Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
266848783
label
LEBANON VOL. III January 1971-October 1973 [2 of 3]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
266848783
contentType
document
title
LEBANON VOL. III January 1971-October 1973 [2 of 3]
citationUrl
collections
National Security Files (Nixon Administration)
Central Files
iiifBase
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
266848783
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
url
mediaId
ec9b963a0303b8e2
ocrText
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
CALLED STATES
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 204
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12587 3016322
42
ACTION SS=30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
115717
R 3015357 OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4961
S E C R E T BEIRUT 12587
EXDIS
EO 11652; GDS
TAGS: PFOR XF LE
SUBJ: FRANGIE'S VIEWS ON NEXT STEP
SUMMARY: PRES FRANGIE STATES: (1) US HAS ABOUT
TWO MONTHS IN WHICH TO MAKE BREAK=THROUGH TOWARD PEACE
SETTLEMENT BEFORE THERE IS FULLY UNITED ARAB STAND AGAINST
US ECONOMIC INTERESTS; (2) SMALL UN PEACE=KEEPING FORCE SHOULD BE
STATIONED IN SOUTHERN LEBANON; (3) GOL WISHES PARTICIPATE
IN EARLY STAGE OF PEACE NEGUTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.
1. IN MEETING OCT 30 AT MY REQUEST FOR TOUR HORIZON,
PRES FRANGIE DEVELOPED FOLLOWING IDEAS:
A . IT IS MORE IMPERATIVE THAN US REALIZES TO PROVE
WE ARE DETERMINED TO BRING EARLY PEACE TO MIDDLE EAST.
ARABS ARE DEEPLY ALIENATED BY OUR SUPPORT OF
ISRAEL AND DISTRUSTFUL THAT US MAY LET SITUATION DRIFT
AS WE HAVE SINCE 1967, WITHOUT PUSHING VIGOROUSLY FOR
DEFINITIVE PEACE SETTLEMTNT. HE SAID NOW THAT EVEN
CONSERVATIVE KING FETSAL HAS JOINTED RANKS OF THOSE WILL-
ING TO USE PETROLEUM WEAPON AGAINST us, WE WILL
SEE ESCALATION OF ECONOMIC PRESSURES DESIGNED TO COMPEL
US TO BRING ABOUT AN EARLY SETTLEMENT, WITH ARAB STATES
OUTBIDDING EACH OTHER TO SHOW WHAT GOOD ARABS THEY
ARE. HE FEARS RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF WHAT HE CALLED
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXPEN
UNITED
same
/
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12587 301632Z
"ARAB COMMON MARKET" WHERE THERE WOULD BE INCREASINGLY
UNITED STAND AGAINST ALL US ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN MIDDLE
EAST UNLESS WE PRODUCE RESULTS SHOWING THAT WE ARE NOT
ENGAGED ON CONTRIBUTION OF POST 167 POLICIES WHICH
CONTAINED PROMISES OUT NO RESULTS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN
THAT PERHAPS USG DID NOT FULLY REALIZE MAGNITUDE OF
THREAT FROM FUTURE ARAB OIL BOYCOTT WHICH HE LIVENED
TO CHILD BEING HANDED LOADED GUN.
B. RE LEBANESE-ISRAELI FRONTIER, HE NOTED QUIET
HAS REIGNED LAST TWO NIGHTS, HOWEVER, HE FEARED THIS MAY
NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. BOTH TO FORESTALL FEDAYEEN
CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS AND IMMODERATE ISRAELI RESPONSE,
HE CONFIDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A UN FORCE
STATIONED IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, I EXPRESSED SOME DOUBT
SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE WILLING TO APPROVE SUCH
OPERATION WHICH BOTH COSTLY AND LOGISTICALLY DIFFICULT,
GIVEN ITS PREOCCUPATION IN EGYPT WHERE THERE HAD BEEN
MAJOR HOSTILITIES AS OPPOSED TO MINOR BORDER INCIDENTS
IN LEBANON. FRANGIE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS, BUT SAID HE FELT
GROUNDWORK SHOULD BE LAID NOW FOR LONGER RANGE UN PEACE-
KEEPING MISSION HERE. THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID NEITHER
GOL NOR US SHOULD INITIATE SUCH REQUEST, BUT INTIMATED
HE HAD IN MIND APPROACHING INDIA AND AFRICAN MEMBERS OF
SC TO BEGIN CONSULTATIONS IN THIS sense. HE REQUESTED US
NOT OPPOSE SUCH PROPOSAL IF HE IS ABLE TO SECURE SUPPORT
OF NEUTRAL NATIONS ON COUNCIL. I NOTED THAT TO DO
EFFECTIVE JOB, SUBSTANTIAL UN FORCES WOULD BE REQURED.
FRANGIE REPLIED THAT INITIALLY HE WOULD BE QUITE HAPPY
TO HAVE FORCE OF A COUPLE HUNDRED MEN CHARGED WITH
PEACE-KEEPING RESPONSIBILITIES AS OPPOSED TO SIMPLE
OBSERVER MANDATE OF PRESENT UNTSO TEAM. HE
REASONED THAT IF SITUATION SHOULD HEAT UP AGAIN, ONCE
EXPIS
PRINCIPLE OF PEACE-KEEPING UNIT IS ESTABLISHED, IT
WOULD BE MUCH EASIER TO EXPAND SUCH FORCE TO SIZE REQUIRED
TO MEET ANY GIVEN SITUATION. FRANGIE ARGUED THAT SMALL
UNEF CONTINGENT ON LEBANESE SOIL ALONG ISRAELI FRONTIER
WOULD BE STABILIZING ELEMENT DURING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS,
C. FRANGIE CONFIRMED (BEIRUT 12500) THAT GOL
WISHES PARTICIPATE IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AS soor AS THEY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TH SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
form
DEPARTMENT DEP OF STATE
*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 12587 301632Z
HAVE ADVANCED BEYOND THE STAGE OF DEALING WITH CEASEFIRE
LINES AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO PERMANENT BOUNDARIES
WITH EGYPT AND JORDAN. HE REASONS THAT DISCUSSION OF
ANY PERMANENT BOUNDARIES IN AREA MUST INCLUDE
TRANSFORMATION OF PRESENT ARMISTICE LINE BETWEEN LEBANON
AND ISRAEL INTO PERMANENT BOUNDARY AND APPRECIATES THAT
SUCH DISCUSSIONS WILL QUICKLY INVOLE QUESTION
OF
ARAB UNDERTAKINGS VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL, E.G., COMMITMENTS
TO ISRAEL, SUCH AS WOULD BE EXPECTED BY ISRAEL
IN A PEACE TREATY AS QUID PRO QUO FOR WITHDRAWAL.
ADDITIONAL ELEMENT IN DISCUSSIONS WHICH WILL REMAIN
BUFFUM CRITICAL FOR LEBANON, HE SAID, IS STATUS OF PALESTINIANS.
EXCESS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUPTHEAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
WH
SECRET 999
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12488 261235Z
2
43
ACTION SS-30
In
EXAIS
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
085721
R 261015Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4920
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
$ E C R E T BEIRUT 12488
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, XF, LE
SUBJECT: FEDAYEEN THREAT TO CEASEFIRE
REF: BEIRUT 12470 AND 12479
SUMMARY: WITH CEASEFIRE IN SYRIA AND EGYPT AND UN
ASSISTANCE TO ENSURE IT HOLDS, PROBLEM OF PREVENTING
FEDAYEEN FROM DISRUPTING CEASEFIRE AND ONGOING NEGOTIA-
TIONS BECOMES MUCH MORE IMPORTANT. GOL TAKING VIGOROUS
ACTION MEET CHALLENGE OUTSIDE SUPPORT. LEADERS OF
LARGER FEDAYEEN GROUPS APPEAR TO HAVE TEMPORARILY BOWED
TO PRESSURE FROM ARAB GOVTS AND SAY THEY WILL COOPERATE
WITH GOL ON CEASEFIRE. HOWEVER, SMALLER, RADICAL GROUPS
APPEAR LESS COOPERATIVE. SABOTAGE OPERATION INSIDE
ISRAEL, TERRORISM, AND SOME MINOR CROSS-BORDER OPERA-
TIONS LIKELY CONTINUE, DESPITE CEASEFIRE. ATTITUDE
OF USSR RAISE THIS QUESTION WITH sovs. END SUMMARY.
1. AS REPORTED REFTEL, GOL AWARE OF ITS ADDED
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON IF SC RESOLUTION 338 TO BE IMPLEMENTED. GOVT
AWARE THAT ITS MILITARY WEAKNESS AND OPEN SOCIETY MAKE
LEBANON CENTER OF FEDAYEEN OPPOSITION, GOL ALSO AWARE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
PEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SEATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12488 2612352
THAT INFILTRATION OR FIRING FROM LEBANON ASSUMES MUCH
GREATER SIGNIFICANCE IN ISRAELI EYES WHEN THERE IS NO
MILITARY ACTION ELSEWHERE, AND THEREFORE MUCH MORE
LIKELY PROVOKE RETALIATION. GOLDA MEIR'S WARNING IN
KNESSET ADDRESS RECEIVED HERE LOUD AND CLEAR,
2. EVENTS OF LAST MAY CLEARLY REVEALED LIMITATIONS ON
GOL'S ABILITY IMPOSE FIRM CONTROL ON ALL FEDAYEEN
ACTIVITIES. NEITHER BLANCE OF MILITARY FORCE NOR
INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION HAS EVOLVED IN GOL FAVOR
SINCE THEN. THEREFORE GOL WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE
OUTSIDE SUPPORT IF IT IS TO IMPOSE AND MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE
CEASEFIRE ON FEDAYEEN.
3. MOST IMPORTANT FEDAYEEN GROUPS IN LEBANON ARE
SA'IQA (PLUS SOME PLA) WHICH RESPONSIVE TO DAMASCUS,
AND FATAH WHICH IS INDEPENDENT BUT CAN BE INFLUENCED
BY SYRIA, EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT. SYRIAN
ATTITUDE TOWARD FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON IS MOST
IMPORTANT SINGLE OUTSIDE FACTOR AS SEEN IN EVENTS OF LAST
MAY. GOL HAS THEREFORE BEEN IN ALMOST DAILY CONTACT
WITH SARG ON THIS QUESTION AND IS RECEIVING STEADY
STREAM OF ASSURANCES OF FULL COOPERATION, INCLUDING PROMISES
MADE BY PRESIDENT ASSAD TO PRIME MINISTER SOLH IN
DAMASCUS OCT 21 AND MORE RECENT PROMISES MADE BY PHONE.
RECENT SYRIAN ASSURANCES SEEM BE GENUINE JUDING BY LIMITED
FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY OCT 24 AND 25, ALTHOUGH GOL FEARS
SARG COULD EASILY CHANGE POLICY SHOULD INTERNAL POLITICAL
SITUATION CHANGE. GOL ALSO MAINTAING CONTACT WITH
SAUDIS AND KUWAIT IN HOPES OF GETTING HELP WITH FATAH.
DESPITE APPARENT COOPERATION OF MAJOR FEDAYEEN LEADERS
WITH CEASEFIRE, GOL KNOWS THAT IT MUST EXPECT TROUBLE
ALONG BORDER FROM EXTREMIST FATAH MEMBERS AS WELL AS FROM
PFLP AND PDFLP. AMRY BELIEVES IT CAN DEAL WITH MOST
OF THESE THREATS so LONG AS MAJOR FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS
STAY OUT.
4g ATTITUDE OF USSR TOWARD FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON IS
NATYRALLY VERY IMPORTANT. WE HOPE THAT CONSTRUCTIVE
ATTITUDE DISPLAYED BY SOVS IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON
RES 338 SUBSEQUENT RESES WILL ALSO APPLY TO FEDAYEEN
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
Department of State
UNITED and STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 12488 2612352
EXQIC EXCES
PROBLEM, IF USSR WILLING THROW ITS WEIGHT BEHIND EFFORTS
RESTRAIN FEDAYEEN, BOTH IN ITS DIRECT CONTACTS WITH
THEM AND IN ITS CONTACTS WITH OTHER ARAB GOVTS, CHANCES
OF IMPOSING CEASEFIRE ON FEDAYEEN WILL BE MUCH IMPROVED,
5. IN ADDITION TO DIFFICULTY OF IMPOSING CEASEFIRE ON
FEDAYEEN, THERE WILL ALSO BE PROBLEM OF CONTINUING
SABOTAGE ACTIVITY INSIDE ISRAELI-CONTROLLED TERRITORY AND
CONTINUING TERRORISM. IT EVEN POSSIBLE THAT TERRORISTS
WOULD STRIKE INCREASINGLY AT ARAB TARGETS, ESPECIALLY IN
COUNTRIES BELIEVED READY TO "SELL OUT" PALESTINIAN
CAUSE. THIS COULD RESEMBLE PATTERN OF PAST
FEDAYEEN ACTIONS VIS. JORDAN, AND TERRORISTS WOULD
LIKELY BE SUPPORTED BY EXYREMIST ARAB GOVTS UNHAPPY WITH
SC RES 338, (E.G., IRAQ, LIBYA AND PERHAPS ALGERIA).
NEED TO GENERATE ARAB AND SOVIET PRESSURES TO DEAL
WITH THESE PROBLEMS IS CLEAR, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT
REASLISTICALLY THIS SHOULD BE TACKLED AT LATER STAGE,
CONCENTRATING PRESENT EFFORTS ON EASTER PROBLEM OF
IMPOSING CEASEFIRE.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
DEPARTMENT
%
STATE
Department of State
EXET
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
WH
SECRET 655
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12487 261028Z
3
14
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00
EXPIC
USSS-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
084702
P R 260935Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4919
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
SECRE T BEIRUT 12487
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
EXAIS
TAGS: PINS, LE, IS
SUBJECT: FEDAYEEN CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS
REF: BEIRUT 12470, 12479
1. LEBANESE ARMY AND UNTSO REPORT VERY FEW INCIDENTS
OF CROSS-BORDER FIRING OR OTHER FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY NIGHT
OF OCT 24 AND DAY AND NIGHT OCT 25. THIS FOLLOWS SAIQA,
FATAH AND PFLP PROMISES TO LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER THAT
THEY WOULD RESPECT CEASEFIRE, AT LEAST FOR PRESENT.
2. IN CONTRAST TO RECENT INACTIVITY, LEBANESE ARMY NOW
PARTROLLING IN BORDER AREA FOLLOWING POLICY MEETING CHAIRED
BY PRES FRANGIE.
EXCES
3. IDF CONTINUED HARASSING FIRE INTO LEBANON NIGHTS
OCT 24 AND 25, DAMAGE TO SOME HOUSES AND LIVESTOCK
REPORTED BUT NO KNOWN CIVILIAN CASUALTIES,
4. COMMENT: I STRONGLY HOPE CONCURRENCE IN SEASE-
FIRE BY SAIQA AND FATAH, REPORTED REFTEL, COUPLED
WITH STRONGER GOL ACTIONS ALONG FRONTIER WILL "PRODUCE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon UTHORIZATION Presidential Library. OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
or
STATE
EXA
*
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
of
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12487 261028Z
THE DESIRED RESULT" TO USE LANGUAGE OF ALLON IN TREMENDOUSLY
HELPFUL DISCUSSION HELD WITH HIM BY AMB KEATING CTEL AVIV
8578), WE ARE DISCUSSING THE RAMIFICATION OF THIS PROBLEM IN
GREATER DEPTH IN SEPTEL LATER TODAY.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECREUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
18/20/199
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
WH
SECRET 417
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12485 260756Z
2
11
In
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO=00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00
NSAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00 /031 W
083464
0 R 260745Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4918
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
SECRET BEIRUT 12485
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, LE, IS
SUBJECT: FEDAYEEN LEADERS AGREE STOP BORDER OPERATIONS
REF: BEIRUT 12470
SADAQA INFORMS US FUTHER (OCTOBER 25) THAT AHAED GEBRIL'S
GROUP (PFLP-GC) HAS ALSO AGREED TO STOP BORDER ACTIVITIES.
PRIME MINISTER SOHL IS REQUESTING SAME FROM PFLP AND PDFLP
AND, ACCORDING TO SADAQA, IF THEY REFUSE GOL PREPARED TAKE
NECESSARY MEASURES TO ENSURE THEIR COMPLIANCE.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT of STATE
*
*
STATE AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 734
EXPIC EXPIC EXCLU
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12479 251609Z
44
2
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
076197
0 2515557 OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4915
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T BEIRUT 12479
EXDIS
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS LE IS
SUBJ: FEDAYEEN LEADERS AGREE STOP BORDER OPERATIONS
REF: BEIRUT 12470
SADAQA INFORMS us FURTHER COCTOBER 25) THAT AHMED GEBRIL'S
GROUP (PDFLP - DC) HAS ALSO AGREED TO STOP BORDER ACTIVITIES.
PRIME MINISTER SOLH IS REQUESTING SAME FROM PFLP AND PDFLP
AND, ACCORDING TO SADAQA, IF THEY REFUSE GOL PREPARED TAKE
NECESSARY MEASURES TO ENSURE THEIR COMPLIANCE.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER INSTRUCTIONS SS-0,
MR. FINNERTY.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
PARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 571
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12470 251502Z
2
42
ACTION SS=30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO=00 CCO=00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE=00
EXATE
INRE-00 /031 W
075609
0 2514437 OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4908
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECRE T BEIRUT 12470
EXDIS
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS LE IS
SUBJ: FEDAYEEN LEADERS AGREE TO STOP BORDER OPERATIONS
REF: BEIRUT 12333
NEGIB SADAKA, SECRETARY GENEGOL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, TELEPHONED DCM TO SAY THAT PRIME MINISTER SOLH HAD
ONCE AGAIN SPOKEN FIRMLY AND FRANKLY WITH LEADERS OF BOTH
FATAH AND SAIQA, LEADERS BOTH GROUPS AGREED CEASE ALL
ACTIVITIES ON BORDER ON CONDITION THAT: (A) ISRAEL OBSERVE
CEASEFIRE, AND (B) ISRAEL SUBSEQUENTLY (PRESUMABLY IN PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS) PUBLICLY RECOGNIZED PALESTINIAN RIGHTS
AND THEIR CAUSE (SADAKA INDICATED FEDAYEEN LEADERS RATHER
VAGUE ON SECOND CONDITION). SADAKA EMPHASIZED GOL WAS
VIGILANT AND WAS DOING ALL IT COULD TO KEEP BORDER QUIET.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. FINNERTY, S/SO,
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DS-1652
ио
of
DEP
STATE
WH
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 661
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12333 220940Z
2
13
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
047620
o 220750Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4845
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT 12333
EXDIS
CORRECTED COPY (PARA 5)
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, IS
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCUL RESOLUTION RE CEASEFIRE
1. DIRECTOR GENERAL FOREIGN OFFICE, SADAQA, CALLED ME
EARLY OCTOBER 22 TO CONGRATULATE US ON SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION AND TO SAY LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS FULLY CONSCIOUS OF
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FOR LEBANON. I EXPRESSED PLEASURE
AT THIS, NOTING THAT THE RESOLUTION HAD CALLED UPON ALL
PARTIES RPT ALL PARTTEIS TO THE FIGHTING TO CEASE ALL
FIRING, WHICH CLEARLY MEANT FEDAYEEN WERE GOING TO HAVE
TO STOP ALL ACTIVITIES FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY.
2. SADAQA SAID GOL MOST CONSCIOUS OF THIS, THAT SUBJECT
EXPIS
HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE IN EARLY HOURS
THIS MORNING. PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD ORDER NECESSARY DISPOSIT-
TON OF LEBANESE FORCES TO DO THEIR BEST TO ASSURE CEASEFIRE
IS RESPECTED. HE ASKED THAT WE DO WHAT WE COULD TO
ASSURE THAT IN THE IMMEDIATE PERIOD AHEAD ISRAELIS DO NOT
OVERREACT TO ISOLATED INCIDENTS, SHOULD THEY OCCUR.
3. I RECOMMENDED GOL CONVENE IMMEDIATELY MEETING OF
UN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION AND INFORM ISRAELIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TRANTMENT
of
STATE
EXPIS
Department of State
SENTE AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12333 220940Z
THAT THEY RECOGNIZE SC CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION APPLIES
TO LEBANON ALSO AND WHAT THEY ARE DOING TO IMPLEMENT
IT. HE APPRECIATED SUGGESTION AND SAID HE WOULD PURSUE
IT.
EXAIS
4. SINCE FOREGOING CONVERSATION, HAVE JUST RECEIVED
TEL AVIV'S 8441. I AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO AMBASSADOR
KEATING FOR HIS EXTREMELY HELPFUL INITIATIVE WITH EBAN,
LATTER'S COMMENTS ON ISRAEILI ATTITUDE ARE MOST
USEFUL IN PRESSING OUR CASE WITH LEBANESE
THAT THEY MUST TAKE STERNER MEASURES TO RESTRAN
FEDAYEEN. I SHALL GET BACK IN TOUCH WITH GOL
IMMEDIATELY AND DRAW ON HIS REMARKS AS SUGGESTED.
IN MEANTIME, IN ANY FUTHER DISCUSSION AMBASSADOR
KEATING MAY HAVE, HE IS FREE TO USE ANY AND ALL OF
COMMENTS MADE TO ME BY SADAQA.
5, WE UNDERSTAND PRESIDENT FRANGIE CONVOKING URGENT
MEETING WITH ARMY C-IN-C AND OTHER KEY OFFICIAL TO
DECIDE ON MEASURES OF CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN. ONE OF
CRITICAL QUESTIONS TO WHICH GOL SEEKING ANSWER IS
WHETHER SYRIA WILL IMPOSE STRICT ORDERS ON SAIQA
AND PLA UNITS IN LEBANON TO RESPECT CEASEFIRE.
SAIQA/PLA UNITS BELIVED RESPONSIVE TO SARG ORDERS
HAVE MOVED INTO BORDER AREAS, ESPECIALLLY ARKUB, IN
LARGE NUMBERS SINCE OCTOBER 6.
BUFFUM
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O
HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMOUNT
TELEGRAM
73 OCT 17 AM 8 06
SECRET 560
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12187 162007Z
EXPIS EXPIS
64
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 USSS-00
INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
120636
OR 1617207 OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4775
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCEUR
JCS
NSC
SECRE T BEIRUT 12187
EXDIS
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMER
SUBJECT: E AND E PLANNING
REF: STATE 204191
1. CURRENT SITREP CONTAINED BEIRUT
12163, BETRUT IS CALM
AND OPERATIONS WITHIN CITY ARE RELATIVELY NORMAL. PORT IS ALL
BUT CLOSED WITH PRINCIPAL SHIPPING LINES HAVING CANCELLED
CALLS DUE TO EXTREMELY HIGH INSURANCE RATES NOW IN FORCE.
AIRPORT IS OPEN ALTHOUGH REPORTS ARE THAT FLIGHTS ARE 70 PERCENT
OF NORMAL. SO FAR THERE HAS APPEARED TO BE NO RUN ON
FOODSTUFFS AND SUPPLIES SEEM ADEQUATE.
2. FOLLOWING ARE OUR VIEWS ON QUESTIONS, PARA 2 REFTEL:
A. AS FEW AMERICAN TOURISTS NOW ENTERING LEBANON
WE DO NOT BELIEVE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT WARNING AMERICAN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRANTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12187 162007Z
CITIZENS AGAINST TRAVEL TO LEBANON IS NCESSARY. WE
ALSO HAVE IN MIND LEBANESE SENSITIVITY TO SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT.
B. WE DO NOT CONDIDER IT NECESSARY AS YET TO
ENCOURAGE DEPARTURE PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS. THEY
ARE CERTAINLY AWARE RISKS OF CURRENT SITUATION AND A
VERY FEW HAVE LEFT. GIVEN SIZE OF
COMMUNITY, ENCOURAGEMENT TO LEAVE COULD NOT BE HANDLED
DISCREETLY. LIKELY RESULT WOULD BE MASS EXODUS, WHICH
WE DO NOT YET WISH ENCOURAGE.
C. WE ARE NOT YET RECOMMENDING AN
EVACUATION, LIMITED OR OTHERWISE.
3. WE ESTIMATE POTENTIAL PRIVATE AMERICAN EVACUEES
AT 4500 AND TOURISTS AT 250 MAXIMUM.
EXBIN
4. AMERICAN CITIZENS IN SYRIA. WE HAVE
COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES WITH DAMASCUS. WOULD CONSE-
QUENTLY PREFER ASSESSMENT REQUESTED REFTEL BE SOUGHT THROUGH
EMBASSYROME, WE ESTIMATE ABOUT 250 AMERICANS IN SYRIA.
BELIEVE MAJORITY IN DAMASCUS AREA WITH ABOUT 30 IN ALEPPO AND FEW
SCATTERED THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. AS OF MOMENT BELIEVE COULD BE
EVACUATED FROM DAMASCUS TO BEIRUT OR VIA TURKEY
ALTHOUGH WITH ISRAELI BOMBING OF HAMA THAT MAY BE
MORE DANGEROUS ROUTE.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
98/20/199
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPAI
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 710
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12020 111102Z
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
2111
OCT 11 CRM 1:30 1 30
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00
CCO-00 /026 W
073024
P 111048Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4690
SECR E T BEIRUT 12020
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJECT: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS
REF: STATE 201367
1. SITUATION THROUGHHOUT MOST OF LEBANON REMAINS SUR-
PRISINGLY CALM. ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT THUS FAR LESS
VIRULENT THAN THAT IN 1967 WAR OR EVEN AFTER ISRAELI
RAID ON BEIRUT IN APRIL THIS YEAR.
2. HOWEVER, REPORTS BEGINNING TO APPEAR TODAY OF
AMERICAN RESUPPLY EFFORT TO ISRAEL MAY WELL CHANGE THIS
PICTURE BY TOMORROW.
3. OVERNIGHT WE HAVE FURTHER REDUCED ALL EMB FILES TO
MINIMUM REQUIRED IN EMERGENCY SITUATION (WILL BE DOWN TO
ABOUT FOUR HOURS DESTRUCTION TIME BY TOMORROW).
4, I AM KEEPING CLOSE TABS ON SITUATION. ONLY PRESENT
RECOMMENDATION ON E&E PLAN IS TO SUGGEST DEPT CONSULT
APPROPRIATE COMMERCIAL CARRIER ON PURELY CONTINGENT
BASIS TO ASSURE READY AVAILABILITY OF CHARTER AIRCRAFT
IF NEEDED.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
*
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 502
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11970 091628Z
51
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 CCO-00
USSS-00 /026 W
053373
0 0915552 OCT 73
F N AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4664
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S E C R E T BEIRUT 11970
EXDIS
E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PMIL, IS, LE
SUBJECT: ISRAELI ATTACK ON JABAL BAROUK RADAR STATION
REF: USDAO TEL AVIV 15541 TEL AVIV 7866
1. WE ARE DOUBTFUL THAT ISRAELI BOMBING OF INOPERATIVE
JABAL BAROUK RADAR STATION AND WOUNDING OF 9 LEBANESE SOLDIERS
WILL SERVE TO INCREASE GOL DETERMINATION CONTROL FEDAYEEN IF
THIS WAS ITS PURPOSE. ISRAELIS COULD HARDLY HAVE BELIEVED RADAR
CONSTITUTED THREAT SINCE THEY HAD BEEN TOLD CAND COULD EASTLY
CONFIRM) THAT IT INOPERATIVE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. CER-
TAINLY THEY COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WAS "SYRIAN RADAR
SITE... OPERATED BY SYRAINS' AS THEY CLAIM.
2. AS REPORTED OUR 11911, LEBANESE INFORMED IDF AT
OCT 7 ILMAC MEETING THAT BAROUK RADAR INOPERATIVE,
LEBANESE ARMY WAS LED TO BELIEVE AT THAT MEETING THAT
IDF NO LONGER CONSIDERED BAROUK RADAR A PROBLEM AND THAT
IDF PREPARED CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH LEBANESE WHEN SERIOUS
PROBLEMS AROSE.
3. SUDDEN BOMBING OF BAROUK RADAR
CAME AT SAME TIME AS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
SEPARTMENT
or
STATE
Department of State
UNITED 1 STATES OF O
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 11970 091628Z
BOMBING OF DAMASCUS AND HOMS WHICH HIT CIVILIAN AS WELL
AS MILITARY TARGETS. LEBANESE ARMY BELIEVES THAT BOTH
ACTIONS TEND INDICATE UNREASONING, ANGARY FRAME OF MIND
ON PART OF IDF. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, LEBANESE
ARMY LESS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO PURSUE DIALOGUE WITH IDF
OR HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT ISRAELIS REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY
SAY. MOREOVER, BOMBING OF RADAR LIKELY BECOME CONVENIENT
RALLY CRY FOR THOSE LEFTISTS AND OTHERS WHO PRESSING GOL
RELAX CONTROLS ON FEDAYEEN AND GIVE SUPPORT TO SYRIA IN
ITS TIME OF NEED.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O - MR. WRIGHT.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be 85/08/19 declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
OF
STATE
THE
NOITASIROHTUA
THE
*
Department of State
United STATES ,
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 291
FUATION ROOM
HITE HOUSE
12
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10772 120942Z
PM 12:05 05
2
20
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
069557
R 1209157 SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4198
SECRE T BEIRUT 10772
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR CH
SUBJ: CHINESE AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS
1. AT RECENT DINNER PARTY I WAS SURPRISED TO HAVE
COMMUNIST CHINESE AMBASSADOR HSU MING SEEK OUT CHAIR NEXT
TO ME AND ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION. HERETOFORE
HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN RELATIVELY CORDIAL, BUT SLIGHTLY
ALOOF.
2. AMBASSADOR ASKED IF I HAD NOTED SECTION IN TENTH
PARTY CONGRESS REPORT URGING CHINESE PEOPLE TO PREPARE
THEMSELVES AGAINST POSSIBLE SOVIET ATTACK. CHE SPOKE IN
HALTING BUT INTELLIGIBLE ENGLISH AND AVOIDED USE OF
INTERPRETER WHO SAT NEXT TO HIM).
3, I INQUIRED WHETHER HE REALLY EXPECTED SOVIETS WOULD
ATTACK CHINA. AFTER SLIGHT HESITATION, HE SAID HE
DOUBTED IT BECAUSE THEY KNEW CHINESE WOULD BE ABLE TO
REPEL THEM SUCCESSFULLY. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT SOVIETS
TRADITIONALLY SEEK OUT THE WEAKER RATHER THAN THE
STRONGER TARGET AND FELT THEY WOULD BE CONCENTRATING ON
EUROPEANS, ESPECIALLY GERMANY AND YUGOSLAVIA, PICKING
THEM OFF ONE BY ONE AS SITUATION PERMITS. HE ARGUED
THAT CURRENT SOVIET TACTIC IS TO DIVIDE EUROPEANS FROM
EACH OTHER AND us FROM EUROPE,
4 ᵃ AS TABLE TALK BECAME MORE GENERAL, PREVENTING
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Weptoduced at THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
THE AUTHORIZATION
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PARTMENT DER OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
SEALS UNITED MMK AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10772 120942Z
CONTINUATION OF THIS DIALOGUE, HE SAID HE WOULD WELCOME
OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE SUBJECT WITH ME IN FUTURE AND
HOPED I WOULD GIVE HIM A CALL, WHICH I SHALL DO.
BUFFUM
МООЯ
HIEI ON2E
IS bW 02 15:02
LETEEBVW
,13
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
hh/eo/1ea
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE
MOITASIROHTUA
ОБЩНЕ
EXECUTIVE
EXC
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
'73 SEP 15 PM 4:14
WHITE 088 HOUSE
Scoweroft
CONFIDENTIAL
SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10911 150840Z
11
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
/M
102545
0 140837Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4250
CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT 10911
EXDIS
FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJ: CONSULTATION WITH SECRETARY-DESIGNATE KISSINGER
REF: STATE 183960
1. DELIGHTED TO CONSULT WITH SECRETARY-DESIGNATE SEP 20.
2. TENTATIVELY PLAN DEPART BEIRUT 10 A.M. LOCAL
TIME SEP 19 PAN AM 001, OVERNIGHT IN NY SAME NIGHT
AND PROCEED WASHINGTON FOLLOWING MORNING.
3. WILL ADVISE OF PRECISE ARRIVAL TIME.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
THITE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
ELEGRAM
SECRET 856
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11877 061702Z
2
45
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
/026 W
037449
0 0616307 OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4610
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
S E C R E T BEIRUT 11877
EXDIS
DEPT ALSO PASS USINT CAIRO
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, XF
SUBJ: POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF CURRENT HOSTILITIES
1. NO INDICATION HERE YET WHETHER SECURITY COUNCIL
WILL BE CALLED AND IF so BY WHOM.
2. IF CURRENT REPORTS ACCURATE THAT EGYPTIANS HAVE
FOOTHOLD ON EAST BANK SUEZ AND SYRIANS HAVE TAKEN MOUNT
HERMON, I ASSUME ISRAELIS WILL RESIST SC REQUIREMENT FOR
CEASE FIRE IN PLACE UNTIL THEY HAVE DISLODGED SYRIAN AND
EGYPTIAN FORCES,
3. CONTRARIWISE, IF EGYTIAN-SYRIAN ACTION IS PRIMARILY
SYMBOLIC, AIMED AT RETAKING SMALL BIT OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY,
THEY MAY HAVE SOMEONE CALL FOR SC MEETING ASKING FOR IMMEDIATE
STANDSTILL CEASE FIRE.
4, WISH TO POINT OUT POTENTIAL RISKS IN ANY DELAY IN
IMPOSING CEASE FIRE WHICH WOULD PERMIT EXTENSION OF HOSTILI-
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 11877 0617022
TIES. LEBANESE FRONTIER STILL QUIET AND FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP
AT MOMENT APPEARS TO BE IN DEFENSIVE POSTURE WITH NO IMMEDIATE
PLAN TO INITIATE OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THERE IS SERIOUS
QUESTION HOW LONG SUCH POSITION WILL BE MAINTAINED. IF
HOSTILITIES CONTINUE ON EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FRONTS, I BELIEVE
THERE IS HIGH RISK THAT MORE RADICAL FEDAYEEN LEADERS WOULD
SEE THIS AS GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO LAUNCH LIMITED COMMANDO
CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO ISRAEL FROM LEBANON, THEREBY
EMBROILING ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE. ERGO, FROM OUR VANTAGE
POINT, EARLIEST POSSIBLE CEASE FIRE IS CALLED FOR.
5. NEEDLESS TO SAY, ADOPTION OF PUBLIC U.S. POSITION WHICH IN
ARAB WORLD APPEARS ONE-SIDED IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL WOULD ALSO
MERELY ENHANCE TENDENCY IN ARAB WORLD (INCLUDING FEDAYEEN)
TO LASH OUT AT US INTERESTS IN RETALIATION.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
'THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. ea
FORM
иот 10 BE KELKODNCED
ИOIТАДЯНТUА 3HT TUOHTI
HE EXECUTIVE SECKELYKA
or
STATE
WASHINGTON
*
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
100
SITUATION R
WHITE
SECRET 680
AM
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11878 061914Z
HOUSE
73/45
10:09
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 CCO-00
1026 W
039748
o 0616317 OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4611
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TELAVIV
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
SECRE T BEIRUT 11878
EXDIS
CORRECTEDCOPY (TEXT)
FROM DEAN BROWN
EBWO. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, JO
SUB: JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION BORDER WAR
1. EVERYTHING JORDANIAN HAVE TOLD US IN RECENT MONTHS
GOES ALONG LINE THAT GOJ WILL STAY OUT OF ANY WAR WITH
ISRAEL THAT EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS MIGHT START OR TAKE
PART IN. TRUE. BUT POLITICAL SITUATIONS CHANGE AS ACTUAL
EVENTS EXERT THEIR PRESSURE.
2. IF THIS BORDER FIGHTING CONTINUES, PRESSURES WILL
INCREASE ON ALWAYS-EMOTIONAL HUSSEIN. HE WILL REMEMBER
WITH GREAT BITTERNESS HOW EVERYONE LIED TO HIM AND LET
HIM DOWN IN 1967. AGAIN TRUE. BUT WILL HE HOLD ON?
3. THIS IS ENOUGH OF AN HONEST QUESTION THAT WE SHOULD
BUILD IT INTO OUR CALCULATIONS. OBVIOUSLY THIS MEANS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUSECHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
WH
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET 348
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11923 081732Z
45
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 CCO-00
/026 W
046453
O P 0816257 OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4637
USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE
EXPIS EXCLUS
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
SECR E T BEIRUT 11923
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: XXI
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION
1. KUWAIT'S 3690 PERFECTLY STATES BASIC POINT I TRIED
TO MAKE IN URGING SUPPORT FOR STANDSTILL CEASEFIRE.
PREVIOUSLY WE INSISTED THAT ISRAELIS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO
RETURN TO OLD ARMISTICELINE AND THAT ISRAEL HAD RIGHT
TO RETAIN AT LEAST SOME ARAB TERRITORY GAINED BY
CONQUEST IN 1967. SHOULD WE NOW INSIST ON RESTORATION
STATUS QUO ANTE WHILE ARABS HAVE REOCCUPIED SOME OF
THEIR OWN TERRITORY, WE WOULD BE SAYING ISRAELIS
CAN KEEP ARAB TERRITORY TAKEN BY FORCE BUT ARABS
HAVE NO RIGHT TO RETAIN THEIR OWN TERRITORY EVEN WHEN
THEY HAVE RETAKEN IT.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM DS-1652
DEPARTMENT
40
STATE
*
Department of State
SEALS AMERICA UNITED make
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 11923 081732Z
2. RESPONSIBLE LEBANESE WITH WHOM WE HAVE BEEN IN
TOUCH BELIEVE US AND ONLY US HAS STRONG ENOUGH POSITION
WITH BOTH SIDES TO TRANSFORM CURRENT CHAOS INTO PERMANENT
PEACE SETTLEMENT. THEY BELIEVE WE HAVE BEEN RESTRAINED
AND OBJECTIVE IN OUR PUBLIC COMMENTS so FAR AND NOTE
THAT, IN TURN, EGYPT NAD SYRIA HAVE GIVEN US REASONABLE
TREATMENT IN THEIR PUBLIC MEDIA DURING PRESENT ROUND.
3. CONSENSUS OF OPINION AMONG THESE LEADERS IS THAT
WITH SURPRISING DEMONSTRATION OF MILITARY ABILITY AND
COURAGE BY EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS OVER LAST TWO DAYS,
ARABS HAVE REGAINED THEIR SELF-ESTEEM, NO LONGER FEEL
HUMILIATED AND WOULD NOW GO TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE
WITH A DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL
SUPPORT THAT WOULD PERMIT THEM TO ENGAGE IN MEANINGFUL
PEACE DISCUSSIONS.
4. HOWEVER, SHOULD USG APPEAR TO RALLY TO ISRAELI POINT
OF VIEW FOR EXAMPLE BY LINKING CEASEFIRE TO RETURN TO
STATUS QUO ANTE, USG WILL IMMEDIATELY BE CONDEMNED
BY ARABS, SACRIFICE ITS PRESENT STANDING, AND THEREBY
LOSE WHAT MAY BE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING ABOUT REAL
PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. WE WOULD PROBABLY PAY HIGH
NATIONAL PRICE IN THE PROCESS, AS EMBASSY KUWAIT SUGGESTS.
5. FINAL POINT WHICH DESERVES MENTION IS FACT THAT,
AT LEAST ON EGYPTIAN FRONT, FREEZING CEASEFIRE LINES
AS OF TODAY, WOULD STILL NOT RPT NOT DENY ISRAELIS
ANY ARAB TERRITORY THEY APPEAR TO COVET AS ESSENTIAL
FOR SECURITY IN FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT. AS FAR
AS I AM AWARE, EVEN WITH ALL THEIR HOPES OF HOLDING PARTS
OF SINAI AND SHARM AL SHAYKH, GOT HAS NOT CONTEMPLATED
EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT TO ISRAELI RETENTION OF EAST BANK
OF CANAL.
BUFFUM
SECREY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM DS-1652
ea
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 796
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11891 0709522
SITUATION ROOM SITUATION ROOM
WHITE WHITE HOUSE HOUSE
OCT 7 PM 3:11
2
14
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
USSS-00 /026 W
041046
0 070920Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4619
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
SECRE T BEIRUT 11891
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: XX
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION
REF: STATE 199688
1. WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE ON HOW WE RESPOND TO INEVITABLE
QUERIES ABOUT MAJOR DISCREPANCY IN OUR POSITION ON CEASE-
FIRE TODAY AS COMPARED WITH 1967, AT THAT TIME, AFTER
ISRAELIS HAD ATTACKED AND TAKEN ARAB TERRITORY, WE
REFUSED TO SUPPORT UN RESOLUTION CALLING FOR CEASE-
FIRE AND RESTORATION OF STATUS QUO ANTE, THEREBY SUPPORTING
ISRAELI POSITION THAT IT WOULD NOT RETURN TO OLD FRAGILE
BOUNDARIES. TODAY, NOW THAT ARABS HAVE, TEMPORARILY AT LEAST,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THECABTHORIZATION 6 OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM DS-1652
TOPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
IDBYERI
EXCES EXCES
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 11891 0709522
REGAINED SOME OF THEIR LOST TERRITORY CAND SOME SELF-
RESPECT IN THE PROCESS) WE APPARENTLY INSISTING THAT
CEASEFIRE BE ACCOMPANIED BY ARAB ABANDOMMENT OF WHATEVER
OF THEIR LOST TERRITORY THEY HAVE REGAINED. IN EFFECT WE
WILL APPEAR TO BE ENDORSING LINES HELD BY ISRAEL ON
JUNE 5 AS HAVING SOME PERMANENT STATUS.
2. THIS GLARING DISCREPANCY BETWEEN OUR POSITION TODAY
AND THAT OF 1967 IS GOING TO LOOK TO ARABS LIKE A MAJOR
POLITICAL EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION AND
RETENTION OF ARAB TERRITORY, WITH OBVIOUS POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES.
3, WHILE WE HAVE NO REPORTS ON WHAT IF ANY CONSULTATIONS
HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ONBASIS THIS POSITION, I WONDER HOW
MUCH SUPPORT WE WILL FIND FOR IT AT UN AND WHETHER WE
MAY NOT AGAIN FIND OURSELVES ISOLATED EVEN FROM OUR
EUROPEAN FRIENDS AS WE WERE IN VETOING EGYPTIAN RES THIS
SUMMER.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SEEREUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
on/ep/199
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
DS-1652
*******C ONFIDENTIAL*******S COPY
PRIORITY
ESA985BEA069
DE RUESBE #9528 2231055
P 111034Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3688
CONFIDENTIALBEIRUT 9528
NOFORN
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, LE, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI HIJACKING OF
LEBANESE AIRLINER
1. HIGH-RANKING MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES OFFICIAL GAVE DCM
ON STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF
ISRAELI FORCIBLE DIVERSION MEA AIRCRAFT, AS TOLD HIM BY
MEA CAPTAIN OF THE PLANE.
2. MEA CARAVELLE INVOLVED WAS REPLACING REGULAR IRAQI
FLIGHT 006 FOR BAGHDAD. AFTER CAPTAIN TAXIED AIRCRAFT
TO END OF RUNWAY, AIRPORT RADAR CONTROL INFORMED CAPTAIN
OF PRESENCE FOREIGN AIRCRAFT NEAR AIRPORT BUT INDICATED
AIRPORT WAS STILL OPEN TO TRAVEL. CAPTAIN REMAINED AT
END OF RUNWAY FROM 9:05 P.M. TO 9:26 P.M. AFTER CAPTAIN
OF A FLIGHT FROM NICOSIA HAD LANDED AND REPORTED THAT
HE HAD NEITHER SEEN NOR HEARD ANYTHING, RADAR CONTROL
INFORMED MEA CAPTAIN THAT FOREIGN AIRCRAFT WERE 12 MILES
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
SOUTH OF BEIRUT. CAPTAIN TAXIED TO THE OTHER END OF THE
RUNWAY WHICH MEANT HE TOOK OFF IN NORTHERLY DIRECTION OVER THE
EASTERN PART OF THE CITY. AFTER PROCEEDING EXACTLY THREE
NAUTICAL MILES NORTHEAST OF BEIRUT AT ALTITUDE OF 3,000
FEET, HE HEARD UNCLEAR VOICE ON FREQUENCY 119.3 SAYING
QUOTE IRAQI 006 FOR THE SAFETY OF AIRCRAFT AND PASSENGERS
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FOLLOW THE FIGHTERS UNQUOTE. CAPTAIN ESTIMATES HE WAS
OVER JOUNIEH AT THAT POINT. HE NOTED THE GIHTER SLIGHTLY
BEHIND HIM TO HIS LEFT. MEA CAPTAIN INFORMED ISRAELI PILOT
THAT HE WAS BEHIND HIM AND ASKED FOR INSTRUCTIONS. ISRAELI
PILOT MOVED AHEAD OF THE CARAVELLE AND SAID IN ENGLISH
QUOTE FOLLOW ME UNQUOTE. THEY PROCEEDED NORTH AND WHEN
THEY WERE OVER CHEKKA THE ISRAELI PILOT INSTRUCTED HIM TO
GO DUE WEST AND TO CHANGE FREQUENCY TO 118.6 WHICH WAS
WHSR COMMENT
LL,QUANDT CORRECTED COPY
RECALLED
PSN: 000703
PAGE 01
TOR:223/11:46Z
DTG:111034Z AUG 73
*******C NFIDENTIA L*******S COPY
NFIDENTIAL COPY
DIFFERENT FROM BEIRUT FREQUENCY (UP TO THAT POINT BEIRUT
COULD HEAR EVERYTHING).
3. CAPTAIN MEA FLIGHT TOLD ISRAELI PILOT THAT PILOT'S
MESSAGES WERE NOT COMING THROUGH CLEARLY AND ASKED
INSTRUCTIONS TO BE REPEATED TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING.
ADVISED FIGHTER PILOT THAT IF HE (CAPTAIN CARAVELLE)
APPEARED AT ANY POINT TO BE SLOW IN FOLLOWING INSTRUC-
TIONS IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF REFUSING INSTRUCTIONS
BUT BECAUSE HE HAD NOT HEARD THEM CLEARLY. AFTER
FLYING APPROXIMATELY 60 MILES, HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO FLY
DUE SOUTH (COURSE 180) AND LATER CHANGE TO COURSE 135
(SOUTHEAST) TO ENTER ISRAELI TERRITORY. MEA CAPTAIN WAS
REQUESTED INITIALLY LAND AT EMERGENCY FIELD BUT AFTER
RAISING OBJECTIONS ON SAFETY GROUNDS WAS PERMITTED LAND
AT MILITARY AIRFIELD AT RAMAT DAVID. MEA CAPTAIN REQUESTED
PERMISSION TO FLY OVER AIRFIELD TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF
WITH FIELD AND CONTROL TOWER. AFTER SOME RELUCTANCE,
ISRAELIS PERMITTED HIM TO CIRCLE RUNWAY ONCE BUT WARNED
HIM AGAINST ANY SUSPICIOUS ACTION.
4. AFTER LANDING, MEA PILOT INSTRUCTED TURN OFF HIS REGULAR
ENGINES AND TURN ON AUXILIARIES. CAPTAIN THEN
REALIZED ISRAELIS HAD MADE MISTAKE BECAUSE CARAVELLE HAS NO
AUXILIARIES WHILE THE TRIDENT WHICH WOULD HAVE NORMALLY
HANDLED THE IRAQI FLIGHT DOES. HE POINTED THIS OUT TO
ISRAELIS.
5. FIFTY OR SIXTY HEAVILY ARMED PEOPLE BOARDED THE AIRCRAFT
AND MADE BODY SEARCH OF PASSENGERS. CAPTAIN ENDEAVORED TO
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
ENTER CABIN BUT WAS PUSHED BACK FORCIBLY WHILE TRYING
TO EXPLAIN HIS STATUS AS CAPTAIN AND HIS RIGHTS.
FINALLY, HE WAS PERMITTED LEAVE COCKPIT AND APPROACH
CABIN DOOR. THERE WERE SEVERAL HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS
AT THE BOTTOM OF THE STEPS AND AFTER POINTING OUT HIS
INSIGNIA AS CAPTAIN HE WAS ASKED TO DESCEND.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
6. AFTER POINTING OUT ISRAELIS APPARENTLY MISTAKING
HIS AIRCRAFT FOR IRAQI TRIDENT, THE ATMOSPHERE CHANGED
AND ALL PRESENT BECAME POLITE. THEY SOUGHT INFORMATION
FROM HIM RE OTHER IRAQI FLIGHTS WHICH HAD LEFT BEIRUT
THAT EVENING. HE THEN HEARD THEM SAY QUOTE MISSION FAILURE
UNQUOTE. AT THAT POINT, HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THE COMMANDER OF
THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE, MORDECAI HOD, WHO WAS EXTREMELY POLITE.
HE TOLD MEA CAPTAIN THAT HE COULD LEAVE SOON. THE CAPTAIN STATED
THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WITHOUT ALL HIS PASSENGERS AND
WAS ASSURED BY HOD PERSONALLY THAT HE WOULD BE ASKED BEFORE
HE LEFT TO CHECK ALL HIS PASSENGERS AND THEIR BELONG-
INGS AND THE AIRCRAFT TO ASSURE NOTHING WAS MISSING AND NO
RECALLED
PSN:000703
PAGE 02
TOR: 223/11:46Z
DTG:111034Z AUG 73
*******CDNFIDENTIAL*******S COPY
21/60/1601
*******CDNFIDENTIAL*******S COPY
ONE HAD BEEN MISTREATED. THE CAPTAIN DID SO, WAS ASKED TO
SIGN A DECLARATION IN ARABIC CONCERNING THE ABOVE, AND WAS
THEN PERMITTED TO LEAVE. THE CAPTAIN ESTIMATED THAT HE
WAS APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS ON THE GROUND. HE REPORTED
THAT A NUMBER OF PASSENGERS HAD PANICKED, AND HE HAD
ENDEAVORED WHEN THEY HAD ALL DISEMBARKED TO COMFORT
THEM BUT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO DO SO.
7. SOURCE REQUESTED THAT INFORMATION BE TREATED AS
CONFIDENTIAL.
BUFFUM
BT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
RECALLED
PSN: 000703
PAGE 03
OF 03
TOR: :223/11:46Z
DTG:111034Z AUG 73
*******CDNFIDENTIAL*******SCOPV
*******U N CLASSIFIE 0*******S COPY
OP IMMED
ESA929BEA056
DE RUESBE #9526 2231008
0 110950Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3686
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2439
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 8146
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3655
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 5656
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 4065
AMCONSUL MONTREAL PRIORITY 190
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 1888
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4380
UNCLAS BEIRUT 9526
MONTREAL FOR USREP ICAO
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINS, LE, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI HIJACKING OF LEBANESE AIRLINER
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NOTE GIVEN TO AMBASSADOR AT FONOFF
0800Z TODAY. UNDERSTAND GOL IS FURNISHING SAME NOTE TO
ALL UNSC MEMBER STATES.
BEGIN TEXT:
1. THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE HIJACKING ARE THOSE GIVEN
IN THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY ARMY HEADQUARTERS (SEE FBIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
M102208).
2. THIS ACT IS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST LEBANESE
SOVEREIGNTY, AS WELL AS AGAINST LEBANESE AIR SPACE.
3. IT COMPRISES AN ACT OF PIRACY BY A STATE (PIRATERIE
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIETAT) WHICH IS A MEMBER STATE OF THE UN.
4. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS ACT CANNOT BE MITIGATED BY
THE FACT THAT NONE OF THE PASSENGERS OF THE AIRCRAFT WAS
KILLED OR WOUNDED, NOR CAN THE GRAVITY OF THIS CRIME BE
MITIGATED BY THE FACT THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED. AN ACT
OF AVIATION PIRACY COMMITTED BY A STATE MEMBER OF THE
UN MUST BE CONSIDERED AN EXTREMELY GRAVE CRIME.
WHSR COMMENT
LL,QUANDT,HORAN
RECALLED
PSN: 000106
PAGE 01
TOR:223/10:28Z
DTG:110950Z AUG 73
*******U N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
JP/60/1601
N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
5. THE CONVENTIONS SIGNED IN TOKYO, THE HAGUE AND MONTREAL
ENVISAGE PUNISHMENT FOR INDIVIDUALS WHO UNDERTAKE AERIAL HI-
JACKING. THEY DO NOT ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO STATES WHICH
CARRY OUT SUCH ACTS, SINCE IT NEVER OCCURRED TO ANYONE THAT
A STATE MEMBER OF THE UN WOULD COMMIT SO SERIOUS AN ACTION.
6. THIS SUBJECT FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL. FOR THIS REASON, LEBANON IS SUBMITTING A COMPLAINT TO
THE SC AND RESERVES ITS RIGHT TO REQUEST THE CONVENING OF A
COUNCIL MEETING. NO SUCH MEETING HAS YET BEEN REQUESTED SINCE
THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES ARE STILL STUDYING THIS.
7. A DECISION WILL BE TAKEN TODAY ON WHETHER TO REFER THE
MATTER TO ICAO.
8. AMBASSADORS ARE ASKED TO:
(A) BRING THE ABOVE LEBANESE VIEWPOINT AND THE FACTS OF
THE SITUATION TO THE ATTENTION OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS;
(B) REQUEST THE SUPPORT OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR LEBANON,
ESPECIALLY IF IT IS DECIDED TO REQUEST THE HOLDING OF
A SC MEETING;
(C) REQUEST THE SUPPORT OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR LEBANON'S
COMPLAINT IN ICAO.
END TEXT.
BUFFUM
BT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
RECALLED
PSN: 000106
PAGE 02
OF 02
TOR 223/10:28Z
DTG:110950Z AUG 73
*******U N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
51/60/160
*******C ONFIDENTIA _*******S COPY
OP IMMED
ESA882BEA048
DE RUESBE #9523 2230915
0 110854Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3685
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4379
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 8145
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3654
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 5654
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 4064
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 1887
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2438
CONFIDENTIALBEIRUT 9523
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, LE, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI HIJACKING OF LEBANESE AIRLINER
1. IN PRESENTING AIDE MEMOIRE ON ISRAELI PLANE HIJACKING
(SEPTEL), HADDAD SAID HE UNSURE WHAT SENTIMENT WAS IN GOL
FOR CONVENING UN SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE FORMIN AND ALL
OTHER SENIOR STAFF ARE AT SYRIAN BORDER PURSUING DISCUSSION
ON OPENING FRONTIER.
2. HE ASKED FOR MY REACTION RE POSSIBLE RECOURSE TO SECURITY
COUNCIL. I SAID IT IS UP TO GOL TO DECIDE BUT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
PERSONALLY BELIEVED THEY SHOULD CONSIDER FOLLOWING FACTORS:
(A) DEBATE WOULD INEVITABLY WIDEN TO COVER TERRORISM
PROBLEM GENERALLY AND WOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO THIS
SPECIFIC ISRAELI ACTION.
(B) ICAO WILL BE MEETING SHORTLY IN ROME TO DISCUSS
JUST SUCH PROBLEMS.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
(C) UNSYG WALDHEIM HAS LEFT NEW YORK AND, PRESUMABLY,
SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE WOULD NECESSITATE HIS RETURN AND
INTERRUPT HIS VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST.
BUFFUM
BT
WHSR COMMENT
*
LL,QUANDT,HORAN
RECALLED
PSN: 000079
PAGE 01
OF 01
TOR:223/09:27Z
DTG:110854Z AUG 73
*******C 0NFIDENTIAL*******S COP<
*******C DNFIDENTIAL*******SCOPY
OP IMMED /PRIORITY
ESA853BEA042
DE RUESBE #9521 2230810
OP 110755Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3684
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 8144
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3653
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 5653
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 4063
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 1886
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1)78
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2437
CONFIDENTIALBEIRUT 9521
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, LE, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI HIJACKING OF LEBANESE AIRLINER
REF: BEIRUT 9520
1. LEBANESE AIRLINER HIJACKED TO ISRAEL EVENING AUGUST
10 WAS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO BEIRUT DURING THE NIGHT
WITH ALL PASSENGERS ON BOARD.
2. ALL LOCAL PAPERS HEADLINE INCIDENT LABELING IT ONE
OF MOST BRAZEN TERRORIST ACTS OF AERIAL PIRACY.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
3. SOME PAPERS ALLEGE PFLP HABASH AND COLLEAGUES HAD
BEEN SCHEDULED TO TAKE THIS FLIGHT AND ONLY DELAY IN
DEPARTURE CAUSED HIM TO CANCEL HIS PLANS. THEIR
ASSUMPTION IS ISRAELIS TRYING TO CAPTURE HIM OR FELLOW
FEDAYEEN LEADERS.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4. TEL AVIV'S DAO TELEGRAM 1191, JUST RECEIVED, APPEARS CONFIRM
THIS WAS IN FACT ISRAELI OBJECTIVE. PRESUMABLY SEIZURE OF AIRLINER
IS EXTENSION OF RIGHT WHICH ISRAELIS HAVE ARROGATED TO
THEMSELVES TO APPREHEND OR ELIMINATE TERRORISTS ANYWHERE IN THE
WORLD BY ANY MEANS.
5. GIVEN OUR LONG-STANDING INSISTENCE ON THE SANCTITY OF
INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN AIR TRAFFIC TRAVEL, OUR STRONG
WHSR COMMENT
*
LL,QUANDT
RECALLED
PSN: 000056
PAGE 01
TOR: 223/08:56Z
DTG:110755Z AUG 73
*******C NFIDENTIA L*******S COPY
81/60/1601
*******C 0 NFIDENTIA L*******S COPY
OPPOSITION TO HIJACKINGS, AND IMMINENT MEETING OF ICAO IN
ROME, I RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT VOLUNTEER PRESS STATEMENT
IMMEDIATELY CONDEMNING THIS UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
WITH CIVILIAN AIRLINER.
BUFFUM
BT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
RECALLED
PSN: 000056
PAGE 02
OF 02
TOR : 223/08:56Z
DTG:110755Z AUG 73
*******C0NFIDENTIAL*******SCOPY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MOITASIROHTUA
EXECUTIVE
РЕСВЕДУКА
*
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED and
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL 113
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09090 021200Z
2
51
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
119086
R 0210237 AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3517
CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT 9090
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AFSP
SUBJECT: STAFF REDUCTION
REF: STATE 150091
1. APPRECIATE INTERIM RESPONSE CONTAINED REFTEL.
2. RE POSITION OF CIVIL AIR ATTACHE, AFTER REFLECTING ON
OTHER POSSIBLE BASE OF OPERTION, I AGREE BEIRUT IS
MOST LOGICIAL AND IN VIEW OF OBVIOUS IMPORTANCE
PROMOTING US AIRCRAFT SALES, I CONCUR OFFICE SHOULD
CONTINUE TO BE LOCATED HERE,
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S=0 - MR. SARROF,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITH CORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon esidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BODNCED
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET 471
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09020 011049Z
15
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
SITUATION ROOM 187428
WHITE HOUSE
'73 AUG 2 AM 8:03
2
R 0109217 AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3482
SECRE T BETRUT 9020
EXDIS
W.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MASS, LE, us
SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSISTANCE
REF: BETRUT 8948
1. WHILE WE MUST STILL AWAIT GOL INTER-MINISTERIAL
VIEW ABOURT THE PROBELMS INVOLVED IN ARMS PURCHASES, AN
IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL AREA OF FELEXIBILITY HAS APPEARD. COL.
SARDOUK, SECRETARY TO DEFENSE MINISTER, INFORMED DAO
JULY 31 THAT WHILE ABOUT 190 MILLION LEBANESE POUNDS HAVE BEEN
COMMITTED FOR ARMS PURCHASES (AS REPORTED REFTEL), UP TO 60
MILLION POUNDS OF THIS SUM ARE NOT ABSOULTELY "FIRM COMMITMENTS"
AND THERE MAY BE POSSIBILITY OF SHIFTING SOME OR ALL OF THIS AMOUNT.
2. WE WILL, OF COURSE, KEEP DEPARTMENT CURRENTLY ADVISED
OF ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE 41 AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
9.66
DS-165&LASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
818
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08948 311036Z
44
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
EXATE
097745
R 310849Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3458
S E C R E T BETRUT 8948
EXDIS
E O 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MASS LE US
SUBJ: GOL REQ FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE: 1973 FMS
REF: STATE 148979
1. I RAISED QUESTION OF GOL INTENTIONS RE FMS CREDIT
JUL 28 WITH FUAD NAFFA, WHO HAS JUST SWITCHED FROM
FINANCE MINISTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER.
2, NAFFA SAID ONE OF MAIN COMPLICATIONS IS FACT THAT
"MOST" OF 200 MILLION POUNDS AUTHORIZED BY PARLIAMENT
FOR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES HAVE ALREADY BEEN OBLIGATED.
PROBLEM FURTHER COMPLICATED BY FOCUS OF CURRENT PARLIAMENTARY
DEBATE IN CONNECTION WITH APPROVAL OF NEW GOVT. LEFTIST
SPOKESMEN, LED BY KAMAL JUMBLATT, URGING THAT GOL NOT REPEAT
NOT PURCHASE ADDITIONAL ARMS ARGUING THEY WILL NEVER
BE USED AGAINST ISRAEL, BUT ONLY AGAINST PALESTINIANS.
THIS RENDERS ALL ADDITIONAL ARMS PURCHASES SOMEWHAT
MORE DELICATE AT PRESENT MOMENT.
3. I EMPHASIZED DIFFICULTIES THIS UNCERTAINTY ABOUT GOL
SOURCE OF FINANCING CAUSES IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBJ AND
CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE GOL NEEDS, I FURTHER NOTED THAT
FEDAYEEN ARMS BUILD-UP CONTINUES UNABATED WHILE GOL SEEMS
HAMSTRUNG BY TECHNICAL-POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES.
4, NAFFA READILY CONCEDED LATTER POINT AND ADDED THAT THERE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard/Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
EXCELS EXPIS
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08948 311036Z
IS WIDESPREAD EXPECTATION THERE WILL BE ANOTHER ROUND OF
HOSTILITIES IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER.
