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Australia P.M. GORTON VISIT March 31-April 1, 1969
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Australia P.M. GORTON VISIT March 31-April 1, 1969
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CONFIDENTIAL
MEMO K TO THE PRES.
Subj: (as on attached)
proposed
The Department has sent the attached/schedule for Prime
(Tab A)
Minister Gorton's visit./ They propose a meeting with you on the morning
of XMM March 31ˢᵗ,ᵗ dinner on the 31st, and a contingency arrangement for
a second meeting on April 1.st The dinner is Хихмики probably important
to Prime Minister Gorton (as compared with a lunch), so that XXXX comparisons
will nbt be drawn in Australia between your entertainment of Mr. Menzies and
himself.
We suggest a slight rearrangement to fit XXXX your requirements:
arrival ceremony at the White House at 11:30 AM on March 31st, followed by
a ******* private meeting between the two of you; a meeting with advisers
meeting
at 3PM,and ****** the question of a follow-up on the following
day held in abeyance until it is clear whether there will be XXXXXXX need
for further discussion.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That yourmexx private meeting be scheduled for 11:30 AM,
the
March 31st, following/arrival ceremony. Appro
Diasppro
3. That you entertain Préme Minister Gorton
to dinner at 8 PM,XK March 31st. Appr
Disappro
2. That a meeting with advisers be scheduled for 3 PM,
March 31st.
APPRO
Disappro
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
(HUEBNER) JK
y 1, 1969
Suggestions for Remarks at the Departure of
John Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia
This visit has been enormously useful for me and for this govern-
ment. It has given us all a chance to get acquainted with an outstanding
statesman from a land that has been aptly described by one of its poets
as "the land of reliance and never-give-in and help-your-mate."
The spirit of "help-your-mate" is deeply involved in the coopera-
tion between our countries. I might point out that our space program
has six tracking stations in Australia. And Australia is a member of
ANZUS and SEATO, two alliances which are fundamental to our policy
in Southeast Asia. Australian troops are fighting beside ours and those
of other free world nations in Vietnam even as they fought beside us in
World War I, World War II, and in Korea.
While Australia has been called "a prophecy still to be fulfilled,'
it is making an outstanding contribution to peaceful cooperation and
economic development in its part of the world. It participates whole-
heartedly in the Colombo Plan, the Asian Development Bank, and
many other regional activities. In percentage of national income
devoted to foreign aid, Australia ranks second in the world, a record
of which any nation can be proud. Australia and America can both be
proud of the contribution we are making, as partners, to the security
and progress of the Pacific region. That partnership and that contri-
bution will continue.
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
These two days have provided opportunities for us to discuss a
wide range of subjects, including, not only Vietnam and regional
security questions, but also a number of topics outside the security
field. Australia is geographically closer to some of these problems
than we are, so I have very much appreciated the opportunity to
exchange views with its Prime Minister. I have obtained a number
of new insights, but fundamentally, I find the perspective from "down
under" is very much the same as it is from Washington.
Now you return to your homeland -- exchanging the beauties of
a Washington spring for the beauties of an Australian autumn - -
without even going through a hot summer.
An Australian writer has said that the flame of freedom will never
die in Australia because it is fanned by "a wind blowing out of the far
country. 11 That wind is the democratic spirit of our forefathers which
is the product of the old frontier in both Australia and America.
At a time when democratic ideals are under attack all over the
world, all free nations can turn to Australia as they have often turned
to America, and they can be grateful that the winds of freedom are still
blowing "out of that far country."
####
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
(Huebner) JK
April 30, 1969
Suggestions for the President's Toast to
John Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia
Just about one year from now Australia will celebrate the 200th
anniversary of the landing of Captain James Cook and the crew of the
ENDEAVOUR at Botany Bay, near what is now Sydney.
Your government, Mr. Prime Minister, asked ours to send a ship
to join in the celebration. Unfortunately, we had to decline because you
asked us to send a sailing ship, and in the whole United States Navy,
not a single, old-fashioned, wind-powered vessel capable of making
the journey could be found.
I hasten to say, however, that this security gap is not quite as bad
as it might sound. This country does have a famous sailing ship a
12 meter called the Intrepid. I wish I could tell you tonight that the
Intrepid will sail to Australia to represent us at the Cook bicentenary,
even though it is not a government ship. But when I suggested this to
the skipper, our Chief of Protocol, "Bus" Mosbacher, he seemed
somehow reluctant. I think he is afraid someone would suggest that
now that he's in diplomacy -- he should take along the America's Cup
rather than wait for Australia to come and get it.
Your celebration of the anniversary of Captain Cook's landing is
a fine reminder of your country's exciting past. An American writer,
Mark Twain, once said of Australian history: "It does not read like
history, but like the most beautiful of lies."
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
And now, of course, your country is still paced toward the future.
The Australian writer, George Johnston, placed that point in perspec-
tive when he wrote: "In a world where SO many have come to fear the
beginning of the end, Australia has come only to the end of the
beginning."
In the worried world of 1969, Australia and the United States are
partners in many ways -- in spirit, in the ANZUS and SEATO alliances,
in our defense of freedom in Korea and Vietnam, in our goal of develop-
ment for the countries of the Pacific, in our quest for a better world.
In this high purpose, I pledge you the unfailing support and continued
loyal friendship of the United States of America.
And now I would like to offer a riddle: What does Australia have
in common with Monaco and Sikkim? The answer, of course, is that
the leaders of all three are married to beautiful American women.
This is a little-known form of international cooperation. We are
delighted to welcome your lovely lady from Maine back to our shores
as one of us - - and as one of you.
####
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ever get
El- did back the
orig?
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
March 29, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Gorton Visit
an
The Australian Ambassador has relayed to me urgent request from
Prime Minister Gorton that his visit be re-scheduled in May, preferably
before mid-May when Parliament reconvenes. At the very least, Gorton
hopes to be able to announce upon his return from the funeral ceremonies
that you have agreed with him to re-schedule the visit in the very near
future.
May is rather tight, but there is space for a Gorton visit during the
middle of the month.
Recommendation:
(a) That you authorize me to inform the Australian Embassy
that you would welcome a re-scheduling of the Gorton visit in mid-May,
at a time to be worked out but hopefully May 12-13.
Approved
(b) or that I be authorized to welcome a rescheduling at an
unspecified date "in the very near future."
Approved
(c) or other
Henry A. Kissinger
HAK:RLS:mlb (3/29/69)
(Clearance: Dwight Chapin)
Secretariat - 2
Presidential Chron - 1
HAK Chron - 1
WH file - 1
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
RLS - I
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
March 29, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Corton Visit
an
The Australian Ambassador has relayed to me/urgemt request from
Prime Minister Corton that his visit be re-scheduled in May. preferably
before mid-May when Parliament reconvenes. At the very least, Gorton
hopes to be able to announce upon his return from the funeral ceremomies
that you have agreed with him to re-schedule the visit in the very near
future.
May is rather tight, but there is space for a Gorton visit during the
middle of the month.
Recommendation:
(a) That you authorize me to inform the Australian Embassy
that you would welcome a re-scheduling of the Gorton visit in mid-May,
at a time to be worked out but hopefully May 12-13.
Approved
(b) or that I be authorized to welcome a rescheduling at an
unspecified date "in the very near future."
Approved
(c) or other
Henry A. Kissinger
HAK:RLS:mlb (3/29/69)
(Clearance: Dwight Chapin)
Secretariat - 2
Presidential Chron - 1
HAK Chron - 1
WH file - 1
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This ocumenthas been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CC: RLSNEIDER
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
March 29, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Corton Visit
an
The Australian Ambassador has relayed to me urgent request from
Prime Minister Corton that his visit be re-scheduled in May, preferably
before mid-May when Parliament reconvemes. At the very least, Gorton
hopes to be able to announce upon his return from the funeral ceremonies
that you have agreed with him to re-schedule the visit in the very near
future.
May is rather tight, but there is space for a Gorton visit during the
middle of the month.
Recommendation:
(a) That you authorize me to inform the Australian Embassy
that you would welcome a re-scheduling of the Gorton visit in mid-May,
at a time to be worked out but hopefully May 12-13.
Approved
(b) or that I be authorized to welcome a rescheduling at an
unspecified date "in the very near future."
Approved
(c) or other
Henry A. Kissinger
HAK:RLS:mlb (3/29/69)
(Clearance: Dwight Chapin)
Secretariat - 2
Presidential Chron - 1
HAK Chron - 1
WH file - 1
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
March 29, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Richard L. Sneider
SUBJECT: Re-scheduling of Gorton Visit
Ambassador Waller indicated that the best dates from Prime
Minister Gorton's standpoint would be May 8-13. As second best,
he suggested May 1-8. After the 13th, the convening of parliament
makes a trip difficult, but Gorton is still willing to come then, if
necessary.
The third week in May (May 12-16) is free of foreign visitors.
I believe that we should aim for that week, and preferably for the
beginning of the week to accommodate Ambassador Gorton.
Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum to
the President at Tab A.
RLS:mlb (3/28/69)
Secretariat - 2
WH file - 1
RLS - 1
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
March 29, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Gorton Visit
an
The Australian Ambassador has relayed to me/urgent request from
Prime Minister Gorton that his visit be re-scheduled in May, preferably
before mid-May when Parliament reconvenes. At the very least, Gorton
hopes to be able to announce upon his return from the funeral ceremonies
that you have agreed with him to re-schedule the visit in the very near
future.
May is rather tight, but there is space for a Gorton visit during the
middle of the month.
Recommendation:
(a) That you authorize me to inform the Australian Embassy
that you would welcome a re-scheduling of the Gorton visit in mid-May,
at a time to be worked out but hopefully May 12-13.
Approved
(b) or that I be authorized to welcome a rescheduling at an
unspecified date "in the very near future." "
Approved
(c) or other
Henry A. Kissinger
HAK:RLS:mlb (3/29/69)
(Clearance: Dwight Chapin)
Secretariat - 2
Presidential Chron - 1
HAK Chron - 1
WH file - 1
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED do has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
March 29, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Richard L. Sneider
SUBJECT: Re-scheduling of Gorton Visit
Ambassador Waller indicated that the best dates from Prime
Minister Gorton's standpoint would be May 8-13. As second best,
he suggested May 1-8. After the 13th, the convening of parliament
makes a trip difficult, but Gorton is still willing to come then, if
necessary.
The third week in May (May 12-16) is free of foreign visitors.
I believe that we should aim for that week, and preferably for the
beginning of the week to accommodate Ambassador Gorton.
Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum to
the President at Tab A.
RLS:mlb (3/28/69)
Secretariat - 2
WH file - 1
RLS - 1
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
March 29, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Gorton Visit
an
The Australian Ambassador has relayed to me urgent request from
Prime Minister Gorton that his visit be re-scheduled in May, preferably
before mid-May when Parliament reconvenes. At the very least, Gorton
hopes to be able to announce upon his return from the funeral ceremonies
that you have agreed with him to re-schedule the visit in the very near
future.
May is rather tight, but there is space for a Gorton visit during the
middle of the month.
Recommendation:
(a) That you authorize me to inform the Australian Embassy
that you would welcome a re-scheduling of the Corton visit in mid-May,
at a time to be worked out but hopefully May 12-13.
Approved
(b) or that I be authorized to welcome a rescheduling at an
unspecified date "in the very near future."
Approved
(c) or other
Henry A. Kissinger
HAK:RLS:mlb (3/29/69)
(Clearance: Dwight Chapin)
Secretariat - 2
Presidential Chron . 1
HAK Chron - 1
WH file - 1
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document.has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
visit file
Ref.
JB
Keep mil in
March 18, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT
Subject:
Visit of Prime Minister Gorton of Australia
You may wish to consider proposing to Prime Minister Gorton
during the course of his visit March 31 that the Australian
Minister of Science and Education bring a team of Australian
scientists to the United States to discuss with me and other
Government officials ways of further implementing the US-
Australian scientific and technical cooperation agreement of
October 18, 1968.
This would be in return for the visit of an American team of
leading scientists headed by my predecessor who went to Australia
last October. That visit was arranged with Prime Minister Gorton
when he was last in Washington in May 1968.
The invitation would be timely and would give fresh impetus to the
agreement which holds forth promise of great mutual benefit
because of the high quality of Australian science in many areas
and because of the common problems we share in our continent-
wide approach to development.
Our Embassy in Canberra has strongly endorsed the proposed
invitation and the Department of State concurs.
Lee A. DuBridge
Lee A. DuBridge
Approved
Disapproved
Discuss
2018 by 01
cc: Dr. Kissinger
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
GORT-N- - AUSTRALIA
March 17, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: Richard M. Moose
SUBJECT: Scenario for Planning Meeting on Trudeau and Gorton Visits,
Monday, March 17, 2:30 P.M.
These meetings are designed to bring together the various State and
White House elements involved in the visits of the two Prime Ministers.
This will be the first such meeting in the new administration and several
of the White House participants will be new to the problems involved.
Those present will include:
State: Office of Protocol: Emil Mossbacher
Clem Conger
Sam King
Country Representatives:
George Springsteen (Canada)
Joseph Scott (Canada)
James Carson (Canada)
Winthrop Brown (Australia)
Robert Moore (Australia)
Carl Brower (Australia)
Representatives of State Secretariat:
Dirk Glysteen
William Shepard
Jay Hawley
White House: Mrs. Lucy Winchester
Mrs. Jerry Van der Heuvel
Cmdr. Charles Larson (Aide's Office)
Gerald Warren (Press Office)
Kim Keogh
Hal Sonnenfeldt
Dick Sneider
Dick Moose
Mrs. Jeanne Davis
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
...
