTHOUGH THIS OF COURSE WAS POINT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS: IN COURSE
EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION CURRENT ATTITUDES AMERICAN PUBLIC AND PROB
LEMS CREATED BY VIET NAM, I POINTED OUT NEED FOR REALISTIC
ACCEPTANCE USG UNWILLINGNESS ENTER INTO PRIOR MILITARY COM-
SECRET
the Richard Nixon Presidential
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at DECLASSIFIED RIZATION Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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#
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Department of State
UNING
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STATES
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SEPRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05470 301843Z
MITMENTS.I ASSURED HIM OF OUR CONCERN FOR LEBANON, ITS SOVEREIGNTY
AND ITS WELFARE, AND EMPHASIZED THAT USG WOULD NOT IGNORE
LEBANON'S FATE. I SHARED HIS SENSE OF FRUSTRATION THAT THERE WERE
PRACTICAL LIMITS TO OUR ABILITY TO HELP HIM AND I FELT SURE
WASHINGTON MIRRORED MY PERSONAL CONCERN. NEITHER, OF COURSE, DO
WE WISH TO AGGRAVATE CONFESSIONAL PROBLEM BY TAKING STRONG POSI-
TIONS WHICH MIGHT INFLAME RATHER THAT STABILIZE INTERNAL SITUATION.
4. I REITERATED THAT USG CONTINUES PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN URGING
ISRAELI RESTRAINT ON LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER ALSO THERE ARE SIGNS
OF LIMITED BUT TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS ON
ME SETTLEMENT. ALTHOUGH MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS ARE APPARENT BETWEEN
US AND USSR POSITIONS RE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, WE HAVE INDICATIONS
THAT SOVS INTERESTED IN CONTINUING TALKS, AND WE ARE DETERMINED
TO KEEP TRYING. IN DIRECT RESPONSE HIS PLEA FOR URGENT PROGRESS,
I CONFESSED I HAD NO INDICATION THAT AN EARLY BREAKTHROUGH WAS
LIKELY.
5° HELOU'S REACTION WAS THAT TIME HAD PROBABLY ALREADY PASSED us
BY. HE SAID POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND MILITARY ESCALATION IN
ME HAVE GAINED SUCH MOMENTUM THAT,BARRING STRONG AND UNEQUIVOCAL
ACTION AND PRESSURE BY USSR AND US ON THEIR RESPECTIVE "CLIENTS",
ME WAS DOOMED TO FURTHER RADICALIZATION NOT ONLY WILL MODERATE
STATES BE SWEPT ALONG BY TIDE, BUT BOTH USSR AND US WILLI LOSE. SOVS:
WILLILOSE BECAUSE THEY ALREADY BOGGED DOWN WITH COMMITMENTS TO
CERTAIN ARAB STATES AND CANNOT SUBSCRIBE TO REVOLUTIONARY FORCES
AT PLAY AS REPRESENTED BY FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND EXTREMIST RADICALI
PARTIES WHICH SUBSCRIBE MORE TO PEKING THAN TO MOSCOWN COM-
MUNIST CHINA MAY INDEED BE WAVE OF FUTURE IN ARAB WORLDWHELOA
SIA. AS FOR US, ITS FALTERING ATTEMPTS TO STRIKE BALANCE IN ITS
ME POLICY SINCE INCEPTION ARAB-ISRAEL - CONFLICT HAVE SERIOUSLY
JEOPARDIZED AMERICA'S CONSIDERAGLE ECONOMIC POLITICAL AND CUL-
EXCES
TURAL INTERESTS IN AREA.
6. I TOLD HELOU HE SHOULD NOT DISMISS, OUT OF HAND US=USSRHB
LATERAL TALKS AND PRESSURES UPON SOVS TO REACH POLITICAL SETTLE-
MENT ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. SOVS SEEM GENUINELY NOTTTO WANT WARI IN
ME. THEY MAY CONCLUDE (OR BE FORCED BY PRESSUREI OF EVENTS TO
BRING MORE REALISM INTO THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
ONLY US-USSR UNDERSTANDING COULD FACILITATE ESTABLISHMENT DURABLE
PEACE IN ME, GIVEN INCAPACITY OF ARABS OR ISRAELI TO FIND DIRECT
BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT HELOU SAID HE COULD NOT SHARE MY OPTIMISM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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OF
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#
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EXETS
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TELEGRAM
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05470 301843Z
7 o AS FOR LEBANON, HELOU SAID IN LONG RUN HE MUST ADMITTHAT HE
HAS ALREADY LOST GROUND IN HIS PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS MAINTAIN LE-
BANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE IN FACE OF DANGERS:
POSED BY FEDAYEEN® HE WILL LOSE MORE. IF SITUATION DETERIORATED
SHARPLY, BEST HE COULD HOPE FOR WULD BE SOME SORT OF CYPRUS. TYPE
SOLUTION, PRESUMABLY WITH CONFESSIONALI ENCLAVES. IT WAS NO HONOR,
HE COMMENTED, TO BE CHIEF OF A UN-PROTECTED STATE. THE VERY PRE-
SENCE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN A COUNTRY COMPROMISES THAT COUNTRY'S
INDEPENDCENCE, AND DESTROYS ITS FIBRE. NEVERTHELESS, THIS WOULD BE
THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, GIVEN THE DISMAL ALTERNATIVES,
TO INCLUDE ISRAELI OCCUPATION, SYRIAN SUBVERSION, OR DISINTE-
GRATION LEBANESE STATE ALONG CONFESSIONAL LINES.
80 COMMENT: IT IS DIFFUCULT NOT TO SHARE HELOU'S PESSIMISM RE
LEBANON'S FUTURE, ALTHOUGH THE STRAIN HE IS UNDER, AND HIS
ISOLATION, TEND TO DARKEN HIS VISION. HE FORESEES THE SAME PRO-
CESS OF DISINTEGRATION WHICH WE HAVE BEEN REPORTING FOR MANY
MONTHS. NONETHELESS, HE IS PERHAPS SOMEWHAT BLINDED BY HIS
CURRENT ANXIETIES TO THE POINT THAT HE OVERLOOKS THE RESILIENCE
,
OF THE LEBANESE AND THEIR CAPACITY TO FIND A WAY OUT. INSTILL
HAS MANY ASSETS, AND THERE IS AS YET NO INDICATION THAT THE
LEBANESE ARE EAGER TO TAKE THEIR DISAGREEMENT (FUNDAMENTAL AS IT
IS) TO THE BARRICADES. WF INCLINE TO THE VIEW THAT ANY SHOWDOWN
IS STILL SOME TIME OFF, UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR WELL-ORCHES-
TRATED EXTERNAL ATTEMPT AT SUBVERSION (E.GO, FROM SYRIA). PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
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*
EXE™
Department of State
of STATES MAKE AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05470 301843Z
53
2
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
058144
R 3017052 JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8065
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR ET BEIRUT 5470
REF 8 BEIRUT 5469 (NOTAL) )
EXDIS
EXCES
SUBU: PRESIDENT HELOU'S DEMARCHE RE POSSIBILITIES US ASSISTANCE
1 o DURING CONVERSATION WITH HELOU JUNE 28, IN WHICH HE GAVE ME
DETAILS PRESENTATION HIS ANALYSIS LEBANON'S POLITICAL SITUATION
(SEE REFTEL) HELOU MADE FORMAL DEMARCHE CONCERNING POSSIBILITIES
US ASSISTANCE AND HANDED ME FOLLOWING INFORMAL SET OF QUESTIONS.
20 BEGIN TEXT = WHAT WOULD BE POSITIONOF USG IF (A) THERE WAS AN
ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON: (B) LEBANON WAS THE VICTIM OFFFOR
EIGN INTERVENTION (I.E., SARG), EITHER OVERT OR COVERT: (C)
INTERNAL UNREST AND DISORDER ERUPTED IN LEBANON END TEXT
30 HELOU POINTED OUT HE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN LEARNING
USG'S VIEWS RE POINT C. I REITERATED POINTS MADE IN PAST CONVER-
SATIONS AND PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RE POSSIBLE UN INTERVENTION AND
DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN COOPERATION WITH FRANCE AND OTHER FRIENDS
OF LEBANON. IN RESPONSE HIS SPECIFIC QUESTION I DID NOT RULE OUT
USE OF UNEF FORCES ALTHOUGH I REMINDED HIM OF INHERENT DIFFICULTIES
THIS APPROACH. I MADE NO COMMENT WITH REGARD POSSIBLE USE US FORCES
ALTHOUGH THIS OF COURSE WAS POINT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS. IN COURSEI
EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION CURRENT ATTITUDES AMERICAN PUBLIC AND PROB-
LEMS CREATED BY VIET NAM, I POINTED OUT NEED FOR REALISTIC
ACCEPTANCE USG UNWILLINGNESS ENTER INTO PRIOR MILITARY COM-
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SEPRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05470 3g1843Z
MITMENTS.I ASSURED HIM OF OUR CONCERN FOR LEBANON, ITS SOVEREIGNTY
AND ITS WELFARE, AND EMPHASIZED THAT USG WOULD NOT IGNORE
LEBANONS FATE. I SHARED HIS SENSE OF FRUSTRATION THAT THERE WERE
PRACTICAL LIMITS TO OUR ABILITY TO HELP HIM, AND I FELT SURE
WASHINGTON MIRRORED MY PERSONAL CONCERN. NEITHER, OF COURSE DO
WE WISH TO AGGRAVATE CONFESSIONAL PROBLEM BY TAKING STRONG POSI-
TIONS WHICH MIGHT INFLAME RATHER THAT STABILIZE INTERNAL SITUATION.
40 I REITERATED THAT USG CONTINUES PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN URGING
ISRAELI RESTRAINT ON LEBANON ISRAEL BORDER. ALSO THERE ARE SIGNS
OF LIMITED BUT TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN US USSR BILATERAL TALKS ON
ME SETTLEMENT. 00 ALTHOUGH MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS ARE APPARENT BETWEEN
US AND USSR POSITIONS RE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, WE HAVE INDICATIONS
THAT SOVS INTERESTED IN CONTINUING TALKS, AND WE ARE DETERMINED
TO KEEP TRYING. IN DIRECT RESPONSE HIS PLEA FOR URGENT PROGRESS,
I CONFESSED I HAD NO INDICATION THAT AN EARLY BREAKTHROUGH WAS
LIKELY.
5 ᵒ HELOU'S REACTION WAS THAT TIME HAD PROBABLY ALREADY PASSED US
BYo HE SAID POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND MILITARY ESCALATION IN
ME HAVE GAINED SUCH MOMENTUM THAT, BARRING STRONG AND UNEQUIVOCAL
ACTION AND PRESSURE BY USSR AND US ON THEIR RESPECTIVE "CLIENTS",
ME WAS DOOMED TO FURTHER RADICALIZATION NOT ONLY WILL MODERATE
STATES BE SWEPT ALONG BY TIDE, BUT BOTH USSR AND US WILL LOSE. SOVS
WILL LOSE BECAUSE THEY AIREADY BOGGED DOWN WITH COMMITMENTS TO
CERTAIN ARAB STATES AND CANNOT SUBSCRIBE TO REVOLUTIONARY FORCES
AT PLAY AS REPRESENTED BY FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND EXTREMIST RADICAL
PARTIES WHICH SUBSCRIBE MORE TO PEKING THAN TO MOSCOW. COM-
MUNIST CHINA MAY INDEED BE WAVE OF FUTURE IN ARAB WORLD,HELOA
SIA. AS FOR US, ITS FALTERING ATTEMPTS TO STRIKE BALANCE IN ITS
ME POLICY SINCE INCEPTION ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT HAVELSERIOUSLY
JEOPARDIZED AMERICA'S CONSIDERAGLE ECONOMIC POLITICAL AND CUL-
TURAL INTERESTS IN AREA.
EXPIS
60 I TOLD HELOU HE SHOULD NOT DISMISS, OUT OF HAND, USWUSSRI BI
LATERAL TALKS AND PRESSURES UPON SOVS TO REACH POLITICAL SETTLE
MENT ARAB ISRAEL CONFLICT. SOVS SEEM GENUINELY NOTTTO WANT WAR IN
ME . THEY MAY CONCLUDE (OR BE FORCED BY PRESSURE OF EVENTS) TO
BRING MORE REALISM INTO THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
ONLY US-USSR UNDERSTANDING COULD FACILITATE ESTABLISHMENT DURABLE
PEACE IN ME, GIVEN INCAPACITY OF ARABS OR ISRAELI TO FIND DIRECT
BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT.HELOU SAID HE COULD NOT SHARE MY OPTIMISM.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED /ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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*
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EXETS
ORLINO
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05470 301843Z
7 o AS FOR LEBANON, HELOU SAID IN LONG RUN HE MUST ADMITITHAT HE
HAS ALREADY LOST GROUND IN HIS PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS MAINTAIN LE-
BANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE IN FACE OF DANGERS:
POSED BY FEDAYEEN HE WILL LOSE MORE. IF SITUATION DETERIORATED
SHARPLY, BEST HE COULD HOPE FOR WULD BE SOME SORT OF CYPRUS. TYPE
SOLUTION, PRESUMABLY WITH CONFESSIONAL ENCLAVES. IT WAS NO HONOR,
HE COMMENTED, TO BE CHIEF OF A UN-PROTECTED STATE. THE VERY PRE-
SENCE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN A COUNTRY COMPROMISES THAT COUNTRY'S
INDEPENDCENCE, AND DESTROYS ITS FIBRE. NEVERTHELESS THIS WOULD BE
THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, GIVEN THE DISMAL ALTERNATIVES,
TO INCLUDE ISRAELI OCCUPATION, SYRIAN SUBVERSION, OR DISINTE-
GRATION LEBANESE STATE ALONG CONFESSIONAL LINES.
80 COMMENT: IT IS DIFFUCULT NOT TO SHARE HELOU'S PESSIMISM RE
LEBANON'S FUTURE, ALTHOUGH THE STRAIN HE IS UNDER, AND HIS
ISOLATION, TEND TO DARKEN HIS VISION. HE FORESEES THE SAME PRO-
CESS OF DISINTEGRATION WHICH WE HAVE BEEN REPORTING FOR MANY
MONTHS. NONETHELESS, HE IS PERHAPS SOMEWHAT BLINDED BY HIS
CURRENT ANXIETIES TO THE POINT THAT HE OVERLOOKS THE RESILIENCE
OF THE LEBANESE AND THEIR CAPACITY TO FIND A WAY OUT. HE STILL
HAS MANY ASSETS, AND THERE IS AS YET NO INDICATION THAT THE
LEBANESE ARE EAGER TO TAKE THEIR DISAGREEMENT (FUNDAMENTAL AS IT
IS) TO THE BARRICADES. WF INCLINE TO THE VIEW THAT ANY SHOWDOWN
IS STILL SOME TIME OFF, UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR WELL-ORCHES-
TRATED EXTERNAL ATTEMPT AT SUBVERSION (EOGO, FROM SYRIA). PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05469 01 OF 02 301808Z
2
43
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
057940
R 301700Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8063
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR ETT SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 5469
EXDIS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HELOUS POLICY RE FEDAYEEN PROBLEM
10 I PAID CALL ON PRES HFLOU JUNF 28 TO OBTAIN HIS VIEWS ON
PRESENT SITATION BEFORE MY DEPARTURE ON HOME LEAVE. HELOU GAVE
ME CAREFULLY PREPARED PRESENTATION OF HIS ASSISSMENT OF THE SITUA-
TION AND HIS ANALYSIS OF WHAT PROBABLE COURSE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS:
WOULD TAKE. HE WAS PESSIMISTIC, FATALISTIC, AND OBVIOUSLY HAS
ASSUMED ATTITUDE OF ALMOST OLYMPIAN DETACHMENT IN REFUSING TO
LISTEN TO THE VOICES OF COMPROMISE WHICH HE HEARS FROM ALL SIDES.
HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF COMPROMISING ON THE
i
- -
PUBLIC POSITION HE HAS ADOPTED, I.E., CATEGORICAL REFUSAL OF
FEDAYEEN FAIT ACCOMPLI AND REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE AWAY LEBANON'S
SOVEREIGNTY BY BITS AND PIECES. AT FIRST HE SAID HE WOULD RATHER
RESIGN AS CHIEF OF STATE THAN PRESIDE OVER A "POLICY OF CAPITULA-
TION. BUT HE LATER TOOK A MORE RIGID STAND AND SAID HE WAS NOT
GOING TO "ABDICATE" WHATEVER THE CONSEQUENCES AND EVEN IF THIS
MEANT "NEVER LEAVING BAABDA (THE PRESIDENCY) ALIVE". HE WAS QUICK
TO ASSURE ME THAT HE WAS NOT THE CAPTIVE OF HIS OWN PUBLIC STANCE,
BUT RATHER, THAT HE WAS THE CAPTIVE OF A FIRM CONVICTION OF WHAT
HE THOUGHT WAS THE RIGHT AND HONORABLE COURSE FOR LEBANON TO TAKE.
I EXPRESSED MY PERSONAL ADMIRATION FOR HELOU'S COURAGE IN MAKING
THIS HARD AND LONELY DECISION. I TOLD HIM THAT USG SHARED MY AD-
MIRATION AND ENDORSED HIs JUDGMENT RE FEDAYEEN. HELOU REITERATED
HIS THESIS THAT ANY NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD, BY NECESSITY, BE A
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon P esidential Library
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05469 01 OF 02 301808Z
"GOVERNMENT OF CAPITULATION" SINCE NO SUNNI PRIME MINISTER COULD
WITHSTAND PRESSURE OVER THE LONG RUN TO COME TO TERMS WITH FED-
DAYEEN. FEDAYEEN, HE SAID, WOULD VIEW FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT
AS JUST ANOTHER STAGE IN THEIR ANTI REGIME CAMPAIGN. NEW GOVERN-
MENT WOULD BECOME VIRTUAL "HOSTAGE" OF FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT.
20 HELOU ADMITTED THAT HIS POLICY DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SOLUTION
TO LEBANESE DILEMMA. HE WAS ONLY BUYING TIME. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH
HIS APPROACH HAS TO DATE BEEN SUCCESSFUL AS A PLAY FOR TIME, HE
MADE IT CLEAR HE THOUGHT SHARP DETERIORATION IN SITUATION COULD
OCCUR WITHIN NEXT FEW MONTHS. IT COULD COME MUCH SOONER, IF HE
LOST CONTROL OF EVENTS. HE SAID HIS POLICY COULD BE SERIOUSLY
JEOPARDIZED BY ANY ONE OF FOLLOWING FOUR FACTORS: A) ISRAELI RE-
PRISAL ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON, EITHER DIRECTED AGAINST FEDAYEEN
OR AGAINST LEBANESE ARMY; B) FEDAYEEN CLASHES WITH LEBANESE ARMY
RESULTING IN BLOODSHED: C) SYRIAN-INSPRIED SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN
AGAINST LEBANESE REGIME IN COLLUSION WITH LEFT-WING RADICAL
GROUPS: AND DI POLITICAL MACHINATIONS OF OPPORTUNIST POLITICIANS
WHO SEEK TO PROTECT THEIR POLITICAL POSITIONS BY URGING COM-
PROMISE SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD PROLONG THEIR SURVIVAL IN THE SHORT
RUN, BUT WHOSE TEMPORIZING WOULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO DISINTEGRATION
OF LEBANON AS A MODERATE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REGIME. HE HAD
NO INTENTION, HELOU SAID, OF "PRESIDING OVER THE DEMISE OF LEBANON"
AND SEEING PALESTINAINS AND BAATHISTS TAKE OVER REINS OF POWER.
3. HELOU, IN WHAT WAS OBVIOUSLY A PRACTICE FORENSIC SESSION,
READ TO ME FROM AN INFORMAL PAPER OUTLINING SUBSTANCE OF HIS PO-
SITION AND ARGUMENTATION. HIS PRESENTATION WAS CHARGED WITH
EMOTION. HE STARTS SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS JUNE 30 WITH ALL PO-
LITICAL LEADERS AND GROUPS, AND WILL REITERATE HIS POSITION AS
STATED TO ME. AFTER EXPOSING HIS THESIS TO LEBANESE LEADERS,
HE WILL ASK THEM PRIVATELY TO STATE THEIR POSITION CONCERNING
HIS POLICY IN WRITING» THE ANSWERS TO BE HELD ONLY BY HIM. INTER
ALIA HELOU WILL ASK THE LEADERS TWO QUESTIONS: A ) DO THEY AC-
CEPT HIS POLICY RE FEDAYEEN, AND B) IF SO, DO THEY AGREE TO CON-
CEPT THAT LEBANESE MILITARY BE AUTHORIZED USE FORCE IF NECESSARY
TO CONTROL FEDEYEEN ACTIVITIES.
40 THE TEXT OF THE INFORMAL PAPER HANDED TO ME BY HELOU FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT
THE FEDAYEEN PROBLEM.
Ao 1. THE FEDAYEEN CONSTITUTE A MILITARY VANGUARD WHICH ASSUMES
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASSIFIED ORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE #
EXPIN
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 858
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05469 02 OF 02 301832Z
45
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
058105
R 301700Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8064
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR ET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 5469
EXDIS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HELOU'S POLICY RE FEDAYEEN PROBLEM
B. WHEN SKIRMISHES OCCUR WITH THE ENEMY (I.E., ISRAEL):
1. IF EITHER VICTORS OR VANQUISHED, THE FEDAYEEN WOULD CAUSE
HARM TO THE ARMY'S REPUTATION IN THE EYES OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE
(TOE., IF FEDAYEEN CARRIED OUT SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS AGAINST
ISRAEL, THEY WILL HAVE DONE WHAT LEBANESE ARMY NEVER COULD DO
AGAINST ISRAEL: ON OTHER HAND, IF FEDAYEEN FAILED, THEY COULD AL-
WAYS BLAME LEBANESE ARMY AS SCAPEGOAT).
2. THE FEDAYEEN DESTROY THE ARMY'S MORALE AND STRENGTH.
3. THEY FORCE THE STATE TO TAKE DEMOGOGIC MEASURES AND TO
CONFRONT BA'ATH-INSPRIED PROPAGANDA.
Co WHATEVER OUR PERSONAL OPINION, THESE ARE THE OBJECTIVE FACTS
WHICH WILL GOVERN EVENTS IN THE FUTURE. LEBANON WILL FIND ITSELF
ENGAGED IN WAR WITHOUT CLEARLY DEFINED MILITARY OBJECTIVES, ONE
WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY BE FORCED ON THE ENTIRE POPULATION
AND WHICH WOULD LEAD TO MILITARY AND CIVIL DISINTEGRATION. OUR
ECONOMY COULD NOT SURVIVE SUCH A WAR AND LEBANON'S UNITY WOULD BE
SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED.
Do ALL THE DANGERS INHERENT IN TAKING A POSITION TO STEM THIS
TIDE ARE LESS THAN THE DANGERS OUTLINED ABOVE (I.E., ECONOMIC
DETERIORATION CAUSED BY THE STALEMATE IS LESS DAMAGING THAN A
POTENTIAL POLITICAL EXPLOSION.) END TEXT.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05469 02 OF 02 301832Z
EXPIS EXCE
5. HELOU CONFIDED THAT WHAT HE FOUND PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT,
DESPITE HIS STRONG CONVICTION, WAS HIS ISOLATION. HE VOICED HIS
SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING OF POTENTIALLY TRAGIC PREDICAMENT
OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IN LEBANON WHICH ITSELF BEGINNING TO FEEL
ISOLATED IN ARAB MUSLIM WORLD. IF IT CAME TO CONFESSIONAL STRIFE,
HE SAID, LEBANON'S VIOLENT CHRISTIAN GROUPINGS, EVEN PARA-
MILITARY PHALANGE, WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHANCE IN FACE OF OVER-
WHELMING NUMBERS OF MUSLIMS, EXPECIALLY IN LIKELY CONTINGENCY
OF SYRIAN INTERVENTION. HOWEVER, HELOU WAS CRITICAL OF LEBANON'S
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP. EX. PRESIDENT FUAD CHEHAB, FOR EXAMPLE,
HELOU SAID,IS A MAN OF PRINCIPLE WHOM HE RESPECTED, BUT HE FEELS
THAT CHEHAB, IN SEEKING ACCOMMODATION WITH THE FEDAYEEN IS A CAP -
TIVE OF HIS "SENSE OF REALISM", WHICH LEADS HIM TO ACCEPT COMPRO-
MISE FOR SAKE OF SHORT-TERM AND TRANSIENT STABILITY. CHEHAB, HELOU
SAID, FAILS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE CAN BE NO COMPROMISE WITH
FEDAYEEN WHICH WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A SELL-OUT. AS FOR PIERRE
GEMAYEL, LEADER OF CHRISTIAN PARAMILITARY PHALANGE PARTY, HE IS
ADVOCATING FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL ON FE-
DAYEEN POLICY AND CREATION OF AN INNER-CABINET' WHICH WOULD DEAL
WITH FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN SECRET. THIS APPROACH, HELOU SAID,
WAS ONE OF PURE FORM AND NO SUBSTANCE. EX- PRESIDENT CAMILLE CHA -
MOUN, AMONG ALL THE OTHER CHRISTIAN LEADERS (WHOM HELOU DISMISSED
AS NOTHING MORE THAT "PITIFUL BASTARDS") FINALLY NOW UNDERSTOOD
COUNTRY'S DILEMMA AND AGREED WITH HELOU'S POLICY. AS FOR REYMOND
EDDE, LEADER OF NATIONAL BLOC, HE WAS ACTING LIKE A REAL "MORON".
HE WAS ADVOCATING RECOURSE TO THE STREETS WHILE AT SAME TIME
PRESSURING HELOU TO FORM NEW GOVERNMENT IN ORDER STABILIZE FAL-
TERING ECONOMY. HELOU COULD NOT UNDERSTAND CONTRADICTION IN EDDE'S
APPROACH. AS FOR MUSLIM LEADERS, HELOU GAVE NO INDICATION THAT
HE HAD FOUND A SUBSTITUTE FOR KARAME AS PRIMIN. ALL THE MUSLIMS,
WHATEVER THEIR PRIVATE AGREEMENT WITH HELOU'S VIEWS, COULD NOT
ACCEPT A PUBLIC ESPOUSAL OF HIS ANTI-FEDAYEEN LINE. AS FOR KARAME,
HELOU SHOWED NO OPTIMISM THAT THEY WERE ANY CLOSER TO COMING
TO TERMS. PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 27 Presidential,Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
860/E0/029Q
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE DRP
Department of State
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TELEGRAM
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05469 01 OF 02 301808Z
NO LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES.
2. THE FEDAYEEN CRYSTALIZE THE STRUGGLE OF THE PALESTINIANS
OF WHOM LEBANON SHELTERS APPROXIMATELY 300,000. (OBVIOUSLY A RE-
FERENCE TO LATENT THREAT TO INTERNAL ORDER IF REFUGEES ARE
MANIPULATED BY FEDAYEENI.
3. THERE IS AN INHERENT DANGER TO LEBANON IN BECOMING ACCUSTOMED
TO THE FEDAYEEN PRESENCE ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. WHATEVER THE
STAGE OF THEIR OPERATIONS, THEY WOULD CONSTANTLY EXERCISE THE
RIGHT TO INCREASE THEIR NUMBERS, EXPAND THEIR TERRITORIAL PRESENCE,
AND EXPAND THEIR DIRECT OR INDIRECT POLITICAL POWER.
4. TROUBLEMAKERS I.E., SARG AND RADICAL LEFT) ALSO MUST BE
TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. THEY MAY JOIN THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT
WITHIN THE COUNTRY OR AID IT FROM WITHOUT.
5. THE FEDAYEEN HAVE TACIT APPROVAL TO CARRY ARMS AND PRACTICE
VIOLENCE WHENEVER THE HOTY CAUSE OF PALESTINE IS INVOKED (I.
Eop FEDAYEEN ARE EXEMPT FROM THE LAWS WHICH GOVERN ALL OTHER
LEBANESE CITIZENS). PORTER
EX@
SEI RET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon residential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
BE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 738
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05255 241652Z
47
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
019394
R 241508Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8015
SEC R E T BEIRUT5255
EXDIS
1) NOW THAT JORDANIANS AND EGYPTIANS ARE WELL BRIEFED ON
SUBSTANCE OF CONCRETE
POINTS WHICH USR SUBMITTED IN WRITING TO
SOVS, I CAN EXPECT THAT PRES HELOU WILL BE GETTING REPORTS ON
NATURE OF USG PROPOSALS. THE REPORTS MAY OR MAY NOT BE ACCURATE.
EXCES
21 HELOU'S STRONG ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSITION
WHICH HAS LED TO
CURRENT POLITICAL STALEMATE IN LEBANON IS ABOVE ALL AN ATTEMPT
TO PLAY FOR TIME IN HOPE THAT 2-POWER AND 4-POWER TALKS WILL
MAKE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS OR SHOW HOPE PROGRESS so THAT HELOU
CAN CONTINUE SECURE MAJOR PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HIS CURRENT TOUGH
STAND
3 I WILL BE PAYING FAREWELL CALL ON HELOU IN NEXT WEEK PRIOR
MY
DEPARTURE HOME LEAVE/CONSULTATION AND HE WILL BE PRIMARILY
QUESTIONING ME ON SUBSTANCE US POSITION AND OUR FORECAST ON
PROGRESS. I HAVE GENERALLY ADEQUATE GUIDANCE FROM FREQUENT
EXCELLENT REPORTING FROM WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, I HAVE NOT RECEIVED
SPECIFIC US PROPOSALS AND WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT RELEASING THEM
TO ME WITH AUTHORITY DISCUSS IN GENERAL TERMS WITH HELOU. I THINK
IT NOW IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO BE ACCURATELY INFORMED OF US
POSITION.
41 ANY OTHER GENERAL GUIDANCE FROM DEPT WTULD ALSO BE
APPRECIATED.
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
32
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Lebron
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 793
RAGE 01 BEIRUT 04411 3010292
EXCES EXEM EXCES
SUMMARY?