5. RECOGNIZING URGENCY OF PROBLEM, HE PROMISED CONSULT
WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FINANCE MINISTRY AND PROVIDE
US CLARIFICATION SOONEST.
6. POL COUNS ALSO RAISED PROBLEM WITH DIRGEN OF PRESIDENCY,
DIB, POINTING OUT APPARENT LACK OF COORDINATION WITHIN
GOL OF FINANCING ARMS PURCHASES. (MINDEF CONTENDS COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS CAN AUTHORIZE EXPENDITURE FMS FUNDS OVER AND
ABOVE 200 MILLION FIGURE WITHOUT GOING TO ASSEMBLY.
MINFIN HOLDS OPPOSITE VIEW.) DIB PROMISED ARRANGE MEETING THIS
week BETWEEN DEFENSE AND FINANCE MINISTRIES TO RESOLVE ISSUE.
7. TO RESPOND TO QUESTION IN PARA 2 REFTEL, DAO
JUL 30 OBTAINED FROM LEBANESE DEFENSE MINISTRY AUTHORITATIVE
LIST OF PURCHASE COMMITMENTS MADE PURSUANT TO PARLIAMENTARY
200 MILLION POUND AUTHORIZATION. LIST, WHICH WE ACCEPT AS
VALID, (SENT SEPTEL) TOTALS APPROX 190 MILLION POUNDS LEAVING
BALANCE OF ONLY 10 MILLION COR ABOUT $4.2 MILLION AT CURRENT
EXHCNAGE RATE).
8. ACCORDINGLY, GOL MUST NOW FIGURE OUT HOW IT WILL
FINANCE REMAINING EQUIPMENT WHICH IT STILL WISHES TO PURCHASE
FROM us.
COMMENT: IN ADDITION TO LACK OF PROPER INTERNAL
COORDINATION WITHIN GOL, PURCHASE PROBLEM HAS BEEN
COMPOUNDED BY LEBANESE EXPECTATION, BASED ON VARIOUS
STATEMENTS TO THEM OF GENERAL U.S. SUPPORT, THAT WE WOULD
BE CONTRIBUTING OR LOANING MILITARY EQUIPMENT. DESPITE
OUR CLARIFICATIONS THIS IMPOSSIBLE, THEY ARE ONLY NOW
FACING UP TO HARSH REALITY THAT IF THEY WANT MORE EQUIPMENT
FROM US THEY MUST PAY FOR IT AND MUST FIND A MEANS
OF DOING so OUTSIDE OF 200 MILLION POUND BUDGET PREVIOUSLY
AUTHORIZED.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Mixon Presidential Library.
15/00/199
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Recutive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-6-7
*******CD NFIDENTIAL*******S COPY
OP IMMED
ESA4128EA207
DE RUESBE #8692 2060645
0 250640Z JUL 73
State Dept. review completed
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 3358
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 4013
INFO MSGBN WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 1057
USMC review(s)
completed.
CONFIDENTIALBEIRUT 8692
TUNIS FOR RMO
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC PINS LE
SUBJ: FEDAYEEN DETENTION OF MARINE GUARD
1. LCPL. THOMAS M. HARDIN, MARINE SECURITY GUARD ASSIGNED TO
KUWAIT, PRESENTLY ON TDY BEIRUT FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. HARDIN
WENT FOR WALK AFTERNOON JULY 24 AND BECAME LOST. HE WAS STOPPED
BY THREE MEN WHO TOOK HIM TO UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION AND INTERROGATED
HIM FOR APPROXIMATELY EIGHT HOURS. HARDIN STATED THAT MEN
CLAIMED TO BE PALESTINIAN. AT ABOUT 2300 LOCAL JULY 24, HARDIN
TAKEN TO GOL ARMY PALESTINIAN LIAISON OFFICE WHERE HE WAS
DEBRIEFED FOR ANOTHER TWO HOURS BEFORE EMBASSY NOTIFIED. EMBOFF
WENT AND GOT HARDIN AND RETURNED HIM TO EMBASSY WHERE
HE HAS REMAINED SINCE. HARDIN BEING DEBRIEFED BY RSO,
WE WILL PROVIDE TELEGRAPHIC
SUMMARY OF DEBRIEFING TODAY.
25X1
2. LEFTIST AL MUHARRIR JULY 25 FRONTPAGES STORY OF HARDIN'S
ARREST WITH PICTURES OF HIS PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION
AND ASSERTS HE IS WORKING AS A "SECRET GUARD" IN
US EMBASSY, BEIRUT, "WHICH RAISED A LARGE QUESTION
ABOUT HIS DENIAL THAT HE IS A SPY." (FEDAYEEN OBVIOUSLY
FED THE STORY TO MUHARRIR, WHICH IS THEIR CHOSEN
INSTRUMENT, AND IT BROKE TOO LATE TO BE CARRIED IN OTHER
BEIRUT NEWSPAPERS YET.)
3. WE ARE PREPARING FACTUAL PRESS RELEASE WHICH WILL
FOLLOW SEPTEL.
BUFFUM
*WHSR COMMENT
*
LL,SAUNDERS
RECALLED
PSN:044539
PAGE 01
TOR:206/07:07Z DTG:250640Z JUL 73
*******CONFIDENTIAL*******S COPY
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-6-7
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 : NLN-NSC-621-2-6-7
*******C D NFIDENTIAL*******S COPY
BT
RECALLED
PSN 044539
PAGE 02
OF 02
TOR:206/07:07Z
DTG:250640Z JUL 73
*******CDNFIDENTIAL*******S COPY
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 : NLN-NSC-621-2-6-7
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
G AMERICA UNITED and
TELEGRAM
ATES
OF
SECRET 806
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08594 231144Z
2
43
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO=00 NSCE-00 USSS-00 /026 W
EXCESS
028403
R 230954Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3317
S E C R E T BEIRUT 8594
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJECT: FEDAYEEN KIDNAP DUTCH LOCAL EMPLOYEE
1. EARLY JULY 22 DUTCH AMBASSADOR VROON (WHO LIVES
CLOSE BY IN YARZE) ASKED TO COME SEE ME URGENTLY.
HE WAS CONSIDERABLY UPSET AND RECOUNTED FOLLOWING
INCIDENT:
2. HIS LEBANESE GARDENER, LONG TRUSTED EMPLOYEE WHO
LIVES ON RESIDENCE PREMISES, FAILED TO REPORT FOR WORK
SATURDAY, JULY 21. FOLLOWING MORNING HE REAPPEARED
IN AGITATED STATE AND REPORTED HE HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED
FROM RESIDENCE FRIDAY NIGHT. TECHNIQUE INVOLVED WAS
APPEARANCE OF CAR AT EMBASSY GATE WHILE AMBASSADOR
AND MRS. VROON WERE ABSENT AT SOCIAL OCCASION; TWO MEN
RANG AND ASKED GARDENER (WHO WAS SOLE OCCUPANT OF THE
PREMISES AT THE TIME) IF HE COULD DIRECT THEM TO
AN ADDRESS IN BAABDA. HE STEPPED OUT OF GATE TO POINT WAY
WHEREUPON HE WAS IMMEDIATELY SEIZED, BLINDFOLDED AND
BUNDLED OFF TO UNKNOWN DESTINATION=-15 OR 20 MINUTE
RIDE. INTERROGATORS, WHO DESCRIBED THEMSELVES AS
MERELY "FEDAYEEN" OVER PERIOD OF HOURS PRESSED HIM FOR
DETAILS ON NUMBER OF ISRAELI AGENTS WHOM DUTCH
AMBASSADOR ALLEGEDLY SHIELDED AFTER ISRAELI RAID ON
BEIRUT IN APRIL. DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL PRESSURE,
GARDENER HONESTLY INSISTED HE KNEW OF NO SUCH EPISODE.
HE WAS FINALLY RELEASED WITH WARNING HE WOULD BE KILLED
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THECRETHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
3
3)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
PARTMENT OF STATE
*
AMERICA WE UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
ATES
OF
EXCES EXAMS
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08594 231144Z
IF HE DISCLOSED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. DESPITE THREAT, HE
IMMEDIATELY APPRISED AMBASSADOR ON RETURN, WHO ACCEPTS
HIS STORY COMPLETELY IN VIEW OF HIS LENGTHY AND
COMPLETELY RELIABLE SERVICE,
3. VROON PLANNING TO PROTEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTOR
GENERAL AND ASK FOR GUARDS ON EMBASSY RESIDENCE.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
C
HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
E5/20/199
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DER OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 770
PAGE 01 231233Z
46 S
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 /026 W
2
028701
P 231050Z JUL 73
FM USDAO BEIRUT LEBANON
TO SECDEF WASHDC
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
C CONFIDENTIAL619JUL73
SECDEF FOR ISA/DSAA - EXDIS
SUBJ: DD FORM 1513 (U)
REF: STATE 135365 SECRET EXDIS
(C) IN VIEW CONTENTS REFTEL REQUEST SOONEST POSSIBLE
FORWARDING DD FORM 1513'S FOR SIXTEEN EACH A4B AND A4C
AIRCRAFT.
GDS 31DEC79
NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION INSERTED PER MR. SARROS, S/S=0
'73 JUL 23 PM 3:06
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONF IDENTIAL
32
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
EXPIS
Department
of State
GELLING STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
SECRET 915
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08278 131035Z
41
2
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
074311
R 130917Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3185
S E C R E T BEIRUT 8278
EXDIS
EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR LE
SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRES FRANGIE, JUL 12
1. DURING THREE HOUR PRIVATE SESSION JUL 12 WITH PRES
FRANGIE AT HIS SUMMER VACATION RETREAT OF EHDEN IN
LEBANON'S NORTHERN MOUNTAINS, I FOUND HIM JUST STARTING
TO CATCH HIS BREATH FROM MAY FIGHTING AND SUBSEQUENT
STRUGGLE OVER CABINET FORMATION. HOWEVER, HE HAS
AMAZING POWERS OF RECUPERATION. HE ALREADY LOOKED RELAXED
AND WAS BOTH CONFIDENT AND CHEERFUL.
2, HIS MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT THE FIGHTING IN BEIRUT
THIS SPRING MAY HAVE BEEN ONLY THE PRELIMINARY TO A MAJOR
BOUT LATER ON. HE SAID INTERNECINE WARFARE GOING ON
BETWEEN FATAH AND SAIQA, WITH BOTH TRYING TAKE CONTROL
OF ENTIRE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND FEARED IF GOING GOT
ROUGH EITHER SIDE MIGHT PROVOKE CONFRONTATION WITH
GOL TO RESTORE PALESTINIAN UNITY. HE DOUBTS SYRIA WOULD
INTERVENE OVERTLY BUT IS CONCERNED THEY MIGHT DO so
UNDER PALESTINIAN COVER, E.G., YARMUK BRIGADE.
3, I INFORMED PRES OF WIDESPREAD ADMIRATION AND SUPPORT
FOR HIM OBSERVED DURING MY RECENT WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS,
WHICH HE MUCH APPRECIATED.
4. HIS CONCERN AT NEED TO STRENGTHEN ARMY'S CAPABILITIES
REFLECTED IN HIS STATED INTENTION CONTINUE USING AUTHORITY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THECAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard 29 Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
DEP
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08278 1310352
TO CALL UP RESERVES TO ADD ABOUT 3,000 YOUNG MEN ON SHORT TERM
BASIS.
5, HE WAS LIKEWISE GRATIFIED AT DECISION TO
PERMIT SALE OF A4'S AND TO DISCUSS PRICE AND AVAILABILITY
DATA ON TANKS AND ARTILLERY. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT
BRIEFED ON DETAILS AND ASKED THAT SPECIFICS BE
PURSUED WITH LEB DEFENSE DEPT, WHICH WE WILL NOW DO.
CI AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR TIMELY DISPATCH DEPTEL 136029 THIS SUBJ).
6. FRANGIE MADE FOL OBSERVATIONS ON MAY HOSTILITIES:
A) HE WAS ELATED AT UNITY, COURAGE AND ELAN OF LEB ARMY.
B) WAS ALSO MOST GRATIFIED THAT NO SIGNIFICANT CONFESSIONAL
SPLIT DEVELOPED DURING FIGHTING. SUCH TENDENCIES APPEARED
ONLY AFTERWARDS, AND THEN LARGELY AS RESULT MANEUVERINGS BY SUCH
OPPORTUNISTIC CHIS WORD) POLITICANS AS JUMBLATT.
EXPIS
C) ATTITUDE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT PERFECTLY "CORRECT" AND
WHILE JORDAN UNABLE TAKE MORE PROMINET PUBLIC STAND LEST IT BE
ACCUSED OF JOINING IN "CONSPIRACY" TO COMPLETELY LIQUIDATE
FEDAYEEN, HE WAS FULLY SATISFIED WITH PRIVATE SUPPORT (INCLUDING
MATERIEL) FROM HUSSEIN.
D) ALL OTHER ARAB REACTION DISAPPOINTING (WITH THEIR REPS
TELLING HIM ONE THING AND TELLING FEDAYEEN ANOTHER). THIS
PARTICULARLY TRUE OF SYRIA WHO HE BELIEVED HAD REALLY CLOSED
BORDER TO KEEP PALESTINIANS FROM RETURNING THERE. KHADAFI SEEMS
ABOUT READY FOR THE INSANE ASYLUM AND IS STILL STIRRING UP
TROUBLE IN LEBANON BY BUYING SUPPORT FROM CERTAIN SUNNI LEADERS
(THOUGH THE MUFTI, HE WAS GRATIFIED TO REPORT, REFUSED TO
PLAY THIS GAME.)
E) SOVIET ROLE PROBABLY HELPFUL WITH SOME EVIDENCE (UNSPECIFIED)
OF RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON DAMASCUS.
F ) LEB ECONOMY SURVIVED MUCH BETTER THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN
EXPECTED. LEB POUND REMAINED VERY FIRM AND EVEN IN JUNE
CUSTOMS RECEIPTS WERE UP SHARPLY.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Mixon 29 Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
SECKEIVEA
*
*
Department of State
SETTS AMERICA UNITED NAME
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08278 131035Z
7. I CONGRATULATED HIM ON SUCCESS IN FORMING CABINET
WITH BROADLY BASED SUPPORT. HE SHOWED LITTLE ENTHUSIASM
FOR FINAL GROUPING, WHICH, I BELIEVE, TENDS TO CONFIRM
REPORTS THAT HE HAD MADE CONCESSIONS HE WOULD HAVE
PREFERRED TO AVOID AND THAT HE DOESN'T REALLY EXPECT
NEW GOVT TO ACCOMPLISH MUCH.
8, FRANGIE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT FRONTIER WITH SYRIA
WOULD BE OPENED SOON. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT CONCLUDE
SYRIANS WOULD DO THIS MERELY FOR LEBANON BUT, RATHER,
TO STIMULATE ATTENDANCE AT THE DAMASCUS FAIR OPENING NEXT
MONTH.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
GRANTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
973 JUL 13 PM 1:34
SECRET 855 WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08277 1309547
2
13
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
073939
R 130916Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3186
$ E C R E T BETRUT 8277
EXDIS
EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR LE
SUBJE DIALOGUE WITH LEBANESE GOVT
REF: STATE 132168
1, IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH PRES FRANGIE JUL 12
I BROACHED RATHER GINGERLY POSSIBILITY OF CONSULTATIONS
ON STEPS US MIGHT TAKE TO HELP GOVT OF LEBANON IN
EVENT IT HAS MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN.
2, I SAID USG HAD BEEN REFLECTING CAREFULLY ON
EARLIER LEBANESE REQUESTS FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING
AND DECISIONS. WHILE OBVIOUSLY A NUMBER OF THINGS COULD BE DONE IN
EVENT OF NEW OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING, PARTICULARLY ON DIPLOMATIC
PLANE, US ROLE WOULD BE EXTREMELY DELICATE AND BOTH
GOL AND USG WOULD NEED CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHAT
IMPLICATIONS OF ANY REACTION ON OUR PART WOULD BE. I
ADDED THAT AT SUCH TIME AS HF FELT ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS
CALLED FOR I WOULD BE PREPARED TO OFFER SOME PRELIMINARY
COMMENTS FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION.
3, i RECALLED ABOUHAMAD HAD ORIGINALLY RAISED THIS
MATTER AND WONDERED WHEN TIME CAME IF PRESIDENT WOULD
LIKE ME TO PURSUE SUBJ WITH NEW FORNMIN FOUAD NAFFA
OR WITH HIM.
4, FRANGIE SAID HE WOULD LIKE ANY SUCH DISCUSSION TO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
BEF of STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08277 130954Z
START WITH BOTH HIMSELF AND NAFFA AND THEN PERHAPS CARRIED
ON WITH NAFFA.
5. SINCE PRES INDICATED NO SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT SUCH
DIALOGUE (HE WAS OBVIOUSLY ACQUIRING "HOLIDAY SPIRIT"
HAVING JUST ARRIVED AT HIS SUMMER MOUNTAIN HOME) I DID NOT
EXCIS EXCLUS
PURSUE MATTER. THUS BASIC TALKING POINTS CONTAINED
REFTEL REMAIN TO BE DRAWN ON IN ANY FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS,
THE INITIATIVE FOR WHICH I SHALL LEAVE TO FRANGIE.
BUFFUM
И BOOW
MHIIE HONSE
.13 nor 13 bW 1:3d
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
as/eo/iea
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TRANSPORT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
SEALS AMERICA UNITED NAME
TELEGRAM
OF
EXELS EXPIS
SECRET 557
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08165 111139Z
20
SITUATION WHITE HOUSE ROOM
on = PM 9:34
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
050792
P 111104Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3133
S E CRR EXT BEIRUT 8165
EXDIS
ED 116521 GDS
TAGS: AFSP
SUBJ: STAFF REDUCTION
REF: BEIRUT 7722
AS AGREED WITH NEA/ARN I HAVE REVIEWED REFTEL IMMEDIATELY
ON RETURN AND HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:
1. I CONCUR FULLY IN ANALYSIS OF SITUATION IN WHICH
WE MUST EXPECT TO OPERATE OVER FORESEEABLE FUTURE, I.EMN
CONTINUED INSTABILITY IN LEBANON AND THREAT OF PERIODIC CRISES.
2, MAIN CONSIDERATION I SEE HERE IS POSSIBLE INTERRUPTION
TO ACTIVITIES OF REGIONAL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO
BEIRUT IF AIRPORT SHOULD AGAIN BE CLOSED AS IT WAS FOR
SEVERAL DAYS THIS MAY. WITH SOME REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL
TOTAL POST SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WOULD ALSO BE SOMEWHAT
REDUCED. HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN SIGNIFICANTLY
ALTER MAGNITUDE OF THREAT WITHOUT DRASTIC
CHANGE FROM PRESENT OPERATIONS WHICH CLEARLY NOT
WARRANTED UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
3. ACCORDINGLY, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BEGIN WITH A
GRADUAL THINNING OUT EXERCISE WHICH WOULD REMOVE THOSE
POSITIONS WHOSE RESPONSIBILITIES IN LEBANON ARE
MARGINAL AND WHICH CAN BE MOVED WITH MINIMAL EXPENSE OR
DIFFICULTY.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard/Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08165 1111397
4. SPECIFICALLY I RECOMMEND RELOCATION OR ABOLITION OF
FOLLOWING POSITIONS: RAPA, REGAIONAL LIBRARIAN, REGIONAL
SECURITY SUPERVISOR, REGIONAL GEOGRAPHIC ATTACHE, AND AIR
ATTACHE. I WOULD ALSO ADD ARPA FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSFER AND
THE LABOR AND CIVIL AIR ATTACHES FOR RELOCATION ON INCUMBENTS'
DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT.
5. I RECOMMEND THAT THE MORE SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGES SUGGESTED AS POSSIBILITIES IN PARA 3 REFTEL
BE REVIEWED BY DEPT IN TERMS OF COST OF RELOCATING THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE (20) AND AMOUTN OF EQUIPMENT
INVOLVED AS OPPOSED TO AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATE FACILITIES
WITH POSSIBLY MORE SECURE BASE OF COMMUNICATIONS
AND TRANSPORTATION. THIS CANNOT BE ANSWERED FROM
HERE BECAUSE WE ARE NOT IN POSITION TO JUDGE WHAT THE
ALTERNATIVES ARE AND WHAT TOTAL COSTS WOULD BE, I
DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE 20
PEOPLE INVOLVED (REGIONAL TECHNICAL CENTER, REGIONAL
MARINE OFFICE, REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE) CONSTITUTE
UNACCEPTABLE SECURITY BURDEN ON EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY
SINCE DURING A TIGHT SITUATION, PERSONNEL IN THESE
OFFICES ARE AMONG THE MOST USEFUL. THUS, ON BALANCE, I
WOULD PREFER THEY STAY IN BEIRUT UNLESS DEPT CONSIDERS
FRAGILITY OF SITUATION HERE MAKES THEIR ASSURED AVAILABILITY
FOR DUTY ELSEWHERE IN AREA TOO UNCERTAIN.
BUFFUM
HE:e M9 11 JUL ETP
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE- AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
LS/en/ien
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
WH
EXEIS
GELINA
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET 032
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07722 01 OF 02 291315Z
41
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
EXCESS
P 291206Z JUN 73
SITUATE HOUSEM SITUATI WHITE HOUSE 085154 ROOM
73 JUN 30 AM 8:31
3
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2960
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 7722
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AFSP
SUBJECT: STAFF REDUCTION
REF: STATE 87648
1. FOLLOWING THE RECENT DISTURBANCES WHICH WERE THE WORST
IN LEBANON SINCE THE 1967 WAR, IT WOULD SEEM ONLY PRUDENT
TO CONSIDER REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE EMBASSY STAFF. ALTHOUGH
THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS NOW CALM IT REMAINS UNCERTAIN
BECAUSE THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE ROLE AND STATUS OF
THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED NOR IS IT LIKELY
TO BE IN THE ABSENCE OF A SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINE
PROBLEM OR DEMONSTRABLE PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. AS
THE LIKELIHOOD OF PROGRESS DOES NOT SEEM PROMISING, WE FACE
THE VERY REAL RISK HERE OF CONTINUING PERIODIC CRISES OVER
THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE SYRIAN
ATTITUDE TOWARD LEBANON. ADDED TO THIS IS A WORSENING IN THE
AREA AND IN LEBANON OF THE us POSITION WHICH HAS BECOME IN
ARAB EYES INCREASINGLY IDENTIFIED WITH THE ISRAELIS AND THERE-
FORE SUBJECT TO ATTACK. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE ARE
SUGGESTING THAT A REDUCTION IN STAFF BE STUDIED,
2. ANY REDUCTION FINALLY DECIDED UPON MUST BE CAREFULLY
CONSIDERED AND PHASED AS OTHERWISE PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF OUR
INTENTION TO REDUCE OUR STAFF WOULD HAVE A VERY DISQUIETING
EFFECT BOTH AMONG THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT IN MY JUDGMENT THERE ARE TWO MAJOR REASONS FOR
E.O. 13528, Section 3.5
NLN 09-1319 Per Itr. 1/22/2010
By
AM
NARA, Date 11/15/2010
[P. 10F 5]
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the 20 Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07722 01 OF 02 291315Z
EXCES EXCLUS EXAMS
REDUCING THE STAFF, THE FIRST IS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF
PEOPLE EXPOSED TO TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND THEREBY REDUCE TO SOME
EXTENT THE JOB OF OUR SECURITY SECTION. IN THIS CATEGORY WE WOULD
RECOMMEND THE REDUCTION OF PEOPLE WHOSE JOBS ARE NOT ESSENTIAL
TO THE OPERATION OF THIS MISSION. THE SECOND CATEGORY IS THE
REGIONAL PERSONNEL WHOSE SERVICES ARE EQUALLY, IF NOT MORE,
NEEDED IN OTHER POSTS IN THE AREA OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY,
WITH THE CLOSURE OF THE BEIRUT AIRPORT DURING THE DISTURBANCES
WE HAD SECURITY AND OTHER TECHNICAL PERSONNEL HERE WHO COULD
NOT LEAVE To SERVICE ANOTHER POST NO MATTER HOW URGENT OR
DESPERATE THE REQUIREMENT WAS. IN ADDITION, REGIONAL PERSONNEL
SPEND A MAJOR PORTION OF THEIR TIME TRAVELLING AND ARE
WORRIED ABOUT THE RISK OF LEAVING THEIR FAMILIES ALONE HERE
IN TIMES OF CRISES.
3. WITH THESE FACTORS IN MIND, I HAVE THE FOLLOWING
RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAKE FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION.
I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE
MISSION, INCLUDING THE HEADS OF THE REGIONAL OFFICES LISTED
IMMEDIATELY BELOW EXCEPT FOR THE HEAD OF THE REGIONAL MARINE
HEADQUARTERS.
A . REGIONAL SECTIONS
(1) REGIONAL TECHNICAL CENTER 7 PEOPLE
(2) REGIONAL SECURITY SUPERVISOR 1 PERSON
(3) REGIONAL MARINE HEADQUARTERS 7 PEOPLE
(4) REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CENTER 6 PEOPLE
4. THESE OFFICES COULD PRESUMABLY OPERATE EFFECTIVELY FROM
ANOTHER POST IN THE AREA. THE TRANSFER OF THE REGIONAL
TECHNICAL CENTER AND THE REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE
WOULD INVOLVE THE MOVEMENT OF CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES OF
EQUIPMENT AND THUS WOULD BE EXPENSIVE, ALTHOUGH THE REGIONAL
TECHNICAL CENTER SENT ABOUT 20 PERCENT OF THEIR EQUIPMENT TO
SAFEHAVEN DURING THE RECENT FIGHTING. A PARTIAL TRANSFER OF
THE SECTIONS WOULD NOT APPEAR PRACTICAL. ON THE OTHER HAND,
I UNDERSTAND NEITHER THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL CENTER NOR THE
REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS PER SE HAVE TO BE AT THE SAME POST,
THE RTC, RMO AND RSS SHOULD PROBABLY BE AT ONE POST. THE
TRANSFER OF THE REGIONAL MARINE HEADQUARTERS WOULD REDUCE OUR
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
NLN09-13/9: P.2055
ORM DSDECEASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 07722 01 OF 02 291315Z
MILITARY COMPLEMENT AND THUS BE OF SOME POLITICAL ADVANTAGE,
GIVEN THE LARGE NUMBER OF MARINES WE HAVE HERE TO GUARD THE
EMBASSY PREMISES.
5 . WITH THE TRANSFER THE EMBASSY WOULD HAVE A CONTINUING
EXCELS
REQUIREMENT FOR A REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICE, A SECRETARY,
AND ONE SEABEE.
6. STAFF WHOSE FUNCTIONS ARE NOT ESSENTIAL TO LEBANON OR
WHICH COULD BE REDUCED IN SIZE ARE:
A . REGIONAL LIBRARIAN (HER JOB COULD BE HANDLED FROM ANY
NEARBY POST WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TEL AVIV AS WELL AS FROM
BEIRUT.)
B. RAPA (I QUESTION THE ESSENTIALITY OF THIS POSITION IN
TERMS OF THE COST OF THE OPERATION. ALTHOUGH RAPA DOES
PERFORM CERTAIN OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS IN LEBANON, HIS REGIONAL
ADVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE TRAVEL AND
COULD BE BASED IN ANY NEARBY ARAB POST.)
C. REGIONAL GEOGRAPHIC OFFICER. (THIS IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE
MOST CONVENIENT PLACE FOR HIM TO BE LOCATED BUT GIVEN THE
SECURITY PROBLEMS HERE HE COULD PROBABLY ALMOST AS EFFECTIVELY
OPERATE FROM ATHENS OR SOME OTHER NEA POST. AS PRESENT INCUMBENT
HAS ONLY RECENTLY HAD TO MOVE IN BEIRUT FOR SECURITY REASONS,
THE TRANSFER SHOULD BE DEFERRED. HOUGHTON
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
NIN 09-13/9: P. 30F5
FORM DECL ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
GRANTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXELS EXCES
SECRET 020
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07722 02 OF 02 2913222
2
51
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
085258
P 291206Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2961
S ECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 7722
EXDIS
D. MILITARY ATTACHE OFFICE. WE CURRENTLY HAVE THREE
ATTACHES WHO ARE PRIME TARGETS FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITY. THIS
IS PARTICULARLY TRUE BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO
MILITARY ATTACHES BY THE ARABS WHO TEND TO USE THEM AS THE
PULITICAL AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ARM OF A MISSION. AS THE
FUNCTIONS OF THE NAVAL AND AIR ATTACHES HERE ARE SOMEWHAT
MARGINAL, IT WOULD NOT SEEM PRUDENT FOR THEM TO RUN THAT RISK,
WHAT THE EMBASSY REALLY NEEDS IS AN ASY OR MARINE CORPS
COLONEL AS DATT WITH AN ASSISTANT AND SUCH SUPPORT PERSONNEL
AS ARE NECESSARY TO HANDLE MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR LEBANON AND
THE BI-WEEKLY MATS FLIGHT. ONE CONVENIENT WAY OF EFFECTING
REDUCTION WOULD BE NOT TO REPLACE COLONEL GALLO WHEN HE LEAVES
IN OCTOBER.
E. LEGAL ATTACHE (FBI). AS THE FUNCTIONS OF THIS OFFICE
WOULD NOT APPEAR ESSENTIAL TO THIS PARTICULAR POST, HE COULD
BE STATIONED ELSEWHERE IN THE AREA.
F . BNDD (POSSIBLY COULD BE CUT FROM THREE TO TWO AGENTS.)
G. VOA. TECHNICAL MONITORING OFFICER. AS HIS FUNCTIONS INVOLVE
VETTING VOA BROADCASTS IN A VARIETY OF AREA COUNTRIES, HE COULD
OPERATE AS EFFECTIVELY OUT OF ANY NEARBY POST.
THE TOTAL OF PARS 3 AND 6 ARE 29.
7. THIS WOULD APPEAR ALL WE SHOULD DO FOR A START, THERE ARE A
NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES WHICH WE HAVE AVOIDED. FOR EXAMPLE THE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
5
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07722 02 OF 02 291322Z
OFFICE OF THE FAA AND THE REGIONAL CAA COULD PROBABLY OPERATE
ELSEWHERE AS WELL. HOWEVER, THEIR PERSONNEL ARE WELL KNOWN IN
AVIATION CIRCLES AND THEIR TRANSFER AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME COULD
BE NOTED WITH CONCERN BY THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT.
8. IF THE DEPARTMENT DECIDES TO ACT ON THESE SUGGESTIONS
THE MOVES SHOULD BE MADE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME IN ORDER TO
ATTRACT THE LEAST ATTENTION LOCALLY. WE MAY LATER DEPENDING
ON THE SITUATION HAVE TO CUT MORE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT MOST OF THE
RELOCATIONS WOULD BE TEMPORARY AND THAT THE SITUATION IN THE
AREA WOULD HAVE IMPROVED SUFFICIENTLY BY THE TIME THE NEW EMBASSY
IS CONSTRUCTED HOPEFULLY BY EARLY 1976 TO PERMIT THEIR RETURN.
9. THESE SUGGESTIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSADOR
BUFFUM. HOUGHTON
NLN N09-1319 : P.505
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE- AUTHORIZATION O THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
85/20/199
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
H
EXPIS
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 871
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07715 291228Z
2
46
ACTION SS-25
5
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
0 R 291148Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2954
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE 884719 HOUSE
73 JUN 30 AM 8:31
SECRE T BEIRUT 7715
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS LE IR
SUBJECT: LEBANESE REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE
REF: TEHRAN 4399
1. LEBANESE AMB TO TEHRAN (KHALIL) PRESENTLY IN BEIRUT FOR
CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS PURCHASES. HE PLANS RETURN TEHRAN JULY 4.
2. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF WE COULD GIVE GOL RESPONSE ON
AVAILABILITY A-4 AIRCRAFT WHILE AMB. KHALIL STILL HERE IN ORDER
CLARIFY QUESTION OF AIRCRAFT. LEBANESE STRONGLY PREFER A-4;
INTERESTED IN IRANIAN F-5 ONLY AS ALTERNATIVE. HOUGHTON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESEURHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
set
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PROARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 188
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07363 211713Z
02
50
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
EXPIS
017094
R 211502Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2826
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S ECRET BEIRUT 7363
EXDIS
DEPTARTMENT PASS USINT CAIRO
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS
SUBJECT: SISCO-DINITZ CONVERSATION JUNE 18
REF: STATE 119401
1. INFORMED SECRETARY GENERAL FOREIGN OFFICE NEGIB
SADAK (FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD PRESENTLY IN PARIS
FOR MEDICAL REASONS) OF SISCO/DINITZ EXCHANGE JUNE 18
RE LEBANON. SADAKA MOST PLEASED BY DEPARTMENT'S ACTION.
2. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH GOL WILL DO WHAT IT CAN CONTROL
FEDAYEEN ITS CAPACITY AT MOMENT LIMITED. MOST OF
THE ARMY INVOLVED IN DEFENSIVE POSITION VIS-A-VIS SYRIANS
AND IN MAINTAINING POSITION OF STRENGTH IN BEIRUT
AREA. IT UNLIKELY GOL CAN DO MORE TO CONTROL BORDER UNTIL
RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND FEDAYEEN MUCH CLEARER THAN AT PRESENT.
ON OTHER HAND, WE HAVE NO REPORTS THAT FEDAYEEN ARE
PRESENTLY PLANNING UNDERTAKE CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS.
LOCAL PRESS HAS CARRIED WIRE SERVICE REPORTS FROM
JERUSALEM THAT FEDAYEEN ENGAGED IN JUNE 13 CLASH NEAR
LETECKVW
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION QC OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
TELEGRAM
EXAMS EXATE
AMERICA UNITED NAME
STATES OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07363 211713Z
LEBANESE BORDER WERE INHABITANTS OF ISRAELI-OCCUPIED
TERRITORY AND HAD NOT COME FROM LEBANON.
HOUGHTON
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USINT CAIRO
M
LETECKYW
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
09/20/199
ORDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
*
EXPIS
UNITED STATES AMERICAN
Department of State19 TELEGRAM
OF
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
2
SECRET 035
3
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07217 190923Z
14
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
124903
R 1908267 JUN 73
FM AMZPBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2758
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
S E C R E T BETRUT 7217
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: ASEC, TU
SUBJ: ASSASSINATION THREAT
REF: BEIRUT 7064
1. RE PARA 2 REFTEL, G-2 MACHINE RECORDS HAVE PRODUCED
THE FOLLOWING DATA CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF ABDUL KADIR
TALU, BORN TURKEY 1917, WHO GAVE PROFESSION AS
"COMMERCE" AND WHO WAS BEARER OF TURKISH PASSPORT:
JUNE 14, 1972 - ARRIVED BEIRUT AIRPORT (NO RECORD OF EXIT)
JULY 7, 1972 a ARRIVED BEIRUT AIRPORT (NO RECORD OF EXIT)
SEPT 12, 1972 - ARRIVED BEIRUT AIRPORT
MAY 15, 1973 - DEPARTED BEIRUT AIRPORT FOR TURKEY.
2. FROM THE MACHINE RECORD PRINT-OUT, WE CONCLUDE
THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT TALU DEPARTED AND RETURNED
TO LEBANON DURING THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE SEPTEMBER 12
ARRIVAL AND MAY 15 DEPARTURE BUT THERE IS NO SPECIFIC
RECORD OF THIS.
HOUGHTON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED 1 STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 397
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07203 181642Z
51
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
P 1815117 JUN 73
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HO HOUSE 18892 SE
'73 JUN 18 PM 8:31
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2750
S ECRE T BEIRUT 7203
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (MALIK, DR. CHARLES)
SUBJECT: DR. CHARLES MALIK'S MISSION TO US FOR PRESIDENT
FRANGIE
REF: BEIRUT 7042
1. FURTHER TO REFTEL, I RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM DR. MALIK CONCERNING HIS VISIT TO THE US.
2. DR, MALIK CLAIMED THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAD REQUESTED
HIM TO CONTACT PRESIDENT NIXON AND DR. KISSINGER DURING
HIS TRIP TO THE US TO "DISCUSS FUNDAMENTAL MATTERS WHICH
CANNOT BE PUT ON PAPER, " DR. MALIK INFORMED ME THAT
PRESIDENT FRANGIE WOULD CONTACT THE EMBASSY AND ADVISE
THAT "I REPRESENT HIM AND SPEAK IN HIS NAME IN THE
NAME OF LEBANON, MALIK SAID HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO
MEET WITH THE SECRETARY.
3. DR. MALIK STATED HE WOULD BE ATTENDING ACONFERENCE
AT THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS
AND IDEOLOGIES, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO DURING THE
PERIOD JUNE 18 TO JULY 6. HE COULD BE CONTACTED
THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR, EDWARD ROZAK. HE WAS PREPARED TO
LEAVE THE CONFERENCE ANY TIME A MEETING COULD BE
ARRANGED WITH THE PRESIDENT OR DR. KISSINEGER. HE MIGHT
REMAIN IN THE US A WEEK OR TWO AFTER THE CONFERENCE IF
THE SITUATION IN LEBANON REMAINED CALM,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATES
Department of State
UNITED STATES American
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07203 181642Z
4, DR. MALIK EXPLAINED THAT HIS MISSION WAS TOP SECRET AND
REQUESTED THAT THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE OF THE
DENVER FBI OFFICE ACT AS LIAISON WITH HIM AND THAT ALL
COMMUNICATIONS BE HANDLED THROUGH HIM. HE NOTED THAT ONLY
PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER WERE AWARE OF THE
MISSION.
EXCESS EXCES
5. I HAD NO CHANCE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH DR. MALIK
AS HE LEFT BEFORE I RECEIVED THE MESSAGE. HOWEVER NOT
RECEIVING WORD FROM THE PRESIDENCY I CALLED ON
DR. SADAKA, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
TO CLARIFY MALIK'S MISSION, SADAKA CALLED PRESIDENT
FRANGIE IN MY PRESENCE AND CONFIRMED THAT DR. MALIK
WOULD BE SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE
AND HAD AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE. DR. SADAKA DID NOT TELL
ME WHAT THE MESSAGE WAS AND I DID NOT PRESS HIM. HE
DID EMPHASIZE ITS IMPORTANCE. HE ALSO REPORTED THAT
PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAD GIVEN NO INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHOM
MALIK SHOULD CONTACT AND HAD NOT MENTIONED THE PRESIDENT
OR DR. KISSINGER.
6. I REALIZE THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE AN
APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT ALTHOUGH MALIK IS GOING TO
PRESS, I AM SURE, FOR ONE WITH BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND
DR. KISSINGER. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE THAT PRESIDENT
FRANGIE ATTACHES TO WHATEVER MALIK IS GOING TO SAY I
WOULD RECOMMEND THAT HE SEE THE SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT
SECRETARY SISCO. SUGGEST THE DEPARTMENT DISCUSS THE
VISIT WITH AMBASSADOR BUFFUM.
18
7. MALIK, I AM ALMOST CERTAIN, WILL TAKE NO INITIATIVE
BUT WILL EXPECT WORD FROM THE DEPARTMENT AS SOON AS
APPOINTMENTS FOR HIM HAVE BEEN ARRANGED.
HOUGHTON
.13
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
09/20/199
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED name
TELEGRAM
OF
EXCESS EXEIS
WH
SECRET 077
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07064 151156Z
43
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USSS-00 1026 W
098303
R 151051Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2694
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
SECRE T BEIRUT 7064
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC, TU
SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION THREAT
REF: ANKARA 4693
1. UNFORTUNATELY LEBANESE G-2 INFORMS US THEY CANNOT CHECK
TALONI ACCOUNT IN NARODNEY BANK BECAUSE OF LEBANESE BANKING
SECRECY LAWS. ONLY WAY WE COULD CHECK ACCOUNT WOULD BE TO
MAKE REQUEST OF LEBANESE ATTORNEY GENERAL WHICH WE WOULD PREFER
NOT TO DO AS THERE WOULD BE MUCH GREATER RISK OF PUBLICITY,
HOWEVER WE WILL OF COURSE DO so IF DEPARTMENT so INSTRUCTS.
2. LEBANESE G-2 WILL HOWEVER CHECK ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE DATA
CONCERNING TALU RPT TALU'S AIR TRAVEL BEIRUT FEB 13 AND RETURN
ANKARA MAY 18, WE WILL PASS ON INFORMATION AS SOON AS IT IS
RECEIVED. HOUGHTON
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard® Nixon I residential Library.
FORDEGLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET 340
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06899 01 OF 02 121904Z
EXCES EXPIS EXCESS
41
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
SITUATION ROOM
R 1215527 JUN 73
'73 JUN 12 PM 9:19
2
WHITE HOUSE
069716
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2626
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 6899
EXDIS
STATE PASS DOD
EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MASS LE US
SUBJ: LEBANESE REQ FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE
REF: STATE 109631 AND 109512
1. BASED ON REFTELS AND KORN (NEA/ARN) JUN 7 LETTER
TO CHARGE WE HAVE CONTINUED TO DISCOURAGE MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN LEADERS FROM EXPECTING ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT IN WAY
OF GRANT OR LOAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE. WE HAVE STRESSED NEED
RELYING PRIMARILY UPON FMS CREDITS ALREADY AVAILABLE WITH
POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE CREDITS ALREADY AVAILABLE WITH
POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE CREDITS. I HAVE NOT AS YET CATEGORICALLY
TOLD THEM THERE NO GRANT AID AND NO POSSIBILITY OF AN EQUIPMENT
LOAN ALTHOUGH I'VE DONE EVERYTHING BUT INCLUDING DISCOURAGING
GENERAL GHANEM AND FONOFF SECRETARY GENERAL NAJIB SADAQA FROM
EXPECTING GRANT AID NEXT YEAR. BEFORE TELLING THEM THERE NO GRANT
AID AVAILABLE, I WOULD LIKE IF POSSIBLE TO BE ABLE TO SOFTEN
THE IMPACT WITH SOMETHING POSITIVE.
2. NEEDLESS TO SAY, OUR POSITION RE AID HAS PRODUCED DISAPPOINT=
MENT AMONG HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS WHOSE EXPECTATIONS AND/OR HOPES
FOR ASSISTANCE FROM UNITED STATES GOVT DURING TIME OF MAJOR
CRISIS HAVE BEEN UNREALISTICALLY HIGH. WE HAVE BEEN TRYING FROM
BEGINNING TO INPART MORE PERSPECTIVE AND REALISM TO LEBANESE
THINKING ABOUT ASSISTANCE WHICH USG CAN PROVIDE BUT OUR EFFORTS
HAVE NOT ENJOYED GREAT SUCCESS. PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY REMEMBER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
L
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
on
STATE
*
*
Department of State
GELINO STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
EXE™ EXC
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06899 01 OF 02 121904Z
MASSIVE AID ACCORDED JORDAN UNDER SOMEWHAT SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES
IN 1970 AND 1971; PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY HAVE MISINTERPRETED
PAST EXPRESSIONS OF USG ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT IN DEALING
WITH PROBLEM OF FEDAYEEN PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY ARE FEELING
INCREASINGLY ABANDONED BY FORMER EXTERNAL SUPPORTERS (E.G.,
FRANCE AND SAUDI ARABIA) IN ANY EVENT LEBANESE LEADERS ARE
COUNTING HEAVILY UPON HELP FROM US, MILITARY AS WELL AS POLITICAL.
WHAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GIVE THEM HAS BEEN APPRECIATED.
3. ALTHOUGH PROSPECTS NOT BRIGHT CEMBTEL 6691) WE HAVE
NOT GIVEN UP HOPE ALTOGETHER THAT GOL MAY FIND WAY TO
UTILIZE 1973 10 MILLION DOLLAR FMS CREDIT BEFORE NEXT YEAR.
WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STRESSED NECESSITY OF so DOING IF AT ALL
POSSIBLE. IF THERE IS ANY CHANCE, PRESIDENT FRANGIE MUST FIRST
OVERCOME INTERNAL POLITICAL CHALLENGE AND HAVE PRIME MINISTER
WHO WILLING AND POLITICALLY KNOWLEDGABLE TO EXPLORE ALL
POSSTBILITIES OF LEGALLY JUSTIFYING USE OF CREDIT.
4. CONCERNING POSSIBILITIES OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM
IRAN (STATE 109512) WE HAVE DISCUSSED MATTER WITH LEBANESE
FOREIGN OFFICE AND WITH GENERAL GHANEM. BOTH AGREE FULLY THAT
MATTER SHOULD BE KEPT IN GOL CHANNELS. GENERAL GHANEM AND HIS
STAFF DO NOT RPT NOT WANT F-5S AND ARE DEFINITELY COMMITTED TO
IDEA OF A-4S AS AIRCRAFT MOST SUITABLE FOR LEBANON'S NEEDS. THEY
ALSO REALIZE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES IN TRANSPORTING ARTILLERY OR
OTHER HEAVY ITEMS FROM IRAN TO LEBANON. LEBANESE (INCLUDING
GHANEM) APPEAR TO HAVE LOST MOST OF INITIAL INTEREST IN POSSIBLE
TRANIAN ASSISTANCE ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THEY MAY SOUND OUT SHAH
TO SEE IF HE WOULD BE WILLING PROVIDE LONG-TERM CREDIT TO ENABLE
LEBANESE BUY SOME OF ARMS THEY NEED. WE HAVE NOT DISCOURAGED
THEM FROM SO DOING. IN ANY EVENT, LEBANESE UNDERSTAND THAT ANY
FURTHER ACTION RE IRAN WILL HAVE TO BE AT THEIR INITIATIVE,
AND ANY TRANSFERS MUST HAVE OUR PERMISSION. FORMER PRESIDENT
CHAMOUNIS EFFORT WHICH HAD FRANGIE'S APPROVAL WAS DIRECTED
PRIMARILY AT DETERMINING WHETHER EQUIPMENT COULD BE PROCURED
QUICKER AND CHEAPER FROM IRAN,
5. BEFORE DEFINITELY INFORMING TOP ECHELON AND MILITARY
OFFICIALS THAT WE CANNOT PROVIDE GRANT AID OR LOAN EQUIPMENT
I WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO BE IN POSITION INFORM THEM
OF WHAT WE CAN RPT CAN DO AND WHEN WE CAN DO IT. SHOULD IT
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Оминоль
CANE
EXETS
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06899 01 OF 02 121904Z
APPEAR THAT ALL WE CAN DO IS SELL ARMS ON VIRTUALLY COMMERCIAL
TERMS, WE RISK UNDERMINING POSITION AND CONFIDENCE OF PRESIDENT
FRANGIE IN DEALING WITH PRESENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES FROM
FEDAYEEN, SYRIA AND OTHER HOSTILE ELEMENTS (E.G., COLONEL QADHAFI,
LOCAL LEFTISTS, IRAQ, ETC.)
6. AMONG QUESTION WE WOULD LIKE BE ABLE ANSWER ARE FOLLOWING:
(A) NEXT TIME WE DISCUSS THEIR MILITARY NEEDS WITH GOL IS USG
PREPARED FURNISH ALL ITEMS ON TOP-PRIORITY LIST SUBMITTED MAS
23 IN BEIRUT 5968, AND, IF so, WHAT ARE ESTIMATED COSTS AND
DELIVERY DATES FOR ITEMS WE PREPARED FURNISH? (WE NOTE THAT WITH
REFERENCE A-4 AIRCRAFT CNO MSG 301956Z REPLYING TO BEIRUT DAO
2509377 SAYS DECISION ON SUPPLYING A-45 BEING DEFERRED PENDING
RESOLUTION OVERALL LIST TRANSMISSTED BEIRUT 5968, USG WILLINGNESS
NOTE BY OC/T: BEIRUT 6899 NOT PASSED DOD,
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORMDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXPIS
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET 252
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06899 02 OF 02 121835Z
51
2
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
069408
R 1215527 JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2627
SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 6899
EXDIS
STATE PASS DOD
SUPPLY 155 MM SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZERS ALSO UNCERTAIN.)
WITH THIS INFO WE COULD ESTABLISH LIST OF PRIORITIES
WHICH WOULD CONFORM WITH AMOUNT OF FMS CREDITS GOL ABLE
SPEND. (B) IS $368,000 WHICH REMAINS UNSPENT FROM USG FY
1971 MAP GRANT TO LEBANON OF 5 MILLION DOLLARS AVAILABLE FOR
IMMEDIATE EXPENDITURE FOR MINOR ITEMS SUCH AS NIGHT OBSERVATION
DEVICES, DETECTION DEVICES, ARMORED VESTS, ETC. WHICH LEBANESE
BADLY WANT AND NEED IN ADDITION TO MAJOR ITEMS? LEBANESE ARMY
HAS RAISED THIS QUESTION. WE UNDERSTAND THAT FUNDS ARE PRESENTLY
BLOCKED BECAUSE DA/ILA WISHES RECLAIM THEM FOR SOME OTHER
PURPOSE, IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THESE FUNDS AND RAPID ACTION TO
MEET LEBANESE REQUESTS FOR DELIVERY MINOR ITEMS WHICH COULD BE
PURCHASED THEREWITH WOULD HELP CUSHION IMPACT OF DELAYS WITH
LARGER ITEMS. LEBANESE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND IF THESE FUNDS
SHOULD BE TAKEN AWAY.
7. FINALLY, ANTHING ELSE WHICH CAN BE DONE TO AID LEBANESE
MILITARILY WITHIN LIMITS OF PREVAILING LEGAL, FINANCIAL,
POLITICAL AND LOGISTIC SITUATION IN UNITED STATES WILL BE
APPRECIATED BY GOL (AS WELL AS THIS EMBASSY) AND WOULD, WE
BELIEVE, BE IN USG INTEREST. WE WOULD APPRECIATE EARLY
REPLY.
HOUGHTON
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DOD.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE-AUTHORIZATION ME OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT state or
EXC-S
*
*
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED NAME
TELEGRAM
STATES of
SECRET 839
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06423 021209Z
2
=
53
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
107584
o 0211457 JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
ANDERSON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2451
HOLDRIDGE
HORMATS
S E C R E T BEIRUT 6423
JORDEN
KENNEDY
EXDIS
D
LEHMAN
LEVINE
E.O. 11652: XGDS
NEGROPONTE
TAGS: MASS LE
SUBJ: LEBANESE REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE
ODEEN
RATLIFF
RONDON
REF: STATE 106414; BEIRUT'S 5968 AND 6040
SAUNDERS
SONNENFELDT
1. AS REPORTED BEIRUT REFTELS, GOL HAS COMMITTED 1972
FMS CREDIT FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT REQUEST. IT CANNOT
V.I.G.
APPROPRIATE FURTHER BECAUSE THERE ARE NO UNOBLIGATED
WALSH
FUNDS REMAINING FROM 200 MILLION LEBANESE POUNDS
AUTHORIZED FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN 1972 FOR
FIVE YEAR PERIOD. THIS APPROPRIATION CONSTITUTED AN
AUTHORIZATION TO BORROW FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES. CONSE-
QUENTLY THEY HAVE NO LEGAL BASIS AT THE MOMENT TO USE
OUR 1973 FMS CREDIT OF $10 MILLION. THEY ARE STUDY-
ING WAYS AND MEANS FOR LEGALLY COMMITTING SECOND CREDIT
BUT SECRETARY GENERAL OF MINISTRY FINANCE TOLD ME THIS
MORNING JUNE 2 THAT PROSPECTS FOR USING IT NEAR FUTURE
ARE NOT PROMISING. HE IS MAKING A STUDY OF GOL
FINANCIAL RESOURCES IN AFTERMATH OF RECENT CRISIS
WHICH HE EXPECTS WILL BE COMPLETED BY JUNE 4. ECONOMIC
COUNSELLOR AND I ARE MEETING WITH HIM THAT DAY FOR
LUNCH TO OBTAIN HIS FINDINGS. AT THAT POINT WE WILL HOPE-
FULLY BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO DEFINE WHAT RESOURCES
GOL HAS AVAILABLE TO HELP DEFRAY COST OF EQUIPMENT.
2. I HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT OUR FINANCIAL
RESOURCES ARE ONLY WHAT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECROUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRANTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SENTES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06423 021209Z
AND THAT IT WAS PROBLEMATIC AT THIS LATE DATE IN THE FISCAL
YEAR WHETHER WE WOULD HAVE ANY GRAND AID AVAILABLE.
I HAVE ALSO EXPLAINED THAT EQUIPMENT LOANS CAUSE US
GREAT DIFFICULTY, HOWEVER, THE LEBANESE HAVE AN UNREALISTIC
CONCEPTION OF OUR FINANCIAL RESOURCES, PARTICULARLY
THE MILITARY, AND I DOUBT IF THEY BELIEVE ME.
3. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN HANDLING THE PROBLEM HERE TO
HAVE SOME IDEA OF HOW FAR WE COULD HELP THEM IN FINANCING
EXCLUS EXAIS
THE EQUIPMENT IF ONLY FOR OUR OWN BACKGROUND. FOR
EXAMPLE, IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY OF GIVING THEM SOME
GRANT AID AND COULD WE LOAN THEM AT LEAST SOME OF
THE EQUIPMENT? THE LEBANESE ARE CERTAINLY GOING TO BAR-
GAIN FOR THE BEST DEAL POSSIBLE, BUT THERE IS NO QUESTION
THAT THEY HAVE SUFFERED ECONOMICALLY FROM THE RECENT CRISIS
AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO so AS LONG AS SITUATION REMAINS
UNSETTLED. ON JUNE 4, I HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE PERHAPS TO
QUANTIFY THE EXTENT OF THEIR CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.
THERE IS ALSO NO QUESTION THAT THEY ARE COUNTING HEAVILY
ON OUR SUPPORT AND I HOPE WE CAN BE AS GENEROUS AS
POSSIBLE. ANY FINANCIAL HELP WE CAN GIVE THEM EITHER
IN GRANT AID OR LOANS OF EQUIPMENT WILL ADD TO THEIR
CONFIDENCE AND STIFFEN THEIR RESOLVE IN THEIR WAR OF
NERVES WITH THE FEDAYEEN.
HOUGHTON
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
'73 JUN 3 PM 7:23
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
59/20/199
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2ECKELYBA
*
EXE™S
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 866
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06419 0118302
47
02
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 1026 W
099743
OP 0118187 JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2448
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY
SECRE T BEIRUT 6419
EXDIS
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC, TU
SUBJ: ASSASSINATION THREAT
REF ANKARA 4413
CHECK OF POST PERSONNEL FILES REVEALED THAT WE HAVE NO REPEAT
NO ACTIVE REGULAR EMPLOYEES WHO ARE TURKISH NATIONALS. HOUGHTON
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WGS
*
*
Department of State
SELLS AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 243
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06257 301551Z
50
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
077584
0 301610Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2387
SECRE T BETRUT 6257
EXDIS
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
DEPT PASS SECDEF ISA AND DA DALO-ILS
'73 MAY 30 PM 4:47 47
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MASS, LE
SUBJ: LEBANESE ARMS REQUESTS
1. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY LEBANESE FOREIGN OFFICE, AFTER
CHECKING WITH ARMY COMMANDER IN CHIEF GENERAL GHANEM,
THAT GOL WISHES KEEP ITS EMBASSY AND ITS MILITARY ATTACHE
IN WASHINGTON OUT OF ARMS PICTURE TO MAXIMUM DEGREE
POSSIBLE. THIS APPLIES NOT ONLY TO DISCUSSING LEBANESE
REQUESTS WITH EMBASSY OFFICIALS BUT ALSO TO HAVING LEBANESE
ATTACHE SIGN VARIOUS DOCUMENTS CONNECTED WITH ARMS PURCHASE.
LEB ARMY NOT SATISIFED WITH THEIR WASHINGTON MILITARY ATTACHE!S
HANDLING OF CASES TO DATE.
2. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR ALL
DOCUMENTS TO BE SENT TO THIS EMBASSY FOR SIGNING BY AUTHORIZED
LEBANESE OFFICIALS WITHOUT APPRECIABLY DELAYING DELIVERY TIME
OF ARMS, EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS. THIS IS PROCEDURE
ARMY AND FOREIGN OFFICE STRONGLY PREFER PROVIDED IT
MEANS NO MORE THAN ONE WEEK OR TEN DAY DELAY. IF
DELAY WOULD BE GREATER, THEN ARMY AND FOREIGN OFFICE
WILLING SEND OFFICER TO WASHINGTON ON SPECIAL MISSION
TO HANDLE ARMS DEALS. THIS WOULD, HOWEVER, CAUSE CON-
SIDERABLE FRICTION WITH LEBANESE EMBASSY WASHINGTON.
3. REQUEST REPLY SOONEST.
LETECKVW
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT or STATE
BECKE
THE
OF
THE
EXECUTIVE
EXC-S
*
Department of State
STATE AMERICA UNITED and
TELEGRAM
OF
НУЙОГЕ
VKW8
ОБГУЛ
BE
SECRET
It
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06257 301551Z TA
ГЕВУИЕВЕ
OSR
4. REQUEST DA INFORM ALL COMMANDS WHICH DEAL WITH LEBANON
AS TO WHATEVER NEW PROCEDURE IS ADOPTED.
HOUGHTON
ΓEB
NOT
IM
DECHEE
VHW2
TE
5'0" XeDe
DESL
DV
MOOR MOITAUTIS МООЯ ЭТІНШ
HONSE
E of C E il
10 SPEA
.13 was 30 bW its till
43
M
VOLTON 88"52
28
ЬУСЕ
OF
LETECKVW
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Willoo Nixon Presidential Library.
621/02/67
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
WA
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF !
TELEGRAM
SECRET 240
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06253 301545Z
50
ACTION SS-25
EXCESS
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
077544
0 P 3014597 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2384
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY
SECRE T BEIRUT 6253
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
TAGS: ASEC, TU
'73 MAY 30 PM 4:47
SUBJ: ASSASSINATION THREAT
REF: STATE 102951
1. IN COURSE OF OTHER
BUSINESS, WE MADE ROUTINE NAME CHECK REQUEST FOR ABDUL KADIR
TOLONI WITHOUT INDICATING PURPOSE OF REQUEST. SURETE HAD NO
RECORD OF TOLONI.
2. FROM AMERICAN BANK OFFICIAL WE FIND IT IS NOT POSSIBLE
TO OPEN AN ACCOUNT IN THE NAME OF ANOTHER PERSON UNLESS
THE IDENTITY OF THAT PERSON IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED. CONSE-
QUENTLY, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE, EVEN IF WE WISHED
TO DEPOSIT MONEY IN THE NAME OF TOLONI UNLESS THERE
WAS AN ACCOUNT FOR HIM ALREADY IN THE BANK. THE MOST
EFFECTIVE WAY OF DETERMINING WHETHER SUCH AN ACCOUNT
EXISTS IN THE NARODNEY BANK IS TO REQUEST G-2 TO INVESTI-
GATE. WE THINK THEY WOULD.
3. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER YOU WANT US NOW TO APPROACH
G-2 FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO
EXPLAIN TO G-2 THE REASON FOR OUR REQUEST. WE SEE NO
PROBLEM AS THEY ALREADY FAMILIAR WITH THE CASE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THEAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Wh Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSII This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TRANTMENT of STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
EXETS EXEMS
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06253 301545Z
4. RE SECOND SENTENCE LETTER REPORTED ANKARAIS 4277, TELEPHONE
SYSTEM (INCLUDING EMBASSY) WAS FULLY OPERATIVE THAT DAY.
IN FACT WE HAD RESERVED PRINCIPAL INCOMING EMBASSY
LINES FOR EXTENDED PERIOD FOR POSSIBLE CALL. THERE WAS NO
TROUBLE IN BEIRUT THAT DAY THAT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED CALL.
HOUGHTON
МООЯ NOITAUTI2
MHILE HONSE
ЛЗ WYA 30 bW of did t:11
LETECKVW
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE UTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
89/80/199
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
or
DEF
STATE
with
*
*
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
EXPIS EXPIS EXAIS
SECRET
759
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06211 301114Z
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
SITUATION RO ROOM 025241
2
11
WHITE WHITE HOUSE HOUSE
73 MAY 30 PM 4:47 47
0 3010137 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2367
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T BETRUT 6211
EXDIS
DEPT PASS SECDEF (SD/ISL) AND CINCEUR FOR INFO IMMEDIATE
E.O. 11652% XGDS
TAGS: MASS, LE
SUBJ: GOL REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE
REF: TEHRAN 3660; AMMAN DAO 124; STATE 101446
1. LEBANESE EFFORTS PROCURE ADDITIONAL ARMS AND MUNITIONS
NOW, AS WE HAVE REPORTED, MATTER OF TOP PRIORITY AND URGENCY
FOR PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND ARMY. BOTH ARE CONVINCED THAT
ANOTHER ROUND WITH FEDAYEEN IS VERY LIKELY WITHIN NEXT
FEW MONTHS AND WISH TO BE PREPARED, REALIZING THAT
FEDAYEEN ARE ALSO TRYING TO IMPROVE THEIR MILITARY CAPA-
BILITIES IN ANTICIPATION OF ANOTHER ROUND. MAJOR GAPS
WHICH NEED TO BE FILLED INDICATED BY FIRST PRIORITY
LIST OF EQUIPMENT ARMY SUBMITTED TO US AND ANALYSIS MADE
BY DAO OF WHY PARTICULAR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT ARE NEEDED
(BEIRUT 5968 AND 6039). MAJOR FACTOR IS TIME OF DELIVERY
BUT ANOTHER FACTOR IS PRICE SINCE GOL IS NOT PRESENTLY IN
STRONG POLITICAL POSITION TO OBTAIN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
APPROVAL OF ANOTHER LARGE APPROPRIATION FOR
ARMS PURCHASES.
2. IN ADDITION TO REQUESTING NEEDED MILITARY EQUIPMENT
FROM US, LEBANESE ARE QUITE NATURALLY INTERESTED IN
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE-AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
on
STATE
Department of State
UNITED <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06211 301114Z
WHAT MIGHT RPT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE FROM TTIGHBORING COUNTRIES
SUCH AS JORDAN AND IRAN WHICH HAVE EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD
APPEAR AT XERST GLANCE COMPATIBLE WITH NEEDS OF ITS ARMY.