Because of the large cast of characters, those involved only with the
Gorton visit will remain outside until the Trudeau visit has been
taken care of.
The participants will have received a set of papers prepared by the State
Department for each visit. (Copies are attached for your reference.)
I suggest you use the following scenario:
Explain purpose of the meeting:
- to acquaint the various participants with each other's interests
and requirements.
- your staff is available to help all concerned in any way. Our interest
is the policy content of the visit and to insure that the "atmospherics"
are appropriate to the foreign policy interests involved.
Discuss what we expect to achieve by the visit and what the other side
wants out of it
(At this point take up the Trudeau visit, going through its various aspects
and then repeat the drill for Gorton.)
- give your view of the visit or call on Sonnenfeldt (for Trudeau),
Sneider (for Gorton) Substantive talking points and State's draft scope
papers are tabbed for your reference.
ask George Springsteen for comments on Trudeau (and Winthrop Brown
for comments on Gorton).
Preparation of briefing books:
- What should they contain
- When you want them
Public Statements:
(State drafts for the Trudeau visit have been received, at Tab: , Keogh and
others have copies)
- welcoming statement
- toast
- which should we use -- agreed press guidance, joint statement
or communique?
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
Review the schedule -- State Protocol will distribute copies of lithe latest
draft schedule. (Tentative schedules are tabbed into the attached papers)
Points to be noted:
- President's participation
- First Lady's participation (Trudeau dinner will be mixed, at
his request). Mrs. Gorton apparently will accompany her husband).
Discuss gift suggestions:
- State has already sent suggestions. Ask Luch Winchester if she
has questions about gifts, this is one of her big interests.
Consider appropriate entertainment.
- State has sent suggestions. Again, Lucy will want to discuss these
in an effort to get a better--more imaginative--idea of what the
guests would enjoy.
Ask if there are questions or problems concerning:
- the guest lists (State has provided a suggested list for Trudeau and
will do so for Gorton)
- the menu
- are there dietary restrictions?
- do they drink?
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
100
JGA/G-3
March 12, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969
SCOPE PAPER
I. The Setting
Prime Minister Gorton's visit comes at a turning
point in the history of Australian foreign policy. On
February 25, Gorton announced his Government's decision
to maintain Australian forces -- including ground forces --
in Malaysia/Singapore after the British withdrawal in 1971.
This is perhaps the most important step Australia has
taken since its entrance as an independent actor on the
world stage in the 1940's. Gorton's main purpose in
coming is to plumb United States attitudes and intentions
regarding East Asia as they bear on the Australian decision.
The impressions he receives can be expected to affect the
vigor with which Australia assumes its new, heightened
role in Southeast Asia.
The Australian Government's historic decision resulted
from the interplay of several factors. These included
anticipated changes in British and U. S. deployments in
Southeast Asia; the accession of a strong-minded,
nationalistic Prime Minister with heterodox foreign policy
leanings; the approach of a general election; and the
stirrings of a new nationalism in Australia.
"Forward Defense" or "Fortress Australia"?
Since World War II, Australia has increasingly sought
to develop closer relations with Southeast Asian countries.
While this course has been carried out through economic aid,
diplomacy and participation in regional organizations, it
has also had an important military component -- the policy
of "forward defense." Based on the idea of stopping
the enemy as far as possible from Australian shores, forward
defense has justified Australian participation in regional
SECRET
Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-3
SECRET
2
security efforts including Korea, SEATO and Viet-Nam and,
since 1955, its support of British undertakings to defend
Malaysia and Singapore. Conscious of its relative
weakness, however, and feeling isolated and vulnerable
in its corner of Asia, Australia has been careful to risk
its limited forces only in close association with one
or both of its "great and powerful friends", Britain and
the United States.
In 1968, two developments combined to thrust Australia
into a dilemma. The first was Britain's decision, made
public in January, to accelerate withdrawal of its forces
from Malaysia/Singapore and complete the pull-out by
the end of 1971. The second was President Johnson's
announcement on March 31, 1968 of a unilateral halt in
the bombing of North Viet-Nam and his own retirement from
politics. This surprising and dramatic development, and
the subsequent change of leadership in a United States
which as seen from Australia has seemed increasingly
preoccupied with internal problems, have created uncertainty
and anxiety in Australian minds about the future course
of America's Asia policy. One of Australia's "powerful
friends", the U.K., was preparing to leave the scene.
Would the other, the U. S., also drift away? In view of
this possibility, was forward defense still a wise policy?
Debate on this question could not remain theoretical,
since Australia was faced with a pressing practical
decision. It now has ground, air and naval forces in
Malaysia/Singapore alongside the British. Should it keep
its forces there after the British leave (as Malaysia
and Singapore have requested), or should it pull them out?
Keeping them there would be a historic and possibly
dangerous departure from the traditional policy of
stationing Australian forces overseas only alongside a major
power -- the British or the Americans. Pulling them out
would imply abandonment of forward defense, and perhaps
a fundamental reorientation of Australia's Southeast Asia
policy. The decision could not be long deferred, since
the five Commonwealth powers concerned (Malaysia, Singapore,
Australia, New Zealand and the U.K.) have begun consultations
looking toward a new arrangement for the defense of the
area post-1971. Australian participation is the key to
the emergence of any such new arrangement which promises
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-3
SECRET
3
to be effective, and Australian indecision has already
seriously hampered the five-power consultations.
In the debate in Australia, the traditional forward
defense policy has had powerful advocates, including the
Ministers of External Affairs and Defense, the top civil
servants in these departments, and the military services.
The alternative strategy, dubbed "fortress Australia" by
the press, calls for less involvement in Southeast Asia
and increased concentration upon internal economic
development, military preparedness and continental and
immediate offshore defense, focusing on the mainland and
Papua/New Guinea. In an extreme, isolationist form it has
been espoused by Jim Cairns, spokesman for the powerful
left-wing faction in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and
a good bet to become Leader of the Opposition in 1970.
A still more important figure who early disclosed strong
leanings toward "fortress Australia" -- although his
position was often contradictory and unclear -- was the
complex, controversial man who became Prime Minister in
January 1968, John Grey Gorton.
Gorton's Indecision
Gorton at various times has given numerous indications
of doubts about forward defense and a predisposition
towards its opposite. At his first press conference as
Prime Minister, he made a startling off-the-cuff announcement
that no more Australian troops would be sent to Viet-Nam.
A strong nationalist, he has charted a course assertive
of distinctively Australian interests and has shown that
in his thinking domestic economic development enjoys first
claim on national resources. Seeming to split sharply
with his Ministers of External Affairs and Defense over
Southeast Asia policy and the Malaysia/Singapore question,
he brought no advisers and requested no briefing papers
from their departments when he visited Washington in May 1968.
He repeatedly expressed skepticism as to the wisdom or
desirability of stationing Australian forces, especially
ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971 -- at least
without being sure of being able to get them out if they
got into serious trouble. This attitude reflects his
personal experience; as a fighter pilot in action over
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-3
SECRET
4
Singapore in 1942, he saw an entire Australian division --
one fourth of his country's combat infantry -- trapped
and forced to surrender to the Japanese. As Prime Minister,
he is understandably determined not to be responsible
for a repetition of this debacle.
With Britain's decision to withdraw from Malaysia/
Singapore by 1971 apparently irrevocable, Gorton's concern
appeared to focus sharply on the course of U. S. Asia
policy under President Johnson's successor. After
Johnson's March 31, 1968 speech, Gorton told the Liberal
Party caucus and the press that he was convinced there
would be a major U. S. retrenchment in Asia -- possibly
amounting to a return to pre-World War II isolationism --
under the next U. S. administration, and that this might
well necessitate abandonment of "the Menzies concept of
forward defense" in favor of "an Israeli-type defense
scheme " Although this topic dominated his discussions
in Washington in May 1968 almost to the exclusion of all
others, he left unconvinced by the Johnson administration's
protestations of continued U. S. firmness in East Asia.
He subsequently reiterated in public that no decision
would be made on the commitment of Australian ground forces
until certain "imponderables" -- meaning primarily U. S.
Asia policy under the new administration -- became clear
to him. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference
in mid-January, he privately took the position with the
British that he could not run the risk of involvement,
particularly of his ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore
until he knew in advance who would "back him up". He
therefore planned to make no decision on post-1971 deployment
of ground forces, he said, until he had talked to
President Nixon.
With characteristic directness and persistence, Gorton
successfully sought an early meeting with the new President.
On February 7, "Len" Hewitt, Secretary of the Prime Minister's
Department and Gorton's closest adviser, told our
Ambassador that Gorton had only one thing on his mind in
coming to Washington other than getting acquainted with
the President, and that was to learn exactly what was the
U. S. position on the stationing of Australian troops in
Malaysia/Singapore. Gorton would make it clear that if
Australian troops were-stationed there, they would never
get involved in local conflicts or hostilities with
Indonesia or the Philippines. However, he would want to
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-3
SECRET
5
know from President Nixon what the United States would do
if Australian troops became involved in countering aggression
by Red China or North Viet-Nam. Gorton himself reiterated
this to our Ambassador the next day, adding that if the need
arose he would commit troops to fight with us in Thailand.
The Election and Gorton's Decision
Meanwhile -- with a general election coming up in
November 1969 at the latest -- there were signs that the
Australian public was making up its mind on the foreign policy
debate. The fact that British withdrawal implied increased
Australian responsibility, while it had its alarming aspect,
appealed at the same time to Australia's growing national
pride. Australia -- economically the third most powerful
nation in Asia and technologically second only to Japan --
was being called upon to play a new, more independent role.
Surely it would not be too timid to rise to the challenge?
"Fortress Australia", from this point of view, could easily
be depicted as un-Australian. Gorton's Christmas message to
Australian troops in Viet-Nam, written in ringing "forward-
defense" tones, met with a warm response. The Liberal Party
organization began advising him that a strong defense policy
was his election winner. This advice was reinforced by the
press, most of which favored staying on after 1971, and by
the views of the Liberal Party's two election allies, the
Country Party and the hawkish Democratic Labor Party.
The uncertainty created by Gorton's previous, conflicting
statements helped build up suspense for his promised announce-
ment of a new defense policy when Parliament reconvened on
February 25. Most observers expected him to announce a
decision to maintain air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore
after 1971, but to postpone a decision on ground forces
because of "imponderables". The moderate leader of the
Opposition (ALP), Gough Whitlam, evidently anticipated such
a position and tried to pre-empt it by adopting in advance
a very similar one. Whitlam came out for air and naval
deployments but rejected the commitment of ground forces, in
favor of maintaining a "mobile striking force" in Australia
which could be sent if needed -- an idea originally advanced
by Gorton.
Gorton made one quiet, preparatory move -- he announced
the resignation of Paul Hasluck as Minister for External
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Affairs and his elevation to Governor General. With
Hasluck thus out of the way, Gorton had the spotlight
entirely to himself when he made his surprise announcement
on February 25 that Australia would go all the way with
the policy of which Hasluck had been the leading advocate --
forward defense including a commitment of ground forces
to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.
Gorton's speech was his finest hour and a political
masterstroke. Lucid, forthright, statesmanlike, it won
warm applause both at home and abroad. (Prime Minister
Holyoake of New Zealand, who had been urging this course
on Gorton all along, made a simultaneous and similar
announcement.) The Australian press was unanimously
laudatory. Whitlam, neatly outmaneuvered, was obliged to
attack the commitment of ground forces, thus making this
the only foreign policy issue in an election which the
bitterly divided ALP seems sure to lose. Gorton, on the
other hand, seems likely to emerge from the election with
increased stature, firmer control, and an enhanced image
as a truly Australian Prime Minister leading his country
into a new era of its nationhood.
Significance for the Visit
Gorton's decision to announce a commitment of ground
forces to Malaysia/Singapore in advance of his visit to
Washington has simplified our task. Previously, he seemed
likely to seek a specific U. S. guarantee of the safety
of his forces as a precondition for committing them.
Obviously it would have been difficult to give such a
guarantee, especially in a form which would have been
politically useful to Gorton. The February 25 speech has
made it clear that the U. S. will not have to pay this price
in order to get an Australian ground-force presence in
Malaysia/Singapore.
On the other hand, the speech has also in a sense put
us on a spot, challenging the U. S. to be as firm and
forthcoming as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that
Australia is meeting the American requirement to do all
it can; now what will Washington do to support that commitment?
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His speech made it clear that contingencies were conceivable
with which Australian forces could not cope, and that "if
such a situation should arise we would have to look to the
support of allies outside the region". In this connection
Gorton may still ask for specific assurances of U. S.
support. At the very least, he will seek to sound out the
temper of the new administration and the general posture it
will take in Southeast Asia. The answers and impressions
he receives will have a bearing on the confidence and vigor
with which Australia pursues the new path in regional affairs
on which it is taking the first step.
II. The Visitor
Personally, Prime Minister Gorton is conservative,
with a brusque and flamboyant style. He is quick on his
feet and tends to say what comes first into his mind.
Prickly and sensitive, he refuses to be pressured or taken
for granted. (For example, he reacted angrily and resentfully
when he felt President Johnson had not consulted sufficiently
with the GOA before announcing the partial bombing halt
on March 31, 1968.) He can be extremely charming, but is
instinctively aggressive with a streak of toughness and
possibly nastiness just below the surface. He is inclined
to be impetuous, abrasive and cocksure, restricts his
advisers to a small inner circle, and has at times seemed
lackadaisical in his approach to his work. These qualities
have earned him a bad press and poor personal relations
in the Government, but this has not seemed to bother him.
He projects a charismatic toughness which Australians like,
and his standing with the man in the street is high.
Recently, both his performance and his press have improved.