14
ACTION SSU30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
121026
RI 300830Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7824
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR ET BEIRUT 4411
EXDIS
REFIB PARIS 79051
1. DESPITE HINTS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES INCLUDING PRESIDENT
HELOUP THAT FRENCH HADI BACKED AWAY FROM THEIR INITIAL
ENTHUSIASM TO ASSIST LEBANON AFTER DEC 28 BEIRUT AIRPORT RAID,
WE HAD NO INKLING THAT FRENCH HAD RENEGED ON THEIR AGREEMENT
TO SUPPLY ARMS TO GOLD THIS LEAVES HELOU AND LEBANESE ARMY
IN DIFFICULT POSITION VIS-A-VIS THEIR ARMS REQUIREMENTS AND
IS PROBABLY A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO HELDUMS LOW SPIRITS.
26 1 DISCUSSED WITH PRES HELOU MAY 7 IDEA OF USG'S ISSUING
PUBLIC STATEMENT IN SUPPORT LEBANON'S INTEGRITY HELOU HAS
NEVER PRESSED THE POINT, HOWEVER, POSSIBLY BECAUSE HE UNCERTAIN
THAT SUCH STATEMENT WOULD BE HELPFUL AT TIME WHEN FEDAYEEN
ISSUE TENDED TO HAVE CONFESSIONALI CONNOTATIONS. ALSO, HELOU,
AWARE THAT THIS EMBASSY AND USG BEING BRANDED LATELY IN LEFTIST
PRESS AS BEING THE AUTHOR OF HIS ANTI-FEDAYEEN POLICY, UNDER
STANDABLY WOULD PREFER A MULTILATERAL RATHER THAN A U.S.
UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF SUPPORT. DEPARTMENT WILL NOTE REQUEST
HELOU MADE TO ME MAY 26 (BEIRUT 43751 RE POSSIBLE 4=POWER STATEMENT
EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER ACTIONS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, AND HIS
RELATED REQUESTS FOR U.S. HELP IN SECURING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
FOR LEBANON WE GUESS HE MADE SIMILAR POINTS TO FRENCH, AND
SECRET
at the Richard Nixon
NOT TO BE DECLASSIFIED OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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DIPARTMENT OF STATE
*
UNITED
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STATES
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04411 301029Z
LEBEL'S APPROACH TO EMB PARIS IS: GOFI ATTEMPT TO GROPE FOR
RESPONSE WHICH WOULD CAUSE MINIMUMI DIFFICULTIES FOR FRENCH IN
THEIR ARAB RELATIONS:
30 AT MEETING MAY 26, HELOU RESPONDED NEGATIVELY (AND DES-
PONDENTLY) WHEN I ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER HIS TALKS WITH
BRITISH AND FRENCH HADI PRODUCED ANY RESULTS UKI AMB KING TOLD
US TWO WEEKS AGO THAT HELOU HAD SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF HMG ° S
ISSUING SUCH STATEMENT. HOWEVER, HELOU RAISED MATTER IN SUCH AN
OFFHAND MANNER THAT KING DID NOT CONSIDER IT AS FIRM REQUEST ON
HELOU'S PART WE DON KNOW WHETHER HELOU HAS SUGGESTED SUCH
STATEMENT TO SOVIET OR FRENCH AMBASSADORS HERE LATTER DID NOT
EXPIS EXCES EXCES
RAISE SUBJECT RECENT MEETING WITH ME.
40 IT SOUNDS TO US AS THOUGH FRENCH IDEA OF FOUR-POWER STATEMENT,
WHILE CERTAINLY DESIRABLE FROM LEBANONS POINT OF VIEW IF SOVIETS
CAN INDEED BE PERSUADED TO PARTICIPATE, IS A CONVENIENT MEANS
TO GET FRENCH OUT OF ARMS DEAL WITHOUT LOSING TOO MUCH
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CREDIT WITH HELOU AND GOL.
5 ᵉ WE BELIEVE SUGGESTED FOUR=POWER STATEMENT WOULD BE OF
ASSISTANCE TO HELOU, GOL AND PARTICULARLY TO FALTERING LEBANESE
ECONOMY. SINCE LEFTISTS SOVIETS CLIENT STATE SYRIA AND ITS
BAATHI SPONSORED AS SAIQA / ARE THE ELEMENTS POSING THE GREATEST
IMMEDIATE THREAT TO LEBANON'S SECURITY, SOVIET PARTICIPATION
WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL ALTHOUGH DEPT WILL HAVE TO
JUDGE WHETHER IT MIGHT BE OBTAINED WE HOPE DEPT WILL GIVE
FRENCH SUGGESTION SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. ALSO, DESPITE FRENCH
RELUCTANCE KEEP PROPOSED STATEMENT SEPARATE FROM FOUR-POWER
TALKS, WE WONDER WHETHER IT MIGHT BETTER BE INCLUDED IN ANY
FOUR-POWER COMMUNIQUE WHICH MIGHT BE ISSUED IN NEW YORK,
PARTICULARLY IFI SUCH COMMUNIQUE SPEAKS OF OTHER THREATS TO
PEACE IN ME, I.E,, VIOLATIONS OF CEASE FIRE
PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION : THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
091/49/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
AROE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 131
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04375 01 OF 02 281734Z
41
ACTION SS 30
2
INFO OCT 01/031 W
107167
R 281233Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7814
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN
S El C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 4375
EXDIS
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON
REF: A . STATE 75037 AND 75214; B. BEIRUT 4270
10 DURING MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU MAY 26, HE RAISED PROS-
PECTS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, BOTH IN CONTEXT OF A -
VOIDING FURTHER DETERIORATION NOW AS WELL AS IN TERMS OF CON-
TINGENCY ACTION IF LEBANON GETS INTO REAL TROUBLE IN FUTURE.
HELOU PREFACED HIS REMARKS BY STATING HE WELL UNDERSTOOD WASHING-
TON'S POSITION TOWARD REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND ITS RELUCTANCE
INTERVENE. AS PRESIDENT OF A FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT WHICH MIGHT
NEED U.S. HELP, HE WOULD WISH THINGS WERE OTHERWISE, BUT ONE MUST
ACCEPT ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FORMED BY USG'S INVOLVEMENT
IN VIETNAM. THIS ATTITUDE UNDERSTANDABLY AFFECTS USG IN CON-
SIDERING WHAT IT CAN DO FOR ITS FRIENDS, AND IN SUPPORT ITS
OWN INTERESTS IN ME.
2. WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING HE ASKED WHAT WASHINGTON'S REACTION
WAS TO HIS SUGGESTIONS (SEE BEIRUT 3868 AND 38811 CONCERNING
POSSIBILITIES OF EXPANDED UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON, IF SITUATION
DETERIORATES FURTHER. I REPLIED ALONG LINES REFTEL A , AND EX-
PLAINED THAT GOL ITSELF MUST APPROACH UNSYG OR SC DIRECTLY AND
OBTAIN SUPPORT OR ACQUIESENCE OF OTHER ARAB STATES FOR SUCH A
MOVE. I INFORMED HIM IN RATHER UNHAPPY EXCHANGE THAT DEPT FEELS
SECRET
27
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASSIFIED ORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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DEPARTMENT
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TELEGRAM
STATES
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04375 01 OF 02 281734Z
POSSIBILITY OF LEBANONI OBTAINING SIGNIFICANT OUTSIDE HELP IN
COPING WITH ITS CURRENT PROBLEMS IS SLIGHT. ONE COULD ENVISAGE
POSSIBLE UN ROLE AT SOME FUTURE TIME, DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES,
BUT INSTALLATION OF UNEF WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND DIRECT US MILI-
TARY PARTICIPATION IN A UNEF DOES NOT APPEAR POSSIBLE.
3. AS FOR DISPATCH SPECIAL UN REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT LEBANON
AND REPORT ON REFUGEE INVOLVEMENT IN PRESENT SITUATION, ROLE
OF SYG REPRESENTATIVE WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT WITH U THANT
AND APPROVED BY UNSC, AND WOULD CLEARLY BE DIFFERENT FROM THAT
OF CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO INVESTIGATE SITUATION IN CAMPS AS HELOU
ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED. I TOLD HIM WE SEE NO WAY THAT PRESENCE
CIVILIAN OBSERVERS COULD BECOME BASIS FOR INTRODUCING UN POLICE
TEAMS AND EVENTUAL ESTABLISHMENT UN MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON
INFORMED HELOU OF REPLY UNRWA DIRECTOR MICHELMORE RECEIVED FROM
BUNCHE RE SECURITY SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS AND MADE POINTS
CONTAINED IN REFTEL B, AND STRESSED THERE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD UN
PRESENCE IN LEBANON COULD BE AUGMENTED WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORI-
ZATION OF UNSC. HELOU ASKED IF UNSC DECISION NECESSARY FOR IN-
CREASE IN NUMBERS OF UNMOS/ILMAC. I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT THINK
UNSC DECISION WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR SLIGHT INCREASE OF UNMOS'S,
AS LONG AS THERE NO OBJECTION FROM INTERESTED PARTIES, BUT THAT
DISPATCH OF NEW TYPE OF OBSERVERS AS VISUALIZED BY HELOU WOULD
REQUIRE UNSC APPROVAL ALSO, ATTACHMENT CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO
UNRWA TO MONITOR SECURITY SITUATION IN CAMPS UNACCEPTABLE TO SYG,
SINCE WOULD CHANGE UNRWA'S ROLE BY GIVING IT RESPONSIBILITIES
IN FIELD OF SECURITY WHICH HAS BEEN EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF HOST
GOVERNMENTS I CONCLUDED BY SAYING USG HOPEFUL NOTHING WOULD
ARISE WHICH WOULD REQUIRE UNSC DEBATE AT MOMENT ON ANY ME PROB-
LEM. THIS COULD SERIOUSLY DETRACT FROM PROGRESS OF BIG FOUR TALKS.
4. HELOU SAID HE UNDERSTOOD (ALTHOUGH HIS OPTIONS WERE OF COURSE
ADVERSELY AFFECTED) BOTH OUR POSITION AND UN POSITION AS TRANS-
MITTED TO MICHELMORE. HE THEN POSED QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT CON-
CRETE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON WOULD BE POSSIBLE ON HU-
MANITARIAN GROUNDS, IF SITUATION SO DETEROIRATED THAT THERE WAS
PILLAGE, BLOODSHED AND MAJOR BREAKDOWN OF INTERNAL ORDER IN
LEBANON. I SAID THAT IT WAS MOST DIFFICULT TO SPECULATE ON WHAT
SPECIFIC ACTIONS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MIGHT TAKE, AND THAT A
GREAT DEAL DEPENDED UPON ACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES. HELOU REFERRED
TO HIS SUGGESTION OF DISPATCHING US CONTINGENTS AS ADVANCE ELE
MENTS IF UNEF AUTHORIZED BY SC. I STATED USG HAS NOT ENVISAGED
BIG POWER PARTICIPATION WITH MILITARY FORCES. SG THINKING MORE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04375 01 OF 02 281734Z
IN TFRMS OF POSSIBILITIES ECONOMIC AID TO GOL AND ASSISTANCE TO
LEBANESE ARMY, RATHER THAN UNREALISTIC MILITARY INTERVENTION.
IN CRISIS SITUATION, I SUGGESTED ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE DE-
TAIL ELEMENTS UNFICYP FORCES AS STOP-GAP MEASURE PROVIDED AGREE-
MENT COULD BE REACHED. AN INTERNATIONAL FLEET PRESENCE WAS
THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE, IF IT WOULD REALLY HELP RESTORE STABILITY.
HOWEVER, NO PRIOR COMMITMENTS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN CONSIDERING
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS. MEANTIME, U.S. WOULD CONTINUE SUPPORT
LEBANON IN ALL POSSIBLE WAY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS.
PORTER
SECRET
27
NOT TO BE REPRODUCEDR at the Richard N lixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
162
EXCES EXCE
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04375 02 OF 02 281744Z
41
ACTION SS 30
02
INFO OCT 01/031 W
107241
R 281233Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7815
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN
S EICOR E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 4375
EXDIS:
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON
5. HELOU THEN ASKED THAT WE CONSIDER THREE POSSIBLE COURSES
OF ACTION WHICH COULD HELP HIM RESIST FEDAYEEN PRESSURES.
FIRST HE ASKED USG GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO DEMARCHE TO
USSR CONCERNING NASSER'S POSITION ON FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, ES-
PECIALLY AS IT AFFECTS LEBANON. IN HELOU'S VIEW, NASSER NOT BEING
AS HELPFUL TO LEBANON ON FEDAYEEN ISSUE AS IS COMMONLY BELIEVED.
UAR PLAYING DOUBLE-FACED GAME IN ITS PRESENT EFFORTS TO "MEDIATE"
BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN. ALTHOUGH UARG VOICED SUPPORT FOR LEBANON,
NASSER ALSO HAS A REAL INTEREST IN SEEING LEBANON BECOME "HOSTAGE"
OF FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT BECAUSE FEDAYEEN THREAT TO MODERATE PRO-
WEST LEBANESE REGIME COULD ENCOURAGE US, UK AND FRANCE TO PUSHI
HARDER FOR EARLY PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. NASSER,
HELOU SAID, WANTS PEACEFUL settlement BUT FIRMLY BELIEVES BIG-
FOUR WOULD ONLY "IMPOSE" SETTLEMENT, IF THEY FEAR SHARP DE-
TERIORATION ME SITUATION. IF SOVIETS CAN MAKE EFFECTIVE REPRESEN-
TATION TO NASSER TO HAVE UAR EXERT ITS INFLUENCE OVER COMMANDO
ORGANIZATION CONCERNING GOL/FEDAYEEN CONFRONTATION, THIS WOULD
CLEARLY ASSIST LEBANON IN SOLVING ITS POLITICAL CRISIS.
60 HELOU ALSO SUGGESTED CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO "INTERNATIONAL
DECLARATION" ON PART OF MAJOR POWERS THAT TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN
ME, WHICH DIRECTED NOT ONLY AGAINST ISRAEL BUT ALSO AGAINST ARAB
SECRET
27
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASTORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
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STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04375 02 OF 02 281744Z
GOVERNMENTS, POSE SERIOUS OBSTACLE To PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND
AREA STABILITY. HELOU COMMENTED THAT FEDAYEEN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE
TO INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY AND PUBLIC OPINION, THEREFORE, SUCH
A DECLARATION MIGHT HELP TO INHIBIT THEIR ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTI-
VITIES IN JORDAN AND LEBANON. I RESPONDED THAT THIS EASIER SAID
THAN DONE. EFFECT OF SUCH ACTION MIGHT BE OPPOSITE, CAUSING FEDAYEEN
TO INCREASE THEIR PRESSURES ON MODERATE ARAB STATES.
7. AS THIRD SUGGESTION, HELOU MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF HAVING
COUNTRIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO UNRWA MAKE REPRESENTATIONS
TO UNSYG THAT THEY SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES
EXCES EXCES EXCES
IN UNRWA CAMPS MIGHT JEOPARDIZE STATUS PALESTINE REFUGEES. HELOU
SAID THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE IMPLICIT THREAT THAT CONTINUATION
UNRWA ACTIVITIES COULD BE BROUGHT INTO QUESTION BY FEDAYEEN EX-
PLOITATION OF PALESTINIAN CAMPS. (COMMENT: IT DIFFICULT FOR US
SEE HOW THIS COULD BE HELPFUL.) I TOLD HELOU THAT I WOULD REPORT
HIS RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEPARTMENT FOR CONSIDERATION, AND REMINDED
HIM THAT WE HAVE ALREADY RAISED SUBJECT OF GOL/FEDAYEEN CRISIS
WITH SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH I NOT AWARE WHETHER SOVS HAVE SPECIFICALLY
DISCUSSED WITH NASSER.
8. ON SOVIET POSITION TOWARD FEDAYEEN, HELOU SAID HE WAS CON-
FUSED BY WHAT SEEMED TO BE DUALISTIC APPROACH BY SOVIETS. ON
ONE HAND SOVIET DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS TO GOL INDICATE
THAT SOVIETS OPPOSED TO FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON. BUT, ON
OTHER HAND, CPL PARTICIPATED IN PRO-FEDAYEEN DEMONSTRATIONS
IN BEIRUT APRIL 23-24 WHICH SPARKED OFF PRESENT CRISIS. I TOLD
HELOU IT OUR ESTIMATE THAT SOVIETS ARE IN FACT OPPOSED TO FEDAYEEN
MOVEMENT BECAUSE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES INHIBIT PROGRESS TO PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT WHICH SOVIETS NOW SEEM SUPPORT. ALSO, SINCE SOVIETS DO
NOT CONTROL FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, THEY OBVIOUSLY OPPOSE IT. AS FOR
CPL, THERE INDICATIONS IT DECIDED PARTICIPATE IN BEIRUT DEMON-
STRATIONS WITHOUT CONCURRENCY USSR. THIS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN AN
INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT TAKEN LOCALLY BY CPL.
9. HELOU EXPRESSED CONCERN RE ISRAELI PRESENT POSITION TOWARD
LEBANON AND ASKED IF WE HAD RECEIVED ANY INDICATIONS OF WHAT IS-
RAEL'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE IF GOL CONCLUDED SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT
WITH FEDAYEEN. SPECIFICALLY, HOW WOULD THIS AFFECT GOL'S POLICY
OF REPRISALS. I REFERRED TO SUBSTANCE TEL AVIV'S 1961 AND STATED
I UNABLE PREDICT CLEARLY ISRAELI POLICIES OR INTENTIONS, BUT
DO UNDERSTAND ISRAEL WOULD TAKE VERY DIM VIEW OF GOL/FEDAYEEN
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04375 02 OF 02 281744Z
AGREEMENT, WHICH IN ISRAELI EYES WOULD AMOUNT TO SERIOUS IN-
CREASE IN FEDAYEEN PRESTIGE. HELOU WISHED THERE WERE SOME WAY
ISRAELIS WOULD RE-THINK THEIR REPRISAL POLICY, AND INSTEAD OF
HITTING LEBANESE TARGETS IN RETALIATION FOR ISOLATED FEDAYEEN
ENCROACHMENTS, THEY WOULD HIT SOURCES OF FEDAYEEN PENETRATION
ACROSS THE LEBANESE- ISRAEL BORDER IN SYRIA. AS AN EXAMPLE HE
STATED THAT ALL FEDAYEEN NOW LOCATED IN SHIBARA COME FROM AND
ARE SUPPLIED BY FEDAYEEN BASES LOCATED IN SYRIAN VILLAGE OF
AARNE ACROSS LEBANESE/SYRIAN BORDER.
10. I COMMENTED TO HELOU THAT CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
FOR LEBANON, HIS DIPLOMATIC POSITION WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IN
PROPORTION TO THE STAND HE ADOPTS IN DEFENDING LEBANON'S SOVER
EIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE IF LEBANON GAVE IN TO FEDAYEEN, OB-
VIOUSLY IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR LEBANON'S FRIENDS TO
FIND SUBSEQUENT BASIS FOR DEFINING AND SUPPORTING A POSITION IN
UN WHICH WOULD SERVE PROTECT LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY. PORTER
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DISARTMENT
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SECRET
74
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04270 232009Z
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ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
078724
R 231639Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7792
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN
S EC R E T BEIRUT 4270
EXDIS
SUBJ: UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON
REF: STATE 75037
1. UNRWA DIRECTOR MICHELMORE TELLS US THAT IN REPLY
EXCES
TO HIS LETTER RE SECURITY SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS
(BEIRUT 38681 BUNCHE STATED THERE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD
UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON COULD BE AUGMENTED WITHOUT
SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
PARTICULARLY IF MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED.
SINCE ILMAC CURRENTLY OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED ON ONLY
ONE SIDE OF FRONTIER, ANY CHANGE IN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
ITS FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS EXPANSION OF KITS ACTIVITIES, WOULD
HAVE TO BE AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND BY
THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
2. BUNCHE ALSO COMMENTED THAT ATTACHING "CIVILIAN
OBSERVER PERSONNEL" TO UNRWA TO MONITOR SECURITY
SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS WOULD CHANGE UNRWA'S ROLE,
GIVING IT RESPONSIBILITIES IN FIELD OF SECURITY WHICH
HERETOFORE EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF HOST GOVERNMENT".
HE BELIEVES THIS ACTION WOULD BE BOTH UNDESIRABLE AND
"TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE" AND WOULD RISK JEOPARDIZING THE
AGENCY'S RELATIONS WITH THE REFUGEES THEMSELVES.
BUNCHE'S LETTER WAS CLEARED WITH SYG.
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EXCES EXEMS
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04270 232009Z
30 MICHELMORE ADVISES THAT AS OF MAY 22 SECURITY
SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON GRADUALLY RETURN-
ING TO NORMAL. ALL UNRWA SERVICES NOW FUNCTIONING
THOUGH SCHOOL ATTENDANCE STILL DOWN FROM LEVEL BEFORE
APRIL 23 DISTURBANCES- SIBLIN VOCATIONAL TRAINING
SCHOOL PARTICULARLY HARD HIT SINCE MEASURES TAKEN BY
LEBANESE MILITARY TO CONTROL MOVEMENT OF PALESTINIANS
HAVE PREVENTED MANY YOUNG MEN FROM RETURNING TO CLASS.
UNRWA HAS RAISED THIS PROBLEM WITH ARMY AND BELIEVES
IT WILL BE RESOLVED SHORTLY. AS RESULT RECENT
ABSENSES AND UNRWA TEACHERS STRIKE EARLIER IN YEAR,
AGENCY NOW CONSIDERING EXTENDING SCHOOL YEAR UNTIL MID
OR LATE JULY.
4.° I PASSED THE SUBSTANCE OF BUNCHE.S REPLY TO PRES HELOU
THROUGH INTERMEDIARY TODAY. HE WAS, OF COURSE, DISAPPOINTED
THAT U THANT UNWILLING ACT WITHOUT SC ACTION.
I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS THAT US DOES NOT WANT ANYTHING
TO COME UP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THIS TIME SINCE SUCH
ACTION WOULD ONLY DETRACT FROM EFFORTS ALREADY BEING MADE
TO FIND A WAY TO EASE ME CRISIS. IN ANY SC DEBATE, THE
MAJOR POWERS WOULD REPEAT WELL=KNOWN POSITIONS WHICH WOULD
NOT BE HELPFUL. WHAT WE ARE SAYING IS THAT THIS IS NOT THE
TIME TO BRING UP FEDAYEEN ISSUE, OR ANY OTHER ASPECT OF
MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, IN SC FORUM I REITERATED THAT HELOU OF
COURSE ALWAYS HAD RECOURSE TO SYG IF SITUATION DETERIORATED,
AND IF HE COULD VISUALIZE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION WHICH SYG MIGHT
INITIATE.
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TELEGRAM
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04268 232151Z
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ACTION SS 30
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R 2315552 MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7790
INFO AMEMBAECL AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
02
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECRE T BEIRUT 4268
EXDIS
REF % STATE 82597
1. IN ELABORATION REPORT REFTEL SAMIR SOUKI INFORMED ME
RECENTLY ON HIS RETURN FROM US THAT INFORMATION RE
SYG'S PROPOSAL RE JARRING "SOLUTION" WAS IMPARTED TO HIM
BY RALCA BUNCHE PRESUMABLY KERN WAS PRESENT OR WAS INFORMED
BY SOUKI.
2. BUNCH REFLECTED U THANT'S CONCERN THAT US AND USSR
MIGHT NOT REACH AGREEMENT WITHING SHORT TIME FRAME WHICH
O THANT THINKS REMAINS. JARRING PROPOSALS PRESUMABLY MIGHT
BREAK BIG FOUR DEADLOCK BY ALLOWING SECURITY COUNCIL
ACCEPTANCE JARRING REPORT WHICH WOULD THEN SERVE AS
BASIS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL SOLUTION. NO INDICATION
WHETHER JARRING HAD AGREED TO THIS COURSE OF ACTION.
PORTER
SECRET
44
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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OF STATE
Febanon
UNITED
Department of State
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STATES
OF
SECRET 93
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04088 01 OF 02 191313Z
02
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ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
043188
R 190720Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7743
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
EXQIS EXATS
S E C R ET SECTION I OF 2 BEIRUT 4088
XDIS
SUBJECT: LEBANON, THE FEDAYEEN AND DP RETURN
1. THE TENSE ATMOSPHERE WHICH PREVAILED IN LEBANON FOLLOWING
RIOTS ON APRIL 23-24 HAS ABATED SOMEWHAT AND THE SPORADIC
CLASHES BETWEEN ARMY AND FEDAYEEN IN SOUTH LEBANON EARLY THIS
MONTH HAVE NOT REOCCURRED. WHILE TALKS BETWEEN PLO LEADER YASIR
ARAFAT AND LEB AUTHORITIES WERE INCONCLUSIVE AS NO "AGREEMENT"
WAS CONCLUDED, A "STANDOFFSITUATION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED WHICH
HOPEFULLY MAY AVOID FURTHER CONFRONTATION FOR THE TIME BEING.
2. DESPITE THESE MILDLY ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS, WE BELIEVE
THE ROAD AHEAD FOR LEBANON IS DOWNHILL. THE MOMENTUM ACHIEVED
BY THE PALESTINIAN COMMANDO MOVEMENT DURING THE PAST 18 MONTHS
APPEARS IRREVERSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT
OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. WHILE THE VAST MAJORITY OF
LEBANESE OPPOSE "UNCONTROLLED" FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAEL
FROM LEBANON, MOST LEBANESE SUPPORT EMOTIONALLY (OR FEAR TO
OPPOSE) THE DECLARED OBJECTIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN COMMANDO
ORGANIZATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY IT UNLIKELY THAT POPULAR OPINION
WOULD APPROVE ANY AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY PRESIDENT HELOU AGAINST THE
FEDAYEEN AT LEAST AS LONG AS THE PRESENT "TRUCE" IN THE SOUTH
SEEMS TO HOLD, AND IF THE STARK ALTERNATIVE IS VIEWED AS IMMINENT
CIVIL WAR.
3. PRESIDENT HELOU'S ABILITY TO ACT DECISIVELY AGAINST FEDAYEEN
PRESENCE IN LEBANON IS CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE FACT THAT THE
SECRET
26
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04088 01 OF 02 191313Z
LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN CONFRONTATION IS BUT ONE MANIFESTATION OF THE
BROADER ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. WHILE A BROAD SPECTRUM OF THE
LEBANESE BODY POLITIC HAS LONG SUPPORTED A POLICY OF NON-IN-
VOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT, IT IS PROBABLY UNREALISTIC
TO EXPECT THAT THIS SENTIMENT COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO A SHOWDOWN
WITH THE FEDAYEEN, PARTICULARLY WHEN MOST LEBANESE DO NOT
PERCEIVE HOW SUCH A SHOWDOWN COULD SUCCEED.
4. ONE OTHER IMPORT STATE OF MIND BEARS ON THE LEBANESE
ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS THE FEDAYEEN. MOST LEBANESE ARE NOW DEEPLY
CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL INTENDS, AT TIME OF HER CHOOSING, TO
SEIZE A PORTION OF SOUTH LEBANON. THE BEIRUT AIRPORT RAID
DESTROYED ANY PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE PREMISE THAT, IF LEBANON
BEHAVIOR GAVE ISRAEL NO PRETEXT TO ATTACK, LEBANON COULD STAY OUT
OF THE ARAB ISRAEL CONFLICT. THE RESULT, HAS BEEN TO REDUCE
LEBANONS CAPACITY TO MAKE A CLEAR CHOICE BETWEEN THE FEDAYEEN
OR ISRAEL AS THE GREATER AND MORE IMMEDIATE DANGER. THE STEADY
ESCALATION OF FIGHTING ON THE CEASE-FIRE LINES, AND THE
INCREASINGLY MILITANT STATEMENTS OF ISRAELI LEADERS (AS INTER-
PRETED HERE), ADD TO LEBANESE SUSPICIONS RE ISRAEL'S LONG-
TERM OBJECTIVES CLIMATE IN ARAB MIDDLE EAST, IN SHORT, IS NOT ONE
WHICH ENCOURAGES LEBANESE TO EXPECT PEACE.
5% THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO FIND SOME NEW ELEMENT
WHICH CAN BE INTERUECTED INTO THE OVERALL AREA PICTURE IN AN
ATTEMPT TO REVERSE OR AT LEAST STEM THE DOWNHILL DRIFT. THIS
MUST BE ABOVE ALL SOMETHING WHICH WILL PRODUCE HOPE THAT A
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS STILL POSSIBLE, AND ENABLE THE ESTABLISHED
AREA REGIMES TO COMBAT THE FEDAYEEN PROPAGANDA LINE THAT WAR AND
ONLY WAR IS THE SOLUTION AND SUCH HOPE CAN ONLY BE NURTURED
AND SUSTAINED BY A POSITIVE AND DRAMATIC ACTION WHICH WILL
CONVINCE THE ARABS THAT ISRAEL IS ALSO PREPARED TO DO ITS SHARE
EXPIS
TO FIND PEACE.
6. WE HAVE NOTED AMBASSADOR YOST'S STATEMENT ON THE REFUGEE
PROBLEM PRESENTED AT THE FOUR-POWER TALKS MAY 6 (STATE 717391
AND BELIEVE A REVIVED AND MAJOR EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT THE RETURN
OF THE NEWLY "DISPLACED PERSONS" TO THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES MIGHT OFFER A WAY TO REVIVE WANING HOPES IN THE ARAB
WORLD, AND TO BUY ESSENTIAL TIME.