INITIAL DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN LEBANESE AND JORDANIAN
ARMIES WERE ESTABLISHED DURING RECENT FIGHTING. (BEIRUT 5521)
CONTACTS WITH IRAN ESTABLISHED VIA LEBANESE AMBASSADOR
TEHRAN (TEHRAN 3646) WHO IS PROTEGE OF FORMER PRESIDENT
CHAMOUN, BUT ONLY AFTER CHAMOUN HAD LONG DISCUSSION
CAPPROVED BY PRESIDENT FRANGIE) WITH KEY ARMY OFFICERS ON
WHAT LEBANESE ARMY NEEDS IN WAY OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT.
WE UNDERSTAND CHAMOUN'S TRIP TO TEHRAN APPROVED BY
FRANGIE PERSONALLY.
3. IT IS OUR OPINION THAT FRANGIE AND ARMY ARE CORRECT
IN TURNING TO ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES TO ASCERTAIN WHAT
MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO FILL THEIR TOP-PRIORITY NEEDS,
PARTICULARLY SINCE TIME IS OF ESSENCE AND DELIVERY DATES
ON SOME OF EQUIPMENT REQUESTED FROM US ARE UNCERTAIN.
WE RECOMMEND THAT DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE
CONSIDER USE OF OUR EMBASSIES, DAO'S AND MAAGIS, AS
APPROPRIATE, QUIETLY TO ASSIST LEBANESE ARMY IN DETERMINING
WHAT EQUIPMENT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE FROM JORDANIAN, IRANIAN
OR OTHER FRIENDLY ARMIES WHICH COULD MEET LEBANESE NEEDS
AND TIMETABLE AS OUTLINED TO us. SECRECY IS, OF COURSE,
OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE. IF SUITABLE EQUIPMENT, IN GOOD
CONDITION, AVAILABLE ON TIMELY BASIS FROM SOURCES OTHER
THAN USG, THIS COULD ALSO HAVE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES FOR GOL.
4, AS TO SPECIFIC HUNTER DEAL FROM JORDAN, LEBANESE
AIR FORCE ALREADY HAS THREE OF THE FOUR JORDANIAN HUNTER
TYPES. THEREFORE MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS WOULD BE
FACILITATED BY PROCUREMENT IDENTICAL EQUIPMENT AND NO
PILOT TRANSITION REQUIRED. HOWEVER, THERE NO INDICATION
OF CONDITION JORDANIAN AIRCRAFT WHICH DEALER APPARENTLY
INTENDS TO SELL TO LEBANESE (?) AS IS. GIVEN SUPERIORITY
OF A-4 EVEN IF PRICED SLIGHTLY HIGHER AND SIMILAR LEAD TIMES,
HUNTER DEAL OUTSIDE OF PROCUREMENT AIRCRAFT ALREADY ON
LEBANESE INVENTORY WOULD APPEAR ADVANTAGEOUS ONLY IF AIRCRAFT
COULD BE DELIVERED NEAR FUTURE IN GOOD OPERATING CONDITION
AT LOW PRICE. THERE WOULD ALSO BE A LOCAL POLITICAL
ADVANTAGE BUT NOT A DECISIVE ONE FOR LEBS TO HAVE BRITISH
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
DEP
STATE
*
*
Department of State
CELLING STATES OF the
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06211 301114Z
RATHER THAN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT. WE DO KNOW COMMANDER
LEBANESE AIR FORCE WANTS A-4'S AND FAILING THAT F-515,
AS DEPARTMENT INDICATES (STATE 101446) WE NEED MORE INFOR-
MATION BEFORE PROPOSAL CAN BE CONSIDERED AND CERTAINLY
BEFORE RAISING WITH LEBANESE WHICH WE PRESUMABLY SHOULD
DO BEFORE FINAL DECISION MADE AS TO SALE MAP EQUIPMENT.
SUCH CONSULTATION WILL BE ALL THE MORE NECESSARY IF IRANIANS
MAKE F-5'S AVAILABLE.
HOUGHTON
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECDEF AND CINCEUR.
EXETS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-7-6
DEPARTMENT on STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET 427
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06198 300720Z
2
16
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-09 USSS-00 /026 W
073548
OP 300714Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2365
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY
SECRETBEIRUT 6198
EXDIS
EO 116521 GDS
TAGS: ASEC TU
SUBJ: ASSASSINATION THREAT
REF: ANKARA 4277 AND STATE 102951
NO INFORMATION ON ABDUL KADER TALONI. ON BASIS
AVAILABLE DATA, WE CANNOT MAKE JUDGMENT AS TO
WHETHER BSO OPERATION OR NOT. WILL ENDEAVOR ANSWER
OTHER REQUESTS SOONEST.
25X1 EXCES
HOUGHTON
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
'73 MAY 30 PM 4:47 47
State Dept. review completed
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-7-6
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
POPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 075
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05907 2218052
53
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
'73 MAY 23 AM 8:25
02
ACTION SS=25
EXPIS
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
001066
o 2217457 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2259
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
SECRET BEIRUT 5907
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC, TU
SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION THREAT
REF: ANKARA 4011 AND BEIRUT 5864
1. EMBOFFS CONFERRED WITH GOL G=2 WHO HAVE AGREED PROVIDE
NECESSARY COOPERATION IN ATTEMPT APPREHEND EXTORTIONIST, WE PLAN
FOLLOWING SCENARIO IF DEPT. CONCURS:
A . TURKISH LANGUAGE OFFICER, IF PROVIDED BY ANKARA OR ISTANBUL,
WOULD TAKE CALL ALONE IN SECURITY OFFICE.
B. IN NEARBY ROOM WOULD BE COMMAND CENTER WHERE CALL WOULD BE
MONITORED AND RECORDED WITHOUT CALLER'S BEING ALERTED. CHARGE,
TURKISH SPEAKER HOPEFULLY GOL ARMY OFFICER, GOL G=2 LIAISON
OFFICER AND RSO WOULD BE IN CENTER. WILL HAVE DIRECTSOOMMO LINK WITH
SWITCHBOARD WHERE RCO TELEPHONE TECHNICIAN WILL BE STATIONED TO
ADVISE WHICH ONE OF EMBASSYIS 20 OUTSIDE LINES CALL IS ON. THIS
INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED G=2 LIAISON WHO WILL OPEN LINE WITH
PTT WHERE CALL WILL BE TRACED. G=2 LIAISON OFFICER WILL NOTIFY
HIS OPERATIONS CENTER WHEN LOCATION FROM WHICH CALL MADE IS KNOWN.
G=2 WILL HAVE APPROXIMATELY 5 OR 6 PATROLS STATIONED AROUND BEIRUT
READY CONVERGE ON CALL LOCATION IN ATTEMPT ARREST CALLER. HOWEVER,
WE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT TRACING AND REACTION CAN BE QUICJA
ENOUGH TO APPREHEND CALLER, WE WOULD PLAN TO RECEIVE CALL FROM
0800 TO 1200 ON MAY 25,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
UNITED
Department of State
ASSURANCE
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
EXPIS EXCESS EXPIS EXPIRE
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05907 221805Z
2. DOES EMBASSY ANKARA HAVE ANY IDEA WHOM CALLER MIGHT ASK FOR
HERE? ONE OF REAL DIFFICULTIES THAT WE CAN FORESEE IS WHAT
INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO LOCAL TELEPHONE OPERATOR AS TO
CALLS TO BE PUT THROUGH TO THE SECURITY OFFICE.
3. G-2 VOLUNTEERED THAT IT WILLING TO PRETEND THAT THEY ARE
DELIVERING MONEY TO CALLER SHOULD TRACING OF CALL FAIL TO
APPREHEND HIM. EMBASSY WOULD NOT BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED. HOWEVER,
IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCE, WE WOULD PROVIDE EMBASSY VEHICLE WITHOUT
DIPLOMATIC PLATES EQUIPPED WITH PROTECTIVE MOBILE RADIO. THIS
WOULD PERMIT OCCUPANT OF CAR TO PROVIDE LOCATION AND ANY INFORMATION
HE MIGHT RECEIVE BY USE HIDDEN MICROPHONE WHICH WILL TRANSMIT ANY
CONVERSATION IN CAR WITHOUT MANUAL AND THUS OBVIOUS USE OF
RADIO'S REGULAR MICROPHONE.
4 , G-2 WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR ANY TECHNICAL ADVISE DEPT. COULD
PROVIDE RE OPERATION.
HOUGHTON
МООЯ MOITAUTI2
MHILE HONSE
.13 WVA 53 VII
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
C
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
12/20/109
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
STATES AMERICA UNITED time
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 934
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05864 220708Z
R2
ACTION SS-25
2
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 USSS-00 /026 W
126802
o 2206507 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2240
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
SECRE T BEIRUT 5864
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC, TU
SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION THREAT
REF: STATE 097564
SITUATION ROOM HOUSE
SITUATION WHITE ROOM
73 MAY 22 AM 9:00
1. JUDGING FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, DOUBTFUL CALLER
CAN BE TRAPPED BUT CALL CAN BE TRACED. IN OTHER CASES,
CALLS HAVE BEEN MADE FROM PUBLIC PAY STATIONS, CAFES,
GROCERY STORES, ETC. GOL HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL ON OCCASION
IN TRAPPING CALLER BUT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. IN ANY
EVENT, WE ARE APPROACHING GOL G-2 TO ENLIST ITS COOPERA-
TION WHICH WE ALMOST CERTAIN WILL BE GIVEN. TO
FACILITATE QUICK TRACE OF CALL, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD HAVE
TURKISH SPEAKING G-2 OFFICER PRESENT WHEN CALL RECEIVED.
WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND TURKISH LANGUAGE OFFICER BE SENT
BEIRUT FROM ANKARA OR ISTANBUL TO RECEIVE CALL AS WE HAVE
NO TURKISH LANGUAGE OFFICER HERE.
2. SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT GOL HAS HAD VERY LITTLE
EXPERIENCE IN HANDLING THIS TYPE OF CASE. CONSEQUENTLY
WOULD APPRECIATE ANY TECHNICAL ADVICE FROM USG LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AGENCIES WHICH WE CAN PASS ON TO LEBANESE G-2.
3. DEPARTMENT WILL PRESUMABLY BE SENDING US GUIDANCE
AS TO HOW TO HANDLE CALL AND AFTERMATH.
HOUGHTON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
AMERICA make UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
EXE™ EXCLUS
SECRET 418
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05859 211631Z
51
ACTION SS-25
2
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /026 W
121067
0 R 211500Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2235
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECRET BEIRUT 5859
SITUATION ROOM SITUATION WHITE ROOM
HOUSE
73 MAY 22 AM 9:00
EXDIS
DEPT PASS USINT CAIRO DIA IMMEDIATE AND USCINCEUR
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJECT: GOL-FEDAYEEN ARRANGEMENTS
REF: BEIRUT 5776
SUMMARY. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON GOL-FEDAYEEN ARRANGE-
MENTS CONFIRM OUR PREVIOUS BELIEF THAT GOL HAS DONE WELL
ON PAPER BUT THAT ALL DEPENDS UPON EXECUTION BY FEDAYEEN
OF THEIR PROMISES. ARMY HAS BEEN GIVEN PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
AND FIRM BACKING BY PRESIDENT FOR THIS TASK AND INTENDS INCREASE
ITS STRENGTH IN ORDER BETTER HANDLE FURTURE COMPLICATIONS. FOR
PRESENT, FATAH ANDSGNIQA APPEAR COOPERATIVE AND ARE SHOWING
NO UNHAPPINESS WITH ARRANGEMENTS WHILE EXTREMIST GROUPS APPEAR
UNHAPPY YET GOING ALONG OVERTLY IN GRUDGING FASHION, END
SUMMARY.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN 09-13/11 per ltr. 1/22/2010
By AM NARA, Date 11/15/2010
SECRET
[P.10F4]
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
PAILED
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05859 211631Z
1. FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTAL DETAILS ON GOL-FEDAYEEN ARRANGE=
MENTS SUPPLIED BY SENIOR ARMY OFFICER WHO WAS ONE OF KEY
POLICY-MAKERS AND NEGOTIATORS THROUGHOUT CRISIS. THEY ARE
KEYED TO PARAS 2=5 OF REFTEL. OFFICER WHO SUPPLIED DETAILS
PREFACED HIS REMARKS WITH STATEMENT THAT OBVIOUSLY PROMISES
MEAN LITTLE OR NOTHING WHERE FEDAYEEN ARE CONCERNED AND
EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND CONTINUED EXECUTION
BY FEDAYEEN OF WHAT THEY HAVE AGREED TO. ARMY WILL MAKE
MAJOR EFFORT ENSURE THAT COMPLIANCE ACTUALLY TAKES PLACE,
BUT IT FULLY EXPECTS THAT ALL SORTS OF CHEATING, FUGING AND
STALLING BY FEDAYEEN--AS WELL AS PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF
IMPLEMENTATION AND LARGER POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS--WILL
RESULT IN INCOMPLETE COMPLIANCE. AT PRESENT, FATAH AS
A WHOLE, INCLUDING SALAH KHALAF, GIVES EVERY APPEARANCE OF
GOOD WILL BUT THIS DECIDEDLY NOT CASE WITH PFLP, POFLP
AND PFLP/GC. SAVIQA HAS BECOME MORE COOPERATIVE AS
ATTITUDE OF SYRIAN GOVT TOWARD GOL HAS IMPROVED, BUT SAVIQA/
SYRIAN ATTITUDE IS EVEN MORE SUBJECT TO RAPID CHANGE THAN
FATAH MOREOVER, SAITQA HAS EMERGED FROM FIGHTING WITH
DE FACTO POWER POSITION IN FEDAYEEN HIERARACHY IN LEBANON
WHICH IS VIRTUALLY EQUAL TO FATAH. THIS IS SOURCE
FOR FUTURE CONCERN ON PART OF GOL AND SOURCE OF PRESENT
CONCERN ON PART OF FATAH. ARMY JUDGMENT IS THAT FATAH,
SA'IQA AND EVEN EXTREMIST GROUPS LIKELY BEHAVE PRETTY WELL
FOR NEXT THREE OR FOUR MONTHS, AT WHICH POINT LATTER LIABLE
BEGIN CREATE INCIDENTS AND TEST ARMY/GOL RESOLVE. THIS
COULD LEAD TO PERIOD INCREASING UNEASINESS AND EVENTUAL
RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING IF ARMY AND GOL, NOT ABLE AND WILLING
MEET CHALLENGE FIRMLY AND SUCCESSFULLY. THAT IS WHY ARMY
TRYING BUILD UP ITS STRENGTH IN MEN AND ARMS OVER NEXT FEW
EXCES
MONTHS.
2, ACTIVITY IN CAMPS: "HEAVY WEAPONS" HAVE BEEN DEFINED
AS ANY CREW-SERVED WEAPON AND ANY WEAPON WITH LONG
RANGE. IN PRACTICE, ARMY CONSIDERS THIS MEANS NO RPT NO
MORTARS, KATYUSHA ROCKETS, HEAVY MACHINE GUNS OR ARTILLERY
IN CAMPS. AGREEMENT NOT YET REACHED ON WHERE TO STORE
"HEAVY WEAPONS" ONCE REMOVED FROM CAMPS, WHAT SORT OF
CONTROL TO APPLY TO STORED ARMS, OR TIMETABLE FOR
REMOVAL. ARMY AWARE THAT EFFORTS WILL BE MADE HIDE MOST
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
29
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
VILN09-13/11:P.20F4
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05859 211631Z
EXELS EXPIC
HEAVY WEAPONS, MOST LIGHT WEAPONS IN CAMPS SUPPOSED TO
BE STORED IN CENTRAL CAMP LOCATION WITH SOME SORT OF CONTROL
OVER ISSUANCE. TRAINING IN CAMPS IS HENCEFORTH PROHIBITED
AND AGREED TRAINING AREA HAS BEEN DESIGNATED IN FINGER OF
LEBANON WHICH STICKS INTO SYRIA NEAR VILLAGE OF MARABOUN
(33 51N, 36 11E).
3. CONTROL OF CAMPS: MIXED PATROLS OF ARMY AND FEDAYEEN
HAVE RIGHT ENTER CAMPS TO ENFORCE ARRANGEMENTS OR INVESTI-
GATE REPORTED INFRACTIONS. LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES
HAVE RIGHT ENTER CAMPS ACCOMPANIED BY MEMBER FEDAYEEN
MILITARY POLICE (PASC OR CLAP) SHOULD LEBANESE CIVILIAN
OR PALESTINIAN CHARGED WITH CRIME BE BELIEVED TO BE IN CAMP
AND NOT BE DELIVERED BY CLAP. CLAP TO BE IN
CHARGE OF SECURITY INSIDE CAMPS, AND GOL WILL NOT INVOLVE
ITSELF IN DISPUTES BETWEEN FEDAYEEN. CLAP PATROLS CAN CIR-
CULATE OUTSIDE CAMPS WITH PERMISSION AND ACCOMPANIMENT OF
LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES. ONLY OTHER FEDAYEEN WHO HAVE
RIGHT CARRY ARMS OUTSIDE CAMPS WILL BE "LEADERS" AND THEIR
BODYGUARDS. LIST OF LEADERS WILL BE DRAWN UP BY PLO
EXCOM AND APPROVED BY ARMY WHICH WILL ISSUE THEM SPECIAL PASSES.
4. INFORMATION/PROPAGANDA: IN ADDITION TO DETAILS ALREADY
REPORTED, FEDAYEEN INDICATED DURING TALKS WITH ARMY THAT
THEY WOULD MOVE ALL HEADQUARTERS OUT OF LEBANON, LEAVING
BEHIND ONLY REPRESENTATIVES SUCH AS THEY HAVE IN OTHER ARAB
COUNTRIES. ARMY DOES NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE A FIRMLY-
AGREED POINT AND IS AWAITING FURTHER CLARIFICATION.
5. BORDER AREAS: FEDAYEEN PRESENCE SOUTH OF LITANI RIVER
AND OUTSIDE OF COASTAL CAMPS WILL BE LIMITED TO AREA EAST
OF 35 20E, BOUNDED ROUGHLY BY ROAD EAST FROM TYRE THROUGH
QANA TO TIBNINE (3312N=352SE), THENCE NORTH THROUGH ASH
CHEHABIYE AND QAAQIYET EJ JISR TO NABATIYAH
(3323N=3529E). THIS MEANS NO FEDAYEEN CLOSER THAN 8-10
KMS TO ISRAELI BORDER, IN ARQUB SOUTH OF HASBAYAH-CHEBAA
ROAD THERE ARE TO BE LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED FEDAYEEN WITHOUT
ARMS, IN VICINITY RACHAYA EL FUKKHAR. NORTH OF THAT ROAD
AND EAST OF MASNAA=MARJAYOUN ROAD, FEDAYEEN ARE ALLOWED
REMAIN. TRAINING AREA, AS NOTED, STILL FURTHER NORTH. ARMY
IS MORE CONFIDENT ABOUT BEING ABLE ENFORCE THESE CONTROLS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOU CRAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard 29 Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
30F 4
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
EXPIS EXPIC
PAGE 04 BEIRUT 05859 211631Z
THAN OTHERS SINCE PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAS GIVEN ARMY EXPLICIT
ORDERS TO TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION,
AND PAST POLITICAL HESITATIONS ARE CONSIDERED UNLIKELY so
FAR AS BORDER AREAS ARE CONCERNED.
6. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM: AT LOWEST LEVEL, THE MIXED
FEDAYEEN=ARMY PATROLS AND CHECKPOINTS NEAR SENSTIVE SPOTS
WILL CONTINUE, WHEN THERE IS DISAGREEMENT AT THIS LEVEL
CONCERNING SUSPECTED INFRACTION, APPEAL WILL BE MADE TO
HIGHER COMMITTEE OF FEDAYEEN AND LEBANESE ARMY WITH
BRIGADIER GENERAL REPRESENTING LATTER. IN EVENT QUESTION
CANNOT BE RESOLVED AMICABLY BY THIS MIXED COMMITTEE,
LEBANESE ARMY RESERVES RIGHT TO SETTLE MATTER AS IT DEEMS BEST.
7. COMMENT: WE CONTINUE BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST ON PAPER
GOL AND ARMY HAVE DONE VERY WELL. EVEN IF MANY OF ABOVE
POINTS WERE IN OLD CAIRO ACCORDS AND SEPT 1972 AGREEMENT,
THEY WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED. WE SHALL OBSERVE CLOSELY
FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION, BUT IT IS HOPEFUL SIGN THAT ARMY BEING
GIVEN SO MUCH RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCEMENT.
HOUGHTON
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USINT CAIRO, DIA AND USCINCEUR.
NLN NLN 09-13/11:P.40F4 09-13/11:P.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE,AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
29
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
EL/en/1er
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET 545
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05842 01 OF 02 211513Z
42
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
EXPIN
121655
0 R 2113557 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2222
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TELAVIV
SITUATION WHITE ROOM
HOUSE
73 MAY 22 AM 9:00
SECRE T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 5842
EXPIN
EXDIS
EO 111652: GDS
TAGS: PINS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANESE REQUEST FOR USG ASSISTANCE
REF: STATE 96645
SUMMARY. WE CONCUR ENTIRELY WITH DEPTS SUGGESTION RE
US APPROACHES TO VARIOUS GOVTS IN SUPPORT OF GOL EFFORTS
ENSURE FULLEST POSSIBLE FEDAYEEN COMPLIANCE WITH ARRANGE-
MENT WORKED OUT HERE IN AFTERMATH OF RECENT FIGHTING. WE
OFFER SOME SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS THAT MAY PROVE USEFUL IN
MAKING SUCH DEMARCHES, WHICH WE HOPE WILL TAKE PLACE
SHORTLY AFTER GOL HAS HAD OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM GOVTS CON-
CERNED OF DETAILS OF NEW GOL-FEDAYEEN ARRANGEMENT. END
SUMMARY.
1. WE AGREE FULLY WITH LINE DEPT SUGGESTS IN REFTEL FOR
APPROACHES TO VARIOUS GOVTS CONCERNED. THIS SORT OF LOW-
KEY APPROACH IS WELL SUITED TO PRESENT SITUATION ON THE GROUND.
SECRET
NOTTO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05842 01 OF 02 211513Z
STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FACT THAT FEDAYEEN AND GOL HAVE
REACHED MUTUALLY AGREEABLE UNDERSTANDING so NEED IS FOR ALL
CONCERNED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO MAKE BEST EFFORTS SEE
THAT UNDERSTANDING IS CARRIED OUT AND FRACTIOUS ELEMENTS NOT
EXCLUS
BE ALLOWED PROVOKE RENEWAL OF FIGHTING. (FYI: MOST EX-
PERIENCED OBSERVERS THINK THIS IS LIKELY OVER NEXT FEW
MONTHS. END FYI.)
2. IN ADDITION TO INFO ALREADY REPORTED ON SITUATION HERE AND
PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE, THERE ARE SOME NEW DETAILS ON LEFT WING
INVOLVEMENT WHICH MAY BE USEFUL IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ARAB
GOVTS. LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY
ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR INCIDENTS IN LEBANON OVER
PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, AS WELL AS THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST
PROVOCATIVE AND VIOLENT ACTION DURING RECENT FIGHTING. LEADING
THE LIST ON BOTH COUNTS ARE PFLP/GC AND PDFLP, WITH SAIQA
PLAYING MAJOR ROLE IN RECENT FIGHTING AND SOME OF
LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY, PPS AND OTHER "PROGRESSIVES"
EXCES
PLAYING ROLE IN FIGHTING, ESPECIALLY IN FIRING OF ROCKETS,
BOMBINGS, ETC. OUR SEPARATE INFORMATION (SOME OF WHICH
CONTAINED OUR SITREPS) TENDS CORROBORATE LEBANESE INTELLIGENCE,
WHICH BASED MOSTLY ON INTERROGATIONS OF PERSONS CAPTURED IN
COURSE OF RECENT FIGHTING AND IDENTITY CHECKS WHICH HAVE
FOLLOWED FIGHTING. LEBANESE ARMY IS OF OPINION THAT FATAH IS,
AT LEAST FOR PRESENT, SUSPICIOUS AND ANGRY WHERE LEFTIST FEDAYEEN
GROUPS CONCERNED AND LATTER ARE CONSTANT DANGER TO ARRANGE-
MENTS JUST REACHED BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN. EVEN PFLP
AND PDFLP WHO PARTICIPATED IN NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO NEW
ARRANGEMENTS ARE REPORTEDLY UNHAPPY WITH THEM AND PFLP/GC
IS NOT BOUND BY ARRANGEMENTS AT ALL.
3. AMONG SPECIFIC INCIDENTS FOR WHICH GOL HAS BEEN ABLE IDENTIFY
RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION ARE FOLLOWING (WITH ORGANIZATION LISTED
IN PARENTHESES) : SURPRISE ATTACK ON LEBANESE ARMY POST AT AIN
ARAB ON MAR 21 WHICH CAUSED THREE ARMY CASUALTIES (PFLP/GC);
ATTACK ON OIL STORAGE TANKS BELONGING TO TAPLINE ON APR 14
(PFLP/GC, PDFLP, AND LOCAL LEFTISTS) VARIOUS PROVOCATIVE
INCIDENTS, INCLUDING THOSE AT AIRPORT AND AMERICAN EMBASSY AS
WELL AS KIDNAPPING OF LEBANESE SOLDIERS, WHICH TOUCHED OFF
FIGHTING ON MAY 2 (PDFLP); BREAKING OF FIRST CEASE-FIRE MAY 3
(PDFLP AND PFLP/GC); BREAKING OF SECOND CEASE FIRE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PREARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
*
EXPIS
UNITED
!)
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05842 01 OF 02 211513Z
AND INDISCRIMINATE ROCKET ATTACKS PLUS INFILTRATION AND OTHER
BORDER ACTION ON MAY 7 (SAIQA PLUS PDFLP AND LCP AND PPS
WHERE ROCKETS CONCERNED). ADDITIONAL DETAILS AVAILABLE IN
OUR SITREPS IF DESIRED FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION OF WHAT WENT
ON IN LEBANON AND WHY IT IS IN DIRECT INTEREST OF MODERATE
ARAB GOVTS TO WORK TOGETHER ON MAINTAINING CONTROL OVER
PALESTINIANS AND ESPECIALLY FEDAYEEN LOCATED ON THEIR
TERRITORIES. (THIS IS QUITE ASIDE FROM PROBLEM OF TERRORISM
WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH WITH ARAB
GOVTS.) INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF LEFTIST INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
OPPOSITION
TO FRANGIE AND SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN DURING RECENT FIGHTING
FOLLOWED GENERAL LINES DESCRIBED BEIRUT A-68, MAR 23, 1973.
4. IN APPROCHING SAUDIS, KUWAITIS AND ABU DHABIANS IT
MAY BE USEFUL TO POINT OUT ROLE PLAYED BY LEFT WING ORGAN-
IZATIONS AMONG FEDAYEEN (AS WELL AS SAIQA/SYRIA) IN
ORDER BRING HOME MORE CLEARLY TO THESE GOVTS DANGER FROM
LEFT TO MODERATE ARAB GOVTS (INCLUDING THEIR OWN, SINCE
THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT FEDAYEEN WILL BE PAYING INCREASING
ATTENTION TO GULF AREA IN COMING MONTHS) SHOULD FEDAYEEN
BE ALLOWED OPERATE WITHOUT BEING SUBJECTED TO AUTHORITY OF GOVT
OF COUNTRY IN WHICH THERE IS CLEAR DANGER OF LEFTIST ELEMENTS
PROVOKING TROUBLES WITH GOVT. MOREOVER SINCE FOR PRESENT
FATAH, INCLUDING ARAFAT AND EVEN ABU IYAD, SEEM DESIROUS OF
KEEPING PEACE WITH GOL AND CLAIM TO BE DETERMINED IMPLEMENT
PROMISES THEY HAVE MADE, IT SHOULD BE EASIER FOR ARAB GOVTS
TO TAKE A STAND IN FAVOR OF STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF ARRANGEMENTS
AGREED TO BY FEDAYEEN AND GOL TOGETHER, AND TO SUPPORT FATAH
AS OPPOSED TO LEFTISTS WHOSE GOALS GO FAR BEYOND PALESTINE
AND ISRAEL TO NATURE OF ARAB GOVTS THEMSELVES. SEEN IN THIS
CONTEXT, WE BELIEVE IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THESE GOVTS DID NOT
PLAY STRONGER ROLE.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 548
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05842 02 OF 02 211519Z
41
ACTION SS-25
EXPIS
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
121664
o R 2113557 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2223
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TELAVIV
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 5842
EXDIS
5. WHERE SAUDI ARABA IS CONCERNED, LEBANESE FONOFFICE TELLS
US THAT SAUDI AMBASSADOR URGED BOTH SIDES TO BE MORE UNDER-
STANDING AND PLAYED SOMEWHAT HELPFUL ALTHOUGH DISTINCTLY SECONDARY
ROLE. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SAUDIS APPROACHED SYRIA, OR
WEIGHED IN AS HARD AS THEY HAVE IN PAST WITH FEDAYEEN. ALSO,
GOL HAS WHAT IT CONSIDERS BE RELIABLE INFO THAT SAUDI MILITARY
ATTACHE, FOR REASONS LEBANESE CANNOT FATHOM, TOOK DISTINCTLY
PRO-FEDAYEEN ATTITUDE. GOL HAS, OF COURSE, NO INTENTION RAISING
THIS MINOR MATTER WITH SAUDIS AND THERE ALL MORE REASON FOR US
NOT TO DO SO,
6. CONCERNING KUWAIT, WE ARE TOLD FONMIN WAS HELPFUL AT BEGINNING,
ESPECIALLY IN URGING RESTRAINT ON SYRIA. HOWEVER, AS FIGHTING
CONTINUED AND ARAB PROPAGANDA SUPPORTING FEDAYEEN INCREASED,
KUWATTI EFFORTS APPARENTLY COOLED SOMEWHAT. HERE, TOO, THEIR
ROLE WAS NOT AS STRONG AS IT HAD BEEN IN PAST, ESPECIALLY LAST
JUNE-JULY.
7. WE NOTE IN LOCAL PRESS THAT UAE HAS ONLY RECENTLY ESTABLISHED
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PREARTMENT
of
STATE
*
*
Department of State
SELVES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05842 02 OF 02 211519Z
EXPIS EXCLUS
5PCT. WITHHOLDING LEVY ON SALARIES OF PALESTINIANS WORKING IN EMIRATE
PROCEEDS TO GO TO FEDAYEEN IN A "LIBERATION FUND". THIS IS
INDICATIVE OF SORT OF SYMPATHY WHICH FEDAYEEN ENJOY AND CON-
FIRMS DEPT OPINION THAT LITTLE IN WAY OF POSITIVE RESPONSE CAN
BE EXPECTED FROM UAE. STILL, IT MAY NOT HURT TO EXPOSE UAE
OFFICIALS TO ANOTHER SIDE OF PICTURE.
8. CONCERNING USSR, WE BELIEVE THAT ONCE STORM HAD ACTUALLY
BURST AND DANGERS OF POSSIBLE SYRIAN INTERVENTION AND
ISRAELI COUNTER-ACTION HAD DAWNED ON USSR, SOVS DID PLAY
STATESMANLIKE ROLE, ESPECIALLY WITH SYRIA AND PERHAPS TO SOME
DEGREE DIRECTLY WITH FEDAYEEN, GOL ALSO UNDER THIS IMPRESSION.
NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT USSR, FOR UNDERSTAND-
ABLE REASONS, CONTRIBUTED TO OUTBREAK OF CRISIS BY STIRRING UP ANTI-
USG AND ANTI-GOL SENTIMENTS AMONG FEDAYEEN AFTER BEIRUT RAID.
WE HAVE REPORTED DETAILS OF THIS SORT OF SOVIET ACTIVITY HERE ON
SEVERAL OCCASIONS VIA STATE AND SRF CHANNELS. WE
BELIEVE ONE MUST MAKE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SORT OF PROPAGANDA
USSR PROMULGATES IN MOSCOW WHICH MEANT FOR WORLD-WIDE CON-
SUMPTION AND IS HIGHLY VISIBLE AND ACTIONS WHICH IT UNDERTAKES
ON REGIONAL OR LOCAL BASIS. IT IS LATTER WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO
OVERHEATING OF FEDAYEEN CAND PERHAPS TO INFLATED EXPECTATIONS OF
SOV SUPPORT). WHILE USSR CLEARLY DOES NOT HAVE POWER CONTROL
FEDAYEEN, IT JUST AS CLEARLY HAS SOME INFLUENCE WITH THEM (E.G.,
SUPPLY OF ARMS AS WELL AS PROPAGANDA). IT HAS BEEN WORKING
HARD OVER PAST YEAR IN THIS AREA TO IMPROVE FEDAYEEN-USSR
RELATIONS, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF COMMANDO MOVEMENT'S
LEFTIST-REVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL (E.G., ESTABLISHMENT OF SO-
CALLED "ARAB FRONT FOR PARTICIPATION IN PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION"
EMBRACING WIDE VARIETY OF LEFTIST, "PROGRESSIVE" GROUPS
FROM MANY PARTS OF ARAB WORLD). AT SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT
USSR WOULD PREFER TO SEE INTEGRATED FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND
PROBABLY NERVOUS ABOUT SUCH SPLINTER GROUPS AS PDFLP AND
PFLP EVEN THOUGH THEY CLAIM TO BF MARXIST IN IDEOLOGY.
THEREFORE, IT MAY BE TO SOV TASTE TO USE SOME OF ITS INFLUENCE
TO COUNTER ANTICIPATED EFFORTS BY EXTREMIST ELEMENTS TO DISRUPT
GOL-FEDAYEEN UNDERSTANDING,
9. SECGEN OF FONOFFICE (SADAQA) INFORMED CHARGE MORNING OF
MAY 21 THAT TELEGRAM TO VARIOUS LEBANESE EMBASSIES (IN-
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
LIBODNCED
THE
MOITASIRONIUA
2ECKEIVEA
*
*
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXCLUS
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05842 02 OF 02 211519Z
CLUDING ARAB STATES, IRAN AND USSR) ON DETAILS OF GOL-FEDAYEEN
ARRANGEMENTS HAS BEEN COMPLETED BY ARMY AND FONOFFICE AND
SENT TO PRESIDENT FOR CLEARANCE BEFORE DESPATCH. SADAQA
EXPECTS TEL WILL BE SENT BY MAY 22 AT LATEST. IT WOULD SEEM
PREFERABLE FOR OUR DEMARCHES IN VARIOUS CAPITALS TO AWAIT THAT
OF LEBANESE. THIS WOULD PROBABLY MEAN LATE THIS WEEK OR FIRST
PART OF NEXT WEEK.
HOUGHTON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THEAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT of STATE
WH
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET: 475
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05776 181608Z
47
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
3
101932
o 181500Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2212
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
SECRET BEIRUT 5776
EXDIS
DEPT PASS DIA IMMEDIATE FOR ACTION
DEPT PASS CAIRO
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS LE
SUBJ: GOL-FEDAYEEN ARRANGEMENT
REF: STATE 94202
SUMMARY: FEDAYEEN REPS IN MIXED COMMISSION CAME UP WITH
LIST OF SPECIFIC PROMISES EVENING MAY 17 ON ACTIONS THEY WOULD
TAKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S DEMAND THAT
GOL SOVEREIGNTY HENCEFORTH BE FULLY RESPECTED. LIST COVERS
COMMITMENT NOT TO UNDERTAKE CROSS-BORDER RAIDS, TO STAY WELL
DECLASSIFIED
BACK FRON SENSITIVE BORDER AREAS, TO CEASE USING BEIRUT AS
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
INFORMATION/PROPAGANDA HEADQUARTERS, TO REMOVE HEAVY WEAPONS
NLN 09-13/12 per Itr 1/22/2010
By AM NARA, Date 11/15/2010
[P. 10F 41
FROM CAMPS, TO ACKNOWLEDGE SUPREMACY LEBANESE LAW OVER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
55
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05776 1816082
PALESTINIANS, TO REMOVE ALL "FOREIGN ELEMENTS" (I.E., NON=ARABS)
AND TO ALLOW LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES ACCESS TO CAMPS. GO
FULLY AWARE THAT FEDAYEEN PROMISES MUST BE IMPLEMENTED AND
THEN BE RESPECTED OVER TIME TO BE WORTHWHILE, AND THAT FEDAYEEN
GOOD FAITH IN THIS REGARD IS SUPECT. ARMY PRESENTLY WORKING
OUT DETAILED AGREEMENT WHEREBY FEDAYEEN WILL BE SUPPOSED IMPLEMENT
THEIR PROMISES. THESE COMMITMENTS BY FEDAYEEN APPLY TO ALL
15 REFUGEE CAMPS NOT ONLY THOSE IN BEIRUT AREA. END SUMMARY,
1. IN CONVERSATION WITH FONMIN REPORTED SEPTEL, DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF PRESIDENCY (DIB) BRIEFED CHARGE AND EMBOFF MORNING MAY 18
ON STATUS OF GOL-FEDAYEEN TALKS WHICH CONCLUDED EVENING MAY 17.
DIB AND FONMIN BOTH STRESSED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT THERE
WAS NO RPT NO AGREEMENT OR EVEN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GOL AND
FEDAYEEN. RATHER, LATTER HAD MADE SERIES OF COMMITMENTS OR
PROMISES TO ARMY NEGOTIATORS WHICH GOL HAS ACCEPTED AS
BASIS FOR NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ITSELF AND ALL FEDAYEEN IN
LEBANON. COMMITMENTS MADE EVENING OF MAY 17 WILL BE DRAWN
UP ON PIECE OF PAPER BY ARMY AND WE CERTAIN OTHER GOVTS
WILL RECEIVE COPIES. ARMY TALKING RIGHT NOW TO FEDAYEEN
REPS ABOUT MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION, INCLUDING TIMETABLE.
DIB THEN SUMMED UP (FROM MEMORY) ESSENTIAL POINTS OF FEDAYEEN
COMMITMENTS. (THESE ARE REPORTED AS FOLS BUT MAY NOT BE
COMPLETE NOR COMPLETELY ACCURATE. WE SHALL OBTAIN FURTHER
INFO AND PRECISION WHEN AVAILABLE.)
2. ACTIVITY IN CAMPS: FEDAYEEN HAVE AGREED TO CEASE ALL
TRAINING IN CAMPS, TO REMOVE "HEAVY WEAPONS" FROM CAMPS,
AND TO CLEANSECAMPS OF ALL "FOREIGN ELEMENTS" (I.E., NON=ARABS).
ARMY AND FEDAYEEN WORKING OUT DETAILED AGREEMENT ON
MEANING OF HEAVY WEAPONS WHICH WILL BE BASED ON CALIBER,
RANGE AND WHETHER OR NOT WEAPON IN CREW-SERVED OR HANDLED
BY SINGLE MAN. TIME-TABLE FOR REMOVAL ALSO BEING ESTABLISHED
SINCE FEDAYEEN ARGUE THAT FOR LOGISTIC REASONS AND TO ALLOW
FEAR AND SUPICION OF LEBANESE ARMY TO DIE DOWN, REMOVAL OF
HEAVY WEAPONS CANNOT TAKE PLACE ALL AT ONCE AND RIGHT AWAY.
IN REMOVAL OF FOREIGNERS, FEDAYEEN MADE ONE EXCEPTION AND
THAT IS THOSE WHO ENGAGED IN MEDICAL WORK. ALL "COMBATTANTS"
WILL GO AND THIS EXPLICITLY INCLUDES TURKS AND IRANIANS AS WELL
AS VARIETY OF OTHERS (SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN ROUNDED UP BY
LEBANESE ARMY AT CHECKPOINTS OUTSIDE OF CAMPS IN PAST TWO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESE HORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
26
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
NLN09-13/12: P.20F4 NLN 09-13/12:
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05776 181608Z
WEEKS). DIB AND FONMIN AGREED THAT SO-CALLED MEDICAL
PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE TO BE WATCHED CAREFULLY AND SAID THAT
FEDAYEEN WOULD HAVE TO BE WATCHED CAREFULLY ON EVERY POINT,
EVERY STEP OF THE WAY.
3. CONTROL OF CAMPS: LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES CARMY AND
CIVILIAN) WILL HAVE CHECKPOINTS JUST OUTSIDE CAMPS IN
STRATEGIC LOCATIONS FROM WHICH, THEY CAN OBSERVE INTERIOR
OF CAMPS ON COMINGS AND GOINGS. THERE IS TO BE NO MORE
EXCES EXPIS
MILITARY TRAINING IN CAMPS AND CAMPS ARE NO LONGER TO SERVE
AS SHELTERS FOR FUGITIVES FROM LEBANESE JUSTICE. (WE UNDER-
STAND FROM SEPARATE RELIABLE SOURCE THAT PALESTINIAN ARMED
STRUGGLE COMMAND WILL STILL HAVE AUTHORITY WITHIN CAMPS BUT
WILL COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES WITH RESPECT
TO FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.) FONMIN AND DIB SAID THAT
LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES WILL HAVE RIGHT TO ENTER CAMPS
BUT WITH PERMISSION OF FEDAYEEN. FEDAYEEN HAVE NO RIGHT
CIRCULATE WITH ARMS OUTSIDE OF CAMPS AND MUST USE ONLY
VEHICLES WITH SPECIAL PLATES.
4. INFORMATION/ PROPAGANDA: ALL INFO MEDIA SUPPOSED TO BE
CONSOLIDATED UNDER PLO AND THERE IS TO BE NO MORE ATTACKS ON
GOL BY FEDAYEEN MEDIA, EVEN VIA VOICE OF PALESTINE IN BAGHDAD
AND DAMASCUS, BETRUT NO LONGER TO BE USED AS BASE FOR RELEASING
FEDAYEEN COMMINIQUES AND ANNOUNCEMENTS ALTHOUGH WAFA
(PALESTINE, NEWS AGENCY) WILL BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE
IN LEBANON. WHERE TRACTS AND OTHER "WILDCAT" FEDAYEEN
PUBLICATIONS CONCERNED, GOL FREE TO ACT UNDER LEBANESE
LAW AS IT WOULD AGAINST ANY OTHER SUCH PUBLICATION.
5. BORDER AREAS: FEDAYEEN HAVE AGAIN AGREED TO RESPECT
LIMITS DRAWN UP BY ARMY FOLLOWING SEPT 16-17, 1972 ISRAELI
ACTION. THERE ARE TO BE NO RPT NO CROSS-BORDER ACTIONS
OF ANY KIND, FEDAYEEN TO BE ABSENT COMPLETELY FROM WESTERN
AREA (VICINITY RAS NAQURAH) AND AT LEAST 8-10 KMS BACK FROM
BORDER IN CENTRAL AREA (VICINITY BINT JBEIL). IN ARKUB,
FEDAYEEN TO BE NORTH OF ROAD FROM HASBAYAH TO CHEBAA EXCEPT
FOR TWO OR THREE SPECIFIED AND CAREFULLY CONTROLLED SPOTS.
6, COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE MANY DETAILS STILL
TO BE WORKED OUT IN ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THEAHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
25
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
P.30F4
PRANTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
SEATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 04 BEIRUT 05776 181608Z
ARMY IS BEING VERY WARY AND VIGILANT. PUBLIC PRESENTATION
OF ARRANGEMENTS BY GOL AS UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS IS LIKELY
BE COUNTERED ON FEDAYEEN SIDE BY CLAIM THAT IT IS ALL WITHIN
CONTEXT CAIRO ACCORDS WHICH STILL IN FORCE. THIS IS NOT
CASE BUT ON OTHER HAND THERE IS A MUTUAL--ALBEIT ONE-SIDED--
AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN. GOL APPEARS TO HAVE
COME OUT VERY WELL IN TERMS OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID. BIG TEST
WILL BE IN IMPLEMENTATION, AS GOL AND ARMY SEEM UNDERSTAND.
HOUGHTON
NOTE BY OCT: BEIRUT 5776 NOT PASSED DIA AND CAIRO.
EXPIC
NLN 09-13/12: P.40FM P
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION 30 OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
56/20/199
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXATS
OF
SECRET 566
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05755 181542Z
53
ACTION SS-25
SITUATION
WHITE HOUSE
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ( BOOK-444,
106750 ROOM
NM 73 MAY 2 9:22
61
O 1813157 MAY 73 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2200
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
SECRE T BEIRUT 5755
EXDIS
CORRECTEDCOPY (TEXT)
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJECT: GOL REQUEST FOR USG ASSISTANCE
REF: STATE 94202
SUMMARY. GOL HAS OBTAINED FROM FATAH, PFLP AND PDFLP
SPECIFIC CONCESSIONS (SEPTEL) WHICH GO BEYOND MINIMAL DEMANDS
REPORTED EARLIER. IT IS ON BASIS OF FEDAYEEN ACCEPTANCE THESE
SPECIFIC POINTS THAT GOL WOULD LIKE US TO MAKE DEMARCHES
DISCUSSED REFTEL. DEMARCHES WOULD BE IN SUPPORT OF FULL
IMPLEMENTATION OF PROMISES MADE BY FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS,
WHICH GOL INTENDS PROVIDE ARAB AND CERTAIN OTHER GOVTS
THROUGH ITS OWN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. USSR STILL CONSIDERED
TO BE TOP PRIDITY SINCE GOL CONSIDERS IT HAS GREATEST
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TRETAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
DS.DECLA SSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIC
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05755 181542Z
POTENTIAL INFLUCENCE ON ACTIONS OF FEDAYEEN AND OF SYRIA.
THIS ALL MORE IMPORTANT SINCE SAIQA HAS NOT RPT NOT EX=
PLICITLY ACCEPTED PROMISES MADE BY OTHERS AND SARG
POSITION REMAINS VERY UNCLEAR. CONCERNING ISRAEL, CHARGE
INFORMED FONMIN AND DIB OUR ESTIMATE OF ISRAELI POSITION
RE LEBANON AND INDICATED WE HAD RECENTLY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH
ISRAELIS ON GENERAL PROBLEM. END SUMMARY.
1. CHARGE AND EMBOFF MET MORNING MAY 18 WITH FONMIN ABOU
HAMAD, PRESIDENCY DIRECTOR-GENERAL DIB AND FONOFF SEC-GEN
SADAQA TO INFORM THEM SUBSTANCE CONTENTS REFTEL. CHARGE
ALSO SAID THAT SINCE LAST MEETING ON MAY 15 WE HAD APPROACHED
USSR AGAIN IN MOSCOW AND HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS
RE GENERAL PROBLEM WHICH GOL FACING AT PRESENT. CHARGE GAVE
GROUP DEPT'S ESTIMATE RE ISRAELI INTENTIONS ALONG LINES PARA 6
REFTEL. SADAGA ASIED WHAT USG WOULD DO SHOULS SITUATION
CHANGE (E.G., SYRIAN INTERVENTION) AND ISRAEL FELT OBLIGED
TAKE MILITARY ACTION IN LEBANON. CHARGE REPLIED THAT OUR BASIC
POSITION REMAINS ONE OF SUPPORTING LEBANESE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, BUT THAT IT NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY WHAT
ACTION WE WOULD TAKE IN VAGUE HYPOTHETICAL CIRCUMSTANCES
SADAQA HAD MENTIONED. FONMIN APPEARED WELL SATISFIED WITH
OUR POSITION VIS--VIS ISRAEL.
2. AFTER INFORMING GOL OF OUR WILLINGNESS MAKE DEMARCHES
REQUESTED OF US, CHARGE ASKED FONMIN IF HE COULD NOT BE
CLEARER RE SORT OF DEMARCHE GOL HAS IN MIND AND WHEN THEY
SHOULD BE MADE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF REPORTS THAT GOL
AND FEDAYEEN HAD REACHED AGREEMENT IN MIXED COMMISSION
ss:e
EVENING OF MAY 17. FONMIN ASKED DIB TO EXPLAIN JUST WHERE
GOL STOOD WITH FEDAYEEN SINCE THIS ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND FOR
DETERMINING HOW TO PITCH DEMARCHE. DIB'S REPORT BEING SENT
SEPTEL, BUT IN SUMMARY GOL HAS OBTAINED FROM FEDAYEEN
18
GREATER CONCESSIONS THAN THOSE LISTED AS MINIMAL DEMANDS.
FEDAYEEN CONCESSIONS ARE IN FORM OF UNILATERAL PROMISES UNDER-
TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS AND NOT RPT NOT IN FORM OF NEW GOL-FEDAYEEN
AGREEMENT. ARMY IS TO PREPARE PAPER INCORPORATING THESE
PROMISES WHICH GOL WILL PROVIDE TO ARAB GOVTS AND CERTAIN
J3
OTHER GOVTS IN ORDER THAT THERE BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO
SUBSTANCE OF FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN.
HOWEVER, NOW THAT FEDAYEEN HAVE ACCEPTED, THE MOST
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUSE AUTHORIZATION 05 THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM Ds.PES2 SSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAPARTMENT
of
STATE
*
Department of State
STATE AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
EXBIN EXCLUS EXPIS
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05755 181542Z
IMPORTANT PROBLEM BEGINS OF BRINGING ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF
PROMISES AND ASSURING THAT THERE NO BACKSLIDING BY
FEDAYEEN. ARMY AND FEDAYEEN WORKING ON MODALITIES AND
TIME-TABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION AT PRESENT TIME. ANOTHER
OUTSTANDING PROBLEM IS FACT THAT SAIQA AND PFLP/GC HAVE
NOT DIRECTLY AND EXPLICITLY AGREED TO COMMITMENTS MADE BY
OTHERS. FATAH, PFLP AND PDFLP REPS ON MIXED COMMISSION
STATE THEY SPEAKING FOR ALL FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS, BUT GOL
DOES NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT THIS AS NECESSARILY SO. PROBLEM OF
PFLP/GC IS OF LESSER MAGNITUDE THAN THAT OF SAIQA,
SINCE LATTER REFLECTS ATTITUDE OF SYRIAN GOVERNMENT AND OF
COURSE HAS MORE MEN.
3. ABOUHAMAD SAID HE THOUGHT USG DEMARCHES TO SAUDI ARABIA,
KUWAIT, ABU DHABI AND IRAN CAND ANY FURTHER TALKS WE MIGHT
HAVE WITH JORDAN) SHOULD STRESS VITAL IMPORTANCE TO LEBANON
AND ENTIRE REGION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDAYEEN PROMISES, SINCE
GOL FAILURE TO ESTABLISH ITS SOVEREGNTY OVER ITS OWN TERRITORY
AND THOSE LIVING THEREIN CAS OTHER ARAB GOVTS HAVE DONE) WOULD
SURELY RESULT IN ULTIMATE DESTRUCTIONOF PRO-WESTERN, DEMOCRATIC,
FREE-ENTERPRISE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH LEBANESE SYSTEM RESTS,
AS WELL AS CREATE NEW SOURCE OF MAJOR TENSION IN AREA WHICH
NONE OF COUNTRIES TO BE APPROACHED WOULD WANT. GOL HAS NO RPT
NO INTENTION OF "LIQUIDATING" FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND WISHES PRESERVE
GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEM WITHIN LIMITATIONS DICTATED BY LEBANESE
SOVEREIGNTY. GOL HAS ALREADY SPOKEN TO ARAB GOVTS, EXPLAINING ITS
CASE, AND WILL DO so AGAIN EARLY NEXT WEEK WHILE PASSING ALONG
COPY OF FEDAYEEN PROMISES.
SUBSEQUENT SUPPORTING DEMARCHE BY USG, AND IF POSSIBLE BY OTHER
GOVTS (WE ASSUME HE MEANT FRANCE AND ENGLAND AND PERHAPS
OTHER WESTERN EUROPEANS) WOULD ADD CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO GOL
DEMARCHE. IMPORTANT THING IS TO ENSURE THAT FEDAYEEN KEEP THEIR
PROMISES IN FACT AND THAT AS TIME GOES ON THEY NOT BE ALLOWED
BACKSLIDE. GOL INTENDS SUPERVISE THIS VERY CLOSELY BUT WILL
NEED SUPPORT FROM GOVTS WHICH CONTRIBUTE MOST TO FEDAYEEN COFFERS.
4. CONCERNING SOVS, ABOU HAMAD SAID THEY CONTINUE BE MOST
IMPORTANT GOVT IN TERMS OF SBILITY INFLUENCE SITUATION FOR GOOD
OR BAD. THEY HAD DIRECT INFLUENCE ON FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON AS
WELL AS ON THEIR LEFT-WING ALLIES SUCH AS LEBANESE COMMUNIST
PARTY AND KAMAL JUMBLATT. THEY ALSO HAVE MAJOR INDIRECT IN-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
form
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
9.66
ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
SEALS AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 04 BEIRUT 05755 181542Z
FLUENCE THROUGH THEIR STRONG POSITION IN DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD
WHICH ARE MAJOR SOURCES OUTSIDE TROUBLE FOR LEBANON. ONE OF
FRANGIE'S SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES IS TO OBTAIN EXPLICIT COMMITMENT
BY SAIQA TO PROMISES MADE BY OTHER FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS AND
THIS WOULD DEPEND UPON ATTITUDE OF SARG. USSR COULD BE VERY
HELPFUL ON THIS SPECIFIC POINT AS WELL AS IN COUNSELLING
MODERATION GENERALLY ON SARG AND OTHERS.
5, ABOUHAMAD AND DIB CLOSED MEETING BY THANKING US FOR ALL
SUPPORT USG HAS ALREADY PROVIDED AND FOR WHATEVER MORE WE
CAN DO. THEY REPORTED THEIR CONVICTION THAT ONLY WAY TO AVOID
ANOTHER, MORE SERIOUS EXPLOSION IN LEBANON IS FOR FEDAYEEN TO
ACTUALLY MAKE GOOD ON PROMISES AND THEN TRY NOT BACK AWAY
FROM THEM WITH PASSSAGE OF TIME. SUPPORT FROM VARIOUS OUTSIDE
GOVTS WHOM USG WILL APPROACH WILL BE VITAL IN THIS PROCESS.
HOUGHTON
EXPIR EXC-S
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED /ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. aL/eo/ieg
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
MAY 16 Department of State
SELLES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
WH
SECRET 778
EXPIS EXPIS EXCELS EXPIS
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05588 01 OF 02 151915Z
47
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
069193
0 1518237 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2151
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
SECRE T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 5588
EXDIS
NOFORN
DEPT PASS DIA NIACT IMMEDIATE AND USCINCEUR PRIORITY
REF: BEIRUT 5437
BEGIN SUMMARY. PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAS REQUESTED STRONG
USG SUPPORT IN IMPENDING SHOWDOWN WITH FEDAYEEN. HE WANTS
POLITICAL SUPPORT IN FIRST INSTANCE IN ATTEMPT GENERATE
ENOUGH PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN TO ACCEPT MINIMUM GOL
DEMANDS IN SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH BEGAN MAY 15.
AT SAME TIME HF WANTS ASSISTANCE IN BEEFING UP LEBANESE
ARMY AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE SHOULD FEDAYEEN REFUSE TO
DECLASSIFIED
ACCEPT MINIMUM DEMANDS, SHOULD THERE BE ANOTHER ROUND
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
OF FIGHTING AS RESULT OF FEDAYEEN INTRANSIGENCE, FRANGIE
NLN 09-13/13 per 1tr. 1/22/2010
NARA, Date 11/15 12010
[P. OF [P.10F8]
WOULD LIKE FURTHER POLITICAL SUPPORT TO DETER SYRIAN
INTERVENTION, INDIRECT AS WELL AS DIRECT. WE HOPE DEPT
By AM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE-AHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
46
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT BE OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
STATES AMERICA same UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05588 01 OF 02 151915Z
EXCES EXCLUS
CAN PROVIDE AT LEAST INTERIM RESPONSE SOMETIME MAY 16
AND THAT URGENT CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO MEETING
FRANGIE REQUESTS WHICH WE BELIEVE FULLY JUSTIFIED IN VIEW
OF SITUATION DESCRIBED REFTEL. END SUMMARY.
1. LATER AFTERNOON MAY 15 CHARGE AND EMBOFF MET WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER ABOU HAMAD, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRESIDENCY
DIB AND FONOFF SECGEN SADAQA, WHO WERE ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS
FROM PRESIDENT FRANGIE. (BECAUSE OF SENSITIVE POLITICAL
SITUATION WITH COMMENCEMENT OF GOL-FEDAYEEN NEGOTS, FRANGIE
PREFERRED NOT RECEIVE CHARGE HIMSELF.) ABOU HAMAD SUMMED
UP SITUATION BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN, SAYING THAT GOL IS
PRESSING FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER LEBANESE
TERRITORY AND THOSE LIVING IN LEBANON, INCLUDING 300,000
PALESTINTANS AND FEDAYEEN. FRANGIE IS DETERMINED
ACCOMPLISH THIS AND REALIZES THAT SHOULD HE AND GOL
BACK DOWN NOW IN FACE OF FEDAYEEN AND OTHER ARAB
PRESSURE THE GOL WILL FIND ITSELF LESS AND LESS ABLE
CONTROL WHAT GOES ON IN LEBANON. FIRST STEP IN REASSERTING
CONTROL IS ACCEPTANCE BY FEDAYEEN
OF FRANGIE'S MINIMAL
DEMANDS. THESE ARE: (A) INVENTORY BY LEBANESE ARMY
CWITH FEDAYEEN) OF ALL ARMS IN CAMPS AND TRANSFER OF ALL
HEAVY ARMS AND PERHAPS SOME LIGHT ARMS OUT OF CAMPS (B) CON-
TINUING ACCESS TO CAMPS BY LEBANESE ARMY: AND (C) APPLICATION
OF LEBANESE LAWS AND JUSTICE TO ALL PALESTINIANS,
INCLUDING THOSE IN CAMPS. GOL CANNOT BACK DOWN FROM
THOSE DEMANDS SINCE IT IS FULLY COMMITTED AND TO BACK DOWN
WOULD DO GREAT DAMAGE TO POSITION OF FRANGIE AND MORALE OF ARMY IN
SHORT TERM AND TO BASIC POSITION OF CHRISTIANS IN LEBANON IN
LONG RUN.
2. ABOU HAMAD SAID THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE WANTS TO KNOW
WHAT HELP HE CAN EXPECT TO RECEIVE FROM THE UNITED STATES
IN THIS SITUATION, MOST URGENT NEED IS FOR POLITICAL
ASSISTANCE RIGHT AWAY IN ORDER BRING PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN
TO CEDE TO MINIMAL GOL DEMANDS. IF THIS SHOULD OCCUR, THEN
MILITARY CONFRONTATION COULD PERHAPS BE AVOIDED. (ABOU HAMAD'S
PRESENTATION WAS SUCH THAT IT CLEAR GOL BELIEVES IT HAS DONE
ALL IT CAN WITH VARIOUS COUNTRIES REFERRED TO
BELOW AND IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT IT TURNING NOW TO USG.)
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED /ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to NLN be declassified.
P.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXCE EXCES
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05588 01 OF 02 151915Z
AT PRESENT, FEDAYEEN APPEAR TO GOL TO BE
ABSOLUTELY UNWILLING AGREE TO DISARM CAPS OR PROVIDE
LEBANESE ARMY ACCESS THERETO. THEREFORE SITUATION AT
STALEMATE JUST AS SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN
(AFTERNOON MAY 15). PRESSURE NEEDS TO BE BROUGHT ON
FEDAYEEN VIA OTHER STATES, STARTING WITH USSR, SAUDIA
ARABIA, KUWAIT AND ABU DHABI ALSO HAVE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE
FEDAYEEN BUT USSRIS INFLUENCE CRUCIAL.
3, CHARGE EXPLAINED THAT USG HAD ALREADY MADE DEMARCH
TO SOVS IN BOTH WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW TO GET THEM TO RESTRAIN
SYRIANS. ABOU HAMAD SAID HE APPRECIATED THAIS BUT WHAT IS
NEEDED NOW IS TO GET SOVS TO USE THEIR DIRECT PRESSURE ON
FEDAYEEN IN BOTH LEBANON AND SYRIA, AS WELL AS VIA
SYRIAN GOVT, TO GET FEDAYEEN TO ACCEDE TO GOL TERMS.
ABOU HAMAD SAID THAT USSR AMBASSADOR AZIMOV HAD TOLD HIM.
SUBSEQUENT TO HIS MEETING WITH FRANGIE, THAT USSR
MOVING ON FOUR FRONTS TO HELP GOL AND PREVENT MAJOR CONFLICT
FROM ERUPTING AGAIN IN ME AS CONSEQUENCE OF GOL-FEDAYEEN
STRUGGLE: (A) PRESSURE ON TSRAEL NOT TO REPEAT
JUNE 1967 ATTACK: (B) PRESSURE ON SYRIA NOT TO ALLOW
INFILTRATION: (C) PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN RECONCILE DIFFERENCES
WITH GOL: (D) PRESSURE ON KAMAL JUMBLATT TO USE HIS INFLUENCE
ON FEDAYEEN AND MODERATE HIS OWN VIEWS RE SITUATION. ABOU
HAMAD SAID HE COULD NOT TELL WHETHER AZIMOV TELLING TRUTH OR NOT
BUT GOL HAS NOTED NO SOFTENING OF POSITION BY JAMBLATT OR
FEDAYEEN OR SYRIANS. PERHAPS AZIMOV STATEMENT WOULD BE USEFUL IN
TALKING TO SOVS BUT GOL BELIEVES THAT ONLY USG HAS SORT OF
INFLUENCE WHICH CAN IMPRESS USSR ENOUGH TO BRING ABOUT
MEANINGFUL ACTION. (HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT GOL EXPECTS LITTLE
OR NOTHING FROM FRENCH WHERE USSR OR SYRIA OR FEDAYEEN ARE
CONCERNED.)