Australia's top political journalist provides a vivid
sketch bringing out Gorton's political appeal: "Oxford
educated, a Victorian orchardist, he had been when young
a very good-looking man, but in World War II, as a fighter
pilot, he drove his face into the instrument panel of his
bullet-damaged Hurricane in landing on the Singapore
aerodrome as an RAAF-Japanese dogfight proceeded overhead.
His rebuilt features are attractively ugly, mobile,
conveying on TV screens a pleasant impression of battered
strength and homely charm. His later war service has about
it some of the romantic charm that surrounded that of the
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late John F. Kennedy
Back on active service, a
crumpled-faced veteran, he crashlanded on an island in
the Timor Sea and lived for days on turtles' eggs and
fish before being rescued. Lean, wiry, six feet one inch
tall, a careless dresser with hair that succumbs only
temporarily to the discipline of comb and brush, laconic,
direct and irreverent, addicted to swimming and tennis,
an easy mixer who is impatient with formality, protocal,
the establishment, and 'longhaired' intellectuals,
Gorton represents what Australians have chosen to believe
is the traditional Australian, both in his masculinity
and derisive distaste for those who parade pretentiously
intellectual accomplishments or academic qualifications."
Gorton has been married since 1935 to an American
citizen, nee Bettina Brown of Bangor, Maine. Mrs. Gorton
is a shy, intelligent, gray-haired woman who has some
competence in Indonesian studies. She is reportedly
embittered by her husband's reputation as a lady-killer.
III. Australian Aims
The new administration's strategy in Southeast Asia,
as it relates to Australia's involvement in the defense
of the region, will be uppermost in the Prime Minister's
mind.
He will:
-- assess the firmness of the new administration's
posture in Southeast Asia;
-- ask to what extend the U. S. is prepared to back
up Australian forces committed to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971;
-- ask the President's thoughts on strategy and
prospects for the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
-- be interested in the President's thinking on
post-Vietnam Asia;
-- argue for better treatment from the United States
in the economic field;
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-- size up the President.
IV. United States Aims
Our aim is to secure continued strong Australian
leadership in Southeast Asia. We should try:
-- without increasing our commitments, to give
Gorton sufficient reassurance to encourage him to make
a whole-hearted contribution to regional security;
-- to consult fully and frankly with him on the
Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
-- fully to share our thoughts - and elicit his -
on post-Vietnam Asia;
-- to establish a good personal relationship
between the President and Gorton;
-- to reassure Gorton and, through him, the
Australian people that the United States is and will
remain a close, steadfast and special friend which can be
relied upon to play a leading role in checking Communist
expansion in Asia.
Drafted by: EA/ANZ: CCBrower
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
EA/RA - Mr. Donald
EA - Amb. Brown
EA - Amb. Godley
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard
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March 13, 1969
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Richard L. Sneider
SUBJECT: Visit of Australian Prime Minister
As you know, Prime Minister Gorton's visit is scheduled
for March 31-April 1. Preparations are in hand and appear to
pose no particular problems. (There will be a meeting on the
visit at 3:00 p.m. on Friday.)
It may be worthwhile to put down some observations
concerning the style and manner of our expected visitor, the
purposes which he hopes to serve by the visit and our own
interests in the visit.
Gorton the Man: For your purposes, these are probably
the salient aspects of Gorton's personality and approach:
He is tough, brusque and impatient of formalities.
-- As a fighter pilot in 1942, Corton saw an Australian
division stranded in Singapore by the lack of effective
external support. His own experience probably makes
him unusually sensitive to the danger of Australia's
getting out on a limb in Southeast Asia.
-- He is prickly and sensitive, and does not like to be
taken for granted or pressured. He was annoyed with
our failure to consult more fully with Australia in
the policy decisions of Marth 31 and October 31 last
year; and he has complained that he was subjected to
pressure in Washington last year.
- - He is a strong Australian nationalist, has been at
least until recently suspicious of foreign commitments
He seemed upon taking office to be toying with a
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2.
"fortress Australia" policy; and in one press conference
he said that he would not send any more Australians to
Vietnam. He must be shown the advantages of a
particular policy for Australia, rather than offered
broad generalities.
He is suspicious of intellectuals, of theorists and of
bureaucrats. He came to Washington without briefing
papers in 1968, and it is still uncertain whether he will
bring any professional defense or foreign affairs
advisers on this trip. He will probably not be interested
in detail or prepared to discuss issues in depth.
He came to office as a dark horse candidate without
international experience, and without intellectual
pretensions. He is particularly conscious of living in
the shadow of Menzies and Holt and now wishes to
establish himself as a leader in his own right and an
independent authority in foreign affairs.
Background the February 25th Speech: Corton's
February 25 commitment to keep land, naval and air forces
in Singapore /Malaysia after 1971 is a major development
integrally related to his forthcoming visit.
In the Australian internal context, his speech established
Prime Minister Gorton in the foreign policy field with a powerful
statement of the forward defense position. It flanked the
opposition, which finds itself in an election year in a weak straddle
on the basic issue of forward defense vs. "fortress Australia".
Having been made before rather than after the Washington visit,
the speech stands as an Australian policy rather than a response
to American pressure.
In the specific context of the visit, Gorton has made a major
decision for which we had been asking. He has done so although he
had been holding back because he did not want to get Australia
committed without a commitment from us. He has now made the
commitment without demanding any quid pro quo. He comes to
us as a man with "clean hands" asking the President to be equally
forthcoming.
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3,
Gorton has, probably consciously, helped to shape the
nature of our response by the specific character of his speech.
First, he himself indicated a preference for general understandings
rather than specific treaty commitments. Second, he pointed
very clearly to his expectation that the U.S. would come to
Australia's help if subversion from outside or some other threat
were too much for Australia to handle alone, but he went on to
say that "Australia's continued effort would in that case have to
be decided in the light of all the circumstances prevailing at that
time. 11 Gorton can hardly expect us to be more specific or
committed than he is, and by these remarks he has provided us
with the rationale for answering him with bros d and non-specific
reassurances of our continuing commitment to Southeast Asia and
the importance we attach to ANZUS.
What Gorton will be Secklar: Above all, Groton will focus
on the 2242 of teassurances comerning the U.S. role in Southeast
Asia. He will want to have something for public consumption to
reassure the Australian voters that his commitment to Malaysia/
Singapore has not overextended his country's defense resources.
He will particularly need some specific reference to ANDOS.
Corton's second purpose is to develop 1 personal relationship
with the President which would be valuable in itself and which
would enhance Gorton's political position for the elections.
Gorton will wish to talk about other issues, particularly
the outlook for the Paris talks, and the situation in Vietnam,
trade problems, and the Gapar Keraudren project.
The U.S. Interest: Our most fundamental interests vis-a-vis
Australia fit in closely with Gorton's February 25 statement and
with his interests in this trip. By his action in undertaking a
responsibility within the area, he has made it more feasible for the
U.S. to maintain a. role in supporting security arrangements in Southeast Asia.
We should try
11 To reassure him that we are prepared to maintain
U.S. commitments in Asia and that we view ANZUS as an important
element in these commitments.
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4.
2. To keep him in our confidence concerning the
Vietnam situation and the Paris negotiations.
3. To establish a personal relationship between the
President and Prime Minister Gorton.
There will of cour se be specific recommendations from
the Department of State concerning recommended U.S. positions
on all issues.
RLSneider/LGrant
3/13/69
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100
NOT TO BE RELEASED
THE PRESS
MARCH 12, 1969
REVISION NO. 3
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
TENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. OF THE RIGHT
HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON, M.P., PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, AND
MRS. GORTON
March 29 - April 2, 1969
SATURDAY, MARCH 29
5:30 p.m. PST
The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, M.P.,
Prime Minister of Australia, and Mrs.
Gorton and their party will arrive at
San Francisco International Airport, San
Francisco, California, aboard QANTAS Air-
lines Flight 530.
6:15 p.m. PST
Departure from San Francisco, California,
aboard a United States Air Force special
flight. (Flying time: 4 hours and 40
minutes; 3 hours change in time.)
SUNDAY, MARCH 30
1:55 a.m. EST
Arrival at Langley Air Force Base,
Virginia.
2:00 a.m.
Departure from Langley Air Force Base
by automobile.
2:40 a.m.
Arrival at Williamsburg, Virginia.
MONDAY, MARCH 31
p.m. EST
Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton and their
party will depart from the Williamsburg
Inn Golf Course aboard a United States
Marine Corps special helicopter flight.
p.m. EST
Arrival at Washington, D.C. at (Ellipse
or Pentagon Heliport).
p.m.
Departure from (Ellipse or Pentagon Heliport)
p.m.
Arrival at Blair House.
7:50 p.m.
Departure from Blair House.
8:00 p.m.
His Excellency Sir Keith Waller, C.B.E.,
Ambassador of Australia, and Lady Waller
will give a dinner in honor of Prime
Minister and Mrs. Gorton at the Embassy
of Australia, 3120 Cleveland Avenue,
Northwest.
Dress:
TUESDAY
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- 2 -
TUESDAY, APRIL 1
10:25 a.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will depart from
Blair House.
10:30 a.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will arrive at the
White House where he will be greeted by
the Honorable Richard M. Nixon, President
of the United States.
Prime Minister Gorton will meet with
President Nixon at the White House.
1:00 p.m. Mrs. Rogers will give a luncheon
in honor of Mrs. Gorton at her
residence, 7007 Glenbrook Road,
Bethesda, Maryland.
p.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will have luncheon
privately at Blair House.
2:30 p.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will meet with
the Honorable William P. Rogers, Secretary
of State, at the Department of State.
4:00 p.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will meet with
the Honorable Melvin R. Laird, Secretary
of Defense, at the Department of
Defense.
8:00 p.m.
President and Mrs. Nixon will give a dinner
in honor of Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton
at the White House.
Dress: White tie.
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2
9:55 a.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will depart from
Blair House.
10:00 a.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will meet with
President Nixon at the White House.
11:30 a.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will meet with
the Honorable Spiro T. Agnew, Vice
President of the United States, at
the White House.
p.m.
Luncheon open.
WEDNESDAY (Cont'd.)
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- 3 -
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2 (Continued)
p.m.
Possible - Prime Minister Gorton will
meet with the Honorable David M. Kennedy,
Secretary of the Treasury, at the
Department of the Treasury.
p.m.
Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton and their
party will depart from Blair House.
p.m.
Arrival at the Military Airlift Command
Terminal, Washington National Airport.
p.m. EST
Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton and their
party will depart from Washington, D.C.
aboard a Canadian Department of Transport
aircraft for Ottawa, Canada. (Flying
time: 1 hour and 40 minutes.)
* * *
Protocol
March 12, 1969
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100
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
TENTATIVE LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY ACCOMPANYING THE RIGHT
HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON, M.P., PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, AND
MRS. GORTON TO THE UNITED STATES
March 30 - April 2, 1969
Members of the Official Australian Party
The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, M.P.
Prime Minister of Australia
Mrs. Gorton
His Excellency Sir Keith Waller, C.B.E.
Ambassador of Australia
Lady Waller
Mr. C. L. S. Hewitt
Secretary, Prime Minister's Department
Miss Ainsley Gotto
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Mr. Anthony Eggleton
Press Secretary to the Prime Minister
Miss Jean Lester
Private Secretary to Mrs. Gorton
Security Officer
Protocol
March 12, 1969
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March 14, 1969
100
Gift, Menu and Entertainment Suggestions
Gifts
When the Gortons visited Washington last May, President
Johnson gave the Prime Minister a replica of the George
Washington Reading Lamp in the Smithsonian, a gold Bulova
desk clock, an IBM dictating machine and an inscribed
family photograph. Mrs. Johnson gave Mrs. Gorton a vermeil
dressing table box, a gold Bulova boudoir clock, three
American Designer scarves, two White House books and three
books on Indonesia (in which Mrs. Gorton has a scholarly
interest). On this occasion, it is recommended that we
avoid multiple gifts, and confine ourselves to one or two
nice gifts to each person. With regard to personal gifts,
both Gortons have simple conservative tastes in clothing
and accessories.
Prime Minister Gorton is a heavy smoker (Benson and
Hedges); an engraved cigarette box, case or lighter might
be a suitable gift on this visit. From his university days
he retains a knowledge of our Civil War, suggesting a book,
map or other gift with a Civil War theme. Other
possibilities include:
-- a painting (any period or style with the exception
of "pop". Suggested by Embassy Canberra).
-- an antique map depicting Australia, the Pacific
and the Americas. (Suggested by Embassy Canberra.)
-- a memento of the Apollo 8 flight, perhaps some
fitting from the actual spacecraft. This would be appropriate
in view of the extent of U.S. -Australian space cooperation;
also, astronaut Walter Cunningham will be guest of honor
at the 1969 Coral Sea celebration in Australia in May,
which has a "space" theme.
-- photographs of Sydney, Brisbane and Perth, taken
by the Apollo 9 crew. (In its traditional farewell to
our spacecraft, Perth turned on its lights for Apollo 9.)
-- a memento of the Battle of the Coral Sea, perhaps
a ship's bell or a chair, etc. used by Admiral Nimitz.
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-- a ship model of bone and ivory (rare example of
Americana; we know of only two in existence).
Mrs. Gorton's hobby is gardening. She has some artistic
interests and some competence in Indonesian studies.
A suitable gift for her this time might be a book on
gardening or famous American gardens; an American painting;
or an American handicraft or piece of jewelry.
Menu
According to Embassy Canberra, the Prime Minister likes
all foods except clams. Mrs. Gorton does not like red wines.
Both are especially fond of fresh fruit. The following
dishes would add a personal touch to the menu:
-- a salad or other dish of fresh fruit, named after
the Gorton's citrus farm in northern Victoria, "Mystic Park".