7 . WE CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS FAVOR SUCH A MOVE:
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04088 01 OF 02 191313Z
A) BOTH THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAVE
REPEATEDLY CALLED UPON ISRAEL TO TAKE IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE
STEPS TO ALLOW THE DPS TO RETURN:
B) RETURN OF THE DPS IS AN OBVIOUS AND ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP OF
ANY SETTLEMENT SCHEME WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY EMERGE FROM THE
FOUR-POWER TALKS:
C) ACTIVATION OF A LARGE-SCALE DP RETURN SCHEME NOW WOULD IN NO
WAY PREJUDICE EITHER THE PROCEEDINGS OR FINAL OUTCOME OF THE
FOUR-POWER TALKS. NOR WOULD IT COMPROMISE THE ISRAELI POSITION
REI THE NECESSITY OF DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ARABS TO IMPLEMENT
THE NOV. 22 RESOLUTION RATHER IT WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, HAVE A
POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE PROSPECTS OF AN AGREEMENT SINCE IT WOULD
BE A GENUINE INDICATION THAT ISRAEL IS WILLING TO MOVE TOWARD
A REALISTIC SETTLEMENT:
DI ANNOUNCEMENT THAT ALL THOSE WHO FLED THEIR HOMES ON THE
WEST BANK IN SUMMER 1967 COULD NOT BEGIN TO RETURN, WOULD GIVE
EXCE
THE DPS A FEELING OF HOPE, AND A SENSE OF A PURPOSEFUL FUTURE:
Ell SINCE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE COMMANDOS HAVE BEEN
RECRUITED FROM THE FRUSTRATED AND DISILLUSIONED DP POPULATION,
IF THEY WERE NOW GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES
AND FORMER JOBS' SOME OF THE STRENGTH AND APPEAL OF THE FEDAYEEN
ORGANIZATIONS WOULD BE SAPPED. THOSE WHO RETURNED WOULD AGAIN BE
LIVING IN PALESTINE AND WOULD HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES TO
WHICH THEY COULD DEVOTE THEIR ENERGIES:
PORTER
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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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DEPARTMENT UNIT OF STATE
*
AMERICA
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STATES OF
SECRET 334
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04088 02 OF 02 191800Z
2
43
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
R 1907202 MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
1969 MAY 19 045026 PM 4 58
KISSINGER'S OFFICE
RECEIVED
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7744
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
SECRE T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 4088
EXDIS
CORRECTED COPYTEXT)
SUBJECT: LEBANON, THE FEDAYEEN AND DP RETURN
F I) AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE MIGHT BE INTRODUCED INTO THE
EAST AND WEST BANKS TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THE DPS. THIS
COULD BE A CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ITS OWN RIGHT.
80 THE TOTAL NUMBER OF DP'S PROBABLY DOES NOT EXCEED 250,000.
ISRAELI DEF MIN DAYAN USED FIGURE OF 226,000 IN NOV. 68 (TEL AVIV
61171. IF THE GOI COULD BE PREVAILED UPON TO ALLOW THE DPS
TO BEGIN RETURNING, EVEN AT A RELATIVELY SLOW RATE OF
10,000 PER MONTH, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF MOVEMENT TOWARD A
RETURN TO NORMALCY WOULD, IN OUR VIEW BE SIGNIFICANT. THERE
EXCLUS
WOULD BE NO INSUPERABLE LOGISTICS PROBLEM. UNRWA OFFICIALS
WORKING WITH THE GOJ, WHICH WE ARE ASSUMING WOULD SUPPORT ANY
VIABLE DP RETURN PROGRAM, COULD QUICKLY IDENTIFY THE DP'S
WHETHER OR NOT REGISTERED WITH UNRWA. FURTHERMORE, THE HOMES
OF MOST OF THE DPS REMAIN VACANT.
9. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE GOI, AS IN THE PAST, WILL RESIST ON
FAMILIAR (AND TO THEM CONVINCING) GROUNDS. FRANKLY, WE DO NOT
CONSIDER THESE REASONS CONVINCING, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF REPEATED
ASSERTIONS BY ISRAELI LEADERS THAT THE GOI'S OCCUPATION POLICY
HAS BOTH DISSUADED WEST BANK RESIDENTS FROM COOPERATING WITH THE
FEDAYEEN AND RAISED THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE AREA. WE WOULD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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STATES
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SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04088 02 OF 02 191800Z
ARGUE, THEREFORE, THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOI TO HAVE
AS MANY PALESTINIANS AS POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE THE POSITIVE ASPECTS
OF ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION, AND TO BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO ISRAELI-
ARAB ECONOMIC COOPERATION. FRUTHERMORE, WE SEE NO REASON TO
EXCES
DOUBT THE CAPABILITY OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO INSTITUTE
WHATEVER SECURITY MEASURES MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE DPS
FROM BECOMING A MAJOR DISRUPTIVE ELEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF A FINAL AGREEMENT. RATHER
THE THREAT TO ISRAELI SECURITY SHOULD BE REDUCED, ONCE THE FEDAYEEN
SPAWNING GROUND AMONG THE DPS ON THE EAST BANK HAS BEEN
ELIMINATED.
100 WE CAN'T, OF COURSE, PREDICT HOW LONG THE PRESENT DRIFT CAN
CONTINUE BEFORE THE MODERATE REGIMES IN LEBANON JORDAN AND
PERHAPS ELSEWHERE IN THE ME ARE BROUGHT DOWN OR RENDERED IMPOTENT
BY MOUNTING LEFTIST AND PALESTINIAN PRESSURES. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY,
HOWEVER, THAT THESE REGIMES CAN LONG SURVIVE THE COMBINED
THREAT POSED BY THE FEDAYEEN PAN-ARABISTS AND OTHER LEFTIST
POLITICAL ELEMENTS® ON OTHER HAND, HUSSEIN WOULD CERTAINLY GET
MORE BREATHING ROOM IF HIS REFUGEE POPULATION CAN BE REDUCED.
LEBANON WOULD BENEFIT ACCORDINGLY, AND WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVINCE
ITS PEOPLE THAT PEACE IS WORTH FIGHTING FOR.
11. IF ISRAEL WISHES TO MAINTAIN MODERATE ARAB REGIMES WITH WHOM
SHE MIGHT MAKE PEACE, SHE MUST BE WILLING TO TAKE SOME RISK AND
PAY A PRICE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT HER ACCEPTANCE OF A DP RETURN
SCHEME MIGHT ACCOMPLISH MUCH TO SERVE HER INTERESTS AT MINIMUM
RISKO IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT U.S. INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED, AND
WE SUGGEST WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF PAST FAILURE) THAT IT IS WORTH
ANOTHER TRY. WE FRANKLY DON'T SEE ANYTHING ELSE THAT MIGHT
WORK, IN THE SHRINKING TIME FRAME WHICH FACES US.
12. WHILE BOTH ARABS AND JEWS ARE DOUBTLESS SINCERE IN THEIR
DESIRE FOR PEACE, THEY BOTH APPEAR INCAPABLE OF EITHER CORRRECTLY
ASSESSING THE OHTERS DESIRES OR MOTIVES OR TAKING ANY POSITIVE
STEPS TOWARD CONVINCING THE OTHER OF THEIR GENUINE DESIRE AND
READINESS FOR PEACE. IT IS APPARENT THAT ISRAEL FAILS TO CONSIDER
A RETURN OF THE DPS AS BEING IN ITS GENUINE INTEREST. WE CONTEND
THAT IT IS VERY MUCH SO AND BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE
ANOTHER GO AT CONVINCING THE ISRAELIS THAT IT IS.
PORTER
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67 ?
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04088 02 OF 02 191000Z
17
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,/031 W
1969 MAY 19 PM 58
KISSINGER'S RECEIVED OFFICE
042029
EXATS
R 190720Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7744
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
2
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 4088
EXDIS
SUBJECT: LEBANON, THE FEDAYEEN AND DP RETURN
F ) AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE MIGHT BE INTRODUCED INTO THE
EAST AND WEST BANKS TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THE DPS. THIS
COULD BE A CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ITS OWN RIGHT.
8. (#) TOTAL NUMBER OF DP'S PROBABLY DOES NOT EXCEED 250,000.
ISRAELI DEF MIN DAYAN USED FIGURE OF 226,000 IN NOV. 68 ITEL AVIV
6117). IF THE GOI COULD BE PREVAILED UPON TO ALLOW THE DPS
TO BEGIN RETURNING, EVEN AT A RELATIVELY SLOW RATE OF
10,000 PER MONTH, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF MOVEMENT TOWARD A
RETURN TO NORMALCY WOULD, IN OUR VIEW BE SIGNIFICANT. THERE
WOULD BE NO INSUPERABLE LOGISTICS PROBLEM. UNRWA OFFICIALS
WORKING WITH THE GOJ, WHICH WE ARE ASSUMING WOULD SUPPORT ANY
(#) DP RETURN PROGRAM, COULD QUICKLY IDENTIFY THE DP'S
WHETHER OR NOT REGISTERED WITH UNRWA. FURTHERMORE, THE HOMES
OF MOST OF THE DPS REMAIN VACANT.
9. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE GOI, AS IN THE PAST, WILL RESIST ON
FAMILIAR (AND TO THEM CONVINCING) GROUNDS. FRANKLY, WE DO NOT
CONSIDER THESE REASONS CONVINCING, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF REPEATED
ASSERTIONS BY ISRAELI LEADERS THAT THE GOI'S OCCUPATION POLICY
HAS BOTH DISSUADED WEST BANK RESIDENTS FROM COOPERATING WITH THE
FEDAYEEN AND RAISED THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE AREA. WE WOULD
ARGUE, THEREFORE, THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOI TO HAVE
AS MANY PALESTINIANS AS POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE THE POSITIVE ASPECTS
SECRET
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AUTHORIZED
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STATES
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EXCE EXEIS
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04088 02 OF 02 191000Z
OF ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION, AND TO BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO ISRAELI-
ARAB ECONOMIC COOPERATION. FURTHERMORE, WE SEE NO REASON TO
DOUBT THE CAPABILITY OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO INSTITUTE
WHATEVER SECURITY MEASURES MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE DPS
FROM BECOMING A MAJOR DISRUPTIVE ELEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF A FINAL AGREEMENT. RATHER,
THE THREAT TO ISRAELI SECURITY SHOULD BE REDUCED, ONCE THE FEDAYEEN
SPAWNING GROUND AMONG THE DPS ON THE EAST BANK HAS BEEN
ELIMINATED.
10. WE CAN'T, OF COURSE, PREDICT HOW LONG THE PRESENT DRIFT CAN
CONTINUE BEFORE THE MODERATE REGIMES IN LEBANON JORDAN AND
PERHAPS ELSEWHERE IN THE ME ARE BROUGHT DOWN OR RENDERED IMPOTENT
BY MOUNTING LEFTIST AND PALESTINIAN PRESSURES. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY,
HOWEVER, THAT THESE REGIMES CAN LONG SURVIVE THE COMBINED
THREAT POSED BY THE FEDAYEEN, PAN-ARABISTS AND OTHER LEFTIST
POLITICAL ELEMENTS. ON OTHER HAND, HUSSEIN WOULD
(#)
ROOM IF HIS REFUGEE POPULATION CAN BE REDUCED.
LEBANON WOULD BENEFIT ACCORDINGLY AND WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVINCE
ITS PEOPLE THAT PEACE IS WORTH FIGHTING FOR.
11. IF ISRAEL WISHES TO MAINTAIN MODERATE ARAB REGIMES WITH WHOM
SHE MIGHT MAKE PEACE, SHE MUST BE WILLING TO TAKE SOME RISK AND
PAY A PRICE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT HER ACCEPTANCE OF A DP RETURN
SCHEME MIGHT ACCOMPLISH MUCH TO SERVE HER INTERESTS AT MINIMUM
RISK. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT U.S. INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED, AND
WE SUGGEST (WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF PAST FAILURE) THAT IT IS WORTH
ANOTHER TRY. WE FRANKLY DON'T SEE ANYTHING ELSE THAT MIGHT
WORK, IN THE SHRINKING TIME FRAME WHICH FACES US.
12. WHILE BOTH ARABS AND JEWS ARE DOUBTLESS SINCERE IN THEIR
DESIRE FOR PEACE, THEY BOTH APPEAR INCAPABLE OF EITHER CORRRECTLY
ASSESSING THE OTHERS DESIRES OR MOTIVES OR TAKING ANY POSITIVE
STEPS TOWARD CONVINCING THE OTHER OF THEIR GENUINE DESIRE AND
READINESS FOR PEACE. IT IS APPARENT THAT ISRAEL FAILS TO CONSIDER
A RETURN OF THE DPS AS BEING IN ITS GENUINE INTEREST. WE CONTEND
THAT IT IS VERY MUCH SO AND BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE
ANOTHER GO AT CONVINCING THE ISRAELIS THAT IT IS.
PORTER
NOTE: (#) OMISSIONS. CORRECTIONS TO FOLLOW.
SECRET
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*
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TELEGRAM
SECRET 476
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04078 161806Z
02
EXCLUS EXCE EXETS
89
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
029424
R 161501Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7737
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASS JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR E T BEIRUT 4078
EXDIS
SUBJECT: LEBANESE CRISIS
REF: STATE 76791
1. APPRECIATE SUGGESTION RE CHEHAB. WE OF COURSE HAVE BEEN FO|'-
LOWING CHEHAB'S ROLE CLOSELY AND I HAVE BEEN IN FREQUENT DIRECT
AND INDIRECT TOUCH WITH HIM. I HAVE ANOTHER APPOINTMENT ON MAY
19. CHEHAB IS SUPPORTING HELOU. HE SEES CLEARLY THE FEDAYEEN
DANGER TO LEBANON AND HIS VIEWS HAVE BEEN MADE KNOWN, PARTICUL-
ARLY TO ARMY. INDEED, THIS SUPPORT HAS BEEN ONE OF HELOU'S MAIN
ASSETS AND HAS ALSO SERVED MAINTAIN COHESIVENESS OF MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT.
2. CHEHAB, HOWEVER, PREFERS TO WORK BEHIND THE SCENES. HE IS NOT
A PARTICULARLY COURAGEOUS OR BOLD MAN. HE ABHORS PUBLIC STATE-
MENTS AND HAS NOT MADE ONE FOR YEARS. ALSO HE WOULD FEEL PARTI-
CULARLY INHIBITED IN MAKING A CLEAR-CUT PUBLIC STATEMENT BE-
CAUSE OF HIS DESIRE NOT TO EMBARRASS HIS OLD FRIEND AND PROTEGE,
RASHID KARAME. KARAME IS AT THIS POINT FACING MOST DIFFICULT DE*
CISION OF HIS POLITICAL CAREER AND WE BELIEVE CHEHAB IS QUIETLY
ADVISING HIM TO FORM A GOVT WHICH WOULD BE ABLE HANDLE FEDAYEEN
PROBLEM. COROLLARY OF THIS WOULD BE THAT KARAME WOULD NOT HAVE TO
TAKE PUBLIC ANTI FEDAYEEN POSTURE WHICH WOULD DESTROY HIM WITH
SECRET
44
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04078 161806Z
HIS MUSLIM CONSTITUENCY. CHEHAB THEREFORE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY
SHY AWAY FROM ANY STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD EMBARRASS HIS LONGTIME
COLLEAGUE AND PERHAPS DESTROY HIS OWN EFFECTIVENESS IN EXERTING
QUIET PRESSURE ON HIS MANY MUSLIM FRIENDS.
3. I AM AFRAID THAT CHEHAB WOULD BELIEVE THAT IN ORDER FOR HIS
INFLUENCE TO BE SIGNIFICANT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE EXERCISED QUIETLY.
TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD ONLY SHARPEN THE CONFESSIONAL DIVISION,
LUMPING HIM IN THE PUBLIC EYE WITH THE "MILITANT" CHRISTIANS
FOR WHOM HE HAS GREAT CONTEMPT.
4. WHEN I SEE CHEHAB I WILL OF COURSE SEE HOW FAR HE WILL GO AND
EXPLORE WITH HIM ALL POSSIBILITIES OF SUPPORT FOR HELOU HELOU
(WHO INCIDENTALLY IS NO CHEHAB-LOVER) HAS LEFT NO DOUBT IN MY MIND
THAT HE IS SATISFIED WITH THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF CHEHAB'S
CURRENT SUPPORT. PORTER
EXCES
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02
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04035 151837Z
47
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
021302
R 151403Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7728
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
S El C R E T BEIRUT 4035
EXDIS
SUBJ: CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN LEBANON
11 PRES HELOU REPORTED TO ME LAST NIGHT (MAY 141 THROUGH
MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) WHERE THINGS NOW STAND.
21 RE FORMATION NEW GOVT, HELOU HAS BEEN RELUCTANT CHARGE
KARAME TO DO so UNTIL KARAME FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT WEIGHT OF
PUBLIC OPINION TOGETHER WITH STRONG VIEWS OF CHRISTIAN
LEADERSHIP DEMANDED SOMETHING MORE FROM HIM THAN EQUIVOCATION
ON FEDAYEEN ISSUE. HOWEVER, AS ALL LEBANESE POLITICANS
WERE PRESURRING HELOU ESTABLISH CIVILIAN GOVT AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE, HE NOW PLANS DISCUSS MATTER WITH KARAME TODAY (MAY
151 HOPING REACH RAPID AGREEMENT.
31 HELOU CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS IT NOT POSSIBLE ENTICE SUNNI
EXPIS EXPIS XQIS
MUSLIMS INTO GOVT ON PUBLICLY-ANNOUNCED ANTI-FEDAYEEN PLATFORM
CONFIDENTIAL DEAL HE HOPES STRIKE WITH KARAME WOULD BE:
(A) GOVT TO ISSUE POLICY STATEMENT STATING THAT LEBANON
SUPPORTS FEDAYEEN TO SULLEST EXTENT THAT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY
AND NATIONAL SECURITY PERMIT. (B) FEDAYEEN PRESENCE TO BE
TOLERATED IN RELATIVELY SMALL AREA SOUTHEAST LEBANON UNDER
UNWRITTEN AGREEMENT THAT FEDAYEEN WILL NOT ENGAGE IN OPERATIONS
AGAINST ISRAEL WILL NOT EXPAND OUTSIDE AGREED AREA, WILL NOT
INCREASE NUMBERS IN LEBANON AND WILL NOT ENGAGE IN SUBERSION
IN LEBANON. (C) IN EVENT FEDAYEEN VIOLATE TERMS OF AGREEMENT,
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04035 151837Z
LEBANESE ARMY TO FEEL FREE ACT AGAINST THEM AS SITUATION
DICTATES, AND ARMY TO RECEIVE SECRET ORDER FROM GOL TO THIS
EFFECT. HELOU STRESSED THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL BE
ACCEPT ENTERING INTO A WRITTEN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD CONCEDE
ANYTHING TO FEDAYEEN. QUESTION IS WHETHER HELOU CAN GET
KARAME OR ANY OTHER SUNNI LEADER TO AGREE TO THESE TERMS.
HIS HOPE IS THAT KARAME WILL, IF HE CAN BE ALLOWED MAINTAIN
APPARENT PUBLIC POSITION OF SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT,
DESPITE SECRET ACQUIESCENCE TO HELOU THAT HE WILL NOT OPPOSE
WHATEVER MEASURES ARNY MUST TAKSNIOBVIOUSLY INCLUDING SHOOTING
IF NECESSARY) TO CONTAIN FEDAYEEN THREAT.
4) HELOU HOPEFUL THAT LARGE CABINET WILL BE FORMED - ONE
WHICH PRESENTS AS GOOD A MUSLIM IMARE AS POSSIBLE WHILE AT
SAME TIME CONTAINING STRONG CHRISTIAN LEADERS SUCH AS PIERRE
GEMAYEL AND
POSSIBLY RAYMOND EDDE. A CHAMOUNIST, HOWEVER,
IS STILL NOT ACCEPTABLE TO KARAME AND OUR INFORMATION IS THAT
CHAMOUN WILL NOT CAUSE TROUBLE ON THIS SCORE. IT ALSO
DOUBTFUL THAT INCLUSION OF JUMBLATT IS ACCEPTABLE TO KARAME.
5) KHOURY REPORTED UNEASY TRUCE WITH FEDAYEEN STILL
CONTINUES IN SOUTH LEBANON. FEDAYEEN ARE UNOBTRUSIVE AT
MOMENT AND HACE WITHDRAWN TO CONSIDERABLE EXTENT FROM POPULATED
AREAS. NONE, HOWEVER, HAVE LEFT LEBANON AND THEY ARE
AWAITING ORDERS PRESUMABLY FROM ARAFAT. KHOURY BELIEVES
FEDAYEEN MAY REMAIN QUIET FOR SOME DAYS OR EVEN WEEKS (BARRING
INDIVIDUAL IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS) WHILE WAITING SEE EXTENT
LEBANESE COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN OF THEIR DEMANDS, SUCH AS
REMOVING SECURITY MEASURES IN PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS,
RELEASING FEDAYEEN PRISIONERS AND PRO-FEDAYEEN LEBANESE IMPRISON-
ED RESULT APRIL 23 RIOTS. IF GOVT FORMED, ARAFAT PRESUMABLY WILL
THEN PRESS FOR RESUMPTION NEGOTIATIONS SEEK FIRM AGREEMENT WITH
GOL ON FEDAYEEN OPERATION IN LEBANON. THIS WILL BRING
EXCLUS EXCLUS EXCES
TREMENDOUS PRESSURE ON KARAME TO ACCEDE TO FEDAYEEN REQUEST
FOR A "REASONABLE" AGREEMENT - SOMETHING WHICH HELOU WISHES
ASSURE IN ADVANCE WILL NOT OCCUR. AS HELOU PUT IT, HE MUST
BE SURE KARAME ACCEPTS WITHOUT RESERVATION THE PROPOSALS
OUTLINED PARA 3 ABOVE, WHICH HELOU BELIEVES REPRESENT MAXIMUM
CONCESSIONS HE CAN MAKE TO FEDAYEEN WITHOUT LOSING HIS CONTROL
OVER THEM.
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04035 1518372
61 HELOU MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THAT HE FULLY EXPECTS FEDAYEEN
WILL BREAK THE UNWRITTEN AGREEMENT WHEN IT SUITS THEM TO DD
SO. HE MUST BE SURE THAT IN SUCH EVENT KARAME WILLWAT LEAST
ACQUIESCE TO A QUICK RESPONSE BY THE LEBANESE MILITARY.
IF KARAME CANNOT ACCEPT THESE CONDITIONS, HELOU
PROBABLY WILL NOT RUN RISK OF ATTEMPTING FORM GOVT AT THIS
TIME. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT IF KARAME SHOULD RESIGN AGAIN IN
FUTURE IN OPPOSITION oT GOVT'S FEDAYEEN POLICIES, THERE WOULD
BE SLIM CHANCE FORMING ANOTHER CIVILIAN GOVT, AS BREAK WITH
MUSLIMS WOULD THEN BE ALMOST INEVITABLE.
7) HELOU FULLY EXPECTS STEP-UP IN FEDAYEEN-INSPIRED PROGAGANDA
AGAINST LEBANON, AND AGAINST HIM PERSONALLY, WILL BEGIN
WHEN IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT HE HAS NOT CAVED IN TO THEIR
DEMANDS. HE IS NOT PERSONALLY CONCERNED, BUT IS DEEPLY
APPREHENSIVE WHETHER HE CAN WORK OUT A LASTING MODUS
OPERANDI WITH KARAME AND THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY, WHOSE COURAGE
LIKELY TO EVAPORATE IN FACE PREDICTABLE THREATS AND
CHARGES OF TREASON. IN MEANTIME, WE DOUBT THAT HELOU HAS
ANY REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO HIS PRESENT COURSE OF ACTION.
PORTER
EXCLUS EXCLUS EXATS
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DEPARTMENT
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Lebanon
STATE
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 333
Y
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04006 141736Z
47
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
013346
R 141554Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7719
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USMISSION USUN
S: ECRE T BEIRUT 4006
EXDIS
EXCES
1) ONE AFTERMATH UNSUCCESSFUL FEDAYEEN-GOL NEGOTIATIONS
HAS BEEN GROWING GROUNDSWELL OPINION AMONG FEDAYEEN AND THEIR
SUPPORTERS THAT USG (SPECIFICALLY AMEMBASSY BEIRUT) HAD
EXERCISED DECISIVE INFLUENCE ON PRES HELOU TAKE FIRM POSITION
AGAINST CONCESSIONS FEDAYEEN.
21 WE KNOW THAT ARAFAT PERSONALLY SAID THIS IN SPEAKING OF
"US SCENARIOM WHICH HELOU FOLLOWED, AND WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL
PLAYBACKS THIS THEME. DETAILED REPORT ON NEGOTIATIONS CONTAINED
NLB-9477 OF MAY 12 DESCRIBES ALLEGED STATEMENT OF HELOU TO
ARAFAT TO EFFECT THAT HELOU MENTIONED ASSURANCES US INTERVENTION
IN ANY EVENT FEDAYEEN CONTINUED ATTEMPTS SUBVERT LEBANON I
FEEL CERTAIN HELOU MADE NO SUCH STATEMENT BUT IT IS SORT OF
ACCUSATION WHICH WE WILL CERTAINLY HEAR MORE OF IN FUTURE.
31 OF COURSE ONE CAN AUTOMATICALLY ASSUME FEDAYEEN
WOULD BELIEVE IN "FACT" OF US INTERVENTION AND WOULD SPREAD
STORY TO DISCREDIT HELOU (AND OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS WHO
-
OPPOSE FEDAYEEN) AS AMERICAN LACKEYS. WE WILL DO WHAT WE
CAN TO COUNTER WHISPERING CAMPAIGN, BUT ONE SHOULD NOT RULE
OUT THAT FEDAYEEN HOSTILITY MAY BE DIRECTED AGAINST US
IN SOME WAY. PERHAPS IN FIRST INSTANCE THROUGH TIRADES
THROUGH CAIRO VOICE OF ASIFA.
ORTER.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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Leban
OF STATE
#
Department of State
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TELEGRAM
SECRET 771
PAGE 01 USUN N 01449 122146Z
83
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
130007
R 1220432 MAY 69
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7129
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
S EPC R E T USUN 1449
EXDIS
DEPT PASS BEIRUT
SUBJ: POSSIBLE UNEF IN LEBANON
1. WE HAVE NOTED ONE OF CONTINGENCIES PRES HELOU
THINKING ABOUT (BEIRUT'S 38811 IS POSSIBLE UNEF FOR
LEBANON.
2. AS SEEN FROM HERE, GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS APPLYING
TO UN ACTION IN LEBANON (STATE 65333) ALSO APPLY TO
A POSSIBLE UNEF NO BOUBT IN LARGE PART DUE TO
AMB PORTER'S EFFORTS, HELOU SEEMS QUITE REALISTIC CON-
CERNING FACTORS WHICH WLD GOVERN DISPATCH OF A UNEF
(PARA 5 BEIRUT 38811. OUR LIST LARGELY PARALLELS HIS:
(A) KEY TO GETTING UNEF AUTHORIZED IN UN IS SUPPORT OF
MODERATE ARABS, INCLUDING UAR AND JORDAN.
(B) WITH SUCH ARAB SUPPORT, SOV VETO IN SC WLD BE LESS
LIKELY (ALGERIA WLD PRESUMABLY NOT BE HELPFUL BUT
PAKISTAN JUST NOW MIGHT BE).
(C) IF ISSUE WERE TO BECOME VERY CONTENTIOUS AND IF
SOVS WERE TO VETO IN SC ABSENCE BROAD ARAB SUPPORT,
WE AGREE WITH HELOU THAT TWO- THIRDS MAJORITY IN EMER-
GENCY SPECIAL GA WLD BE UNLIKELY.
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PAGE 02 USUN N 01449 122146Z
3. FOL BSERVATIONS ALSO SEEM RELEVANT:
(A) RE HELOU'S SUGGESTION US CONTINGENTS MIGHT BE DIS-
PATCHED AS ADVANCE ELEMENTS AS SOON AS UNEF AUTHORIZED,
WE HERE HAVE NOT ENVISAGED GREAT POWER PARTICIPATION
WITH FORCES, WHICH WOULD BE UNPRECENDENTED IN ME.
(HOWEVER, MAJOR POWERS MIGHT PROVIDE LIGISTIC SUPPORT.)
(B) IF AND WHEN HELOU DECIDES TO APPROACH OTHER ARABS
ON THIS MATTER, WE BELIEVE LEBANON SHOULD ALSO ENGAGE
IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH SYG. HE WLD NEED TO CONSIDER
WHICH COUNTRIES TO APPROACH FOR FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS,
LOGISTIC SUPPORT, AND HOW FINANCING COULD BE MANAGED.
ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO TEMPORARILY TAKE SOME
UNFICYP FORCES AS STOP-GAP MEASURE PROVIDED CONTRIBUTING
COUNTRIES, GOC, TURKEY, AND GREECE AGREED.
GP-3.
YOST
NOTE: NOT PASSED BEIRUT BY OCT.
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DIPARTMENT THE OF
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788
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03881 01 OF 02 091800Z
27
42
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
114937
R 091526Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7684
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
S El C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 3881
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO
SUBJ: REPRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT HELOU CONCERNING US SUPPORT
FOR LEBANON
REF: STATE 070266
10 DURING MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU MAY 7, HELOU
REITERATED HIS QUESTION CONCERNING POSSIBILITIES OF
US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON I RELAYED SUBSTANCE OF
INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFTEL RECAPITULATING WHAT
WE HAVE DONE, EMPHASIZING USG SUPPORT FOR GOL'S POLICY
OF FEDAYEEN INTERDICATION AND OUR SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, TO INCLUDE POSSIBILITY OF
PUBLIC STATEMENT IN THIS REGARD AT APPROPRIATE TIME.
I INFORMED HIM THAT WASHINGTON GIVING ATTENTION AS TO WHAT
ELSE WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO FOR LEBANON AND THAT WE WILL
BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM FURTHER.
2. HELOU EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR US SUPPORT
AND FOR OUR SPECIAL EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON IN THIS
CRISIS. HE PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON CONTINUING US
REPRESENTATIONS TO SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND LIBYA
CONCERNING THEIR FINANCING OF FEDAYEEN, AND URGED
WE CONTINUE OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAEL, FULLY
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03881 01 OF 02 091800Z
COGNIZANT THAT HE WAS EXPOSING HIMSELF DANGEROUSLY IF
GOI LEAKED FACT THAT HE ASKING FOR ISRAELI COOPERATION
RE BORDER AND FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION. HIS COMMENTS ON
PARAGRAPH Do REFTEL RE SELECTED ARMS SHIPMENTS AND
PARAGRAPH E , RE POSSIBLE ROLE OF UN ARE REPORTED SEPTELS.