4. ABOU HAMAD SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND ABU DHABI
COULD USE THEIR FINANCIAL LEVERAGE WITH FEDAYEEN TO TRY
AND BRING THEM TO ACCEPT GOL TERMS. HE SAID THAT GOL
HAS APPROACHED ALL THREE BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO GET
SORT OF POSITIVE RESPONSE NEEDED. HE ASKED IF USG WOULD USE WHAT
INFLUENCE IT HAD WITH THESE COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA.
5. CHARGE SAID HE WOULD INFORM DEPT AT ONCE OF GOL REQUESTS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
13/13
:P.
. 30F8
PEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
OF
EXETS EXCES
SECRET
PAGE 04 BEIRUT 05588 01 OF 02 151915Z
FOR SUPPORT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.
NOTE BY OCT: BETRUT 5588 NOT PASSED DIA AND US CINCEUR.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCEL VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
P.
8
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 777
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05588 02 OF 02 1519302
41
2
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
EXAIS
069332
0 1518237 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2152
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
S E C RE T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 5588
EXDIS
NOFORN
DEPT PASS DIA NIACT IMMEDIATE AND USCINCEUR PRIORITY
6. ABOU HAMAD SAID THATT IF FEDAYEEN REFUSE GOL TERMS AND
BOL FORCED TO RESUME FIGHTING IN ORDER OBTAIN WHAT IT MUST
HAVE, MASSIVE INFILTRATION OF YARMOUK BRIGADE AND PALESTINE
LIBERATION ARMY AND PROBABLY SAIQA COULD BE EXPECTED
FROM SYRIA. MOREOVER, THERE WOULD BE INSURRECTION IN
SOME SUNNI MOSLEM QUARTERS OF MAJOR CITIES AND FEDAYEEN
AND OTHER ANTI-GOL ELEMENTS AMONG LOCAL POPULATION
WOULD MOVE INTO BUILDINGS AND HOMES TO FIRE AT ARMY.
SITUATION WOULD NOT, IN HIS JUDGMENT, DEGENERATE INTO FULL-
SCALE CIVIL WAR BUT TT WOULD BE VERY BLOODY AND VERY
DIFFICULT FOR GOL AND LEBANESE ARMY. ARMY WOULD THEREFORE
NEED TO BE BEEFED UP IN TERMS OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS,
ESPECIALLY LATTER SO IT COULD DELIVER EXTREMELY HIGH RATE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET UTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
40
Reproduced at the RichardINixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 13/13:P.50F8
DS-1652
PREARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05588 02 OF 02 151930Z
OF FIRE WITHOUT SPARING AMMO AND THEREBY OBTAIN
SUPERIORITY ON GROUND BEFORE THERE WAS TIME FOR INFILTRATION
TO REACH BEIRUT. ONCE BEIRUT SECURED, ARMY COULD BEGIN TO
WORK ON OTHER SECTORS OF LEBANON BUT IT NOT STRONG ENOUGH
TO TACKLE WHOLE COUNTRY AT SAME TIME. ABOU HAMAD ASKED WHAT
MILITARY SUPPORT USG MIGHT BE ABLE SUPPLY AND ALSO ASKED
CHARGE'S OPINION ON WHETHER OR NOT GOL CORRECT IN BELIEVING
IT HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO OBTAIN ITS MINIMUM TERMS OR FITHT
FEDAYEEN.
7. CHARGE SAID THAT TALKS PRESENTLY UNDERWAY AS OF MAY 15
BETWEEN OUR DEFENSE ATTACHE AND LEBANESE ARMY ON JUST WHAT
LATTER THOUGHT IT NEEDED AND WHEN IN WAY OF ARMS AND
MUNITIONS. QUESTION OF DELIVERY ALSO NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED.
WE WILL INFORM DEPT OF GOL DESIRE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE
BUT REPLY WOULD HAGZ TO AWAIT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF WHATEVER
SSPECIFICS EMERGED FROM TALKS WITH ARMY.
8. CONCERNING GOL ATTITUDE TOWARD FEDAYEEN, CHARGE SAID
HE COULD FULLY UNDERSTAND SITUATION AS FRANGIE SAW IT AND
ABOU HAMAD EXPLAINED IT. OBVIOUSLY HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR
USG ON THIS QUESTION SINCE HE UNINSTRUCTED. CHARGE
WONDERED IF IT WERE NOT BETTER PART OF WISDOM
FOR GOL TO FIGHT FOR TIME IN NEGOTIATIONS TO GIVE ITS
FRIENDS CHANCE TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO HELP LEBANON
BRING ABOUT OUTCOME IT DESIRED. GOL SHOULD
THINK VERY, VERY CAREFULLY BEFORE COMMITTING ITSELF IRRE-
VOCABLY TO FIGHT WITH FEDAYEEN WHICH COULD POSSIBLEY PRE-
CIPITATE CIVIL WAR. HE ASKED FONMIN WHAT GOL CONSIDERING
IN WAY OF TIME FRAME FOR SOME SORT OF OUTCOME WITH FEDAYEEN,
AS WELL AS FOR BEEFING UP ARMY. ABU HAMAD WAS NOT CLEAR
ON THIS BUT REPEATED THAT MOST URGENT STEP WAS FOR USG TO
DO WHAT IT COULD WITH USSR AND, IF POSSIBLE, WITH ARAB
STATES WHO FINANCE FEDAYEEN so THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE
FAVORABLE OUTCOME.
9. ABOU HAMAD THEN ASKED ABOUT ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS
LEBANON IN PRESENT SITUATION. CHARGE SAID HE HAD IMPRESSION
GOI DOES NOT WISH CAUSE TROUBLE FOR GOL AT PRESENT TIME AND
THAT WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH GOI ON THIS QUESTION BUT
HE COULD NOT SAY ANY MORE. ABOU HAMAD SAID THAT ISRAELI
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. P. 6 OF
8
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXC-S EXELS
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05588 02 OF 02 1519302
OFFICIALS HAVE MADE SEVERAL DIFFERENT STATEMENTS ABOUT
OCCUPYING PART OF LEBANON SHOULD SYRIA INTERVENE: MOVING
AGAINST SYRIA BUT ONLY IF INFILTRATION OCCURRED ALONG ISRAELI
BORDER; OR NOT INTERVENING AT ALL. WHAT WAS ISRAELI INTEN-
TION, ABOU HAMAD WONDERED? WAS IT WILLING USE PRESSURE TO
DETER INTERVENTION BY FEDAYEEN FROM SYRIA OR WAS IT AWAITING
CHANCE TO TAKE SOME OF LEBANONS TERRITORY? WHAT
WAS POSITION OF USG VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL AND LEBANON? CHARGE
SAID HE WOULD SEE WHAT, IF ANYTHING, DEPT COULD ADD TO WHAT
HE HAD SAID.
10. ABOU HAMAD SAID THAT JORDAN AND IRAN COULD PERHAPS
PLAY ROLES OF SOME VALUE SHOULD FIGHTING BEGIN AGAIN
IN LEBANON. IRAQ HAS BEEN A TROUBLEMAKER AND IRAN HAS
CAPABILITY EXERTING PRESSURE ON TRAQ CAS DOES USSR).
JORDAN HAS SOME CAPABILITY EXERTING PRESSURE ON SYREA TO
DETER INFILTRATION. WHAT COULD USG DO TO GENERALT SUPPORT
FROM THESE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE?
CHARGE SAID HE WOULD PUT QUESTION TO DEPT. ABOU HAMAD
CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT PRESIDENT GRANGIE NEEDED TO KNOW WHAT
SUPPORT HE COULD COUNT UPON FROM USG UNDER PRESENT CIR-
CUMSTANCES. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO HAS SAID US READY
TO HELP BUT HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFIC. ABOU HAMAD HAD TRIED
TO SUGGEST SOME SPECIFIC THINGS WHICH USG MIGHT DO, POLITICAL
AND MILITARY. HOWEVER BIG THING IS FOR PRESIDENT TO KNOW
WHETHER OR NOT HE CAN COUNT UPON USG.
10. IN CONCLUSION, PRESIDENT FRANGIE WANTS TO KNOW:
(A) WHAT USG CAN DO TO EXERT PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN TO MEET GOL'S
MINIMUM TERMS, AND (B) WHAT USG CAN DO TO SUPPORT
GOL IF MINIMUM DEMANDS NOT MET AND GOL COMPELLED TO RESUME
CONFLICT WITH FEDAYEEN. UNDER (A) GOL WASNTS USG (1) FIRST
AND FOREMOST TO PRESS SOVIET UNION TO PERSUADE FEDAYEEN TO
ACCEPT MINIMUM DEMANDS: (2) TO APPROACH SAUDI ARABIA,
KUWAIT AND ABU DHABI TO DO SAME THING BY THREATENING WITH-
DRAWAL OF FUNDS, AND (3) TO PRESS IRAN TO EXERT PRESSURE KEEP
IRAQ QUIET. UNDER (B) FONMIN DID NOT SUGGEST MILITARY INTERVEN-
TION BUT DID REQUEST IN GENERAL TERMS ASSISTANCE FOR
LEBANESE ARMY. HE DID WANT TO
KNOW WHAT WE COULD DO TO HELP.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE ALTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED DS-1652 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 7 OF 8
PEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SEALS
OF
SECRET
PAGE 04 BEIRUT 05588 02 OF 02 151930Z
11. COMMENT: PRESIDENT FRANGIE IS A TOUGH AND
COURAGEOUS MOUNTAINEER WHO IS QUITE CAPABLE, DESPITE
ODDS, OF ENGAGING THE FEDAYEEN IN A SHOWDOWN. HIS
HONOR IS AT STAKE AND HE CONSIDERS THE INDEPENDENCE
AND SOVEREIGNTY OF HIS COUNTRY IS SERIOUSLY THREATENED.
WE THINK THE IMPERATIVE OF THE MOMEMT IS TO GIVE
HIM THE POLITICAL SUPPORT HE REQUESTS, PARTICULARLY WITH
RESPECT TO THE SOVIETS IN EFFORT OBTAIN PEACEFUL SOLUTION
TO CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN AND PREVENT MAJOR HOSTILITIES
WHICH COULD BE DISASTER FOR LEBANON AND WOULD ALSO RISK
DRAGGING OTHER COUNTRIES INTO BROADER CONFLICT. THE ODDS
WHICH HE FACES WERE OUTLINED IN DETAIL IN REFTEL. WE HOULD
ALSO CONSIDER FAVORABLY RAPID RESPONSE TO MILITARY REQUESTES
(WHICH WE EXPECT HAVE FROM LEBANESE ARMY MAY 16.) TO GIE
HIM ENCOURAGEMENT TO STAND FIRM IN NEGOTIATIONS AND FIGHT FOR
TIME WHILE PRESSURES HOPEFULLY CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON FEDAYEEN,
I THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT I BE ABLE TO GIVE HIM SOME SORT
OF RESPONSE IF ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS BY MAY 16.
12. FOR DEPT. FONMIN REQUESTED THAT SUBSTANCE THIS TEL NOT
REPEAT NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH LEBANESE EMBASSY WASHINGTON.
HOUGHTON
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DIA, USCINCEUR.
NLN 09-13/13 : P.80F8
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be 1/80/19 declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
МИНОЛ
OE THE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES 73 OF I
11 PM 8:55
TELEGRAM
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
SECRET 348
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05412 111653Z
51
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
037347
P 1116407 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2082
SECRET BEIRUT 5412
EXDIS
E O 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PINS PFOR LE
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM SECY TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE
MANY THANKS FOR MESSAGE WHICH PASSED TODAY MAY 11 TO
EXPIS
FRANGIE THROUGH NEGIB SADAQA, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
FOREIGN OFFICE. SADAQA IS CONFIDENT OF PRESIDENT AND
PRESIDENT INFORMED US PREVIOUSLY THAT IF WE EVER
HAD MESSAGES TO PASS TO HIM SADAQA WAS AN EMINENTLY
ACCEPTABLE CONDUIT. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES
I DID NOT THINK IT WAS POLITICALLY WISE FOR ME TO CALL
ON PRESIDENT, SADAQA AGREED AND WAS EXTREMLY PLEASED
WITH MESSAGE.
HOUGHTON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
Wit
STATE
*
'73 MAY Department of State
SEATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
SECRET 318
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05324 101535Z
46
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP=00 SSO=00 NSCE-00 1026 W
026061
0 1015157 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2051
S E C R F T BEIRUT 5324
EXDIS
EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PINS PFOR LE
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE
1. WE REALIZE DEPT IS CONSIDERING POSSIBLE MEASURES
TO BE TAKEN SHOULD SYRIANS INTERVENE AND WE RECEIVE FORMAL
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM GOL. WE ALSO REALIZE THAT
DEVISING EFFECTIVE MEASURES IS NOT AN EASY TASK GIVEN
EXCLUS EXCES
OUR PRESENT POSITION IN THE AREA AND THE FACT THAT WE
ARE BEING CONTINUALLY ATTACKED HERE INTER ALIA BY BOTH
SYRIAN AND MORE IRRESPONSIBLE LEBANESE PRESS FOR
INVOLVEMENT ISRAELI BEIRUT RAID APRIL 10 AND EVEN FOR
INSPIRING PRESENT CRISIS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING
ON FYI BASIS ANY TENTATIVE IDEAS DEPT MAY HAVE DEVELOPED.
SYRIA REMAINS IN OUR JUDGMENT VITAL FACTOR FOR RESOLUTION
PRESENT CRISIS.
2. HOWEVER, LEBANESE BADLY IN NEED OF FRIENDS AND
REASSURANCE AND PARTICULARLY SOME INDICATION OF US
SUPPORT DURING THIS TROUBLED PERIOD. ASSISTANT
SECRETARY SISCO'S REMARKS TO KABBANI (STATE 88229)
EXPRESSING OUR CONCERN AND WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ANY
LEBANESE REQUEST TO HELP WERE VERY HELPFUL THIS
REGARD AND HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY GOL.
3. WE THINK IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL IF THE SECRETARY
COULD SEND A CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE
WHICH WE COULD PASS ORALLY. MESSAGE COULD EXPRESS OUR
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05324 101535Z
EXPIS EXATS EXPIS EXPIS
CONCERN, FACT THAT DEPT IS FOLLOWING SITUATION CLOSELY
AND READY CONSIDER ANY REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE
AND REAFFIRM IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO LEBANESE
INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. ADMITTEDLY,
THIS COULD RAISE GOL EXPECTATIONS, BUT I THINK THIS
POSSIBILITY IS OFFSET BY REASSURANCE WHICH OUR CONCERN
AND SUPPORT WOULD PROVIDE.
4, SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON PRESIDENT FRANGIE THIS
MORNING AND MAY WELL HAVE OFFERED ASSISTANCE TO LEBS
AS HE DID AFTER ISRAELI RAID IN SEPTEMBER 1972. IT
WOULD THEREFORE BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IF I COULD
PASS ORAL MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE.
HOUGHTON
WAY
10
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT TSFECRESTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 29 Presidential Library.
62/20/199
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPART AENT of STATE
8
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
WN
CONFIDENTIAL 649
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05267 091608Z
EXPIS EXPIS
43
ACTION SS-25
3
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-09 CCO-00 /026 W
015775
o 0915407 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2029
CONFIDENTI A L BEIRUT 5267
EXDIS
FO 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR LE
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR SEA EVACUATION
REF: STATE 86829
1. CURRENT UPDATED ESTIMATES AS FOLLOWS (TITLES AND
PARAGRAPH NUMBERS CORRESPOND TO THOSE IN BEIRUT A-188):
5. AMERICAN RESIDENTS 5,000
6. AMERICAN TOURISTS 1,000
7. OTHER POTENTIAL EVACUEES 1,000
2. ESTIMATE OF AMERICAN RESIDENTS INCLUDES 4,500
REGISTERED WITH EMBASSY, REFLECTING SIGNIFICANT INCREASE
IN AMERICANS REGISTERED SINCE APRIL 10 ISRAELI RAID.
LOWER TOURIST ESTIMATE REFLECTS RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL.
3. GIVEN THE UNDERLYING CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH EVACUETION
BY SEA WOULD PRESUMABLY 'TAKE PLACE, I.E. LACK OF ACCESS TO AIR-
PORT, WE ESTIMATE THAT LARGER PERCENTAGE OF THE 7,000
EVACUEES IN PARAGRAPH ONE WOULD DEPART COMPARED TO
JUNE 1967 EVACUATION. BEST ESTIMATE WE THINK IS
6,000 EXCLUDING OFFICIAL AMERICANS AND DEPENDENTS.
4. WE BELIEVE ABOVE ESTIMATE OF "OTHER POTENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT CONE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT of STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
IEAE
TELEGRAM
OF
THE
tom
or
CONFIDENTIAL
BA
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05267 091608Z
&
EVACUEES" IS CONSERVATIVE. FIGURE REPRESENTS PRIMARILY
ALIEN DEPENDENTS OF AMERICAN RESIDENTS. IF CONDITIONS
IN LEBANON LEAVE SEA EVACUATION AS ONLY ALTERNATIVE,
AND PORT NOT ACCESSIBLE, IT PROBABLE THAT SOME OTHER
NATIONALS SUCH AS BRITISH, CANADIAN, DUTCH, ETC. WOULD
TURN TO US FOR EVACUATION AND THUS INCREASE THE TOTAL.
AT THIS POINT WE OBVIOUSLY DO NOT WISH TO CONTACT
OTHER MISSIONS FOR THEIR PREDICTIONS.
HOUGHTON
2'00"
IN
BELF 9095b
CONTINUENCA
VENB FE
EXCES
ED ene
a
V
-
10
TURI38 1178
D 13
УСТОЙ
13
BY
LETECKVW
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTHER W AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
08/20/199
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT STATE or
Department of State
OF STATE AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXBIN EXCLUS
WH
SECRET 221
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05251 091228Z
42
2
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
3
013842
O 0911437 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2019
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5251
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PINS, LE, JO, SY
SUBJ: JORDANIAN VIEWS ON SITUATION IN LEBANON
REF: AMMAN 2490
1. WE HAVE MADE AMMAN AN ADDRESSEE ON ALL OF OUR RE-
PORTS ON LOCAL SITUATION TO AMMAN WITH EXCEPTION ONE
TELEGRAM RE SYRIAN ASPECT OF PROBLEM WHICH BEING REPEATED
SEPARATELY. WE VERY MUCH AWARE RELEVANCE OF SITUATION
HERE TO JORDAN AND WILL CONTINUE REPEAT SUBSTANTIVE
MESSAGES AMMAN. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SITUATION PRESENTLY
AS DANGEROUS AS ZAYD RAFAI MAKES IT OUT ALTHOUGH, AS
WE HAVE OBSERVED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, PROLONGATION OF
FIGHTING WHICH INCREASES LIKELIHOOD IT WILL SPREAD AND
SYRIAN INTERVENTION ARE TWO ELEMENTS WE (AND GOLD FEAR
MOST.
2. THUS FAR EGYPT HAS APPEARED TO BE RATHER POSITIVE IN
SUPPORT OF FRANGIE AND IN EFFORTS RESTRAIN SYRIANS. HOW-
EVER, THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE COULD
NOT CHANGE OR THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE PLAYING DOUBLE GAME
ALTHOUGH WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH TO DATE.
3. AS WE HAVE REPORTED THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT COLLABORA-
TION BETWEEN SOME OF LEBANESE LEFTIST GROUPS AND FEDAYEEN
WITH LIKELY SUPPORT OF AT LEAST POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
35
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRANTMENT OF STATE
some
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SEAL
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05251 091228Z
EXPIS EXPIS
NATURE BY USSR VIA LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND SUPPLY
OF SOV ARMS VIA SYRIA. OTHER LEFTISTS GROUPS ARE KAMAL
JUMBLATT'S PSP, THE PPS, AND SYRIAN AND IRAQI BAATH.
THEIR NUMBERS ARE NOT GREAT, HOWEVER, AND GREATEST DANGER
SEEMS COME FROM PDFLP, PFLP/GC AND SOME EXTREMIST ELEMENTS
OF PFLP AND FATAH. AS REPORTED THEY CLEARLY DO NOT WISH
AGREEMENT BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND GOL AND HAVE ALREADY BEEN
INSTRUMENTAL IN SABOTAGING SEVERAL CEASE=FIRES.
4, WE SHARE GOJ'S CONCERN OVER SYRIAN ROLE BUT ARE A BIT
SURPRISED THAT GOJ CONSIDERS IT CAN DO NOTHING. THIS ALL
MORE TRUE SINCE AMMAN HAS LONG BEEN ARGUING THAT GOL SHOULD
TAKE SORT OF ACTION IT HAS FINALLY BEEN FORCED TO TAKE.
AS REPORTED REFTEL, GOJ DOES HAVE "NUMEROUS AND HEAVY
TROOP UNITS" ALONG NORTHERN BORDER. PRESENCE THESE TROOPS
HAS IN PAST APPEARED WEIGH SIGNIFICANTLY IN SARG CAL-
CULATIONS. WE WONDER WHETHER GOJ COULD NOT PASS DISCREET
WORD TO SARG THAT IT CONSIDERS ITS OWN INTERESTS BEING
JEOPARDIZED BY WHAT IT HAS LEARNED OF SYRIAN ASSISTANCE
TO HEATING UP SITUATION IN LEBANON, THAT CONTINUATION SUCH
ACTIONS BY SARG COULD CAUSE ISRAELI INTERVENTION WHICH
WOULD THREATEN JORDAN AS WELL AS SYRTA, AND THAT GOJ
THINKS SYRIANS WOULD BE WISE TO PULL IN HORNS. LEBANESE
FOREIGN MINISTER JUST INFORMED CHARGE THAT EGYPTIAN ENVOY
KHOLI HAS LEFT THIS MORNING MAY 9 FOR DAMASCUS IN EFFORT
RESTRAIN SYRIANS. JORDAN DEMARCHE WE SUGGEST WOULD THUS
COMPLEMENT AND SUPPORT EGYPTIAN EFFORTS. WERE THIS TO BE
ACCOMPANIED BY OSTENTATIOUS (YET PURELY FOR SHOW) REINFORCE-
MENTS OR MOVEMENTS OF JORDANIAN TROOP UNITS IN NORTH IT
MIGHT HAVE SOME DETERRENT EFFECT ON SARG,
5. WE QUITE AGREE THAT PUBLIC SUPPORT OF GOL BY THE
JORDANIANS COULD BE HARMFUL AND LYING LOW FOR TIME BEING
GOOD POSTURE.
HOUGHTON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED W HOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
18/50/199
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
1
or
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 941
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05136 0511267
20
ACTION SS-25
EXCL
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
D 0511157 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
SITUATION 1 ROOM
73 MAY 5 PM 3:21
2
WHITE HOUSE
W\
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1973
SECRE T BEIRUT 5136
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ACOM
SUBJ: RETIREMENT OF FILES TO SAFEHAVEN
1. AS PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF
REDUCING OUR CLASSIFIED FILES TO AMOUNT REQUIRING FOUR
HOURS BURN TIME. SOME ARE BEING RETIRED, SOME SENT TO
SAFEHAVEN ATHENS AND OTHERS DESTROYED.
2. WE HAVE FELT COMPELLED BECAUSE OF SENSITIVE NATURE
FILES TO SEND VISA DEROGATORY TO ATHENS WHICH HAS INFORMED
US IT WOULD BE UNABLE TO SERVICE FILES IF REQUESTED.
OUR ONLY CONCERN IS INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN WHICH
IS NOT AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE IN CLEARANCE PROCESS. WE
NOT ABLE TO ASSESS EXTENT PROBLEM AND WON'T UNTIL
WE HAVE SPECIFIC CASES IN HAND.
3, WE DO NOT FEEL MEASURES TAKEN RE FILES WILL SIG-
NIFICANTLY EFFECT OPERATIONS MISSION. WE RETAINING
1973 FILES.
HOUGHTON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
23
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-8-5
DEPARTMENT
on
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES or
73 APR 32 TELEGRAM at
SECRET 035
SITUATION ROUSE ROUSEM
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05016 021255Z
46
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
084814
R 0212207 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1923
SECRET BEIRUT 5016
EXDIS
FO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR LE UR
25X1
SUBJECT: SOVIET INCITEMENT OF FEDAYEEN
AS DEPT IS AWARE FROM OUR REPORTING
25X1
THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING THE
FEDAYEEN BOTH HERE AND IN DAMASCUS IN BELIEF THAT THIS
EMBASSY WAS INVOLVED IN APRIL 10 ISRAELI RAID BEIRUT.
PRESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST US WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS OUR
ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT APRIL 10 RAID IS CONTINUING ALTHOUGH
CONCENTRATED IN LEFTIST AND PRO-FEDAYEEN PRESS AND
THE PRO-SOVIET PRESS HERE HAS ACTIVELY PUSHED THIS LINE.
IN CIRCUMSTANCES, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND, IF SUCH HAS NOT
ALREADY BEEN DONE, THAT A DEMARCHE BE MADE TO THE SOVIETS
ON THIS SCORE.
HOUGHTON
State Dept. review completed
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTSHEAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-8-5
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
Department of State
of STATE AMERICA UNITED SMART
TELEGRAM
SECRET 369
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04659 210955Z
14
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
001721
R 201344Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1778
SECR ET BEIRUT 4659
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PFOR, LE
SUBJECT: FRANGIE ON FEDAYEEN
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
1. DURING DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE APRIL 20,
'73 APR 21 PM 3:11
I ASKED FOR HIS APPRAISAL SITUATION RE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND FEDAYEEN IN AFTERMATH
ISRAELI RAID ON BEIRUT.
2. FRANGIE SAID HE HAD LONG MEETING WITH *ARAFAT WHO
WAS OBVIOUSLY DEPRESSED C AND WHOSE TOCK, FRANGIE
CONSIDERS, HAS SUFFERED SHARP DROP. FRANGIE ANTICI-
PATES FURTHER JOCKEYING FOR LEADERSHIP POSITION AMONG
FEDAYEEN AND WAS UNCERTAIN HOW THIS WOULD COME OUT.
3. IF ARAFATIRETAINU COPTROL, FRANGIE DOES NOT
EXPECT MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN.
SHOULD HE LOSE OUT, THIS BECOMES MORE PROBLEMATICAL.
4. IN ANY EVENT, FRANGIE ANTICIPATES INDIVIDUAL "ACTS
OF FOLLY" AGAINST US INTERESTS.
5. PRESIDENT REASSURED ME GOL WILL DO EVERYTHING IT
CAN TO PROTECT US AGAINST FEDAYEEN ATTACK. HE
VOLUNTEERED THAT, IN VIEW INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FEDAYEEN
PLAN TO ROCKET EMBASSY AND ARE SEEKING APARTMENTS IN
CHANCERY AREA, HE GAVE INSTRUCTIONS NO APARTMENTS TO
BE RENTED TO NEW TENANTS WHICH OVERLOOK EMBASSY WITHOUT
PRIOR SCREENING OF TENANT BY ARMY INTELLIGENCE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PROARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXCES
UNITED STATES AMERICA
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04659 210955Z
6. I RETURNED TO THE CHARGE IN URGING GOL AT MINIMUM
EXPEL ALL TERRORIST PEADERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE SUCH
AS SALAH KHALAF. I RECALLED HAVING MADE SAME PROPOSAL
AND NOTED THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WOULD HAVE SPARED
LEBANON PAIN AND HUMILIATION OF ISRAELIS BEIRUT RAID.
HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND SAID HE IS MAKING STRENUOUS
EFFORTS TO DO SO. HE CONFIDED THAT HE HAD ENROLLED
HELP OF TWO RECENT EGYPTIAN VISITORS, SADAT'S ADVISOR
EL KHOLI AND ARAB LEAGUE SECGEN MAHMOUD RIAD. AT
HIS REQUEST THEY BOTH SPOKE TO FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP
AND URGED THAT FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY THEY TRANSFER
THEIR OPERATIONS FROM BEIRUT TO CAIRO. HE CLAIMED
ALGERIANS ALSO "PROMISED" TO BE HELPFUL THIS REGARD
BUT WAS UNSURE WHAT THEY WOULD DO.
7. I ADVOCATED FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF LEBANESE
ARMY AND ASKED WHERE HE STOOD ON CONSCRIPTION. HE
REPLIED HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT THIS SINCE OUR
LAST TALK AND IS COMING INCREASINGLY TO CONCLUSION
THIS WAS NOT THE BEST ROUTE FOR LEBANON, PRIMARILY
BECAUSE OF HIS CONCERN THAT INDISCRIMINATE CONSCRIR-
TION OF YOUNG PEOPLE WOULD INJECT RADICAL ELEMENT
(REFLECTED IN RECENT STUDENT OUTBURSTS) INTO WHAT WAS
MOOR NOITAUTIC 32U0H 9THW HW
OTHERWISE, FORTUNATELY, STILL A RELIABLE ARMY.
11:8 M9 is ЯЯА Er'
BUFFUM
EXPIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
128/80/180
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
08/60/1601
*******UNCLASSIFIED*******S CDPY
FLASH
ESA978BEA362
DE RUESBE #4189 1011020
Z 111010Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1585
UNCLAS BEIRUT 4189
SITREP 2
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJ: AFTERMATH OF ISRAELI RAID ON BEIRUT - SITPRE 2
NOON BEIRUT TIME POLICE RADIO ALERTS LOCAL GUARDS
HERE LARGE DEMONSTRATION ACCOMPANIED BY ARMED FEDAYEEN
HEADING TOWARD EMBASSY. SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY
REINFORCEMENTS HAVE ARRIVED ON SCENE. AM AGAIN CLOSING
EMBESSY.
BUFFUM
BT
WHSR COMMENT
*
SAUNDERS,LL'D
RECALLED
PSN: 026754
PAGE 01
OF 01
TOR:101/10:21Z
DTG:111010Z APR 73
*******U N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
*******CDNFIDENTIAL*******S_COP
OP IMMED /ROUTINE
ESA001BEA374
DE RUESBE #4186 1011030
0 R 110955Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1580
INFO USMISSION USUN 2261
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4081
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 7798
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5278
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3726
AMMBASSY ATHENS 2932
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 1739
USINT CAIRO 917
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 977
CONFIDENTIALBEIRUT 4186
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS PFOR US LE
SUBJ: AFTERMATH OF ISRAELI RAID ON BEIRUT- SITREP 1
FOLLOWING IS GENERAL SITUATION MID-MORNING APRIL 11
BEIRUT TIME.T
IN VIEW FACT THAT SCENE SHIFTS FREQUENTLY WE WILL SUBMIT
SERIES OF SITREPS DURING CURRENT EMERGENCY, TO WHICH WE WILL
ASSIGN THIS NUMBER 1.
1. SITUATION CURRENTLY QUIET. WE HAVE REOPENED EMBASSY
FOR NORMAL BUSINESS, BUT ARE KEEPING CLOSE EYE ON
DEMONSTRATIONS SCHEDULED AND READY TO SECURE QUICKLY
IF NECESSARY.
2. VARIOUS PALESTINIAN AND LEFTIST ORGANS CONTINUE
WHIP UP ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT WITH EVEN GREATER EMPHASIS
ON ALLEGED US EMBASSY BEIRUT COLLUSION WITH
ISRAELI ATTACKERS. PLO ORGAN (WAFA) FRONT PAGES
THIS. LEAFLETS BEING DISTRIBUTED AROUND TOWN TO SAME
EFFECT AND CARS WITH LOUDSPEAKERS WERE SPREADING SAME LIE
WIDELY AROUND BEIRUT LATE LAST EVENING. THIS
CONNECTION, WE ARE DISTURBED BY FBIS LONDON REPORT
QUOTING ALGIERS VOICE OF PALESTINE. IT NOT ONLY CONTAINXS
SAME ALLEGATION, BUT CALLS ON ARAB MASSES "TO STRIKE
EVERYWHERE AT AMERICAN INTERESTS AND EMBASSIES AND TO
*WHSR COMMENT
*
SAUNDERS,LL'D
RECALLED
PSN:026777
PAGE 01
TOR:101/11:07Z
DTG:110955Z APR 73
*******C IFIDENTIAL*******S COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
08/00/160
*******CDNFIDENTIAL*******SCOPY
KILL AND ASSASSINATE EVERYONE WHO IS AMERICAN". (COULT
NOT USINT ALGIERS BE INSTRUCTED MAKE VIGOROUS
PROTEST TO GOA ABOUT SUCH INFLAMMATORY PROPAGANDA?)
3. PRESIDENT FRANGIE STILL CONSIDERING PRIME MINISTER'S
SUBMISSION OF CABINET'S RESIGNATION LAST NIGHT.
THIS WILL BE SUBJ OF SEPTEL. POINT TO BE MADE
HERE IS GOL OPERATING FROM POSITION OF TREMENDOUS
WEAKNESS AND OBVIOUS EMBARRASSMENT AT SUCCESS OF
ISRAELI ATTACK IN HEART OF DOWNTOWN BEIRUT. SOME
MARCHERS YESTERDAY CALLED FOR SAEB SALAM'S HEAD
AND HE WAS PELTED WITH GARBAGE WHEN VISITING ONE SITE
OF ISRAELI ATTACK.
4. AGAINST FOREGOING BACKDROP, FURTHER DEOMONSTRATIONS
WILL TAKE PLACE TODAY AND TOMORROW. TODAY;' CEREMONIES,
WE THINK, WILL BE ESSENTIALLY WARM UP
FOR MASSIVE AFFAIR TOMORROW AFTERNOON WHICH
PALESTINIAN AND LEFTIST GROUPS HAVE CALLED ON PUBLIC TO
MAKE BIGGEST IN HISTROY OF COUNTRY. AT THAT TIME
FUNERALS WILL BE HELD FOR TOP FEDAYEEN LEADERS WHO
WERE KILLED AND ARAB GOVTS HAVE BEEN INVITED
SEND SPECIAL REPS MAKING THIS A MAJOR OCCASION.
5. PALESTINIANS CLEARLY SEEKING TO MAKE US EMBASSY A
MAJOR OBJECT OF ATTACK AND WE ARE MAKING SURE GOL
KNOWS THIS IN REQUESTING REINSTITUTION OF EXPANDED
SECURITY MEASURES WHEN SITUATION REQUIRES. (GOL
RESPONSE YESTERDAY WAS QUICK AND IMPRESSIVE ALTHOUGH
BEST ESTIMATE OF CROWD SIZE WHICH FORMED DOWNTOWN
AT THAT TIME AND LATER DIVERTED WAS ONLY ABOUT 7,000.)
WHAT GOL WILL BE ABL TO DO GIVEN SUBSEQUENT TENDER OF GOVT'S
RESIGNATION AND IN FACE OF ANTICIPATED MASS DEMONSTRATION
REMAINS TO BE EEEN. I AM CONFIDENT THAT FRANGIE WIL
DO HIS BEST. IF PRESS REPORTS ARE CORRECT, HE
RESISTED SAEB SALAM'S ALLEGED DEMANDS YESTERDAY
FOR RESIGNATION OF ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL GHANEM.
GHANEM IS TOUGH ANTI-PALESTINIAN AND WITH FRANGIE'S
ENDORSEMENT, I FEEL SURE WOULD GIVE FIRM INSTRUCTIONS
TO TROOPS NOT TO PERMIT HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST EMBASSY.
BUFFUM
BT
RECALLED
PSN: 026777
PAGE 02
OF 02
TOR:101/11:07Z
DTG:110955Z APR 73
*******C 0NFIDENTIAL*******S COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
18/60/1601
*******CDNFIDENTIAL*******SCOPV
OP IMMED
ESA984AAA931
DE RUESBE #4185 210110151
OR 1110954Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1579
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2260
CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT 4185
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PFOR, LE
SUBJECT: UN ACTION ON ISRAELI RAID
1. SADAQA CALLED ME THIS MORNING TO SAY INSTRUCTIONS
HAD JUST BEEN SENT TO NEW YORK TELLING GHORRA TO
CONTENT HIMSELF WITH A LETTER OF COMPLAINT TO THE
SC BUT NOT RPT NOT REQUEST CONVEINIGN COUNCIL.
2. SADAQA ALSO COMMENTED THAT SISCO'S DISCUSSION
WITH KABBANI HAD WEIGHED VERY HEAVILY IN PROCESS OF
DECIDING THIS MATTER. GOL MUCH APPRECIATED SINCERITY
AND FRANKNESS OF SISCO'S, COMMENTS, ALTHOUGH THEY COULD,
OF COURSE, NOT SUBSCRIBE TO EVERTHING HE SAID.
BUFFUM
BT
WHSR COMMENT
*
SAUNDERS, LL'D
RECALLED
PSN: 026757
PAGE 01
OF 01
TOR:101/10:28Z
DTG:110954Z APR 73
*******C ONFIDENTIAL*******S COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
*******C0NFIDENTIAL*******SCOPY
OP IMMED /ROUTINE
ESA468BEA134
DE RUESBE #4128 1000755
0 R 100745Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1557
INFO USUN NEW YORK 2253
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4072
CONFIDENTIALBEIRUT 4128
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJECT: ISRAELI RAID ON BEIRUT
1. FONOFF SECGEN SADAQA INFORMED AMBASSADOR EARLY
APRIL 10 THAT CABINET MEETING WOULD BE HELD 9 A.M.
BEIRUT TIME TO CONSIDER REACTION TO ISRAELI
RAID. ABOUHAMAD WANTED CONVEY WORD THAT HE EXPECTED
VERY STRONG PRESSURE FOR SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IN
VIEW OF FLAGRANT CHARACTER OF ATTACK AND NUMBER OF
DGDEATHS, INCLUDING LEBANESE. IN KEEPING WITH PROMISE
TO CONSULT US, GOL WISHED ALERT US IN ADVANCE OF
MEETING THAT SC MEETING APPEARS PROBABLE OUTCOME.
2. I SAID I COULD UNDERSTAND THAT PASSIONS
WOULD BE RUNNING HIGH AND THAT THERE WOULD BE
DEMANDS FOR ACTION AND THAT, OF COURSE, GOL WOULD
HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT BEST SERVES ITS INTERESTS.
HOWEVER, EVEN IN ABSENCE OF CONTACT IN WASHINGTON
I WAS SURE THAT I COULD TELL HIM WITHOUT SLIGHTEST
DOUBT US POSITION WOULD BE TO INDICATE OUR OPPOSI-
TION TO TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE FROM ALL SIDES; THAT
EMOTIONS HAD RUN VERY HIGH AMONG AMERICANS AS RESULT
OF KHARTOUM ASSASSINATION OF OUR DIPLOMATS AND
THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS EPISODE
AS WELL IN OUR APPROACH TO ANY COUNCIL DEBATE.
SADAQA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS REACTION AND
SAID THAT ABOUHAMAD WOULD TRY TO GET CABINET
DECISION ADJOURNED TO PERMIT FURTHER CONSULTATIONS
WITH US.
3. I PROMISED INFORM WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY AND GIVE
WHSR COMMENT
SAUNDERS,
RECALLED
PSN: 026079
PAGE 01
TOR:100/08:35Z DTG:100745Z APR 73
*******CDNFIDENTIAL*******SCOPV
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
88/60/100
Ad00 S*******1 V IINBOIN00*******
HIM REACTION SOONEST
4# DETAILS ON RAID SEPTEL.
BUFFUM
BT
RECALLED
PSN: 026079
PAGE 02
OF 02
TOR:100/08:35Z
DTG:100745Z APR 73
*******C 0 NFIDENTIAL*******S COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MILHONE
THE
ИОIТАТЯОНТUА
OF THE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED PAYMENT STATES OF American
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXCES EXCES
SECRET 488
PAGE 01 BETRUT 03856 0413077
44
ROOM
ASNOH
2
73 APR 4 PM S 2
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
104050
R 041150Z APR 73
FM AOEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1446
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
SECRET BEIRUT 3856
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PINS, XFI
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM
REF: PARIS 9125
FULLY UNDERSTAND PARIS RESERVATION ABOUT PROPOSING
GOF ASSIST LEBANON IN DISPOSAL OF MIRAGES. GIVEN
FRENCH SENSITIVITY THIS SUBJECT CAN APPRECIATE MAKING
SUCH SUGGESTION MIGHT BE COUNTER- PRODUCTIVE AND WE
WOULD CONCUR EMBASSY SHOULD NOT TAKE INITIATIVE TO
MENTION THIS.
OBVIOUSLY, IF TOUR D'HORIZON WITH FRENCHI ON LEBANESE
SECURITY PROBLEMS WOULD MAKE IT APPROPRIATE TO DROP
SUDJECT INTO THE CONVERSATION, WE WOULD RECOMMEND IT,
BUT AGREE THERE IS NA COMPELLING REASON TO RAISE IT.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
73 MAR GUA 3:00
SECRET 944
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03632 301609Z
2
44
ACTION SS-25
WI
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 /026 W
065736
PR 3009557 MAR 73 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1346
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
SEE CORE T BEIRUT 3632
EXDIS
E#01 116521 XGDS-3
TAGS:
PINS, GE
SUBJECT:
TERRORISM IN LEBANON
EXC
REF: STATE 057787
1.º DISCUSSED PROBLEM OF FEDAYEEN AND TERRORISM WITH
PRIME MINISTER SAEB SALAM AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH DURING
LUNCHEON MARCH 29. T MADE ROUGHLY SAME PRESENTATION AS
THAT TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE (BEIRUT 29671. HEI SAID HE
FULLY UNDERSTOOD NATURE AND EXTENT OF U.S. CONCERNI AND WHY
WE REGARDED PROBLEM SP SERIOUSLY. THIS CONNECTION, HE
CONVEYED APPRECIATION TO AMBASSADOR MEYER FOR SPIRIT IN
WHICH HIS LETTER ON THIS SUBJECT HAD BEEN ADDRESSED.
2. TO HIS CREDIT, SALAM DID NOT REHEARSE HIS FAMILIAR
ARGUMENTS ABOUT INEQUITIES AND INEQUALITIES OF U.S.
POLICY TOWARD PALESTTNIANS NOR SEEK IN THE LEAST TO
DEPRECIATE INTOLERABLE CHARACTER OF TERRORISM BY
MAKING USUAL REFERENCES TO NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING ITS
BASIC UNDERLYING CAUSES. IN FACT HE DECRIED TERRORIST
ACTS AS SENSELESS.
3. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, NEITHER DID HE CONTEST OURI THESIS
THERE IS ESSENTIAL IDENTITY OF FATAH WITH BSO AND THAT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the RichardNixon-Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
EXPIS EXCES
SECRET
PAGE 02 BETRUT a3632 3016097
ARAFAT HIMSELF WAS PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN APPROVING
SOMEHGSO ACTIONS.
0000<00
4. ONE MAJOR POINT WHERE HE SAID HIS OWN REPORTS DID NOT
CONFIRM OURS RELATED TO ROLE OF SALAH KHALAF. WITHOUT
ELABORATING, HE MERELY SAID INFORMATION THAT HE GETS FROM
LOWER LEVEL SOURCES IS THAT SALAH KHALAP IS NOT AS MUCH
OF * PRIME MOVER AS AUR INFORMATION INDICATES. I
ASKED IF HE HAD READ ABU DAOUD'S TESTIMONY ON THIS WHOLE
SUBUECT. WHEN HE SAID HE HAD NOT, I LERT WITH HIM
COMPLETE TEXT INARABIC AS SUPPLIED US BY AMMAN WHICH HE
SAID HE WOULD STUDY WITH GREAT INTEREST.
5. BURDEN OF SALAMIS COMMENT WAS TO REQUEST UNDERSTANDING
FOR DIFFICULTIES LEBANON HAS IN COPING WITH THIS KIND
OF PROBLEM, ALLUDING TO PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY GOVERN-
MENTS EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD IN TRYING TO COPE WITH
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS. I NOTED THAT EVEN THOUGH IT
IS OFTEN DIFFICULT TO LOCATE TERRORISTS WHO GO UNDER-
GROUND AND USE FALSE DOCUMENTATION, WE REALLY COULD
NOT UNDERSTAND IT WHEN A KNOWN TERRORIST LEADER
LIKE SALAH KHALAF POPS UP IN A PUBLIC PLACE. AS HEI DID
RECENTLY WITH PFLP LEADER HABBASH IN SREAKING
TO ARAB UNIVERSITY. SALAM OFFERED NO EXCUSE.
60 AMPLIFYING ON FOREGOING, I ARGUED LEBANON SHOULD
WEIGH CAREFULLY GROWING THREATTO ITS OWN SECURITY WHICH
IT WOULD FACE WITH INCREASING RECOURSE TO TERRORISM BY
MILITANT FEDAYEEN AND THE INCREASING UNITY OF PURPOSE
AND ACTION AMONG EXTREMIST ELEMENTS CUTVING ACROSS ALL
ORGANIZATIONAL LINES OF PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT. CLOSER
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALAH KHALAF AND HABBASH IS A GOOD
EXPIS
CASE IN POINT, I SAID WHERE FATAH RADIEALS ARE INCREASINGLY
MAKING COMMON CAUSE WITH LEFTIST LEADERS DEDICATED TO
THE OVERTHROW OF EXISTING CONSERVATIVE REGIMES IN THE
MIDDLE EAST. SALAM ACCEPTED THIS POINT INDEED HE
SAID, LEBANON FINDS TTSELF UNDER INCREASING THREAT FROM
RADICAL ARAB FORCES. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT
ACTIVITIES OF FORMER LEBANESE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS WHO HAD FLED COUNTRY TO DAMASCUS TO AVOID
TRIAL HERE FOR THEIR CRIMES UNDER THE CHEHAR REGIME
AND RECALLED LONG STINDING SYRIAN DESIGNS AGAINST LEBANON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
OF
STATE
2ECKELVHA
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BETRUT 03632 3016097
HE NOTED, TOO, INCREASING DIFFICULTIESS LEBANONI FACING
WITH IRAQ AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BY PRAQI BA'ATHISTS
-
HERE. HE SAID THAT INVESTIGATION HAS STILL NOT REVEALED
WHO KILLED TWO LEBANESE SOLDIERS IN SOUTH BEKAA
EXAIS
RECENTLY, AND DID Not EXCLUDE EITHER OF FOREGOING
FOREIGN SOURCES AS WELL AS RADICAL FEDAYEEN GROUPS.
7. I ALSO INDICATED OUR CONCERN ABOUT REAPPEARANCE OF
FEBAYEEN NEAR SOUTHERN FRONTIER, RECRUDESCENCE OF CRDSS
BORDER ROCKETING AND DIMINISHED LEBANESE ARMY PRESENCE
IN AREA. HE SAID THAT, BASED ON LENGTHY PRIVATE
CONVERSATION WITH ARAFAT MARCH 27, HE WAS SATISFIED,
AS FAR AS FATAH COULD CONTROL SITUATION ITS FOLLOWERS
WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN ANY CRTS -BORDER ACVIVITIES FROM LEBANESE
TERRITORY. HE VOLUNTEERED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE
ADDITIONAL GROUPS T.E., PFLP GENERAL COMMAND, NOT
RESPONSIVE TO ARAFATIS DIRECTION, WHO COULD TRY TO
STIR UP TROUBLE THROUGH OCCASIONAL INDISCRIMINATE,
THOUGH, INEFFECTIVE, CROSS-BORDER FIRING.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard SECRET Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
OF STATE
EXECUTIVE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF American
TELEGRAM
WH
SECRET 740
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03457 2712467
45
2
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 ADP 1026 W
031034
R 271116Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1270
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
SECR E T BEIRUT 3457
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: XF
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM
EXCES
REF: PARIS 7340 AND STATE 55399
BELIEVE OUR INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY ENCOURAGING TO
MAXIMUM ANY FREE WORED SUPPORT OF LEBANESE MILITARY
CAPABILITY TO COPE WITH FEDAYEEN. FRENCH ARE ALREADY
IMPORTANT SUPPLIER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, ALTHOUGH WE
UNDERSTAND THIS IS ON A STRAIGHT COMMERCIAL BASIS.
MOREOVER, LEBANESE ARE A BIT GUN SHY AT MOMENT RE
ADDITIONAL FRENCH EQUIPMENT. THEY ARE UNHAPPY WITH AMX
TANKS AND PANHARD ARMORED CARS, AND GENERAL POLITICAL
CLIMATE HERE STILL BADLY CLOUDED BY CROTALE MISSILE
SCANDAL.
MOST CONSTRUCTIVE THING FRENCH COULD DO IN OUR JUDGEMENT
WOULD BE TO ASSIST GOL IN DISPOSAL OF ANTIQUATED AND
COSTLY MIRAGE FIGHTERS. A MAJOR ASSIST COULD ALSO
COME IF FRENCH WOULD CONTRIBUTE HELICOPTERS (GOLI HAS: JUST
PURCHASED 6 ALOUETTES* BUT THERE IS APPARENTLY
CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING PENDING PURCHASE
CONTRACT WITH ITALIAN AUGUSTA BELL FIRM FOR ADDITIONAL
610
BEARING ABOVE FACTORS IN MIND, WE WOULD WARMLY
SUPPORT EMBASSY PARIS' SUGGESTION THAT DEPT AUTHORIZE
IT TAKE A SOUNDING WITH THE FRENCH.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
Гио
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
EXE-S
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
WH
SECRET 500
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03435 2710397
11
'73 MAR 23 PM 12 12
2
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
SITUATION ROOM
3
029995
R 271005Z MAR 73
HOUSE
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1267
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
SECRET BEIRUT 3435
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJECT: TERRORISM IN LEBANON
1. HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM NORTH AFRICA TRIP, PRIME
MINISTER SAEB SALAM HAS INVITED ME TO STRICTLY FAMILY
LUNCH MARCH 29.
2. T PLAN TO GO OVER SAME GROUND WITH HIM ON PROBLEMS OF
TERRORISM IN LEBANON AS COVERED RECENTLY WITH PRESIDENT
FRANGIE AND WILL INQUIRE ABOUT SALAM'S MEETING LAST NIGHT
WITH ARAFAT. I PLAN ALSO TO DRAW ON PUBLIC CONFESSION
ABU DAOUD IN AMMAN ABOUT FATAH INVOLVEMENT. IF DEPT
HAS ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS, WOULD WELCOME GUIDANCE.
BUFFUM
43g WVB 53 bll is is 15:15
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon esidential Library.
TORDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
5.66
PRANTMENT or STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 151
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 73377 01 OF 02 2612252
15
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
020537
R 261120Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1248
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
C73 MAR 23 AM 8.43 8. 43
AMEMBASSY LONDON
ONROOM
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
S ECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 3377
EXDIS
EXQIS EXCES
FROM GRIFFIN: ABU DHABI
DEPT PASS USINT CAIRB AND AMEMBASSY MANAMA
E.O. 11652: GDS:
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, TC/ XF
SUBJ: CALL ON UAE PRESIDENT SHAYKH ZAYID
REF: A ° ABU DHABI 366: B, STATE 478471 E. STATE 32219: D. KUWAIT
565
PART I OF 2 PART MSG.OH
1. BEGIN SUMMARY: (A) HAD LONG MEETING MAR 20 WITH
SHAYKH ZAYID DEVOTED MAINLY TO TERRORISM ISSUE. CHARGE'S
PRESENTATION FOLLOWER CLOSELY THAT MADE SEVERAL DAYS:
EARLIER TO FM SUWAIDI WITH EMPHASIS PLACED ON:
(1) INDISPUTABLE CONNECTION BETWEEN BSO AND FATAH, AND
(2) IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHES WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE
BILATERAL RELATIONS, TO SEEING EVIDENCE OF STEPS ARAB
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
M
NLN 09-13/15 persec 3. 3(6)()(6) Hr. 1/22/2010
By AM
NARA, Date 11/15/2010
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
[P.1.058]
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
SANITIZED
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATE
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 93377 01 OF 02 2612252
STATES TAKING TO DENY ASSISTANCE TO TERRORIST GROUPS.
THRUST OF ZAYID'S REALY WAS PALESTINIAN TERRORISMI CANNOT
BE SEPARATED FROM FRUSTRATION FELT THROUGHOUT ARABI
WORLD OVER IRRESOLUTION OF ME CONFLICT. AS SOLUTION TO
PALESTINIAN DISUNITY WHICH HE FEELS IS CONTRIBUTING
FACTOR TO BREEDING EXTREMISM, ZAYID PROROSED USG FORCE
RESISTANCE MOVEMENT UNIFY RANKS OR BE DEALT OUT OF
SETTLEMENT TERMS. IN GENERAL, I CONSIDER ZAYID'S RESPONSE
THIS ISSUE DISAPPOINTING.
(B) ACKNOWLEDGING NEED FOR PENINSULAR-WIDE APPROACH
TO COMBAT LEFTIST SUBVERSIVE THREATS, UAE PRESIDENT
STATED HIS READINESS INCREASE AID TO OMAN, BUT OBUECTS
SANITIZED
TO SULTAN'S INSISTANCE ON CASH PAYMENTS
PER SEC 3.3(b)(6)
ZAYID WELCOMES ALL MANNER
OF AREA AND WESTERN MILITARY HELP FOR OMANI ARMY, BUT
WAS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF OABUS DECISION INTRODUCING
IRANIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL INTO COUNTRY. THIS MOVEL HE
STRESSED, DISAPPOROVED BY ALL ARAB STATES, EVEN SAUDIS.
EXQIC EXCES
END SUMMARY.
2. LONG POSTPONED MEETING WITH SHAYKH ZAYID FINALLY TOOK
PLACE MAR 20. HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED APPOINTMENT LATE
FEB. MEETING NEVER TOOK PACE BECAUSE ZAVID DECIDED
SUDDENLY REMOVE HIMSELF FOR SEVERAL WEEKS TO DUBAI BOTH
TO ESCAPE FROM TURMOIL AND FRUSTRATIONS OF ABU DHABI AND
TO REFURBISH HIS POLITICAL IMAGE BY VISITING SHAYKHS AND
ISOLATED COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN EMIRATES. FROM ALL
ACCOUNTS ZAYID'S EFFORTS MAKE HIMSELF MORE VISIBLE POLITICALLY
AND TO DEMONSTRATE HTS INTEREST IN CONDITIONS AND
PROBLEMS OF POORER EMIRATES WAS SUCCESSFUL. NET RESULT
OF PRESIDENT'S LONG ABSENCE COUPLED WITH HIS SLIGHT
ILLNESS WAS UNABLE SEE HIM UNTIL HE RETURNED ABU DHABI.
3. CALLED ON SHAYKH ZAYID EVENING MAR 20 FOR PRIVATE
DISCUSSION LASTING 90 MINUTES. PRESIDENT CHARMING,
CONSIDERATE AND PATIENT AS EVER, BUT WAS MORE VISIBLY
TIRED THAN I HAVE SEEN HIM ON PREVIOUS EALLS. FOLLOWING
OUR MEETING, HE WAS RECEIVING YEMENI PM HAJARI FOR MAIN
SUBSTANTIVE SESSION. STRAIN OF CONSTANT VISITORS AND
HEAVY OFFICIAL WORKLOAD WHILE HE IN ABU DHABI TAKES TOLL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
SANITIZED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 09-13/15:P.20F8
TRANTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BETRUT 03377 01 OF 02 2612252
EXQIC EXCES EXCES
ON ZAYID AND IS MAIN REASON HE SEEKS FREQUENT ESCAPES TO
AL PAIN AND DESERT.
4. OPEN CONVERSATION BY INFORMING ZAYID THAT ON QUESTION
OF TERRORISM I ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS. THERE ALSO NUMBER
OTHER MATTERS OF CURRENT INTEREST WHICH DEPT AND AMB
STOLTZFUS WISHED ME TAKE UP WITH HIM PRIOR TO MY GOING ON
LEAVE.
5° RE KHARTOUM AND PALESTINIAN TERRORISM, I WENT OVER
WITH PRESIDENT ALL POINTS COVERED IN EARLIER CONVERSATION
WITH FM SUWAIDI (REF A), ON WHICH HE HAD BEEN
BRIEFED. EMPHASIZED THAT I UNDER INSTRUCTIONS INFORMI HIM
USG POLICY IN FUTURE TOWARD ARAB STATES WILLI BE AFFECTED
TO CONSIDERABLE DEGREE BY TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF MEASURES
THEY ARE TAKING TO DENY SUPRORT TO BSO AND SIMILARI
TERRORIST GROUPS. KHARTOUM MURDERS HAD SHOCKED US PUBLIC
OPINION, WHICH DEMANBING ITS GOVT PREVENT REPETITION!
OF SUCH WANTON KILLINGS AND PURSUE POLICY OF NO-COMPROMISE
WITH TERRORIST ELEMENTS. STATED TO ZAYIO THAT UNTIL
KHARTOUM, AS HE AWARE THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF POSSIBLE
BSO ACTION DIRECTED AGAINST TARGETS IN ABU DHABI, INCLUDING
US EMBASSY: SPECIFICALLY, WE RELIABLY INFORMED OF PRESENCE
IN DUBAI OF DANGEROUS FATAH/BSO LEADER, RIBHI HALLOUM,
WHO SEVERAL MONTHS EARLIER INTERCEPTED TRANSITING AMSTERDAM
AIRPORT ON ALGERIAN DIPL PPT WITH BAG FULL OF WEAPONS.
BAG CONFISCATED BUT HALLOUM HAD BEEN ALLOWED CONTINUE
TRAVEL TO LATIN AMERICA. ALTHOUGH HALLOWM'S IDENTITY AND
PRESENCE KNOWN TO UAE SECURITY FORCES, VOLD ZAYID I WOULD
FEEL MORE AT EASE IN TERMS SAFETY MY STAFF IF THIS KNOWN
TERRORIST WERE DEPORTED.
6.0 THROUGHOUT MY PRESENTATION PLACED MAUOR STRESS ONI
IRREFUTABLE LINKAGE BETWEEN FATAH AND BSO USG HAS
CONCLUDED FROM ITS ANALYSIS THAT VIRTUALLY NO DISTINCTION
NOW CAN BE DRAWN BETWEEN BSO AND FATAH, PARTICULARLY AT
TOP ECHELON. THIS CONNECTION, CAREFULLY SUMMARIZED
FOR ZAYID INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING CONTAINED REFTELI
(B) POINTING OUT THAT AT LEAST FOUR MEMBERS OF FATAHI
LEADERSHIP COMMAND, INCLUDING 'ARAFAT'S DEPUTY, SALAH
KHALAF ALSO COMPRISE BSO HIGH COMMAND. EXPLAINED TO
ZAYID THAT THIS INFO BEING BROUGHT HIS PERSONAL ATTENTION
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
25
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
P.30F8
or STATE
SANITIZED
*
Department of State
of STATE AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 04 BEIRUT 03377 01 OR 02 2612252
BECAUSE WE THINK HE SHOULD KNOW THAT ANY FINANCIALI AND
OTHER SUPPORT BEING GIVEN TO FATAH/PLO NIKELY BE DIVERTED
TO BSO.
SANITIZED
PER SEC. . 3. 3(b)(1)
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO ANDI MANAMA.
EXCES EXQIC EXCES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED VITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard SANITIZED Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined
MoNbedeclassified. P. 4 OF8 OF
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
SANITIZED
t
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 187
PAGE 01 BETRUT 93377 92 OF 02 2612582
52
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
020737
R 261120Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1249
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
SECRE T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 3377
EXDIS
EXBIS EXC-S
7. ZAYID LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO PRESENTATION AND SEEMED
APPRECIATIVE OF EFFORT WE WERE MAKING TO ALERT HIM AND
GOVT ABOUT PALESTINIAN EXTREMISM.
SANITIZED
PER SEC 3.3(b)(b)
8. ZAYID STATED HE AND ALL ARAB LEADERS DEEPLY
SORRY AND ASHMAED FOR SENSELESS DEEDS AT KHARTOUM THAT
DETRIMENTAL TO ARAB CAUSE. HE PRAISED COURAGE OF
NUMEIRI IN HIS HANDLING OF AFFAIR AND ASSURED ME SUDANESE
LEADER WOULD NOT ALLOW MURDERERS TO GO UNPUNISHED. REFLECTING
ON PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT IN GENERAL, ZAYID SAID
KHARTOUM WAS SYMPTOMATIC OF POOR STATE 70 WHICH PALESTINIANS
AND THEIR LEADERS HAVE SUNK. HE CHARACTERIZED THEM AS
DRIFTING BANDS OF INDIVIDUALS, WHO HAVE LOST ALL HOPE FOR
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
FORM
ml
Reproduced at the Richard SANITIZED Nixon
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be
PROARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03377 02 OF 02 2612582
FUTURE AND WHO ATE WITHOUT RESPONSIBLE CEADERS. THEIR
DISUNITY AND HOPELESSNESS HAVE MADE IT EASY FOR BETTER
ORGANIZED AND MORE LEFTIST GROUPS TO DOMINATE PALESTINIANS.
INEFFECTIVENESS AND INSTABILITY OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
POINTED UP BY FACT NOT ONE OF FRUNTLINE STATES PERMITS
THEM OPERATE FREELY. ONLY IN LIMITED SENSE ARE THEY ALLOWED
OPERATE IN LEBANON, AND EVEN THERE WEAK LEBANESE
EXCES EXCES
FORCED OCCASIONALLY CLAMP DOWN ON PALESTINIAN ACTIVITIES.
ZAYID EMPHASIZED POINT THAT FACT so MANY PALESTINIANI
GROUPS OPERATING SEPARATELY INEVITABLY WEADS TO
EXTREMISM. HIS OWN EXPERIENCE YEARS BEFORE AS
GOVERNOR EASTERN REGIONS HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT TRIBES
HAVING WEAK LEADERS WERE DANGEROUS THREAT TO GENERALI
SECURITY OF AREA.