-- Mrs. Gorton's home town is Bangor, Maine, and
Maine lobster would be an appropriate dish in her honor.
It could be called "Lobster Bettina.' Australians are
fond of lobster, which they call "crayfish", but are
accustomed only to the Pacific variety without claws.
Entertainment
Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton like the theater. (On
their last visit to the United States, they reserved an
evening in New York to see Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are
Dead.) They have little interest in opera or ballet, but
like musical comedy. They prefer light entertainment, perhaps
with a sophisticated touch. As background to the meal, an
orchestra playing Broadway showtunes, etc., would be
appropriate.
Special entertainment might be:
-- A celebrated singing entertainer such as Dinah Shore,
Tony Bennett or Mahalia Jackson.
-- Pianist Andre Watts (but avoid a heavy program).
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-- A celebrated actor in a program of readings.
(Charlton Heston had considerable success in Australia
with such a program.)
-- If Helen Hayes or Edgar Bergen could be coaxed
out of retirement for the occasion, either one would be
sure to please the Gortons.
-- Bob Hope is well known to Australians.
Drafted by: EA/ANZ: CCBrower
)
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
S/CPR - Miss Dunaway
S/CPR - Mr. King
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard
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100
LOU
JGA/G-1
March 10, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969
Suggestions on Approaching Australians and
Conversational Topics
Australians are outgoing and straightforward, and
mix exceptionally well with Americans. In fact, they
have a special fondness for us, not untinged with envy
at our greater affluence. Similarities in culture and
outlook are great, and there are very few special
sensitivities to beware of. Australia was first settled
as a penal colony, and many of its citizens today are
descended from convicts; this is a joking matter with
most but a few may be touchy about it. Also, Australia
today has a developed, dynamic economy and a sophisticated
and predominantly urban culture. There is a growing sense
of nationalistic pride. Australians sometimes resent
questions which imply a rural stereotype (sheep, kangaroos
and boomerangs) in the mind of the questioner.
Australia has no racial problems. The indigenous
aborigines have a status similar to that of American
Indians, and the "White Australia" immigration policy,
while no longer officially referred to as such and slightly
liberalized, remains substantially in effect. It enjoys
solid public support, reinforced recently by our well-
publicized racial troubles and those of Great Britain.
Before he became Prime Minister, John Gorton firmly
advocated the continued exclusion of colored immigrants,
and expressed sympathy for the racial policies of Rhodesia
and South Africa.
Conversational Topics
Australians are keenly competitive, a trait which is
reflected in their excellence in several sports. Since
World War II they have produced a number of great swimmers,
including Dawn Frazer, Murray Rose and Mike Wenden (who
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won two gold medals at Mexico City). Milers John Landy
and Herb Elliott have a place in history, as do tennis
stars Lew Hoad, Ken Rosewall and Rod Laver. The Davis
Cup in tennis has been completely dominated by the
U. S. and Australia during the 23 years since World War II
(15 wins for Australia VS. 8 for the U. S.). In 1968
at Adelaide, a U. S. team headed by Arthur Ashe and
Clark Graebner recaptured the cup after a long string
of Australian victories. President Nixon received the
team on February 11, 1969 to congratulate them and view
the cup; he was presented with a team necktie.
In recent years Australia and the U. S. have begun
to vie in the America's Cup in yachting. This cup was
first awarded at the London Exposition of 1851 after a
race around the Isle of Wight open to all comers; it
was named the America's Cup after the winning U. S. entry.
The U. S. has defended the cup twenty times since and
won every time. Australia has challenged twice, in 1962
with the Gretel and in 1967 with the Dame Pattie (named
for the wife of former Prime Minister Menzies). The
skipper of the victorious U. S. yachts in both encounters
(Weatherly in 1962 and Intrepid in 1967) was Emil "Bus"
Mosbacher Jr., now Chief of Protocol of the United States.
On the more serious side, Australia has been
experiencing a remarkable boom in the discovery and
exploration of mineral resources, including iron, nickel,
bauxite and petroleum. This is often a good subject for
conversation with Australian men.
Conversing with Gorton
Gorton is a complex personality who combines the
shrewd, homespun quality of a man of the land with the
sophistication of an honors graduate in history at Brasenose
College, Oxford. While he has a typical Australian's
rough contempt for intellectual pretensions, he has also
(as Minister for Education and Science) come into intimate
contact with the problems of the intellectual community
and technology in a rapidly evolving modern society.
His conversational range is broad. Topics for light
conversation may be suggested by his student days, his
marriage, his war experiences, or his recreational interests.
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Gorton's father owned a fruit farm in Victoria and,
though the family could afford to send him to Melbourne'
fashionable Geelong Grammar School, young John also had
to work on the family property to help pay his way.
When he finished at Oxford he went to Spain for a holiday
and there met an American girl, Bettina Brown, of Bangor,
Maine, a student at the Sorbonne who was vacationing in
Spain. They were married in 1935 in the chapel at
Brasenose College. Mrs. Gorton has retained her American
citizenship to this day, although since her husband became
Prime Minister she has traveled on an Australian diplomatic
passport.
The couple returned to Australia and Gorton was making
a big success of running his father's farm when the war
broke out. He joined the Royal Australian Air Force as
a fighter pilot and was shot down over Singapore. As he
puts it, "My face got rather mixed up with the instrument
panel. He was left with amiably crumpled features which
today make him look rather like an aging former prize
fighter. Swathed in bandages, he was evacuated from
Singapore aboard a ship which was torpedoed and sunk.
He spent 24 hours aboard a life raft in the Java Sea before
being rescued by an Australian destroyer. Returning to
active duty, he was shot down again in 1944 and lived for
days on turtle eggs and fish on an island in the Timor Sea.
Although Gorton no longer farms actively, he still
spends much time outdoors at tennis and swimming. He likes
bridge and "mucking around in the garden. He reads
avidly -- anything from spy fiction to scientific reports --
but describes his taste in entertainment as somewhat
philistine. "I was brought up as a kid on a diet of flying
arrows in Nottingham Forest and books where Buffalo Bill
Cody harried redskins on every page, " he told an interviewer.
"Give me Laramie, not Lohengrin. I'm not a boor, but I'm
no culture-vulture either. "
However, Gorton and his wife share an interest in the
theater which is not "philistine." On their visit to the
United States in May last year, they reserved an evening
in New York to see Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-1
DRAFTED BY:
MB
EA/ANZ: CCBrower: r lw 3/6/69
CONCURRENCES:
EA/ANZ R Moore
S/S-S: WSShepard
X-4155
(
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
1000
OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
S/S 3422
March 14, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Preparatory Meeting for the
Visit of Prime Minister Gorton
of Australia
The enclosed materials relating to the visit
of Prime Minister Gorton of Australia have been
prepared for use at the preparatory meeting for
the visit, to be held at 2:30 PM on Monday
afternoon in the White House situation room.
Five copies of each document are enclosed
for your convenience.
John P.Walsh
John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary
Enclosures:
1. Scope Paper
2. Suggestions on Approaching the
Australians
3. Gift, Menu and Entertainment
Suggestions
4. Official Party
5. Tentative Program
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
635
2.
department OF STATE
pet.
Washington, D.C. 20520
February 27, 1969
2569
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Visit of Australian Prime Minister Gorton
Prime Minister Gorton will visit Washington
March 31, 1969, at the President's invitation. The
Department contemplates the following schedule of major
events for the visit, which would meet all of the
Prime Minister's requests:
A. March 30
1. Late afternoon: Arrive Andrews Air Force
Base in USAF aircraft. (Aircraft will pick up Prime
Minister at his CONUS point of entry, as yet undetermined.)
Travel from AAFB to Blair House by car.
2. Evening private.
B. March 31
1. 10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.: Meeting with
President at White House; informal arrival ceremony.
2. Lunchtime unscheduled as yet.
3. Afternoon unscheduled as yet.
4. 8:00 P.M.: Dinner at White House.
C. April 1
1. 11:00 A.M.: Meeting with Secretary of State.
CONFIDENTIAL
Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
2. Lunchtime unscheduled as yet.
3. 2:00 P.M.: Meeting with Secretary of Defense.
4. 4:15 P.M.: Meeting with Secretary of
Treasury
5. Evening: Reserved for social function at
Australian Embassy.
D. April 2
1. Morning unscheduled as yet.
2. 12:15 P.M.: Prime Minister addresses
National Press Club lunch.
3. 2:30 P.M.: Departure from Washington by
Canadian Government aircraft
for official visit to Ottawa.
Furtheroplans for the yet unscheduled time in the
Prime Minister's program will be made in consultation
with the Australian Embassy. The composition of the
Prime Minister's party has not yet been announced, but
should Mrs. Gorton accompany him a separate program for
her can be arranged.
Before the Department can coordinate and elaborate
the schedule with the Australian Embassy, approval of
certain key elements in it is required, as follows:
(A) Meeting with the President at 10:30 A.M., March 31;
(B) Dinner at the White House at 8:00 P.M., March 31.
It would also be desirable to set aside time on the President's
appointments calendar for a second business meeting, should
the President wish to talk further with the Prime Minister.
The hour of 10:00 A.M., April 1, would fit into the schedule.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That the 10:30 A.M. meeting with the President
on March 31 be approved.
Approve
Disapprove
Alternative
2. That a dinner be scheduled at the White House
at 8:00 P.M., March 31.
Approve
Disapprove
Alternative
3. That the hour 10:00 - 11:00 A.M., April 1,
be set aside for a possible second meeting between
the President and the Prime Minister.
Approve
Disapprove
+
Alternative
John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNCLASSIFIED
JGA/ Memo 3 (REV.)
March 13, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969
LIST OF PAPERS
I. GENERAL
A. Scope Paper
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
3/7
B. President's Briefing
Memorandum
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
3/24
C. Secretary's Briefing
Memorandum
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
3/24
D. Suggestions on Approaching
the Australians
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
3/7
E. Gift and Menu Suggestions
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
3/7
F. Official Party
S/CPR - Mr. King
3/7
G. Schedule
S/CPR - Mr. King
3/7
II. BACKGROUND PAPERS
A. Situation in Australia
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
3/17
B. Malaysia/Singapor Defense
EA/RA - Mr. Donald
3/17
C. Sabah Dispute
EA/PHL - Miss McLendon
3/17
D. Australia and Vietnam
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
3/17
E. Paris Negotiations
EA/VN - Mr. Isham
3/28
F. Defense Purchases
ISA - Cmdr. Kuhn
3/17
G. Trade Problems
E/ORF - Mr. Katz
3/17
H. U.S. Investment in Australia
E/OMA - Mr. Heginbotham
3/17
I. Civil Aviation Problems
E/OA/AVP - Mr. Styles
3/17
J. Cape Keraudren Nuclear
Excavation Project
SCI - Mr. Sievering
3/17
K. Nonproliferation Treaty
ACDA - Mr. Maylen
3/17
L. Regional Cooperation in
Southeast Asia
EA/RA - Mr. Donald
3/21
III. PUBLIC STATEMENTS
A. President's Toast
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
3/12
B. Joint Statement
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
3/12
IV. BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
3/21
William S/S-S
Ext. 4155, Room 7237
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
JGA/BP-1
March 14, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969
Background Paper
42
AUSTRALIA AND VIET-NAM
Summary
The Australian Government supports the allied effort
in South Viet-Nam both with an 8000-man troop contribution
and with economic assistance. The Government's position
enjoys strong public support which has, however, been
subject to steady erosion in the past eighteen months.
Prime Minister Gorton is sensitive about being fully
consulted on U. S. Viet-Nam policy, and the GOA is uneasy
about our future posture on Viet-Nam.
Main points are -
Troop Contribution. Australia now maintains in
Viet-Nam approximately 8000 troops. These include a
combat brigade and support, a jungle warfare advisory
unit, a Canberra bomber squadron, an air transport unit
and a guided missile destroyer. The first Australian
contingent was sent in early 1965 by Prime Minister
Menzies. Harold Holt as Prime Minister announced two increases
--from 1500 to 6300 troops in January 1966, and from 6300
to 8000 in October 1967. However, his successor, John Gorton,
declared immediately after assuming office in January
1968 that there would be no further troop increases,
barring some major change in the situation.
Economic Aid. Australia has given South Viet-Nam
more than $10.5 million in economic aid since 1964. Goods
and materials furnished have included textbooks in
Vietnamese, corrugated roofing, community windmills, a
radio broadcasting station, hand tools, radios, blankets
and food. About fifty Australian civilian technicians
SECRET
Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-1
SECRET
2
are serving in Viet-Nam, including surgical teams, civil
engineers and agricultural experts. About 130 Vietnamese
students are studying in Australia.
Public Support. The Government's stand on Viet-Nam
enjoys strong but slowly diminishing public support.
The last general election, in November 1966, was fought
largely on the Viet-Nam issue, with the opposition
Australian Labor Party arguing against military involvement
in the conflict. The election returns gave the Government
the biggest parliamentary majority in Australian history,
and the ALP's new and more flexible leader, Gough Whitlam,
subsequently moderated the party's line on Viet-Nam.
Gallup polls during the past eighteen months have reflected
steady erosion in Viet-Nam support, with those favoring
continuing the war falling from a high of 62% (May 1967)
to 49% in December 1968. (The breakdown in the December 1968
poll was "continue the war, 49%; "bring back our forces,"
37%; undecided 14%.)