3. RE WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE, HELOU STRESSED ESTABLISH
EXCES
WHAT OPTIONS AVAILABLE IF SITUATION DETERIORATES SHARPLY
AND SECURITY SITUATION BECOMES UNCONTROLLABLE.
HELOU EMPHASIZED HE THINKING OF ULTIMATE STEPS HE MAY
HAVE TO RESORT TO. IN PROBING POSSIBILITIES US: ASSISTANCE
HE SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS USG RELUCTANCE SERVE AS
WORLD'S POLICEMAN IN INTERVENING IN LOCAL OR REGIONAL
CONFLICTS, PARTICULARLY AS RESULT US EXPERIENCE IN VIET-
NAM. HOWEVER, AS CHIEF OF STATE, HE HAD TO STUDY WHAT
OPTIONS HE HAD AVAILABLE TO H M IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE
THREATS TO HIS COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND
SOVEREIGNTY. HE STATED HE WOULD MAKE WHATEVER DECISIONS
HE THOUGHT NECESSARY WITH OR WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF US
ASSISTANCE, BUT THAT PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF AVAILABILITY SOME SORT
OF US ASSISTANCE WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS HAND IN MAKING THE
HARD DECISIONS REQUIRED AT THIS POINT I URGED THAT HE
AND GOL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID DETERIORATION IN
SITUATION WHICH WOULD NECESSITATE APPEALS FOR EXTERNAL
ASSISTANCE. I FELT A FIRM STAND ON HIS PART NOW
HAD BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESS THAN CONTINUED POLICY OF
DRIFT, AND EXPRESSED PERSONAL BELIEF THAT CLIMATE OF
PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORT WAS MORE FAVORABLE AT THIS MOMENT THAN
IT WOULD BE IN FUTURE. WE, ON OUR PART, I SAID, WOULD
CONTINUE OUR PRESENT EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON.
40 IN HELOU'S ANALYSIS, THERE ARE TWO BASIC CONTINGENCIES
WHICH CAN LEAD TO DOWNFALL LEBANESE REGIME AND
COMPROMISE, IF NOT DESTROY, LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
AND SOVEREIGNTY THESE ARE 11 INTERNAL SUBVERSION
(I.E. MOUNTING PRESUURE ON GOL AGAINST ITS POLICY OF
EXCLS
FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION, EMANATING FROM SARG MACHINATIONS
IN LEBANON, AS-SAIQAH AND OTHER
FEDAYEEN GROUPU, DEMONSTRATIONS ECGINEERED BY PALESTINIAN
AND SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON, AND CONSPIRATORIAL ACTIVITIES
OF RADICAL LEFT ORGANIZATIONS) 21 COLLAPSE
OF SECURITY ON LEBA ON-ISRAEL BORDER I.E. ISRAELI
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03881 01 OF 02 091800Z
RETALIATION AND POSSIBLE OCCUPATION LEBANESE TERRITORY
AS RESULT ESCALATION CONFLICT BETWEEN LEBANESE ARMY AND
FEDAYEEN WITH CONSEQUENT LOSS OF ARMY'S BORDER CONTROL AND
INTERNAL SECURITY CARABILITY). IN EITHER OF THESE TWO CONTINGENCIES
HELOU ENVISAGES POSSIBILITY RAPID SPLIT LEBANON ALONG MUSLIM-
CHRISTIAN LINES. AND SPECTER OF BLOOD BATH IN ENSUING CIVIL WAR.
IN THIS RESPECT, I AM CONVINCED HE IS THINKING AS A
CHRISTIAN PRESIDENT WHO FEELS HE WILL BE COMPELLED TO
CALL FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO PROTECT A THREAT TO
CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, AS WELL AS COUNTERBALANCE THE FORCES
AT PLAY AND RE-ESTABLISH SECURITY IN COUNTRY. HELOU EMPHASIZED
MUTUAL US-LEBANESE INTEREST IN
MAINTAINING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, AND REPEATED THIS THESIS
THAT FALL OF LEBANON WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE HASHEMITE REGIME
IN JORDAN AND WEAKEN OTHER MODERATE ARAB REGIMES, THEREBY
LEADING TO RADICALIZATION OF ARAB MIDDLE EAST. AS HE
PUT IT, "IF NOT TROSTKYITES, WE WILL SEE THE RISE OF
KERENSYS IN THE ARAB WORLD".
5% HELOU THEN ASKED THAT WASHINGTON GIVE URGENT
CONSIDERATION TO CONTIGENCY PLANNING SO THAT BOTH USG
AND GOL COULD BETTER DETERMINE WHAT OPTIONS AVAILABLE
IN CRISIS SITUATION SPECIFICALLY, HE RECOMMENDED
CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO HOW USG COULD HELP IN CONTEXT
OF GOL REQUEST SOR DISPATCHI OF UNEF TO LEBANON.
HELOU SAID HE PREPARED TO APPEAL TO UN FOR EMERGENCY
FORCES IF SITUATION IN LEBANON DETERIORATED TO POINT
WHERE IN HIS OPINION SUCH TROOPS NEEDED TO STABILIZE
SITUATION IN LEBANON. TIMING WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT,
AS PREMATURE CALL FOR UNEF COULD AGGRAVATE INTERNAL
POLITICAL SITUATION IN LEBANON AND DO MORE HARM THAN
GOOD
PORTER
NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.
SECRET
1
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
EXEMS
SECRET
764
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03881 02 OF 02 091728Z
27
42
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
114432
R 091526Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBAUSY BEIRUT
TO ROEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7685
INFO AMEMBAUSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
S EC E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 3881
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO
SUBJ: REPRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT HELOU CONCERNING US SUPPORT
FOR LEBANON
REF: STATE 070266
60 HELOU REALIZED INHERENT DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING UN
APPROVAL DISPATCH UNEF TO CRISIS AREA. HE CITED THESE
AS8 11 EXERCISE OF VETO, ESPECIALLY BY SOVIETS, WHO
MAY NOT WISH TO PRESERVE MODERATE LEBANESE REGIME: 21
RELUCTANCE SOME STATES FINANCE PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS
31 DIFFICULTY GAIN NECESSARY MAJORITY IN UNGA UNDER
UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION AND 41 POSSIBLE OPPOSITION
OF ARAB STATES THEMSELVES TO DISPATCH UN TROOPS TO
LEBANON THEREFORE, THERE MIGHT WELL BE DELAY IN
OBTAINING A UN DECISION TO DISPATCH UNEF TO LEBANON.
BY TIME FORCE DID FINALLY ARRIVE, IT MIGHT BE TOO LATE:
CONSEQUENTLY, HELOU ASKED, ON BASIS CONTINGENCY PLANNING
AND IF UN ACTION POSSIBLE, WOULD WE CONSIDER POSSIBILITY
OF DISPATCHING AMERICAN TROOPS AS A FIRST CONTINGENT
TO UNEF TO LEBANON? HE EXPLAINED THIS WOULD BE OF
IMMEDIATE HELP IN RESTORING ORDER IN LEBANON AND PUTTING
FEDAYEEN, SYRIA AND EVEN ISRAEL ON NOTICE THAT US AND
UN SUPPORT LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL
SECRET
27
1
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03881 02 OF 02 0917282
INTEGRITY. IF THIS COURSE OF ACTION NOT POSSIBLE, HELOU
ASKED WHAT OTHER FORMS OF US ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE FEASIBLE.
7. AFTER TELLING HELOU I WELL UNDERSTOOD WHY HE, AS
CHIEF OF STATE, FELT IT NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHAT
OPTIONS HE HAD AVAILABLE CONCERNING EXTERNAL AND
SPECIFICALLY US ASSISTANCE, I STATED IT IMPERATIVE THAT
HE UNDERSTAND THE GROWING OPPOSITION OF THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC AND CONGRESS TO ANY UNIATERAL USMILITARY
INTERVENTION ABROAD. THIS WAS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR
WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON AND USG HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
IN FORMULATING ITS FOREIGN POLICY TODAY. SPEAKING
PERSONALLY AND UNDERLINING I WAS NOT SPEAKING UNDER
INSTRUCTIONS, I TOLD HELOU IT WAS MOST DIFFICULT FOR USG TO
CONTEMPLATE POSSIBILITIES OF US ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON IN
ADVANCE AND UNDER HYPOTHETICAL CIRCUMSTANCES GOL MUST UNDERSTAND
THE REALITY OF THIS POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, I WAS CERTAIN USG,
IF IT DID CONTEMPLATE ASSISTING LEBANON UNDER CONTINGENCIES
HELOU OUTLINED WOULD BE ABLE DO so ONLY IN CONTEXT OF AN INTER-
NATIONAL EFFORT, E.G. UNDER UN AEGIS. IN SHORT, US
WOULD BE LOOKING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION AND
HELOU SHOULD NOT RELY ON US ALONE BUT SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER
OPTIONS FOR EXAMPLE WITH FRANCE AND UK.
8. IN TERMS OF CRITICAL DETERIORATION OF SITUATION IN
LEBANON IN WHICH THERE IS CIVIAL WAR, CONSIDERABLE
LOSS OF LIFE AND ONE IN WHICH US LIVES AND PROPERTY
WERE IN GRAVE DANGER, I VOLUNTEERED THAT USG WOULD
HAVE TO DETERMINE ITS POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER NO PRIOR COMMITMENT COULD BE
MADE BASED ON SUCH A CONTINGENCY.
9. COMMENT: I LEFT IT WITH HELOU THAT WE WOULD STAY IN CLOSE AND
CONSTANT TOUCH. AT EACH MEETING, I CONTINUE TRY INJECT REALISM INTO
HIS THINKING LIMITATIONS ONUS CAPABILITIES TO ASSIST, AND
ABOVE ALL TO INTERVENE MILITARILY. SINCE HE HAS NO CONFIDENCE
IN EXTERNAL HELP FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE THAN USG, IT UNDERSTANDABLE
THAT HE RETURNS TO THE SUBJECT OF WHAT HELP WE MIGH OFFER IF
SITUATION BECOMES DESPERATE I THINK OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION
IS TO REPEAT WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TELLING HIM, WITHOUT COMMITTING
OURSELVES TO ANY SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION EXCEPT TO DO EVERYTHING
WE CAN TO SECURE UN INTERVENTION ON ONE HAND, AND RESTRAIN ISRAEL
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MOLIO
THE
MOITASISOHTUA
EXE™
AMERICA UNITED # DEPARTMENT sicke OF DEPARTMENT
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03881 02 OF 02 091728Z
ИСЕ
ON THE OTHER.
riew
10. THE CHANCES OF SECURING A LEBANESE- TYPE COMPROMISE THAT WILL
FOR LOND ENDURE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY REMOTE IN MY OPINION.
HELOU IS CORRECT IN FOCUSING ON THE NEED FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING
TO BE READY FOR THE WORST. REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE ARE ABLE TO
TELL HIM, USG MUST ALSO NOW ACCEPT THE REALITY THAT SITUATION
COULD (AND PERHAPS RAPIDLY) DETERIORATE AS HE SUGGESTS.
PORTER
NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.
SECRET
1
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 514
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03606 011603Z
41
ACTION SS 70
INFO OCT 01,CIAE 00,/071 W
064273
R 011403Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7615
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN
S ECRET BEIRUT 3606
LIMDIS
SUBJECT: VIEWS OF EX-PRESIDENT CAMILLE CHAMOUN
1. CAMILLE CHAMOUN CALLED ON ME APRIL 29 AT HIS REQUEST. I GOT
THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS NOT PRESSING FOR INCLUSION OF HIS
PARTY IN NEW GOVERNMENT. HE PROFESSES BE DOING EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE TO REASSURE AND MOLLIFY LEBANESE MUSLIMS, BUT BELIEVES
MUSLIMS BASICALLY INCAPABLE OF ACTING TO PROTECT LEBANON AGAINST
FEDAYEEN EVEN THOUGH THEY FULLY AWARE OF AND CONCERNED BY
CONSEQUENCES CONTINUED FEDAYEEN ACTION. HE IS NOT OPPOSED TO RETURN
OF RACHID KARAME AS PRIMIN AND SAYS MOST IMPORTANT CHRISTIAN
LEADERS AGREE. HIS VIEW IS THAT LEBANESE ARMY MUST BE GRADUALLY
STRENGTHENED IN ORDER BE ABLE BOTH TO CONTINUE CONTROL FEDAYEEN
AND TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL ORDER. ARMY CAN CONTROL FEDAYEEN TODAY
IF GOVERNMENT WILL SO ORDER BUT HE FEELS FEDAYEEN WOULD HOLD
DECISIVE UPPER HAND IN SIX MONTHS IF FEDAYEEN CHALLENGE NOT MET
BEFORE.
2. BASED ON PRELMINARY SOUNDINGS FROM HIS EMISSARIES, I EXPECTED
THAT CHAMOUN WOULD REQUEST USG ASSISTANCE TO CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY
IN FORM ARMS OR PERHAPS FINANCES. PERHARS ANTICIPATING MY NEGATIVE
RESPONSE, HE REFRAINED AND INSTEAD URGED THAT BUILD-UP OF
LEBANESE ARMY AS RAPIDLY AS FEASIBLE OVER NEXT THREE TO FIVE YEARS
WAS PROBABLY ONLY WAY TO ASSURE LEBANON WOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH
TO MEET INTERNAL THREAT AND DETER SYRIAN AGRESSION AS FOR
FEDAYEEN, I SAID EMBASSY SOMEWHAT SURPRISED AT HIS SEEMINGLY
PRO-FEDAYEEN PUBLIC COMMENTS. HE ASSURED ME THESE DESIGNED ONLY AS
SOP TO MUSLIM PUBLIC OPINION IN HOPES OF DAMPENING CONFESSIONAL
SECRET
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DEPARTMENT
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03606 011603Z
CONFLICTS. HE DOUBTED THAT HIS ATTEMPTS HAD HAD MUCHI SUCCESS AND
SAID LEBANESE MUSLIMS, AS IN 1958 WERE AGAIN SUBMERGING THEIR
LEBANESE PERSONALITIES AND ALLOWING THEIR PRO-ARAB INSTINCTS TO
TAKE OVER® HE ADMITTED THAT MOST LEBANESE MUSLIM LEADERS KNEW THEY
WERE ACTING IRRATIONALLY BUT THEY WERE UNABLE AVOID IT, BOTH
BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERN OVER PRO-FEDAYEEN SENTIMENTS OF MUSLIM
PUBLIC OPINION AS WELL AS THEIR PERSONAL FEAR OF ASSASSINATION.
3. LEBANESE CHRISTIANS BY AND LARGE, SAID CHAMOUN, WERE GETTING
FED UP AND THERE WAS INCREASING TALK ABOUT CREATION OF SMALLER
LEBANESE CHRISTIAN STATE (THE OLD MOUNT LEBANON) IF CONFESSIONAL
SPLIT OCCURRED. HE CAREFULLY AVOIDED ENDORSING SUCH A SOLUTION
HIMSELF, PARTICULARLY AFTER MY STRONG REMONSTRANCES THAT SUCH A
STATE COULD NOT BE VIABLE OR LONG-ENDURING.
4. CHAMOUN WAS NOT SANGUINE ABOUT EFFECTIVENESS OFI POSSIBLE UN
INTERVENTION IN A LEBANON TORN BY POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL CIVIL WAR.
HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE AND PROBABLY
SUBJECT TO SOVIET VETO. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT FRENCHI WOULD NOT
UNILATERALLY INTERVENE AND ACCERTED MY EXPLANATION THAT ANY US
INTERVENTION WAS NOT POSSIBLE AND WOULD CLEARLY AGGRAVATE THE
SITUATION IF ATTEMPTED.
5. ONLY HOPE HE COULD SEE WAS ATTEMPT TO GRADUALLY BUILD UP ARMY,
QUIETLY ASSURING CONFESSIONAL BALANCE IN PROCESS SO THAT LEBANON
COULD MORE EFFECTIVELY COPE WITH ITS OWN PROBLEMS. HE CAME TO THE
CONCLUSION RELUCTANTLY, PARTICULARLY SINCE HE HAD BEEN OUTSPOKENLY
OPPOSED TO ARMY AND ITS RECENT INTERVENTION IN LEBANESE POLITICS.
(CHAMOUN OF COURSE MADE CLEAR THAT IN PROCESS OF EXPANDING ARMY,
CERTAIN OF HIS PARTICULAR ENEMIES IN ARMY SHOULD BE QUIETLY
DROPPED.) HE HAD CONFIDENCE IN GENERAL BOUSTANY AS A SOLDIER AND
PATRIOT WHO WOULD DO HIS JOB AND WOULD PROTECT LEBANON IF HEI
RECEIVED CLEAR ORDERS FROM POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. ARMY BUILD-UP,
CHAMOUN CONTINUED, COULD ONLY OCCUR WITH FULL SUPPORT AND
FINANCIAL HELP OF US. USG SHOULD PLEDGE ITSELF TO ASSURE THAT
BUILD-UP WOULD NOT FAIL BECAUSE OF GOLDS LACK OF FINANCIAL
RESOURCES. I REMINDED CHAMOUN THAT MUCH HAS CHANGED SINCE THE
DAYS OF HIS PRESIDENCY IN MID-FIETIES, AND THERE WAS: NO LIKELIHOOD
AT MOMENT OF GRANT MILITARY AID TO LEBANON. CREDITS MIGHT BE
AVAILABLE BUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL CREDITS WOULD REQUIRE LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY WHICH MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME. CHAMOUN ADMITTED THAT HE WAS
ACCUSTOMED DURING HIS PRESIDENTIAL TERM TO RECEIVING US GRANT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03606 0116032
MILITARY AID AND PERHAPS WAS A LITTLE OUT OF DATE. NONETHELESS,
HE URGED USG SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AND STRESSED THAT NO OTHER
SOLUTION OCCURRED TO HIM WHICH MIGHT HAVE CHANCE OF PRESERVING
LEBANON.
6. ON INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE CHAMOUN GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE
WAS PRESSING FOR REPRESENTATION OF HIS NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY IN
THE NEW CABINET. PERHAPS HE IS GRATEFUL, AS I SUGGESTED SOME TIME
AGO HE MIGHT BE, THAT IS OFFICIALLY EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING
-
IN THE ONEROUS DECISIONS OF THE MOMENT ON THE FEDAYEEN. HE FELT
THAT SHOWDOWN WITH FEDAYEEN WOULD HAVE TO COME BUT HAD NO CLEAR
IDEAS AS TO EXACTLY WHEN OR HOW. HE SAID ALL CHRISTIANS SEEMED IN
AGREEMENT THAT RACHID KARAME WAS LOGICAL PRIMIN CANDIDATE AND THAT
NO OTHER SUNNI MUSLIM COULD QUALIFY EXCEPT POSSIBLY SAEB SALAAM.
(COMMENT: EMBASSY STRONGLY DOUBTS THAT SAEB SALAAM COULD EVER
COMMAND ENOUGH SUPPORT.1 CHAMOUN FELT THE RIOTING WAS NOT OVER.
SOME OF THE VICTIMS OF LAST WEEK'S RIOTS WERE STILL NOT BURIED AND
THEIR FUNERALS WOULD PROBABLY BE USED TO STIR UP THE STREET.
7. I URGED CHAMOUN, AS I HAVE ALL OTHER CHRISTIAN LEADERS, TO CLOSE
RANKS WITH PRESIDENT HELOU AND GIVE HIM ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT.
CHAMOUN WAS LESS CONTEMPTUOUS OF HELOU THAN USUAL, AND ASSURED ME
HE HAD NO INTENTION OF ADDING TO PRESIDENT'S DIFFICULTIES. HE
QUITE AWARE OF NATURE OF CURRENT THREAT TO LEBANONI WHICH HE
TERMED AN INDIRECT INVASION FROM SYRIA IN ALLIANCE WITH LEBANESE
RADICAL LEFT. PORTER
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNINO
TELEGRAM
SECRET
788
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03881 01 OF 02 091800Z
42
2
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
114937
R 091526Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7684
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
S RECORRENT SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 3881
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO
SUBU: REPRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT HELOU CONCERNING US SUPPORT
FOR LEBANON
REF: STATE 070266
10 DURING MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU MAY 7, HELOU
REITERATED HIS QUESTION CONCERNING POSSIBILITIES OF
US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON I RELAYED SUBSTANCE OF
INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFTEL RECAPITULATING WHAT
WE HAVE DONE, EMPHASIZING USG SUPPORT FOR GOL'S POLICY
OF FEDAYEEN INTERDICATION AND OUR SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, TO INCLUDE POSSIBILITY OF
PUBLIC STATEMENT IN THIS REGARD AT APPROPRIATE TIME.
I INFORMED HIM THAT WASHINGTON GIVING ATTENTION AS TO WHAT
ELSE WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO FOR LEBANON AND THAT WE WILL
BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM FURTHER.
2. HELOU EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR US SUPPORT
AND FOR OUR SPECIAL EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON IN THIS
CRISIS. HE PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON CONTINUING US
REPRESENTATIONS TO SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND LIBYA
CONCERNING THEIR FINANCING OF FEDAYEEN, AND URGED
WE CONTINUE OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAEL, FULLY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
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UNITED
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03881 01 OF 02 091800Z
EXCES EXEMS EXCES
COGNIZANT THAT HE WAS EXPOSING HIMSELF DANGEROUSLY IF
GOI LEAKED FACT THAT HE ASKING FOR ISRAELI COOPERATION
RE BORDER AND FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION. HIS COMMENTS ON
PARAGRAPH D, REFTEL RE SELECTED ARMS SHIPMENTS AND
PARAGRAPH E , RE POSSIBLE ROLE OF UN ARE REPORTED SEPTELS.
3. RE WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE, HELOU STRESSED ESTABLISH
WHAT OPTIONS AVAILABLE IF SITUATION DETERIORATES SHARPLY
AND SECURITY SITUATION BECOMES UNCONTROLLABLE,
HELOU EMPHASIZED HE THINKING OF ULTIMATE STEPS HE MAY
HAVE TO RESORT TO. IN PROBING POSSIBILITIES US ASSISTANCE
HE SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS USG RELUCTANCE SERVE AS
WORLD'S POLICEMAN IN INTERVENING IN LOCAL OR REGIONAL
CONFLICTS, PARTICULARLY AS RESULT US EXPERIENCE IN VIET-
NAM. HOWEVER, AS CHIEF OF STATE, HE HAD TO STUDY WHAT
OPTIONS HE HAD AVAILABLE TO H M IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE
THREATS TO HIS COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND
SOVEREIGNTY. HE STATED HE WOULD MAKE WHATEVER DECISIONS
HE THOUGHT NECESSARY WITH OR WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF US
ASSISTANCE, BUT THAT PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF AVAILABILITY SOME SORT
OF US ASSISTANCE WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS HAND IN MAKING THE
HARD DECISIONS REQUIRED AT THIS POINT 1 URGED THAT HE
AND GOL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID DETERIORATION IN
SITUATION WHICH WOULD NECESSITATE APPEALS FOR EXTERNAL
ASSISTANCE. I FELT A FIRM STAND ON HIS PART NOW
HAD BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESS THAN CONTINUED POLICY OF
DRIFT, AND EXPRESSED PERSONAL BELIEF THAT CLIMATE OF
PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORT WAS MORE FAVORABLE AT THIS MOMENT THAN
IT WOULD BE IN FUTURE. WE, ON OUR PART, I SAID, WOULD
CONTINUE OUR PRESENT EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON.
40 IN HELOU'S ANALYSIS, THERE ARE TWO BASIC CONTINGENCIES
WHICH CAN LEAD TO DOWNFALL LEBANESE REGIME AND
COMPROMISE, IF NOT DESTROY, LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
AND SOVEREIGNTY. THESE ARE: 11 INTERNAL SUBVERSION
(I.Eo MOUNTING PRESUURE ON GOL AGAINST ITS POLICY OF
FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION, EMANATING FROM SARG MACHINATIONS
IN LEBANON, AS-SAIQAH AND OTHER
FEDAYEEN GROUPU, DEMONSTRATIONS ECGINEERED BY PALESTINIAN
AND SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON, AND CONSPIRATORIAL ACTIVITIES
OF RADICAL LEFT ORGANIZATIONS) 8 21 COLLAPSE
OF SECURITY ON LEBA ON-ISRAEL BORDER (I.E. ISRAELI
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASSIFIEDORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03881 01 OF 02 ø918øøz
RETALIATION AND POSSIBLE OCCUPATION LEBANESE TERRITORY
AS RESULT ESCALATION CONFLICT BETWEEN LEBANESE ARMY AND
FEDAYEEN WITH CONSEQUENT LOSS OF ARMY'S BORDER CONTROL AND
INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITY). IN EITHER OF THESE TWO CONTINGENCIES
HELOU ENVISAGES POSSIBILITY RAPID SPLIT LEBANON ALONG MUSLIM-
CHRISTIAN LINES AND SPECTER OF BLOOD BATH IN ENSUING CIVIL WAR.
IN THIS RESPECT, I AM CONVINCED HE IS THINKING AS A
CHRISTIAN PRESIDENT WHO FEELS HE WILL BE COMPELLED TO
CALL FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO PROTECT A THREAT TO
CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, AS WELL AS COUNTERBALANCE THE FORCES:
AT PLAY AND RE-ESTABLISH SECURITY IN COUNTRY. HELOU EMPHASIZED
MUTUAL US-LEBANESE INTEREST IN
MAINTAINING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, AND REPEATED THIS THESIS
THAT FALL OF LEBANON WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE HASHEMITE REGIME
IN JORDAN AND WEAKEN OTHER MODERATE ARAB REGIMES, THEREBY
LEADING TO RADICALIZATION OF ARAB MIDDLE EAST. AS HE
PUT IT, "IF NOT TROSTKYITES, WE WILL SEE THE RISE OF
KERENSYS IN THE ARAB WORLD".
5. HELOU THEN ASKED THAT WASHINGTON GIVE URGENT
EXCES
CONSIDERATION TO CONTIGENCY PLANNING SO THAT BOTH USG
AND GOL COULD BETTER DETERMINE WHAT OPTIONS AVAILABLE
IN CRISIS SITUATION. SPECIFICALLY, HE RECOMMENDED
CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO HOW USG COULD HELP IN CONTEXT
OF GOL REQUEST SOR DISPATCH OF UNEF TO LEBANON.
HELOU SAID HE PREPARED TO APPEALI TO UN FOR EMERGENCY
FORCES IF SITUATION IN LEBANON DETERIORATED TO POINT
WHERE IN HIS OPINION SUCH TROOPS NEEDED TO STABILIZE
SITUATION IN LEBANON. TIMING WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT,
AS PREMATURE CALL FOR UNEF COULD AGGRAVATE INTERNAL
POLITICAL SITUATION IN LEBANON AND DO MORE HARM THAN
GOOD
PORTER
NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.
SECRET
1
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
TELEGRAM
EXEMS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SECRET 764
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03881 02 OF 02 091728Z
42
ACTION SS 30
2
INFO OCT 01/031 W
114432
R 091526Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBAUSY BEIRUT
TO ROEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7685
INFO AMEMBAUSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
SECR E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 3881
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO
SUBJ: REPRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT HELOU CONCERNING US SUPPORT
FOR LEBANON
EXCES
REF: STATE 070266
6 HELOU REALIZED INHERENT DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAININ UN
APPROVAL DISPATCH UNEF TO CRISIS AREA ® HE CITED THESE
AS8 11 EXERCISE OF VETO, ESPECIALLY BY SOVIETS, WHO
MAY NOT WISH TO PRESERVE MODERATE LEBANESE REGIME: 21
RELUCTANCE SOME STATES FINANCE PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS:
31 DIFFICULTY GAIN NECESSARY MAJORITY IN UNGA UNDER
UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION: AND 41 POSSIBLE OPPOSITION
OF ARAB STATES THEMSELVES TO DISPATCH UN TROOPS TO
LEBANON THEREFORE, THERE MIGHT WELL BE DELAY IN
OBTAINING A UN DECISION TO DISPATCH UNEF TO LEBANON.
BY TIME FORCE DID FINALLY ARRIVE, IT MIGHT BE TOO LATE:
CONSEQUENTLY, HELOU ASKED, ON BASIS CONTINGENCY PLANNING
AND IF UN ACTION POSSIBLE, WOULD WE CONSIDER POSSIBILITY
OF DISPATCHING AMERICAN TROOPS AS A FIRST CONTINGENT
TO UNEF TO LEBANON? HE EXPLAINED THIS WOULD BE OF
IMMEDIATE HELP IN RESTORING ORDER IN LEBANON AND PUTTING
FEDAYEEN, SYRIA AND EVEN ISRAEL ON NOTICE THAT US AND
UN SUPPORT LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon F Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03881 02 OF 02 0917282
EXCL EXCES EXEMS EXCES
INTEGRITY. IF THIS COURSE OF ACTION NOT POSSIBLE, HELOU
ASKED WHAT OTHER FORMS OF US ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE FEASIBLE.
7. AFTER TELLING HELOU I WELL UNDERSTOOD WHY HE, AS
CHIEF OF STATE, FELT IT NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHAT
OPTIONS HE HAD AVAILABLE CONCERNING EXTERNAL AND
SPECIFICALLY US ASSISTANCE, I STATED IT IMPERATIVE THAT
HE UNDERSTAND THE GROWING OPPOSITION OF THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC AND CONGRESS TO ANY UNIATERAL USMILITARY
INTERVENTION ABROAD. THIS WAS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR
WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON AND USG HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
IN FORMULATING ITS FOREIGN POLICY TODAY. SPEAKING
PERSONALLY AND UNDERLINING I WAS NOT SPEAKING UNDER
INSTRUCTIONS, I TOLD HELOU IT WAS MOST DIFFICULT FOR USG To
CONTEMPLATE POSSIBILITIES OF US ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON IN
ADVANCE AND UNDER HYPOTHETICAL CIRCUMSTANCES GOL MUST UNDERSTAND
THE REALITY OF THIS POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, I WAS CERTAIN USG,
IF IT DID CONTEMPLATE ASSISTING LEBANON UNDER CONTINGENCIES
HELOU OUTLINED WOULD BE ABLE DO so ONLY IN CONTEXT OF AN INTER-
NATIONAL EFFORT, E.G. UNDER UN AEGIS. IN SHORT, US
WOULD BE LOOKING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION AND
HELOU SHOULD NOT RELY ON US ALONE BUT SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER
OPTIONS FOR EXAMPLE WITH FRANCE AND UK .