9° ZAYID PROPOSED THAT US, AS ONLY NATION POWERFUL AND
INFLUENTIAL ENOUGH D6 SO, SHOULD INFORM PALESTINIANS INI
CLEAREST TERMS THAT THEY AND THEIR ASPIRATIONS WILL BE
CONSIDERED IN EVENTUAL PEACE SETTLEMENT ONLY IF THEY
UNIFY THEIR RANKS AND SELECT SINGLE LEADER WHO CAN DEALI
WITH OTHER STATES AND WHO CAN BE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY
WORLD LEADERS FOR ACTS OF VARIOUS COMPONENT PARTS OF
MOVEMENT. IN EFFECT, ZAYID SEEMED TO BE CALLING FOR USG
TO SUPPORT FORMATION OF PALESTINIAN GOVT IN EXILE. SUCHI
A GOVT WITH RECOGNIZED LEADER SHOULD THEN BE TOLD IN
UNMISTAKABLE TERMS BY US REALITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF
ME SETTLEMENT. WITH THESE IN MIND PALESTINIANS SHOULD
THEN BE ASKED DEFINE THEIR REALIZABLE GOALS. ZAYID
REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT EXTREMISM OF PALESTINIANS IS
NOT ISOLATED PHENOMENON, BUT DIRECT FUNCTION OF UNRESOLVED
ME PROBLEM, AND US THEREFORE SHOULD NOT DELAY TAKING
EXQIN
INITIATIVE TO PROMOTE EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT.
PART 2 OF 2 PART MSG.
10. FOLLOWING DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF TERRORISM ISSUE
OUR DISCUSSION TURNED TO AREA SITUATION. NOTED THAT VISIT
OF YEMENI LEADERS TO BE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY
THAT OF SULTAN QABUS POINTED UP COMMON RROBLEMS FACED BY
THESE COUNTRIES. BOTH ARE EMERGING RAPIDLY FROM LONG
PERIOD OF HISTORICAL ISOLATION AND BACKWARDNESS,
BOTH ARE POOR, AND BOTH MAY BE CONSIDERED IN FRONT LINES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET o- THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
NLN09-B/15:P.60F8
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNABTMENT OF STATE
SANITIZED
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03377 02 OF 02 2612582
OF STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND LEFTIST SUBVERSION. IF
FRONT LINES BREACHED IN EITHER PLACE, BATTLEGROUND
IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO SAUDI ARABIA AND UAE.
STRESSED TO ZAYID ASGI UIEW THAT STATES OF PENINSULA
SHOULD TAKE CONCERTED ACTION MEET THIS COMMON SECURITY
THREAT AND WE BELIEVE IT ESPECIALLY INSUMBENT UPON
SAUDI ARABIA AND UAEJ AS STATES MOST VITALLY AFFECTED, TO
INCREASE LEVEL OF THEIR ASSISTANCE
11. ACKNOWLEDGING ADEN-INSPIRED THREAT TO ENTIRE PENINSULA,
ZAYID CONFINED HIS COMMENT ABOUT EXTEND UAE ASSISTANCE TO
OMAN. ALLUDING TO BD 3 MIL IDOLS 7.5 MILD
GRANT PLUX MISCELLANEOUS HELP ALREADY GIVEN SULTAN, ZAYID
AFFIRMED HIS READINESS DO EVEN MORE IN WAY DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS, BUT SAID MAJOR PROBLEM WITH SULTAN IS MANNER OF
PAYMENT.
PERSEC. 3.3(b)(6)
EXCES EXCES
12. RE IMMEDIATE OMANI MILITARY NEEDS, MENTIONED PROMPT
IRANIAN AND SAUDI RESPONSE IN LENDING HELICOPTERS AND
MOST APPRECIATED GIFT BY UAE OF MORTOR ROUNDS. ZAYID SAID
HE WELCOMED FRIENDS OF OMAN CONTRIBUTING MATERIAL AND
EVEN PERSONNEL TO WAR EFFORT, BUT HE OBUECTED STRONGLY
TO SULTAN'S DECISION INTRODUCE IRANIAN TROOPS, EVEN IF
THEY IN TRAINING: CAPACITY. ZAYID STATED HE
UNDERSTANDS THAT ALL ARAB STATES INCLUDING EGYPT AND SAUDI
ARABIA VIGOROUSLY OPPOSE PRESENCE IRANIAN FORCES ONI ARAB
-
SOIL AND HE FEARFUL THIS ISSUE WILL SOON BREAK OUT INTO
PUBLIC DEBATE. THERE NO DOUBT MY MIND THAT ZAYID WILI
PRESSURE QAZUS AT FORTHCOMING MEETING TO REMOVE IRANTAN
PERSONNEL.
13. AT NO TIME DURING CONVERSATION DID ZAYID RAISE
SAUDI-UAE BORDER ISSUE, AND FOLLOWING DEPT'S INSTRUCTION:
I LEFT INITIATIVE TO HIM. DID USE OCCASION, HOWEVER, TO
MAKE STRONG PITCH IN SUPPORT OF VARIOUS US FIRMS
BIDDING ON MAJOR ABU DHABI AND UAE PROJECTS AND TO INFORM
PRESIDENT OF FORTHCOMING USG-SPONSORED MEDICAL TRADEI
MISSION.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
SANITIZED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. P. 70F8
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
$73 MAR 2+ BM 2 53
WH
SECRET 746
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03312 231310Z
2
44
w\
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W A
001744
R 231140Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1230
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
SECRET BEIRUT 3312
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS CAIRO FOR INFO
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
EXCES EXCES
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJECT: ARAB GOVERNMENTS SUPPORT FOR BSO
REF: AMMAN 1482
SUMMARY: WE HAVE BEEN VIGOROUSLY FOLLOWING UP AMBASSADOR'S:
DEMARCHES TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND FONORF SECGEN
SADAQA, REITERATING POINTS ALREADY MADE PUTTING FORWARD
ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS AND STRESSING IMPORTANCE
OF ACTION BY GOL RATHER THAN WORDS. AS YET ONY GOL
ACTION OF WHICH WE ARE AZARE WAS MEETING WITH FEDAYEEN
REPORTED BEIRUT 3245. WE REGARD THIS AS STOP-GAP
MEASURE AND FOREIGN MINISTER, ARMY AND RRESIDENT
FRANGIE ARE ENGAGED IN SERIOUS: STUDY OF WHAT PRACTICAL
ACTION GOL CAN TAKE. END SUMMARY
1. IN ADDITION TO DEMARCHES MADE TO FRANGIE AND SADAQA,
WE HAVE FOLLOWED UP WITH ACTING PRIME MINISGER, WITH
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRESIDENCY, WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY,
WITH LEBANESE ARMY, AND WITH PRESIDENT'S SON (DEPUTY
TONY FRANGIE). IN THESE DEMARCHES WE HAVE DRAWN UPONI
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN 09-13/16 persec 3.3(b)(1), Hr. 1/22/2010
By AM NARA, Date 11/15/2010
[P. 10F. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRPARTMENT
OF
STATE
SAMITIZED
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03312 2313102
MATERIAL TAKEN FROM STATE 47847 AND OTHER SOURCES TO
DEMONSTRATE DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN FATAH AND BSO,
SPECIFICALLY CITING NAMES OF SOME OF OVERLAPPING
LEADERS, AND TO DRIVE HOME SWING BY FEDAYEEN ORGANIZA-
TIONS AND LEADERS AAAR FROM GUERRILLALAND OTHER
ACTIONS VS ISRAEL TO PRESENT SITUATION WHERE TERROR AND
ACTION AGAINST WESTERN AND MODERATE ARAB STATES CONSTITUTES
MAJOR PART OF FEDAYEEN PLANNING AND ACTIVITY. WE
HAVE BEEN OVER PAST HISTORY OF usei MADE OF LEBANON AS
BASE FOR PLANNING AND REFUGE. WE HAVE STRESSED
IMPORTANCE WHICH USG PLACES ON ACTION BY GOLI (AND
OTHER ARAB GOVTS) AND MAJOR THREAT WHICH THOSE LEADING
TERRORIST MOVEMENT AND FATAH) POSE FOR LEBANESE
INTERESTS, INCLUDING SETTLEMENT OF ME PROBLEM AND
CONTINUATION PRESENT SYSTEM OF DEMOCRATIC, PRO-
WESTERN GOVERNMENT, UNLESS THEY CAN SOMEHOW BE BROUGHT
UNDER CONTROL.
SANITIZED
PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1)
EX@-4
3. WITH FOREIGN OFFICE, WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN UP SUCH
MATTERS AS GREATER GOL SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTIONS AND REINFORCEMENT OF CONTROLS (ALREADY TIGHT
BY ARAB STANDARDS) OF ISSUANCE PASSPORTS, USE OF
DILLOMATIC POUTH, ETE.
4. IN EFFORT GIVE MAXIMUM CREDIBILITY TO EVIDENCE
PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT ON TERRORIST LEADERS AND ACTIONS, WE
HAVE SUGGESTED THAT GUL MIGHT WISH QUIETLY TO SEND
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE PREFERABLY ARMY OFFICER, TO
KHARTOUM AND AMMAN IN ORDER OBTAIN FIRST HAND ACCOUNT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ! THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
RM
SANITIZED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to
NLNG9-13/16:P.20F3
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
SANITIZED
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03312 231310Z
EXCES wxe-s
OF WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT LINKS BETWEEN FATAH LEADERS
AND ABU DAOUD AND THOSE WHO CARRIED OUT ASSASSINATIONS
IN KHARTOUM.
SANITIZED
PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1)
WE DO NOT KNOW IF
GOL HAS ADOPTED THIS SUGGESTION BUT INTEND FOLLOW IT
UP -
5. FINALLY, AT OUR REQUEST, FORMER LEBANESE DCM IN
WASHINGTON, SUHEIL CHAMMAS, TALKED ABOUT TERRORISM
PROBLEM FOR OVER ONE HOUR WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE ON
MARCH 22, CONVEYING FIRST-HAND IMPRESSIONS OF ATTITUDES
HE OBSERVED ON PART OF USG OFFICIALS PRIOR TO LEAVING
HIS POST LAST WEEK. WE WENT OVER WITH CHAMMAS PRIOR
TO MEETING DEMARCHES WE HAD ALREADY MADE AND HE
PROMISED DO HIS BEST TO REINFORCE THEM. CHAMMAS
HAD GOOD GRASP OF SITUATION AS RESULT HIS PRE-DEPARTUREI
TALKS WITH DEPT OFFICIALS. HE SAID THAT FRANGIE
RESPONDED POSITIVELY BUT DID NOT VOLUNTEER ANY
SPECIFICS AS TO ACTION GOL WILL TAKE.
BUSFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
RM
Reproduced at the SANITIZED Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
NLN 09-13116 : P.30F3
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-9-4
is
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES of
TELEGRAM
WH
SECRET 699
PAGE 01 BEIRUT *3254 2210227
EXEMS EXP-0
16
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
120231
P 220927Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1213
SECRE T BEIRUT 3254
State Dept. review completed
EXDIS
E.O. 116521 XGDS-2
TAGS: PINR, LE
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE WITH ISRAEL ON TERRORISM
SUMMARY: IN EXAMINING WAYS TO COPE WITH INCREASED
FEDAYEEN TERRORIST THREAT, I AM STRUCK BY CONTINUED
UNAVAILABILITY TO US OF INFORMATION IN THIS FIELD POSSESSED BY
ISRAELIS. WHILE WE SHARE WITH ISRAELIS INTELLIGENCE AFFECTING THEM,
WE SEE NO EVIDENCE THIS IS RECIPROCAL
AND AS RESULT ARE DEPRIVED OF ONE OF FEW EFFECTIVE
WEAPONS AVAILABLE AGAINST TERRORISM. END SUMMARY
1 . I NOTE TEL AVIV PRESS REPORTS JORDANIAN TERRORISTS
JUST APPREHENDED IN FRANCE WERE UNCOVERED AS RESULT
INFORMATION OBTAINED BY ISRAELIS IN RAID ON FEDAYEEN
CAMPS IN NORTH LEBANON.
2. OTHER PRESS REPORTS ALLEGE ISRAELIS HAD SOME
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF KHARTOUM OPERATION AS RESULT SAME
RAID.
25X1
3. SOME TIME AGO I REQUESTED
THAT WE BE
PROVIDED WITH PERTINENT INFORMATION FROM ISRAELIS
OBTAINED THROUGH THEIR ATTACK ON TERRORIST RASE NEARI
TRIPOLI, INCLUDING CAPTURED TURK. so FAR I HAVE
RECEIVED NOTHING.
4. AFTER LOD AIRPORT MASSACRE ISRAELIS TOLD PRESS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-9-4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-9-4
DEPARTMENT
On
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03254 2210222
THAT THEIR INTERROGATIONS REVEALED TERRORISTS CON-
CERNED HAD BEEN TRAINED IN LEBANON. AT THAT TIME
WE REQUESTED (BEIRUT TELS 6047 AND 61551 THAT GOI
PROVIDE US WITH DETAILS TO USE IN OUR EFFORTS GET
LEBANESE TO CLAMP DOWN HARDER ON FEDAYEEN. FOR
RESPONSE WE RECEIVED NOTHING BUT COPIES OF PUBLIC
HANDOUTS.
5. I AM NOT AWARE FUEL EXTENT OUR INTELLIGENCE SHARING
WITH ISRAELIS BUT HAVE IMPRESSION WE CONSISTENTLY PASS
THEM INFO ON ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. IT DOES
SEEM TO ME THAT BEST WEAPON WE HAVE IN RIGHTING
TERRORISM IS BETTER INTELLIGENCE, AND AMONG THOSE
MOST QUALIFIED TO PRAVIDE IT ARE THE ISRAELIS.
THEREFORE WISH TO INQUIRE WHETHER ISRAELIS ARE
SHARING SUCH INFO WITH US AND, IF so, COULD RELEVANT
PORTIONS NOT BE PASSFD ON, IN NO MATTER HOW RESTRICTED
A MANNER, TO EMBASSIES MOST CONCERNED.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THESBUTEHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 : NLN-NSC-621-2-9-4
56/00/199
9
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRANTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
WN
SECRET
506
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03245 2208197
2
12
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
119302
R 211635Z MAR 73 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1208
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 3245
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJ: LEBANESE OFFICTALS MEETING WITH FEDAYEEN LEADERS MAR 19
SUMMARY: LEBANESE OFFICIALS MET FEDAYEEN LEADERS MARI 19 TO
(1) INSIST FEDAYEEN RULL BACK FROM SOUTHERN FRONTIER:
(2) REFRAIN FROM ADDITIONAL PUBLIC DEOMONSTRATIONS: (3)
CEASE CURRENT ENTRENCHMENT OF FEDAYEEN CAMPS (WHICH
PARTICULARLY CONCERNS PRES FRANGIE): (2) REQUEST COMMITMENT
NO TERRORIST ACTION WOULD TAKE PLACE IN LEBANON: AND
(5) REQ RETURN OF KIDNAPPED JORDANIAN STUDENT.
ARAFAT PROMISED FEDAYEEN PULLBACK IN SOUTH, SAID
FEDAYEEN WISHED AVOID TROUBLE WITH GOLD BUT WAS EVASIVE
IN REPLYING TO OTHER DEMANDS. MEETING SHOWS COMMENDABLE
DEGREE OF GOL CONCERN TO TIGHTEN UP ON REDAYEEN
ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.
1. ACTING PRIME MINISTER ALBERT MOUKHEIBER AND MINISTER
OF DEFENSE MAJID ARSLAN MET TWO HOURS MAR 19 WITH
YASSER 'ARAFAT' KAMAL NASSER OFFICIAL SROKESMAN OF PLO,
FATAH'S TAWFIQ SAFADI AND PFLP'S AHMED YAMANI TO DISCUSS:
OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. FOL ARE HIGHPOINTS OF
MEETING AS RELATED TO DCM MAR 20 BY ACTING PRIME MINISTER:
A. FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS WAS GOL DEMAND THAT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
GRANTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03245 2208197
FEDAYEEN MOVE OUT ONCE AND FOR ALL FROM TIRI AND ALLI
OTHER POINTS IN BORDER AREAS. MOUKHEIBER TOLD ARAFAT
HE UNABLE UNDERSTAND POSITION FEDAYEEN AS THERE
WERE ONLY 10 FEDAYEEN AT TIRI. RARAFAT REGRETTED
PRESENCE OF FEDAYEEN BUT INDICATED THAT THEY WERE NOT
HIS MEN BUT THOSE OF HAWATMEH'S PDFLP. HE PROMISED THEY
WOULD BE OUT BY 0900 FOL MORNING. (ACCORDING TO
MOUKHEIBER, "ARAFAT'S PROMISE IN THIS INSTANCE WAS KEPT.)
B . MOUKHEIBER ALSO REMONSTRATED FOR RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS
BY FEDAYEEN IN SIDON AND IN BEIRUT. HE EOULD NOT
UNDERSTAND PURPOSE OF DEMONSTRATIONS FOR PRESENCE OF
ARMED MEN IN AREA. ARAFAT LAMELY EXPLAINED THAT
FEDAYEEN HAD BEEN KILLED IN GAZA AND MANIFESTATION WAS
BEING HELD IN THEIR MEMORY. MOUKHEIBER INDICATED REASON
WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE AND REQUESTED THAT THERE NOT BE A
RECURRENCE. DCM POINTED OUT TO MOUKHEIBER THAT WE WERE
PARTICULARLY DISTURBED BY BEIRUT MANIFESTATION WHICH
HELD AT ARAB UNIVERSITY AS, ACCORDING TO PICTURES IN THE
PRESS, KNOWN TERRORISTS, SUCH AS SALAHI KHALAF OF BSO
AND HABBASH OF PFLP, WERE PRESENT. MOUKHEIBER WAS
SOMEWHAT TAKEN ABACK BY NEWS AND ASKED FOR PAPERS WHICH
DCM PROMISED TO SEND HIM.
C . IT HAS COME TO GOE'S ATTENTION THAT RADAYEEN WERE
BUILDING DEFENSIVE TRENCHES AROUND FEDAYEEN CAMPS.
MOUKHEIBER ASKED "ARAFAT WHY THIS WAS BEING DONE.
ARAFAT EXPLAINED FEDAYEEN FEARED ISRAEDI ATTACK.
MOUKHEIBER DISMISSED EXPLANATION AS NONSENSE AND DEMANDED
THAT CONSTRUCTION STAP AND TRENCHES THAT HAD BEEN DUG BE
FILLED IN. ACCORDING TO MOUKHEIBER, PRESIDENT FRANGIE
WAS PARTICULARLY UPSET BY THIS NEWS, AND COLL DIB KAMALI
OF THE LEBANESE ARMY HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TASK OF INSURING
THAT GOL WISHES ARE MET.
D. MOUKHEIBER INFORMED 'ARAFAT THAT GOL WOULD NOT
TOLERATE TERRORIST ACTIONS IN LEBANON AND SOUGHT COMMIT-
MENT NONE WOULD TAKE PLACE. HE STRESSED DISASTROUS
EFFECT WHICH THE "MURDERS" IN KHARTOUM HAD HAD ON NOT
ONLY THE ARAB AND THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE BUT ON FATAH, WHOSE
IMAGE HUD BEEN BLACKENED. IN REPLY, ARAFAT MAINTAINED
THAT THE FEDAYEEN DID NOT WANT TO MAKE TROUBLE IN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
MOITASIROHTUA
CHE
SECBELYBA
EXCES
*
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03245 220819Z
LEBANON. HOWEVER, HE NEVER GAVE A CLEAR COMMITMENT THAT
NO TERRORIST ACTS WOOLD TAKE PLACE IN LEBANON. (MOUKHEIBER
COMMENTED THAT ARAFAT WAS EXTREMELY AGILE IN TALKING
HIMSELF AROUND A PROBLEM.
E ° MOUKHEIBER ALSO BROUGHT UP THE RECENT KIDNAPPING
OF A JORDANIAN STUDENT FROM ARAB UNIVERSITY. °ARAFAT
DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF INCIDENT. MOUKHEIBER BRUSHED
HIS WORDS ASIDE AND DEMANDED STUDENT BE RETURNED WITHIN
THREE DAYS. HEI PLANS TO SEE 'ARAFAT AGAIN AT END OF
THREE DAYS.
2. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO MOUKHEIBER, NETHER HE NOR
MINDEF ARSLAN, WHO IS A DRUZE, WERE HAMRERED BY THE
"MOSLEM COMPLEX" WHICH PM SALAM HAS. HE MAINTAINED THAT
THE TWO MEN TALKED FRANKLY AND FORCEFULLY TO 'ARAFAT'
IN FACT, ACCORDING TO MOUKHEIBER, ARSLIAN WAS PARTICULARLY
"HARD" ON 'ARAFAT TO THE EXTENT OF CALLING HIM A
LIAR SEVERAL TIMES. MOUKHEIBER - OF COURSE HAD NO
IDEA WHAT THE RESULTS OF THE TALK WOULD BE BUT DID
EMPHASIZE THAT THE GÖVERNMENT MEANT BUSINESS. WE
SHALL ENDEAVOR TO OBTAIN THE RESULTS OF MOUKHEIBER'S:
SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH 'ARAFAT.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DER OF STATE
USE
ROOM
'73 MAR 15 PM 8:21
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 523
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02983 1512557
2
43
ACT ON SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
061739
EXATE
R 151226Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1100
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
S E C R EVT BEIRUT 2983
EXDIS
DEPT PASS INFO CAIRO
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS:
PINS, CE
SUBJECT:
HOW TO FIGHT FEDAYEEN TERROR
REF: AMMAN 1339
1. REFTEL CONTAINS NUMBER OF INTERESTING SUGGESTIONS
ON HOW TO DEAL WITH GOVT OF LEBANON. OBVIOUSLY IT
WAS WRITTEN PRIOR TO RECEIPT REPORT ON YESTERDAY'S
MEETING WITH PRES FRANGIE AND WITHOUT BENEFIT OF
SEEING INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED IN DEPTEL 41440 OR
DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR COPING WITH TERRORISM SUGGESTED
IN REIRUT TEL 2701 OF MARCH 8 (CIRCULATION OF WHICH WAS:
LEFT TO DEPT'S DISCRETIONI.
2. WE ARE, AS REPORTED, PRESSING GOL TO CLAMP DOWN
HARD ON KNOWN TERRORISTS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO
SO. I WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED URGE GOLI INSIST FATAH/
PLO HEADQUARTERS BE TRANSFERRED OUT OF NEBANON BUT WOULD
THINK IT ONLY RIGHT AND PROPER BEFORE DOING THIS TO SET
EXAMPLE BY CLOSING PEO OFFICE IN NEW YORK AND GET
EUROPEAN CAPITALS TO DO SAME.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
PRANTMENT
or
STATE
*
Department of State
STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02983 1512552
3. OBVIOUSLY EVEN IF HEADQUARTERS MOVED OUT OF BEIRUT,
TERRORIST PROBLEM WOULD REMAIN. WHILE ELANDESTINE
OPERATIONS CERTAINLY SHOULD (AND PROBABLY CAN TO
LIMITED EXTENT) BE CORTAILED, BITTER EXPERIENCE IN
VIET-NAM AND ELSEWHERE REVEALS DIFFICULTIES IN
ELIMINATING THEM.
4. AS FOR BALANCE OF AMMAN RECOMMENDATION, WHICH I
TAKE IT IS FOR A WHOLESALE ATTACK ON FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON
AS WAS MOUNTED IN JORDAN IN SEPT 1970, I TRUST REPORTING
FROM HERE OVER PAST TWO YEARS IDENTIFYING DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES (ESPECIALLY A-274 OF
OCTOBER 27, 1972 AND A-88 OF MARCH 24, 19721 HAS
CLARIFIED WHY GOL CANNOT FOLLOW HUSSEIN'S EXAMPLE.
WITH A MEDIOCRE ARMY ABOUT ONE-FIFTH THE SIZE OF THEI
WELL-EQUIPPED AND TRAINED JORDANIAN ARMY, A CONCENTRA-
TION OF OVER 300,000 PALESTINIANS AND A GOVERNMENT
DELICATELY BALANCED BETWEEN CHRISTIAN AND MOSLEM, WE
WOULD DELUDE OURSELVES IF WE PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION
WE CAN GET THE LEBANESE GOVT TO "MOVE AGAINST FEDAYEEN"
AS AMMAN APPEARS TO ENVISAGE.
5. GIVEN THE RISKS INVOLVED, IF SUCH CONFRONTATION
COMES, AND IT WELL MAY, IT WILL BE AT FEDAYEEN INITIATIVE
AND NOT BECAUSE GOL WILL INITIATE IT. THE KIND OF
CARROTS AND STICKS WE HAVE TO USE DON'T COME CLOSE TO
AN ADEQUATE INDUCEMENT FOR THE GOL TO PROVOKE
A CIVIL WAR WITH ALL THIS ENTAIL FOR AMERICAN
AS WELL AS LEBANESE INTERESTS.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
23
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
Lb/eo/1e9
FORM
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
CAUHONI
*
*
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
'73 MAR 13 AM 8:20
MITH
SECRET
670
10
BE
PAGE 01 BETRUT 02967 01 OF 02 142129Z
2
64
ACTION SS-25
ГУВГЕ
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
EXPIS
054156
R 141530Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1094 THE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY RABAT
SE C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 2967 LMC
EXDIS
DOE
DEPT. ALSO PASS SANAA FOR INFO
E.O. 11652: GDS, DECLAS. DEC. 31, 1981
CONNIBIES
TAGS: PINS, XF
SUB IECT: ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION
REF, STATE 42486 $ 41440
OE
SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSED TERRORSIM PROBLEM
AT LENGTH MARCH 14 WITH PRES FRANGIE COVERING ALL POINTS
REFTEL. FRANGIE SAID GOL PREPARING FULL DOSSIER ON
KHARTM ATTACK TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. WHILE
EXPIS
LEBANON ABHORS SUCH ACTIONS, WHIEH HE CONSIDERED SERVE
ONLY ISRAELI AND SOVIET PURPOSES IT IS EXTREMELY
DIFFICULTS TO COPE WITH CLANDESTINE TERRORIST OPERATIONS.
HE FEARED SECURITY SITUATION IN AREA WOULD CONTINUE
DETERIORATE AND CONSIDERED ONLY HOPE LIES IN US
TAKING INITIATIVE TO GET PEACE SETTLEMENT BASED
ON RES. 242. END SUMMARY
1. IN INTROUDUCING DEMARCHE, I TOLD PRESIDENT I WAS
CALLING ON EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS FROM DEPARTMENT AND THAT
ЕГЕСКУШ
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THEAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
49
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02967 01 OF 02 142129Z
SIMILAR APPROACHES WERE BEING MADE IN OTHER ARAB
CAPITALS. MY APPRIACH WAS ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:
A ° UNFORTUNATELY, PROBLEM OF TERRORISM BY FEDAYEEN
ORGANIZATIONS HAS BECOME MORE AND MORE WIDESPREAD
AND ACUTE, CULMINATING TEN TEN DAYS AGO IN ASSASSINATION OF
TWO AMERICAN AND ONE BELGIAN DIPLOMATIC IN KHARTOUM.
EMBASSY BEIRUT WAS ATTACKED IN DECEMBER AND COULD WELL
EXPIS EXETS
BE ATTACKED AGAIN IF THERE SHOULD BE A WEAKNESS IN
SECURITY MEASURES. CLEARLY TERRORISTS HAVE EXPANDED
THE SCOPE OF THEIR OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE ARAB COUNTRIES:
AND DIPLOMATS.
B ° WHILE WE SUPPORT LEGITIMATE ASPIRATION OF
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, WE BELIEVE TERRORIST ACTIONS DOE
DAMAGE TO PALESTINIAN CAUSE. IT ALSO DIES GREAT HARM,
TO PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT OF THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.
C . STATEMENTS BY GOL DISAPPROVING OF KHARTOUM ATTACK
WERE MUCH APPRECIATED.
D . KHARTOUM EPISODE AND DANGER OF FUTHER TERRORISM
HAVE CREATED A SITUATION IN WHICH UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WILL INEVITABLY BE INFLUENCED
IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD A ARAB GOVERNMENT BY WHAT THE
LATTER ARE ABLE TO DO ABOUT THIS GROWING THREAT.
E ° IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO MAKE A DISTINCTION
BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR SUCH WELL-ESTABLISHED WELL ORGANIZATIONS
AS FATAH AND ITS LEADERS WHO ACT IN PRIVATE UNDER LABLE
OF BLACK SEPTEMBER. THIS APPLIES TO SUCH WELL-KNOWNI
FATAH LEADERS AS YASSSIR ARAFAT AND ABU YUSSIF AS WELL
EXPIC
AS TO SALAH KHALAF, ABU HASSEIN AND ABU JIHAD.
F ° UNDER THESE CIRCUSMSTANCE, WE REQUEST GOL TO
ARREST OR AT THE VERY LEAST EXPEL THOSE WHO KNOWN TO BEI
IDENTIFIED DIRECTLY WITH TERRORIST ACTION. I NOTED WITH
REGRET THAT SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE NAMES I HAD
SUPPLIED GOL PREVIOUSLY WERE INVOLVED EITHER IN THE
ABORTIVE ABU DAOUD ATTACK IN AMMAN OR THE ATTACK
ON THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM® SALAH KHALAF
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BRODNCED
УЛӀНОВӀЅУДОЙ
o(
EXECUTIVE
2ECBELVBA
*
*
SEALS AMERICA MMC UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
EXETS EXETS
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 02967 01 OF 02 1421292
HAS BEEN POSITEVELY IDENTIFIED AS RESPONSIBLE FOR
PLANNING BOTH THESE ATTACKS AND HAVING DONE SO HERE
IN BEIRUT. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THERE ARE LIMITS ON WHAT
CAN BE DONE IN THIS REGARD, WE BELEIVE IT IS EXTREMELY
IMPORTANT THT SOME ACTION BE TAKEN.
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SANAA.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
9.66
DSDECEASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET 724
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02967 02 OF 02 141920Z
64
ACTION SS-25
2
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
053222
R 141530Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1095
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY RABAT
SECR E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 2967
EXDIS
G ᵒ I ALSO URGED CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR RES-
PECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN ORDER TO PREVENT
ADDITIONAL TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND TO UNCOVER POSSIBLE
SUBERSION AGAINST LEBANON. WE HAVE BEEN VERY PLEASED
BY THE EXCHANGES WE HAVE HAD: HOWEVER, WE THINK THEY COULD
BE FUTHER IMPORVED.
H. THE MEASURES TAKEN BY ARAB GUVERNMENTS WILL BE
SEEN AS AN INDICATION OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY DESIRE TO
MAINTAIN NORMAL INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN GOVERNMENT
TO GOVERNMENT DEALING. MOREOVER IT WILL INEVITATLY
BE SEEN, WHERE LEBANON IS CONCERNED, AS MEASURE OF GOL
DETERMINATION TO PROTECT AND TOURISM FOR THE ENTIRE REGION.
2. PRESIDENT FRANGIE RESPONED AS FOLLOWS:
A ° FIRST OF ALL HE REITERATED IN MOST SINCERE AND
SOMBER TERMS HIS SHOCK AND DISTRESS AT ASSASSINATION OF
US DIPLOMATS.
B . HE HAS REQUEST LEBANESE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TO
PREPARE COMPLETE DOSSIER ON ACTIVITIES OF ALL KNOWN OR
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS AND ON LINK BETWEEN BETRUT AND
KHARTOUM TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE HOWEVER, HE NOTED
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
9.66
PDECEASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXEMS
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02967 02 OF 02 141920Z
TREMENDOUS DIFFICULTY OF DEALING WITH TERRORISTS, SUCH
AS SALAH KHALAF, WHO MOVE FROM PLACE TO PLACE, USING
FLASE NAMES AND FALSE DOCUMENTATION.
C. HE IS REQUESTING LEBANESE AMBASSADORS IN JORDAN
AND SUDAN PROVIEE FULLEST POSSIBLE DETAIL ABOURT ABU
DAOUD OPERATION AND ATTACK IN KHARTOUM. HE AGREED THAT
IT WOULD BE BETTER Tn USE INTELLIGENCE CHANNEL TO AMMAN, BUT
SAID RELATIONS WITH JORDAN REMAIN COOL SINCE JORDAN UNJUSTLY
REFUSED PERMIT RETURN LEBANESE MILITARY ATTACHE.
D . HE COULD NOT HELP BUT BELIEVE ISRAELIS HAD IN SOME
FASHION INSTIGATED KHARTOUM OPERATION THROUGH INFILTRATION
OF FATAH SINCE IT so CLEARLY SERVED ISRAELI INTERESTS AND
RESULTED IN COMPLETE REVERSAL OF ADVERSE WORLD OPINION
WHICH HAD DELELOPED TOWARD ISRAELIS AS RESULT OF THEIR
SHOOT-DOWN OF LIBYAN AIRLINER. THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID
THAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, SAUDI
LEADERS TOLD HIM THEY HAD INCONTROVERTIBLE PROFF OF
FREQUENT MEETING BETWEEN CERTAIN FATAH MEMBERS AND
ISRAELIS IN GENEVA.
E ° HE ALSO WONDER IF COMMUNISTS MAY HAVE HAD
HAND IN OPERATIONS: DESPITE SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF
DESTRE FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, HF BELIEVES STATUS QUO
SUITS THEM BETTER AND THEY MAY BE WORKING BEHIND THE
SCENES TO PREVENT PROGRESS.
F . RADICALIZATION OF PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT WOULD
CONTINUE UNLESS AND UNTIL RAPID RROGRESS MADE TOWARD
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE.
G. FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT HOPELESSLY DIVIDED. ARAFAT
NOT REALLY IN CONTROL OF FATAH: HIS LEADERSHIP BEING
CHALLENGED ON ALL SIDES.
H. FROM HIS RECENT TRIP TO EGYPT HE CONVINCED SADAT
WANTS PEACE BUT POLITICALLY CANNOT ENTER NEGOTIATIONS
WITHOURT KNOWING IN ADVANCE THERE COULD BE RAVORABLE
OUTCOME. HE URGED US TAKE LEAD IN FINDING OUT WHAT REAL
ISRAELI TERRITORIAL REQUIREMENTS ARE AND CONVEY THESE TO
EGYPTIANS. ( I NOTED THAT ISRAELIS TRADITIONALLY REFUSED
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCEL VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DEGLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPA
STATE
THE
EXECUTIVE
EXPIS
*
*
Department of State
OF SEAL AMERICA UNITED NAME
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 02967 02 OF 02 141920Z
TO DEVELOP THEIR NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENTS IN THE ABSTRACT
AND WERE UNLIKELY TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE.) SADAT HAD TOLD
HIM HE IS IN NO POSTION TO START HOSTILITIES BECAUSE HEI
LACK AIR COVER: HOWEVER, IF HE SEES NO HOPE OF PROGRESS
AS RESULT ISMAIL'S RECENT DIPLOMATIC EFRORTS, HE WOULD
BE BOUND TO RESORT TO WAR OF AYTRITION. FRANGIE SAW NO
WAY OF IMPASSE UNLESS US TAKES INITAIATIVE AND PUSHES
FOR SETTLEMENT BASED ON RES. 242.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SANITIZED
*
*
Department of State
OF STATE AMERICA UNITED
SHOATIONROOM
TELEGRAM
'73 MAR 13 AM 8:59
SEPRET 687
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02831 121941Z
2
EXCES EXQIN EXCES EXCES
73-60
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
032107
R 121630Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1946
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT.
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
SECRET BEIRUT 2831
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: ADS
TAGS:
PINS, XF
SUB, IECT:
ARAB GOVERNMENTS SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER: ORGANIZATION
REF: STATE 044811
SANITIZED
PER SEC.
3.3(b)(1)
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION 1111 OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
ORM DS-1652
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
3.3(b)(1), Hr 5/25/2010
BY:AM By: AM
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SE RET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02831 1219417
2. ON OTHER HAND " IT MIGHT BE USEFUL, PARTICULARLY AS MEANS
REINFORCING OUR CONCERN OVER TERRORIST ACTIONS, IF SELECTED
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD BE INDUCED WORK MORE
CLOSELY WITH ARAB GOVTS, IN BOTH INTELLIGENCE AND DIPLOMATIC FIELDS,
IN EFFORT COMBAT TERRORISM
DECON DEC 31, 1981.
BUFFUM
EXCES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
66/80/199
ORM
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. P.20F2
PHPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 758
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02701 02 OF 02 0814527
52
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
130683
0 081408Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 981
EXCES EXATE
S E CRE T SECTION 2 OF 2 BETRUT 2701
EXDIS
E ° THIS EFFORT SHOULD BE COLLECTIVE IN FIRST INSTANCE.
EVEN MODERATE ARAB STATES GENERALLY FIND IT EASIER
RESPOND POSITIVELY TO DEMARCHE BY WESTERN
EUROPEANS THAN TO EXCLUSIVE APPROACH BY USG WHICH IS:
OFTEN SEEN AS ACTING AS MUCH ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL
AS ACTING IN OWN INTEREST. USEFUL FIRST STEP IN
DEVELOPING COLLECTIVE APPROACH MIGHT BE ANOTHER MEETING
IN NATO, FOLLOWED BY APPROACHES TO POTENTIALLY
LIKE-MINDED NON-WESTERN GOVTS (E.G. IRAN, TURKEY,
JAPAN). PURPOSE OF THESE CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE TO
DEVELOP CAREFULLY COORDINATED SERIES OF COLLECTIVE
DEMARCHES TO VARIOUS ARAB STATES, IMPRESSING UPON THEM
NEED TO TAKE WHAT ACTION THEY CAN AGAINST TERRORISM
AND ASSURING THEM OF SUPPORT.
F ° APPROACHES TO ARAB STATES WOULD BE CAREFULLY
TAILORED TO FIT RELATIONSHIP AND DIFFICULTIES EACH HAS
WITH PALESTINIANS IN GENERAL, AND FEDAYEEN IN PARTICULAR.
FOR INSTANCE, SAUDI ARABIA COULD BE ENCOURAGED PUT
END TO SO-CALLED POPULAR CMTE FOR CARE OF FAMILIES OF
PALESTINIAN MARTYRS WHICH CULLECTS FIVE PERCENT FROMI
SALARIES OF PALESTINIAN WORKERS ON BEHALF OF FEDAYEEN.
KUWAIT COULD BE URGED CUT OFF GOVT FINANCIAL SUPPORT
AND ALSO DO ITS
BEST CUT OFF PRIVATE SUPPORT. SAME
APPLIES TO OTHER OIL-RICH GULF STATES. LEBANESE SHOULD
BE URGED TO EXPEL AS MANY OF TERRORIST WEADERS (E.G.,
SALAH KHALAF) AS POSSIBLE AND EXPEL OR TAKE OTHER ACTION
AGAINST PERSONS KNOWN TO HAVE ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT OR
ATTEMPTED TO CARRY OUT TERRORIST OPERATIONS. (I PROPOSE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 29 Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TRANTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02701 02 OF 02 0814522
IMPLEMENT DEPTEL 41440; ON THIS SUBJECT SHORTLY WITH
PRESIDENT FRANGIE WHO RETURNS TODAY FROM SAUDI
ARABIA TUNISIA COULD BE URGED CEASE ITS POLITICAL
SUPPORT FOR ARAFAT. ARAB GOVTS SHOULD BE URGED USE
EXCES
THEIR INFLUENCE IN ARAB COUNCILS TO DEFEND OTHERS, SUCH
AS JORDAN AND SUDAN, WHICH HAVE ACTED FORTHRIGHTLY AGAINST
TERRORISTS.
G. AS PART OF EFFORT, JORDAN AND SUDAN SHOULD BE
ENCOURAGED CONTINUE THEIR PRACTICE OF INFORMING
OTHER ARAB STATES IN DETAIL OF JUST WHAT PLO/FATAH
AND OTHER TERRORISTS ARE UP TO AND WHAT THIS MEANS
IN TERMS OF DANGEROUS INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS
OF ARAB STATES. EITHER THROUGH JORDAN OR SUDAN OR
DIRECTLY, WE AND OTHER CONCERNED GOVTS SHOULD SUPPLEMENT
THIS EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN WITH WHAT INFORMATION CAN BE
MADE AVAILABLE.
H. U.S. EFFORT SHOULD BE KEPT AS QUIET AS
POSSIBLE. WHILE ADVOCATING MAJOR PRESSURE CAMPAIGN
AGAINST FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS, I SHARE VIEWPOINT IN
CAIRO'S TEL 683 AND KHARTOUM 467 THAT OUR REACTION TO KHARTOUM NOT
BE SUCH AS TO DECREASE POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATING
WITH ARAB STATES IN CONTINUED SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF ME PROBLEM. HOWEVER, I SEE NO REASON
WHY ACTIVE ANTI-TERRORISM CAMPAIGN NEED TO DO SO.
WE SHOULD PRESS ARAB STATES HARD TO COORERATE WITH
US ON THIS, BUT RECOGNIZING THERE ARE LIMITS TO EXTENT
THEY WILL GO, PARTICOLARLY IN PUBLIC DOMAIN, I WOULD NOT
MAKE THEIR PERFORMANCE ON THIS SUBJECT TOUCHSTONE OF
OUR WHOLE RELATIONSHIP.
T . EFFORT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED AND NOT MERELY
ONE-SHOT AFFAIR. THOSE GOTS MAKING DEMARCHES AND
SUPPLYING INFO TO VARIOUS ARAB GOVTS SHOULD FOLLOW
UP REGULARLY, NOT ONLY WHEN CRISIS ERUPTS. SOME
ARAB GOVTS FIND IT EASIER TO ACT WHEN THERE IS NO
CRISIS THAN WHEN THERE IS.
4. EVEN SORT OF MAJOR EFFORT WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO
ABOVE IS, WS BELIEVE LIKLEY PRODUCE ONLY LIMITED AND SHORT TERM
RESULTS UNLESS ALSO ACCOMPANIED BY INDICATIONS THAT EFFORTS ARE
BEING ACCELERATED TO BRING ABOUT SOME SORT OF SETTLEMENT
IN ME, INCLUDING PROVISION FOR SATISFYING LEGITIMATE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WIT OUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF TI EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 29 Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
TUOHTIW
THE
Ob
THE
EXECUTIVE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 02701 02 OF 02 081452Z
ASPIRATIONS OF PALESTINIANS. WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE
THAT OUR POSITION NOT DIRECTED AT MASS OF PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE WHO, WE BELIEVE, DO NOT ENDORSE KILLING AMERICAN
DIPLOMATS. OUR SUPPORT FOR LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN
ASPIRATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE BE MADE EXPLICIT. HUSSEIN
PLAN, FOR EXAMPLE HAS PROVISION FOR WHAT COULD BE
CONSIDERED PALESTINIAN "HOMELAND" AND SELF-DETERMINATION.
WHILE IT HAS BEEN REJECTED BY FEDAYEEN WEADERS, WE
BELIEVE THIS CONCEPT OR SOMETHING LIKE IT WOULD HAVE
CONSIDERABLE APPEAL TO LEBANESE AND PROBABLY OTHER
ARAB GOVTS SINCE IDEA OF SOME SORT OF "HOMELAND" IS
SEEN AS MAKING IT EASIER DEAL WITH PALESTINIANS THANI
UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES*
VISIBLE PROGRESS TOWARD OVERALL SETTLEMENT, ASIDE FROM
PALESTINE ANGLE, ALSO EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN ENABLING
ARAB GOVTS DEAL WITH TERRORISTS. IF GOVTS BELIEVE THAT
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE ARE DIM OR NIL, THEY ARE LESS
INCLINED TAKE DIFFICULT DECISIONS AND RWN RISKS INVOLVED
BECAUSE THEY SEE NO LIGHT AT END OF TUNNEL. ON OTHER
HAND, IF THEY BELIEVE THERE REALLY ARE PROSPECTS FOR
SETTLEMENT, THEY MORE LIKELY MOVE AGAINST THOSE WHO
ARE TRYING BLOCK IT. FINALLY, IT IS ESSENTIAL, IN
OUR VIEW, THAT FEDAYEEN THEMSELVES NOT RPT NOT HAVE
IDEA THAT TERRORIST ACTS CAN SIDETRACK EFFORTS FIND
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. ONE AIM OF PRESENT FEDAYEEN
LEADERS IS TO BLOCK SETTLEMENT, AND THERE ARE ENOUGHI
TERRORISTS SPREAD AROUND ARAB WORLD AND REST OF GLOBE
SO THAT THEY CANNOT BE COMPLETELY NEUTRALIZED. THERE-
FORE THEY MUST BE BROUGHT TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR EFFORTS:
WILL BEING ABOUT REDOUBLED EFFORT FIND REACEFUL SETTLE-
MENT RATHER THAN INTERRUPT THIS EFFORT.
6. DEPT MAY WISH REPEAT THIS TO OTHER
POSTS FOR THEIR COMMENTS.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
29
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-10-2
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET 735
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 92701 a1 or 02 0814422
2
46
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
130581
o 081408Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
'73 MAR 9 AM 7:58
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 980
SECRET SECTION I OF 2 BEIRUT 2701
EXDIS
FROM THE AMBASSADUR
State Dept. review completed
E.O. 116521 XGDS-3
TAGS: PINS, XF
SUBJI CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM
SUMMARY. WITH CLEAR INVOLVEMENT OF FATAH AND ARAFAT
PERSONALLY IN KHAKTOUM OPERATION, WE ENTER NEW AND MORE
DANGEGOUS PHASE OF CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN. BELIEVE
WHOLESALE REVIEW THIS PROBLEM WARRANTED and INCLUDING CONSIDERATION
FOL POSSIBLE MEASURES:
1) EXPAND SECURITY PRECAUTIUNS:
2) INTENSIFY INTELLIGENCE FFFORTS (INCLUDING CLOSER COLLABORATION
WITH ARAB GOVTS):
31 EXPEDITE DELIVERY US MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR COMBATTING FEDAYEEN:
4) SEEK WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CONCEPT CURRENT
FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP AS OPPOSED TO PALESTINIAN MASSES) ARE
OUTLAWS, SHOULD BE DENIED SUPPORT OF ANY KIND AND SUBJECTED TO
RIGOROUS CONTROL: ACCELERATE US EFFORTS TO PROMOTE FUNDAMENTALI
SETTLEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST.
END SUMMARY
25X1
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DS-1652
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-10-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-10-2
TATE
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02701 01 OF 02 0814422
SIGNIFICANT. THIS INFO, COUPLED WITH EXTENSIVE PROVEN
COMPLICITY OF FATAH ORGANIZATION IN KHARTOUM ATTACK INDICATES
RADICALIZATION . OF FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS HAS TAKEN ON NEW AND
MORF OMINOUS DIMENSION MERITING MAJOR US POLICY REVIEW OF ALL
FACETS THIS PROBLEM.
2. FIRST, WHAT IS NEW IN ALL THIS? THE MAJOR ELEMENT I BELIEVE
IS FACT THAT WHEREAS IN PAST BLACK SEPTEMBER (RSO) PRESUMABLY
CONSISTED OF INDIVIDUAL LEADERS AND GROUPS OF FEDAYEEN LARGELY
WITHIN FATAH, WHO PLANNED AND CARRIED OUT SEPARATE OPERATIONS,
THIS WAS LARGELY DONE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF ARAFAT AND WITHOUT
INVOLVING FATAH ORGANIZATION AS A WHOLE. NOW, TO ALLI INTENTS
AND PURPOSES NO SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTION CAN BE MADE BETWEEN
BSO AND FATAH (AND PLOI. IN OTHER WORDS, THE LARGEST, MOST
POWERFUL, AND HERETOFORE MOST "MODERATE" OF COMPETING FEDAYEFN
GROUPS WAS JOINED THE RANKS OF THE MOST MILITANTS SUCH AS PFLP.
3. THUS, TREND TO RADICALIZATION OF ENTIRE MOVEMENT, WHICH HAS:
LONG BEEN PREDICTED FROM HERE, HAS CRESTED, AND THERE IS
SOPHISTICATED WORLDWIDE PLO/FATAH NETWORK READY AND ABLE TO
STRIKE AT ANY TARGET TO SUIT POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF PRESENT
FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP THEY HAVE, IN KHARTOUM, DEMONSTRATED
WILLINGNESS RESORT TO MORE EXTREME MEASURES THAN EVER BEFORE
BY LAUNCHING ATTACK ON ARAB PREVISES AND ASSASSINATING AMERICAN
OFFICIALS. RESULTANT QUESTION IS WHAT DOES THIS IMPLY FOR
US POLICY?
FOL TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS SUGGEST THEMSELVES FOR DEPT CONSIDERATION:
A . SECURITY THREAT TO US INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST IS EVEN
GREATER THAN WOULD APPEAR ON SURFACE FROM KHARTOUM OPERATION.
CURRENT PLANNING TO REEF UP PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE
EXCES
INTENSIFIED: IF NECESSARY TO GET ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR THIS
PURPOSE FROM CONGRESS, OUR LEGISLATORS MIGHT BE GIVEN BACK-
GROUND BRIEFING ON SERIOUSNESS THIS DEVELOPMENT.
B. INTENSIFY INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS (DISCUSSED SEPARATE CHANNEL).
C. ATTACH HIGHER PRIORITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO DELIVERY
US MILITARY EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO CRACK DOWN ONFEDAYEEN. FOR
MANY MONTHS WE HAVE SOUGHT EXPEDITE DELIVERY TO LEBANESE ARMV
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECREI AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
M DS-1652 No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-10-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-10-2
DEP
,TATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 02701 01 OF 02 0814422
(WHICH HAS ACTIVELY CURTAILED FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON) OF EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR THIS PURPOSE. WITH BEST OF
WILL ON US SIDE FREQUENT LONG DELAYS HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED.
NOW THAT SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONFLICT LARGELY WOUND UP WHICH HAS
HERETOFORE OFTEN BEEN MAJOR IMPEDIMENT, RECOMMEND SUBSTANTIAL
UPGRADING PRIORITY ATTACHED TO PROVISION AND DELIVERY OF
EQUIPMENT FOR COUNTERING FEUAYEEN.
D. WE SHOULD CONSULT URGENTLY WITH LIKE-MINDED GOVTS TO DEVELOP
MOST EFFECTIVE POSSIALE DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM. EFFORT
SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ORTAINING MUCH MORE STRINGENT POLICY BY
ALL ARAB STATES IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH ALL FEDAYEEN. PRES
NUMEIRY IN SUDAN HAS SET EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF APPLYING NEW
"GET TOUGH" POLICY TO ORGANIZATION SUCH AS FATAH WHICH HAS
BEEN CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO. OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO
MAKE IT AS DIFFICULT AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE FOR FEDAYEEN
ORGANIZATIONS TO CONTINUE TO GET MONEY AND WEAPONS: OR OPERATE
FREELY AND WITH ALL THE MANTLE OF RESPECTABILITY THEY HAVE HERETO-
EXCES
FORE ENJOYED. USG AND OTHER WESTERN GOVTS SHOULD SERIOUSLY
CONSIDER EXPELLING QUASI-OFFICIAL REPS OF FATAH AND PLO AND/OR
CLOSING THEIR OFFICES.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
M
DS-1652 No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-10-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
THE
EXECUTIVE
RECKEIVE!
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF ,
TELEGRAM
SECRET 887
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02503 050940Z
13
2
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ECO-00 1026 W
097677
0 050932Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 911
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE
SECRE T BEIRUT 2503
EXDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PINS
SUBJ: ADDITIONAL TERRORIST THREAT
WE HAVE INFO SENT SEPARATE CHANNEL BLACK SEPTEMBER
OPERATION, PRESUMABLY SIMILAR TO KHARTOUM, PLANNED
FOR KUWAIT, ABU DHABI AND MADRID THIS WEEK. WHILE
TARGET REPORTEDLY JORDANIANs. US PERSONNEL
OBVIOUSLY COULD BE INVOLVED PARTICULARLY IF IN
COMPANY OF JORDANIANS.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THEAHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
-WH
CONFIDENTIAL 942
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02382 0114377
8h Wd
ROOM
DUSE
42
ACTION SS-25
2
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
The
063175
3
R 011400Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 856
INFO USUN NEW YORK 2229
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ROME
CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT 2382
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS:
PFOR; SY, Us, PINS
SUBJECT:
U.S. SYRTAN RELATIONS
REF: STATE 035079
1. EMBASSY BEIRUT STRONGLY ENDORSES DEPT'S VIEW THAT
WE PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY AND GRADUALLY RE HANDLING TRAVEL
USG EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS TO SYRIA ONCE BAN LIFTED.
IF SYRIANS EXPLICITLY ENSURE PROTECTION ACCORDED USG
OFFICIALS UNDER EXISTING INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES WE
RECOMMEND DEPT AUTHORIZE, THRU WORLD-WIDE CIRCULAR
INSTRUCTION, SUCH TRAVEL FOR ALL EMPLOYEES AND DEPEN-
DENTS NOT CONNECTED WITH INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY
WORK (E.G. FRS AND MILITARY) AND WHO NOT ASSIGNED
ISRAEL. (INCIDENTALLY, WE RECEIVE REPORTS HERE THAT
USG EMPLOYEES ARE TRAVELING TO SYRIA DESPITE PRESENT
BAN, MOSTLY FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAN, TURKEY
AND GREECE).
2. MECHANICS ON CONTROL AND ENFORCEMENT SOMEWHAT
COMPLEX. SPEAKING FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, USG
TRAVELERS ENTER SYRIA WITHOUT VISAS BUT RECEIVE STAMP
AT BORDER POINT. ENTRY FROM TURKEY, IRAQ OR JORDAN ALSO
MAY BE MADE BY APPLICATION AT BORDER BUT ADVISABLE VISAS
BE OBTAINED IN ADVANCE FROM SYRIAN EMBASSY SINCE AVAILABLE
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
SEALS AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02382 0114377
IN THOSE COUNTRIES IROSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF JORDAN). WE
WOULD REINSTITUTE EMBASSY CONTROL ESTABLISHED AUGUST 1969
WHEN SYRIANS OPENED OP AGAIN TO USC'S, BY REQUIRING ALL
MISSION EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS TO REGISTER IN ADVANCE
PROPOSED TRAVEL WITH DCM WHO CAN THEN DISAPPROVE SPECIFIC
TRIP IF CONDITIONS so WARRANT. OUR CONTROL WOULD APPLY
TO VISITING USG VISITORS ONLY IF THEY CONSULT EMBASSY WHICH
MANY DO NOT.
3. NOTIFICATION TO SARG THRU USINT IS MORE DIFFICULT
PROBLEM. AS SEEN ABOVE, VISITING TRAVELERS OFTEN DO NOT
INFORM US AND PRESUME ADANA AND AMMAN WOULD HAVE SIMILAR
PROPLEMS. AS DEPT WILL RECALL, SARG ORIGINALLY LEVIED
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT VIA USINT FOR ALL TRAVELERS AND
SPECIAL PERMISSION REQUIRED ON USG TRAVELERS WHEN BORDER
OPENED IN AUGUST 1969. THEY WITHDREW THIS REQUIREMENT
HOWEVER. AS BUREAUCRATIC AND INEFFICIENT MESS. WE CON-
TINUED GIVE NAMES TO USINT OF U.S. EMBASSY BETRUT
EXSIS
TRAVELERS BUT DUE TELEPHONE INADEQUACIES AND LIMITATION
OF WEEKLY POUCH, USINT (AFTER CONSULTATION SARG) SUB-
SEQUENTLY LIFTED THIS REQUEST.
4. RECOMMENDATION: WHEN DEPT SATISFIED IT OPPORTUNE
LIFT TRAVEL BAN, CIRCULAR INSTRUCTION BE ISSUED ALL
POSTS THAT USG EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENT TRAVELERS TO SYRIA
MUST HAVE VISAS TO SYRIA UNLESS ENTERING FROM LEBANON
AND MUST SEEK LATEST ADVICE FROM EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTIONS
IN NEIGHBORING POSTS BEFORE ENTERING SYRIA. (THESE POSTS
COULD KEEP LOG OF AND BRIEF TRAVELERS).
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TRENCUTFORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
35
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
801/20/199
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
EXEMS
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
'73
SECRET 642
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02155 2319077
44
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 eco-gø 1026 W
FEB 2= PM 10:27 10. 27
2
ACTION SS-25
UATION ROOM
017193
o 231900Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 790
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
SECR E T BEIRUT 2155
EXDIS
SUBJ: LEBANON AND SECURITY COUNCIL
REF: BEIRUT 2093; STATE 33803
1. UPON RECEIPT STATE 33803, AMBASSADOR WENT OVER USG POSITION
IN DETAIL WITH FONMIN ABOU HAMAD. LATTER SAID HE WOULD CONVEY
POSITION TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND LET US KNOW REPLY. AT 2015
BEIRUT TIME FONMIN CALLED AMBASSADOR TO SAY THAT IN VIEW OF
USG POSITION, PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED FOREGO ASKING FOR SC
MEETING.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
9-66 DECLASSIFIED DS-1652 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PUPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
*
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
WN
SECRET 667
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02093 01 OF 02 2310402
11
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 €CO-00 1026 W
012861
O 231010Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 761
INFO USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2220
'73 FEB 2: PM 4:01 01
SITUATION house ROOM
SECRE T SECTION I OF 2 BEIRUT 2093
EXDIS
SUBJ: ISRAELI RAID ON NORTHERN LEBANON
REF: DEPTEL 33714
FROM THE AMBASSADOR
1 - T AGREE 200 PERCENT WITH THE ARGUMENTS DEPARTMENT
CONSIDERING GIVING TO LEBANESE AGAINST GOING TO
SECURITY COUNCIL ON LATEST ISRAELI RAID AND SEE NO COMPELLING
DOMESTIC REASONS WHY THEY MUST DO SO. BOTH CIRL
CUMSTANCES OF THE RAID ITSELF AND CURRENT INTERNATIONALI
CONTEXT IN WHICH MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE MAKE THIS
WORST POSSIBLE TIME FOR SUCH A LEBANESE INITAITIVE.
2. SINCE I WAS SURE 0S GOVT WOULD SUSTAIN POSITION
OUTLINED IN PARA 5 REFTEL AGAINST A MEETING AND CONCERNED
THAT GOL MIGHT MOVE PRECIPITOUSLY, I ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE
MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD AS SOON AS
HE ARRIVED IN OFFICE THIS MORNING, WHICH HE GRANTED.
3. I EXPLAINED THAT WASHINGTON WAS CONSIDERING
KABBANI'S DEMARCHE AND THAT DEFINITIVE POSITION NOT
YET TAKEN. HOWEVER, SINCE I THOUGHT RECOURSE TO SC
WOULD BE SUCH GRAVE ERROR ON PART OF GOLI I WISHED
ON MY OWN INITIATIVE TO URGE THAT THEY TAKE NO MORE
MOVES IN THIS DIRECTION WITHOUT GETTING A CONSIDERED
AND FINAL US REPLY. 1 EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL
WHY I THOUGHT AN SC MEETING CONVENED TO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXPIS
Department of State
OF SEALS AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02093 01 OF 02 2310402
DEAL WITH ISRAELI RAID ON TERRORIST BASE WAS WORST
POSSIBLE CIRCUMSTANCE IN WHICH LEBANON COULD GO TO
SC (DETAILS BELOW).
4. ABUHAMAD SAID GOL HAD NO INTENTION FACE US WITH
FAIT ACCOMPLI, THAT THIS CONSULTATION ON RECOURSE TO
SC WAS DISCHARGING COMMITMENT HE MADE TO SECRETARY
AND SISCO TO CONSULT IN ADVANCE OF ANY SUCH MOVE.
HE STATED NO OTHER COUNTRY HAS BEEN YET CONSULTED.
5. FOREIGN MINISTER THEN DEVELOPED HIS OWN ARGUMENTA-
TION IN FAVOR OF A COUNCIL MEETING (ALL OF WHICH
BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONSI.
HE SAID GOL HAD SUCCEEDED IN ACHIEVING PULL-BACK OF
FEDAYEEN FROM SOUTHERN FRONTIER, USING ARGUMENT THEIR
ACTIVITIES WERE PROVOCATION FOR ISRAELI
RAIDS WHICH POSED UNACCEPTABLE COSTS FOR LEBANON
ITSELF. NOW, HE SAID, SINCE ISRAELIS HAD STRUCK FAR
NORTH IN LEBANON WITH NO REPEAT NO PROVOCATION, GOL
EXCIS
EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED OF THIS ARGUMENT AND LEVER AGAINST
FURTHER FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES. IN ADDITION, HF SAID,
GOL FELT NEED TO WEIGH ADVANTAGES OF SUCH MOVE IN
TERMS OF IMPROVING ITS POSITION VIS-A-VIS SYRIA.
WHEREAS LATTER AT LEAST PUT UP A FIGHT WHEN ISRAELIS
STRUCK THERE, HE HAD TO ADMIT LEBANON HAD DONE
NOTHING TO STOP ISRAELI ATTACK, FELT HIS COUNTRY LOOKED
IMPOTENT AND UNCONCERNED ABOUT PALESTINIANS IN
COMPARISON WITH SYRIA IF IT FAILED TO SEEK AT LEAST
POLITICAL REMEDY. FINALLY AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, HE
ARGUED, FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO TAKE A STAND AGAINST THIS TYPE OF
UNPROVOKED ISRAELI ATTACK COULD HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS
0.13 LEB
FOR LEBANON'S FUTURE, SINCE ISRAEL WOULD CONCLUDE IT
COULD GET AWAY WITH THIS TYPE OF THING WITH IMPUNITY.
ABOUHAMAD SAID SUCH GRATUITOUS AND UNPROVOKED ATTACKI
BY A GOVERNMENT USING ITS MILITARY FORCES ON THE
SOVERIGN TERRITORY OF ANOTHER GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED
THE "LAW OF THE JUNGLE", WHICH, IF PERMITTED TO
CONTINUE, COULD LEAD TO INTERNATIONAL CHAOS. HE
SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, EVEN IF CAMPS WERE USED FOR
TRAINING COMMANDOES, WHAT WOULD US POSITION HAVE BEEN
IF CUBANS HAD LAUNCHED STRIKE AGAINST TRAINING BASES
SECRET
NOT 10 BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 02093 01 OF 02 2310402
WHICH HAD EXISTED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR TRAINING
ANTI-CASTRO REBELS.