Consultation. Prime Minister Gorton was indignant
when President Johnson on March 31, 1968 announced
limitation of U. S. bombing of North Viet-Nam with only
24 hours' prior notice to him and what he felt was
insufficient consultation. The GOA was embarrassed because
less than a week previously Minister for External Affairs
Hasluck and Minister for Defense Fairhall had told
Parliament that the bombing pressure must be kept up until
North Viet-Nam was willing to make a reciprocal reduction
in the level of hostilities.
There has been a full flow of information about the
Paris talks to the Australian Government through briefings
in Paris of Ambassador Anderson (the Australian liaison
officer there) by our negotiators, through briefings of
Ambassador Waller in Washington, and through transmission
of texts and reports by our Embassy in Canberra. However,
the Australian Government is uneasy about the future
posture of the United States with respect to Viet-Nam and
Asia generally.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/Dr-1
DRAFTED BY:
EA/ANZ: CCBrower: oh rlw 2/25/69
CONCURRENCES:
EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
EA/VN - Mr. Flowerree Nex
S/S-S: WSShepard
X-4155
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
IMITED OFFICIAL USE
GA/G-2
March 12, 1969
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Gift and Menu Suggestions
Gifts
When the Gortons visited Washington last May, President
Johnson gave the Prime Minister a replica of the George
Washington Reading Lamp in the Smithsonian, a gold Bulova
desk clock, an IBM dictating machine and an inscribed
family photograph. Mrs. Johnson gave Mrs. Gorton a vermeil
dressing table box, a gold Bulova boudoir clock, three
American Designer scarves, two White House books and
three books on Indonesia (in which Mrs. Gorton has a
scholarly interest). On this occasion, it is recommended
that we avoid multiple gifts, and confine ourselves to one
nice gift to each person. With regard to personal gifts,
both Gortons have simple conservative tastes in clothing
and accessories.
Prime Minister Gorton is a heavy smoker (Benson and
Hedges); an engraved cigarette box, case or lighter might
be a suitable gift on this visit. From his university days
he retains a knowledge of our Civil War, suggesting a book,
map or other gift with a Civil War theme. Other possibilities
include:
-- a painting (any period or style with the exception
of "pop". Suggested by Embassy Canberra.)
-- an antique map depicting Australia, the Pacific
and the Americas. (Suggested by Embassy Canberra.)
-- a memento of the Apollo 8 flight, perhaps some
fitting from the actual spacecraft. This would be appropriate
in view of the extent of U.S. -Australian space cooperation;
also, astronaut Walter Cunningham will be guest of honor
at the 1969 Coral Sea celebration in Australia in May, which
has a "space" theme.
-- a memento of the Battle of the Coral Sea, perhaps
a ship's bell or a chair, etc. used by Admiral Nimitz.
-- a ship model of bone and ivory (rare example of
Americana; we know of only two in existence).
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-2
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
2
Mrs. Gorton's hobby is gardening. She has some artistic
interests and some competence in Indonesian studies.
A suitable gift for her this time might be a book on
gardening or famous American gardens; an American painting;
or an American handicraft or piece of jewelry.
Menu
According to Embassy Canberra, the Prime Minister
likes all foods except clams. Mrs. Gorton does not like
red wines. Both are especially fond of fresh fruit.
The following dishes would add a personal touch to the
menu:
-- a salad or other dish of fresh fruit, named after
the Gortons' citrus farm in northern Victoria, "Mystic Park".
-- Mrs. Gorton's home town is Bangor, Maine, and
Maine lobster would be an appropriate dish in her honor.
It could be called "Lobster Bettina.' Australians are
fond of lobster, which they call "crayfish", but are
accustomed only to the Pacific variety without claws.
Drafted by: EA/ANZ:CCBrower
for
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
S/CPR - Miss Dunaway
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard
S/CPR - DC Mr. Kingh
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LOU
JGA/G-1
March 10, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969
Suggestions on Approaching Australians and
Conversational Topics
Australians are outgoing and straightforward, and
mix exceptionally well with Americans. In fact, they
have a special fondness for us, not untinged with envy
at our greater affluence. Similarities in culture and
outlook are great, and there are very few special
sensitivities to beware of. Australia was first settled
as a penal colony, and many of its citizens today are
descended from convicts; this is a joking matter with
most but a few may be touchy about it. Also, Australia
today has a developed, dynamic economy and a sophisticated
and predominantly urban culture. There is a growing sense
of nationalistic pride. Australians sometimes resent
questions which imply a rural stereotype (sheep, kangaroos
and boomerangs) in the mind of the questioner.
Australia has no racial problems. The indigenous
aborigines have a status similar to that of American
Indians, and the "White Australia" immigration policy,
while no longer officially referred to as such and slightly
liberalized, remains substantially in effect. It enjoys
solid public support, reinforeed recently by our well-
publicized racial troubles and those of Great Britain.
Before he became Prime Minister, John Gorton firmly
advocated the continued exclusion of colored immigrants,
and expressed sympathy for the racial policies of Rhodesia
and South Africa.
Conversational Topics
Australians are keenly competitive, a trait which is
reflected in their excellence in several sports. Since
World War II they have produced a number of great swimmers,
including Dawn Frazer, Murray Rose and Mike Wenden (who
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
GA/G-1
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
2
won two gold medals at Mexico City). Milers John Landy
and Herb Elliott have a place in history, as do tennis
stars Lew Hoad, Ken Rosewall and Rod Laver. The Davis
Cup in tennis has been completely dominated by the
U. S. and Australia during the 23 years since World War II
(15 wins for Australia VS. 8 for the U. S.). In 1968
at Adelaide, a U. S. team headed by Arthur Ashe and
Clark Graebner recaptured the cup after a long string
of Australian victories. President Nixon received the
team on February 11, 1969 to congratulate them and view
the cup; he was presented with a team necktie.
In recent years Australia and the U. S. have begun
to vie in the America's Cup in yachting. This cup was
first awarded at the London Exposition of 1851 after a
race around the Isle of Wight open to all comers; it
was named the America's Cup after the winning U. S. entry.
The U. S. has defended the cup twenty times since and
won every time. Australia has challenged twice, in 1962
with the Gretel and in 1967 with the Dame Pattie (named
for the wife of former Prime Minister Menzies). The
skipper of the victorious U. S. yachts in both encounters
(Weatherly in 1962 and Intrepid in 1967) was Emil "Bus"
Mosbacher Jr., now Chief of Protocol of the United States.
On the more serious side, Australia has been
experiencing a remarkable boom in the discovery and
exploration of mineral resources, including iron, nickel,
bauxite and petroleum. This is often a good subject for
conversation with Australian men.
Conversing with Gorton
Gorton is a complex personality who combines the
shrewd, homespun quality of a man of the land with the
sophistication of an honors graduate in history at Brasenose
College, Oxford. While he has a typical Australian's
rough contempt for intellectual pretensions, he has also
(as Minister for Education and Science) come into intimate
contact with the problems of the intellectual community
and technology in a rapidly evolving modern society.
His conversational range is broad. Topics for light
conversation may be suggested by his student days, his
marriage, his war experiences, or his recreational interests.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-1
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
3
Gorton's father owned a fruit farm in Victoria and,
though the family could afford to send him to Melbourne's
fashionable Geelong Grammar School, young John also had
to work on the family property to help pay his way.
When he finished at Oxford he went to Spain for a holiday
and there met an American girl, Bettina Brown, of Bangor,
Maine, a student at the Sorbonne who was vacationing in
Spain. They were married in 1935 in the chapel at
Brasenose College. Mrs. Gorton has retained her American
citizenship to this day, although since her husband became
Prime Minister she has traveled on an Australian diplomatic
passport.
The couple returned to Australia and Gorton was making
a big success of running his father's farm when the war
broke out. He joined the Royal Australian Air Force as
a fighter pilot and was shot down over Singapore. As he
puts it, "My face got rather mixed up with the instrument
panel. He was left with amiably crumpled features which
today make him look rather like an aging former prize
fighter. Swathed in bandages, he was evacuated from
Singapore aboard a ship which was torpedoed and sunk.
He spent 24 hours aboard a life raft in the Java Sea before
being rescued by an Australian destroyer. Returning to
active duty, he was shot down again in 1944 and lived for
days on turtle eggs and fish on an island in the Timor Sea.
Although Gorton no longer farms actively, he still
spends much time outdoors at tennis and swimming. He likes
bridge and "mucking around in the garden." He reads
avidly -- anything from spy fiction to scientific reports --
but describes his taste in entertainment as somewhat
philistine. "I was brought up as a kid on a diet of flying
arrows in Nottingham Forest and books where Buffalo Bill
Cody harried redskins on every page, he told an interviewer.
"Give me Laramie, not Lohengrin. I'm not a boor, but I'm
no culture-vulture either.'
However, Gorton and his wife share an interest in the
theater which is not "philistine." On their visit to the
United States in May last year, they reserved an evening
in New York to see Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-1
DRAFTED BY:
EA/ANZ: CCBrower: 1w 3/6/69
CONCURRENCES:
EA/ANZ R Mr. Z Moore
S/S-S: WSShepard
X-4155
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
JGA/G-3
March 12, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969
SCOPE PAPER
42
I. The Setting
Prime Minister Gorton's visit comes at a turning
point in the history of Australian foreign policy. On
February 25, Gorton announced his Government's decision
to maintain Australian forces -- including ground forces --
in Malaysia/Singapore after the British withdrawal in 1971.
This is perhaps the most important step Australia has
taken since its entrance as an independent actor on the
world stage in the 1940's. Gorton's main purpose in
coming is to plumb United States attitudes and intentions
regarding East Asia as they bear on the Australian decision.
The impressions he receives can be expected to affect the
vigor with which Australia assumes its new, heightened
role in Southeast Asia.
The Australian Government's historic decision resulted
from the interplay of several factors. These included
anticipated changes in British and U. S. deployments in
Southeast Asia; the accession of a strong-minded,
nationalistic Prime Minister with heterodox foreign policy
leanings; the approach of a general election; and the
stirrings of a new nationalism in Australia.
"Forward Defense" or "Fortress Australia"?
Since World War II, Australia has increasingly sought
to develop closer relations with Southeast Asian countries.
While this course has been carried out through economic aid,
diplomacy and participation in regional organizations, it
has also had an important military component -- the policy
of "forward defense." Based on the idea of stopping
the enemy as far as possible from Australian shores, forward
defense has justified Australian participation in regional
SECRET
Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-3
SECRET
2
security efforts including Korea, SEATO and Viet-Nam and,
since 1955, its support of British undertakings to defend
Malaysia and Singapore. Conscious of its relative
weakness, however, and feeling isolated and vulnerable
in its corner of Asia, Australia has been careful to risk
its limited forces only in close association with one
or both of its "great and powerful friends", Britain and
the United States.
In 1968, two developments combined to thrust Australia
into a dilemma. The first was Britain's decision, made
public in January, to accelerate withdrawal of its forces
from Malaysia/Singapore and complete the pull-out by
the end of 1971. The second was President Johnson's
announcement on March 31, 1968 of a unilateral halt in
the bombing of North Viet-Nam and his own retirement from
politics. This surprising and dramatic development, and
the subsequent change of leadership in a United States
which as seen from Australia has seemed increasingly
preoccupied with internal problems, have created uncertainty
and anxiety in Australian minds about the future course
of America's Asia policy. One of Australia's "powerful
friends", the U.K., was preparing to leave the scene.
Would the other, the U. S., also drift away? In view of
this possibility, was forward defense still a wise policy?
Debate on this question could not remain theoretical,
since Australia was faced with a pressing practical
decision. It now has ground, air and naval forces in
Malaysia/Singapore alongside the British. Should it keep
its forces there after the British leave (as Malaysia
and Singapore have requested), or should it pull them out?
Keeping them there would be a historic and possibly
dangerous departure from the traditional policy of
stationing Australian forces overseas only alongside a major
power -- the British or the Americans. Pulling them out
would imply abandonment of forward defense, and perhaps
a fundamental reorientation of Australia's Southeast Asia
policy. The decision could not be long deferred, since
the five Commonwealth powers concerned (Malaysia, Singapore,
Australia, New Zealand and the U.K.) have begun consultations
looking toward a new arrangement for the defense of the
area post-1971. Australian participation is the key to
the emergence of any such new arrangement which promises
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-3
SECRET
3
to be effective, and Australian indecision has already
seriously hampered the five-power consultations.
In the debate in Australia, the traditional forward
defense policy has had powerful advocates, including the
Ministers of External Affairs and Defense, the top civil
servants in these departments, and the military services.
The alternative strategy, dubbed "fortress Australia" by
the press, calls for less involvement in Southeast Asia
and increased concentration upon internal economic
development, military preparedness and continental and
immediate offshore defense, focusing on the mainland and
Papua/New Guinea. In an extreme, isolationist form it has
been espoused by Jim Cairns, spokesman for the powerful
left-wing faction in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and
a good bet to become Leader of the Opposition in 1970.
A still more important figure who early disclosed strong
leanings toward "fortress Australia" -- although his
position was often contradictory and unclear -- was the
complex, controversial man who became Prime Minister in
January 1968, John Grey Gorton.
Gorton's Indecision
Gorton at various times has given numerous indications
of doubts about forward defense and a predisposition
towards its opposite. At his first press conference as
Prime Minister, he made a startling off-the-cuff announcement
that no more Australian troops would be sent to Viet-Nam.
A strong nationalist, he has charted a course assertive
of distinctively Australian interests and has shown that
in his thinking domestic economic development enjoys first
claim on national resources. Seeming to split sharply
with his Ministers of External Affairs and Defense over
Southeast Asia policy and the Malaysia/Singapore question,
he brought no advisers and requested no briefing papers
from their departments when he visited Washington in May 1968.