8. IN TERMS OF CRITICAL DETERIORATION OF SITUATION IN
LEBANON IN WHICH THERE IS CIVIAL WAR, CONSIDERABLE
LOSS OF LIFE AND ONE IN WHICH US LIVES AND PROPERTY
WERE IN GRAVE DANGER, I VOLUNTEERED THAT USG WOULD
HAVE TO DETERMINE ITS POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, NO PRIOR COMMITMENT COULD BE
MADE BASED ON SUCH A CONTINGENCY.
9. COMMENT: I LEFT IT WITH HELOU THAT WE WOULD STAY IN CLOSE AND
CONSTANT TOUCH® AT EACH MEETING, I CONTINUE TRY INJECT REALISM INTO
HIS THINKING LIMITATIONS ONUS CAPABILITIES TO ASSIST, AND
ABOVE ALL TO INTERVENE MILITARILY. SINCE HE HAS NO CONFIDENCE
IN EXTERNAL HELP FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE THAN USG, IT UNDERSTANDABLE
THAT HE RETURNS TO THE SUBJECT OF WHAT HELP WE MIGH OFFER IF
SITUATION BECOMES DESPERATE I THINK OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION
IS TO REPEAT WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TELLING HIM, WITHOUT COMMITTING
OURSELVES TO ANY SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION EXCEPT TO DO EVERYTHING
WE CAN TO SECURE UN INTERVENTION ON ONE HAND, AND RESTRAIN ISRAEL
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03881 02 OF 02 091728Z
ON THE OTHER.
10. THE CHANCES OF SECURING A LEBANESE - TYPE COMPROMISE THAT WILL
FOR LOND ENDURE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY REMOTE IN MY OPINION.
HELOU IS CORRECT IN FOCUSING ON THE NEED FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING
TO BE READY FOR THE WORST. REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE ARE ABLE TO
TELL USG MUST ALSO NOW ACCEPT THE REALITY THAT SITUATION
COULD (AND PERHAPS RAPIDLY) DETERIORATE AS HE SUGGESTS.
PORTER
NOTE NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.
SECRET
1
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03868 091537Z
2
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ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
113590
R 091431Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7679
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN
S E C R E T BEIRUT 3868
EXDIS
SUBJ: POSSIBLE UN ROLE IN LEBANESE CRISIS
ON MAY 5 I DISCUSSED WITH MICHELMORE PRESIDENT
HELOU'S APPREHENSIONS RE POSSIBLE DETERIORATION
INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON AND HIS DESIRE
FIND POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY INCREASE STRENGTH AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON. IN VIEW
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PARTICIPATION IN APRIL 23 RIOTING
IN SUPPORT OF FEDAYEEN ACTION HELOU THINKS IT MIGHT
BE APPROPRIATE CONSIDE USING UNRWA OBSERVERS AS MEANS
AUGMENT SIZE UN PRESENCE SINCE UNRWA ALREADY INVOLVED
WITH REFUGEES AND AT SAME TIME IS UN AGENCY WITH "LEAST
POLITICAL OVERTONES"M HELOU HORES WAY CAN BE FOUND TO
PERSUADE UNSYG SEND CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO INVESTIGATE
CONDITIONS IN REFUGEE AMPS AS INITIAL STEP TO STABILIZE
SITUATION IN LEBANON AND LAQ GROUNDWORK FOR FUTURE
MORE SUBSTANTIAL, UN PRESENCE.
2° MICHELMORE OBSERVED THAT UNRWA HAS ALWAYS CONFINED
ITS ACTIVITIES TO PROVIDING WELFARE SERVICES TO REFUGEES,
LEAVING ALL POLICE AND SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS. HE NOTED THERE NOTHING IN UNRWA'S MANDATE
WHICH WOULD ALLOW HIM ASSUME ANY RESPONSIBILITIES THIS
DOMAIM AND THAT SYG RETAINS AUTHORITY IN HIS HANDS TO
CONTACT GOVENMENTS ON MATTERS CONCERNING PROTECTION OF
UN PERSONNEL. MICHELMORE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CONCENTRATIONS
SECRET
20
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECEASSFIEDORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03868 091537Z
OF PALESTINIAN REGUFEES MIGHT BECOME SERIOUS SECURITY
PROBLEM FOR GOL IN EVENT ESCALATION OF CLASHES BETWEEN
LEBANESE ARMY AND FEDAYEEN AND INDICATED HE WOULD COMMUNICATE
PROVATELY WITH SYG, POSSIBLY THROUGH BUNCHE, HIS CONCERN RE
POSSIBLE EFFECT UPON FUTURE UNRWA OPERATIONS.
3. I CONVEYED MICHELMORE'S VIEWS TO HELOU DURING MEETING
MAY 7 o CONCERNING EXISTING OPTIONS FOR UN ACTION IN NEAR
FUTURE (PARA 2E OF STATE 702661, HELOU BELIEVES AUGMENTATION
OF UN OBSERVER FORCE ON BORDERS NOT POLITICALLY FEASIBLE.
REQUEST FOR MORE UNMOS WOULD PUT GOL IN DIFFICULT POSITION
BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE OBLIGED TO REPORT ON GOL EFFORTS TO
INTERDICT FEDAQEEN ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAEL.
UNMOS COULD HARDLY AVOID REPORTING ON INCREASED NUMBER OF
LEBANESE ARMY/FEDAYEEN CLASHES. SUCH REPORTS WOULD BE
UOURCE OF EMBARRASSMENT TO GOL AND UNACEEPTABLE TO
LEBANESEPUBLIC OPINION.
4. HELOU BELIEVES, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY
FEASIBLE TO BRING IN CIVILIAN UN OBSERVERS TO INVESTIGATE
CONDITIONS IN UNRWA REFUGEE CAMPS HE SEES NIMBER OF
ADVANTAGES FROM SUCH COURSE OF ACTION: 1) OBSERVERS
COULD BELIE FEDAYEENCLAIMS THAT GOL Is OPPRESSING
--
PALESTINIAN REFUEES IN LEBANON 21 THEY WOULD BE ABLE
TO INVESTIGATE ARMS SITUATION IN CAMPS: 31 THEIR
PRESENCE MIGHT INHIBIT FEDAYFEN FROM USING REFUGEE CAMPS
AS VIRTUAL BASES FOR COMMANDO OPERATIONS: 4.) THEY COULD
HELP SUPPRESS PALESTINIAN PROPAGANDA EMANATING FROM CAMPS.
HELOU ENVISAGES ARRIVAL THESE OBSERVERS AS OPENING
STEP TO BRING IN LARGER AND MORE EFFECTIVE UN PRESENCE
IN LEBANON, PERHAPS, AT FIRST IN FORM OF "UN POLICE
TEAM" TO "PROTECT" THE CIVILIAN OBSERVERS. HE REGARDS
CIVILIANOBSERVERS AS ACCEPTABLE FIRST MOVE WHICH
MIGHT FACILITATE ULTIMATE CREATION OF A UNEF IN LEBANON
IF NEEDED
5. I TOLD HELDU THAT ANY INITIATIVE SEND CIVILIANI
OBSERVERS TO UNRWA CAMPS IN LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO COME
FROM SYG RATHER THAN MICHELMORE, ON BASIS MY TALKS WITH
LATTER. I ASKED IF HE HAD CONSIDERED SENDING SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE TO NEW YORK TO DISCUSS SITUATION WITH SYG.
HELOU BELIEVES TIME NOT RIGHT TO SEND SPECIAL REP SINCE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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OF STATE
SECUELVER
*
Department of State
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STATES AMERICA UNITED
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03868 091537Z
SUCH A STEP WOULD TEND TO SOUND THE ALARM OVER HIS: FEAR OF
EXTERNAL INTEVENTION IN LEBANON, THEREBY AGGRAVATING
INTERNAL SITUATION. FOR TIME BEING, HELOU WISHES KEEP
PROPOSAL WITMIN FRAMEWORK OF HIS CONFIDENTIAL CONTACTS
WITH ME TO AVOID PREMATURE ADVERSE REACTION FROM OTHER
ARAB STATES AND FROM SOME LERANESE.
6. I PROMISED HELOU I WOULD REPORT HIS INTEREST IN
CIVILIAN OBSERVERS AND HIS PRESENT NEGATIVE REACTIONI TO
PROPOSAL STRENGTHEN UN OBSERVER FORCE. I OBSERVED
THAT, WHILE IFI WAY COULD BE FOUND TO SEND OBSERVERS TO
LEBANON, IT WOULD NOT BE REALISTIC AT THIS TIME TO
CONSIDER THEM A FIRST STEP TOWARD CREATION OF A UNEF.
7 * COMMENT: FRANKLY WE ARE NOT SANGUINE OVER FEASIBILITY
HELOU'S IDEA OF SENDING CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO INVESTIGATE
CONDITIONS IN UNRWA REFUGEE CAMPS EEN IKTSYG COULD
FIND WAY ACCEDE TO SUCH A REQUEST FROM GOLD WE SERIOUSLY
QUESTION WHETHER OBSERVERS WOULD BE ABLE TO RENDERI THE
SERVICES ENVISAGED BY HELOU HOWEVER, AS HE IS UNDER-
STANDABLY LOOKING INTO EVERY CONCEIVABLE WAY TO SAFEGUARD
THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF LEBANON FROM THE CONSE-
QUENCES OF THE FEDAYEEN THREAT 1 BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT
SUMMARILY DISMISS CIVILIAN OBERSVER SCHEME AS UNWORKABLE IF,
IN FACT, THERE MIGHT BE SOME WAY WHEREBY SYG COULDI ACT
UNDER THE UN CHARTER. I TOLD HELOU I WOULD SEEK DEPARTMENT'S
VIEWS AS TO WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE FEASIBLE APPROACHI
HE COULD TAKE TO INDUCE SYG TO SEND OBSERVERS TO
UNRWA WITHOUT REQUIRING SC OK UNGA ACTION WHICH WOULD
ATTRACT UNACCEPTABLE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO MOVE.
PORTER
SECRET
20
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential bibraryo F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXEMS EXCES
SECRET 3621
27
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03824 081531Z
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ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
105527
R 081405Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7674
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
S E C R ENT BEIRUT 3824
EXDIS
1. MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) INFORMED MEI PRES HELOU PERSUADED EX-
PRIMIN OUEINI TO COMMUNICATE WITH KING FEISAL ON FEDAYEEN THREAT.
OUEINI FINALLY AGREED DO SO AFTER RECENT LEFTIST AND FEDAYEEN-
INSPIRED RIOTING IN LEBANON OUEINI WISHES REMAIN ANDNYMOUS BUT
MERE FACT THAT HE HAS COMMUNICATED HIS VIEWS TO HIS OLD FRIEND
FEISAL INDICATES INCREASED CONCERN OVER TREND FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES
ON PART MODERATE MUSLIM LEADERS LEBANON®
20 LEBANESE HAVE NOT YET CONTACTED LIBYANS AND KUWAITIS SPEC-
IFICALLY ON QUESTION FINANCIALI SUPPORT TO FEDAYEENI BUT HAVE
KEPT BOTH GOVERNMENTS FULLY INFORMED OF CONNECTIONI BETWEEN RECENT
LEFTIST. INSPIRED RIOTS AND FEDAYEEN ARE ALSO PLAYING UP SUBVER-
VISE ROLE OF SYRIANS IN MANIPULATING COMMANDOS TO ATTACK LEBANON.
KUWAITI AMB JAFAAR TOOK VERY STRONG ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSITION IN CON-
VERSATION WITH ME RECENTLY. I DQUBT HE REPORTING AS STRONGLY TO
KUWAIT BUT HE HAS MADE NO ATTEMPT HIDE HIS FEELINGS HERE.
3. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH PRES HELOU MAY 7, I REPORTED ON US
EFFORTS INFLUENCE OIL-RICH ARAB STATES REDUCE FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES
TO FEDAYEEN. I STRESSED THAT WE WERE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT RESULTS
BUT THOUGHT WE HAD AT LEAST INJECTED SOME REALITY INTO THEIR THINK-
ING WHICH MIGHT HAVE SUBSEQUENT EFFECT THEIR ACTIONS. URGED HELOU
CONTINUE MAKE COMPARABLE APPROACHES. HELOU SAID GOL WOULD DO
WHAT IT COULD ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE IN
KUWAIT, LIBYA AND SAUDI ARABIA. LEBANESE REPRESENTATIONS BRING
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED
MAKE
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03824 081531Z
GESTURES OF SUPPORT BUT THERE IS LITTLE FOLLOW.THROUGH FROM OIL-
RICH REGIMES. HE FELT US WITH ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPI THESE RE-
GIMES WAS IN BETTER POSITION EMPHASIZE REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTER
FEDAYEEN THREAT WHICH, IF IT SUCCEEDED IN LEBANON WOULD CONTINUE
ATTACK AGAINST ALL MODERATE ARAB REGIMES. HE URGEDI US MAINTAIN
ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE REDUCE FEDAYEEN FINANCIAL SUPPORT. HELOU
ADDED THAT THE CONSERVATIVE ARAB REGIMES DID REACT TO FEAR.
THEREFORE# ONCE THEY BECOME AWARE OF MOTIVES AND LONG-TERM THREAT
FEDAYEEN POSE TO THEIR OWN REGIMES, THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO ACT
ACCORDINGLY. HE FELT THIS WAS GOOD TIME (USING LEBANON AS OBJECT
LESSON) TO MAKE THEM LISTEN TO REASON. PORTER
EXCES
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon 29 Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
E11/40/0198
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Rehanon
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXE™S EXCESS
SECRET 362
02
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03824 081531Z
50
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
105527
R 081405Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7674
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
S E C R ENT BEIRUT 3824
EXDIS
1. MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) INFORMED ME PRES HELOU PERSUADED EX-
PRIMIN OUEINI TO COMMUNICATE WITH KING FEISAL ON FEDAYEEN THREAT.
OUEINI FINALLY AGREED DO SO AFTER RECENT LEFTIST ANDI FEDAYEEN-
INSPIRED RIOTING IN LEBANON OUEINI WISHES REMAIN ANONYMOUS BUT
MERE FACT THAT HE HAS COMMUNICATED HIS VIEWS TO HIS OLD FRIEND
FEISAL INDICATES INCREASED CONCERN OVER TREND FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES
ON PART MODERATE MUSLIM LEADERS LEBANON
2. LEBANESE HAVE NOT YET CONTACTED LIBYANS AND KUWAITIS SPEC-
IFICALLY ON QUESTION FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO FEDAYEEN BUT HAVE
KEPT BOTH GOVERNMENTS FULLY INFORMED OF CONNECTIONI BETWEEN RECENT
LEFTIST- INSPIRED RIOTS AND FEDAYEEN ARE ALSO PLAYING UP SUBVER-
VISE ROLE OF SYRIANS IN MANIPULATING COMMANDOS TO ATTACK LEBANON.
KUWAITI AMB JAFAAR TOOK VERY STRONG ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSITION IN CON-
VERSATION WITH ME RECENTLY. I DOUBT HE REPORTING AS STRONGLY TO
KUWAIT BUT HE HAS MADE NO ATTEMPT HIDE HIS FEELINGS HERE.
3. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH PRES HELOU MAY 7, I REPORTED ON US
EFFORTS INFLUENCE OIL-RICH ARAB STATES REDUCE FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES
TO FEDAYEEN. I STRESSED THAT WE WERE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT RESULTS
BUT THOUGHT WE HAD AT LEAST INJECTED SOME REALITY INTO THEIR THINK-
ING WHICH MIGHT HAVE SUBSEQUENT EFFECT THEIR ACTIONS. URGED HELOU
CONTINUE MAKE COMPARABLE APPROACHES. HELOU SAID GOL WOULD DO
WHAT IT COULD ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE IN
KUWAIT, LIBYA AND SAUDI ARABIA. LEBANESE REPRESENTATIONS BRING
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION 29 OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03824 081531Z
GESTURES OF SUPPORT BUT THERE IS LITTLE FOLLOW.THROUGH FROM OIL-
RICH REGIMES. HE FELT US WITH ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPI THESE RE-
GIMES WAS IN BETTER POSITION EMPHASIZE REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTER
FEDAYEEN THREAT WHICH, IF IT SUCCEEDED IN LEBANON, WOULD CONTINUE
ATTACK AGAINST ALL MODERATE ARAB REGIMES. HE URGED US MAINTAIN
ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE REDUCE FEDAYEEN FINANCIAL SUPPORT. HELOU
ADDED THAT THE CONSERVATIVE ARAB REGIMES DID REACT TO FEAR.
THEREFORE# ONCE THEY BECOME AWARE OF MOTIVES AND LONG-TERM THREAT
FEDAYEEN POSE TO THEIR OWN REGIMES, THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO ACT
ACCORDINGLY. HE FELT THIS WAS GOOD TIME (USING LEBANON AS OBJECT
LESSON) TO MAKE THEM LISTEN TO REASON. PORTER
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 29 Presidential Library
H/1/E0/0290
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ATIORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
348
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03659 0216472
26
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ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,CCO 00,SSO NSCE 00/031 W
071387
0 R 0=1500Z MAY 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7624
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN
S E C R E T BEIRUT 3659
EXDIS
NOFORN
1) MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) JUST REPORTED TO ME (MAY 21 THAT
PRESIDENT HELOU HAD YESTERDAY ISSUED ORDERS TO LEBANESE ARMY
(THROUGH CIC GEN BOUSTANY) TO USE ANY MEASURES INCLUDING SHOOTING
TO CONTAIN FEDAYEEN WITHIN AREAS THEY NOW OCCUPY IN SOUTHEAST
LEBANON, AND TO ASSURE NO ISRAELI BORDER CROSSINGS* HELOU
OFFERED PROVIDE ORDERS IN WRITING BUT BOUSTANY ACCEPTED VERBALI
ORDERS AND SAID WOULD CARRY THEM OUT.
21 THIS DECISION HAS NOT BEEN COMMUNICATED TO PRIMIN KARAMCE
OR OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS IN LEBANON. HELOO NONETHELESS FELT
HE COULD NO LONGER WAIT TO TRY TO ACHIEVE PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE)
NATIONAL CONSENSUS TO CONFRONT REDAYEEN, NOR DID HE WISH EMBARRASS
KARAME. AS KHOURY SAYS, REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF BOUSTANY'S
PATRIOTISM WILL OUTWEIGH HIS DESIRES CURRY FAVOR WITH MUSLIMS
TO FURTHER HIS PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS, BUT BOUSTANY ASSURED HELOU
THAT HE WOULD PASS THE ORDERS TO APPROPRIATE SOUTHERN LEBANON
MILITARY COMMANDERS.
31 KHOURY REFERRED TO MAY 1 ISRAELI HELICOPTER- TRANSPORTED
MILITARY BUILD-UP IN OCCUPIED SYRIA OPPOSITE LEBANESE
SECRET
26
NOT TO BE REPRODUCERWITHOE Richard THE Nixon AUTHORIZATION Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
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UNITED
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03659 021647Z
VILLAGE OF CHEBAA WHICH CONTAINS LARGE CONCENTRATION FEDAYEEN.
HE WONDERED WHETHER ISRAELI TROOP CONCENTRATIONS WERE RESPONSE
TO CHEHAB'S REQUEST TO ME FOR INCREASED ISRAELI DEFENSE MEASURES:
AGAINST FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS (PARA 8, BEIRUT 36091. I GAVE HIM
SUBSTANCE STATE 68528 WHICH INDICATED OUR APPROACHI TO ISRAELIS
WOULD BE MADE TODAY (MAY 21, AND SAID WE HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF
OR EXPLANATION FOR NEW ISRAELI TROOP CONCENTRATIONS. HE HOPED
ISRAELIS WERE NOT PLANNING MASSIVE RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST
FEDAYEEN IN CHEBAA. THIS WOULD PUT LEBANESE MILITARY
IN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION. THEY WOULD HAVE EITHER TO (A) COOPERATE
WITH FEDAYEEN AND RESIST ISRAELI ATTACK OR (B) STAND ASIDE
WHILE ISRAELIS TOOK CARE OF FEDAYEEN, EARNING IN PROCESS DERISION
OF ALL LEBANON, OR (C) FEDAYEEN WOULD WITHDRAW DEEPER INTO
LEBANESE HINTERLAND, REPEATING PROCESS WHICH OCCURRED IN JORDAN
AFTER KARAME RAID. NONE OF THESE CONTINGENCIES WOULD SERVE
ISRAELI INTERESTS AND ALL WOULD EFFECTIVELY DESTROY LEBANON'S
ABILITY COPE WITH FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN FUTURE. KHOURY URGED THAT
WE IMPRESS UPON GOI NECESSITY FOR HOLDING OFF ON A CHEBAA RAID
PARTICULARLY SINCE THERE HAD BEEN NO PROVOCATIONS ACROSS BORDER.
IF ON OTHER HAND ISRAELIS WERE INTENDING TO INTERDICT FEDAYEEN
BEFORE THEY INFILTRATE INTO LEBANON, GOL COULD ONLY WELCOME
PROSPECT. WOULD APPRECIATE IF DAVIS COULD RAISE THIS SPECIFIC
POINT WITH BITAN.
4) KHOURY CONJECTURED POLITICAL IMPASSE IN LEBANON WILL LAST
AT LEAST ANOTHER TEN DAYS. HELOU, DURING THIS RERIOD, WILL TRY
TO ACHIEVE EITHER CONTROL OF OR EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT WITH FEDAYEEN
AND WILL DO HIS BEST REDUCE ACTIVITY OF LEFTIST GROUPS WITHIN
COUNTRY, IN ORDER EASE KARAME'S DECISION FORM GOVT. IF DESPITE
HIS EFFORTS, HELOU UNABLE ENTICE KARAME INTO NEW GOVT, HE MAY
THEN TRY FORM GOVT WITH SAEB SALAAM. SALAAM HAS INDICATED
WILLINGNESS SERVE AS PRIMIN BUT HELOU DOUBTS WHETHER
SALAAM CAN RESIST CAVING IN TO PRO-FEDAYEEN MIICITMI OPINION.
(COMMENT: EMBASSY SHARES HELOU'S DOUBT). IF HELOU DECIDES
SALAAM UNSATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE FOR KARAME, HE WILLITHEN FORM
MILITARY GOVT POSSIBLY WITH A FIGUREHEAD MUSLIM PRIMIN (IF ONE
CAN BE FOUND), BUT WITH MILITARY OCCUPYING MANY KEY MINISTERIAL
PORTFOLIOS. HE BELIEVES IF ALL ELSE FAILS, THIS ONLY EFFECTIVE
WAY AVOID TURNING LEBANON OVER TO FEDAYEEN. IN ANY CASE, HELOU
DETERMINED STAY ON AS PRESIDENT.
5) COMMENT: SUGGEST WE NOT RPT NOT YET COMMUNICATE SUBSTANCE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATIO OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
иот 10 BE БЕЪКОРПСЕР миноли THE OL THE EXECUTIVE
UNITED DEPARTMENT * STATES OF AMERICA STATE #
and
Department of State
TELEGRAM
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SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03659 021647Z
PARA 1 ABOVE TO GOI.
PORTER
SECRET
26
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
929
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03678 01 OF 02 031555Z
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ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
077541
R 031433Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7636
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
SECR ETT SECTION I OF 2 BEIRUT 3678
EXDIS
11 PRESIDENT HELOU APPEARS TO HAVE MADE CRUNCH DECISION
CONFRONT FEDAYEEN. CONSEQUENCES OF DECISION ARE CLEAR TO
HIM AND HE REALIZES SITUATION IN LEBANON COULD GET OUT OF
CONTROL. QUESTION HELOU POSED TO ME IN LONG INTENSE SESSION
LAST NIGHT MAY 21 WAS WHAT ASSISTANCE HE COULD EXPECT
FROM USG IS SITUATION DETERIORATES SHARPLY.
EXCES EXEMS
21) SEPTEL GIVES HELOU'S ANALYSIS CURRENT SITUATION AND HIS
EFFORTS FIND SOLUTION SHORT OF CAPITULATION TO FEDAYEEN HIS
DECISION ORDER ARMY TO SHOOT IF NECESSARY AMOUNTS TO WATERSHED
DECISION AND RUNS RISK OF DIVIDING COUNTRY. HELOU APPEARS TO
HAVE REUECTED ANY COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD EFFECTIVELY CEDE
LEBANON° SOVEREIGNTY OR TERRITORY TO FEDAYEEN. HE IS CALM
SELF-ASSURED AND NOT INDULGING IN SELF-DOUBT. I BELIEVE HIS
DECISION IS FIRM: THAT (AS HE HIMSELF PUT IT) IT WAS NOT MADE
IN PANIC. HE HAS DECIDED HE NOW HAS NO CHOICE EXCEPT TO MEET
PRESENT CHALLENGE TO LEBANON'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND
INTEGRITY. HE KNOWS EFFECTS DECISION MAY HAVE IN BREAKING
COUNTRY APART ON CONFESSIONAL LINES, OR IN AGGRAVTING FEDAYEEN
AND LEFTIST PRESSURES, BUT HE ALSO AWARE THAT HE CANNOT DELAY
MUCH LONGER.
3) IN RAISING QUESTION OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON, HE
EMPHASIZED HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR ACTION NOW BEYOND DIPLOMATIC
ACTIONS USG ALREADY TAKING. HE EMPHASIZED HE WOULD NEVER
RESORT TO REQUESTING EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE UNTIL HE HAD EXHAUSTED
AND EXPLOITED ALL COURSE OF ACTION OPEN TO HIM AT DOMESTIC AND
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE ATRORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon F residential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
EXEM
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03678 01 OF 02 031555Z
REGIONAL LEVELS. HOPEFULLY RECOURSE TO EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE
CAN BE AVOIDED BUT POTENTIAL DANGERS IN SITUATION WERE
SUCH THAT HE HAD TO HAVE BEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT
USG MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO IF HE HAD TO RESORT TO THE "ULTIMATE
RECOURSE" OF ASKING US.
41 BOTH US AND LEBANON HAD LEARNED MUCH SINCE US INTERVENTION
IN 1958, SAID HELOU. HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR UNREALISTIC HELP OR
HELP WHICH IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR USG TO GRANT. HE
HOPED US WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT HE NOT ENGAGING IN BLACKMAIL,
BUT IT WOULD ENABLE HIM ACT MORE DECISIVELY IN HANDLING
INTERNAL SITUATION IF HE FELT HIS HAND WAS STRENGTHENED BY
ASSURANCES US SUPPORT "AS A LAST RESORT". OUR REASSURANCES
WOULD EMBOLDEN HIM TO RESIST TREMENDOUS PRESSURES UPON HIM
TO "STRIKE A BARGAIN" WITH FEDAYEEN - A STEP WHICH HE DOES
NOT WISH TO TAKE, KNOWING IT WOULD BE BEGINNING OF LOSS OF
LEBANONS SOVEREIGN CONTROL OVER ITS OWN POLICIES AND DESTINY.
51 HELOU REUECTED PROSPECT EFFECTIVE EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE FROM
OTHER NON=AREA POWERS. FRENCH COULD AND WOULD DO NOTHING.
UK CAN NO LONGER PLAY EFFECTIVE ROLE AND ITS INFLUENCE LIMITED
IN ME. AS FOR SOVIET UNION, HELOU WAS DEEPLY DISTRUSTFUL
OF SOV INTENTIONS TOWARD LEBANON DESPITE LIP SERVICE
GIVEN BY SOV AMBASSADOR DURING PRESENT CRISIS. SOVS COULD NOT
RECONCILE THEIR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES IN ARAB WORLD
WITH A POSITION OF SUPPORT OF MODERATE FREE-ENTERPRISE LEBANON
AGAINST RADICAL SYRIA SOVS HAVE THE POWER AND THE INFLUENCE
IN SYRIA TO REDUCE SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANONS AFFAIRS
BUT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THEY WILL EXERCISE IT.
61 HELOU FELT THERE WAS STRONG COMMON IDENTITY BETWEEN HIS
DUTY TO SAFEGUARD LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY IN FACE PRESENT THREAT
AND US INTERESTS IN ME. IF HE SHOULD FAIL, RESULT WOULD BE
"JORDANIZATION" OF LEBANON WITH FEDAYEEN (AND SYRIA) ULTIMATELY
CONTROLLING LEBANON'S FATE. IF FEDAYEEN WIN THE STRUGGLE,
LEBANESE REGIME COULD NOT ENDURE. HUSSEIN, IN HELOU'S OPINION,
COULD NOT LONG OUTLAST COLLAPSE LEBANESE REGIME. REPERCUSSIONS
ON OTHER MODERATE ARAB STATES SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT WOULD
BE LESS DRAMATIC BUT PERHAPS AS SERIOUS IN LONG RUN. KUWAIT
WOULD BE PUT IN A BLACKMAIL SITUATION WHERE IT WOULD HAVE TO
BECOME PRIMARY FINANCIAL ANGEL OF FEDAYEEN. ALSO ANY CHANCE
FOR RESTORATION MORE MODERATION IN IRAQ WOULD BE TOTALLY DESTROYED.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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#
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03678 01 OF 02 031555Z
7) IN HELOU'S VIEW, EFFECTS OF "JORDANIZATION" OF LEBANON
WOULD LEAD TO "VIETNAMIZATION" OF ARAB WORLD WITH THE INEVITABLY
RADICALLY-ORIENTED PALESTINIAN COMMANDO GROUPS BECOMING
INSTRUMENTS AND SPEARHEADS OF RADICAL REGIMES THROUGHOUT AREA.
A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF ME PROBLEM UNDER THESE CONDITIONS
SIMPLY COULD NOT HAPPEN IT WAS IN THIS PERSPECTIVE OF
POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT HELOU EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE EXPLORE
POSSIBILITIES US ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON IN INTEREST BOTH
COUNTRIES.