6. T EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR HIS AMPUIFICATION
OF GCL VIEWS, SAYING WE THOUGHT PERHAPS DOMESTIC
CONSIDERATIONS ALSO PLAYED A ROLE IN THEIR DECISION
TO EXPLORE SC ROUTE. HE DENIED THIS, SAYING HIS
OWN ANALYSIS RESTS EXCLUSIVELY ON FOREIGN POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS. SEPTEL ANALYZES DOMESTIC REPERCUSSIONS HERE®
7 ° T SAID THAT AS FRIEND OF LEBANON AND EVEN IN
ABSENCE OF WASHINGTON POSITION I WANTED TO LET HIM KNOW
IMMEDIATELY I THOUGHT GOL WOULD MAKE GREVIOUS ERROR
IN RESORTING TO UNSC ON THIS PARTICULAR EPISODE,
DEVELOPING THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS:
A . ISRAELI RAID WAS CONFINED TO FEDAYEEN BASE
WIDELY UNDERSTOOD (AT LEAST BY US) AS BEING USED TO
TRAIN TERRORISTS. RAID WAS CARRIED OUT WITH GREATEST
"SURGICAL PRECISION" OF ANY ISRAELI RAID THUS FAR.
THERE WERE NO LEBANESE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, IN
CONTRAST TO SOME OF THE DEPLORABLE ISRAELI RAIDS AGAINST
LEBANESE VILLAGES IN THE SOUTH. WHILE SOME UNRWA
INSTALLATIONS WERE DAMAGED, THESE WERE UNDER FEDAYEEN
CONTROL AND UNRWA HAD BEEN TRYING UNSUCEESSFULLY TO
GET THEM BACK. UN DERATE WOULD HIGHLIGHT BOTH
IMPOTENCE OF GOL AND UNRWA TO CONTROL REFUGEE CAMPS.
B . DEBATE WOULD INEVITABLY FOCUS ON TERRORISM AND
COUNTER. TERRORISM, AND LEBANON MIGHT WELL WIND UP APPEARING
TO CONDONE TERRORISM. PROBLEM OF COPING WITH TERRORISM WOULD
INEVITABLY DEVELOP IN BROADER CONTEXT AND MASSACRE
BY JAPANESE TERRORIST, PROBABLY TRAINED IN LEBANON,
OF INNOCENT TRAVELERS AT ISRAELI AIRPORT WAS
EQUALLY "LAW OF THE JUNGLE."
C. FINALLY, I SAID GOL WOULD SURELY BE DELUDING
ITSELF IF IT THOUGHT ANYTHING COULD COME OUT OF A
SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON THIS COMPLAINT WHICH WOULD
DETER ISRAELIS FROM TAKING FURTHER MEASURES TO DEAL
WITH FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
CONSTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
OF SEALES AMERICA UNITED MAKE
TELEGRAM
SECRET 676
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02093 02 OF 02 2310462
2
11
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
012902
0 231010Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 762
INFO USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2221
S ECR E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 2093
EXDIS
80 ABOUHAMAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WHOLE DOSSIER OF
TERRORISM WOULD BE OPENED BUT ARGUED THAT RESULTANT
DEBATE WOULD HAVE DETERRENT EFFECT ON ISRAELIS IF
US SUPPORTED LEBANESE POSITION. I REPLIED THAT
ISRAELIS HAVE NOT BEEN NOTABLY RESPONSIVE TO UN
EXE
RESOLUTIONS AND I WAS CERTAIN THAT WHATEVER
DETAILS EMERGED IN PREPARING THE US POSITION WE WOULD
INSIST THAT ADEQUATE RECOGNITION BE GIVEN TO FEDAYEEN
TERRORIST ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM.
9° THIS CONNECTION I MADE OBVIOUS ADDITIONAL POINT THAT
SUCH DEBATE WOULD HAVE DAMAGING EFFECT ON CURRENT US:
EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
10. I ARGUED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS RAID OF SOUTH INVOLVING
OCCUPATION OF LEBANESE TERRITORY AND DEATHS OF LEBANESE
AND FOR ALL THE REASONS DISCUSSED ABOVED URGED GOLI DROP
POSSIBILITY OF REQUESTING SC DEBATE.
11. FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ME TO INFORM WASHINGTON
IMMEDIATELY OF HIS ARGUMENTS AND PROVIDE HIM WITH
DEFINITIVE US POSITION IF AT ALL POSSIBLE BY CLOSE OF
BUSINESS TODAY BEIRUT TIME.
RECOMMENDATION: THAT DEPARTMENT CONFIRM FOREGOING VERY
NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD GOL RECOURSE TO SC AS'
OFFICIAL US GOVERNMENT POSITION SOONEST.
GDS
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
UNITED
Department SE of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
73
FEB 8 AM 9:38
SECRET 381
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01433 0713052
50
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
015222
R 071230Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 528
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S E CORE T BEIRUT 1433
EXDIS
SUBJ: LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER NEGOTIATIONS
1. FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD PROVIDED AMBASSADOR FULL
DETAILS FEB 6 ON RECENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAELIS:
ON BORDER PROBLEMS, INCLUDING TEXTS OF RAPERS EXCHANGED.
ABOUHAMAD SAID THAT ON JAN 18, 1973, ISRAELI DELEGATE
PRESENTED FOL DRAFT COMMITMENT IT WISHED GOLING TO MAKE:
"1. THE GOVT OF LEBANON REAFFIRMS ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN
A COMPLETE CEASE-FIRE WITH ISRAEL.
"2" ACCORDINGLY, THE LEBANESE GOVT UNDERTAKES TO PREVENT
STRICTLY:
"A . ALL FIRE FROM LEBANESE TO ISRAELI TERRITORY, AND THE GOLAN.
"B. ALL PENETRATIONS BY SEMI-REGULARS AND IRREGULARS FROM
LEBANESE TO ISRAELI TERRITORY AND THE GOLAN BY LAND OR SEA."
2. ON JAN 23, LEBANESE REP PRESENTED FOU COUNTER-PROPOSAL:
" THE LEBANESE GOVT CONSIDERING THAT LEBANON AND ISRAEL ARE
STILL BOUND BY THE DISPOSITIONS OFI THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
TO WHICH THEY BOTH SUBSCRIBED ON MAR 23) 19491 REAFFIRMS THAT
IT IS DOING AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING IN ITS
POSSIBILITY TO PREVENT ALL WARLIKE ACTS, HOSTILITIES ORI
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DS-1652
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
SEALS AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01433 0713057
INFILTRATIONS WHICH COULD BE PERPETRATED FROM THE LEBANESE
TERRITORY AGAINST THE TERRITORIES CONTROLLED BY ISRAEL.
"IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE ISRAELI GOVT REAFFIRMS FROM ITS OWN
SIDE ITS OBLIGATIONS TO RESRECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, THE INTEGRITY
OF THE LEBANESE TERRITORY, ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS AND
ITS AERIAL SPACE AS WELL AS THE INVIOLABILITY OF ITS:
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES."
3.° AT THE LAST MEETING, FEB 2: ISRAELI REP INFORMED LEBANESE
DELEGATE THAT GOI HAD NOT EXPECTED SUCH A REPLY, SO THERE IS
"NO DEAL AND THE SITUATION WILL REMAIN AS IT WAS BEFORE
ISRAELIS DID NOT INDICATE WHY NOTE UNACEEPTABLE.
40 ABOUHAMAD WONDERED WHAT ISRAELI MOTIVES WERE,
PARTICULARLY WHY THEY WANTED WRITTEN PROMISE FROM GOL
WHEN THEY KNEW FROM THE FACTUAL SITUATION ON THE GROUND
THAT LEBANESE WERE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT
HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST ISRAEL AND GOLAN.
5° AMBASSADOR SAID WF DID NOT KNOW, BUT RECALLED THAT
CAIRO ACCORD HAD NEVER BEEN FORMALLY ABROGATED BY
LEBANESE GOVT AND POSSIBLY GOI WANTED SOME
REASSURANCE OF FORMAL CHARACTER WHICH IN EFFECT ASSURED THEM
CAIRO AGREEMENT WAS DEAD. ABOUHAMAD DOUBTED THIS.
60 AMBASSADOR ALSO SPECULATED THAT FACT LEBANESE
TEXT MADE A REFERENCE TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT NO
DOUBT FOUND OBUECTIONABLE BY ISRAELIS. ABOUHAMAD
NOTED THIS WAS DESCRIPTION OF LEBANESE ROSITION, NOT
ISRAELI POSITION, AND THEREFORE THOUGHT IT UNEXCEPTIONAL
7. AMBASSADOR SAID, GIVEN LONG HISTORY OF RESPECTIVE
DIFFERENCES ON GAA, IT SEEMED DOUBTFUL ACCORD COULD BE
REACHED WHICH INJECTED THIS ELEMENT AND SUGGESTED GOL
SHOULD ASK ITSELF WHAT IT REALLY WANTS OUT OF ANY
SUCH PAPER. ABOUHAMAD WAS CATEGORIC IN SAYING WHAT
LEBANESE WANTED IS RECIPROCITY IN TERMS OF RESPECT
FOR THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. HE NOTED GOL QUITE
PREPARED TO GIVE ASSORANCE AGAINST HOSTILE ACTS NOT
ONLY TOWARD ISRAEL BUT "TERRITORIES CONTROLLED BY
ISRAEL" AND MERELY WANTED IN RETURN ISRAELI RESPECT FOR
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEP STATE %
OMITHONI
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 01433 071305Z
INTEGRITY OF LEBANESE TERRITORY.
8. COMMENT: LEBANESE. ISRAELI EXCHANGE OF PAPERS, INITIATED BY GOI,
SEEMS TO HAVE COME To AN END. WE BELIEVE GOLI HAS BEEN VERY
FORTHCOMING IN SUBMITTING A WRITTEN TEXT WITH SUCH SPECIFIC
COMMITMENTS ON PREVENTING HOSTILE ACTS NOT ONLY AGAINST
ISRAEL BUT ALSO OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HAD GOI BEEN ABLE
ACCEPT GOL TEXT, IT WOULD HAVE HAD DIRECT AGREEMENT WITH ARAB
GOVT OF SORT IT HAS LONG BEEN SEEKING. XGDS.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
EXCESS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET 262
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01338 01 OF 02 0311462
2
11
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADR-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
116767
0 R 0310452 FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 498
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
USINT GABHDAD
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
SECR E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 1338
EXDIS
SUBJ: ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL
1. SUMMARY. ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL APPEARS TO HAVE REVEALED
MODERATION OF POSITIONS MOST ARAB STATES AND ESPECIALLY EGYPT,
AND SYRIA VIS-A-VIS REDAYEEN AND CLOSER ALIGNMENT OF EGYPT,
SYRIA AND JORDAN ON POLITICAL MATTERS. UORDAN AND KING HUSSEIN
CONSIDERED BY LEBANESE TO HAVE WON CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL
VICTORY WHILE SYRIA ALSO EMERGED WITH REAL BENEFITS.
FEDAYEEN REPORTEDLY FURIOUS OVER WHAT THEY SEE AS SELL-OUT
DESPITE SOME SUPPORT FROM LIBYA, ALGERIA, IRAQ AND TUNISIA.
END SUMMARY.
2. VERY RELIABLE SENIOR LEBANESE ARMY OFFICER PRESENT
AT ARAB DEFENSE EOUNCIL GAVE EMBOFF RUNDOWN ON MEETING
EVENING FEB. 2. HIS ASSESSMENT GENERALLY CONFORMS WITH
WHAT ALREADY KNOWN BUT ADDS SOME FASCINATING DETAILS WHICH
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORDECLASSIFIED DS-1652 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
%
STATE
*
Department of State
EXE™
SETTES AMERICA UNITED some
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01338 01 OF 02 0311462
REVEAL DEGREE OF SUPPORT ACCORDED KING HUSSEIN AND GOU AND
DEGREE TO WHICH REDAYEEN INTERESTS DISREGARDED.
3. LEBANESE OFFICER SAID THAT EGYPTIAN WAR MINISTER OPENED
MEETING BY TABLING PAPER ESTABL ING THREE-FRONT COMMAND
(EGYPT) SYRIA AND JORDAN) UNDER SINGLE COMMANDER (HIMSELF).
PAPER OBYIOUSLY WORKED OUT TOGETHER IN ADVANCE BY THREE
GOVTS. CONCERNED. IT MADE NO RPT NO REFERENCE TO FEDAYEEN.
BOUTEFLIKA OF ALGERIA AND MASMOUDI OF TUNISIA OBJECTED STRONGLY
TO PAPER ON GROUNDS THAT IT GAVE KING HWSSEIN BLANK CHECK
FROM ARAB LEAGUE FOR HIS VISIT TO UNITED STATES AND
IGNORED INTERESTS OF FEDAYEEN. MASMOUDI ESPECIALLY CRITICAL
OF PAPER. THIS CAUSED SHAZLI AND ZAYYAT TO REACT STRONGLY
CHALLANGING ANYONE ELSE TO COME UP WITH BETTER MILITARY IDEA
AND WALKING OUT OF MEETING. JORDANIAN FONMIN RESERVED HIS:
RIGHT OF REPLY. LIBYA AND IRAQ BACKED ANGERIA AND
TUNISIA WHILE SEVERAL OTHERS, INCLUDING SYRIAN FONMIN
KHADDAM, PAYED LIP SERVICE TO SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS.
4. FATAH LEADERS ALL REACTED VIOLENTLY 70 DEVELOPMENTS OF
FIRST DAY, TALKING OF COMPLETE SELL-OUT AND IMPLYING CLEARLY
THAT FEDAYEEN HAD LITTLE CHOICE LEFT BUT TO UNDERTAKE
TERRORISM AGAINST ARAB GOVTS. AND LEADERS WHO WORKING
AGAINST THEM. (LEBANESE OFFICER SAID HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT
THEY MEANT IT.) THIS PLUS REPORTED PERSONAL APPEAL FROM
ARAFAT TO QADHAFI (AND ENSUING STRONG LEBYAN SUPPORT')
CAUSED MAJORITY TO INSCRIBE DISCUSSION OF FEDAYEEN QUESTION
AS LAST ITEM ON AGENDA AND ULTIMATELY TO COME TO COM-
PROMISE AGREEMENT WHEREBY THREE-FRONT UNIFIED COMMAND
ESTABLISHED, FEDAYEEN TO SERVE UNDER UNITIFED COMMAND, BUT
MEDIATING COMMITTEE (WEIGHTED IN FAVOR OF MODERATES)
CRATED TO SOFTEN BLOW WHERE FEDAYEEN CORCERNED. RESULTS:
OF WORK THIS COMMITTEE DO NOT RPT NOT CONSTITUTE PREREQUISITE TO
CREATION UNIFIED COMMAND BUT APPARENTLY WILL AFFECT FEDAYEEN
AGREEMENT SERVE UNDER IT.
5. JORDAN FONMIN DEFENDED HIS POSITION BEAUTIFULLY,
SAYING JORDAN DID NOT COME TO ADC TO BEG BUT AS COUNTRY
WITH 80,000 MEN, IN BEST-EQUIPPED AND BEST TRAINED ARMY
IN ARAB WORLD. HE SAID NONE OF JORDAN'S CRITICS (I.E.
ALGERIA AND TUNISIA WERE LISTED AS OFFERING EITHER TROOPS:
OR MONEY FOR UNIFIED DEFENSE EFFORT. THERE WAS NO REPLY
FROM ALGERIA OR FUNISIA. EGYPTIAN PAPER HAD ALSO PROPOSED
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FO DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
9.66
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
ODNCED
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EXEMS EXET EXE
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 01338 01 OF 02 0311462
THAT ONCE HOSTILITIES BEGIN ALL ARAB COWNTRIES WOULD
CONSTITUTE ARAB FRONT LINE. SAUDIS AND NEBANESE OBJECTED
STRONGLY TO THIS WITH LEBANESE REJECTING ANYTHING WHICH
MIGHT PREJUDICE THEIR POSITION RE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT,
SO THIS CONCEPT REMOVED FROM PAPER AS FINALLY APPROVED. FINAL
PAPER ALSO CONTAINED PROVISION FOR ARAB LEAGUE FUND TO
SUPPORT UNIFIED COMMAND, SIMILAR TO PRE-1967, BUT DETAILS
NOT WORKED OUT.
60 SYRIA CAME OUT AHEAD WITH PLEDGE IN RRINCIPLE OF SEVENTY-
FIVE MILLION STERLING IN SUPPORT, AND ACTUAL PROMISES OF TEN
MILLION POUNDS EACH FROM KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA AND TWENTY-FOUR
MILLION DOLLARS FROM ABU DHABI (OF WHICH WE ARE TOLD BY
ANOTHER SOURCE FIFTEEN MILLION ALREADY RAID). SYRIANS
NATURALLY CLAIM THIS SEPARATE FROM ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE FUND.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
6DECLASSIFIED 1652 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT PER OF STATE
*
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF the
TELEGRAM
SECRET 304.
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01338 02 OF 02 0311582
12
2
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADR-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
116769
0 R 031045Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 499
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
USINT BAGHDAD
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
SECRE T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 1338
EXDIS
SUBJ: ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL
70 LEBANESE OFFICER SAID SYRIANS IN ADC MEETINGS AND IN
PRIVATE TALKS WITH LEBANESE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THEY
HAVE HAD IT WITH FEDAYEEN AND THAT THEY INTEND MAKE TIGHT
CONTROLS IMPOSED ON FEDAYEEN STICK. SYRIANS ALSO SUPPORTED
LEBANESE POSITION WHERE FEDAYEEN CONCERNED, ALTHOUGH AIQA#LEADER ZOHEIR
MOHSEIN MADE SOME SNIDE REMARKS ABOUT
JORDAN IN CONNECTION FEDAYEEN. FONMIN KHADDAM ALSO
REPORTEDLY MADE SOME RATHER DEMOGAGIC PUBLIC REMARKS
NOT CONSONANT WITH REAL SARG POSITION, WHICH CLEARLY
HAS BECOME MUCH MORE MODERATE, ACCORDING TO LEBANESE
OFFICER.
8. FATAH LEADERS REPORTEDLY STILL FUMING AT END OF MEETING,
AND TALKING OF MOVING MAIN BASE OF OPERATIONS FROM SYRIA
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DS-1652
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICANT
TELEGRAM
EXATS EXPIS
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01338 02 OF 02 0311582
TO IRAQ WHICH WOULD GIVE THEM SUPPORT AND STILL BE NEAR
"PALESTINE". LEBANESE OFFICER BELIEVES SUCH IDEA MORE
MOTIVATED BY DESIRE HELP IRAQ BRING DOWN ASSAD GOVERNMENT
THAN BY ANY REAL DESIRE MOVE TO IRAQ OR EXPECTATION
OF MEANINGFUL SUPPORT. MEETINGS OF PLOYEC AND FATAH
CENTRAL COMMITTEE NOW UNDERWAY LIKELY BE VERY EXPLOSIVE,
ACCORDING LEBANESE OFFICER, ESPECIALLY SINCE SALAH KHALAF,
ABU YUSSIF AND KHALED EL-HASSAN ALL THREE TRYING TAKE
ARAFAT'S PLACE BUT UNABLE WORK TOGETHER TO BRING HIM
DOWN. FEDAYEEN DID NOT THREATEN RENEW ACTIVITY IN LEBANON.
9. COMMENT: LEBANESE OFFICER WHO WAS PRESENT AND
OTHER INFORMED OBSERVERS OF ARAB SCENE HERE SHARE OPINION
THAT UNIFIED COMMAND IS OF NO RPT N REAL MILITARY
SIGNIFICANCE BUT IT COULD HAVE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE.
THEY THINK IT SYMBOLIZES PUBLICLY NEW RAPPROACHMENT BETWEEN
JORDAN, SYRIA AND EGYPT, PRETTY MUCH ON FORMER'S TERMS
AND IN TIME STRENGTHEN KING'S HAND FOR TRIP TO UNITED
STATES. OBJECTIONS BY FEDAYEEN AND THEIR ARAB SUPPORTERS
PRETTY MUCH OVERRIDDEN SINCE UNIFIED COMMAND ESTABLISHED
WITHOUT ANY JURDANIAN AGREEMENT TAKE FEDAYEEN BACK AND
FEDAYEEN FORCED BACK OFF THEIR POSITION OF NEVER
NEGOTIATING WITH OR RETURNING TO JORDAN SO LONG AS KING
STILL THERE. SYRIANS HAVE HAD ENOUGH OF FEDAYEEN AND, AT
LAST FOR NEAR FUTURE, OF FIGHTING WITH ISRAEL. THEY
SEEM TO BE MOVING TOWARD GREATER POLITICAL SOLIDARITY WITH
EGYPT AND JORDAN.EFFECT OF ADC MEETING ON EGYPTIAN- LIBYAN
RELATIONS RAISES BIG QUESTION SINCE ON RAPER LIBYA LINKED
MILITARILY TO JORDAN THROUGH EXISTENCE TWO OVERLAPPING
JOINT COMMANDS WITH EGYPTIAN WAR MINISTER AT HEAD OF
BOTH. EGYPTIAN STAND AGAINST FEDAYEEN, DESPITE QADHAFI'S
OBJECTIONS, ALSO AROUSES SPECULATION. OVERALL
IMPRESSION IS THAT MOT ARAB STATES MOVING CLOSER TOGETHER
IN EXPECTATION OF RENEWED UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORT
RESOLVE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.
GDS.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED. WILL SERVICE UPON REQUEST.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
Loller/1ea
FORDECLASSIFIED DS-1652 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
WH
CONFIDENTIAL 080
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 13282 081613Z
51
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
101072
P R 081305Z DEC 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9759
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
72 DEC 8 PM 48
BOOK
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 2174
CONFIDENTIALBEIRUT13282
EXDIS
SUBJ: UN CONTACTS RE CEASEFIRE LINES
REF: JERUSALEM 952
1 ° SUMMARY: UNTSO COMMANDER GENERAL SILASVUO CON-
SIDERS SITUATION IN AREA AND EXPECIALLY ALONG SYRIAN-
ISRAELI CEASE- FIRE LINE AS MUCH IMPROVED OVER THAT WHICH
PREVAILED IN OCTOBER-NOVEMBER AND IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC
THAT CALM MAY PREVAIL FOR SOME TIME TO COME. HIS TALKS
WITH SYRIAN GENERAL CHACOUR AND LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER
GHANEM AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRESIDENCY
DIB ON DEC 7TH WERE ENCOURAGING. HE HOPES THAT FURTHER
TALK WITH DAYAN WILL CONFIRM TREND TOWARD MODERATION
ON PART OF GOI. END SUMMARY.
EXPIS
2. RELIABLE UNTSO SOURCES HAD BRIEF TALK WITH EMBOFF
AFTERNOON DEC 7 ON GENERAL SILASVUO'S CONVERSATIONS DEC 4 WITH
GENERAL DAYAN (REFTEL) AND ON DEC 7 WITH SYRIAN GENERAL
CHACOUB AND LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL AHANEM AND
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRESIDENCY DIB.
3. CONVERSATION WITH DAYAN ALREADY REPORTED REFTEL AND
SOURCES HAD NOTHING NEW TO ADD EXCEPT To SAY THAT DAYAN
SEEMED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR HARD LINE ON PRISONER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
25
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXC
Department of State
UNITED
ASSURANCE
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 13282 0816132
EXCHANGE QUESTION, ESPECIALLY ON NOT RELEASING SEPARATELY
THE SYRIAN AND LEBANESE OFFICERS CAPTURED ON JUNE 21ST
AND ON NOT RELEASING LEBANESE TAKEN PRISONER ON SEPT
16-17 RAID. SOURCES STRESSED THAT ONCE QUESTION OF
NON-DELIVERED MESSAGE WAS GOTTEN OUT OF WAY, AND WITH
EXCEPTION PRISONER QUESTION, DAYAN HAD BEEN MORE
POSITIVE THAN BEFORE BOTH IN WHAT HE SAID ABOUT SYRIAN
AND LEBANESE SITUATIONS AND IN HIS DESIRE HAVE UNTSO
USE ITS "GOOD OFFICES".
40 SOURCES SAID THAT CHACOUB HAD OPENED MEETING DEC 7
BY SAYING HE HAD HEARD "FROM UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK"
THAT SILASVUO COMING TO PRESENT ULTIMATUM. WHEN SILASVUO
EXPLAINED THAT NOT AT ALL THE CASE AND EXPLAINED WHAT
HAD ACTUALLY TRANSPIRED VIS-A-VIS EGYPTIAN "MESSAGE",
CHACOUB RELAXED. IN RESPONSE To SILASVUO'S
QUESTIONS ABOUT SITUATION ALONG ISRAEL SYRIAN CEASE-
FIRE LINE AND SYRIAN INTENTIONS, CHACOUB APPEARED FAIRLY
FRANK AND MODERATE IN REPLY. HE SAID THAT SARG DOES
NOT RPT NOT INTEND VIOLATE CEASE-FIRE AND WILL FIRE
BACK ONLY WHEN FIRED UPON. HE SAID THAT SYRIAN ARMY
COULD NOT CONTROL FEDAYEEN 100PCT AT ALL TIMES ALONG THE
FRONTIER BUT SAID THAT FEDAYEEN INCIDENTS RECENTLY HAVE
BEEN VERY FEW IN NUMBER AND NOT SERIOUS. SILASVUO CAME
AWAY WITH IMPRESSION THAT SYRIANS ARE TRYING TO CONTROL
SITUATION NOW RPT NOW, AND CONSIDERED THAT CHACOUB'S
TONE MUCH MORE MODERATE THAN WHEN THEY LAST MET. HE
NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO INCIDENTS OF ANY KIND SINCE
NOV 25, WHICH SEEMS INDICATE SYRIAN DESIRE KEEP THINGS
QUIET.
5 ° WHEN ASKED ABOUT STATUS OF POSSIBLE SYRIAN SYRIAN-ISRAELI
ORISONER EXCHANGE, SOURCES SAID THAT SITUATION IS AGAIN
FROZEN, AND THAT ICRC REP THINKS IT LIKELY REMAIN so
FOR LONG TIME. SYRIANS INSIST THAT SIX OFFICERS TAKEN
ON JUNE 21ST BE RELEASED FIRST, AFTER WHICH THEY WILL
"COOPERATE WITH ICRC" IN DISCUSSING WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN
NEXT. ISRAELIS WANT FIRM COMMITMENT THAT SYRIANS WILL
RELEASE THEIR PRISONERS, EVEN IF ENTIRE OPERATION
DONE IN MORE THAN ONE PHASE, WHICH SYRIANS WILL NOT GIVE.
UNTSO CONSIDERS ITS ROLE RE PRISONERS HAS ENDED AND WILL
LEAVE MATTER TO ICRC.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED V THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 13282 081613Z
EXPIS EXPIS
6. CONCERNING MEETING WITH LEBANESE, SOURCES SAID THAT
BOTH GENERAL GHANEM AND DIB HAD EXPLAINED GOL POLICY
OF TRYING CONTROL FEDAYEEN AND HAD SAID THAT CAIRO
AGREEMENT PER SE MEANS NOTHING TO GOL. THEY HAD EX-
PRESSED USUAL VIEW THAT ISRAEL OFTEN LOOKED FOR PRE-
TEXTS ATTACK LEBANON AND FEARED THAT ISRAEL HAD SOME
LONGER-TERM INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS LEBANON WHICH WENT FAR
BEYOND PROVOCATION BY FEDAYEEN ACTION FROM LEBANON.
HOWEVER, THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT GOL IS DETERMINED
DO WHAT IT REASONABLY CAN TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN FROM
PROVIDING PRETEXTS. SILASVUO HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY DIB.
7. LEBANESE INQUIRED AS TO ISRAELS INTENTIONS RE
LEBANESE PRISONERS, BOTH THE OFFICER CAPTURED ON
JUNE 21ST AND THOSE TAKEN ON SEPT 16-17, EXPLAINING
THAT GOL DOES NOT CONSIDER THEM TO BE POWS AND HAS
FOLLOWED CONSISTENT PRACTICE OF RETURNING ANY ISRAELIS
WHO OCCASSIONALLY STRAY INTO LEBANESE TERRITORY. SIL-
ASVUO APPARENTLY INTENDS TACKLE DAYAN ON THIS POINT,
AT LEBANESE REQUEST, ALTHOUGH HE KNOWS DAYAN MAY
NOT REACT POSITIVELY. HE ALSO INTENDS SEE
HOW DAYAN WILL REACT TO REPLIES HE BRINGS AS TO LEBANESE
ATTITUDE TOWARD CAIRO ACCORDS AND SYRIAN INTENTIONS
ALONG CEASE-FIRE LINE.
8. IN GENERAL CONVERSATION ON SITUATION IN AREA SOURCES
SAID THAT SILASVUO CONSIDERS THAT ISRAEL, SYRIA AND
EGYPT ALL THREE APPEAR INTERESTED IN AVOIDING TROUBLE.
HE HOPES THAT THIS ATTITUDE CONTINUES AND THAT FEDAYEEN
IN SYRIA AND LEBANON WILL BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL, AS PRE-
SENTLY APPEARS BE CASE.
GDS
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXCES
*
Department of State
NITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
WH
SECRET 197
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10478 01 OF 02 291930Z
02
46
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
102082
R 291440Z SEP 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8757
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S E C R E T SECTION I OF 2 BEIRUT 10478
EXDIS
DEPT PASS TO DIA
SUBJ: ISRAEL AND LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN FEDAYEEN RELATIONS
1. SUMMARY: IN RECENT HIGH LEVEL CONVERSATION WITH USG OFFICIALS
AND IN THEIR PROPAGANDA, ISRAELIS HAVE SOUGHT TO PORTRAY LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT AS SOFTENING IN ITS CONTROLS OVER FEDAYEEN IN SOUTH
LEBANON AND REPRESENT BEIRUT AS CENTER OF "MURDER INTERNATIONAL.
THEY ARE WRONG ON BOTH COUNTS, AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO DISABUSE
THEM OF ANY NOTION THAT THIS IS A SHARED JUDGMENT. END SUMMARY.
2. THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT ASPECTS OF PROBLEM, ARTICULATED VERY
WELL BY RABIN TO SISCO: (A) PREVENTION OF USE OF SOUGTH LEBANON
AS BASE FOR ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AND (B) PEVENTION OF USE OF
BEIRUT FOR CLANDESTINE ANTI-ISRAEL TERROR ACTIVITIES.
OURTEL 10343 OF SEP 27 PROVIDED INTIMATE DETAIL OF LEBANESE
ARMY MEASURES TO INHIBIT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH. IN
ADDITION, OUR DEFENSE ATTACHE HAS JUST COMPLETED FULL DAY INSPECTION
EXPIS
OF ALL VILLAGES MOST RECENTLY ATTACKED BY ISRAEL. HIS DETAILED REPORT
BEING SUBMITTED SEPTEL AND CAN BE USED IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH
ISRAELIS, IF DEPT DESIRES. BRIEFLY, HE REPORTS THAT (A) IN
CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS VISITS, NO RPT NO FEDAYEEN WERE SEEN, AND
HE TOURED MOST OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES VISITED BY IDF ON SEP 16-17:
(B) LEBANESE ARMY HAD ROADBLOCKS AT ALL STRATEGIC POINTS AND
SHIFTED THEM PERIODICALLY, EFFECTIVELY DENYING FEDAYEEN POSSIBILITY
OF TRAVELLING BY ROAD (ALTHOUGH TERRAIN IS SUCH THAT INDIVIDUAL
FEDAYEEN NOT CARRYING HEAVY LOADS COULD CIRCUMVENT CHECKPOINTS BY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE-AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10478 01 OF 02 291930Z
USING ROUGH GROUND RATHER THAN ROADS) (C) ARMY PERSONNEL AT
CHECKPOINTS AND ELSEWHERE WERE ALERT AND DOING THOROUGH JOB IN
SEARCHING ANY SUSPICIOUS VEHICLES MA INDIVIDUALS: AND (D) ARMY
ENFORCING STRICTLY ITS DIRECTIVES OF SEPT 17 WHICH ISRAELIS CLAIM
HAVE BEEN QUIETLY ABANDONED. ON LATTER POINT, ALL OUR INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS INDICATE ARMY CONTINUING ENFORCE TH S DIRECTIVE, AND
SHOOTING INCIDENTS BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND ARMY ARE AVERAGING ABOUT
ONE PER DAY AS RESULT. ALSO, STATE OF EMERGENCY CONTINUES IN
EFFECT THROUGHOUT COUNTRY, WITH ARMY CHECKPOINTS AND SPOT-
SEARCHES CONDUCTED OF VEHICLES AND SUSPICIOUS PERSONS IN MANY
LOCATIONS, RANGING FROM NORTH OF TRIPOLI TO MANY SPOTS IN AND
AROUND BEIRUT, AS WELL AS SOUTH LEBANON, AND PARTICULARLY
AROUND REFUGEE CAMPS.
4. WITH THESE INCREASINGLY SEVERE RESTRICTIONS AND DETERMINATION
OF PRES FRANGIE TO CONTINUE THEM, I BELIEVE THAT EVEN THE SMALL
NUMBER OF CROSS-BORDER INCIDENTS OF PAST YEAR WILL DECREASE. IT
IS, OF COURSE, IMPOSSIBLE FOR LEBANESE TO ASSURE THAT THERE WILL
NEVER BE ANOTHER PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA TO CROSS BORDER OR FIRE
EXBIN
INTO ISRAEL, ANY MORE THAN IDF CAN GUARANTEE NONE WILL AGAIN
ELUDE ITS SURVEILLANCE. GIVEN NATUE OF TERRAIN ALONG BORDER, THIS
IS NOT POSSIBLE. THUS IT IS NOT UNLIKELY THAT AFTER PERIOD OF
COMPLETE CALM, FEDAYEEN MAY AGAIN TRY DELIBERATELY TO PROVOKE
ISRAEL (AS THEY DID IN EARLY SEPT) WITH LEBANESE ARMY HAVING
DIFFICULTY STOPPING ALL SUCH ATTEMPTS.
5 . IN CONSIDERING DAMAGE ACTUALLY DONE BY SUCH ISOLATED INCIDENTS
IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO NOE THAT SINCE LEBANESE ARMY MOVED INTO
' ARQUB AND ESTABLISHED SOME CONTROLS ON FEDAYEEN MOVEMENTS
LAST MARCH 1ST, OUR STATISTICS (BASED ON ISRAELI REPORTS TO UN AND
TELEGRAMS FROM EMBASSY AND DAO TEL AVIV) SHOW NO RPT NO ISRAELI
CIVILIAN DEAD OR WOUNDED AS RESULT OF CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS FROM
LEBANON, ALTHOUGH 3 ISRAELI SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN KILLED AND SEVEN
WOUNDED (ANOTHER 2 IDF KIA AND 5 WIA RESULTED FROM INCIDENT
WITH MINE REPORTED USDAO TEL AVIV 497 BUT NOT IDENTIFIED AS
HAVING ORIGIN IN LEBANON). DURING SAME PERIOD, AS RESULT OF
ISRAELI REPRISALS, OUR OWN COUNT (NOT THE GOL COUNT) SHOWS 80
LEBANESE CIVILIANS KILLEDHOND SOME 122 WOUNDED. (WE HAVE NOT
INCLUDED LEBANESE OR ISRAELI MILITARY CASUALTIES DURING SEP 16-17
OPERATION, NOR LEBANESE GENDARME AND MILITARY KILLED AND CAPTURED
DURING JUNE 21ST RAID). OBVIOUSLY, ONE CANNOT GET AT THIS PROBLEM
MERELY BY SHOWING THE TREMENDOUS DISPARTIY IN ISRAELI REPRISALS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE-AUTHORIZATION OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
A KODNCED
MOITASIROHTUA
EXECUTIVE
2ECKELVBA
Department of State
NITED STATES OF AMERICANT
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 10478 01 OF 02 291930Z
TO THE PROVOCATION, BUT WE ARE PLEASED TO NOTE CONSIDERABLE
CRITICISM IN US PRESS ABOUT SUBSTANTIAL AND QUESTIONABLE LOSS OF
LIFE INFLICTED BY ISRAEL IN PURSUIT OF ITS CURRENT POLICIES.
6. IN SHORT, WE BELIEVE THAT LEBANESE ARE DOING MAXIMUM THEY
CAN TO CONTROL PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS WITH MEN AND MATERIAL
AVAILABLE AND WITH OTHER DEMANDS ON 14,000-MAN ARMYIE.G.,
DEFENSE AGAINST REGULAR OR IRREGULAR ATTACK FROM SYRIA, SECURITY
PROTECTION IN BEIRUT AND OTHER CITIES FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL/
PURPOSES). TO DO MORE WOULD RUN VERY SERIOUS RISK OF UNLEASHING
JORDAN-TYPE CONFRONTATION WITH 5,000 FEDAYEEN REGULARS SUPPORTED
BY LARGE NUMBERS OF 300,000 PALESTINIANS AND MANY OF 200,000
SYRIANS IN LEBANON PLUS STRONG POSSIBILITY OF INVOLVING SOME
8.000 OR MORE FEDAYEEN/PLA EFFECTIVES AND EVEN REGULAR ARMY FORCES
(DOUBTLESS MASQUERADING AS SA'IQAI FROM SYRIA. THIS COULD EASILY
BRING ABOUT WHOLESALE CIVIL WAR WITH CERTAINTY OF MAJOR FIGHTING
IN AND DAMAGE TO BEIRUT AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES (SEE OUR A=88 OF
MARCH 24).
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DIA
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
STATEMENT OF STATE
*
EXCES
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 011
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10478 02 OF 02 2918237
46
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
101516
R 291440Z SEP 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8758
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 10478
EXDIS
DEPT PASS TO DIA
SUBJ: ISRAEL AND LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN RELATIONS
7. THE SECOND ISRAELI CONCERN, NAMELY TERRORISM, IS MUCH MORE
SERIOUS THAN THREAT OF CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS BY PALESTINE
GUERRILLAS FROM SOUTH LEBANON. BEIRUT'S 9844. 10162, AND
10174 EXPLAIN WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THIS
THREAT TO ISRAELI AND WESTERN INTERESTS so FAR AS LEBANON IS
CONCERNED, AND WHAT WE THINK GOL CAN AND CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO
DO ABOUT IT. BRIEFLY, LEBANON IS NO LMPGER, EVEN IF IT MAY ONCE
HAVE BEEN, THE MAJOR BASE FOR TERRORIST OPERATIONS. MOST CER-
TAINLY IT IS NOT THE CENTER OF TERRORIST BROADCASTING AND PUBLISHING
AS ALLEGED BY EBAN TO SECRETARY. SUCH ACTIVITIES HAVE OVER RECENT
MONTHS BEEN SHIFTED PRIMARILY TO DAMASCUS. AND WHILE PLO HAS
IMPORTANT OFFICES HERE, PLO ALSO HAS OFFICES ELSEWHERE INCLUDING
NEW YORK. WHILE WE CONTINUE URGE MORE EFFECTIVE GOL MOVES TO
INHIBIT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, TO PUT PROBLEM BLUNTLY, NEITHER THE
OCCUPATION OF SOUTH LEBANON NOR INDEED ALL OF LEBANON WOULD
MATERIALLY REDUCE THE POTENTIAL OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS. BY
ITS VERY NATURE, CLANDESTINE, SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY SIMPLY
CANNOT BE STAMPED OUT BY LEBANESE ANY MORE THAN THE ISRAELIS CAN
DO IT IN TERRITORIES THEY CONTROL SUCH AS GAZA AND EVEN IN
SUPERMARKETS IN JERUSALEM (SEE JERUSALEM 7321.
8. IN LIGHTOF CONSIDERATIONS CITED ABOVE, WE FIND IT HARD TO
EXPLAIN FEROCITY OF ISRAELI CAMPAIGN AGAINST LEBANON. WE FIND
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM DS-1652 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10478 02 OF 02 291823Z
EXPIS EXE™
EVEN MORE PUZZLING THE DELIBERATE ISRAELI DOWNPLAYING OF THREAT
FROM SYRIA BOTH DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLLY (VIA FEDAYEEN) THROUGH
LEBANON. QUESTIONS ON THIS ASPECT OF GOI POLICY ASKED BY ZURHELLEN
AND SECRETARY ARE VERY PERTINENT YET MET ONLY EVASIVE REPLIES.
FEDAYEEN RECEIVE THEIR ARMS THROUGH SYRIA. SYRIAN MILITARY
AND POLITICAL PRESSURES MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR GOL TO
CONTROL FEDAYEEN. IT IS SYRIANS, WITH APPARENT SOV BACKING, WHO
DELIBERATELY HEATED UP FEDAYEEN ACTION ALONG SYRIA- ISRAEL AND
LEBANON- ISRAEL BORDERS. AND IT IS THROUGH SYRIA THAT MOST NON-
PALESTINIANS (SUCH AS SA'IQA, TURKISH TERRORISTS, LIBYAN VOLUNTEERS,
ETC.) MOVE TO JOIN RANKS WITH FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. SYRIA PRESENTLY
PROVIDES GREATER REFUGE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND PROGPAGANDA
FOR PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS (AS DISTINCT FROM GUERRILLAS) THAN DOES
LEBANON. MOE ISRAELI PRESSURE ON LEBANON WILL NOT HELP CURE
SITUATION IN SYRIA. IN OUR VIEW, IT WILL MAKE IT WORSE, AND SYRIANS
(AND PROBABLY SOVS) WILL BE DELIGHTED AT WHAT BEFALLS THEIR SMALL
RO-WESTERN NEIGHBOR.
9. TO SUM UP, CONTINUED ISRAELI AND WESTERN PRESSURS ON GOL (AND
OTHER ARAB GOVTS) TO CRACK-DOWN ON PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS AND
GUERRILLAS ARE ESSENTIAL IN ORDER LIMIT DAMAGE THEY CAN DO TO
ISRAELI AND WESTERN INTERESTS. HOWEVER, EXCESSIVE ISRAELI PRESSURE
ON LEBANON WHICH LEADS EITHER TO SITUATION APPROACHING ANARACHY
OR CIVIL WAR, OR IDF OCCUPATION OF SOUTH LEBANON "PERMANENT
PATROLLING"), WOULD ACCTUALLY DIMINISH RATHER THAN AGUMENT GOL
WILL AND ABILITY CONTROL PALESTINIANS ON ITS TERRITORY. MOREOVER IT
WOULD POSE SERIOUS THREAT TO SECURITY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS INTERESTS IN LEBANON.
GDS.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DIA
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
bolleo/ie9
FORM DS-1652 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 869
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10343 01 OF 02 271405Z
'72 SEP
02
51
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
0 R 271310Z SEP 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8713
27 088254 22
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 10343
EXDIS
NOFORN
DEPT PASS DIA
SUBJ: LEBANESE RESTRICTIONS ON FEDAYEEN
1 - SUMMARY: INFORMATION RECEIVED SEP 26 FROM SENIOR LEBANESE
EXCES EXCES
MILITARY OFFICER DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN
SHOWS LEBANESE VIGOR AND FIRMNESS IN MAINTAINING RESTRICTINS
WHICH IS TOTALLY AT VARIANCE WITH PICTURE OF "BUSINESS AS USUAL"
GIVEN SECRETARY AND SISCO BY ISRAELIS. ORIGINAL ARMY DIRECTIVES
ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED AND EFFORTS UNDERCUT THEM ARE BEING
RESISTED (ALTHOUGH GOL DOES MAINTAIN DIALOGUE WITH FEDAYEEN
AND DOES NOT DESCRIBE ARMY DIRECTIVES AS ULTIMATUM.)
FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON DRASTICALLY REDUCED
FROM WHAT IT WAS PRIOR SEP 16 AND IS NOT RPT NOT INCREASING.
LEBANESE ARMY HAS BEEN WORKING THUS FAR UNDER DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS
FROM PRESIDENCY (BYPASSING PRIME MINISTER SAEB SALAMI
TO ASSURE TO EXTENT OF ITS CAPABILITIES THAT ISRAELIS ARE
OFFERED NO FURTHER PROVOCATION BY PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA CROSS-
BORDER OPERATIONS. SPECIFICS OF CONVERSATION REPORTED BELOW
so SENSITIVE THAT I REGRET WE CANNOT USE THEM WITH ISRAELIS
TO REBUT ALLEGATIONS OF LEBANESE BACKSLIDING. HOWEVER, BASED
UPON OBSERVATIONS OF OUR DEFENSE ATTACHE WHO TOURING SOUTH
LEBANON TODAY AND OTHER INFO AVAILABLE TO US, WE WILL PREPARE
DETAILED BRIEF SEP 28 FOR USE IN FURTHER REVIEW OF DETAILS WITH
ISRAELIS. END SUMMARY.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3,5
NLN 09-13/20 per sec 3.3 Hr. 1/22/2010
By AM
NARA, Date 11/15/2010
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIF ED This 57 document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES of AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EXCES EXCES EXCES
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10343 01 OF 02 2714052
2.
)
BRIEFED EMBOFF EVENING
SEP 26. HE SAID THAT LEBANESE ARMY HAS BEEN DOING ITS BEST TO
IMPLEMENT INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED ON SEP 17 AND HAS DONE WELL, WITH
ADDITIONAL PROGRESS HAVING BEEN MADE IN PAST TWO DAYS AND MORE
EXPECTED. SITUATION IN CENTRAL SECTORS (I.E., LEBANON SOUTH OF
LITTANI EXCLUDING ARKUB) HAS BEEN STABILIZED WITH APPROX
TWO HUNDRED FEDAYEEN REMAINING IN AREA (COMMENT: THIS IS
LOWER THAN EARLIER ESTIMATES BY GOV LAHOUD OF ABOUT 300 LEFT IN
CENTRAL SECTOR). THEY ARE GROUPED IN THREE SEPARATE LOCATIONS
(AWAY FROM VILLAGES) PROPOSED BY LEBANESE ARMY AND AGREED TO
BY FEDAYEEN IN PRESENCE OF
ON SEP 24. NEAREST
LOCATION TO LEBANESE ISRAELI BORDER IS THIRTEEN KILOMETERS AND
WELL BEHIND LEBANESE ARMY LINES. SAIQA REP AS WELL AS FATAH
REP ABU ZAIM SAID THEY ACCEPTED ARMY INSTRUCTIONS AND DEMAND
THAT INSTRUCTIONS BE ENFORCED BY THE ARMY AND NOT RPT NOT BY
FEDAYEEN. SOME TWENTY FEDAYEEN REMAINING IN JOUAYA AREA WERE
ROUNDED UP AND MOVED OUT DURING DAY SEP 26. (COMMENT: WE HAD
RECEIVED REPORTS ON SEP 25 OF SMALL FEDAYEEN PRESENCE AT
JOUAYA ON SEP 24 AS WELL AS STRONG PROTESTS BY INHABITANTS
OVER THIS PRESENCE.)
ALSO SAID THAT TWO SMALL BAYS ALONG
COAST JUST NORTH OF TYRE (SOMETIMES USED BY SMALL FEDAYEEN
CRAFT WHICH OCCASIONALLY ATTEMPT HARASS ISRAELIS'S PATROL BOATS
WHICH COME CLOSE INSHORE) HAD BEEN CLEANED OUT ON SEP 25.
(COMMENT: THESE ARE PROBABLY COASTAL "BASES" REFERRED TO BY
GEN SHALEV IN TEL AVIV DATT 1479 SEP 24 UNLESS LATTER MEANT
REFUGEE CAMP WHICH IS ON COAST JUST SOUTH OF TYRE.)
3. SITUATION IN ARKUB STILL HAS SOME WAY TO GO BUT IS IMPROVING
SAID. LEBANESE ARMY HAS DECIDED ALLOW THIRTY RPT THIRTY
FEDAYEEN TO REMAIN IN AREA SOUTH OF CHEBAA. HSBAYAH ROAD,
PAYING THIS PRICE IN NUMBER BEFORE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN EVACUATION
OF ALL OTHERS FROM SOUTH OF THAT ROAD WITHOUT FIRE FIGHT WHICH
COULD TOUCH OFF CHAIN REACTION WITH FIGHTING MILITIA ELSEWHERE
IN LEBANON AND CAUSE REFUGEE CAMPS TO ERUPT. THIRTY FEDAYEEN
WILL BE CONFINED TO THREE LOCATIONS AWAY FROM VILLAGES AND MUST
HAVE PERMISSION
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DIA.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION or ЧЕ EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2 OF 5
TEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
INITED 3 STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 858
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10343 02 OF 02 271359Z
51
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
080117
o R 2713102 SEP 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8714
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 10343
EXDIS
DEPT PASS DIA
NOFORN
SUBJ: LEBANESE RESTRICTIONS ON FEDAYEEN
FROM LEBANESE ARMY TO MOVE ELSEWHERE.
BELIEVES FEDAYEEN
IN SOUTH ARKUB WILL BE DOWN TO THIRTY BY NEXT WEEK. MASS OF FEDAYEEN
HAVE MOVED NORTH FROM ARKUB TO DAR EL AA'CHAR REGION NEAR SYRIA.
4.
DESCRIBED AN ADDITIONAL INCIDENT BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND
LEBANESE ARMY WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET REPORTED. ON SEP 25 AT
RACHAYAH (CENTRAL ARKUB) TWO FEDAYEEN WERE ARRESTED FOR TRYING PASS
CHECKPOINT ARMED. TWO OF THEIR COMRADES DROVE UP IN VOLKSWAGEN AND
CHALLENGED SOLDIERS AT CHECKPOINT WHO OPENED FIRE, WOUNDING ONE
PEDAYEEN.
SAID THAT FATAH AND SAIQA REPS HAVE AGREED TO CONSIDER THIS AND
EXQIS
OTHER INCIDENTS AS ISOLATED ONES ADMITTING THEIR LACK OF FULLICONTROL
OVER ALL FEDAYEEN. ARMY DOES NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT PROTESTATIONS
OF LACK OF CONTROL OR OTHER STATEMENTS BY FEDAYEEN LEADERS AT FACE
VALUE, ACCORDING TO
BUT IF IT KEEPS FEDAYEEN AND THEIR SYMPA-
THIZERS IN LEBANON FROM GOING ON WARPATH, ARMY WILL ACCEPT IT. ARMY
CONTINUING TALK (NOT RPT NOT NEGOTIATE) WITH FEDAYEEN FOR SAME REASON ®
IT HELPS CALM OVEREXCITED PEOPLE IN REFUGEE CAMPS AND ELSEWHERE WHO
COULD BECOME VIOLENT DUE TO WILD RUMORS ABOUT ARMY PLOT TO MASSACRE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SUTRORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
P.30F5
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10343 02 OF 02 271359Z
PALESTINIANS.
5. ASKED ABOUT SITUATION IN AINATA (VILLAGE OUTSIDE BINT JBEIL - PARA
5 STATE 1744091
CONFIRMED WHAT EMBOFF HAD BEEN TOLD ON SEP 25
BY GOV OF SOUTH (LAHOUD). I.E., THERE HAVE BEEN NO FEDAYEEN THERE
SINCE SEP 16. THERE WAS ONE ATTEMPT BY SAIQA SINCE SEP 16 TO RETURN
TO AINATA BUT PEOPLE OF VILLAGE OPENED FIRE ON THEM. SINCE THEN, ARMY
HAS ESTABLISHED POSTS IN AINATA, MEJDEL SELIM AND SEVERAL OTHER
VILLAGES WHICH FORMERLY HELD FEDAYEEN. LOCAL POPULACE IS ENTHUSIAS-
TICALLY SUPPORTING ARMY IN KEEPING FEDAYEEN OUT OF VILLAGES.
60
SAID HE HAD OBSERVED INTERESTING CHANGE IN
ATTITUDE SAIQA FEDAYEEN OVER PAST FORTY-EIGHT HOURS. THEY ARE
ACCEPTING, OR AT LEAST APPEARING TO ACCEPT, ARMY INSTRUCTIONS
MORE READILY THAN EVER BEFORE AND GIVE APPEARANCE OF BEING MORE
REASONABLE THAN FATAH. THIS IS COMPLETE REVERSAL OF SITUATION
OVER PAST SEVERAL WEEKS WHERE SAIQA HAS BEEN HARD-LINER, USUALLY
RESULTING IN FATAH TO TAKE HARD LINE RATHER THAN BE HUMILIATED BY
SAIQA. LEBANESE ARMY AS YET UNABLE EXPLAIN WHAT LIES BEHIND THIS
APPARENT SHIFT AND DOES NOT KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL
ADDED
THAT AT ILMAC MEETING EARLIER THIS WEEK LEBANESE HAD ASKED IDF
REP TO EXPLAIN GOI POLICY TOWARD SYRIA WHICH SEEMED REMARKABLY
TBFERANT WHEN COMPARED TO GOI POLICY TOWARD LEBANON AND DIRECT
RESPONSIBILITY SARG IN INSTIGATING ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL FROM
BOTH SYRIA AND LEBANON. IDF REP REPLIED HE COULD NOT ANSWER
QUESTION.
7. FINALLY,
CONFIRMED WHAT WE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN
TOLD THIS WEEK BY GOV. LAHOUD AND PRESIDENCY DIRECTOR GENERAL
DIB, I.E., UNDER PRESENT EMERGENCY CONDITIONS LEBANESE ARMY DOES
EXCES
NOT RPT NOT TAKE ORDERS FROM PRIME MINISTER SALAM AND IS WORKING
DIRECTLY WITH PRES FRANGIE. PRIME MINISTER MEETS WITH
FEDAYEEN, MAKES PUBLIC DECLARATIONS AND IS USEFUL IN CALMING
FEARS OF PALESTINIANS AND DILUTING CRITICISM OF GOL INTERNALLY
AND OTHER ARAB STATES. HOWEVER, AFTER BAD EXPERIENCES WITH
PRIME MINISTER AND FEDAYEEN IN NEGOTTATING AND IMPLEMENTING
DETAILS OF LAST JUNE'S UNDERSTANDING, ARMY HAS THUS FAR BEEN
HANDLING SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS WITH FEDAYEEN WITH GUIDANCE FROM
PRESIDENCY. (COMMENT: LAHOUD TOLD EMBOFF SEP 25 THAT PRIME
MINISTER UNDER SUCH HEAVY FIRE FROM SYRIA, LIBYA, ETC., THAT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION )F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified 20 P.40E5
DOPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 10343 02 OF 02 271359Z
HE MIGHT EMULATE FORMER PM KARAME AND RESIGN. HOWEVER, HIS PRESS
CONFERENCE OF SEP 25 (BEIRUT 10290) SEEMS INDICATE HE HAS DECIDED
STICK WITH FRANGIE.)
8. COMMENT:
HAS GIVEN US ACCURATE INFORMATION
IN PAST AND DOES NOT TEND EXAGGERATE. HE DID NOT RPT NOT
CLAIM THAT ALL INDIVIDUAL FEDAYEEN MOVEMENTS ON OR OFF ROADS
OR OUTSIDE AGREED ZONES WERE CONTROLLED. THIS OBVIOUSLY BEYOND
CAPARILITY LEBANESE ARMY JUST AS IDF OCCASIONALLY ALLOWS FEDAYEEN
PATROLS SLIP PAST ITS BORDER CONTROL NET. HE ASKED THAT HIS DETAILED
INFO BE HELD WITHIN USG. WE HAVE NO REPORTS AT THIS TIME FROM ANY
OTHER SOURCES WHICH CONFLICT WITH WHAT HE SAID.
XGDS-1.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DIA.
EXQIC
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified P.50F5
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
WH
SECRET 667
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09846 151616Z
42
ACTION SS-25
EXCLUS
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 1026 W
120669
R 151101Z SEP 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8500
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SEE C R ET BEIRUT 9846
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS USINT CAIRO
SUBJ: TRAVEL TO SYRIA
TAKING ACCOUNT OF ARREST OF MCCLINTOCK, DETENTION MAJOR
BARRATT INCOMMUNICADO, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY OF ALL GIVEN
PROBABILITY MAJOR ISRAELI STRIKES AGAINST SYRIA ITEL
AVIV 59751, AS PRECAUTION FOR SAFETY OF AMERICAN
CITIZENS, I RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCE TEMPORARY BAN TRAVEL
OF ALL REPEAT ALL AMERICANS TO SYRIA. AT MOMENT, OF COURSE,
ALL OFFICIAL TRAVEL IS BANNED AND WE DISCOURAGE
PRIVATE TRAVELERS WHEN OUR VIEWS ARE ASKED.I THINK
FOR ABOVE REASONS, WE SHOULD NOW GO BEYOND THIS
AND MAKE GENERAL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT BECAUSE
OF "UNCERTAIN SECURITY SITUATION IN THE AREA" ALL
AMERICAN TRAVELERS SHOULD AVOID SYRIA.
GDS.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: BEIRUT 9846 NOT PASSED CAIRO.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
WH
SECRET 537
ACTION SS-25
'72 JUL 6 PM 008897 33
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07385 061710Z
50
SITUATION ROOM SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
Im
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
R 061535Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7807
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
S: E C R E T BEIRUT 7385
EXDIS
1 . PRIME MINISTER SAEB SALAM TOLD ME AT SMALL LUNCH
TODAY HE CONSIDERS AGREEMENT WITH FEDAYEEN LEADERS HAS
BEEN CARRIED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. HE INDICATED IT
INVOLVES FOLLOWING SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON PART OF ARAFAT:
A . CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS WILL BE DISCONTINUED.
B. MAJORITY OF FEDAYEEN WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM ARQOUB.
(PM ACKNOWLEDGED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO VERIFY
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS AMONG OTHER REASONS BECAUSE ARAFAT
CLAIMS ONLY 250 FEDAYEEN PRESENT IN ARQOUB WHEREAS
ARMY FIGURES SHOW CLOSE TO 2,000).
C. FEDAYEEN MUST EVACUATE ALL VILLAGES IN SOUTH.
D. FEDAYEEN WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO APPEAR IN PUBLIC
PLACES IN UNIFORM OR BEARING ARMS.
2. SALAM ALSO SATISFIED THAT ARAFAT WOULD MAKE GOODFAITH
EFFORT TO ASSURE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROVISIONS OF
UNDERSTANDING.
3. AT SAME TIME, HE ACKNOWLEDGED SOME INCIDENTS COULD
STILL OCCUR: NOTING HE HAD JUST RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED REPORT
THAT TWO MEMBERS OF EXTREMIST PFLO-GENERAL COMMAND HAD
THIS MORNING CROSSED INTO ISRAEL, ONE OF WHOM KILLED AND ONE
WOUNDED BY ISRAELIS. (GENERAL COMMAND HAS BEEN
WIDELY KNOWN AS HOLD-OUT FROM AGREEMENT REACH WITH ARAFAT.)
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
OF
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIC
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07385 061710Z
4. GENERAL COMMAND LEADER, GABRIL, SOUGHT APPOINTMENT WITH
SAEB SALAM YESTERDAY. LATTER REFUSED TO SEE HIM FEARING IT
WOULD ENHANCE THE MANOS STATURE AMONG PALESTINIANS AND BELIEVING
HE WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN MODERATING HIS VIEWS.
5. SALAM CONSIDERS SYRIANS BEAR MAJORITY RESPONSIBILITY
FOR GABRIL'S OBSTREPEROUS BEHAVIOR, ALTHOUGH HE AGREED THAT
GENERAL COMMAND HAS BEEN GETTING SUBSTANTIAL SUBSIDY FROM
LIBYANS.
6. EXCEPT FOR SUCH ISOLATED INCIDENTS, WHICH GOL WILL DO ITS
BEST TO PREVENT, SALAM RELATIVELY OPTIMISTIC THAT AGREEMENT
WITH FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP WILL HOLD: HE HOPED IT WOULD LAST
AT LEAST UNTIL NOVEMBER, HE SAID.
7. PRIME MINISTER WAS SATISFIED HE HAS CARRIED PROCESS
AS FAR AS POSSIBLE FOR THE TIME BEING AND IS PLANNING
TO DEPART FOR EUROPEAN VACATION OVER COMING WEEKEND.
COMMENT: WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE ISRAELIS SHOULD GIVE
LEBANESE REASONABLE PERIOD IN WHICH TO ASSURE, AS FAR
AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE, THAT FEDAYEEN ATTACKS ON ISRAELI
TERRITORY FROM LEBANON ARE IN FACT BROUGHT TO
A HALT. WE ARE, THEREFORE, PLEASED WITH APPROACH DEPT
HAS SUGGESTED EMBASSY TEL AVIV TAKE WITH GOI AS OUTLINED
IN PARA 2 OF DEPTEL 120909.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be 01//20/19 declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
DS-1652
PREARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
W &
SECRET 644
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07197 301210Z
52-50
JUN 30 |PM 12 10
SITUATION
ACTION SS-25
WHITE FOOM
OM
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
098903
R 301043Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7760
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 1983
S E COR EST BEIRUT 7197
EXDIS
EXPIS
DEPT PASS USINT CAIRO
SUBJ: LEBANESE RESTRICTIONS ON FEDAYEEN
REF: BEIRUT 7144
1. PRES FRANGIE GAVE ME RUN-DOWN JUNE 30 ON STATUS HIS
EFFORTS TO BRING FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON UNDER TIGHTER
CONTROL AND TO ASSURE AGAINST FURTHER BORDER INCIDENTS
WITH ISRAEL. HE CONF ONFIRMED GENERALLY CONTENTS REFTEL.
2° AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED BETWEEN GOL AND ®ARAFAT
ALTHOUGH SOME POINTS REMAIN TO BE WORKED OUT. PRESIDENT
DID NOT PROVIDE ALL DETAILS BUT SAID IT INCLUDED
EVACUATION OF FEDAYEEN FROM BORDER AREAS AND FROM
VILLAGES IN SOUTH.
3. POINTS COVERED IN AGREEMENT ARE COMMITTED TO
WRITING SO THERE CAN BE NO FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDING.
TO GIVE AGREEMENT GREATER WEIGHT, COPIES HAVE BEEN
PROVIDED KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA WHO HAVE BEEN MOST
HELPFUL. (FRANGIE SAID AMIR OF KUWAIT AND SAQQAF WERE
VERY TOUGH WITH ARAFAT, TELLING HIM FUTURE FINANCIAL
SUPPORT WOULD DEPEND ON HIS FULL COOPERATION WITH
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXX
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07197 301210Z
LEBANESE GOVT.)
4. FRANGIE BELIEVES ARAFAT CAN MAKE AGREEMENT STICK
WITH MOST FEDAYEEN EXCEPT POSSIBLY TINY SPLINTER GROUP
SUCH AS GENERAL COMMAND. PFLP.