He repeatedly expressed skepticism as to the wisdom or
desirability of stationing Australian forces, especially
ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971 -- at least
without being sure of being able to get them out if they
got into serious trouble. This attitude reflects his
personal experience; as a fighter pilot in action over
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-3
SECRET
4
Singapore in 1942, he saw an entire Australian division --
one fourth of his country's combat infantry -- trapped
and forced to surrender to the Japanese. As Prime Minister,
he is understandably determined not to be responsible
for a repétition of this debacle.
With Britain's decision to withdraw from Malaysia/
Singapore by 1971 apparently irrevocable, Gorton's concern
appeared to focus sharply on the course of U. S. Asia
policy under President Johnson's successor. After
Johnson's March 31, 1968 speech, Gorton told the Liberal
Party caucus and the press that he was convinced there
would be a major U. S. retrenchment in Asia -- possibly
amounting to a return to pre-World War II isolationism --
under the next U. S. administration, and that this might
well necessitate abandonment of "the Menzies concept of
forward defense" in favor of "an Israeli-type defense
scheme. Although this topic dominated his discussions
in Washington in May 1968 almost to the exclusion of all
others, he left unconvinced by the Johnson administration's
protestations of continued U. S. firmness in East Asia.
He subsequently reiterated in public that no decision
would be made on the commitment of Australian ground forces
until certain "imponderables" -- meaning primarily U. S.
Asia policy under the new administration -- became clear
to him. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference
in mid-January, he privately took the position with the
British that he could not run the risk of involvement,
particularly of his ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore
until he knew in advance who would "back him up". He
therefore planned to make no decision on post-1971 deployment
of ground forces, he said, until he had talked to
President Nixon.
With characteristic directness and persistence, Gorton
successfully sought an early meeting with the new President.
On February 7, "Len" Hewitt, Secretary of the Prime Minister's
Department and Gorton's closest adviser, told our
Ambassador that Gorton had only one thing on his mind in
coming to Washington other than getting acquainted with
the President, and that was to learn exactly what was the
U. S. position on the stationing of Australian troops in
Malaysia/Singapore. Gorton would make it clear that if
Australian troops were stationed there, they would never
get involved in local conflicts or hostilities with
Indonesia or the Philippines. However, he would want to
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SECRET
5
know from President Nixon what the United States would do
if Australian troops became involved in countering aggression
by Red China or North Viet-Nam. Gorton himself reiterated
this to our Ambassador the next day, adding that if the need
arose he would commit troops to fight with us in Thailand.
The Election and Gorton's Decision
Meanwhile -- with a general election coming up in
November 1969 at the latest -- there were signs that the
Australian public was making up its mind on the foreign policy
debate. The fact that British withdrawal implied increased
Australian responsibility, while it had its alarming aspect,
appealed at the same time to Australia's growing national
pride. Australia -- economically the third most powerful
nation in Asia and technologically second only to Japan --
was being called upon to play a new, more independent role.
Surely it would not be too timid to rise to the challenge?
"Fortress Australia", from this point of view, could easily
be depicted as un-Australian. Gorton's Christmas message to
Australian troops in Viet-Nam, written in ringing "forward-
defense" tones, met with a warm response. The Liberal Party
organization began advising him that a strong defense policy
was his election winner. This advice was reinforced by the
press, most of which favored staying on after 1971, and by
the views of the Liberal Party's two election allies, the
Country Party and the hawkish Democratic Labor Party.
The uncertainty created by Gorton's previous, conflicting
statements helped build up suspense for his promised announce-
ment of a new defense policy when Parliament reconvened on
February 25. Most observers expected him to announce a
decision to maintain air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore
after 1971, but to postpone a decision on ground forces
because of "imponderables". The moderate leader of the
Opposition (ALP), Gough Whitlam, evidently anticipated such
a position and tried to pre-empt it by adopting in advance
a very similar one. Whitlam came out for air and naval
deployments but rejected the commitment of ground forces, in
favor of maintaining a "mobile striking force" in Australia
which could be sent if needed -- an idea originally advanced
by Gorton.
Gorton made one quiet, preparatory move -- he announced
the resignation of Paul Hasluck as Minister for External
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6
Affairs and his elevation to Governor General. With
Hasluck thus out of the way, Gorton had the spotlight
entirely to himself when he made his surprise announcement
on February 25 that Australia would go all the way with
the policy of which Hasluck had been the leading advocate --
forward defense including a commitment of ground forces
to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.
Gorton's speech was his finest hour and a political
masterstroke. Lucid, forthright, statesmanlike, it won
warm applause both at home and abroad. (Prime Minister
Holyoake of New Zealand, who had been urging this course
on Gorton all along, made a simultaneous and similar
announcement.) The Australian press was unanimously
laudatory. Whitlam, neatly outmaneuvered, was obliged to
attack the commitment of ground forces, thus making this
the only foreign policy issue in an election which the
bitterly divided ALP seems sure to lose. Gorton, on the
other hand, seems likely to emerge from the election with
increased stature, firmer control, and an enhanced image
as a truly Australian Prime Minister leading his country
into a new era of its nationhood.
Significance for the Visit
Gorton's decision to announce a commitment of ground
forces to Malaysia/Singapore in advance of his visit to
Washington has simplified our task. Previously, he seemed
likely to seek a specific U. S. guarantee of the safety
of his forces as a precondition for committing them.
Obviously it would have been difficult to give such a
guarantee, especially in a form which would have been
politically useful to Gorton. The February 25 speech has
made it clear that the U. S. will not have to pay this price
in order to get an Australian ground-force presence in
Malaysia/Singapore.
On the other hand, the speech has also in a sense put
us on a spot, challenging the U. S. to be as firm and
forthcoming as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that
Australia is meeting the American requirement to do all
it can; now what will Washington do to support that commitment?
SECRET
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7
His speech made it clear that contingencies were conceivable
with which Australian forces could not cope, and that "if
such a situation should arise we would have to look to the
support of allies outside the region". In this connection
Gorton may still ask for specific assurances of U. S.
support. At the very least, he will seek to sound out the
temper of the new administration and the general posture it
will take in Southeast Asia. The answers and impressions
he receives will have a bearing on the confidence and vigor
with which Australia pursues the new path in regional affairs
on which it is taking the first step.
II. The Visitor
Personally, Prime Minister Gorton is conservative,
with a brusque and flamboyant style. He is quick on his
feet and tends to say what comes first into his mind.
Prickly and sensitive, he refuses to be pressured or taken
for granted. (For example, he reacted angrily and resentfully
when he felt President Johnson had not consulted sufficiently
with the GOA before announcing the partial bombing halt
on March 31, 1968.) He can be extremely charming, but is
instinctively aggressive with a streak of toughness and
possibly nastiness just below the surface. He is inclined
to be impetuous, abrasive and cocksure, restricts his
advisers to a small inner circle, and has at times seemed
lackadaisical in his approach to his work. These qualities
have earned him a bad press and poor personal relations
in the Government, but this has not seemed to bother him.
He projects a charismatic toughness which Australians like,
and his standing with the man in the street is high.
Recently, both his performance and his press have improved.
Australia's top political journalist provides a vivid
sketch bringing out Gorton's political appeal: "Oxford
educated, a Victorian orchardist, he had been when young
a very good-looking man, but in World War II, as a fighter
pilot, he drove his face into the instrument panel of his
bullet-damaged Hurricane in landing on the Singapore
aerodrome as an RAAF-Japanese dogfight proceeded overhead.
His rebuilt features are attractively ugly, mobile,
conveying on TV screens a pleasant impression of battered
strength and homely charm. His later war service has about
it some of the romantic charm that surrounded that of the
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JGA/G-3
SECRET
8
late John F. Kennedy
Back on active service, a
crumpled-faced veteran, he crashlanded on an island in
the Timor Sea and lived for days on turtles' eggs and
fish before being rescued. Lean, wiry, six feet one inch
tall, a careless dresser with hair that succumbs only
temporarily to the discipline of comb and brush, laconic,
direct and irreverent, addicted to swimming and tennis,
an easy mixer who is impatient with formality, protocal,
the establishment, and 'longhaired' intellectuals,
Gorton represents what Australians have chosen to believe
is the traditional Australian, both in his masculinity
and derisive distaste for those who parade pretentiously
intellectual accomplishments or academic qualifications."
Gorton has been married since 1935 to an American
citizen, nee Bettina Brown of Bangor, Maine. Mrs. Gorton
is a shy, intelligent, gray-haired woman who has some
competence in Indonesian studies. She is reportedly
embittered by her husband's reputation as a lady-killer.
III. Australian Aims
The new administration's strategy in Southeast Asia,
as it relates to Australia's involvement in the defense
of the region, will be uppermost in the Prime Minister's
mind.
He will:
-- assess the firmness of the new administration's
posture in Southeast Asia;
-- ask to what extend the U. S. is prepared to back
up Australian forces committed to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971;
-- ask the President's thoughts on strategy and
prospects for the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
-- be interested in the President's thinking on
post-Vietnam Asia;
-- argue for better treatment from the United States
in the economic field;
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9
-- size up the President.
IV. United States Aims
Our aim is to secure continued strong Australian
leadership in Southeast Asia. We should try:
-- without increasing our commitments, to give
Gorton sufficient reassurance to encourage him to make
a whole-hearted contribution to regional security;
-- to consult fully and frankly with him on the
Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
-- fully to share our thoughts - and elicit his -
on post-Vietnam Asia;
-- to establish a good personal relationship
between the President and Gorton;
-- to reassure Gorton and, through him, the
Australian people that the United States is and will
remain a close, steadfast and special friend which can be
relied upon to play a leading role in checking Communist
expansion in Asia.
Drafted by: EA/ANZ: CCBrower
of
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore et
EA/RA - Mr. Donald
EA - Amb. Brown\-
EA - Amb. Godley es
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard
Approved by: The Secretary
Letter
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
JGA/BP-1
March 14, 1969
Art haspen
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969
Background Paper
76
AUSTRALIA AND VIET-NAM
Summary
The Australian Government supports the allied effort
in South Viet-Nam both with an 8000-man troop contribution
and with economic assistance. The Government's position
enjoys strong public support which has, however, been
subject to steady erosion in the past eighteen months.
Prime Minister Gorton is sensitive about being fully
consulted on U. S. Viet-Nam policy, and the GOA is uneasy
about our future posture on Viet-Nam.
Main points are -
Troop Contribution. Australia now maintains in
Viet-Nam approximately 8000 troops. These include a
combat brigade and support, a jungle warfare advisory
unit, a Canberra bomber squadron, an air transport unit
and a guided missile destroyer. The first Australian
contingent was sent in early 1965 by Prime Minister
Menzies. Harold Holt as Prime Minister announced two increases
--from 1500 to 6300 troops in January 1966, and from 6300
to 8000 in October 1967. However, his successor, John Gorton,
declared immediately after assuming office in January
1968 that there would be no further troop increases,
barring some major change in the situation.
Economic Aid. Australia has given South Viet-Nam
more than $10.5 million in economic aid since 1964. Goods
and materials furnished have included textbooks in
Vietnamese, corrugated roofing, community windmills, a
radio broadcasting station, hand tools, radios, blankets
and food. About fifty Australian civilian technicians
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2
are serving in Viet-Nam, including surgical teams, civil
engineers and agricultural experts. About 130 Vietnamese
students are studying in Australia.
Public Support. The Government's stand on Viet-Nam
enjoys strong but slowly diminishing public support.
The last general election, in November 1966, was fought
largely on the Viet-Nam issue, with the opposition
Australian Labor Party arguing against military involvement
in the conflict. The election returns gave the Government
the biggest parliamentary majority in Australian history,
and the ALP's new and more flexible leader, Gough Whitlam,
subsequently moderated the party's line on Viet-Nam.
Gallup polls during the past eighteen months have reflected
steady erosion in Viet-Nam support, with those favoring
continuing the war falling from a high of 62% (May 1967)
to 49% in December 1968. (The breakdown in the December 1968
poll was "continue the war," 49%; "bring back our forces,"
37%; undecided 14%.)
Consultation. Prime Minister Gorton was indignant
when President Johnson on March 31, 1968 announced
limitation of U. S. bombing of North Viet-Nam with only
24 hours' prior notice to him and what he felt was
insufficient consultation. The GOA was embarrassed because
less than a week previously Minister for External Affairs
Hasluck and Minister for Defense Fairhall had told
Parliament that the bombing pressure must be kept up until
North Viet-Nam was willing to make a reciprocal reduction
in the level of hostilities.
There has been a full flow of information about the
Paris talks to the Australian Government through briefings
in Paris of Ambassador Anderson (the Australian liaison
officer there) by our negotiators, through briefings of
Ambassador Waller in Washington, and through transmission
of texts and reports by our Embassy in Canberra. However,
the Australian Government is uneasy about the future
posture of the United States with respect to Viet-Nam and
Asia generally.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-1
DRAFTED BY:
EA/ANZ: CCBrower: oh rlw 2/25/69
CONCURRENCES:
EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore eB
EA/VN - Mr. Flowerree
S/S-S: WSShepard
X-4155
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
AH harsen
SECRET
JGA/G-3
March 12, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969
76
SCOPE PAPER
I. The Setting
Prime Minister Gorton's visit comes at a turning
point in the history of Australian foreign policy. On
February 25, Gorton announced his Government's decision
to maintain Australian forces -- including ground forces --
in Malaysia/Singapore after the British withdrawal in 1971.
This is perhaps the most important step Australia has
taken since its entrance as an independent actor on the
world stage in the 1940's. Gorton's main purpose in
coming is to plumb United States attitudes and intentions
regarding East Asia as they bear on the Australian decision.
The impressions he receives can be expected to affect the
vigor with which Australia assumes its new, heightened
role in Southeast Asia.