81 I RESPONDED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO
DISCUSS REALISTIC POSSIBILITIES OF US ASSISTANCE IN HYPOTHETICAL
CIRCUMSTANCES. ON MANY OPTIONS AVAILABLE, HELOU SURELY WOULD
AGREE THAT SOME WERE IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT WORK.
BOTH PRESIDENT HELOU AND USG WOULD HAVE TO STUDY WHAT WAS
FEASIBLE AND AGREE ON WHAT WAS NOT. SIXTH FLEET OBVIOUSLY
COULD MAKE ITS PRESENCE FELT, BUT WOULD THIS ACCOMPLISH OUR
OBJECTIVES? USG IN ADDITION WOULD HAVE TO ASSESS REGIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF ANY ACTION WE MIGHT TAKE O
WE WERE FOR INSTANCE ENGAGED IN SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET
UNION ON PEACEFUL SOLUTION ME CRISIS AND IMPLICATIONS OUT
DIVERSE RELATIONS WITH SOVS AS WELL AS OTHER POWERS WOULD HAVE
TO BE CONSIDERED
PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
ORLINO
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET 962
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03687 02 OF 02 031632Z
23
46
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
077664
P R 0314332 MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7637
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
$ E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 3687
EXDIS
91 I REMINDED HELOU THAT HE SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBTS OF USG
STRONG SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY.
IN ENUMERATED OUR RECENT DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS DESIGNED
TO ASSIST LEBANON, EMPHASIZING OUR APPROACHES TO BOTH SOVIET
UNION AND ISRAEL. I POINTED OUT EFFORTS THIS EMBASSY TO UNITE
CHRISTIAN LEADERS OF LEBANON BEHIND HELOU AT THIS CRITICAL TIME
AND DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL OUR RECENT EXPLORATIONS
OF POSSIBLE UN ACTION IN LEBANON. THERE NO QUESTION RE
IMPORTANCE WHICH USG PLACED ON PRESERVATION OF LEBANON WITHING
ITS PRESENT BORDERS AND IN ITS PRESENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
FORM, AND HE HAD MY SOLEMN ASSURANCES ON THIS POINT. QUESTION
WAS NOT ONE OF OUR DESIRE TO HELP, BUT HOW WE COULD.
10 HELOU EXPRESSED HIS DEEP APPRECIATION FOR USG EFFORTS
IN RECENT DAYS. HE WAS WELL AWARE, HE SAID, THAT ONLY USG
HAD BEEN WORKING IN LEBANON'S INTERESTS AND IT HAD BEEN A
SOURCE OF DEEP SATISFACTION AND REASSURANCE TO HIM. WE
AGREED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH AND OUR NEXT MEETING WILL BE
1700 LOCAL MAY 60 HELOU STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT SHARING
SUBSTANCE OUR TALK (AS IT RELATED TO POSSIBLE US ASSISTANCE)
WITH EVEN MOST INTIMATE COLLEAGUES.
111 IN COURSE CONVERSATION HELOU EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR CONCEPT
FO SYG SENDING UN OBSERVERS WHO MIGHT PLAY HELPFUL ROLE IN
PREVENTING ESCALATION PALESTINIAN DEMONSTRATIONS AND INCIDENTS'
IN THE COUNTRY. HE ALSO FAVORABLE TO GRADUAL INCREASE IN
STRENGTH UNMO'S WHICH MIGHT HELP STABLIZE BORDER AND
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03687 02 OF 02 031632Z
BOLSTER LEBANESE ARMY'S EFFORTS CONTROL FEDAYEEN. HE
WISHED, HOWEVER, REFLECT FURTHER AND DID NOT REQUEST USG
REACTION AT THIS TIME. 1 HAD ALREADY INFORMED HIM THROUGH
INTERMEDIARY OF MAY PROBLEMS RAISED IN CONSIDERING SENDING
POSSIBLE UNEF TO LEBANON.
121 COMMENT: HELOU WAS NOT DRAMATIZING SITUATION. HIS
PRESENTATION WAS REASONED AND CALM AND IN MY OPINION LOGICAL.
13) I FIND IT DIFFICULT ASSESS WHAT HE REALLY WANTS FROM USG
ABOVE ALL, HE NEEDED PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST) WHICH 1 TRIED PROVIDE
HE FEELS ALMOST TOTALLY ISOLATED AND IS UNABLE SHARE WITH
ANY POLITICAL LEADERS HIS ANXIETIES OR THE HEAVY BURDEN
OF HIS DECISION MEET FEDAYEEN THREAT.
14) HIS REQUEST FOR ASSURANCE OF US ASSISTANCE DOES NOT, AT
LEAST AT PRESENT REFER TO URGENT ECONOMIC OR MILITARY AID.
IT RELATES ONLY TO GETTING OUR IDEAS AS TO WHAT MIGHT FEASIBLY
BE DONE IF LEBANON IS THREATENED WITH AN INTERNAL CHAOS WHICH
HIS SECURITY FORCES CAN NO LONGER CONTROL. IN EFFECT, HE IS
SAYING 5 "IF I LOSE MY GAMBLE, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO SAVE
LEBANON, ONLY USG CAN BE COUNTED ON TO TRY TO HELP. LET'S
BE SURE IN ADVANCE THAT WE KNOW WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS AND
LIMITS. ON BAIS OUT JOINT STUDY OF ALTERNATIVES, I MAY HAVE
TO REASSESS MY TACTICS, THOUGH I DO NOT INTEND CHANGE MY MIND
ABOUT NOT CAVING IN TO FEDAYEEN."
15) IN FACT, HELOU KNOWS USG MILITARY INTERVENTION NOT THE
ANSWER UNLESS THERE NO OTHER ANSWER TO STOPPING A BLOOD BATH
PARTICULARLY ONE IN WHICH LEBANESE CHRISTIANS WOULD BE GETTING
WORST OF IT's HE MUST ABOVE ALL BE CONTEMPLATING US
SUPPORT FOR ORGANIZING AN ADEQUATE UN FORCE WHICH COULD
RESTORE STABILITY AND KEEP FEDAYEEN AWAY FROM ISRAEL BORDER.
IF SUCH A FORCE, WHICH MIGHT HAVE TO BE DISPATCHED QUICKLY,
NEEDED TO INCLUDE READILY AVAILABLE US FORCES, HE WOULD HOPE
USG WOULD BE PREPARED PROVIDE THEM - PERHAPS WITH SIMILAR
PARTICIPATION BY OTHER WESTERN POWERS, ABOVE ALL FRENCH.
161 OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT ODDS SLIGHTLY IN HELOU'S FAVOR
THAT HE WILL WIN THIS ROUND AND PRESERVE INTEGRITY OF THE
COUNTRY. BUT HE CANNOT WIN A DRAMATIC VICTORY THE FEDAYEEN
PRESSURES WILL REMAIN AND IT HARD TO CONCEIVE THAT EIGHER THE
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASSIFIEORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
тои
DIPARTMENT
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DEPARTMENT
STATE
*
Department of State
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TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03687 02 OF 02 031632Z
INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL RADICAL THREATS WILL BE MORE THAN
TEMPORARILY SUPPRESSED. THE KEY AT MOMENT IS THE ARMY. IF
IT FALTERS, WE CAN LOOK FORWARD TO AT BEST AN UNEASY STALEMATE
WHICH CAN ONLY WORK AGAINST HELOU. WE INCLINED BELIEVE ARMY
WILL SUPPORT HIM, AND THAT IT CAN AS WELL CONTINUE FOR TIME
BEING TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY. BUT ANY LONG-TERM
PREDICTIONS ARE HAZARDOUS. THE TREND IN THE AREA IS AGAINST
PEACE, AND PEACE-LOVING LEBANOFRIS: DANGEROUSLY NEAR TO
SUCCUMBING TO THE EXTERNAL PRESSURES WHICH IT HAS SUCCESSFULLY
AVOIDED FOR 20 YEARS.
17) HELOU'S DECISION RE FEDAYEEN IS NONETHELESS INFINITELY
BETTER THAN POLICY OF COMPROMISE AND DRIFT, WHICH WOULD BE
FATAL. HE IS SHOWING GREAT COURAGE AND AN UNSUSPECTED
STRENGTH OF SPIRIT. THIS WILL IN ITSELF BE A MAJOR ASSET
IN RALLYING SUPPORT FOR HIM IN A COUNTRY WHICH IS NOT
ACCUSTOMED TO DECISIVE JUDGEMENTS FROM ITS POLITICAL LEADERS.
18) WHEN I SEE HELOU AGAIN ON MAY 6, I ASSUME HE MAY HAVE
IN MEANTIME CLARIFIED HIS THINKING. MEANWHILE, I WOULD
APPRECIATE RECEIVING BEFORE THAT MEETING DEPT'S PRELIMINARY
REACTION THIS MESSAGE.
PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE *
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
'69 MAY / PM 3:19 19
SECRET 396
02
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03601 011445Z
47
ACTION SS830
INFO OCT 01/031 W
063890
R 0112394 MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7613
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
S El RI E T BEIRUT 3601
EXDIS:
1 ᵃ WHEN I SAW EX-PRESIDENT CAMILLE CHAMOUN APRIL 29,
HE SUGGESTED THAT A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY ISRAELI OFFICIAL
WARNING LEBANESE THAT ANY COMMANDO ACTIVITY ACROSS
LEBANESE BORDER INTO ISRAEL WOULD BE MET BY PROMPT
ISRAELI REACTION MIGHT HAVE EFFECT OF BRINGING TO THEIR
SENSES THOSE MUSLIM EXTREMISTS WHO ADVOCATE COMPLETE
FREEDOM FOR FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON. FURTHERMORE,
SUCH STATEMENT MIGHT PROVE HELPFUL IN GAINING GREATER
SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE ARMY ACTIVITIES TO CONTROL
FEDAYEEN.
2% WITHOUT REFERENCE TO CHAMOUN, I ASKED EX-PRESIDENT
FAUD CHEHAB APRIL 30 WHETHER HE THOUGHT SUCH ISRAELI
STATEMENT WOULD BE USEFUL. AFTER REFLECTION, CHEHAB
TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNINGINDICATING HE THOUGHT SUCH
STATEMENT WOULD BE USEFUL. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS
HIS PERSONAL VIEW, IMPLICATION BEING THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED
IT WITH ON ONE.
3. COMMENT: DESPITE VIEWS OF CHAMOUN AND CHEHAB I
DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD ASK ISRAELIS TO MAKE SUCH
STATEMENT AT THIS TIME. THEY HAVE MADE SIMILAR STATE-
MENTS OFTEN ENOUGH AND WILL PRESUMABLY DO SO AGAIN. ALSO I
BELIEVE LEBANESE PUBLIC WELL AWARE OF DANGERS FEDAYEEN POSE
FOR LEBANON VIS-A-VIS
ISRAEL. FURTHERMORE, I WOULD PRESUME THAT ISRAELIS
WOULD CONSIDER OUT REQUEST PECULIAR IN VIEW OUR RECENT
REQUESTS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND RESTRAINT DURING PRESENT
LETECKVW
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION 32 OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOPARTMENT
OF
KELBODNCED МІДНОМ THE Ot THE EXECUTIVE
DEP
MARKS
AMERICA STATE *
Department BECKEL of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
06 WHO BESIKVINI опитие BBE
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STATES OF ИВТОЕВ one BEONERS БЕСПГЕУВ In AIEM one ВЕСЕИЦ
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03601 011445Z нуле WYDE BIWITYK STYLE
DOMOL 10 WYKE anch
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L11/20/0290
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE Reproduced the Richard Nixon residential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXEC
SECRET 791
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03545 291655Z
41
2
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
050131
RI 291511Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7601
SSEECOR EWT BEIRUT 3545
EXDIS
EXEMS EXCES
1. AS LEBANESE POLITICAL CRISIS DEEPENS, LARGELY AS RESULT
INABILITY CHRISTIAN AND MOSLEM LEADERS TO ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY
SATISFACTORY POLICY VIS-A-VIS CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES
IN LEBANON AND "INVASION" SYRIAN BAATH-SPONSORED ES SAIQA
FEDAYEEN, SPECTRE OF CONFESSIONAL CIVIL WAR LOOMS MORE AND
MORE IN THINKING OF BOTH CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS. THIS IN-
EVITABLY BRINGS CHRISTIAN LEADERS, PRIMARILY PHALANGISTS,
CHAMOUNISTS AND EDDEISTS TO POINT OF TAKING STOCK THEIR
WEAPONRY IN RELATION TO THAT WHICH THEY BELIEVE IS AVAILABLE
TO THE MOSLEMS. THIS IS, AS DEPT AWARE, AN EXERCISE WHICH
CHRISTIAN LEADERS GO THROUGH EACH TIME LEBANON IS PLUNGED
INTO POLITICAL CIRISI THREATENING CONFESSIONAL STRIFE.
2% SINCE JUNE 1967 WAR, BOTH CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS HAVE
PAID MUCH MORE ATTENTION TO MATTER OF WEAPONRY AVAILABLE
TO THEM, AND BOTH CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS HAVE MADE CONCERTED
BUT QUIET EFFORTS TO BUILD UP MAXIMUM RESERVE SUPPLY ARMS
AND AMMUNITION IN EVENT TROUBLE. OUR INFORMATION INDICATES
THAT CHRISTIANS, PRIMARILY PHALANGISTS AND CHAMOUNISTS, HAVE
STEADILY PURCHASED SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION, UTILIZING
VARIOUS SOURCES INCLUDING LEBANESE ARMY, SYRIA AND EVEN FEDA-
YEEN STOCKS, WHICH THEY ABLE TO PURCHASE IN SMALL QUANTITIES
AT HIGH PRICES. AT SAME TIME, THERE EQUALLY FIRM EVIDENCE
THAT MOSLEM GROUPS (PARTICULARLY SUNNI) HAVE ALSO MANAGED
BUILD UP SUBSTANTIAL ARSENAL OF WEAPONS. ADDITIONALLY, PALES.
TINIAN REFUGEES IN UNRWA CAMPS HAVE THEMSELVES ACCUMULATED
SUPPLY OF ARMS. AND THE SOME 1,500 FEDAYEEN NOW OCCUPYING
PARTS OF SOUTH LEBANON ARE VERY WELL EQUIPPED WITH ARMS®
SECRET
32
NOT TO BE at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03545 291655Z
3. THIS IMPRESSIVE ARSENAL OF WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO MOSLEMS
IS SOURCE OF REAL CONCERN TO SUCH CHRISTIAN LEADERS AS
GEMAYEL, CHAMOUN AND EDDE. FEELING RESPONSIBLE TO THEIR
FOLLOWERS, THEY FEEL OBLIGED TO INSURE THAT ALL POSSIBLE
SOURCES OF SUPPLY OF ARMS AVAILABLE TO CHRISTIANS ARE TAPPED.
THIS OF COURSE INCLUDES UNITED STATES.
4. YESTERDAY PHALANGIST LEADER PIERRE GEMAYEL ASKED IF US
COULDI ARRANGE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO PHALANGISTS IF SITUATION DE-
TERIORATED TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT CONFESSIONAL FIGHTING RE-
SULTED. THIS IN EFFECT A REPEAT OF A PHALANGIST REQUEST FOR
ARMS MADE JAN 1969. I AM SEEING CAMILLE CHAMOUN THIS AFTER-
NOON (29TH) AND I EXPECT HE WILL MAKE SIMILAR REQUEST.
5% OBVIOUSLY, THE CAMPAIGN ON PART OF CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO
OBTAIN ARMS FROM US IF POSSIBLE HAS BEGUN. IF SITUATION
SHOULD CONTINUE DETERIORATE, THESE CALLS FOR HELP WILL UN-
DOUBTEDLY BECOME LOUDER AND MORE INSISTENT. I WILL, OF COURSE,
PARRY THESE REQUESTS, COUNSELING THESE CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO
BEND THEIR EFFORTS TOWARD RESOLVING POLITICAL AND FEDAYEEN
DIFFICULTIES IN ORDER TO AVOID THE CONFESSIONAL STRIFE THEY
FEAR, AND TO GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO PRES HELOU IN HIS EF-
FORTS TO RESOLVE POLITICAL IMPASSE WITHOUT CAVING IN TO FEDA-
YEEN®
PORTER
SECRET
811/40/0299
NOT TO BE REPRODUC , WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATIO OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 026
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03465 261443Z
EXCES EXCLUS EXCES
2
45
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
034617
R 261408Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7576
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN
S E C R E T BEIRUT 3465
EXDIS
REF: PARIS 6026
1. APPRECIATE CHARGE'S INITIATIVE IN DISCUSSING LEBANESE SITUATION
WITH QUAI.
2. IT CLEAR THAT GOF'S PREOCCUPATION WITH INTERNALI MATTERS HAS
ALSO LEFT FRENCH EMBASSY HERE WITHOUT GUIDANCE. DIFFICULTY IS
AGGRAVATED BY NEWNESS ON LEBANESE SCENE OF AMBASSADOR DUFOURNIER
WHO SEEMS PUZZLED BY EVENTS AND HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH NONE OF
THE LEBANESE LEADERS WHOM THE FRENCH MIGHT BE INFLUENCING. HE
HAS NOT SEEN HELOU, FOR INSTANCE.
3. I WILL SEE DUFOURNIER EARLY NEXT WEEK AND URGE HIM TO BECOME
MORE ACTIVE. WE HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH HIS DEM AND FIND FRENCH
EMBASSY GENERALLY IN ACCORD WITH OUR ASSESSMENT OFI CAUSES AND EF-
FECTS EVENTS IN LEBANON.
4. I HAVE TWICE SUGGESTED PRESIDENT HELOU TALK TO FRENCH AM-
BASSADOR WITH PURPOSE GETTING FRENCH MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED
FEDAYEEN PROBLEM, BUT HE HAS NOT DONE so EXPRESSING VIEW THAT
FRENCH CAN HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE ON EVENTS. I THING HIS VIEWS HAVE
BEEN PARTIALLY INFLUENCED BY THE NEWNESS OF DUFOURNIER, HIS UNDER-
STANDING OF QUAI'S PREOCCUPATION WITH THE REFERENDUM, AND HIS DIS=
APPOINTMENT AT WIDE GAP BETWEEN FRENCH KIND WORDS FOR LEBANON,
AS CONTRASTED TO MODICUM OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, SINCE AIRPORT
RAID. PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
7
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Saundus
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
HCE597
HAR
AGE ø1 BEIRUT 03385 231715Z
11
CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
CTION NEA 15
NFO CIAE ØØ,DODE 00,NSAE 00, NSCE øø,sso 00, USIE øø,cco øø,ses 04,
1969 APR 23 17 31
AID 28,FB0 01,JPM 04,H 02, INR 07,L 03, NIC øl, NSC 10,0 02,0C ø6,
OPR 02,P 04, PER 02,RSC 01,SCA ø1,SP ø2,SS 20, SY 03,RSR 01,/119 W
013555
R 231645Z APR 69
M AMEMXASSY BEIRUT
0 SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7550
Troopo pen
NFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
IMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 3385
fin I Could
JBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS SPREAD TO BEIRUT
IF: BEIRUT 3353
lemorrow.
FOLLOWING MORNING INCIDENT IN SIDON, VIOLENCE ERUPTED IN
IRUT, AT APPROXIMATELY 1600 LOCAL TIME, BETWEEN LEBANESE SE-
RITY FORCES AND LEFTIST PRO-FEDAYEEN, ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMON-
RATORS. CROWD OF SEVERAL THOUSAND INCLUDING SEVERAL HUNDRED
TIVISTS, TRIED STAGE MARCH FROM VICINITY OF MAQASED SCHOOL AND
SPITAL IN WESTERN QUARTER BEIRUT TO CITY CENTER. DEMONSTRATORS
RE BLOCKED BY TROOPS AND CLASH BROKE OUT. TROOPS OPENED FIRE
TH LIGHT AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND TEAR GAS. EMBOFFS ON SCENE
PORT SEEING NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, THOUGH UNABLE DETERMINE
ETHER THESE GUN SHOT CASES OR VICTIMS OF FLYING ROCKS.
CURITY FORCES THUS FAR HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CONTAINING DEMONSTRA-
RS.
HARD CORE OF DEMONSTRATORS THOUGHT TO BE ANM, LEBANESE COM-
VISTS (BOTH CPL AND DISSIDENT GROUP) AND BA TH PARTY. IT UN-
EAR WHETHER KAMAL JUMBLATT'S PSP PARTUCIPATED. THESE FOUR
RTIES, ALONG WITH OTHER "PROGRESSIVES" CALL BUT PSP ILLEGAL)
) ISSUED APPEAL FOR DEMONSTRATION TODAY (ISRAELI INDE-
IDENCE DAY). LEAFLETS DISTRIBUTED APRIL 21-22 BY THESE GROUPS
LIN FOR RALLY TO PROTEST GOL ACTUVITIES AGAINST FEDAYEEN.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
AGE 02 BEIRUT 03385 231715Z
i. GOL REACTED BY ATTEMPTING DISSUADE CONSTITUENT GROUPS FROM
EMONSTRATING, CONCENTRATING EFFORTS ON JUMBLATT. THERE HAVE BEEN
CONFLICTING REPORTS ON WHETHER JUMBLATT AGREED COMPLY. NON-PSP
1ILITAVTS, HOWEVER, THOUGHT COMMITTED TO DEMONSTRATION REGARDLESS
)F JUMBLATT'S POSITION. WORD OF SIDON VIOLENCE EARLIER IN DAY
PROBABLY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO BEIRUT OUTBREAK.
4. BEIRUT FOR MOMENT CALM. CITY FULL OF RUMORS THAT THERE WERE
SEVERWL FATALITIES IN SIDON FRACAS THIS AM, WHICH COULD INCITE
HOTHEADS TO FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS TOMORROW.
5. AUB STUDENTS TODAY DECLARED 24 HOUR PRO-FEDAYEEN, ANTI-
GOVERNMENT STRIKE WITH RESULT VERY SPARSE ATTENDANCE AT CLASSES
CAMPUS IS QUIET, HOWEVER, AND THERE APPERAS LITTLE ENTHUSIAM
AMONG STUDENTS FOR VIOLENT ACTION.
6. AT 1830 LOCAL TIME, AS THIS CABLE WAS BEING TRANSMITTED,
LEBANESE RADIO ANNOUNCED CURFEW IN BEIRUT AND SUBURBS UNTIL FUR - -
THER NOTICE FOR ALL EXCEPT DIPLOMATUC CORPS AND ESSENTIAL
OCCUPATIONS. RADIO ALSO ANNOUNCED TODAY'S CASUALTIES IN SIDON
AS FIVE SECURITY PERSONNEL WOUNDED, ONE SERIOUSLY (NO WORD ON
DEMONSTRATORS)IIN BEIRUT FIVE SECURITY PEJSONNEW WOUNDED AND ONE
DEMONSTRATOR KILLED, SEVERAL WOUNDED. PORTER
CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIALI 398
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03366 231533Z
53:
ACTION NEA 15
INFO EUR 17,10 13,CIAE 00,DODE 00, JPM 04,H 02, INR 07,L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,ACDA 16,AID 28,RSR 01,
/155 WI
012844
RI 231420Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7547
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
C ONFIDENTIA L BEIRUT 3366
DEPT PASS CAIRO FOR INFO
SUBJ: LEBANON'S RESPONSE TO JARRING QUESTIONNAIRE
REF 8 BEIRUT 3114
1. BEGIN SUMMARY. SUBSTANCE OF GOLDS RESPONSE TO JARRING
QUESTIONNAIRE IS THAT LEBANON CONSIDERS 1949 GAA WITH
ISRAEL TO BE STILL IN EFFECT, AND THAT PRESENT LEBANON-
ISRAEL BORDER CONSTITUTES LEGAL AND SECURE INTERNATIONAL
FRONTIER WHICH SHOULD NOT BE ALTERED IN ANY FUTURE PEACE-
FULi SETTLEMENT. LEBANON DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT THERE IS
ANY OUTSTANDING ISSUE TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH ISRAEL,
SINCE SHE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN 1967 WAR. HOWEVER,
LEBANON SUPPORTS NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION AS A GESTURE OF
"SOLIDARITY" WITH ARAB STATES DIRECTLY INVOLVED ON 1967
WAR (I.E. JORDAN AND UAR) AND WILLI AGREE TO WHATEVER
THESE STATES ACCEPT IN ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS END SUMMARY.
CONFIDENTIAL
23
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of S ate
UNITED
AMERICA
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STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03366 231533Z
2. DURING MY MEETING WITH FONMIN JOSEPH SALAM APRIL 22%
WE DISCUSUED GOL'S RESPONSE TO JARRING QUESTIONNAIRE AND
LEBANON'S POSITION ON NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION. SALAM
MADE THE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION:
3. PLEBANON HAS SUBMITTED ITS RESPONSE TO JARRING TRHOUGH
ITS: EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. ESSENTIAL ASPECT WHICH AFFECTS
SUBSTANCE OF GOL'S RESPONSE AND ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD
NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION IS. THAT LEBANON DID NOT ENTER
INTO HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL IN JUNE 1967 AS DID
OTHER ARAB STATES. GOL FULLY SUPPORTS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
AND NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION AS A GESTURE OF SOLIDARITY
WITH "INTERESTED ARAB STATES" WHICH FOUGHT ISRAEL IN
JUNE 1967 WAR AND LOST TERRITORY. SALAM SPECIFIED THAT HE
WAS REFERRING TO UAR AND JORDAN, AND NOT AT PRESENT TO
SYRIAN WHICH HE CONSIDERES HOSTILE TO LEBANON'S POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE HOWEVER, GOL DOES NOT INTERPRET NOVEMBER 22
UN RESOLUTION TO MEAN LEBANON ISRAEL BORDER IS SUBJECT
FOR ANY FUTURE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
4. SPECIFICALLY PARAGRAPH ONE OF NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION
WHICH REFERS TO "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FREE
FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE" CANNOT IN LEBANON'S VIEW,
BE INTERPRETED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ALTER THE EXISTING
BORDER BETWEEN L'EBANON AND ISRAEL. THIS BORDER IS
LEGALLY BASED ON THE 1949 GAA SIGNED BY ISRAEL AND
LEBANON. LEBANON HAS NEVER RENOUNCED THE GAA AND DOES
NOT CONSIDER IT ABROGATED ISRAEL'S DECEMBER 28, 1968
ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT WAS A VIOLATION OF THE GAA, BUT
DOES NOT ABROGATE IT AND NO UNILATERAL ISRAELI
RENUNCIATION CAN SERVE TO MAKE THE GAA NULL AND VOID.
IN SUM, LEBANON CONSIDERS THE PRESENT BORDER AS THE LEGAL
AND "RECONGIZED" INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER BETWEEN LEBANON
AND ISRAEL.
5. I RESPONDED THAT USG HAS ALWAYS ACCEPTED THE
LEGITIMACY OF PRESENT LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER AND THAT
WE HAVE OFTEN REITERATED THIS POSITION TO ISRAEL.
6. REFERRING TO LOCAL POLITICAL CRITICISM HE RECEIVED
FOR PUBLICLY SUPPORTING "HUSSEIN PEACE PLAN", I ASKED
SALAM WHAT EFFECT THIS HAD ON GOLMS POSITION (SEE REFTEL).
SALAM SAID OPPOSITION POLITCOS WERE USING HIS STATEMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
23
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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OF STATE
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of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03366 231533Z
AS A BASIS. FOR ATTACK ON PRESENT GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE
USING THE "SPECIOUS" LEGAL ARGUMENT THAT HE, AS FONMIN,
SHOULD HAVE FIRST SOUGHT PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL BEFORE
MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT OF POLICY. THIS WAS NONSENSE IN
SALAM'S VIEW SINCE WHAT HE SAID WAS APPROVED GOL POLICY.
HE ASSURED ME GOL'S POSITION ON NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION
WAS EXACTLY AS HE OUTLINED ABOVE.
PORTER
NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.
CONFIDENTIAL
33
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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OF STATE
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of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 108
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03345 231134Z
20
ACTION NEA 15
INFO EUR 17 AF 12,10 13 CIAE 00,DODE 00, JPM 04 H 02,INR 07,L 03,
NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SPI 02,SS 20,USIA 12 NIC 01,RSR 01,
ACDA 16,/140 W
011588
Ri 230958Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASFNY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7544
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONU Ll JERKTALEM
:
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
CONFIDENTIA C L BEIRUT 3345
SUBJECT: SOVIET REPRESENTATIONS TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT
1. BEGIN SUMMARY. GOL HAS AGREED TO SOVIET INITIATIVE TO HAVE
FONMIN GROMYKO VISIT LEBANONa SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON TOLD
LEBANESE FONMIN THAT USSR SUPPORTS: LATTER'S STATEMENTS IN FAVOR
OF HUSSEIN PEACE PLAN AND NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION. SOVIETS RE ®
PORTEDLY HAVE ALSO URGED IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT AND RESOLVE KURDISH PROBLEM. ON WARSAW PACT CALL FOR
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, SOVIETS TOLD GOL THEY HAVE NO 08-
JECTION TO US PARTICIPATION AND URGED GOL SUPPORT FOR CONFERENCE.
END SUMMARY
2. DURING COURSE OF MY CALL ON FONMIN JOSEPH SALAM APRIL 22,
HE REPORTED FOLLOWING DETAILS OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR PETRE DEDUSH-
KIN'S LATEST REPRESENTATIONS TO GOL:
30 GROMYKO VISIT. DEDUSHKIN ASKED GOL IF THERE WOULD BE ANY 08-
JECTION TO OFFICIAL VISIT BY FONMIN GROMYKO TO LEBANON IN CON-
NECTION WITH GROMYKO'S UPCOMING OFFICIAL VISITS AT INVITATION
IRAQ AND SYRIA. SALAM SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED PRESIDENT HELOU'S
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
1
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DEPARTMENT OF STATS
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UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03345 231134Z
RELUCTANT APPROVAL AND INFORMED DEDUSHKIN GOL AGREES TO GROMYKO
VISIT AND THAT SOVIET FONMIN WILL BE GOL'S OFFICIAL GUEST DURING
HIS TWO TO THREE DAY STAY SCHEDULED SOMETIME WITHIN NEXT TWO
MONTHS. HELOU'S POSITION WAS THAT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS GOL COULD
NOT REFUSE SUCH VISIT.