5. FRANGIE SAID SYRIAN-RUN RUN SA'IQA IS NOW ABOARD
ALTHOUGH ADMITTED THAT SYRIAN LEADERS VERY MERCURIAL
AND THAT HE DID NOT KNOW FROM ONE DAY TO NEXT WHAT TO
EXPECT OF THEM. (HE WAS DISTURBED AT REPORTS SYRIANS
DISTRIBUTING ARMS TO THEIR SUPPORTERS IN AREAS OF
LEBANON ALONG SYRIAN FRONTIER THAT USED TO BELONG TO
SYRIA.)
6. AGREEMENT COVERS ONLY RPT ONLY PALESTINIANS (AND
SYRIAN SA'IQA) IN LEBANON. I ASKED WHERE THAT LEAVES
GOL IN RELATION TO LIBYANS AND OTHER NON-PALESTINIAN
COMMANDOS IN SOUTH LEBANON. FRANGIE REPLIED IF THEY
DO NOT BEHAVE THEY CLEARLY SUBJECT TO DIRECT REPRESSION
OF LEBANESE ARMY. (HE IMPLIED PALESTINIANS WILL BE
HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR DISCIPLINING THEIR OWN PEOPLE IN
EVENT AGREEMENT BREACHED
7. PRESIDENT RECOGNIZED MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE AND
THAT ACTIONS ON THE GROUND ARE WHAT WILL COUNT.
8. HE WAS PLEASED THAT LEBANESE ARMY REMAINS SOLIDLY
BEHIND HIS EFFORTS AND VERY PLEASED BY NEWS THAT USG
IS ABLE EXPEDITE DELIVERY 50 APC'S (STATE 117796).
9. ONE MAJOR PROBLEM FOR GOL IS CONSTANT EFFORT BY
ARAB GOVTS SUCH AS LIBYA ALGERIA AND EGYPT, TO OUTBID
EACH OTHER AS CHAMPIONS OF PALESTINIAN CAUSE. HE
CONTINUES TO WORRY ABOUT IMPACT SUCH EFFORTS COULD
HAVE ON MOSLEM MASSES IN THE CITIES IN EVENT OF A
SHOW-DOWN.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
Ell/eo/1e9
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT or STATE
CRONI IHE
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
W/
SECRET 760
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06970 261314Z
2
50
ACTION SS-25
3
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
060630
P 261221Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FRIORITY 7707
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AIV PRIORITY
USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1973
SSEC R ETT BEIRUT 6970
EXDIS
DEPT PASS AS DESIRED
SUBJ: ISRAEL-LEBANON-SYRIA
REF: STATE 114119
1. OUR 6942 REPORTED THAT SARG HAD INFORMED LEBANESE
MILITARY THAT SYRIA HAD OFFERED TO EXCHANGE ISRAELI
PRISONERS IT HELD FOR THOSE HELD BY ISRAEL BUT HAD
SET DEADLINE FOR ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER (TEL
AVIV 4119 CONFIRMS).
2° ON JUNE 25 LEBANESE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF INFORMED
EMBOFF THAT SARG HAD WITHDRAWN ITS OFFER OF EXCHANGE
BECAUSE ISRAELIS DID NOT ACCEPT IT WITHIN SPECIFIED
DEADLINE. LEBANESE MILITARY CONTINUE TO BE SHOCKED
AT CALLOUS SYRIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD PRISONERS BUT BELIEVE
THAT SARG DECISION ON NON-EXCHANGE IS FIRM.
3. WE CONVEYED TO LEBANESE FONOFF ON JUNE 25 ISRAELI
IDEA OF OVERALL PRISONER EXCHANGE CONTAINED REFTEL.
FONOFF INFORMED US JUNE 26 THAT GOL POSITION ON PRISONER
EXCHANGE REMAINS UNCHANGED.
GP-3.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
FORM
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DS-1652
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 168
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06942 242033Z
63
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
054487
O 241901Z
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7701
INFO USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECRET BEIRUT 6942
EXDIS
SUBJ: ISRAEL-LEBANON-SYRIA
1. BASED ON CONVERSATION WITH LEBANESE MILITARY, PARTICULARLY DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF COLONEL KANNAN, WE HAVE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS ON
QUESTIONS
RAISED IN TEL AVIV 4102 AND 4134 AND STATE 114024.
2. SYRIAN OFFICERS IN LEBANON A. THERE HAVE BEEN OCCASIONAL EXCHANGE
VISITS BY LEBANESE AND SYRIAN OFFICERS FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS,
INAUGURATED APPRENTLY BY GENERAL TLASS AFTER FRANGIE BECAME
PRESIDENT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY ULTERIRO MILIRARY
PURPOSE ON PART OF LEBANESE BUT OF COURSE CAN NOT ANSWER FOR
SYRIAN MOTIVES. B . HOWEVER, LEBANESE MILITARY TELL US THAT SYRIANS
HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE CONCERNED OVER POSSIBILITY OF IDF USING ROUTE
THROUGH THE ARKUB AND KEKKA (WHERE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN
BOMBING JUNE 22 AND 23)
FOR BACKDOOR ATTACK" ON SYRIA. THE FEDAYEEN ROUTE FROM SYRIA
TO LEBANON RUNS ALONG SERIES OF VALLEYS FROM VILLAGE OF DAR AL
ACHAAR NEAR SYRIAN-LEBANESE BORDER TO VILLAGE OF AIN ATA JUST
NORTH OF KFEIR) IN ARKUB WHERE IT JOINS REGULAR ROAD LEADING
TO RACHAYA. FEDAYEEN HAVE BEEN USING THIS ROUTE SINCE CAIRO
AGREEMENT IN ORDER AVOID CONTACT WITH LEBANESE POPULATION.
NOW THAT ISRAELIS HAVE BUILT ROAD DOWN INTO ARKUB AT CHEBAA,
LEBANESE MILITARY SAY THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR IDF
TO CUT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ISOLATED VILLAGE OF CHEBAA AND REST
OF LEBANON, TAKE BULLDOZERS UP TO AIN ATA (VIRTUALLY OUT OF
COMMUNICATION WITH REST OF LEBANON AS IS CHEBAA) AND CLEAR WAY
FOR TRUCKS AND TANKS TO MOVE QUICKLY AND UNREPORTED INTO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE-AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06942 242033Z
SYRIA. ONE CAN ALREADY GO FROM CHEBAA TO DAR WL ACHAAR BY BACK
ROUTE IN JEEP. THUS SYRIANS ARE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT MILITARY
IMPLICATION FOR THEM OF SITUATION IN ARKUB SINCE LATE FEBRUARY
LEBANESE HAVE THEREFORE ALLOWED SYRIAN MILITARY VISIT THIS area.
C. LEBANESE, AS WE HAVE FREQUENTLY REPORTED, ARE IN DIFFICULT
POSITION VIS-AVIS SYRIA AND WORK HARD TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS.
CLOSURE OF BORDER WOULD DO LEBANON PERHAPS MORE HARM THAN
IT DID JORDAN. SYRIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD FEDAYEEN, NOT ONLY SAIQA
WHO GET ORDERS FROM SARG EVEN WHILE OPERATING IN LEBANON, BUT
ALSO TOWARD FATTAH IS VERY IMPORTANT. AT TIME OF IDF INCURSION INTO
ARKUB LAST FEB-MARCH, WE REPORTED THAT
SYRIANS REFUSED ALLOW FATAH ELEMENTS CROSS INTO LEBANON TO JOIN
FIGHT. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTS OF SARG REFUSAL ALLOW FATAH
AND OTHERS TAKE HEAVY WEAPONS INTO
LEBANON. CONTROL OF PASSAGE OF LIBYAN AND OTHER "VOLUNTEERS"INTO
LEBANON IS ALSO LARGELY IN SARG HANDSSINCE SYRIAN BORDER CONTROLS
ARE BETTER THAN THOSE ON LEBANESE SIDE. THUS THERS ARE GOOD
REASONS FOR DEGREE OF LEBANESE COOPERATION WITH SYRIAN MILITARY
(INCLUDING OFFICERS MILITARY WHO FORM SARG). WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS
EXTENDS TO ANY SORT OF JOINT PLANNING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
AGAINST ISRAEL. LEBANESE OFFICERS AS WE HAVE REPORTED GO TO
SURIA OCCASIONALLY FOR SUCH THINGS AS TRAINING ON NEW
SOVIET 122MM GUNS.
3. SYRIAN PRISONERS, A. COL. KANNAN TELLS US THAT LEBANESE MILITARY
DELEGATION WHICH WENT TO DAMASCUS JUNE 23 TO EXPRESS REGRETS OVER
CAPTURE SYRIAN OFFICERS WAS SHOCKED AT ALLLOUS AND DISINTER-
RESTED ATTITUDE OF SYRIANS. THEY TOLD LEBANESE THAT THEY HAD
GIVEN IRC DEADLIND FOR EXCHANGE WITH ISRAEL AND THIS IF
ISRAEL DID NOT RETURN PRISONERS BY THAT TIME, ISRAEL
COULD KEEP THEM. LEBANESE TRIED TO EXPLAIN THAT SYRIAN OFFICER,
themselves, HAD CHANGED PLANNED ROUTE OF RETURN FROM ARKUB AREA
EARLY JUNE 21ST AND HAD INSISTED ON TAKING ROAD ALONG BORDER.
INSTEAD OF INTERNAL ROUTE, WITHOIT LEAVING TIME FOR
LEBANESE MILITARY TO PROVIDE PORPER ESCORT. SYRIANS DISMISSED
ENTIRE MATTER AND BEGAN TO TALK ABOUT HOW GOL SHOULD CLOSE DOWN
LEBANESE NEWSPAPERS CRITICAL OF SYRIA. SYRIANS SHOWED NOT SLIGHTEST
CONCERN FOR LEBANESE PRISONERS NOR APPRECIATION
FOR FACT THAT FOUR LEBANESE SOLDIERS HAD DIED TRYING PROTECT
SYRIAN OFFICERS. LEBANESE HAVE NO HOPE THAT ISRAELI IDEAN OF
EXCAHNGING ALL PRISONERS IT HOLDS FOR THOSE HELD BY SYRIA AND EGYPT
WILL WORK, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF APPARENT SYRIAN DISINTEREST
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
form
DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06942 2420332
IN THEIR WON OFFICERS.
B. LEBANESE VERSION OF CAPTURE REMAINS UNCHANGED AND VARIES MARKEDLY
FROM ISRAELI VERSION. BASED ON INTERROGATION OF TWO SYRIAN OFFICERS
1 SEPARATELY AND ON VILLAGERS AND OTHERS WHO WITNESSED AFFARI,
EXATS
LEBANESE MILITARY SAY THAT TWO ISRAELI JEEPS SUDDENTLY CUT
ROUTE IN FRONT OF SYRIAN PARTY AND OPENED FIRE, AT SAME
TIME THREE HALF TRACKS CAME UP BEHIND SYRIAN PARTY, TWO TANKS
FOLLOWED THE JEEPS IN FRONT AND THREE TANKS WERE STATIONED OFF
TO SIDE NEAR ROAD ALONG ISRAELI SIDE OF BORDER.
THIS THREE WAY SUDDEN ATTACK PRODUCED LEBANESE CASULATIES AND
CAPTURE OF FIVE OF THE SYRIANS WHO HAD NO TIME TO ESCAPE.
LEBANESE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT IDF WAS ABLE TAP TELEPHONE
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ARKUB AND RAS NAQURA ADVISING NEW
ROUTE FOR SYRIANS OR HAD SOME OTHER SOURCE OF TIMELY
INTELLIGENCE KANNAN TOLD US HE BELIEVED ISRAELI AWARE OF
PREVIOUS SYRIAN VISIT AND WAITING FOR THIS ONE.
4. INCIDENT OF BAZOOKA ATTACK ON BUS. LEBANESE HERE HAVE NEVER TOLD
US THAT THEY WERE CONVINCED ATTACK ON BUS DID NOT COME FROM
EXBIN
LEBANON. THEY HAVE SAID THEY UNAWARE OF ANY PROOF. WE NOTE THAT AMB
KABBANI MERELY SAID TO SISCO (STATE 111735) THAT
"ONE MINOR INCIDENT" DID NOT JUSTIFY SUCH ISRAELI RETALIATION.
PUBLIC STATEMENTSBY LEBANESE POLITICAL FIGURES ARE, OF
COURSE, ANOTHER MATTER.
5. LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CONDUCTING SERIES OF HIGH-LEVEL
MEETINGS OVER PAST TWO DAYS TO SEE WHAT FURTHER MEASURES MIGHT
BE TAKEN TO PUT END TO INCIDENTS SUCH AS ATTACK ON BUS WHICH
LEAD TO SUCH MASSIVE COMPLETELY ISRAELI RETALIATION.
GOL CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT, LOOKING
FOR SUPPORT, HOWEVER HAVE REPORTED, LEBANON IS NOT STRONG ENOUGH
TO DENY COMPLETELY ITS TERRITORY TO FEDAYEEN AND THEREBY
PREVENT ALL INCIDENTS UNLESS OTHER ARAB STATES, ESPECIALLY
SYRIA, WILLING PROVIDE HOME FOR FEDAYEEN THEMSELVES AND
SUPPORT GOL IN MOVING AGAINST FEDAYEEN. WE WILL HAVE CLEARER IDEA
LATER OF WHAT NEW MEASURES MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST FEDAYEEN, AND HOW
EFFECTIVE THEY MIGHT BE. AT MOMENT GOL ATTENTION IS
DIVERTED BY SC DEBATE, ON WHATEVER, MIGHT BE COMING
NEXT FROM ISRAEL (MANY GOL OFFICIALS FEAR FURTHER MILITARY ACTION)
AND ON HELPING LOCAL OPOULATIONS IN BOMBARDED AREAS.
COMMO NOTE TEL AVIV, USUN MCNS WILL FOLLOW AT OPENING
OF BUSINESS 26 JUNE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED THE STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
ch
SECRET 097
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06627 171032Z
12
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 /026 W
129917
R 171000Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7623
'72 JUN 17 PM 4:23 23
2 M SITUATION WHITE ROOM
EXCES EXATS
SECRE T BEIRUT 6627
HOUSE
EXDIS
SUBJ: SYRIA: RUMORED CABINET CHANGES
1. BEIRUT L'ORIENT-LE JOUR OF JUNE 16 SURFACED
REPORTS OF CABINET CHANGE SHORTLY IN DAMASCUS, NAMING
TLASS AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR TO KHLEIFAUI.
2. FROM SOURCE CLOSE TO LEBANESE G-2, WE HAVE LEARNED
THAT SERIOUS DISPUTE BROKE OUT RECENTLY BETWEEN
KHLEIFAUI AND TLASS LEADING TO KHLEIFAUI CURSING
TLASS IN FRONT OF CABINET AND THEN PRODUCING PISTOL,
TELLING TLASS IF HE RESPONDED, HE (KHLEIFAUI) WOULD
BLOW OFF TLASS' HEAD. SOURCE SAID KHLEIFAUI WAS
DETERMINED TO MAKE AN ALL-OUT BID FOR FULL POWERS,
ALTHOUGH HE WOULD RETAIN ASAD AS FIGUREHEAD FOR ABOUT
A YEAR. SOURCE FURTHER NOTED THAT KHLEIFAUI WAS
ASSEMBLING MILITARY SUPPORT AND ALREADY HAS BOUT "ONE-
HALF OF ARMY WITH HIM."
3. FROM WHAT WE HEAR ABOUT THE TWO MEN, THERE IS MARKED
CONTRAST IN PERSONALITIES. KHLEIFAUI PUTS IN 18-HOUR
DAY, WHILE TLASS HAS TIME TO PLAN TENNIS WITH FRENCH
EXPIS
AMBASSADOR, ALSO AS MINDEF HE NO LONGER IS IN DIRECT
CONTACT WITH ARMY UNITS. THUS, TLASS MIGHT LOSE OUT IN
THIS LATEST INTERNAL STRUGGLE. INTERESTINGLY, ANOTHER
SOURCE HAS PASSED US THIS REPORT THAT TLASS WOULD BECOME
NEXT PRIMIN AND CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT WHEN HE ASKED
TLASS PERSONALLY ABOUT REPORT, TLASS WIFE SPOKE Up
AND SAID SHE WOULD NOT LET HIM TAKE JOB. TLASS DID NOT
ANSWER OUR SOURCE'S QUESTION. GP = 3.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
XQ-6
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
WN
SECRET 059
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06066 01 OF 02 050946Z
02
15
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
028566
0 P 050914 JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7485
INFO USUN NEW YORK PRIRORITY 1941
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMAMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 6365
SEE C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 6066
EXDIS
DEPT PASS USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
SUBJ: PROPOSAL FOR COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
RECOMMEDNATION: TO COMBAT INCREASING THREATS TO SANCTITY
OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL I PROPOSE URGENT CONSULTATIONS
WITH USSR SEEKING APPROVAL OF UNSC RESOLTION CALLING
FOR INTENSIFIED NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO
DEAL WITH PROBLEM
1 . AFTER WRESTLING OVER WEEKEND WITH PROBLEM RAISED BY
SISCO AT CENTO MEETING, IN OURTEL 6045 AND TEL AVIV
TEL3570, RE NEED FOR FINDING MORE EFFECTIVE MEANS OF
COPING WITH SUCH REPREHENSIBLE TERRORISM AS WITNESSED
IN LOD AIRPORT MASSACRE, FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED COURSE
OF ACTION FOR DEPT CONSIDERATION.
2. UNDERLYING THIS APPROACH IS ASSUMPTION THAT US
HAS MAJOR OBLIGATION AND INTEREST IN TAKING INITIATIVE
TO HELP DAMP DOWN INCREASING SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE
PARTICULARLY AS IT AFFECTS INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL,
BECAUSE:
(1) MAJORITY OF VICTIMS IN LOD MASSACRE WERE
US CITIZENS:
(B) UNBRIDLED TERRORISM BECOMING INCREASINGLY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06066 01 OF 02 050946Z
EXPIS EXPIS EXSIS
SERIOUS THREAT TO SECURITY OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVELERS
(OF WHOM AMERICANS CONSTITUTE LARGE SHARE) AND OF AIR
CARRIERS IN WHICH US ALSO HAS MAJOR INTEREST:
(C) INTERNATIONAL TENSION INCREASED BY SUCH
ACTS:
(D) CONCERTED ACTION BY WORLD COMMUNITY OFFERS
BEST POSSIBILITY OF INHIBITING SUCH ACTIONS:
(E) FOR COUNTRY LIKE LEBANON ENDORSEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR MORE STRINGENT MEASURES CAN
BE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE IN CLAMPING DOWN TO MAXIMUM
ON SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS IN COUNTRY.
3. IN BRIEF, WHAT I BELIEVE WE NEED IS A COMBINED
POLITICAL-ACTION ORIENTED PROGRAM DESIGNED TO FOCUS
WORLD OPINION ON PROBLEM AND GALVANIZE GOVERNMENTS
INTO MORE EFFECTIVE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
ACTION.
4. TO THIS END, AND WITH FULL AWARENESS OF PITFALLS IN
UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTIONS (DISCUSSED BELOW), I PROPOSE
WE BEGIN URGENT CONSULTATION WITH USSR SEEKING SIMPLE
RESOLUTION WHICH, AFTER CONDEMNING LOD MASSACRE WOULD
MERELY CALL ON GOVERNMENTS TO EXERT THEIR BEST EFFORTS
NATIONALLY AND IN INTERNATIONAL CONCERT, TO HELP ASSURE
AGAINST FURTHER THREATS TO THE SAFETY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRAVEL: POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL PROVISION COULD BE CALL
ON ICAO AND/OR INTERPOL TO COORDINATE MEASURES OF
INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TO IMPROVE SECURITY AND PERHAPS
SERVE AS CLEARING HOUSE FOR INFORMATION ON K KNOWN
TERRORISTS.
5. SC APROVAL STRIKES ME AS BEST WAY OF PROVIDING
NECESSARY IMPETUS FOR CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL ACTION
WHICH SEEMS INCREASINGLY ESSENTIAL IN COMBATTING
HIJACKING AND OTHER SORTS OF TERRORISM. IN ADDITION
TO UN POLITICAL ENDORSEMENT OF STRONGER MEASURES WE WOULD
HOPE ALSO TO STIMULATE AGREEMENT ON AN ACTION PLAN
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.
T TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THESEUREORIZATION O THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DEP OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXATE
SECRET 051
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06066 02 OF 02 050938Z
15
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
028516
0 P 050914 JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7486
INFO USUN NEW YORK PRIRORITY 1942
'72 JUN 5 PM 12:26 26
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE house
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMAMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 6366
E C R ENT SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 6066
EXDIS
DEPT PASS USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
SUBJ: PROPOSAL FOR COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
TO COMBAT TERRORISM BY AT LEAST THOSE GOVTS WHICH
SEEM TO BE MOST CONCERNED (E.G., JAPAN, GERMANY, ITALY,
TURKEY, IRAN, UK AND SOME LA'S). MERE PROCESS OF
CONSULTATION SHOULD PROVE USEFUL IN MOVING TOWARD
AGREED ACTION PLAN AND WOULD BE LIKELY PRODUCE CLEARER IDEA
ON SORT OF FINAL SC ACTION WHICH WOULD BE MOST
DESIRABLE. IMPACT OF SC RES ITSELF COULD NOT ONLY
PROVIDE WEAKER GOVTS, SUCH AS LEBANON, WITH BASIS FOR
STRONGER NATIONAL ACTION BUT COULD LEAD TO CONCERTED
INTERNATIONAL ACTION PROVIDING MORE TIMELY AND ACCURATE
INFO ON IDENTITIES AND WHEREABOUTS OF KNOWN TERRORISTS,
BOTH HIJACKERS AND OTHERS WHO HAVE INTERNATIONAL LINKS
AND/OR OPERATIONS. IT IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIVE TO
ISRAELI APPEAL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES AND IN
OUR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST.
6. OBVIOUS DISADVANTAGE OF CALLING ON SC TO ACT IS
DANGER DEBATE WILL WIDEN TO COVER ENTIRE ARAB- ISRAELI
DISPUTE, RISK OF SOVIET AND/OR CHINESE VETO, AND POS-
SIBLE EFFORT TO INCLUDE ANTI-ISRAELI PROVISIONS. OF
COURSE, WITH NO NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE AT MONENT,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESEUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06066 02 OF 02 050938Z
USUAL INHIBITION OF SC DEBATE INTERFERING WITH DIPLO-
MATIC EFFORTS TO SOLVE BASIC ME PROBLEM DOES NOT APPLY.
7. MOREOVER, I BELIEVE OTHER RISKS MENTIONED ABOVE
COULD BE MITIGATED BY ANTICIPATING THESE PROBLEMS AND
BEGINNING PROCESS WITH SERIOUS BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS
WITH USSR.
8. THOUGH HAVING NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT EXTENT SOVIET
COOPERATION WE CAN EXPECT IN MIDDLE EAST, USSR HAS IN
PAST SUPPORTED INTERNATIONAL MEASURES AGAINST HIJACKING
AND THERE MAY BE SUFFICIENT IMPROVEMENT IN ATMOSPHERE SINCE
MOSCOW SUMMIT so THAT USSR WOULD JOIN US IN COMMON
APPROACH TO INTEGRITY OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL. (IF
DEPT CONSIDERS THERE IS MERIT TO SUCH APPROACH, PERHAPS
MOSCOW WOULD BE BETTER THAN NEW YORK IN VIEW OF MALIK'S
WELL-KNOWN INTRANSIGENCE AND POSSIBLY IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE
FOR COLLABORATION WITH US EXISTING IN MOSCOW.)
9. IF SOUNDINGS WITH USSR SHOW THEY WOULD AT LEAST NOT
VETO SUCH RES, WE COULD THEN PROCEED TO CONSULT MORE
WIDELY. NATURALLY PRC COULD ALSO POSE PROBLEM GIVEN
THEIR SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS, HOWEVER, THERE ARE
INDICATIONS THEY DO NOT APPROVE LOD MASSACRE (SEE
USUN TEL 20291 AND IN THIS CASE TERRORISTS WERE
JAPANESE, RATHER THAN ARABS.
10. CLEARLY ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED AT
EARLY STAGE BUT HOPE THIS WOULD NOT PRECEDE SOUNDINGS
WITH USSR BECAUSE GOI, LACKING CONFIDENCE IN UN AND,
FEARING UN DEBATE MAY INHIBIT THEM FROM ANY RETAILIATORY
ACTION MAY INTERPOSE OBSTACLES EVEN THOUGH OBJECTIVE
EXPIS
SOUGHT IS PRECISELY THE ONE GOI HAS ANNOUNCED SHOULD
BE PURSUED. AT MINIMUM GOI WILL, AS IN PAST, WANT
RES STRENGTHENED BEYOND WHAT UN TRAFFIC WILL BEAR.
11. AN INCIDENTAL BENEFIT IF SUGGESTED APPROACH
WORKS, WOULD BE REVERSAL OF USUAL UN DOUBLE STANDARD,
WITH BENEFIT TO THE ORGANIZATION.
12. WHILE FOREGOING APPROACH MAY NOT SUCCEED, IF
IT DOES, WE WILL HAVE TAKEN MAJOR FORWARD STEP AND IF
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
STARTMENT OF STATE
CHE EXECUTIVE ΓecBeTyBa
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06066 02 OF 02 050938Z
IT DOES NOT I DO NOT SEE THAT WE WILL HAVE LOST
ANYTHING IN THE TRY.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.
EXPIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
'72
SECRET 512
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06052 031545Z
47
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 1026 W
JUN 4 PM I 50
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE house
EXATE
022634
0 031500Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7484
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
SEC R ET BEIRUT 6052
EXDIS
REF: TEL AVIV 3570
1 . REFTEL RAISES VERY VALID AND IMPORTANT QUESTION. PART OF
CONCERN IT REFLECTS ABOUT NEED FOR WIDER ARAB UNDERSTANDING FOR
GRAVITY WITH WHICH U.S. VIEWS SUCH TERRORIST OUTRAGES AS LOD
MSSACRE ALSO UNDERLAY LONGER MESSAGE I SENT THIS MORNING
(BEIRUT 60451 STRESSING THAT LEBANON ALONE OUGHT NOT BE SINGLED OUT
FOR EXCLUSIVE ATTENTION
2. GOL CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS SERIORISNESS OF U.S. CONCERN.
BOTH WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRES FRANGIE I BEGAN
CONVERSATION STRESSING THAT VERY POINT, WITH EMPHASIS ON LOSS
OF AMERICAN LIFE INVOLVED. IT IS OBVIOUS FROM GOL STATEMENTS
AND ACTIONS TO DATE THAT LEBANON IS NOT RPT NOT ONE OF THOSE
ARAB STATES THAT TAKES POSITION THAT MURDER OF AMERICANS WAS
JUSTIFIED AND PRAISEWORTHY. CONTRARY HAS BEEN SHOWN BY SEVERAL
LEBANESE STATEMENTS CONDEMNING LOD MASSACRE. MOREOVER, TO HIS
CREDIT PRES FRANGIE SAID HE EQUALLY CONDEMNS ANY SUCH TERRORIST
ATTACKS WHETHER INNOCENT VICTIMS ARE AMERICANS OR ISRAELIS.
3. AT SAME TIME, ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS USED WITH LEBANESE,
INCLUDING PROBABLY ISRAELI REACTION AS SUGGESTED BY DEPT
WAS MOST USEFUL DEVICE GOL IS, INDEED, MOST FEARFUL OF
STRONG ISRAELI REACTION IF IT FAILS TO TAKE MORE STRINGENT
MEASURES AND THIS IS PROBABLY MOST EFFECTIVE AND CREDIBLE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPA
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06052 031545Z
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
ARGUMENT THAT COULD BE MUSTERED.
4. FOR U.S. TO THREATEN LEBANON THAT ITS RELATIONS WITH U.S.
WILL SUFFER AS RESULT TERRORIST ACTS WHICH HAVE BEEN
CONDEMNED BY GOL WOULD, TO SAY THE LEAST, BE PUZZLING TO
LEBANESE LEADERS WHO ARE TRYING TO IMPROVE THEIR PERFORMANCE
IN COPING WITH A TREMENDOUSLY DIFFICULT PROBLEM. MOREOVER,
SUCH THREAT WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO QUESTION WHAT
PRESSURES WE HAD PUT ON ISRAEL IN PAST AS RESULT OF ISRAELI
ARMED FORCES KILLING INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN VARIOUS REPRISAL
to
RAIDS AND WHAT PRESSURES WE WILL APPLY ON ISRAEL IN FUTURE
TO FORCE IT TO IMPLEMENT UN RESOLUTIONS TO ELIMINATE THE
UNDERLYING CAUSES OF TENSION IN THE AREA THAT LEAD TO SUCH ACTS
OF TERRORISM.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THEARHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
Сминол
STATE
Department of State
STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
CONFIDENTIAL 279
PM
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06032 021444Z
WOOUN
OUSE
EXPIS EXPIS
45
ACTION SS-25
2
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W
013636
0 021415Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7475
CONFIDENTIALBEIRUT6032
EXDIS
FOR P AND EUR FROM AMBASSADOR
REF: STATE 096887.
10 WHILE LEBANESE PRESS REACTION TO SUMMIT VERY ENTHUSIASTIC
AMONG LEADERS HERE, INITIAL REACTION IS LIMITED AND
AMBIVALENT. IMPACT BLUNTED BY OVERRIDING CONCERN OF POSSIBLE
ISRAELI ATTACKS IN REPRISAL FOR LOD AIRPORT MASSACRE.
2° SUCH COMMENTS AS I HAVE HEARD ARE GENERALLY FAVORABLE.
HOWEVER, ONE ALSO DETECTS SLIGHT TOUCH OF MALAISE. TO
EXTENT COMMUNIQUE REFLECTED PARALLELISM OF US SOVIET
SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF ME CONFLICT,
LEBANESE LEADERS ARE ENCOURAGED. LEADER OF DESTOUR
PARTY AND PROMINENT BANKER, MICHELE KHOURY, COMMENTED
PRIVATELY HE CONSIDERS THAT AS RESULT PRESIDENT'S VISIT
RISK OF MAJOR WAR IN MIDDLE EAST HAS DIMINISHED. SINCE
MOST LEBANESE SUPPORT NEED FOR SOLUTION OF ME CONFLICT
BASED ON RES 242 THIS ASPECT OF OUTCOME GENERALLY
WELCOMED. AT SAME TIME LEBANESE LEADERS HAVE UNDERLYING
AMBIVALENCEABOUT APPEARANCE OF US-SOVIET COLLUSION IN
MIDDLE EAST. MOST OF TOP LEADERS ARE CONSERVATIVE AND
BASICALLY ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVES WHICH APPEAR TO GIVE
USSR GREATER RESPECTABILITY HERE CONCERN SUCH LEBANESE.
30 GABRIEL KHOURY, HEAD OF LEBANON'S LARGEST TRADE UNION,
TOLD ME TODAY THAT WHILE HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE VISIT
OF PRESIDENT NIXON TO MOSCOW, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR MOST
LEBANESE TO UNDERSTAND IT. HE OBSERVED THAT SOME OF THE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06032 021444Z
EXCES EXCLU EXATE
LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE
UNION FIELD HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO EXPLOIT THE VISIT AS
AN INDICATION OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF COMMUNISM AND THE
USSR BY THE UNITED STATES. KHOURY, WHO IS A STAUNCH
CHRISTIAN ANTI-COMMUNISTA CLEARLY FOUND THIS DISTURBING
ALTHOUGH HE ALSO MADE CLEAR HIS APPROVAL OF THE BROADER
IMPLICATIONS OF THE VISIT FOR WORLD PEACE
40 WHILE PRESIDENT FRANGIE DID NOT MENTION TRIP TO ME
DURING LAST EVENING CALL, HE HAS LONG BEEN CONCERNED
AT INCREASING STRENGTH OF SOVIET POSITION AND INFLUENCE
THROUGHOUT MIDDLE EAST AND, I SUSPECT, WOULD SHARE
FOREGOING VIEWS OF GABRIEL KHOURY.
5. OUTGOING MINISTER OF ECONOMY JAROUDI TOLD ME AT
LUNCH TODAY HE CONSIDERED TRIP HIGHLY USEFUL, GIVEN
BENEFITS WHICH ACCRUE FOR LONG RUN FROM PERSONAL
ENCOUNTER BETWEEN LEADERS BEARING SUCH RESPONSIBILITIES.
60 PRIM MINISTER SAEB SALAM REFUSED TO COMMENT ON
SUMMIT THIS MORNING DURING VISIT BY FIRST NATIONAL
BANK PRESIDENT FREEMAN SINCE HE so PREOCCUPIED BY
WORRY ABOUT ISRAELI ATTACK.
70 LEBANESE PUBLIC HAD FULL INFORMATION ON SUMMIT AND
DEMONSTRATED KEEN INTEREST. VISIT EXTENSIVELY COVERED BY
ALL NEWS MEDIA. RADIO LIBAN GAVE 15- MINUTE DAILY REVIEW
AND ANALYSIS OF TRIP, AND SUMMIT ALSO PROMINENTLY
FEATURED ON OTHER NEWSCASTS.
80 WHILE IN PROGRESS, SUMMIT WAS LEADING NEWS EVENT ON
BOTH TELEVISION STATIONS, WHICH SHOWED DAILY COMMERCIAL
CLIPS ON VISIT INCLUDING ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW, ACCORDS
SIGNING AND VISIT TO LENINGRAD.
901 SUMIT WAS MAIN SUBJECT OF EDITORIAL COMMENT IN
BEIRUT PRESS FOR DAYS. PAPERS OF VIRTUALLY ALL TRENDS
WERE UNUSUALLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT RESULTS ACHIEVED,
PARTICULARLY AGREEMENT ON ARMS LIMITATION. DISAPPOINT-
MENT, HOWEVER, WAS EXPRESSED BY MANY (MOSTLY PRO-CAIRO)
BECAUSE NO SIMILAR AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON MIDEAST.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTME
OF
CAME
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06032 021444Z
10. CONSERVATIVE AL HAYAT WHICH IS USUALLY CRITICAL OF
USSR, COMMENTED ON SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE: "JOINT COMMUNIQUE
REVEALS TO ANY ONE WHO CAN READ BETWEEN THE LINES THAT
USSR IS IN COLLUSION WITH WASHINGTON AS FAR AS MIDEAST IS
CONCERNED. THEY BOTH SUPPORT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
EXATES
ACCORDING TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 22,
1967, AND EMPHASIZE THEIR DESIRE TO SEE BOTH PARTIES TO
THE DISPUTE COOPERATE WITH AMBASSADOR JARRING. THIS MEANS
THAT NEITHER US NOR USSR IS ABOUT TO IMPOSE A SOLUTION."
11. LEFTIST PRO-CAIRO ALMUHARRIR, WHICH IS ALSO PRO-FEDAYEEN
WAS MOSTLY CONCERNED WITH MIDEAST CRISIS. IT NOTED THAT
"EVERYTHING HAS REMAINED WHERE IT WAS AS FAR AS MIDEAST
CRISIS IS CONCERNED. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARABS
HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO FIGHT." GP = 3 0
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE CONF AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
THE
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 117
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04996 091050Z
2
11
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 a 1026 W
087564
R 091016Z MAY 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7228
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SEC R E T BEIRUT 4996
'72 MAY 9 PM 6:38 38
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
EXDIS
REF 8 STATE 62081
SUBJ: US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO YAR
1. AS REPORTED SEPARATELY, HASHEM BIN HASHEM MADE APPROACH
TO ME DIRECTLY ALONG SAME LINES HE MADE TO CHARGE IN
TEHRAN A MONTH AGO.
20 ON RECEIVING COPY OF REFTEL, I INFORMED HASHEM BIN HASHEM
MAY 9 OF US POSITION AS OUTLINED PARA 2 REFTEL SINCE HE HAD
INDICATED HE WOULD WAIT IN BEIRUT TO SEE WHETHER US
HAD ANYTHING FURTHER TO SAY. HE WAS DISAPPOINTED BUT
NOT SURPRISED AND GAVE NO CONCRETE INDICATION OF HIS FURTHER
PLANS. GP = 3.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Departmen.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEORAM
W/V
SECRET 264
EXC-0 EXCES
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04907 051624Z
02
43
ACTION SS-25
/3
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
062908
R 051347Z MAY 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7214
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ROME
SECRE T BEIRUT 4907
EXDIS
STATE 76514
1 - WE DISCUSSED MAY 4 WITH MAIOLINI THEROS' VISITS
SYRIA AND HIS CONVERSATIONS THERE. MAIOLINI HAD HEARD
OF THEROS VISITS BUT WAS NOT AWARE OF ATRASH'S APPROACH.
HE TOLD US THAT HE HAD RAISED NOT LONG AGO WITH CHEF DE
CABINET OF FONOFF QUESTION OF LATTER'S MEETING WITH
AMERICAN DIPLOMATS FROM BEIRUT OR ELSEWHERE WHEN THEY
VISITED DAMASCUS. CHEF DE CABINET HAD REPLIED THAT
MATTER WAS STILL SENSITIVE POLITICALLY AND HE RELUCTANT
TO DO SO AT THIS TIME.
2. COMMENT: WE THINK THAT THERE ARE BENEFITS IN THEROS
SEEING ATRASH OCCASIONALLY THROUGH THIRD PARTIES BUT
RECOMMEND THAT THEROS NOT RPT NOT GO TO FONOFF TO CALL ON
HIM AT LEAST UNTIL SITUATION WITH FONOFF AND SARG CAN
BE CLARIFIED. IF ATRASH HAS GREEN LIGHT FROM
HIGHER AUTHORITY TO SEE THEROS AT FONOFF, WHICH WE
EXPIC
DOUBT, VISIT TO FONOFF WOULD BE UNLIKELY
CAUSE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ATRASH
ACTING ON OWN INITIATIVE AND UNAWARE OF RELUCTANCE
AND POSSIBLE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AT HIGHER LEVELS.
IN THIS CASE, THOSE WITHIN SARG OPPOSING CLOSER
RELATIONS WITH US COULD MAKE ISSUE OUT OF THEROS VISIT
WHICH WOULD ACTUALLY WORK AGAINST OBJECTIVE WE ARE
SEEKING OF IMPROVED RELATIONS. IN ANY EVENT, UNTIL
WE ARE FURTHER ALONG IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SARG
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXCES
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF THE AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04907 051624Z
RE ASSIGNMENT AMERICAN OFFICERS TO INTERESTS SECTION,
WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH COULD
COMPLICATE OR CONFUSE THE ISSUE. CONSEQUENTLY WE
BELIEVE THEROS SHOULD NOT SEE ATRASH AT THE FOREIGN
OFFICE. GP = 3.
BUFFUM
181/20/189
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AU
SECRE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 394
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04787 0316272
51
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
041734
R 031510Z MAY 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7188
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
$72 MAY 4 AM 8:32 32
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE house
SEC R E T BEIRUT 4787
EXDIS
SUBJECT: CONTACTS WITH A SYRIAN OFFICIAL
REF: STATE 76514
1 . WE SHARE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW THAT CONTACTS SUCH
AS THEROS COULD HELP LESSEN DISTANCE BETWEEN USG AND
SARG. ACCORDINGLY, WE STRONGLY FAVOR THEROS CONTINUING
HIS CONTACTS WITH ATRASH THROUGH THIRD PARTIES.
2. AS FAR AS CALL ON ATRASH AT FOREIGN OFFICE, WE DEFER
RECOMMENDATION UNTIL, AS DEPT SUGGESTS, WE CAN DISCUSS
WITH MAIOLINI WHOM WE HOPE SEE BEIRUT NEXT FEW DAYS.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State OF
THE
EXECUTIVE
ANITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 468
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04601 281051Z
2
16
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
R 281031Z APR 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7142
SITUA ON ROOM
006490 HOUSE
USMISSION USUN NY
'72 APR 28 PM 4 52
SEC R E T BEIRUT 4601
EXDIS
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE
REF: USUN 1485
1. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHETHER OR NOT
SYG CONSULTED GOL ON QUESTION OF LEBANESE PARTICIPATION
IN POSSIBLE MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE. SHOULD CONFERENCE
EVER COME TO FRUITION AFTER ITS PREMATURE EXPOSURE TO PUBLIC
VIEW, WE THINK THERE WOULD BE MERIT IN SYG AT LEAST SOUNDING
OUT GOL RE ITS PARTICIPATION.
20 PRESENCE OF GOL WOULD ADD A VOICE OF REASON TO
CONFERENCE EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT BE A
DETERMINING FACTOR. THERE IS PRECEDENT FOR GOL PARTICIPATION,
AND CERTAINLY FOR SYG RAISING MATTER WITH LEBANESE. DURING
JARRING'S 1970 TALKS WITH PARTIES IN CONTEXT SC RES 242
(WHICH LEBANESE ACCEPT AND CONSIDER APPLICABLE TO THEIR
SITUATION), JARRING EXCHANGED COMMUNICATIONS WITH GOL ON
EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT (SUBJECT TO CERTAIN RESERVATIONS BY GOLT.
30 WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT GOL RESPONSE WOULD BE NOR DO WE
WISH ENQUIRE WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING DEPT AND USUN.
POSITIVE FACTORS WOULD BE JARRING PRECEDENT AND LEBANESE
DESIRE HAVE VOICE IN WHATEVER ARRANGEMENT MAY EVENTUALLY
BE WORKED OUT FOR REFUGEES. NEGATIVE FACTORS MIGHT BE
GOL-GOI DIFFERENCES OVER 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND
LEBANESE TRADITIONAL DESIRE STAY IN BACKGROUND OF
ARAB- ISRAELI DISPUTE. GP-3.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THEATHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
306
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02686 110940Z
19
ACTION SS-25
SITUATION RO 037062
WHITE HOUSE WHITE HOUSE
'72 MAR 11 PM 3:36 36
2
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W
0 110904Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6595
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
SEC R E T BEIRUT 2686
EXDIS
1. AS AUTHORIZED IN DEPTEL 41293' I INFORMED
DIRECTOR GENERAL, FORNOFF SADAGA MAR 10 THAT WE WERE
TAKING UP QUESTION OF BORDER PROBLEMS WITH ISRAELIS
WITHOUT DISCUSSING NATURE OUR APPROACH.
2. SADAGA CALLED ME EARLY MAR 11 REQUESTING EARLIEST
POSSIBLE INFO ON NATURE OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS.
HE SAID ISRAELIS HAVE NOT ONLY FAILED TO HALT VIOLA-
TIONS OF LEBANESE TERRITORY BUT HAVE INCREASED THEM
OVER LAST 24 HRS. OBSERVATION POST REMAINS AT HABBARIYAH:
NUMEROUS OVERFLIGHTS OCCURRED YESTERDAY, AND THERE
WERE SEVERAL PENETRATIONS OF LEBANESE TERRITORY BY
SQUADS OF ISRAELI SOLDIERS IN VEHICLES NEAR AITA
CHAAB (MIDDLE OF SOUTHERN BORDER).
3. SADAGA SAID THESE CONTINUED ISRAELI VIOLATIONS
CONSTITUTE GRAVE PROVOCATION AND PLACE LEBANESE ARMY
IN EXTREMELY EMBARRASSING SITUATION. HE ADDED THAT
ISRAELI VIOLATIONS CONTINUE ALTHOUGH COMMANDOS ARE
PULLING BACK IN GOOD FAITH IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR
EXPITS
AGREEMENT TO EVACUATE 10 KM AREA ALONG BORDER WITHIN ONE
WEEK. (BEIRUT 2636) HE THOUGHT THIS PROCESS WOULD BE NOW
COMPLETED IN NEXT THREE DAYS BUT ISRAELI ACTION IS MAKING
INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR LEBANON TO ASSURE THAT THIS
AGREEMENT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED.
4. RE MARCH 10 MEETING VIA ILMAC, TEL AVIV'S ASSUMPTION
CORRECT. GOL INFORMS US THEY INTENDED ASK FOR MEETING AT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ио DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
THE
OL
THE
EXECUTIVE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
THEA INLENDED MaK LOB WEELING VI
10 WEELING AIV ДЕГ VAIATE vesnublion
EXPIC EXPIN EXPIS
VGBEEWEN1 BE SECRET
10
THYL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02686 110940Z
12
LEVEL REPORTED BUT CHANGED MIND AS RESULT MARCH 9 ATTACK.
5. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE ADVISE IMMEDIATELY WHAT ISRAELI
RESPONSE, IF ANY, WAS GIVEN TO AMBASSADOR'S BARBOUR'S
URGENT DEMARCHE MARCH 9. GP-1.00 VEWA
BUFFUM CONITATED
CHAVB (WIDDre OE голдневи BOBDEBI
OE eoΓo In ЛЕНӀСГЕВ NEVB VIIV
MEBE ЗЕЛЕНУГ DE ГЕВУИЕЗЕ BA
ИПИЕВОЛЕ олевегіеніе OCCNBBED AERIESDVA УИО THERE
OASE ryal S# HBS* 7021 BEWVING TA HVBBVBLAVH:
LIGNS DE ГЕВУИЕЕЕ TERBILOBA Bn1 НУЛЕ INCREVED THEW
HE HVAE not ОИРА EVICED 10 HVF1 ЛТОГУ»
60881808 INED on ИМПОВЕ ONK Discnasions MITH
SX CYFFED WE ЕУВГА WYB 11 BEONEBLING
MILHONI Discnseine ons УЬЬВОУСН
LYKING nb ONESLION 08 BORDER ьковгене MITH ТЕВУЕГТЕ»
DIBECTOR сеиевуг* ЕОКИОЕЕ evovev WYB TO THAT ME MEKE
1.* ve VOLMOBISED 10 ДЕЬДЕГ 1 INEOBWED
EXDIE
a E C is E 1
ТИЕО YHEWBV281 ДЕГ VALA IWWEDIVIE
30 BECEIVIE MyeHoc IWWEDIVLE
TURI38 Y83A8M3MA MR
D 1103005 WVB AS
1960
M
VC110M
EYGE
N.I.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2ECBELVKA
*
*
EXETS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
WIS
CONFIDENTIAL 496
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01720 171417Z
47
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
ACTION SS-25
FEB 17 25
INFO OCT-01 /026 W
125128
R 171400Z FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6325
USINT CAIRO
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT 1720
EXDIS
SUBJ: CIVAIR: EGYPTAIR REEQUIPMENT
REF CAIRO 473
PARA FOUR REFTEL APPEARS TO CONTAIN ERROR IN TRANSMISSION,
AT LEAST AS RECEIVED BEIRUT. THIS PARA SHOULD
READ AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE: SCENARIO TO BLOCK USSR ATTEMPT
TO CLOSE TOTAL USSR REEQUIPMENT DEAL FOR TU-544'S, YAK-4ØMIS,
IL-62'S REPEAT TU-154'S, YAK-4ØM'S, IL-62'S, UNQUOTE.
BALANCE OF SENTENCE AND PARA OKAY
GP-3
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon CONFIDENTIAL Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXPIN
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
WH
SECRET 774
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00845 241720Z
LL
40
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 /026 W
SITUATION RO ROOM 096733
WHITE HOUS
P 241605Z JAN 72
'72 JAN 6:48
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6119
SEC R E T BEIRUT 845
EXDIS
SUBJ: STATE VISIT FOR PRES FRANGIE
SUMMARY: PRES FRANGIE TODAY CONVEYED WORD HE KEENLY
INTERESTED IN RECEIVING INVITATION TO VISIT US TO COUNTER-
ACT INCREASING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN LEBANON AND ARAB
WORLD. ACTION REQUESTED: APPROVAL OF INVITATION TO
FRANGIE TO VISIT US FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE ANNOUNCEMENT
WITH TIMING OF VISIT FLEXIBLE.
1. FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD CALLED ME TO HIS OFFICE
JANUARY 24 TO CONVEY STRONG DESIRE OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE
TO BE INVITED TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PRESIDENT
BELIEVES SOVIET DRIVE FOR POSITION AND INFLUENCE IN
LEBANON HAS ADVANCED SO FAR DURING PAST YEAR THAT
COUNTERWEIGHT IS NEEDED. ABOUHAMAD SAID IF USG FOUND IT
POSSIBLE EXTEND SUCH INVITATION. PRESIDENT FRANGIE WOULD
COME ON ANY DATE SUITABLE TO US BEGINNING NEXT MONTH
ONWARD. HOWEVER, HE INDICATED IMPORTANT THING WOULD
BE EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF INVITATION RATHER THAN TIMING
OF VISIT.
2. FOREIGN MINISTER ARGUED ANNOUNCEMENT SUCH INVITATION
WOULD MATERIALLY ASSIST IN OVERCOMING GAINS MADE BY
SOVIETS OVER PAST YEAR THROUGH THEIR VERY ATTRACTIVE ARMS
OFFER TO LEBANON, THE DISPATCH OF SEVERAL HIGH-LEVEL RUSSIAN
OFFICIALS TO BEIRUT, AND THEIR FORMAL INVITATION TO
FRANGIE TO VISIT MOSCOW. HE BELIEVED SUCH VISIT WOULD
HAVE MAJOR IMPORT SINCE IT WOULD BE FIRST TIME A LEBANESE
PRESIDENT EVER PAID STATE VISIT TO US AND WOULD MARK FIRST
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00845 241720Z
STATE VISIT OF FRANGIE OUTSIDE THE ARAB WORLD.
3. I SAID I WOULD IMMEDIATELY TRANSMIT PRESIDENT'S VIEWS
TO WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, I CAUTIONED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON'S
SCHEDULE IS ALREADY VERY FULL FOR 1972 WITH HIS PROJECTED
TRIPS ABROAD, SEVERAL STATE VISITS ALREADY SCHEDULED TO
US, AND AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
EXCES EXCLUS
4. COMMENT. DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH EXTENDING
INVITATION TO FRANGIE WOULD NO DOUBT POSE, HIS KEEN INTEREST
IN SUCH VISIT IS MOST GRATIFYING AND I STRONGLY HOPE WE CAN
ACCOMMODATE HIM. FOLLOWING ARE WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE
-
COMPELLING REASONS TO INVITE FRANGIE BOTH IN TERMS OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH LEBANON AND WITH ARAB WORLD:
A. LEBANON REMAINS A PIVOTAL STATE IN MIDDLE EAST:
AS OUTSTANDNG COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORTATION, AND
CULTURAL CENTER IT OCCUPIES POSITION OF STRATEGIC IM-
PORTANCE COMPLETELY DISPROPORTIONATE TO ITS SIZE.
B. SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT OVER
PAST YEAR TO IMPROVE THEIR POSITION IN LEBANON (SEE OUR
A-377 AND TEL 0773), AND WITH RECENT ARRIVAL OF FIRST
CHINESE COMMUNIST DIPLOMATIC MISSION RUSSIANS SEEM INTENT ON
FURTHER INTENSIFYING SUCH EFFORTS. LEBANESE LEADERSHIP
INCREASINGLY NERVOUS ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE SOVIET OVERTURES
AND GROWING INDIGENOUS LEFTIST PRESSURE TO ACCEPT THEM.
C. SUCH VISIT WOULD CONTRIBUTE POLITICALLY AND PSYCHO-
LOGICALLY TO COUNTERACT THE IMPROVED SOVIET POSITION IN
THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE INCREASED PRESSURES FROM RADICAL
ARAB STATES SUCH AS LIBYA AND IRAQ. IT SHOULD HAVE
SALUTARY EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION: PARTICULARLY IN LEBANON
SINCE IT WOULD MATERIALLY REASSURE LARGE MAJORITY OF LEBANESE
POPULATION THAT THEY ARENOT BEING DRAWN FROM TRADITIONALLY
WESTERN STANCE INTO COMMUNIST ORBIT.
D. COMING SOON AFTER LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN
ON FEDAYEEN ALONG SOUTHERN FRONTIER, INVITATION WOULD BE
TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF OUR SUPPORT FOR RESPONSIBLE ARAB
MOVES TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN AREA. CONVERSELY IF GOL EITHER
FAILS HOLD FIRM ON CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN OR SLIPS INTO MORE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE m/ AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXEIS EXATE
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 00845 2417202
EXTREME POSITION, SERIOUS DAMAGES COULD RESULT TO OUR OVER-
ALL PEACE EFFORTS.
E. VISIT WOULD BE CLEAR INDICATION TO OTHER ARAB
GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC THAT USG REMAINS ACTIVELY CONCERNED
ABOUT THEIR FUTURE, HAS NOT ABANDONED ITS BALANCED POLICY
IN ME FOR ONE WEIGHTED IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL, AND MAINTAINS ITS
SUPPORT FOR REASONABLE ARAB REGIMES. AS SUCH, I ASSUME IT
WOULD BE WELCOMED BY KING FEISAL AND HUSSEIN AS SIGN THAT
USG STILL SUPPORTS ITS FRIENDS IN AREA.
F . FRANGIE PERSONALLY, AS CHRISTIAN, CONSERVATIVE
PRESIDENT WOULD BE REINFORCED IN HIS DETERMINATION TO
MAINTAIN AND strengthen FREE WORLD TIES.
G . COMING AFTER REPORTS OF NEW PHANTOM SALES AND
ARMS LICENSING AGREEMENTS FOR ISRAEL, ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUCH
INVITATION WOULD HELP COUNTERACT ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION
THESE MOVES IN ARAB WORLD AND CONVEY CLEAR IMPRESSION US
STILL VALUED AS FRIEND BY RESPONSIBLE ARAB LEADERS.
H. LEBANON GAVE US WHOLEHEARTED AND LOYAL SUPPORT
DURING DIFFICULT CHINESE REPRESENTATION DEBATE AT RECENT
GENERAL ASSEMBLY DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL PRESSURE TO SHIFT.
NOT ONLY DID LEBANON VOTE WITH US, BUT LEBANESE PASSED US
GROUP. IMPORTANT INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN AFRO-ASIAN
FOR ALL THESE REASONS, I STRONGLY HOPE THAT SOME MEANS
CAN BE FOUND TO ACCOMMODATE PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S DESIRE TO BE
INVITED TO US. TO MEET ALL OF THE OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED
ABOVE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUCH VISIT SHOULD TAKE PLACE AS
SOON AS PRACTICABLE. GP = 3 ·
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: LIMDIS CAPTION DELETED. EXDIS CAPTION ADDED
RER INSTRUCTIONS SS-0. MR. FRY.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Оминоль
EXECUTIVE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
WH
SECRET 702
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00351 111324Z
47
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
EXCES
R 111313Z JAN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
SITUATION SITUATION ROOM 118944 ROOM
72 JAN 11 AM 11:35
2
WHITE
31
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5995
USINT CAIRO
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
SECRE T BEIRUT 0351
EXDIS
SUBJ: BOEINGS FOR EGYPTAIR
REF: CAIRO 98
TAMRAZ BRIEFED PRATT JAN. 10 ON ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED
REFTEL. GP-3.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ЕВКОД
D
OITASIROHTUA
ОЬ
THE
EXECUTIVE
4
*
Department of State
EXEC
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 027
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00314 101540Z
47
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
STUATIONATION 103242
WHITE HOUSE WHITE SE
R 101446Z JAN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
'72 JAN 10 PM 1:09 I 09
w/s
C2
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5984
SECRE T REIRUT 0314
EXDIS
REF: STATE 1240
CONVEYED PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ORALLY TO FRANGIE JANUARY 10.
HE WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE. GP-3.
BUFFUM
SECRET
30
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
THE
EXECUTIVE
2ECUELYBA
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
WH
SECRET 705
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00196 061837Z
45
2
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
080749
RI 061501Z JAN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5958
EXCES EXCES
SECRET BEIRUT 196
EXDIS
DEPT PASS CAIRO
REF: STATE 1476
AS INSTRUCTED, DCM CONVEYED TO SALEH MORNING JANUARY 6
MESSAGE CONTAINED PARA 2 REFTEL. SALEH SAID HE WOULD
PASS TO AZOUNI WHO LEAVING FOR CAIRO JANUARY 7 . GP - 1 .
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.
SECRET
29
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
EXCES
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
wts
SECRET 208
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00112 051105Z
a/m
2
12
3
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
069210
P 051018Z JAN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5933
SECRE T BEIRUT 112
EXDIS
DEPT PASS CAIRO
REF: BEIRUT 11372
1. SALEH CALLED ON DCM JANUARY 5 TO RELAY IMPATIENCE
AND CONCERN ON PART OF TWO EGYPTIAN VISITORS AT ABSENCE OF
US REPLY TO THEIR APPROACH. HE SAID OUWEIDA HAS ALREADY
RETURNED TO CAIRO AND AZOUNI NOW PLANS DEPART
BEIRUT JANUARY 7 FOR CAIRO SINCE WE HAVE HAD NO FURTHER
WORD FOR THEM. NOT ONLY HAS HE LEFT HIS POST AT CAIRO
UNIVERSITY WITHOUT INFORMING AUTHORITIES OF HIS WHERE-
ABOUTS. BUT HE ALSO HAS PERSONAL BUSINESS INTERESTS WHICH
HE DOES NOT WISH NEGLECT ANY LONGER.
2. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, HOPE DEPARTMENT CAN GIVE US
GUIDANCE NO LATER THAN JANUARY 6 WHETHER THERE IS INTEREST
IN PURSUING THIS CONTACT HERE. GP-1.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
EXETS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
WH
SECRET 032
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11372 281631Z
50
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
025731
281551Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5875
S EC R ET BEIRUT 11372
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO.
REF: STATE 230894
1. SALEH CALLED TODAY TO INFORM US THAT OUWEIDA AND HIS
SECRETARY FAWZI ABDUL AL AL LEFT BEIRUT DECEMBER 26 FOR
LONDON FOR MEDICAL CHECKUP. ACCORDING SALEH, OUWEIDA
ANTICIPATED THERE WOULD BE DELAY USG RESPONSE AND
CONSEQUENTLY PLANNED RETURN BEIRUT DECEMBER 29. HOWEVER,
AZOUNI FEELS THERE POSSIBILITY OUWEIDA MAY RETURN CAIRO.
2. ACCORDING TO SALEH, OUWEIDA, WHEN IN STATES (LAST JULY)
WAS APPROACHED BY DR. HADI SALEM, A HEART SURGEON LIVING IN
BEVERLY HILLS, WHO IS A FRIEND OF BOB HOPE. SALEM WANTED
TO MAKE APPOINTMENT FOR OUWEIDA THROUGH HOPE WITH VICE
PRESIDENT AGNEW BUT OUWEIDA DECLINED AS HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS.
OUWEIDA REPORTED THIS TO SADAT WHEN HE RETURNED FROM
SAN FRANCISCO AND ALSO HIS GRATITUDE TO SALEH FOR HAVING
FACILITATED HIS VISIT IN THE STATES. HENCE HIS CONNECTIONS
WITH SALEH.
3. SUBSEQUENTLY OUWEIDA APPARENTLY DISCUSSED WITH SADAT THE
POSSIBILITY OF INDIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH USG. IT WAS NOT
HOWEVER UNTIL HIS CONVERSATION WITH SADAT ON DECEMBER 15,
ACCORDING TO SALEH, THAT SADAT MADE DECISION FOR HIM TO
UNDERTAKE INDIRECT DISCUSSIONS THROUGH AMBASSADOR WALSH IN
KUWAIT.
4. SALEH GATHERED FROM CONVERSATION WITH AZOUNI THAT OUWEIDA
SECRET
28
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 11372 281631Z
CLOSE TO SADAT. NOTED THAT WHEN SADAT WAS HEAD OF ISLAMIC
*
CONGRESS, OUWEIDA WAS HIS ASSISTANT. OUWEIDA TOOK SADAT'S
PLACE WHEN SADAT BECAME PRESIDENT BUT NAME OF ISLAMAIC CONGRESS
CHANGED TO SUPREME MOSLEM COUNCIL.
5. SALEH OBVIOUSLY ASSUMED WE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED RESPONSE
FROM USG so ISSUE DID NOT ARISE. GP-1.
BUFFUM
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
leg
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE
EXPIS
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 557
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11313 271448Z
02
41
ACTION SS-25
wl
3
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
018222
271433Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5862
SE C RET BEIRUT 11313
EXDIS
5.
REF: STATE 230894
IN THE EVENT AMBASSADOR EVENTUALLY MEETS WITH
OUWEIDA ANY ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
AVAILABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT OR CAIRO WILL BE
APPRECIATED. GP-1.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
WH
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 839
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11273 241219Z
18
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
008962
0 241204Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5854
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T BEIRUT 11273
EXDIS
REF: STATE 230830: BEIRUT 11257
DELIVER ACTION OFFICER 9:00 AM DECEMBER 24
1. SUMMARY: DCM CONVEYED DEPARTMENT'S POSITION CON-
TAINED REFTEL TO SALEH, OUWEIDA AND AZOUNI MORNING
DECEMBER 24. OUWEIDA INSISTED HE AUTHORIZED BY SADAT
TO INITIATE INFORMAL TALKS WITH U.S. AND SAID HE WOULD
WELCOME HAVING THIS CHECKED OUT PERSONALLY WITH SADAT
BUT URGED IT BE DONE BY BERGUS ALONE ACTION REQUESTED:
REQUEST DEPARTMENT CONSIDER ADVISABILITY INSTRUCTING
BERGUS CHECK OUT BONA FIDES EGYPTIAN EMISSARIES WITH
SADAT WITH VIEW TO DECIDING WHETHER OPENING SUCH
CHANNEL WOULD BE USEFUL.