The Australian Government's historic decision resulted
from the interplay of several factors. These included
anticipated changes in British and U. S. deployments in
Southeast Asia; the accession of a strong-minded,
nationalistic Prime Minister with heterodox foreign policy
leanings; the approach of a general election; and the
stirrings of a new nationalism in Australia.
"Forward Defense" or "Fortress Australia"?
Since World War II, Australia has increasingly sought
to develop closer relations with Southeast Asian countries.
While this course has been carried out through economic aid,
diplomacy and participation in regional organizations, it
has also had an important military component -- the policy
of "forward defense." Based on the idea of stopping
the enemy as far as possible from Australian shores, forward
defense has justified Australian participation in regional
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security efforts including Korea, SEATO and Viet-Nam and,
since 1955, its support of British undertakings to defend
Malaysia and Singapore. Conscious of its relative
weakness, however, and feeling isolated and vulnerable
in its corner of Asia, Australia has been careful to risk
its limited forces only in close association with one
or both of its "great and powerful friends", Britain and
the United States.
In 1968, two developments combined to thrust Australia
into a dilemma. The first was Britain's decision, made
public in January, to accelerate withdrawal of its forces
from Malaysia/Singapore and complete the pull-out by
the end of 1971. The second was President Johnson's
announcement on March 31, 1968 of a unilateral halt in
the bombing of North Viet-Nam and his own retirement from
politics. This surprising and dramatic development, and
the subsequent change of leadership in a United States
which as seen from Australia has seemed increasingly
preoccupied with internal problems, have created uncertainty
and anxiety in Australian minds about the future course
of America's Asia policy. One of Australia's "powerful
friends", the U.K., was preparing to leave the scene.
Would the other, the U. S., also drift away? In view of
this possibility, was forward defense still a wise policy?
Debate on this question could not remain theoretical,
since Australia was faced with a pressing practical
decision. It now has ground, air and naval forces in
Malaysia/Singapore alongside the British. Should it keep
its forces there after the British leave (as Malaysia
and Singapore have requested), or should it pull them out?
Keeping them there would be a historic and possibly
dangerous departure from the traditional policy of
stationing Australian forces overseas only alongside a major
power -- the British or the Americans. Pulling them out
would imply abandonment of forward defense, and perhaps
a fundamental reorientation of Australia's Southeast Asia
policy. The decision could not be long deferred, since
the five Commonwealth powers concerned (Malaysia, Singapore,
Australia, New Zealand and the U.K.) have begun consultations
looking toward a new arrangement for the defense of the
area post-1971. Australian participation is the key to
the emergence of any such new arrangement which promises
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to be effective, and Australian indecision has already
seriously hampered the five-power consultations.
In the debate in Australia, the traditional forward
defense policy has had powerful advocates, including the
Ministers of External Affairs and Defense, the top civil
servants in these departments, and the military services.
The alternative strategy, dubbed "fortress Australia" by
the press, calls for less involvement in Southeast Asia
and increased concentration upon internal economic
development, military preparedness and continental and
immediate offshore defense, focusing on the mainland and
Papua/New Guinea. In an extreme, isolationist form it has
been espoused by Jim Cairns, spokesman for the powerful
left-wing faction in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and
a good bet to become Leader of the Opposition in 1970.
A still more important figure who early disclosed strong
leanings toward "fortress Australia" -- although his
position was often contradictory and unclear -- was the
complex, controversial man who became Prime Minister in
January 1968, John Grey Gorton.
Gorton's Indecision
Gorton at various times has given numerous indications
of doubts about forward defense and a predisposition
towards its opposite. At his first press conference as
Prime Minister, he made a startling off-the-cuff announcement
that no more Australian troops would be sent to Viet-Nam.
A strong nationalist, he has charted a course assertive
of distinctively Australian interests and has shown that
in his thinking domestic economic development enjoys first
claim on national resources. Seeming to split sharply
with his Ministers of External Affairs and Defense over
Southeast Asia policy and the Malaysia/Singapore question,
he brought no advisers and requested no briefing papers
from their departments when he visited Washington in May 1968.
He repeatedly expressed skepticism as to the wisdom or
desirability of stationing Australian forces, especially
ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971 -- at least
without being sure of being able to get them out if they
got into serious trouble. This attitude reflects his
personal experience; as a fighter pilot in action over
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4
Singapore in 1942, he saw an entire Australian division --
one fourth of his country's combat infantry -- trapped
and forced to surrender to the Japanese. As Prime Minister,
he is understandably determined not to be responsible
for a repétition of this debacle.
With Britain's decision to withdraw from Malaysia/
Singapore by 1971 apparently irrevocable, Gorton's concern
appeared to focus sharply on the course of U. S. Asia
policy under President Johnson's successor. After
Johnson's March 31, 1968 speech, Gorton told the Liberal
Party caucus and the press that he was convinced there
would be a major U. S. retrenchment in Asia -- possibly
amounting to a return to pre-World War II isolationism --
under the next U. S. administration, and that this might
well necessitate abandonment of "the Menzies concept of
forward defense" in favor of "an Israeli-type defense
scheme. Although this topic dominated his discussions
in Washington in May 1968 almost to the exclusion of all
others, he left unconvinced by the Johnson administration's
protestations of continued U. S. firmness in East Asia.
He subsequently reiterated in public that no decision
would be made on the commitment of Australian ground forces
until certain "imponderables" -- meaning primarily U. S.
Asia policy under the new administration -- became clear
to him. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference
in mid-January, he privately took the position with the
British that he could not run the risk of involvement,
particularly of his ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore
until he knew in advance who would "back him up". He
therefore planned to make no decision on post-1971 deployment
of ground forces, he said, until he had talked to
President Nixon.
With characteristic directness and persistence, Gorton
successfully sought an early meeting with the new President.
On February 7, "Len" Hewitt, Secretary of the Prime Minister's
Department and Gorton's closest adviser, told our
Ambassador that Gorton had only one thing on his mind in
coming to Washington other than getting acquainted with
the President, and that was to learn exactly what was the
U. S. position on the stationing of Australian troops in
Malaysia/Singapore. Gorton would make it clear that if
Australian troops were stationed there, they would never
get involved in local conflicts or hostilities with
Indonesia or the Philippines. However, he would want to
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5
know from President Nixon what the United States would do
if Australian troops became involved in countering aggression
by Red China or North Viet-Nam. Gorton himself reiterated
this to our Ambassador the next day, adding that if the need
arose he would commit troops to fight with us in Thailand.
The Election and Gorton's Decision
Meanwhile -- with a general election coming up in
November 1969 at the latest -- there were signs that the
Australian public was making up its mind on the foreign policy
debate. The fact that British withdrawal implied increased
Australian responsibility, while it had its alarming aspect,
appealed at the same time to Australia's growing national
pride. Australia -- economically the third most powerful
nation in Asia and technologically second only to Japan --
was being called upon to play a new, more independent role.
Surely it would not be too timid to rise to the challenge?
"Fortress Australia", from this point of view, could easily
be depicted as un-Australian. Gorton's Christmas message to
Australian troops in Viet-Nam, written in ringing "forward-
defense" tones, met with a warm response. The Liberal Party
organization began advising him that a strong defense policy
was his election winner. This advice was reinforced by the
press, most of which favored staying on after 1971, and by
the views of the Liberal Party's two election allies, the
Country Party and the hawkish Democratic Labor Party.
The uncertainty created by Gorton's previous, conflicting
statements helped build up suspense for his promised announce-
ment of a new defense policy when Parliament reconvened on
February 25. Most observers expected him to announce a
decision to maintain air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore
after 1971, but to postpone a decision on ground forces
because of "imponderables". The moderate leader of the
Opposition (ALP), Gough Whitlam, evidently anticipated such
a position and tried to pre-empt it by adopting in advance
a very similar one. Whitlam came out for air and naval
deployments but rejected the commitment of ground forces, in
favor of maintaining a "mobile striking force" in Australia
which could be sent if needed -- an idea originally advanced
by Gorton.
Gorton made one quiet, preparatory move -- he announced
the resignation of Paul Hasluck as Minister for External
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JGA/G-3
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6
Affairs and his elevation to Governor General. With
Hasluck thus out of the way, Gorton had the spotlight
entirely to himself when he made his surprise announcement
on February 25 that Australia would go all the way with
the policy of which Hasluck had been the leading advocate --
forward defense including a commitment of ground forces
to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.
Gorton's speech was his finest hour and a political
masterstroke. Lucid, forthright, statesmanlike, it won
warm applause both at home and abroad. (Prime Minister
Holyoake of New Zealand, who had been urging this course
on Gorton all along, made a simultaneous and similar
announcement.) The Australian press was unanimously
laudatory. Whitlam, neatly outmaneuvered, was obliged to
attack the commitment of ground forces, thus making this
the only foreign policy issue in an election which the
bitterly divided ALP seems sure to lose. Gorton, on the
other hand, seems likely to emerge from the election with
increased stature, firmer control, and an enhanced image
as a truly Australian Prime Minister leading his country
into a new era of its nationhood.
Significance for the Visit
Gorton's decision to announce a commitment of ground
forces to Malaysia/Singapore in advance of his visit to
Washington has simplified our task. Previously, he seemed
likely to seek a specific U. S. guarantee of the safety
of his forces as a precondition for committing them.
Obviously it would have been difficult to give such a
guarantee, especially in a form which would have been
politically useful to Gorton. The February 25 speech has
made it clear that the U. S. will not have to pay this price
in order to get an Australian ground-force presence in
Malaysia/Singapore.
On the other hand, the speech has also in a sense put
us on a spot, challenging the U. S. to be as firm and
forthcoming as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that
Australia is meeting the American requirement to do all
it can; now what will Washington do to support that commitment?
SECRET
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JGA/G-3
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7
His speech made it clear that contingencies were conceivable
with which Australian forces could not cope, and that "if
such a situation should arise we would have to look to the
support of allies outside the region". In this connection
Gorton may still ask for specific assurances of U. S.
support. At the very least, he will seek to sound out the
temper of the new administration and the general posture it
will take in Southeast Asia. The answers and impressions
he receives will have a bearing on the confidence and vigor
with which Australia pursues the new path in regional affairs
on which it is taking the first step.
II. The Visitor
Personally, Prime Minister Gorton is conservative,
with a brusque and flamboyant style. He is quick on his
feet and tends to say what comes first into his mind.
Prickly and sensitive, he refuses to be pressured or taken
for granted. (For example, he reacted angrily and resentfully
when he felt President Johnson had not consulted sufficiently
with the GOA before announcing the partial bombing halt
on March 31, 1968.) He can be extremely charming, but is
instinctively aggressive with a streak of toughness and
possibly nastiness just below the surface. He is inclined
to be impetuous, abrasive and cocksure, restricts his
advisers to a small inner circle, and has at times seemed
lackadaisical in his approach to his work. These qualities
have earned him a bad press and poor personal relations
in the Government, but this has not seemed to bother him.
He projects a charismatic toughness which Australians like,
and his standing with the man in the street is high.
Recently, both his performance and his press have improved.
Australia's top political journalist provides a vivid
sketch bringing out Gorton's political appeal: "Oxford
educated, a Victorian orchardist, he had been when young
a very good-looking man, but in World War II, as a fighter
pilot, he drove his face into the instrument panel of his
bullet-damaged Hurricane in landing on the Singapore
aerodrome as an RAAF-Japanese dogfight proceeded overhead.
His rebuilt features are attractively ugly, mobile,
conveying on TV screens a pleasant impression of battered
strength and homely charm. His later war service has about
it some of the romantic charm that surrounded that of the
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-3
SECRET
8
late John F. Kennedy
Back on active service, a
crumpled-faced veteran, he crashlanded on an island in
the Timor Sea and lived for days on turtles' eggs and
fish before being rescued. Lean, wiry, six feet one inch
tall, a careless dresser with hair that succumbs only
temporarily to the discipline of comb and brush, laconic,
direct and irreverent, addicted to swimming and tennis,
an easy mixer who is impatient with formality, protocal,
the establishment, and 'longhaired' intellectuals,
Gorton represents what Australians have chosen to believe
is the traditional Australian, both in his masculinity
and derisive distaste for those who parade pretentiously
intellectual accomplishments or academic qualifications."
Gorton has been married since 1935 to an American
citizen, nee Bettina Brown of Bangor, Maine. Mrs. Gorton
is a shy, intelligent, gray-haired woman who has some
competence in Indonesian studies. She is reportedly
embittered by her husband's reputation as a lady-killer.
III. Australian Aims
The new administration's strategy in Southeast Asia,
as it relates to Australia's involvement in the defense
of the region, will be uppermost in the Prime Minister's
mind.
He will:
-- assess the firmness of the new administration's
posture in Southeast Asia;
-- ask to what extend the U. S. is prepared to back
up Australian forces committed to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971;
-- ask the President's thoughts on strategy and
prospects for the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
-- be interested in the President's thinking on
post-Vietnam Asia;
-- argue for better treatment from the United States
in the economic field;
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-3
SECRET
9
-- size up the President.
IV. United States Aims
Our aim is to secure continued strong Australian
leadership in Southeast Asia. We should try:
-- without increasing our commitments, to give
Gorton sufficient reassurance to encourage him to make
a whole-hearted contribution to regional security;
-- to consult fully and frankly with him on the
Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
-- fully to share our thoughts - and elicit his -
on post-Vietnam Asia;
-- to establish a good personal relationship
between the President and Gorton;
-- to reassure Gorton and, through him, the
Australian people that the United States is and will
remain a close, steadfast and special friend which can be
relied upon to play a leading role in checking Communist
expansion in Asia.