40 REFERRING TO SALAM'S STATEMENT UPON HIS RETURN FROM WASHING-
TON IN SUPPORT OF "HUSSEIN PEACE PLAN" AND NOVEMBER 22 UN RESO-
LUTION, DEDUSHKIN SAID USSR FULLY SUPPORTS UN RESOLUTION AND AGREES
WITH SALAM'S STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF HUSSEIN PLAN. DEDUSHKIN EM-
PHASIZED USSR DOES NOT WANT ANOTHER WAR IN ME AREA AND SUPPORTS
EFFORTS FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION.
56 SHAYKHLY'S MOSCOW VISIT. DEDUSHKIN GAVE SALEM A RUNDOWN
ON IRAQI FONMIN SHAYKHLY'S RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. REPORTEDLY,
SOVIETS TOLD SHAYKHLY IRAQ SHOULD SUPPORT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND
NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION SINCE ANOTHER MILITARY ROUND WOULD NOT
BE IN ANYONE'S INTEREST. SOVIETS WOULD SUPPORT ARAB POSITION TO
REGAIN TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN JUNE 1967 WAR, BUT WOULD NOT SUP-
PORT ANY ARAB POLICY WHICH ADVOCATES ELIMINATION OF ISRAELI
STATE ALSO, SOVIETS ADVISED IRAQIS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO
RESOLVE KURDISH PROBLEM. ONE ARGUMENT GIVEN WAS THAT IRAQ COULD
NOT FIGHT ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM EFFECTIVELY, IF IT ALSO HAD TO
FIGHT THE KURDS WITHIN ITS OWN BORDERS.
60 EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. DEDUSHKIN ASKED GOL'S SUPPORT FOR
WARSAW PACT'S CALL IN RECENT BUDAPEST MEETING FOR EUROPEAN SE-
CURITY CONFERENCE TO INCLUDE WARSAW PACT AND NATO MEMBERS. DE-
DUSHKIN EMPHASIZED SOVIETS WERE REALLY INTERESTED IN LESSENING
EAST-WEST TENSIONS AND HAD NO OBJECTION TO US PARTICIPATION IN
SUCH A CONFERENCE, IF SUCH PARTICIPATION AGREED UPON BY WARSAW
PACT AND NATO MEMBERS. ADDED THAT BOTH FRG AND GDR WOULD PARTI-
CIPATE. PORTER
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 238
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03253 181725Z
26
45
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
116353
R 181624Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7526
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
SECR E T BEIRUT 3253
EXDIS:
SUBJECT: CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON
REF18 BEIRUT 1325 AND 1632
10 WITH THE CONTINUED INCREASE IN FEDAYEEN STRENGTH IN LEBANON
I HAVE QUERIED MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS:
RE LEBANESE EFFORTS GET OIL-RICH STATES TO URGE FEDAYEEN NOT TO
CAUSE TROUBLE FOR LEBANON
2. KHOURY TELLS ME PRES HELOU AND PRIMIN KARAME HAVE HAD SECRET
DISCUSSIONS ON SUBJECT AND KARAME HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO
APPROACHESTO STATES WHICH ARE PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL BACKERS FE-
DAYEEN. PROBLEM AS YET UNSOLVED, IS HOW TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION
WITHOUT RISK DISCLOSURE WHICH WOULD CAUSE MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS
IN LEBANON. LEBANESE SENT AMB SULEIMAN ZEIN ON A PROBING MISSION
TO KUWAIT. ZEIN TOOK A LOOK AT THE SITUATION, AND APPARENTLY DE-
CIDED NOT TO BROACH SUBJECT TO GOK. HE NOW SEEMS TO HAVE WITH-
DRAWN HIMSELF FROM ATTEMPTING ANY SUCH MISSIONS IN EITHER SAUDI
ARABIA OR LIBYA.
30 I DOUBT THAT GOL CAN FIND ANY TRUSTED AND EFFECTIVE MUSLIM
EMISSARY WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE A MISSION WHICH OBVIOUSLY WOULD
BRING GREAT RISK TO HIS POLITICALI FUTURE. JUDGING FROM TENOR
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ИО DEPARTMENT OF
OE
EXECUTIVE
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DEPARTMENT
STATE
Department of State
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UNITED
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03253 181725Z
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KHOURY'S REMORKS, I EXPECT GOL IS DROPPING THE IDEA9, ASHOICE
OF ZEINN - SHIA#WITHOUT ANY PARTICULAR CRENTIALS, INDICATED
HOW HARD PUT GOL WAS TO FIND AN EMISSARY WHO WOULD COMTEMPLATE
TAKING ON THE JOB.
VWD
4. KHOURY HAS NOT ASKED FOR USG HELP IN THIS MATTER SINCE HIS
INITIAL APPROACH AND I HAVE VOLUNTEERED NONE. PORTER
10
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121/20/0290
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE Reproduced WITHOUT at the THE Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MOITASIROHTUA
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMOUNT
TELEGRAM
SECRET 800
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03253 182317Z
2
821
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
118583:
RI 1816242 APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7526
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
WRCONSUL JERUSALEM 0942
S: ECRET BEIRUT 3253
EXDIS
CORRECTEDCORY(TEXTT
SUBJECT: CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON
REF: BEIRUT 1325 AND 1632
1. WITH THE CONTINUED INCREASE IN FEDAYEEN STRENGTH IN LEBANON
I HAVE QUERIED MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS:
RE LEBANESE EFFORTS GET OIL RICH STATES TO URGE FEDAYEEN NOT TO
CAUSE TROUBLE FOR LEBANON
2. KHOURY TELLS ME PRES HELOU AND PRIMIN KARAME HAVE HAD SECRET
DISCUSSIONS ON SUBJECT, AND KARAME HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO
APPROACHES TO STATES WHICH ARE PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL BACKERS FE-
EXEMS
DAYEEN. PROBLEM, AS YET UNSOLVED IS HOW TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION
WITHOUT RISK DISCLOSURE WHICH WOULD CAUSEI MAJORI POLITICAL CRISIS
IN LEBANON. LEBANESE SENT AMB SULEIMAN ZEIN ON A PROBING MISSION
TO KUWAIT® ZEIN TOOK A LOOK AT THE SITUATION, AND APPARENTLY DE
CIDED NOT TO BROACH SUBJECT TO GOK HE NOW SEEMS TO HAVE WITH-
DRAWN HIMSELF FROM ATTEMPTING ANY SUCH MISSIONS IN EITHER SAUDI
ARABIA OR LIBYA.
the
3. I DOUBT THAT GOLI CAN FIND ANY TRUSTED AND EFFECTIVE MUSLIM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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тои
DEPARTMENT
OF
THE
MOITASIROHTUA
EXECUTIVE
SECKELVBA
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
VE
STATES
OF
ОКУМИ
10
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THE
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SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03253 182317Z
EMISSARY WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE A MISSION WHICH OBVIOUSLY WOULD
BRING GREAT RISK TO HIS POLITICAL FUTURE JUDGING FROM TENOR
KHOURY'S REMARKS, I EXPECT GOL IS DROPPING THE IDEA. CHOICE
OF ZEIN, A SHIA WITHOUT ANY PARTICULAR CREDENTIALS, INDICATED
HOW HARD PUT GOLI WAS TO FIND AN EMISSARY WHO WOULD COMTEMPLATE
TAKING THE JOB® ои
4. KHOURY HAS NOT ASKED FOR USG HELP IN THIS MATTER SINCE HIS:
INITIAL APPROACH AND 1 HAVE VOLUNTEERED NONE. PORTER
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LETECKVW
SECRET
E21/40/0290
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
THE
MOITASIROHTUA
OF
2ECKELVKA
DEP
UNITED
Department of State
EXEC
AMERICA
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TELEGRAM
STATES OF СОЛЕКИНЕИЦ БОГӀСА"
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03178 01 OF 02 161745Z СОИДЕИД
40
ACTION SS 30
10
INFO /030 W
100273
DOES
RI 161628Z APRI 69
FM
AMEMBASSY
BEIRUT
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ИОТ
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CYOBE
OL
сои-
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7503 ДНМИ 11 DOES
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN WOME
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM ои
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV ио
DIA WASHDC
CHRISTIVM
USMISSION USUN
12
YMA
SSECORI E T SECTION I OF 2 BEIRUT 3178
ОИ
EXDIS
MAMIED
LOKCE
10
FIWIL
SUBJECT: GOLDS POLICY ON FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION
IM
REF # A. BEIRUT 3149 $ BD BEIRUT 2931
1. BEGIN SUMMARY GOL HAS MADE MAJOR DECISION TO CONFRONT FEDAYEEN
GROUPS BY FORCE IF FEDAYEEN ATTEMPT TO CROSS LEBANON- ISRAEL BORDER.
THIS POSITION, WHICH ADOPTED BY PRESIDENT HELOU AND APPROVED BY
SUNNI PRIMIN KARAME, HAS NOT YET CAUSED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES
WITHIN LEBANESE ARMY. GOL MAKING DISTINCTION BETWEEN AL FATAH
ON ONE HAND, AND RADICAL BASED FEDAYEEN GROUPS SUCH AS AS SA IQAH
ON THE OTHER WHICH POSE IMMEDIATE THREAT TO LEBANON.S POLITICAL
REGIME. HOWEVER, HELOU CONVINCED THAT, IN LAST ANALYSIS, ALL
FEDAYEEN GROUPS ARE BASICALLY REVOLUTIONARY IN THEIR THINKING
AND IN THEIR MODUS OPERANDI AND WILL BECOME THE CAPTIVE OF EITHER
MOSCOW OR PEKING IN FUTURE END SUMMARY.
EXEMS
2. DURING COURSE OF MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU APRIL 15,
WE HAD TIMELY OPPORTUNITY, IN WAKE OF LEBANESE ARMY-FEDAYEEN CLASH
(REPORTED REFTEL A TO HAVE FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON FEDAYEEN
PROBLEM IN LEBANON HELOU MADE CLEAR THAT FEDAYEEN HAD BECOME
LEBANON'S MAJOR NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEM.
3. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY ON ANY POSSIBLE CHANGES IN GOL'S AT-
TITUDE
LETECKVW
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE Nixon PresidentaTuilioran OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard
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тои
ARTMENT
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STATE
Department of State
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30
STATES
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SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03178 01 OF 02 161745Z
TOWARD FEDAYEEN, HELOU INFORMED ME GOL RECENTLY MADE DECISION
WHICH GOES ONE STEP FURTHER THAN GOVERNMENT'S PREVIOUS POLICY
ON CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON. SPECIFICALLY, ON
APRIL 6, HELOU CONVENED MEETING WHICH INCLUDED PRIMIN RASHID
KARAME, LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER BOUSTANY AND COS SHMAYT (SEE
REFTEL B). FEDAYEEN SITUATION REVIEWED AND DECISION TAKEN TO ORDER
LEBANESE ARMY TO CONFRONT FEDAYEEN GROUPS BY FORCE, AS A LAST
RESORT, IF THESE GROUPS DISOBEY GOL PROHIBITION ON CROSS BORDER
OPERATIONS INTO ISRAEL THIS DECISION HAS BEEN MADE KNOWN TO
FEDAYEEN AND IS DESIGNED TO BE ULTIMATE DETERRENT TO KEEP FEDAYEEN
FROM CREATING INCIDENTS ON THE LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER. AS HELOU PUT
ITD. "IF THEY ATTEMPT TO CROSS, TOO BAD FOR THEM". HELOU ASSURED
ME THIS DECISION HAS PERSONAL APPROVAL OF PRIMIN RASHID KARAME
WHO, OF COURSE, REPRESENTS LEBANON'S SUNNI MUSLIM POPULATION IN
THE GOVERNMENT.HELOU ADDED GOL WOULD CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO
TRY PERSUADE FEDAYEEN BY ALL OTHER MEANS SHORT OF FORCE TO LIMIT
THEIR ACTIVITIES ON LEBANESE SOIL NATURALLY, GOL WANTED TO AVOID
ARMED CONFRONTATIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS ON
LEBANONS POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL SECURITY.
4. I ASKED HELOU WHETHER OR NOT GOLPS POLICY IS CAUSING ANY
PROBLEMS WITHIN ARMY, SPECIFICALLY BETWEEN MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN
OFFICERS. HELOU SAID HE ASSURED BY ARMY LEADERSHIP THERE NO
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN OFFICERS ON
THIS ISSUE. OF COURSE, GENERAL MUSLIM SYMPATHY FOR FEDAYEEN MOVE-
MENT AFFECTS MUSLIM OFFICERS MORE THAN IT DOES CHRISTIAN MILI-
TARY PERSONNEL, BUT THIS WAS A "NUANCE" AND NOT A CAUSE OF CON-
CERN AT THIS TIME.HELOU WAS ASSURED MUSLIM MILITARY PERSONNEL
WOULD FOLLOW THEIR ORDERS WITHOUT FAIL. ONE DANGER WHICH DOES
EXIST, HE CAUTIONED, WAS CONTINUING PRESSURES EXERTED BY MUSLIMS
IN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS CIRCLES WHO TRY TO IMPOSE THEIR PRO-
FEDAYEEN VIEWS ON THE MILITARY AND THE LEBANESE BODY POLITIC
IN GENERAL.
5. AS FOR THE DIFFERENT FEDAYEEN GROUPS GOL HADI TO CONTEND
WITH, I INQUIRED WHETHER OR NOT GOL WAS MAKING A DISTINCTION
IN ITS APPROACH TOWARD AL FATAH ON THE ONE HAND, WHICH SO FAR
HAS NO MOTIVATING IDEOLOGICAL BASE, AND AS SAIQAH AND THE PFLP
ON THE OTHER HAND, WHICH ARE RADICALLY BASED COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS
SEEKING OVERTHROW OF ARAB MODERATE REGIMES. HELOU STATED GOL
INDEED MAKING SUCH A DISTINCTION IN EXECUTING GOVERNMENT POLICY.
THIS COURSE OF ACTION HAS PRIMIN KARAME'S APPROVAL AND TACIT
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF тои STATE DEP
D
THE
THE
Department of State
EXEC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03178 01 OF 02 1617452
APPROVAL OF OTHER MUSLIM LEADERS, TO INCLUDE MUFTI OF THE REPUB-
LIC. ONE SIGNIFICANT DANGER, HELOU STRESSED, IS THAT IF GOLI FOR-
CIBLY CONTROLS AND ATTACKS ONE SPECIFIC RADICAL GROUP, OTHER
COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS MAY FEEL COMPELLED CLOSE RANKS WITH OR-
GANIZATION UNDER ATTACK THEREFORE, FIRM BUT SUBTLE MEASURES MUST
BE APPLIED. HELOU ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH AL FATAH WAS LARGELY
A POLITICAL IT TOO WOULD NOT HESITATE TO ATTEMPT DESTROY LEBANESE
REGIME, IF IT THOUGHT THIS WAS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE GOAL OF
LIBERATING PALESTINE. HOWEVER, DESTRUCTION OF LEBANON WAS NOT
ALI FATAH'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE. THIS, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS THE
PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE RADICAL COMMANDO GROUPS.
PORTER
SECRET
26
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT DEP OF STATE
Department of State
EXEMS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 376
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03178 02 OF 02 161750Z
40
2
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
100310
RI 161628Z APR 69
FMI AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7504
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
DIA WASHDC
USMISSION USUN
E R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 3178
EXDIS
SUBJECT: GOLFS POLICY ON FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION
6. HELOU VOLUNTEERED THAT GOL HAS NOT YET DECIDED
HOW OR AT WHAT LEVEL TO APPROACH PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING FEDAYFEN.
SHOULD GOL CONSIDER PROBLEM WITHIN ITS LEBANESE CONTEXT ALONE,
OR IN RELATION TO SYRIA, OR ON INTER-ARAB LEVEL? I REFERRED TO
FEDAYEEN SITUATION IN JORDAN AND STATED THAT WHATEVER HAPPENS
IN THAT COUNTRY WOULD STRONGLY AFFECT LEBANON. THERE REASON TO
BELIEVE THAT GOU REALIZES THAT IT MADE SERIOUS MISTAKE IN NOT CON-
FRONTING FEDAYEEN SOONER AND THAT CONSIDERABLE ANARCHY REIGNS
IN JORDAN TODAY AS A RESULT OF GOVERNMENT'S EARLIER AND MORE
PERMISSIVE POLICY TOWARD FEDAYEEN. HELOU AGREED AND SAID IT WAS
HIS UNDERSTANDING FROM HIS JORDANIAN CONTACTS THAT A MAJOR CON-
FRONTATION BETWEEN GOU AND FEDAYEEN WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE
IN NEAR FUTURE. HE WAS ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF JORDAN EXAMPLE AS HE
VIEWED FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN LEBANONio
7. DESPITE DISTINCTIONS ONE MIGHT MAKE BETWEEN VARIOUS FEDAYEEN
GROUPS TODAY, HELOU STATED HIS CONVICTION THAT, IN ULTIMATE ANAL-
YSIS, ALL FEDAYEEN GROUPS ARE BASICALLY REVOLUTIONARY IN THEIR
THINKING AND IN THEIR MODUS OPERANDI. THEY OPERATE OUTSIDE THE
ESTABLISHED POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES IN THE
ARAB WORLD, AND HAVE LITTLE OR NO RESPECT FOR ARAB STATES OR THEIR
LEADERSHIP. EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE LARGELY FINANCED BY CONSERVATIVE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced WITHOUT at the THE Richard OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
иот DIPARTMENT OF
DEP
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
VBV
STATES OF
SECRET
EXE EXEC
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03178 02 OF 02 161750Z
ARAB STATES SUCH AS KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, AN LIBYA, THESE STATES
HAVE NO MODERATING INFLUENCE ON FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT. IN THE LONG
RUN, FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT WILLIBE PREY TO THE IDEOLOGICAL MACHINA-
TIONS OF EITHER MOSCOW OR PEKING.
8. I CONGRATULATED HELOU ON THE WISE AND COURAGEOUS DECISION
THE GOL HAS TAKEN TO INTERDICT FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS AND SAID I
WOULD INFORM WASHINGTON. I GET CLEAR MESSAGE THAT HELOU HAS
MADE FIRM DECISION THAT FEDAYEENI ISSUE MUST NOW BE FACED, AS
YESTERDAY'S CLASH BEARS OUT. HE KNOWS THAT LEBANON'S POLITICAW
UNITY MAY BE THREATENED BY RESULTING CONFESSIONAL SPLIT BUT FEELS
THIS IS LESSER DANGER THAN PROVOKING ISRAELI RETALIATION WHICH
WOULD HAVE ALMOST SURE EFFECT OF DESTROYING LEBANON'S CONTROL
OVER FEDAYEEN. PORTER
SECRET
521/40/0190
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATIO OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
=
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOYED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 126 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR nara WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
Form 101 (revised 6-85)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
679
3 EXEMS EXCES
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02931 081641Z
02
44
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
050844
R 081520Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7433
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
S E C R E T BEIRUT 2931
EXDIS
SUBJECT: INCREASED FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN LEBANON
1) (BEGIN SUMMARY) PRESIDENT HELOU, THROUGH INTERMEDIARY MICHEL
KHOURY (PROTECT), INFORMED ME APRIL 7 OF VERY RECENT MARKED
INCREASE FEDAYEEN PRESENCE SOUTH LEBANON. LEBANESE ARMY CONTINUED
OPERATE UNDER CLEAR ORDERS TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN BUT ARMY BECOMING
INCREASINGLY CONCERNED RE ITS CAPACITY HANDLE SUBSTANTIALLY
INCREASED NUMBERS, PARTICULARLY AS SNOW MELTS OPENING UP MORE
TERRAIN. GOL UNABLERISK ALL-OUT MILITARY CONFRON ATION WITH
FEDAYEEN BECAUSE OF ADVERSE REACTION LEBANESE MUSLIMS. AS A
RESULT, WAS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED NEW FEDAYEEN RAIDS MAY BE
MOUNTED FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY PRIMARILY INTO ISRAELI OCCUPIED
SYRIA. URGED USG CONTINUE EFFORTS RESTRAIN ISRAEL FROM REPRISALS
WHICH WOULD ONLY WORSEN SITUATION. (END SUMMARY)
2) KHOURY POINTED OUT FEDAYEEN INCREASE OF PERHAPS 300 PLUS HAD
BEEN VERY SUDDEN, OCCURRING LARGELY IN LAST WEEK. THERE NOW
WERE AT LEAST 800 FEDAYEEN IN THE SOUTH, LARGELY IN MT. HERMON
AREA. (COMMENT: HE HAD INFORMED US MIDDLE LAST week ALL SEEMED
UNDER CONTROL.) FATAH HAD INCREASED ITS STRENGTH SLIGHTLY
BUT MAIN INCREASE HAD BEEN IN SYRIAN-SUPPORTED AL-SA'IQAH UNITS
WHO WERE ABLE INFILTRATE MORE EASILY AS SNOWS MELTED AND TERRAIN
BECAME MORE ACCESSIBLE. GOL FELT SAIQAH INCREASE PROBABLY
RESULT DECISION TAKEN RECENT BAATH PARTY CONGRESS* LEBANESE ARMY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCERT Richard THE Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
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OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AUTHORIZED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
EXE EXETS
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02931 081641Z
DOING ITS BEST CONTAIN INCREASED NUMBERS IN AREA OF PREVIOUS
CONCENTRATION ON NORTH SLOPES MT. HERMON BUT FINDING JOB
DIFFICULT. ARMY CONSIDERING MOVING SOME UNITS FROMI POSITIONS
FURTHER WEST ON LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER INTO HERMON AREA IN ORDER
PUSH FEDAYEEN BACK TOWARDS SYRIA. THERE SERIOUS LIMITS, HOWEVER,
TO ARMY'S EFFECTIVENESS, BOTH IN TERMS INADEQUATE TROOP STRENGTH
AS WELL AS RESISTANCE FROM LEBANESE PUBLIC OPINIONI IF ARMY
APPEARS BE WITHDRAWING FROM ISRAELI BORDER IN ORDER MEET FEDAYEEN
CHALLENGE.
31 PRES. HELOU, PRIMIN KARAME AND CIC GEN. BOUSTANN HAD DAY-LONG
DISCUSSIONS APRIL 6 ON LEBANESE REACTION NEW FEDAYEEN THREAT.
POLICY DECISION WAS TO CONTINUE AS IN PAST - TRY TO REASON WITH
FEDAYEEN, CONTINUE PROVIDE CORDON AROUND FEDAYEEN POCKETS, AT SAME
TIME AVOIDING MILITARY CONFRONTATION WHICH MIGHT SET OFF MAJOR
CONFESSIONAL CRISIS IN LEBANON. KARAME, REPRESENTING SUNNI MUSLIMS,
PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT LEBANESE MILITARY AVOID SHOOTING
INCIDENTS AGAINST FEDAYEEN, ALTHOUGH HE FULLY SUPPORTS CONTINUED
EFFORTS DENY FEDAYEEN ACCESS LEBANESE BORDER.
4) LEBANESE PARLEYING WITH BOTH SYRIAN MILITARY AND FATAH
LEADERSHIP IN EFFORT REASON WITH FEDAYEEN THAT LEBANON MUST REMAIN
APART FROM MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WITH ISRAEL. GOL FRANKLY NOT
OPTIMISTIC OF SUCCESS IN LONG RUN. INCLINED BELIEVE TO CONTRARY
THAT SYRIANS AND FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP DELIBERATELY MOUNTING
SERIOUS EFFORT INVOLVE LEBANON AS COMBATANT ME CONFLICT. ALSO,
GOL HAS INDICATIONS SA'IQAH PLANNING INFILTRATE INTO LEBANESE AREAS
WHERE SUNNI MUSLIMS IN MAJORITY, TO ESTABLISH CELLS AMONG
SYMPATHETIC LOCAL POPULACE. KING HUSSEIN, AT GOL REQUEST, HAD
URGED ARAFAT REDUCE FATAH ACTIVITY IN LEBANON. HUSSEIN REPORTED TO
HELOU ON BEIRUT STOPOVER APRIL 1 THAT HE BELIEVED HIS ENGORTS
HAD FAILED.
51 GOL HAD CONSIDERED VARIOUS ALTERNATE PLANS OF ACTION, SUCH AS
POSSIBILITY INVOKING 1950 TRIPARTITE DECLARATION, REQUESTING UN
PROVIDE INCREASED PRESENCE ON LEBANESE BORDER OR ASKING UNILATERAL
MILITARY SUPPORT FROM FRANCE OR US. ALL THESE ALTERNATE COURSES OF
ACTION HAD BEEN REUECTED AS BEING UNREALISTIC OR IMPRACTICAL. ( I
ASSURED HIM DECISION WAS CORRECT IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL US MILITARY
INVOLVEMENT. FRANCE, FOR INSTANCE, SAID KHOURY, HAD QUITE CLEARLY
INDICATED FRENCH MILITARY SUPPORT NOT AVAILABLE. SINCE AGGRESSIVE
LEBANESE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST FEDAYEEN ALSO IMPOSSIBLE FOR
SECRET
28
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATIO. OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
ORLINO STATES OF
AMERICA STATE #
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 02931 081641Z
MANY REASON, GOL HAS MADE DECISION CONTINUE ITS PRESENT TACTICS
PERSUASION AND CORDONING EFFORTS TO KEEP FEDAYEEN OFF BALANCE AND
AWAY FROM BORDER. WHILE THIS HAS WORKED QUITE EFFECTIVELY LAST
SEVERAL MONTHS, THERE NOW INCREASING RISK FEDAYEENI WILL BREAK
THROUGH INTO ISRAEL.
61 PURPOSE HELDU'S MESSAGE TO ME WAS TO INFORM USG OF NEW
SITUATION AND REQUEST OUR CONTINUED INTERCESSION WITH ISRAELIS TO
EXERCISE RESTRAINT IF ISOLATED INCIDENTS DO OCCUR. STRONG
ISRAELI REPRISALS AGAINST LEBANON WOULD, AS IN JORDAN, ONLY
STRENGTHEN FEDAYEEN AND NEUTRALIZE LEBANESE ATTEMPTS CONTAIN
SITUATION. HELOU SENT SOLEMN ASSURANCES GOL WILL CONTINUE DO ALL
IN ITS POWER CONTROL ITS OWN BORDER AND STOP FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS.
7) KHOURY ALSO POINTED OUT GOL WOULD PREFER USG NOT RPT NOT
INFORM ISRAELIS OF INCREASED STRENGTH FEDAYEEN HEI ASSUMES
ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE ALREADY AWARE BUT WORRIED ABOUT GOI LEAKS
WHICH MIGHT EMBARRASS EITHER USG OR GOL. HE EXPRESSED HELOU'S
THANKS FOR PAST USG EFFORTS RESTRAIN ISRAEL, AND ASKED
SPECIFICALLY THAT USG TAKE APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNI TY PASS TO GOI
EXE
THAT LEBANESE POLICY CONTROL FEDAYEEN IS UNCHANGED AND LEBANESE
ARMY OPERATING UNDER CONTINUING AND CLEAR ORDERS SUPPRESS FEDAYEEN
ACTIVITY ALONG BORDER.
PORTER
SECRET
28
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
of STATES MMK ORLINO AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 427
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02854 041623Z
02
42
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
034525
R 041252Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7417
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
S E C R E T BEIRUT 2854
EXDIS
SUBJ: USG WORKING PAPER ON MIDDLE EAST
REF: BEIRUT 2597
1. DCM MET WITH LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL INTERMEDIARY KHOURY
(PROTECT) EVENING APRIL 3 AT LATTER'S REQUEST TO DISCUSS A
NUMBER OF MATTERS INCLUDING USG WORKING PAPER ON ME. KHOURY
SAID GOL HAD NOT PREPARED ANY WRITTEN COMMENTS ON USG WORKING
PAPER AND HE DOUBTED ANY WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. IT WAS HIS
UNDERSTANDING THAT PRES HELOU AND GOL CONSIDERED WORKING PAPER
AS STARTING POINT FOR BIG FOUR DISCUSSIONS AND DIDI NOT REPRESENT
DEFINITIVE EXPOSITION OF PEACE SETTLEMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT
WOULD BE UNFAIR FOR GOL TO CRITICIZE INDIVIDUAL POINTS IN
WORKING PAPER. GOL UNDERSTOOD THAT UAR AND JORDANI HAD LEFT
LETTLE UNSAID IN EXPRESSING "ARAB" CRITICISMS OF WORKING PAPER
AND AS LEBANON WAS IN REALITY ON SIDELINES OF NEGOTIATIONS
RATHER THAN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN ARAB-ISRAEL PEACE SETTLEMENT,
IT DID NOT SEEM NECESSARY FOR LEBANON TO COMMENT.