2. DCM TELEPHONED SALEH DECEMBER 24 TO SAY HE HAD
REPLY TO HIS APPROACH. SALEH INVITED DCM TO HIS HOUSE
DISCUSS REPLY. OUWEIDA AND AZOUNI CAME DURING DISCUS-
SION. DCM CONVEYED MESSAGE PARA 3 DEPTEL 230830 TO SALEH, OUWEIDA
AND AZOUNI ®
30 OUWEIDA INSISTED THAT HE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED
BY SADAT TO INITIATE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH AMERICAN
EMISSARIES. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD GONE TO SADAT AND
RAISED WITH HIM PROPOSAL THAT HE MEET PRIVATELY WITH
AMERICAN EMISSARIES TO DISCUSS FRANKLY AND INFORMALLY
ISSUES OUTSTANDING BETWEEN USG AND EGYPT. HE FELT THAT
IT WOULD BE EASIER TO DISCUSS FRANKLY PROBLEMS BETWEEN
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXCES
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF HOMELAND
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 11273 241219Z
TWO COUNTRIES BETTER IN PRIVATE DIALOGUE OF THIS NATURE
THAN THROUGH MORE FORMAL CHANNELS. AT CONCLUSION
TALKS HE WOULD REPORT BACK TO SADAT IN ORDER
THAT PRESIDENT MIGHT DETERMINE COURSE TO BE TAKEN
HE MENTIONED SEVERAL TIMES THAT SADAT HAD GIVEN HIM
SPECIFIC POINTS TO RAISE WITH AMERICANS AND PATTED HIS
POCKET AS THOUGH TO INIDICATE HE HAD PAPER WITH POINTS.
HE EMPHASIZED DESIRE OF EGYPT TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS
WITH U.S. AND HIS CONCERN AT EXISTING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES
AND PRESENCE IN EGYPT.
4. OUWEIDA, WHO DID ALL THE TALKING, STATED HE WOULD
TALKS WITH ANY EMISSARIES USG SELECTED. HE HAD MENTIONED
WALSH BECAUSE ORIGINAL PLAN WAS TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS
THROUGH WALSH.
5. OUWEIDA THEN REQUESTED THAT BERGUS BE INSTRUCTED TO
CONFIRM BONA FIDES HIS MISSION BY RAISING SUBJECT DIR-
ECTLY WITH AND ONLY WITH SADAT. HE CONFIRMED SALEH'S
STATEMENT IN BEIRUT'S 11257 THAT ONLY SADAT HIMSELF AND
AZOUNI WERE PRIVY TO PROJECT IN EGYPT. DCM AGREED TO
PASS OUWEIDA'S REQUEST TO WASHINGTON BUT EMPHASIZED
EXCES EXPIS
IN REPLY TO QUERIES THAT HE COULD NOT PREDICT WHAT DE-
PARTMENT'S RESPONSE WOULD BE AND INDICATED THAT IT COULD BE
NEGATIVE. DCM HAD IMPRESSION MISSION WOULD REMAIN IN BEIRUT
PENDING DEPARTMENT'S DECISION ALTHOUGH THAT ISSUE SEEMED TO
BE UNDER DISCUSSION WHEN DCM LEFT.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 249
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11257 231528Z
50 S
ACTION SS-25
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
'71 DEC 23 PM 12: 49
14
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
EXCES
002277
0 231440Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5843
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
E C R E T BEIRUT 11257
EXDIS
REF: KUWAIT 1447: DEPT 230057 CAIRO 3211
SUMMARY: SALEH CALLED ON DCM DECEMBER 23 TO STATE THAT SADAT HAD
AUTHORIZED EGYPTIAN EMISSARIES, OUWEIDA AND AZOUNI, TO
ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH US (ALLEGEDLY TO BYPASS FONMIN
RIAD) THROUGH AMBASSADOR WALSH TO EXPEDITE DIALOGUE ON
PEACE SETTLEMENT. WOULD MEET ANY PLACE WESTERN EUROPE
OR TURKEY. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE REQUIRED FOR
RESPONSE FROM DEPARTMENT TO EMISSARY'S PROPOSAL. 10 MOHAMMED
SALEH CALLED ON DCM DECEMBER 23 AND SAID FOLLOWING.
20 DR. AZOUNI IS CHAIRMAN OF DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF CAIRO AND A CONSULTANT TO THE WADI
TRADING COMPANY IN EGYPT WHICH EXPORTS ORANGES AND AGRI-
CULTURAL PRODUCTS. HE ALSO IS CONSULTANT FOR AGRICULTURAL
AFFAIRS TO KUWAIT MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS. SALEH MET AZOUNI
HIMSELF IN KUWAIT WHERE THEY BECAME GOOD FRIENDS. TEWFIQ
OUWEIDA IS CHAIRMAN, HIGHER ISLAMIC COUNCIL, OF MINISTERIAL
RANK AND EX-ARMY OFFICER. RUSSIANS ENDEAVORED HAVE OUWEIDA
DISMISSED DURING NASSER'S REGIME BECAUSE OF HIS STRONG ANTI=
COMMUNIST LEANINGS, BUT NASSER REFUSED. SALEH MET OUWEIDA
ONLY RECENTLY THROUGH AZOUNI. HOWEVER, AT AZOUNI'S REQUEST
HE FACILITATED ARRANGEMENTS FOR OUWEIDA'S TRIP TO US LAST
JULY TO ATTEND MOSLEM CONGRESS. OUWEIDA ALSO WENT TO
WASHINGTON WHERE HE SAW SOME GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND WAS
EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH HIS VISIT.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 11257 231528Z
30 AZOUNI ARRIVED BEIRUT DEC 18, TOLD SALEH THAT OUWEIDA
WAS ARRIVING NEXT DAY AND REQUESTED SALEH MAKE
APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR WALSH OF KUWAIT. AZOUNI CLAIMED
OUWEIDA WAS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF SADAT AND HAD BEEN
INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH WALSH. SADAT
WANTED TO START NEW ERA AND THOUGHT FRANK DISCUSSIONS BY REPRE-
SENTATIVES (WITHOUT PRESENCE OR KNOWLEDGE FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD
OR ANY OTHER EGYPTIANS) MIGHT LEAD TO BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN
EGYPT AND US. OUWEIDA EMPHASIZED EXTENT OF RUSSIAN
ACTIVITIES IN EGYPT, MAINTAINING THAT THEY WERE INFILTRATING
ALL ASPECTS OF EGYPTIAN LIFE AND THAT RUSSIAN PRESENCE
IN EGYPT WAS BECOMING A NATION WITHIN A NATION. IT WAS
CONSEQUENTLY IMPORTANT THAT SUCH ACTIVITY SHOULD STOP, AND
THEREFORE SADAT WAS INTERESTED IN HAVING SECRET DISCUSSIONS
WITH US TO TRY TO ACHIEVE PEACE.
40 DECISION TO UNDERTAKE THIS PROJECT WAS MADE DECEMBER 15
WHEN OUWEIDA MET WITH SADAT FOR THREE HOURS. (AS EVIDENCE
OF MEETING HE REFERRED AL AHRAM ARTICLE ON DECEMBER 150)
HE INDICATED THE TWO MEN WERE WILLING TO MEET WALSH IN LONDON,
MADRID OR ANY PLACE IN WESTERN EUROPE OR TURKEY. THEY DID
NOT WANT TO GO TO WASHINGTON NOW, ALTHOUGH THIS COULD BE A
SECOND STEP. THEY HAD OPEN TICKETS AND WERE MOST ANXIOUS
TO LEAVE BEIRUT WITH SALEH FOR THE RENDEVOUS, AS THEY
WERE AFRAID NEWS OF THEIR MISSION WOULD LEAK, PARTICULARLY
TO THE RUSSIANS WHOM THEY SEEMED TO FEAR.
50 THEY WOULD PREFER MEET WITH WALSH. SALEH AT FIRST COULD
GIVE NO INDICATION WHETHER OUWEIDA AND AZOUNI WILLING MEET
WITH OTHER AMERICAN EMISSARY. SALEH AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE
RETURNED TO EMBASSY SECOND TIME. SAID HE HAD TALKED WITH
AZOUNI WHO INSISTED THAT EMISSARIES MEET WALSH IF ONLY FOR
A HALF AN HOUR. AFTER THAT THEY COULD SEE ANYBODY. REASON WAS
THAT PROJECT WAS AT AZOUNI'S INITIATIVE, AND ACCORDING SALEH,
PROJECT BASED ON MEETINGS BETWEEN AMBASSADOR WALSH AND
OUWEIDA. SALEH HAD PRESUMABLY ASKED WALSH IF IN GENERAL
TERMS IF HE WOULD MEET WITH OUWEIDA AND AMBASSADOR AGREED.
MATTER so DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT SADAT. ADDITIONALLY
IF ARRANGEMENT, AT LEAST AT THE BEGINNING, WAS
WITH AN AMERICAN OTHER THAN WALSH AZOUNI, ACCORDING
SALEH, FEARED OUWEIDA MIGHT SUSPECT AZOUNI WAS CIA
AGENT . WALSH COULD SIMPLY INTRODUCE AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION = THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 11257 231528Z
TO THE TWO EGYPTIAN EMISSARIES.
60 IN EFFORT TO PROBE REASON FOR SADAT USING THIS APPROACH,
DCM COMMENTED THE PROJECT WAS CURIOUS AS USG HAD GOOD COMMUNI-
CATIONS WITH SADAT AND THERE SEEMED CONSIDERABLE RISK FOR
SADAT IN THIS APPROACH. SALEH AGREED WITH LATTER STATEMENT
AND MADE NO COMMENT ON FORMER. WHEN DCM PUT QUESTION DIRECTLY
DURING SALEH'S SECOND VISIT, HE QUICKLY EXPLAINED THAT APPROACH
WAS DESIGNED TO BYPASS RIAD AND OTHERS "WHO WERE COMMUNISTS"
AND TO GIVE SADAT AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP AN INDEPENDENT
POLICY.
70 SALEH MAINTAINED THAT THE ONLY EGYPTIANS WITH KNOWLEDGE
PROJECT WERE PRESIDENT SADAT, OUWEIDA AND AZOUNI.
80 SALEH STRESSED URGENCY OF RECEIVING PROMPT RESPONSE FROM USG
AND CONSIDERABLE CONCERN THAT RUSSIANS MAY SOMEHOW OBTAIN NAMES
OF TWO EGYPTIANS. NOTED BOTH EGYPTIANS REMAINING BEIRUT
AT MARLEY HOTEL PENDING REPLY FROM USG. AS INSTRUCTED,
DCM TOLD HIM HE WOULD REPORT CONVERSATION TO DEPARTMENT
WITH HIS REQUEST FOR AN URGENT REPLY.
90 DEPT SHOULD NOTEEMBASSY COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE CLOSED
TO ALL TRAFFIC EXCEPT "IMMEDIATE OR HIGHER PRECEDENCE"
AFTER 1100AM FRIDAY, DECEMBER 24. GP-1.
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 080
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10515 01 OF 02 011202Z
COPY
12
ACTION SS-25
SUMMARY
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
EC
P 011000Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5614
SITUATION ROOM
087457 E MOUSE
INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
I PM I PM 4 08
EXPIR EX@IN EXCLU
USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1766
SECRE T SECTION I OF 2 BEIRUT 10515
EXDIS
SUBJ: LEBANESE VIEWS ON ARE INTENTIONS
1. SUMMARY: PRES FRANGIE SAYS HE IS CONVINCED THAT SADAT
WILL ENGAGE IN AT LEAST LIMITED MILITARY ACTION "BY END OF
DEC" IF ISRAEL UNWILLING MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION RE
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND THAT SADAT WILL ALSO MAKE MAJOR
PROPAGANDA EFFORT SHOWING HOW HE WAS MISLED AND LET DOWN
BY USG DURING PAST MONTHS IN WORKING FOR PEACEFUL SETTLE-
MENT. FRANGIE AS WELL AS LEBANESE DEL JUST RETURNED FROM
CAIRO ARE PERSUADED SADAT HAS GONE TOO FAR TO TURN BACK
UNLESS ISRAEL GIVES GROUND. LEBANESE DEL ALSO PERSUADED
THAT OTHER ARABS WILL CERTAINLY RALLY TO SUPPORT OF
EGYPT, ALTHOUGH THEY ADMIT IT UNCERTAIN WHAT THIS WOULD
MEAN IN TERMS OF MILITARY ACTION. FRANGIE ALSO VERY
APPREHENSIVE ABOUT FUTURE OF UNITED STATES INFLUENCE
IN MIDDLE EAST RELATIVE TO THAT OF USSR IF OUR
EFFORTS FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION, INCLUDING INTERIM
AGRREMENT, FAIL AND HOSTILITIES BREAK OUT. END SUMMARY.
2. DIRGEN OF THE PRESIDENCY, BOUTROS DIB, LATE NOV 30
CONVEYED GLOOMY PICTURE FROM FRANGIE OF PEACE PROSPECTS
IN ME. HE SAID THAT FRANGIE HAD ASKED HIM TO STRESS TO
EMBOFF FIVE POINTS:
(1) GOL HAS INFORMATION FRANGIE DESCRIBED AS
"CERTAIN" THAT SADAT WILL CARRY OUT HIS STATED INTENTION
22 2
SFCRET
NOT NOT TO TO BE BE REPRODUCED REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT on STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
or
SECRET
S
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10515 01 OF 02 0112022
TO LAUNCH SOME SORT OF MILITARY ACTION BEFORE THE END
OF DEC IF EFFORTS AT MOVING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
FAIL.
(2) EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THESE MILITARY OPERATIONS,
SADAT WILL INFORM THE WORLD IN GREAT DETAIL OF HIS
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE USG OVER THE PAST YEAR, WHAT THE USG
HAS ASKED OF HIM AND WHAT IT HAS PROMISED HIM, WHAT HE
HAS DONE TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE USG AND WHAT THE
USG HAS FAILED TO DO IN LIVING UP TO ITS PROMISES. HE
BELIEVES SADAT UNHAPPY OVER COOL REPLY TO HIS FEELER FOR
MEETING WITH PRES NIXON.
(3) FRANGIE IS CERTAIN THAT THE RENEWAL OF HOSTIL-
ITIES, EVEN IF ONLY LIMITED AND SHORT-LIVED, PLUS THE
S
SADAT DECLARATION ABOUT THE USG, WILL CAUSE A TREMENDOUS
LOSS OF PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE AMONG THE ARAB STATES,
EVEN THE MODERATE ONES, SINCE THEY WILL ALL BELIEVE THAT
THE USG HAS BETRAYED SADAT AND THE ARAB (INCLUDING
LEBANON).
(4) IF ISRAEL CAN BE INDUCED TO MOVE MEANINGFULLY
TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, THE USG WILL REAP FULL
CREDIT WITH THE ARABS WHILE THE INFLUENCE OF THE USSR
WILL CONTINUE TO DIMINISH.
(5) IF HOSTILITIES BREAK OUT INSTEAD, AND THE
EGYPTIAN ARMY IS UNABLE TO WITHSTAND ISRAEL, THE USSR
WILL BE ORLIGED TO STEP IN TO SAVE EGYPT FROM COMPLETE
DESTRUCTION (WHETHER IT WISHED TO OR NOT) AND WILL THEREBY
SINK ITS ROOTS SO DEEP IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT ITS GRIP
S
CANNOT BE LOOSENED: THE CHICOMS WILL ALSO GAIN GREATLY
IN PRESTIGE SINCE THEY HAVE JUST ARRIVED ON THE WORLD
SCENE AND ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTING THE ARAB CAUSE
(ADMITTEDLY ONLY WITH WORDS).
3. NEAR END OF TALK WITH DIB, NAJIB SADAQA
(DIRGEN OF FONOFF) CAME IN FROM
THE CAIRO CONFERENCE. HE DESCRIBED THAT ATMOSPHERE OF
THE MEETING AND IN EGYPT AS "VERY TENSE. IT WAS HIS
CONVICTION THAT SADAT IS TOO FAR COMMITTED TO BACK DOWN
UNLFSS ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO MAKE SOME REAL CONCESSIONS,
AND THAT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION IS NOT ENOUGH.
MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW FAR THEY WILL GO,
HE WAS ABSOLUTELY FIRM IN HIS CONVICTION THAT ALL OTHER
ARAB COUNTRIES, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA BUT
SECRET
NOT
TO
PRODUCED
WITHOUT
HE
OF
THE
SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CE 1HE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 10515 01 OF 02 011202Z
POSSIBLE EXCLUDING JORDAN (SADAQA SAID GOJ EXTREMELY BITTER
TOWARD OTHER ARABS AFTER TAL ASSASSINATION!, WILL SUPPORT
EGYPT BECAUSE ARAB EMOTIONALISM AND THE SPIRIT OF ARAB
SOLIDARITY VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL WILL PREVAIL OVER STATESMANSHIP AND
REASON--
AS IT HAS SO OFTEN DONE IN THE PAST. SADAQA
SAID THAT HE CONSIDERS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN
INTRA-ARAB RELATIONS AT THE PRESENT TIME TO BE THE VERY
STRONG LINKS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT, AND HE IS
CERTAIN THAT KING FEISAL WILL SUPPORT SADAT
WHEN THE LATTER STARTS MILITARY ACTION. HE AND DIB
AGREED THAT ISRAEL'S COMPLETELY UNREASONABLE RIGIDITY,
ITS DEFIANCE OF WORLD AND ARAB OPINION AND ESPECIALLY
ITS ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. WERE FACTORS WHICH FEISAL COULD
NOT IGNORE, AS WELL AS HIS COMMITTMENT TO SADAT. NEITHER
DIB NOR SADAQA OFFERED A PREDICTION AS TO WHAT FEISAL
WOULD ACTUALLY DO BUT THEY WERE CONVINCED IT WOULD NOT
BE AGREEABLE FOR THE US.
4.0 DIB SAID THAT THE GOL BELIEVES IT HAS GOOD INTELLIGENCE ON
STRONG CURRENT AMONG THE EGYPTIAN YOUTH AND MILITARY PUSHING
SADAT TOWARD A TOUGHER AND TOUGHER POSITION OVER THE PAST
SEVERAL MONTHS. HE DESCRIBED SOME OF THE YOUTH AND
MILITARY AS BEING INEXPERIENCED AND RECKLESS, SOME AS
BEING TRULY DEDICATED TO ERASING WHAT THEY SEE AS UN-
BEARABLE ISRAELI HUMILIATION, SOME AS SUFFERING FROM THE
FRUSTRATIONS OF BAD MORALE (IN THE CASE OF THE MILITARY,
FROM TWO YEARS ALONG THE CANAL WITH NEITHER PEACE NOR
WAR: IN THE CASE OF MANY YOUNG PEOPLE, UNEMPLOYMENT).
THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN OUTSIDE (I.E., INTRA-ARABI POLITICAL
PRESSURES WORKING ON SADAT. HE RESISTED THESE PRESSURES
BUFFUM
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT PER OF STATE
THE
Department of State
UNITED STATES or AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 073
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10515 02 OF 02 011141Z
12
COPY
ACTION SS-25
IL
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
087260
P 011000Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
SITUATION ROOM
CHITE-HOUSE
-
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5615
SUMMARY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1767
PM 4:08 08
S
SECRE T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 10515
EXDIS
SUBJ: LEBANESE VIEWS ON ARE INTENTIONS
FOR A LONG TIME, EXPECTING OR HOPING US WOULD HONOR
THE PROMISES HE BELIEVES WERE MADE TO HIM AND REALIZING
THAT THE USSR IS LESS INCLINED THAN EVER TO SUPPORT ARAB
MILITARY ADVENTURES. HOWEVER, SADAT IS NOW IN A FRAME
OF MIND WHERE HE HAS VIRTUALLY NO MORE HOPE AND
WHERE HE FEELS THAT SOME ACTION IS BETTER THAN NO ACTION.
SADAT, ACCORDING TO DIB, HOPES SOVIET-AIDED DEFENSE OF
EGYPTIAN AIR SPACE, PLUS IMPROVED EGYPTIAN ARMY, WILL
ENABLE HIM TO HOLD HIS OWN WITHOUT MAJOR DEFEAT FOR A
FEW DAYS OF LIMITED FIGHTING, FORCING THE USSR TO
INTERVENE POLITICALLY AND PERHAPS EVEN MILITARILY TO STOP
ISRAEL. LIMITED MILITARY ACTION WILL PUT BOTH US AND
USSR TO TEST AND WILL STRENGTHEN SADAT'S WEAKENING POSITION
AT HOME AND WITH OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. DIB SAID THAT IF
THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY COULD HOLD UNTIL THE USSR AND THE
US WERE ABLE TO STOP THE FIGHTING, SADAT COULD WELL
EMERGE IN A STRONGER POSITION AT HOME AND ABROAD AND
THE RADICALIZATION OF OTHER ARAB STATES MIGHT BE CONTAINED.
THE GREAT DANGER OF EXTREME RADICALIZATION WOULD COME IF
THE ISRAELIS ONCE AGAIN PUT THE EGYPTIAN ARMY TO ROUT.
5. DIB POINTED OUT THAT ARAB REACTION AGAINST US WOULD
BE VERY BITTER SHOULD SADAT BE OBLIGED TO RESUME HOSTILITIES.
12
SECRET
NOT
TO
BE
REPRODUCED
WITHOUT
THE
AUTHORIZATION
OF
THE
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10515 02 OF 02 011141Z
THEY ARE ALL AWARE OF THE PROMISES, EXPLICIT OR IMPLCIT,
WHICH THE US HAS MADE. THEY ARE ALSO AWARE OF US INABILITY
TO GET ISRAEL TO ACCEPT JARRING MEMORANDUM OR SECRETARY
ROGERS' SIX POINTS, OR ANY OTHER CONCESSION. ARABS CAN
NEVER BELIEVE USG COULD NOT OBLIGE ISRAEL TO MAKE REAL
CONCESSIONS IF IT WANTED TO BADLY ENOUGH. THEREFORE,
ARABS WOULD BELIEVE EITHER USG HAD BEEN HYPOCRITICAL FROM
BEGINNING AND WAS LEADING EGYPT ON, OR THAT USG IS NOT
MASTER OF ITS OWN POLICIES AND WILL
IN FINAL ANALYSIS ALWAYS BOW TO
INTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURE OF THE JEWISH LOBBY. IN
EITHER EVENT, US POSITION IN ARAB WORLD WILL BE VERY
BADLY DAMAGED. THISIS PARTICULARLY TRUE SINCE US HAS
HELD ITSELF UP FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AS THE ONLY
POWER ACTIVELY WORKING AND ABLE TO BRING ABOUT A STEP
TOWARDS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THIS HAS LEFT US IN AN
EXPOSED POSITION WHERE IT WILL REAP EITHER GREAT CREDIT
OR GREAT BLAME.
6. DIB SAID LEBANESE ARE IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. THEY WILL
BE FORCED TO GO A CERTAIN DISTANCE WITH OTHER ARABS,
ALTHOUGH THEY KNOW IT IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST TO DO SO.
THEY ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT ANY OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES
BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WILL MARK THE END OF THE
PRESENT PHASE IN THE ARAB WORLD, WHICH DIB CONSIDERS THE
MOST FAVORABLE EVER FOR SOME SORT OF SETTLEMENT WITH
ISRAEL. HE CONSIDERS THAT EVEN SYRIA WILL, IN THE FINAL
ANALYSIS, NOT INSIST UPON RECUPERATING ALL OF THE GOLAN
NOR EGYPT ON ALL OF THE SINAI, IF ONLY ISRAEL WOULD MAKE
CONCESSIONS/ BEGIN TO WITHDRAW, AND ENABLE THE ARABS
TO REGAIN THEIR PRIDE. DIB BELIEVES THAT SADAT WOULD
NOT REQUIRE TOO MUCH TO CLAIM THAT HE HAS GAINED A
FIRST MAJOR VICTORY, BUT ISRAEL REFUSES TO GIVE HIM ANY-
THING. ASKED WHETHER HE REALLY BELIEVED SYRIA WAS IN
SUCH A REASONABLE FRAME OF MIND, DIB SAID HE BELIEVED
THIS TO BE THE CASE WITH ASAD AND THE BULK OF THE
POPULATION "WHO DO NOT EVEN FEEL THE OCCUPATION OF GOLA".
HE SAID THAT THERE ARE SOME YOUNG AND SOME RADICAL
ELEMENTS WHO WOULD OPPOSE A REASONABLE SOLUTION BUT
THINKS THAT IN A CLIMATE OF DETENTE THEY COULD BE
MANAGED.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 10515 02 OF 02 011141Z
7. COMMENT. WE ARE, OF COURSE, IN NO POSITION TO JUDGE
VALIDITY OF LEBANESE GOVT'S BELIEFS ABOUT WHAT SADAT WILL
OR WILL NOT DO. OTHER LEBANESE POLITICAL FIGURES, SUCH AS
RAYMOND EDDE AND CAMILLE CHAMOUN, ARE MUCH LESS APPRE-
HENSIVE, JUDGING FROM THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HOWEVER,
EXET
FRANGIE'S REMARKS, WHICH HE ASKED DIB SPECIFICALLY TO
CONVEY TO EMBOFF, BEAR OUT (AND GO BEYOND) PESSIMISTIC
INTERPRETATION OF SITUATION IN EGYPT AS REPORTED BY
USINT CAIRO (CAIRO 2885 AND 28761. WE SHARE FRANGIE'S
CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR US INFLUENCE AND
INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD IN YEARS AHEAD SHOULD WE
FAIL IN OUR EFFORTS TO MOVE TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION,
WHETHER ON NOT THIS LEADS SADAT TO ENGAGE IN SOME SORT
OF MILITARY ACTIVITY.
GP-3
BUFFUM
EXCLU
SECRET
NOT TO WITHOUT HE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIME ES ECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DISPARTMENT OF STATE
W H
BODNCE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 892
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07979 101217Z
2
44
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
128582
R 101058Z SEP 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4945
SECRE T BEIRUT 7979
EXDIS
DEPT PASS CAIRO
SUBU: INTERIM SUEZ SETTLEMENT
SITUATION ROOM SITUATION WHITE HOUSE ROOM
'71 SEP 10 PM 2:52 52
1 . DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANESE FONOFF
(SABRA) MADE SAME POINT TO EMBOFF SEPT 9 RE IMPORTANCE
OF INTERIM SUEZ AGREEMENT THIS YEAR AS COVERED BY ABOUHAMAD
WITH SECRETARY (DEPTEL 1660801.
2. SABRA WENT ON TO OFFER ANY ASSISTANCE WHICH HE
PERSONALLY MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE IN HIS NEW POST AS
LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TO CAIRO. HE SAID THAT GOOD GOL
RELATIONS WITH EGYPT MIGHT ENABLE HIM HAVE SOME INFLUENCE
AND HE IS LONG-TIME FRIEND OF TOP EGYPTIAN LEADERS,
ESPECIALLY PM FAWZI AND FONMIN RIAD. SABRA SAID HE
DOES NOT KNOW BERGUS BUT HOPES TO ESTABLISH CLOSE RELATIONS
WITH USINT. WE ASSURED HIM USINT WOULD RECIPROCATE
THIS DESIRE. GP-3.
BUFFUM
EXCES
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 22 Library.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT DEP OF STATE
Department of State OL THE
EXECUTIVE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 529
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07891 0812347
2/3
41
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
110279
o P 081224Z SEP 71
FM AMEMBASSY BETRUT
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4918
CONFIDENTIALBEIRUT789
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
EXDIS
'71 SEP 8 PM 3:51
SUBU: FAA TECHNICIANS
REF: AMMAN 4181 AND 4166
1. BECAUSE FIRST AVAILABLE SPACE ON ALIA FLIGHTS
BEIRUT-AMMAN NOT AVAILABLE BEFORE SEPT. 11, FAA
FRANKFURT ARRANGED FOR FAA TECHNICIANS SHAFFER AND
DAVIS TO OFFLOAD ON PAN AM AT FRANKFURT AND FLY TO
ATHENS SEPT. 8 VIA OLYMPIC 1721 WHERE THEY WILL BE MET BY
ADMIN STAFF EMBASSY ATHENS. THEY HOLD ONWARD RESERVA-
TIONS SEPT. 9 ATHENS-AMMAN VIA KLM 557, ARRIVING AMMAN
2115 HOURS.
2. AMMAN UNDERSTANDS THEY ARE BRINGING WITH THEM
MAGNETOMETER AND RELATED EQUIPMENT -- SIZE AND WEIGHT
UNKNOWN. AMMAN WISHES ASSURE EQUIPMENT NOT FOUND
OR IDENTIFIED IN ANY BAGGAGE INSPECTION ON ARRIVAL
AT AMMAN AND PRESUMABLY DEPARTURE ATHENS. AMMAN
EXCES
ASKS CHECK WITH TRAVELERS ON ARRIVAL AND, IF CONSIDERED
NECESSARY AND FEASIBLE, ARRANGE SHIPMENT BY POUCH ON
SAME AIRCRAFT WITH THEM. UNCLASSIFIED POUCH SUITABLE
PROVIDED IT NOT SUBJECT TO INSPECTION.
3. FOR AMMAN: WE RECEIVED NEWS TRAVEL PLANS TOO
LATE TO ASSURE POUCHING OF EQUIPMENT FRANKFURT-ATHENS.
GP-3.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Dixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
WA
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 413
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07741 0215152
42
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
073562
2 HOUSE
WHITE HOUSE
R 021415Z SEP 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4876
ROOM
CONFIDENTI A L BEIRUT 7741
EXDIS
Eh:
SUBJECT: SYRIA: AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE
REF: STATE 159358
1. PER PARA TWO REFTEL WE ARE POUCHING ROME COPY
AUG. 21 NOTE TO SARG. THIS NOTE RELATED TO ADMINISTRATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULAR OFFICER DAMASCUS AND WAS DRAFTED
BY USINT. WE DID NOT SEE IT UNTIL AUG. 26. ONE POINT OF THIS
NOTE WAS SUPERSEDED AT TIME PRESENTATION: NAMELY, OUR PLANS TO PEN
AUG. 28 BECAUSE SARG FONOFF KEILANY INFORMED MAIOLINI WHEN HE PRE-
SENTED NOTE THAT FONMIN KHADDAM HAD REFUSED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
GUARANTEE CONFIRMATION OF IMMUNITY WAS ASKED BY EARLIER USINT
NOTE OF AUG. 14 (ALSO POUCHED), DRAFTED IN BEIRUT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN STATE 143185 AND HANDED TO USINT ON AUG. 7
AS DRAFT RPT DRAFT FOR USE WHEN SO INSTRUCTED BY ITALIAN FONOFF.
2. DEPT. MAY ALSO WISH TAKE INTO ACCOUNT DIFFICULTIES
AND DELAYS ENCOUNTERED BY COMMUNICATIONS GOING THROUGH
FORMAL CHANNELS FROM EMBASSY ROME TO ITALIAN FONMIN
THENCE DAMASCUS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE GAVE DRAFT OF
AUG. 14 NOTE TO MAIOLINI ON SAT., AUG. 7. HE WAS UNABLE
TO DELIVER IT EARLIER BECAUSE HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE so
BADLY GARBLED IN TRANSMISSION THAT HE HAD TO MAKE
SPECIAL TRIP TO ITALIAN EMBASSY BEIRUT TO OBTAIN
READABLE TEXT OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS.
3. ON SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF OUR EXCHANGES WITH USINT
DAMASCUS, WE HAVE FOUND IT MOST USEFUL TO DISCUSS WITH
MAIOLINI TRENDS IN SYRIA AND TO COLLATE AS APPROPRIATE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXCES
UNITED
Department of State
MAKE
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07741 0215152
WITH HIM OUR RATHER CONSIDERABLE AND INDEPENDENTLY
OBTAINED INFORMATION ON SYRIA. WE ASSUME DEPT. DESIRES US
TO CONTINUE THIS INFORMAL INTERCHANGE FROM WHICH NOT
INFREQUENTLY CAN EMERGE POSSIBLE MOVES LOOKING TOWARD
CLOSING US=SYRIAN GAP WHICH CAN THEN BE PROPOSED TO
DEPT. RECENT MILITARY BASKETBALL TOURNAMENT IS ONE SUCH
EXAMPLE. ANOTHER IS CONSULAR PRESENCE ITSELF, GENESIS OF
WHICH WAS MAIOLINI'S INFORMAL ORAL REPLY TO KEILANY'S
QUESTION IN MAY ON WHY HE VISITED BEIRUT so FREQUENTLY.
MAIOLINI'S RESPONSE ON NEED FOR AMERICAN CONSULAR SIGNATURES
ON PASSPORT AND VISAS DID NOT GIVE SARG ANY NEW
INFORMATION, BUT IT LED TO KEILANY'S PROMISE TO LOOK
INTO MATTER FURTHER AND THENCE TO SARG NOTE OF JUNE 22
ON AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE. IN ESSENCE SARG USED
MAIOLINI'S REMARKS TO KEILANY AS PEG TO HANG SYRIAN
INVITATION FOR CONSULAR PRESENCE. HOWEVER, SARG CHOSE
TO DEPICT THIS INVITATIONS AS RESPONSE TO MAIOLINI AS SOP
TO INTERNAL SYRIAN POLITICAL DIFFERENCES AND POSSIBLY
ALSO SOVIET PRESSURE. BEGIN FYI: SIMILAR REMARKS HAVE BEEN MADE
AT VARIOUS TIMES BY USINT AS WELL AS OUR EMBOFFS
TO WELL-PLACED SYRIAN FRIENDS. ONLY DIFFERENCE IN
THIS INSTANCE WAS THAT TIMING TURNED OUT TO BE PROPITITIOUS.
END FYI. IT SEEMS UNNECESSARY TO OBSERVE THAT THIS CON-
TINUED PROBING OF SYRIAN ATTITUDES CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED
THROUGH FORMAL INTERCHANGES OF NOTES. RATHER WE ARE
OPERATING IN A SHIFTING POLITICAL SITUATION WHERE PROPER
TIMING IS OF THE ESSENCE MOREOVER, SYRIAN OFFICIALS
HAVE MARKED ABHORRENCE TO WRITTEN DOCUMENTS OF ANY SORT,
ESPECIALLY THOSE INVOLVING USG. WE HAVE EARLIER CITED
EXAMPLE (BEIRUT 71581 OF TOP SECRET LETTER FROM HAFEZ ASSAD
MERELY TO ORDER US TECHNICAL MAGAZINE AS ONE
EXAMPLE OF HOW SYRIANS BELIEVE THEY MUST PROCEED MOST
GINGERLY ON MOVES TOWARDS US AND THEIR OWN AWARENESS OF
HOW LEAKS CAN KILL THESE TENTATIVE PROBINGS. FOR THESE
REASONS, WE HAVE MAINTAINED STRICTEST OF "NEED TO KNOW"
CONTROLS ON SYRIAN MATTERS, ESPECIALLY DISCUSSIONS ON
CONSULAR REPRESENTATIONW AND WE MOST URGENTLY HOPE ALL
CONCERNED WILL DO so LIKEWISE.
5. IN SUM, WE SEE THIS MATTER OF USG COMMUNICATIONS WITH
USINT NOT FROM VIEWPOINT OF PROTOCOLARY FORM BUT OF
ASSESSING AND ACTING ON SUBSTANTIVE POSSIBILITIES OF
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Department of State
of STATES MAKE AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 07741 021515Z
REBUILDING US-SYRIAN RELATIONS, DESIRABILITY OF WHICH
APPEARS TO NEED NO ARGUMENTATION. WE PROPOSE, THEREFORE,
FOLLOWING GUIDELINES:
EXATS
A ° FOR REPORTING PURPOSES: BETRUT TO CONTINUE
AS IN PAST ITS EXCHANGES WITH MAIOLINI, SIMILARLY FOR
CONSULAR AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS.
B. ON POSSIBLE SENSITIVE MOVES TOWARD IMPROVED
RELATIONS, BEIRUT CONTINUE TO COMMUNICATE WITH DEPT. ON
STRICTEST "NEED TO KNOW" BASIS PENDING CRYSTALLIZATION
OF FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS WITH DEPT. TO DETERMINE DISSEMINATION
ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.
C. FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR USINT COMMUNICATIONS TO
SARG WOULD BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH EMBASSY ROME TO ITALIAN
FONMIN WHILE WE WOULD CONTINUE TO USE OUR INFORMAL PER-
SONAL CHANNELS TO KEEP MAIOLINI INFORMED OF US THINKING,
MAKING CLEAR FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS: WOULD BE EXPECTED FROM
ROME IN DUE COURSE.
60 WE HAVE NO OBUECTIONS IF DEPT. WISHES TO PASS ALL OR
ANY PART OF THIS MESSAGE TO ROME. GP - 3 .
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
2ECSELVMA
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 738
2
PAGE 01 BETRUT 07635 310806Z
21
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
SITUATION ROOM 852212
WHITE HOUS
R 3107562 AUG 71
'71 AUG 31 PM 2:49 49
FM AMEMBASSY BETRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4847
INFD USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY AMMANI
EXCES EXCL
SECR El T BEIRUT 7635
EXDIS
SUBUS JERUSALEM IN St
FONMIN ABOUHAMAD INFORMED ME AUGUST 29 ABOUT HIS DISCUSSION
PREVIOUS DAY WITH JORDANIANI FONMIN SALAH. LATTER BRIEFED
ABOUHAMADI ON AGREEMENT WITH US ON TEXT OF RES DEALING
WITH JERUSALEM SAYING GOU WOULD LIKE IMPROVEMENTS BUT
TEXT "APPROVED BY PRES. NIXON" AND VERY DIFFICULT TO GET
CHANGED. ABOUHAMAD TOLD SALAH THIS TEXT ACCEPTABLE TO
LEBANON AND GOLI WOULD SUPPORT JORDAN IN WHATEVER IT
1
DECIDED TO DO. SALAH SEEMED RECONCILED TO PROCEEDING ON
BASIS PRESENT TEXT ANDI PLANNING REQUEST sc MEETING SEPTEMBER 7.
GP-3.
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon P residential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXCES
2
CONFIDENTIAL 091
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07358 2315377
51
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 1026 W
125093
R 231415Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4762
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
CONFIDENT I A LI BEIRUT 7358
EXDIS
SUBU & SYRIA/ AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE
1. IN URGENTLY REQUESTED MEETING AT CHTAURA AUGUST 22,
MAIOLINI REPORTED ON HIS: AUGUST 21 CONVERSATION WITH
SARG ASSISTANT MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS KEILANY AT
APPOINTMENT ARRANGED PREVIOUSLY FOR PRESENTATION TO
KEILANY OF ITALIAN NOTE GIVING NAME US OFFICER PER-
FORMING CONSULAR DUTIES AT USINT AND HIS SCHEDULE.
2. MAIOLINA REPORTED THAT EILANY, WITHOUT HIDING HIS
GREAT EMBARRASSMENT, TOLD HIM THAT FOREIGN MINISTER
KHADDAM HAD REFUSED TO SIGN SYRIAN NOTE IN RESPONSE
TO USINT NOTE WHICH REQUESTED WRITTEN CONFIRMATION
FULL DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES INCLUDING POUCH FACILITIES
FOR AMERICAN OFFICER. KEILANY QUOTED KHADDAM AS
JUSTIFYING HIMSLEF BY STATING CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT
FAVORABLE FOR TREATING SUCH QUESTIONS BECAUSE LEADERS
OF ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE DECLARED GOOD
INTENTIONS OF US IN CONCRETE FORM. KHADDAM CLAIMED
ARABS ARE BEING REASONABLE ON PEACE SETTLEMENT IN
CONTRAST TO DAYAN SPEECH WHICH REFLECTED HIS BACKING
BY USG MAIOLINI INTERUECTED WITH MCCLOSLKY STATEMENT
ON DAYAN SPEECH. KEILANY ALSO CHIDED MAIOLINI FOR
"LONG DELAY" IN REPLY TO SYRIAN NOTE JUNE 22, STATING
PROMPTER REPLY WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS POSITION BY
KHADDAM
3. KEILANY THEN POINTED OUT KHADDAM INTERVENTION WAS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXCES EXCESS
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07358 231537Z
HIS UNILATERAL ACT THAT SARG COUNCIL MINISTERS*
POSITION REMAINED AS CONTAINED IN JUNE 22 NOTE. HE
STRESSED KHADDAM HAD NO POWER TO ALTER THIS DECISION.
KEILANY URGED THAT US OFFICIAL BE SENT TO SYRIA ON
BASIS THIS NOTE LEAVING QUESTION FORMAL IMMUNITIES FOR
FURTHER DISCUSSION AS SOON AS SITUATION CREATED BY
DAMASCUS TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN CLARIFIED. IF
OFFICIAL IS SENT ON BASIS SYRIAN NOTE, KEILANY SAID HE
WOULD NOTIFY FRONTIER AUTHORITIES IN ORDER TO FACILITATE
CROSSING FORMALITIES. (KEILANY RETAINED PHOTOS AND BIO
DATA SUBMITTED BY USINT FOR AMERICAN OFFICER'S SYRIAN
DIPLOMATIC CARD).
40 AMB BOZZINI, MAIOLINI SAID, IS RECOMMENDING A
FEW WEEKS SHOULD ELAPSE BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH
THIS QUESTION, GIVING SYRIANS CHANCE TO REFLECT ON USINT
DIPLOMATIC STATUS IN CAIRO IN CONTRAST TO THEIR POSITION
ALD ALSO TO SEE THAT IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO ASK A
US OFFICIAL TO COME TO DAMASCUS WITHOUT FORMAL ACKNOWL
EDGEMENT OF HIS LEGAL STATUS THUS, DESPITE KEILANY'S
ASSURANCES, BOZZINI'S RECOMMENDATION WAS THAT WE AWAIT
FORMALSYRIAN NOTE ON IMMUNITIES BEFORE SENDING EMBOFF
TO DAMASCUS.
5. MAIOLINI SAID HE THOUGHT KEILANY, THROUGH HIS OWN
PRIVATE CHANNELS, WOULD DOUBTLESS SEEK TO HAVE HIGHER
LEVEL REVIEW OFIKHADDAMIS POSITION'S HE WAS ALSO
INCLINED TO SUSPECT SOME SOVIET PRESSURE.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS: WE CONCUR WITH BOZZINI THAT WE
SHOULD AWAIT WRITTEN ASSURANCES. HENCE WE ARE
DELAYING UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE OUR PLANS TO SEND OFFI-
CER TO DAMASCUS ON AUGUST 280 WE THINK US POSTURE ON
THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE THAT USINT HAS REPLIED TO
SYRIAN NOTE OF JUNE 22 AND WE ARE MERELY AWAITING
SYRIAN RESPONSE TO IT: IN SO DOING, WE WILL PROVIDE
TIME FOR KEILANY'S PROBABLY EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CLARIFI-
CATION OF SITUATION. WE WOULD NOT FINALLY THE OBVIOUS
OF HOW EASILY ISRAELIS CAN UPSET APPLECART
GP - 3
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O- THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXCES
Department of State
OF STATES SAME AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
WH
CONFIDENTIAL 576
2
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06701 0316132
In
52
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
10
P 031450Z AUG 71
SITUATION.ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
'71 AUG 3 PM 7:52
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4556
CONFIDENTIALBEIRUT 6701
EXDIS
SUBJ: SYRIAN: PROPOSED AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE
REF STATE 137302
SUMMARY: MAIOLINI DISCUSSED WITH ACTION UNDERSECRETARY
EXCES
AMBASSADOR KEILANY QUESTION FULL-TIME US CONSULAR PRES-
ENCE IN SYRIA. KEILANY RESPONDED BY EMPHASIZING TIME
NOT YET RIGHT FOR FULL-TIME PRESENCE, POINTING OUT THAT
PART-TIME PRESENCE APPROVED BY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
ONLY AFTER STIFF MINORITY OPPOSITION. KEILANY PROMISED
OFFICER SOULD REMAIN FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS PER WEEK AS
WORKLOAD DICTATED AND GAVE DRAL ASSURANCES ON FULL
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES. KEILANY URGED US ACCEPTANCE
PART-TIME PRESENCE, EMPHASIZING BELIEF THAT WITHIN
TWO OR THREE MONTHS THIS COULD BE CONVERTED TO FULL-
TIME RESIDENCE DAMASCUS. IN BOTH HIS AND MAIOLINI'S
VIEW, IMPORTANT THING WAS TO GET SARG OFFICIALS USED
TO HAVING AMERICAN OFFICIAL BACK IN SRYIA. END
SUMMARY.
1 * MAIOLINA VISITED BEIRUT JULY 30 TO DISCUSS RESPONSE
TO SYRIANS. BASED ON REFTEL, WE PROVIDED FOR HIS OWN
USE DETAILED NOTOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS ON PROPOSING
FULL-TIME PRESENCE AS EVIDENCE US GOODWILL, QUOTED
THEREIN SECRETARY ROGERS. SEPTEMBER 1969 STATEMENT ON
US WILLINGNESS TO RESUME RELATIONS WITH ALL ARAB
STATES, NOTED OUR NEED TO CLARIFY IMMUNITIES QUESTION
AS WELL AS EXTENT CONSULAR ACTIVITIES E.G., NOTARIALS,
OVER AND ABOVE PASSPORT-VISA WORK, AND ALSO OFFERED
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXEMS
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06701 031613Z
RECIPROCAL SYRIAN FACILITIES IN US (COPY BEING POUCHED
NEW-ARN).
2. MAIOLINI RETURNED BEIRUT AUGUST 3 TO REPORT RESULITS
HIS CONVERSATION JULY 31 WITH ACTING UNDERSECRETARY
FONOFF AMBASSADOR KEILANY. MAIOLINI HAD OPENED BY QUOTING
SECRETARY'S REMARKS AND STATING THAT SARG FONOFF NOTE
WAS VERY CAREFULLY DRAFTED FOLLOWING ITS APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE
BY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR PART-TIME US PRESENCE.
KEILANY EMPHASIZED THAT IT HAD BEEN MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT
GETTING THIS DECISION FROM COUNCIL BECAUSE OF STIFF
MINORITY OPPOSITION WITHIN COUNCIL. TO GO BACK WITH
US COUNTERPROPOSAL WOULD RISK LOSING ALL THAT HAD BEEN
ACCOMPLISHED SO FAR BY GIVING THIS MINORITY
ANOTHER CHANCE TO SHOOT DOWN IDEA. HE THEREFORE URGED
STRONGLY THAT USG ACCEPT PART-TIME PROPOSAL, TELLING
MAIOLINI IT WAS ONLY FIRST STEP TOWARDS RESUMPTION.
HE ANTICIPATED THAT IN RELATIVELY SHORT TIME, PERHAPS
TWO OR THREE MONTHS, THIS PARTIAL PRESENCE COULD EASILY
BE CONVERTED TO FULL-TIME BASIS. IMPORTANT POINT,
KEILANY SAID WAS TO GET SARG OFFICIALS USED TO HAVING
AMERICAN OFFICER ONCE AGAIN IN DAMASCUS. THIS HAD TO
BE A SLOW, GRADUAL PROCESS GIVEN LONG PERIOD SYRIAN
DISTRUST OF US. KEILANY FURTHER ASSURED MAIOLINI THERE
WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ON EXTENDING OFFICER FULL DIPLO-
MATIC IMMUNITIES NOR WOULD THERE BE ANY PROBLEM ABOUT
RELATED CONSULAR ACTIVITIES SUCH AS NOTARIALI WORK.
FURTHERMORE, SARG FONOFF DID NOT CARE IF OFFICER
REMAINED ONE TWO OR THREE DAYS AT A TIME IN DAMASCUS.
IN BRIEF, KEILANY HOPED US WOULD RESPOND FAVORABLY AND
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ORIGINAL SYRIAN APPROACH.
3. MAIOLINI POINTED OUT TO US THAT ATMOSPHERE FOR US
BECOMING INCREASINGLY FAVORABLE IN SYRIA. HE NOTED US
MILITARY BASKETBALL TEAM NOW IN DAMASCUS FOR ELEVEN-DAY
INTERNATIONAL TOURNAMENT, OCCASION OF WHICH HAS
PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSPICUOUS FLYING US FLAG,
PRESS, TV AND RADIO COVERAGE FOR US TEAM (WHICH APPEARS:
INCIDENTALLY TO BE WINNING TOURNAMENT). MAIOLINI
POINTED OUT THIS SORT OF RECEPTION IS CLEARLY RESULT OF
SYRIAN POLITICAL DECISION. HE REITERATED THAT DOMINANT
TREND IN SYRIA TODAY WAS TO MOVE AWAY FROM EXTREME
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O
HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE DEP
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06701 031613Z
SOVIET-SYRIAN CLOSENESS BUT POINTED OUT THAT REGIME
IN SO DOING HAD TO MANEUVER SLOWLY AND CAUTIOUSLY
BECAUSE OF BOTH INTERNAL SYRIAN OPPOSITION AND BECAUSE
OF ITS ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON EAST BLOC COUNTRIES. THUS
MAIOLINI URGED US MOVES SHOULD BE GEARED TO PACE SYRIAN
REGIME FEELS IT CAN SAFELY SET RATHER THAN PUSHING TDO
HARD.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS:
A . SINCE WE NOW HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE OFFICER
INTO SYRIA ON PART-TIME BASIS RAPIDLY, BELIEVE
WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS SITUATION AND SUGGEST THAT
:
MAIOLINI BE INSTRUCTED TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO SARG
FONOFF NOTE.
B. RECOMMEND DEPT ASSIGN EXPERIENCED OFFICER ASAP
FOR COVERAGE SYRIAN AFFAIRS TO BE CARRIED ON NEWLY
ESTABLISHED POST COMPLEMENT FOR DAMASCUS BUT WHO
WOULD BE TEMPORARILY RESIDENT IN BEIRUT.
C * RECOGNIZING THAT ARRIVAL OF SUCH OFFICER MIGHT
REQUIRE SOME TIME WE SUGGEST INTERIM COVERAGE FROM
BEIRUT, PERHAPS ON ROTATING BASIS, SO AS TO ESTABLISH
US PRESENCE IN DAMASCUS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. IN
SETTING UP SUCH SCHEDULE, WE WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE FACT
THAT SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS ARE WORKING DAYS IN
DAMASCUS BUT NOT IN BEIRUT.
5 . IN LAST ANALYSIS, WE CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE TO START
SLOW PROCESS REBUILDING RELATIONS FROM INSIDE AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE INCONVENIENCES IN
HAVING ONLY PART TIME PRESENCE AT FIRST. MAIOLINI
SHARES THESE RECOMMENDATIONS.
GP-3
BUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
Wit
CONFIDENTIAL 404
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06488 271621Z
50
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
R 271519Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4491
200
JULN27 SIGNATION ROOM TE HOUSE PM 8:38 ROOM
C ONFIDENTIALBEIRUT 6488
EXCES EXCES
EXDIS
SUBU: SYRIA: PROPOSED AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE
REF STATE 134512
1. WE APPRECIATE DEPT CONSIDERATIONS FOR DESIRING TO
SEEK FULL-TIME OFFICER AND SECRETARY RESIDENT IN
DAMASCUS.
20 WHILE WE CONTINUE TO HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE
SYRIAN REACTION, WE AGREE MAIOLINI COULD TRY OUT SUCH
PROPOSAL. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO
POINT OUT THAT, BESIDES OBVIOUS GOODWILL ASPECTS, FACT
THAT BEIRUT CONSULAR BURDEN TOO HEAVY TO PERMIT
TEMPORARY DETAILS OF OFFICER ASSIGNED HERE. HE MAY POINT
OUT ALSO THAT FROM OUR EXAMINATION OF WORKLOAD STATISTICS, WE
CONSIDER OUR CONSULAR OFFICER WILL BE FULL OCCUPIED WE
RECOMMEND, HOWEVER, THAT HIS FORMAL DUTIES BE LIMITED
AT BEGINNING TO PASSPORTS AND VISAS PROVIDED SOMEWHAT
BROADER SCOPE IS NOT SPELLED OUT IN ADVANCE IN
MAIOLINI-SARG DISCUSSIONS FOR HIS CONSULAR DUTIES, FOR
EXAMPLE: NOTARIAL WORK, ETD. (AS DETAILED IN PARA 4C OF
BEIRUT 60371.
3. CRUX OF ISSUE ON LONG SLOW PATHI TOWARD RESTORATION
OF SEMBLANCE OF US-SARG RELATIONS IS INORDINATE SYRIAN
SUSPICIONS OF ALL US ACTIONS. THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN
STATIONED THER ARE ONLY TOO KEENLY AWARE OF HOW THESE
SUSPICIONS FOCUSED ON OUR EMBASSY. THESE
SUSPICIONS ARE CLEARLY STILL ALIVE DESPITE SERIES OF
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06488 271621Z
US PROBES SINCE LATE 1968 SEKING TO OVERCOME THEM.
THESE HAVE MET WITH SOME SYRIAN RESPONSE, E.G., REMOVAL
OF BANS ON US TOURISTS AND AIR OVERFLIGHTS AND ENDING
OF US TRADE BOYCOTT. NEVERTHELESS, THIS DEEP SUSPICION
EXCES
HAS INHIBITED SYRIANS IN SEEKING CLOSER TIES WITH US.
THUS WE THINK PATH TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS LIES
IN NOT MOVING TOO FAST, ALTHOUGH A PROBE TO TEST THEIR
REACTION TO PRESENCE OF FULL-TIME OFFICER MAY BE USEFUL.
HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE HIS DUTIES IN THE BE-
GINNING SHOULD REMAIN WITHIN THE CIRCUMSCRIBED AREA
INDICATED ABOVE AND ONLY LATER MOVING TO OTHER RESPONSI-
BILITIES AS THE SYRIANS BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO HIS
PRESENCE. THIS OF COURSE DOES NOT RULE OUT DISCREET
REPORTING ON SYRIAN AFFAIRS.
4. IN SUMMARY THEN OUR RECOMMENDATIONS SUBSTANTIVELY
ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A * PROPOSE TO SYRIANS FULL-TIME OFFICER AND
SECRETARY FOR THE PASSPORT AND VISA WORK PLUS SUCH
OTHER CONSULAR DUTIES AS MAY BE WORKED OUT (PARA 2
ABOVE) :
B. SYRIAN COMMITMENT ON APPROPRIATE IMMUNITIES
FOR AMERICAN PERSONNELI (PARA 4B BEIRUT 60371: AND
C. PROPOSAL OF RECIPROCAL FACILITIES FOR SARG
IN WASHINGTON (PARA 6 BEIRUT 62931.
5. WE URGE SUCH PROPOSALS BE MADE ORALLY BY
MAIOLINI AT APPROPRIATE FOREIGN OFFICE LEVEL, LEAVING
#
now
88:8
FORMAL WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SYRIAN NOTE UNTIL
COMPLETION DISCUSSIONS.
by
GP-3
RUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT
C No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-11-1
STATE
Department of State
STATES OF AMOUNT
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 744
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06037 140842Z
19
ACTION SS-45
State Dept. review completed
SITUATION ROOM
INFO OCT-01 1046 W
079724
PI 140745Z JUL 71
05
FM: AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4372
CONFIDENTIA L: BEIRUT 6037
EXDIS:
SUBJ: SYRIA: PROPOSED AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE
REF BEIRUT 57281 STATE 124626
SUMMARY: SARG HAS PROPOSED WEEKLY VISIT BY AMERICAN
CONSULAR OFFICER TO DAMASCUS FOR: PASSPORT AND VISA
SERVICES. WE RECOMMEND APPROVAL ALTHOUGH WE SEE
PROBLEMS ON LENGTH OF EACH VISITY IMMUNITIES AND
STAFFING. WHILE USINT HAS MADE INTERIM, ENCOURAGING.
INFORMAL RESPONSE, FORMAL POSITION RESERVED. NEED FOR
SECRECY PARAMOUNT. TEXT PROPOSED USG RESPONSE CON-
TAINED HEREIN. END SUMMARY.
1. SARG BY SECRET NOTE: TO USING DAMASCUS HAS PRO-
POSED WEEKLY VISIT AMERICAN CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVE
FROM BEIRUT TO SIGN PASSPORTS AND ISSUE VISAS (SEE)
REFTEL). ITALIANS QUOTED SARG FONOFF REPRESENTATIVE
KEILANY AS EMPHASIZING THIS WAS FIRST STEP. THIS WE
REGARD DEVELOPMENT AS POLITICALLY ENCOURAGING.
2. HOWEVER, WE UNCLEAR WHETHER PHRASE "WEEKLY" MEANS
ONE! DAY A WEEK OR ONE VISIT A WEEK, ALTHOUGH ITALS:
QUOTED KEILANY AS SAYING ONE TIME PER WEEK. WE RECOG-
NIZE: US PRESENCE ON ONE-DAY-A-WEEKI BASIS WOULD BE:
ESSENTIALLY A CONVENIENCE FOR SYRIANS SINCE ITALIANS
CANNOT ISSUE PASSPORTS OR VISAS ON OUR BEHALF. SUCH A
SCHEDULE WOULD PRESENT US WITH SERIOUS OPERATIONAL AND
LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES ON CONSULAR SIDE BECAUSE OF
(1) NEED FOR SECURITY CHECKS
25X1
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-11-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-11-1
STATE
Department of State
EXEMS
UNITED STATES OF AMOUNT
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06037 140842Z
LOOKOUT CARDS, ETC. AND 12) MANPOWER SHORTAGE.
ALTHOUGH ONE-DAY VISIT WOULD THUS GIVE US LITTLE AD-
VANTAGE EXCEPT AS POSSIBLY A POLITICAL ICEBREAKER, WE
BELIEVE CONSTRUCTIVE COUNTERPROPOSAL IS WORTH TRYING.
FURTHERMORE, THERE IS OBVIOUS NEED FOR SOME SORT OF
GUARANTEE OF CONSULAR/DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY FOUR OUR
OFFICER WHILE IN SYRIA.
3. AS INTERIM STEP WE THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO MAKE SOME
POSITIVE ALTHOUGH NON-COMMITTAL RESPONSE NECESSARY TO
SYRIANS. THUE WE AUTHORIZED USINT IROMANO, THEIR DCM,
ACTING IN MAIOLINI'S ABSENCE) TO REPLY ORALLY TO SYRIANS,
STATING IN GENERAL TERMS OUR APPRECIATION THIS SYRIAN
GOODWILL GESTURE. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO NOTE TECHNICAL
CONSULAR DIFFICULTIES WERE INVOLVED AND THAT WE HAD TO
REFERI PROPOSAL TO WASHINGTON ALTHOUGH WE FELT SURE THAT
WASHINGTON WOULD WELCOME IT AS FORWARD SYRIAN STEP.
WE SOUGHT TO BE! RESPONSIVE AND ENCOURAGING TO SYRIANS
BUT WITHOUT LETTING ROMAND BECOME TOO INVOLVED WITH
SYRIANS BEFORE WE HAD FIRM POSITION.
4. WEi RECOMMEND FOLLOWING RESPONSE BY USINT DAMASCUS
TO SARG:
A. QUOTE: WE WELCOME SYRIAN PROPOSAL FOR WEEKLY
VISIT BY AMERICAN CONSULAR OFFICER FROM BEIRUT TO
HANDLE AMERICAN CONSULAR MATTERS.® LENGTH OF STAY EACH
WEEK WOULD BE DETERMINED BY AMOUNT OF WORK BUT SHOULD
NOT EXCEED THREE DAYS. ONLY EXPERIENCE IN DAMASCUS
CAN PERMIT CLEAR RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM.
8. QUOTE: WE EXPECT SYRIANS TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE
ASSURANCES THAT IMMUNITIES EXTENDED THIS OFFICER IN SYRIA
WOULD BE SAME AS THOSE GIVEN USINT OFFICERS OF ITAL!
EMBASSY DAMASCUS. UNQUOTE FYI8 PRECISE FORM OF:
EXCES
IMMUNITY EXTENDED IS NOT IMPORTANT ALTHOUGH IT MUST BE
IN WRITING so THAT SUDDEN CHANGE OF REGIME COULD NOT
LEAD, FOR EXAMPLE, TO CHARGE OUR OFFICER WAS: ILLEGALLY
IN COUNTRY OR OTHER FORM HARASSMENT. BUT WHATEVER FORM
THESE IMMUNITIES TAKE, THEY SHOULD BE SIMPLE. SYRIANS
WILL BECOME SUSPICIOUS: IFI WE ASKI TOO MUCH OR. SEEK TOO
GREAT DETAIL END FYI.
C : QUOTE: WE NOTE AMCITS WILLI EXPECT, AS IS
THEIR LEGAL RIGHT, TO RECEIVE CERTAIN OTHER NORMAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-11-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 NLN-NSC-621-2-11-1
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06037 140842Z
EXEMS EXQIN EXPIR
SERVICES FROM AMERICAN CONSULAR OFFICER, FOR EXAMPLE,
NOTARIAL SERVICES REQUIRED IN US: (NOT IN SYRIA SINCE
QUESTION OF EXEQUATUR NOT INVOLVED) OR ANSWERS TO MIS-
CELLANEOUS INQUIRIES OF TOURISTIC OR OTHER NATURE.
UNQUOTE. FIY: WE SEEK BY THIS TO OBTAIN CLEAR IDEA
OF WHAT SYRIANS EXPECT ITALIANS TO DO AS PROTECTING
POWER AND WHAT AMERICAN OFFICER CAN DO, AS WELL AS TO
PUSH DOOR A LITTLE FARTHER OPEN. END FYI.
5. WHILE FOREGOING IS OUR PROPOSALIFOR FORMAL RESPONSE:
BY USINT DAMASCUS, WE ALSO SEE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS FOR
DEPT TO CONSIDER:
A . WE, NEED ADDITIONAL OFFICER WITHI ARABIC TRAINING
FOR THESE DUTIES SINCE WE LACK STAFF HERE FOR THIS WORK.
FURTHER, WE HOPE, AS KEILANY TOLD ITALS, THIS WOULD BE
ONLY FIRST STEP. THUS RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICER MAY
WELL PROGRESSIVELY INCREASE. MOREOVER OFFICER SHOULD BE
EXPERIENCED.
6. OBVIOUSLY, UNTIL ARRANGEMENTS: COMPLETE, SLIGHTEST LEAK
COULD QUEER NEGOTIATIONS. SYRIAN SENSITIVITY IS SHOWN
BY SECRET CALASSIFICATION ON SARG FONOFF NOTE. OBVIOUSLY,
HOWEVER, ONCE ARRANGEMENTS COMPLETE AND OFFICER OPERATING
IN DAMASCUS, WORD OF HIS PRESENCE WILL GET AROUND VERY
RAPIDLY. IT IS POSSIBLE LEAK BEFOREHAND THAT WE MUST
GUARD AGAINST.
7. FULL DETAILS BEINGPOUCHED JULY 14 IN LETTER FROM: HOUGHTON
TO SEELYE.
GP - 3
SUFFUM
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 : NLN-NSC-621-2-11-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.