2. IN RESPONSE TO DCM'S REMARK THAT JORDAN AND UAR'S REACTIONS
TO WORKING PAPER WERE DECIDEDLY DISAPPOINTING, KHOURY REMARKED
THAT, IN KING HUSSEIN'S TALKS WITH PRES HELOU AND PRIMIN KARAME
IN BEIRUT FEW DAYS AGO, HUSSEIN HAD APPEARED NOT PARTICULARLY
UPSET BY USG WORKING PAPER. AND SIGNIFICANTLY HUSSEIN HAD SAID
THAT, WHILE HE HOPED TO RETAIN CONTROL OF WEST BANK AND JERU-
SECRET
27
NOT TO BE REPRODUCEDOTe THE Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
иот DIPARTMENT OF миноли THE OF THE EXECUTIVE 2ECKELVBA
STATE
Department of State
EXEMS
UNITED
AUGUST
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NOT TO BE REPRODU
,
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATIO
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
тои
Lehavor
HIO
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE *
EXEMS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 566
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02684 311038Z
18
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
006592
P 311025Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7377
INFO USMISSION USUN PRIORITY
SECR ET BEIRUT 2684
EXDIS
SUBJECT: us PEACE PLAN
1. WE ARE SENDING SEPTEL TEXT OF MARCH 31 NAHAR STORY PURPORTING
TO CONTAIN DETAILS OF NINE-POINT WORKING PAPER RECENTLY SUB-
MITTED BY USG TO OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS. STORY IS ATTRTBUTED
TO REUTERS/UPI FROM UN AND IS VERY CLOSE TO THE MARK. PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ио1
DIPARTMENT
ВЕЬВОДПСЕР
THE
MOITASISOHTUA
Ot
OF
Jabaron
EXECUTIVE
STATE
ВІДЦЕИ
OWWENLE
Department of State
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UNITED
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IIH
МНУДЕЛЕВ
MVZ
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10
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nord
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STATES
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STE COR BEIRUT 2585 BEEKING 10 ПУВКӀЙС
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vrone ΓINES CONLVINED ВЕЕДЕГ» IN ВЕВЬОИЕЕ
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ON RECENT US DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS VENTAILA BE WE
ТИБОВТИТ brown BE НЕГЬЕПГ опктие
REF: STATE 41270 In SUBWILLING ВЕЬГЛЕЕ* лінтие
YND VI
1. I MET FONMIN JOSEPH SALEM MARCH 26 TO DISCUSS JARRING
MISSION AND BIG FOUR CONCERTATION. SALEM REFERRED TO
QUESTIONNAIRE JARRING RECENTLY SUBMITTED TO GOL AND
SAID GOL'S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE HAD BEEN DRAFTED AND NOW
BEING COORDINATED WITH UAR. DRAFT WILL ALSO BE
EXCESS
DISCUSSED WITH GOU SHORTLY, PROBABLY DURING KING
HUSSEIN'S BRIEF STOP-OVER IN BEIRUT ENROUTE TO PARIS,
LONDON AND WASHINGTON IN EARLY APRIL. SALEM STRESSED
GOL NOT SEEKING UAR OR JORDANIAN "APPROVAL" BUT MERELY
ATTEMPTING ASSURE THAT ESSENCE OF GOL'S REPLY IN
ACCORD WITH UAR AND JORDANINA POSITIONS. (COMMENT:
LEBANON WILL IN FACT BE SURE ITS REPLY IS CAREFULLY
ALIGNED WITH THAT OF CAIRO).
LETECKVW
2. SALEM SAID HE WILLING AND AUTHORIZED BY PRESIDENT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
EXEMS
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
In
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02585 271152Z
HELOU TO GIVE ME COPY OF GOL'S DRAFT WHEN READY. 10
URGED GOL'S RESPONSE TO JARRINGS QUESTIONS BE AS POSITIVE
AND SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE, AND EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT
RATHER LONG DELAY IN SUBMITTING ARAB REPLIES. TIMING
IMPORTANT AND PROMPT REPLY WOULD BE HELPFUL DURING THIS
PERIOD OF INTENSIFIED DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY RE ME.
REFERRED TO EBAN'S TALKS IN US AND MADR REPRESENTATION
ALONG LINES GUIDANCE CONTAINED REFTEL. IN RESPONSE
SALEM'S QUESTION WHETHER US POSITION ON NOV 22 UN RES
HAS CHANGED IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE BIG FOUR CONCERTATION,
I EMPHASIZED US CONTINUES FULLY SUPPORT UN RES AND
JARRING MISSION. US APPROACHES WITH OTHER POWERS SHOULD
IN NO WAY IMPLY THAT WE SEEKING TO SUPPLANT JARRING
MISSION. OUR PURPOSE IS TO HELP MOVE PARTIES TO
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT UNDER JARRING'S AEGIS. IN OUR
VIEW, PART OF ANY SUCH SETTLEMENT MUST BE RECIPROCAL
CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL SATISFYSECURITY REQUIRE-
MENTS OF INTERESTED PARTIES. ARABS MUST FACE UP TO
THIS REALITY AND MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY SEEK MORE STABLE
ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE THAN HAVE EXISTED PREVIOUSLY.
IN THIS CONTEXT, TONE AND NATURE THEIR REPLIES TO JARRING
COULD IMPORTANTLY AFFECT PROGRESS ON SETTLEMENT.
EXPRESSION OF ARAB WINNINGNESS ACCEPT CONTRACTUAL
AGREEMENT WOULD BE MAJOR BREAK-THROUGH. ARABS SHOULD
NOT ENGAGE WISHFUL THINKING RE US SUPPORT OF AN IMPOSED
SETTLEMENT.
3. SALEM APPRECIATED BEING INFORMED US POSITION AND
ASSURED ME GOL'S DRAFT RESPONSE TO JARRING "VERY POSITIVE".
HE EXPLAINED GOL FULLY SUPPORTS NOV 22 RES AS BASIS
FOR ARRIVING AT SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE. HE
UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENT FOR CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS,
AND SAID HE SAW NO REAL SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTY IN REACHING
SUCH AGREEMENTS, IF MADE BY BOTH PARTIES TO THE UN. HE
IMPLIED THAT ARAB STATES WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE DISPOSED
TO SIGN JOINT ARAB-ISRAELI AGREEMENTS BUT RATHER WOULD
PREFER TO SIGN SEPARATE DOCUMENTS PREVIOUSLY AGREED UPON
BY BOTH SIDES, AND SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED TO UN WITH SOME
PROVISION FOR UNSC GUARANTEES. LEBANON, EVIDENTLY, WOULD
GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER WAS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH JORDAN AND
UAR. HE COMMENTED THAT ARAB STATES PROBABLY COULD BECOME
PARTY TO WRITTEN AGREEMENTS INCORPORATING CONCEPT OF NON-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE
OE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 02585 271152Z
BELLIGERENCY BUT NOT INCORPORATING THE TERM "PACE", SINCE
THIS COULD IMPLY DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, ECONOMIC TIES, ETC.
I SAID THIS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT QUESTION WHICH BOTH
EXEMS
JARRING AND THE INTERESTED PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO WORK OUT,
ONCE PROGRESS IS ACHIEVED ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. MORE
IMPORTANT, ARABS SHOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAELI REQUIREMENT FOR
BINDING RECIPROCAL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION.
40 AS FOR LEBANON- ISRAEL BORDER, SALEM SAID GOL SEES NO
DIFFICULTIES IN FORMAL RECOGNITION, WITHIN CONTEXT
OF OVER-ALL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, OF PRESENT STATUS OF
THE BORDER. HE REITERATED THAT LEBANON DID NOT ENTER
HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL IN 1967. CONSEQUENTLY, LEBANON-
ISRAEL BORDER, WHICH INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED UNDER
GAA'S, REMAINS UNCHANGED AS OF 1949. IN SHORT,
PRESENT FRONTIER COULD EASILY BECOME SECURE AND
RECOGNIZED BORDER BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL.
5. SALEM ALLUDED TO RECENT PRESS REPORTS RE US
-
POSITION, WHICH WAS BEING CIRCULATED TO OTHER POWERS
AND CERTAIN ARAB STATES. I REFERRED TO
BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS NOW UNDERWAY IN WASHINGTON,
NEW YORK AND INTERESTED CAPITALS, AND SAID US EXPECTED
THESE TO LEAD TO FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS IN RELATIVELY
NEAR FUTURE. SALEM SAID HE HOPED GOL WOULD BE INFORMED
IN GREATER DETAIL, WHEN APPROPRIATE.
PORTER
NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon residential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
Ot
OF
Jehanon
STATE
Department of State
EXEMS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
03
SECRET 167
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02547 251725Z
40
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
101806
RI 251518Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7332
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
SECRET BEIRUT 2547
EXDIS
REF: STATE 44798, 45491
1. AGREE APPROPRIATE I HOLD OFF FOR NOW APPROACHING GOL ON
USG WORKING PAPER. HOWEVER, I FEELISURE LEBANESE WILL BEGIN GET
GARBLED VERSIONS SOON ANDI I WOULD PREFER MAINTAIN CLOSE RAPPORT
WITH PRES HELOU NOT ONLY TO INSURE HE GETS ACCURATE REPORTS
BUT ALSO TO ASSURE SUBSEQUENT RECIPROCAL RELEASE OF INFORMATION
FROM HIM.
2. THEREFORE, UNLESS INTERVENING DEVELOPMENTS DICTATE OTHERWISE,
I REQUEST I BE AUTHORIZED GIVE HIMI USG WORKING PAPER NO LATER
THAN FRIDAY, MARCH 28. I WILLI NOT NEED USE MOST OF TALKING POINTS
SET FORTH STATE 44730, BUT CAN LIMIT MYSELF LARGELY TO COMMENT ON
PROCEDURAL MATTERS AND TIME TABLE.
3. I BELIEVE HELOU CAN ASSURE MATTER WILL BE TIGHTLY HELD WITHIN
GOL. ALSO I THINK WE CAN ASSUME FRENCH WILLI BE BRIEFING HIM ON
PROGRESS FOUR POWER TALKS. I WOULD LIKE BEI SURE US VIEWS ALSO
HEARD. PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced WITHOUT at the THE Richard OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Jebanon
ECITIVE
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE "
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXE EXEMS
SECRET
904
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02460 231913Z
51
ACTION SS 30
INFO SSO 00,/030 W
090824
PI R 231725Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7310
02
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USINT CAIRO
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1281
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
S ECR E T BEIRUT 2460
EXDIS
FROM DAVIES
REF: STATE 0447831 STATE 044729: STATE 044730
1. FOLLOWING CONSENSUS EMERGED FROM DISCUSSION OF REFTELS
WITH AMBASSADORS PORTER, EILTS, AND SYMMES AND MINISTER BERGUS.
2. ACTION VIS-A-VIS ARAB GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE
FIELD,
ALLOWING TIME FOR AMBASSADOR YOST TO HAVE PRIOR MEETINGS
WITH BRITISH, FRENCH, AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES:
30 IN VIEW ONGOING AND ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT HKU AND UARG IN THIS
MATTER AND IMPENDING U.S. VISIT OF HUSSEIN, BELIEVE SYMMES AND
BERGUS SHOULD TAKE EARLY OPPORTUNITY, PREFERABLY TUESDAY,
MARCH 25, TO ACT ON STATE 044729 AND STATE 044730.
4. VIEW POSSIBILITY OF INACCURATE LEAK FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS,
BELIEVE SAG AND GOL SHOULD ALSO BE APPROACHED. HOWEVER, IN
RECOGNITION OF CONSIDERATIONS CITED STATE 044783 AND OF LESS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced WITHOUT at the OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF THE OL THE EXECUTIVE
STATE
CHINO
OL
Department of State
AMERICA
VND
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
VMD ВЕГДЕЛЕ УИД
3°
IN
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02460 231913Z
URGENT REQUIREMENT ON PART OF SAG AND GOL FOR DETAILED THE
PRESENTATION OF U.S. POSITION AT THIS TIME, RECOMMEND THAT
EILTS AND PORTER CONFINE THEIR INITIAL PRESENTATIONS TO
WORKING PAPER (STATE 0447291 EXTENT TO WHICH THEY MIGHT HAVE
TO FALL BACK ON TALKING POINTS (STATE 0447301 IN ORDER TO
ANSWER QUESTION FROM HOST GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE LEFT TO
THEIR DISCRETION.
EBOW
OVAIER
5. ALL POSTS ARE MOST APPRECIATIVE OF DEPARTMENT'S COMPREHENSIVE
REPORTING ON DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELI AND GREAT POWER REPRE-
SENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK
PORTER E J. SPPS
newission
VEVA J3T Y88A8M3MA
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петит CVIBO
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INED УННУИ
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30
ST.
EXCES
SECCEL
/
LETECKVW
241/20/0290
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT STATE
OF ВЕЬКОВЛО МІДНОЛІ THE Ot THE EXECUTIVE SECKEIVKA
*
*
UNITED STATES OF
Department of State TELEGRAM
2
SECRET 564
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02451 221214Z
11
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
087156
P R 221145Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 7309
SECRE T BEIRUT 2451
EXDIS
FROM BERGUS FOR MARTHINSEN
RE STATE 044730 PLEASE INFORM MOHAMED RIAD I WILL HAVE
IMPORTANT USG COMMUNICATION TO GIVE HIM EARLY TUESDAY 25TH.
YOU MIGHT SUGGEST TO MOHAMED THAT FONMIN MAY WISH PER-
SONALLY RECEIVE ME FOR THIS IMPORTANT PRESENTATION.
PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DISARTMENT
OF
UNITED
AMERICA STATE *
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET 806
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02425 211523Z
3
41
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
080540
PI R 211222Z MARI 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7298
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
S: El E T BEIRUT 2425
EXDIS
REF $ STATE 041480
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF QUESTIONS SUBMITTED B JARRING TO GOL
WHICHI WERE PROVIDED US BY PRESIDENT HELOU:
EX@
" SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIN 242 (1967) SETS OUT PROVISIONS
AND PRINCIPLES IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED
SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION SHOULD BE ACHIEVED. SOME
OF THESE PROVISIONS WOULD IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES,
SOME ON ONE SIDE, AND SOME ON THE OTHER. IT HAS GENERALLY BEEN
ACCEPTED THAT THEY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A WHOLE THE FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS DESIGNED TO ELICIT THE ATTITUDE OF THE PARTIES TOWARDS
THE PROVISIONS OFTHE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ARE BASED ON
THIS ASSUMPTION AND ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE CONTEXT THAT
EACH PROVISION IS REGARDED AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL ®
I 1. DOES LEBANON ACCEPT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 (1967)
FOR IMPLEMENTATION FOR ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLE-
MENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTIOM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVI-
SIONS AND PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTION?
2. DOES LEBANON AGREE TO PLEDGE TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR
STATES OF BELLIGERENCY WITH ISRAEL?
3. DOES LEBANON AGREE TO PLEDGE RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGE
MENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL IN-
DEPENDENCE OF ISRAEL?
4. DOES LEBANON ACCEPT THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO LIVE IN
PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS
OR ACTS OF FORCE?
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
*
*
Department of State
EXEC
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02425 211523Z
5% IF SO, WHAT IS THE CONCEPTION OF SECURE AND RECOGNIZED
BOUNDARIES HELD BY LEBANON?
60 DOES LEBANON AGREE THAT's IF A PLAN FOR THE JUST SETTLEMENT
OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IS WORKED OUT AND PRESENTED TO THE PARTIES
FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION THE ACCEPITANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF SUCH A
PLAN BY THE PARTIES AND THE DECLARATION OF THEIR INTENTION TO
IMPLEMENT IT IN GOOD FAITH CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION
OF THIS PROVISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO JUS-
TIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTHER PROVISIONS?
7 ᵒ DOES LEBANON AGREE THAT THE TERRITORIAL INVIOLABILITY AND
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES IN THE AREA SHOULD BE
GUARANTEED:
(A) BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES:
(B) THROUGH ADDITIONAL MEASURES?
8. DOES LEBANON AGREE THAT DEMILITARIZATION OF SUCH ZONES SHOULD
BE SUPERVISED AND MAINTAINED BY THE UNITED NATIONS?
9. WOULD LEBANON ACCEPT AS A FINAL ACT OF AGREEMENT ON ALL
PROVISIONS A MUTUALLI SIGNED MULTILATERAL DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD
INCORPORATE THE AGREED CONDITIONS FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE."
PORTER
SECRET
HEL/40/0290
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE Reproduced the Richard Nixon 3/08/19 Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
=
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOYED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 135 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL sheet
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential Library Form 101 (revised 6-85)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
IN
STATE
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 385 POSS DUPE
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00163 2023402
EXEMS EXEMS
81
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
035318
R 2016352 FEB 69
02
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7104
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
S ERCOR ET BEIRUT 1632
EXDIS
SUBJ: CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON
REF: STATE 23327: BEIRUT 1325
1) THERE HAS BEEN BLACKLASH HERE RE LEBANESE ATTEMPTS GET
OIL-RICH ARAB STATES ASSIST IN APPLYING PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN
TO KEEP LEBANON. ISRAEL BORDER QUIET. LEBANESE PLANS SEEM TO
HAVE LEAKED PREMATURELY AND CERTAIN MUSLIM ELEMENTS IN GOL
WHO WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY INFORMED) HAVE OBJECTED.
FORTUNATELY,
MATTER NOT YET IN PUBLIC DOMAIN.
2) RESULT OF ISSUE BECOMING CONFESSIONAL POLITICAL FOOTBALL
IS THAT LEBANESE MAY HAVE TO DROP IDEA. IN ANY CASE, AND
EVEN IF IDEA IS REVIVED, APPROACHES TO OTHER ARAB STATES
WILL NOT BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS,
BUT THROUGH SPECIAL EMISSARIES WHOSE IDENTITIES OR ACTIVITIES
PROBABLY WILL NOT BE KNOWN TO LEBANESE EMBASSIES IN
SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND LIBYA.
31 UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES: WOULD APPRECIATE USG AND US AMBASSADORS
IN COUNTRIES CONCERNED MAKE NO FURTHER MENTION ANY CONTEMPLATED
LEBANESE APPROACHES TO SAG, KUWAIT OR LIBYA ON FEDAYEEN SUBJECT,
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED DECLASSIFIED OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
at the Richard Nixon
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
UP
STATE
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00163 202340Z
EITHER TO CONCERNED HOST GOVERNMENTS OR TO LEBANESE EMBASSIES.
4) GOL WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY CONTINUING EFFORTS USG CAN
EXERT WHICH WILL HAVE EFFECT CURBING FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN
LEBANON. THEY URGE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE BE NO INDICATION OF A
CONCERTED US LEBANESE EFFORT ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE. THIS,
UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, MIGHT BE SELF-DEFEATING.
5' IF THIS INTERNAL CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM CONFLICT WITHIN
GOL CAN BE RESOLVED, I EXPECT GOL WILL MAKE SOME DISCREET
APPROACHES AND ADVISE ME OF OUTCOME ONLY AFTER THE FACT.
1 WILL THEN DECIDE WHETHER TO INFORM PRESIDENT HELOU IN
VERY GENERAL TERMS WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
ACCOMPLISH THROUGH OUR OWN EFFORTS.
61 IN CLARIFICATION ONE OTHER POINT, IT SHOULD BE MADE
CLEAR GOL HAS NEVER ASKED USG TO DO MORE THAN ASK IMPORTANT
FINANCIAL SUPPORTERS OF FEDAYEEN TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO
KEEP LEBANESE-ISRAELI ISRAELI BORDER QUIET. THIS WILL BE MANI
BURDEN OF LEBANESE ARGUMENT, AS WELL, IF THEY DECIDE TO TAKE
EX@
INITIATIVE. LEBANESE UNDERSTAND THAT ANY ATTEMPTS ON THEIR
PART TO DRY UP FINANCIAL AID FROM OIL STATES TO PALESTINE
RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WOULD NOT ONLY FAIL, BUT WOULD BRING
FEDAYEEN REPRISALS ON LEBANON.
PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODU ) WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATIC OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
981/40/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OR AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SUMMARY
SECRET 474
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01325 111822Z
47
ACTION NEA 15
INFO AF 12 EUR CIAE 00,DODE 00,JPM 04,H 02, INR 07,L 03NSAE 00,
NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS USIA 12,SAH 02,10 13,ACDA 16,
AID 28, RSR 01/167 W
108668
R 1115354 FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7045
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
S ECR E T BEIRUT 1325
SUBJECT: CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON.
1. PRESIDENT HELOU'S CONFIDEANT MICHEL KHOURY ASKED ME TO
CALL ON HIM AT HIS HOME EVENING FEB 10. KHOURY SAID THAT
HELOU WANTED USG TO KNOW THAT WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS HE WAS
SENDING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO JIDDA, KUWAIT AND TRIPOLI
TO URGE RULERS THESE THREE COUNTRIES TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE
WITH FEDAYEEN GROUPS, ESPECIALLY EL FATEH, TO LIMIT THEIR
ACTIVITIES ON LEBANES TERRITORY. AS MAJOR CONTRIUBTORS OF
FUNDS TO FEDAYEEN, THEY WERE IN GOOD POSITION EXERT SUCH
PRESSURE. THESE SPECIAL EMISSARIES, WHOSE MISSIONS WOULD
BE PARALLELED BY ACTION LEBANESE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN
THE THREE ARAB CAPITALS, WOULD EXPLAIN DANGERS POSED TO
LEBANONS STABILITY BY FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY ON LEBANESE TER-
RITORY, AS WELL AS THREAT OF ISRAELI ATTACKS IN RETALIATION
FOR FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS MOUNTED IN LEBANON AGAINST ISRAEL
2. HELOU ASKED IF USG WOULD BE WILLING ASSIST GOL IN JIDDA,
TRIPOLI AND KUWAIT BY MAKING SIMILAR DEMARCHES TO THE THREE
RULERS AND/OR THEIR GOVERNMENTS. I TOLD KHOURY THAT US
AMBASSADORS THESE THREE CAPITALS HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01325 111822Z
POINTED OUT TO RULERS AND OFFICIALS DANGERS INHERENT THEIR
FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON AND
JORDAN, EMPHASIZING THREAT POSED TO THE MODERATE ARAB RE-ACTIVITIESTH
ERE. I TOLD KHOURY I WOULD OF COURSE INFORM OUR
AMBASSADORS TO THE THREE COUNTRIES OF LEBANON'S CURRENT
EFFORTS AND ASSURED HIM THAT OUR AMBASSADORS COULD BE RE-
LIED UPON TO CONTINUE POINTING OUT DANGERS INVOLVED IN CON.
TINUED FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO FEDAYEEN
3. LEBANESE BELIEVE SITUATION NOW GETTING CRITICAL AND MAY
SOON GET OUT OF CONTROL. THEREFORE, LEBANESE LOOKING FOR
ASSISTANCE FROM EVERY POSSIBLE QUARTER. WE REALIZE THAT
LEBANESE REQUEST CREATES PROBLEM FOR USG BY ENGAGING IN
WHAT APPEARS TO BE ANTI-FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. BUT TO KEEP
L'EBANON FROM BEING PLUNGED ACTIVELY INTO ARAB ISRAELI CON-
FLICT AT TIME OF NEW INITIATIVES ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT,
DEPT MAY WISH TO CONSIDER FEASIBILITY OF ENGAGING IN CON-
CERTED EFFORT WITH LEBANON VISA
-VIS SAG, KUWAIT AND LIBYA.
PORTER
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixoa Presidential Library
141/40/0290
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DRIVE OF STATE
Department of State
UNING
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
881
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00888 2818222
2
47
ACTION SS 30
NFO 1030 W
025148
R 281716Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6953
$ E C R E T BEIRUT 0888
EXDIS
SUBJEC: LEBANON'S POLITICAL CRISIS.
1.° LEBANON'S POLITICAL CRISIS HAS CONTINUED FOR SEVERAL WEEKS
NOW AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT IT COULD TAKE AN UGLY TURN
TN COURSE NEXT FEW DAYS. CHAMOUN-LED TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE HAS
SHOWN SURPRISING SOLIDARILY AND APPEARS DETERMINED CAUSE FALL
OF PRESENT KARAME GOVT, FROM WHICH PHALANGISTS AND FOLLOWERS
OF RAYMOND EDDE HAVE WITHDRAWN IN PROTEST AT CONTINUED EXCLU-
EXEMS EXE
SION MEMBER OF CHAMOUN'S LIBERAL PARTY FROM CABINET. ALLIANCE
is NOT AGAINST KARAME, WHO IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS BEST PRIMIN
CHOICE AVAILABLE, BUT AGAINST CONTINUED VETO ON CHAUMOUN, WHICH
THEY VIEW AS LAST STRAW IN LONG SERIES OF BLOWS TO FORMER
CHRISTIAN POLITICAL DOMINANCE
2. EARLIER WE HAD THOUGHT THAT RAYMOND EDDE'S VIEW THAT AL-
LANCE SHOULD REMAIN AS PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION WOULD PREVAIL
AND THAT CHAMOUNIST AND PHALANGISTS WOULD PERMIT CHEHABIST
GOVERNMENT BEAR unpleasant TASK OF DEALING WITH FEDAYEEN,
CONSCRIPTION ISSSUE AND OTHER DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. IT NOW AP.
PEARS THAT CHAMOUNISTS AND PHALANGISTSN AT LEAST, HAVE DUG
IN THEIR HEELS AND INTEND MAKE FRONTAL ASSAULT ON KARAME GO.
VERNMENT.
3° CHAMOUNISTS AND PHALANGISTS HAVE BOTH LET IT BE KNOWN
THAT THEY INTEND FIGHT KARAME GOVT FIRST BY CALLING GENERAL
STRIKE (KARGELY OF CHRISTIAN MERCHANTS, ET.) FOLLOWED IF NECES-
SARY BY DEMONSTRATIONS, MASS MEETINGS AND, AS LAST RESORT,
"STREET ACTION TO BRING DOWNFALL OF KARAME7S CHEHABIST GOVT.
THIS COULD, OF COURSE, LEAD TO STREET CLASHES, WHICH PROBABLY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
It
STATES
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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00888 281822Z
WOULD BE BASICALLY CHRISTIANS AGAINST MOSLEMS.
4. EMBASSY HAS CONSISTENTLY AND EMPHATICALLY WARNED OUR
FRIENDS IN TRIPARTITIE ALLIANCE THAT WORST THING THAT COULD
HAPPEN AT THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD FOR LEBANON IS CONFESSIONAL
STRIFE, WHICH WOULD HAVE UNPREDICTABLE AND DANGEROUS CONSE-
QUENCES FOR LEBANON AND PARTICULARLY FOR CHRISTIAN ELEMENT.
WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT USG WOULD DEPLORE ANY SUCH MOSLEM/
CHRISTIAN CONFRONTATION AND COULD NOT BE RELIED UPON TO PRO-
VIDE ASSISTANCE TO CHRISTIANS IN SUCH EVENT. THERE HAVE BEEN
SEVERAL PROBES FROM CHRISTIAN GROUPS IN LAST SEVERAL WEEKS
FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE WHICH EMBASSY HAS REJECTED.
5. TODAY (28TH) CHAMOUN SENT EMISSARY TO EMBASSY TO SEEK Us
SUPPORT IN PRESENT POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND SPECIFICALLY TO RE-
QUEST ARMS FOR PHALANGISTS AND CHAMOUNISTS TO BOLSTER CHRISTIANS
IN ANY MOSLEM/CHRISTIAN STRUGGLE IF SUCH SHOULD EVOLVE. EMBOFF,
SPEAKING DIRECTLY FOR AMBASSADOR, TOLD EMISSARY IN FLAT TERMS
THAT US WOULD NOT BECOMEINVOLVED IN PRESENT INTERNAL POLITICAL
STRUGGLE BETWEEN CHEHAB AND ALLIANCE, USG WOULD CERTAINLY CON-
TRIBUTE NO REPEAT NO ARMS TO ANYONE FOR USE IN SUCH CONFLICT
IN LEBANON, NO US ASSISTANCE COULD BE RELIED UPON TO ASSIST
CHRISTIANS IN ANY BATTLE WITH MOSLEMS HERE, AND USG DISAGREED
COMPLETELY WITH ALLIANCE'S IDEA OF TRYING BRING DOWN PRESENT
KARAME GOVT VIA STRIKES, DEMONSTRATIONS, STREET ACTION, ETC.
CHAMOUN'S EMISSARY WAS PROPERLY INDIGNANT (THOUGH PROBABLY NOT
sURPRISED) AT US POSITION, WHICH HE RELUCTANTLY UNDERTOOK
CONVEY TO CHAMOUN AND HIS LIEUTENANTS, WHO WERE TO MEET LATER
IN MAY TO DECIDE COURSE OF ACTION THEY WOULD TAKE. WE LATER
CONDUCTED SIMILAR EXERCISE WHITH PHALANGIST REP, WHO INDICATED
THAT PHALANGE LEADERSHIP COOLING DOWN AND WERE NOT ADVOCATING
MUCH MORE MODERATE LINE THAN ORIGINALLY.
EXCES
6 WE TRUST THAT RAYMOND EDDE'S EARLIER IDEA OF ALLIANCE'S
-ONFINING ITS POLITICAL ACTION TO SERVING AS OPPOSITION IN
PARLIAMENT WILL PREVAIL. WE ARE LESS CONFIDENT TODAY OF THIS
REING SO, HOWEVERN, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW EDDE'S YESTERDAY'S
BITTER ATTACK AGAINST CHEHAB, WHICH HAS STIRRED EMOTIONS CON-
SIDERABLY. WE ARE MAKING CONCERTED EFFORT TO TRY TO COOL OFF
STRONG MINDED CHAMOUNISTS AND PHALANGISTS AND DISSUADE THEM
FROM ANY ACTS WHICH COULD LEAD TO STRIFE. WHILE WE INCLINED
BELIEVE REASON WILL PREVAIL, EMOTIONS ARE RUNNING HIGH
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced WITHO at UT the THE Richard Nixon residential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
10 BE ВЕЬВОДЛО
THE
OF STATE
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
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PAGE 03 BEIRUT ØØ888 281822Z
EXCES EXEMS
PARTICULARLY AMONG ANTI-CHEHABISTS, WHO APPEAR DETERMINED TO
TOPPLE PRESENT GOVT AND ACHIEVE BY-PRODUCT OF REMOVING ARMY
G-2 FROM POLITICAL ACTIVITY.
7 AMB HAS SENT WORD TO PRESIDENT HELOU TODAY IN RESPONSE
HIS QUERY THAT US NOT INTERVENING IN THIS LEBANESE INTERNAL
STRUGGLE, AND THAT USG HAS MADE NO COMMITMENTS OR PROMISES
OF ASSISTANCE TO ANY POLITICAL GROUPS. HELOU ASKED OUR
SUPPORT TO CONVINCE MILITANT CHRISTIANS THEYWERE RUNNING
RISK OF PRECIPITATING A BATTLE, WHICH THEY COULD NOT WIN AND
WHICH WOULD IN LONG RUN DESTROY THEM AND CONCEPT OF A CONFES-
SIONALLY BALANCED LEBANON. THIS WE HAVE DONE. PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.