Drafted by: EA/ANZ: CCBrower of
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
EA/RA - Mr. Donald
EA - Amb. Brown
EA - Amb. Godley
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard
Approved by: The Secretary
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
AH has
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
JGA/G-2 (Rev.)
March 14, 1969
Gift, Menu and Entertainment Suggestions
Gifts
When the Gortons visited Washington last May, President
Johnson gave the Prime Minister a replica of the George
Washington Reading Lamp in the Smithsonian, a gold Bulova
desk clock, an IBM dictating machine and an inscribed
family photograph. Mrs. Johnson gave Mrs. Gorton a vermeil
dressing table box, a gold Bulova boudoir clock, three
American Designer scarves, two White House books and three
books on Indonesia (in which Mrs. Gorton has a scholarly
interest). On this occasion, it is recommended that we
avoid multiple gifts, and confine ourselves to one or two
nice gifts to each person. With regard to personal gifts,
both Gortons have simple conservative tastes in clothing
and accessories.
Prime Minister Gorton is a heavy smoker (Benson and
Hedges); an engraved cigarette box, case or lighter might
be a suitable gift on this visit. From his university days
he retains a knowledge of our Civil War, suggesting a book,
map or other gift with a Civil War theme. Other
possibilities include:
-- a painting (any period or style with the exception
of "pop". Suggested by Embassy Canberra).
-- an antique map depicting Australia, the Pacific
and the Americas. (Suggested by Embassy Canberra.)
-- a memento of the Apollo 8 flight, perhaps some
fitting from the actual spacecraft. This would be appropriate
in view of the extent of U.S. -Australian space cooperation;
also, astronaut Walter Cunningham will be guest of honor
at the 1969 Coral Sea celebration in Australia in May,
which has a "space" theme.
-- photographs of Sydney, Brisbane and Perth, taken
by the Apollo 9 crew. (In its traditional farewell to
our spacecraft, Perth turned on its lights for Apollo 9.)
-- a memento of the Battle of the Coral Sea, perhaps
a ship's bell or a chair, etc. used by Admiral Nimitz.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-2
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
2
-- a ship model of bone and ivory (rare example of
Americana; we know of only two in existence).
Mrs. Gorton's hobby is gardening. She has some artistic
interests and some competence in Indonesian studies.
A suitable gift for her this time might be a book on
gardening or famous American gardens; an American painting;
or an American handicraft or piece of jewelry.
Menu
According to Embassy Canberra, the Prime Minister likes
all foods except clams. Mrs. Gorton does not like red wines.
Both are especially fond of fresh fruit. The following
dishes would add a personal touch to the menu:
-- a salad or other dish of fresh fruit, named after
the Gorton's citrus farm in northern Victoria, "Mystic Park".
-- Mrs. Gorton's home town is Bangor, Maine, and
Maine lobster would be an appropriate dish in her honor.
It could be called "Lobster Bettina." Australians are
fond of lobster, which they call "crayfish", but are
accustomed only to the Pacific variety without claws.
Entertainment
Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton like the theater. (On
their last visit to the United States, they reserved an
evening in New York to see Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are
Dead.) They have little interest in opera or ballet, but
like musical comedy. They prefer light entertainment, perhaps
with a sophisticated touch. As background to the meal, an
orchestra playing Broadway showtunes, etc., would be
appropriate.
Special entertainment might be:
-- A celebrated singing entertainer such as Dinah Shore,
Tony Bennett or Mahalia Jackson.
-- Pianist Andre Watts (but avoid a heavy program).
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/G-2
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
3
-- A celebrated actor in a program of readings.
(Charlton Heston had considerable success in Australia
with such a program.)
-- If Helen Hayes or Edgar Bergen could be coaxed
out of retirement for the occasion, either one would be
sure to please the Gortons.
-- Bob Hope is well known to Australians.
Drafted by: EA/ANZ : CCBrower
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
esses
S/CPR - Miss Dunaway
S/CPR - Mr. King
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard
MI
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
QM-FYI
633
apea
Sneider
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
United
2. Ret.
Washington, D.C. 20520
FEB 27 1969
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Visit of Australian Prime Minister Gorton
Prime Minister Gorton will visit Washington
March 31, 1969, at the President's invitation. The
Department contemplates the following schedule of major
events for the visit, which would meet all of the
Prime Minister's requests:
A. March 30
1. Late afternoon: Arrive Andrews Air Force
Base in USAF aircraft. (Aircraft will pick up Prime
Minister at his CONUS point of entry, as yet undetermined.)
Travel from AAFB to Blair House by car.
2. Evening private.
April
B. March 31
1. 10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.: Meeting with
A met 1/2
President at White House; informal arrival ceremony.
1/2 hr alam
1 nn w/ advisor
2.
Lunchtime unscheduled as yet.
state
Def
3. Afternoon unscheduled as yet.
Them
4. 8:00 P.M.: Dinner at White House.
)
A pm 2
10:00
am meet w/ Gorto C.
April 1
Y
was
1. 11:00 A.M.: Meeting with Secretary of State.
CONFIDENTIAL
Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
2
2. Lunchtime unscheduled as yet.
3. 2:00 P.M.: Meeting with Secretary of Defense.
4. 4:15 P.M.: Meeting with Secretary of Treasury.
5. Evening: Reserved for social function at
Australian Embassy.
D. April 2
1. Morning unscheduled as yet.
2. 12:15 P.M.: Prime Minister addresses
National Press Club lunch.
3. 2:30 P.M.: Departure from Washington
by Canadian Government aircraft for official visit to
Ottawa.
Further plans for the yet unscheduled time in the
Prime Minister's program will be made in consultation
with the Australian Embassy. The composition of the
Prime Minister's party has not yet been announced, but
should Mrs. Gorton accompany him a separate program for
her can be arranged.
Before the Department can coordinate and elaborate
the schedule with the Australian Embassy, your approval
of certain key elements in it is required, as follows:
(A) Meeting with the President at 10:30 A.M., March 31;
(B) Dinner at the White House at 8:00 P.M., March 31.
It would also be desirable to set aside time on the
President's appointments calendar for a second business
meeting, should the President wish to talk further with
the Prime Minister. The hour of 10:00 A.M., April 1,
would fit well into the schedule.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
3
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That you approve the 10: 30 A.M. meeting with
the President on March 31.
Approve
Disapprove
Alternative
2. That you approve scheduling a dinner at the
White House at 8:00 P.M., March 31.
Approve
Disapprove
Alternative
3. That you approve setting aside the hour
10:00 - 11:00 A.M., April 1, for a possible second
meeting between the President and the Prime Minister.
Approve
Disapprove
Alternative
John Pwaki
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 13, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DWIGHT CHAPIN
The President has approved a recommendation by the Secre-
tary of State that Prime Minister Gorton of Australia be invited
to Washington for a private visit on March 31. Gorton has
accepted the President's invitation. The tentative program for
the day would consist of a working meeting -- probably about
two hours -- and an informal lunch or dinner. As you can see
from the attached memo the details of the schedule have not
yet been presented to the President. I think you should, however,
hold the time open for these activities. As soon as specific
recommendations are received, I will check them with you
before any action is taken.
Spin
Richard M. Moose
Attachment
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
February 13, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DWIGHT CHAPIN
The President has approved a recommendation by the Secre-
tary of State that Prime Minister Gorton of Australia be invited
to Washington for a private visit on March 31. Gorton has
accepted the President's invitation. The tentative program for
the day would consist of a working meeting -- probably about
two hours -- and an informal lunch or dinner. As you can see
from the attached memo the details of the schedule have not
yet been presented to the President. I think you should, however,
hold the time open for these activities. As soon as specific
recommendations are received, I will check them with you
before any action is taken.
Richard M. Moose
Attachment
Cy of Memo for Pres. fm SecState
Cy of Memo for Pres. fm HAK w/Presidential approval check
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Mr. Moose
Dick:
I suggest Telegram not
need not be sent to the
Proident, but held to be that
once President affores invite,
Duh S.
ECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has
Australia Seealso
J walshers
295
per
2/7/69
pin
Benosse
LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM
1. Sent by:
2. TO: WH
3.
Transmitted by: JJJohnston L. Received (Msg. No.) by: 26/
WHSR
Date & Time:
Date & Time:
1440
L
6
5. Description: Memo to President and Telegram to CANBERRA
6. Clefn & Controls:
SECRET and 8NK CONFIDENTIAL
7. No. of Pgs.
2
8. Precedence IMMEDIATE 9. Validated by: JPWalsh
O. Deliver to: Dr. Henry Kissinger
For: Clearance XXXX
The White House
Information
Per Request
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
cleared to J.wabh
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE: []courcr
PENHAK 6:10pm 2/7/69 ONLY USE
CHARGE 10
CONFIDENTIAL
(I
emphasied to oct
Classification
wash Son
Origin
ACTION: Amembassy CANBERRA
1 meets occasion) H social
Demosts
this
STATE
I
Ref: Canberra 726
SUBJECT: Gorton Visit
1. Please inform Prime Minister Gorton that President will be happy to
receive him for private visit March 31, if that date convenient for Gorton.
We will propose detailed schedule of meetings and social events later.
2. Private visit, which is confined to one day and is largely free of
protocol formalities, is proposed in order to conserve President's time
and on assumption (based on Gorton's correspondence with President
and indications received from Australian Embassy here) that essentially
working visit will satisfy Gorton. Private visit precludes neither informal
White House social function nor publicity, of course,
3. Upon receipt Gorton's acceptance we will wish work out joint understanding
with GOA re public announcement of visit.
:
END
Dished by:
del. in.
Telegraphic transmission and
sew
EA/ANZ:RMoore:aw 2/6/69
2996
classification by,
S/S - John P. Walsh
Clearances
snin
EA - Mr. Duemling
S/CPR - Mr. King
EA/P Leins Bh
J - Mr. Dillon
S/S -
White H use -
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM
Classification
DS-322
8-63
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
February 6, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Visit by Prime Minister Gorton
You will recall that, in your absence, I took a call
from Prime Minister Gorton, who suggested that he would
like to visit Washington during the period March 30 to
April 12. Secretary Rogers has recommended a working
visit on March 31 (Tab A). Such a visit would minimize
the demands on your time and still permit a full exchange
with Gorton. I agree.
If you approve, Ambassador Crook will be instructed
Approv to transmit R your invitation.
Disapprove
Other
1- A. the
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET
Historical File
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
256
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 6, 1969
976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Visit by Prime Minister Gorton
RECOMMENDATION:
That you invite Prime Minister Gorton to make a
private visit to Washington on March 31.
Approve
Disapprove
DISCUSSION:
Henry Kissinger has informed me of a recent exchange
with Prime Minister Gorton on the timing of a visit to
Washington, and your preference for the earlier part of
the period which Gorton has suggested (March 30-April 12).
Within the next few days I will be sending you a
memorandum proposing a coordinated schedule of state and
official visits for the next year. A visit by Gorton
would best fit into that tentative schedule on March 31.
I recommend that you invite Gorton for a private
visit (to include a working session and an informal
lunch or dinner), which in effect would restrict his
meeting with you to a single day. It would reduce to the
minimum the demand on your time. It would accommodate
Gorton's main purpose in wishing to talk quietly and
frankly with you at an early date, in advance of a
meeting scheduled for mid-May at which the Five Powers
(Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the
United Kingdom) will discuss security arrangements to
follow British military withdrawal from Southeast Asia.
It would leave open for your later decision the question
of which Asian leader would be the first to be invited
for a formal state or official visit.
wm
William P. Rogers
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
256
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 6, 1969
976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Visit by Prime Minister Gorton
RECOMMENDATION:
That you invite Prime Minister Gorton to make a
private visit to Washington on March 31.
Approve
Disapprove
DISCUSSION:
Henry Kissinger has informed me of a recent exchange
with Prime Minister Gorton on the timing of a visit to
Washington, and your preference for the earlier part of
the period which Gorton has suggested (March 30-April 12).
Within the next few days I will be sending you a
memorandum proposing a coordinated schedule of state and
official visits for the next year. A visit by Gorton
would best fit into that tentative schedule on March 31.
I recommend that you invite Gorton for a private
visit (to include a working session and an informal
lunch or dinner), which in effect would restrict his
meeting with you to a single day. It would reduce to the
minimum the demand on your time. It would accommodate
Gorton's main purpose in wishing to talk quietly and
frankly with you at an early date, in advance of a
meeting scheduled for mid-May at which the Five Powers
(Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the
United Kingdom) will discuss security arrangements to
follow British military withdrawal from Southeast Asia.
It would leave open for your later decision the question
of which Asian leader would be the first to be invited
for a formal state or official visit.
wom
William P. Rogers
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O.13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Hondeck
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
THE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Memorandum on Visit of Prime Minister
of Australia
Enclosed is a brief biographical memorandum on the
Prime Minister of Australia, who is to make a private
visit to Washington on March 31. The Australian
Government has agreed to a joint announcement of the
visit on February 11 at 5:00 P.M. EST.
Benjamin H. Road
Executive Secretary
Enclosure:
Biographical memorandim.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
311
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Visit of the Rt. Hon. John G. Gorton
Prime Minister of Austrelia
March 31, 1969
-- John Grey Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia.
Leader of the Liboral Party.
-- Born in September, 1911, in Melbourne, Australia.
Received MA degree from Oxford. Enlisted in Royal Australian
Air Force in 1940. Fighter pilot, seriously wounded in
action over Singapore in 1941.
-- Elected to the Federal Senate in 1949. Was Minister
of the Navy 1958-1963; Minister for Works and Mining and
Minister Assisting the Prime Minister in Education and
Research, 1963-1966; Minister for Education and Science,
1966-1968. Was appointed Prime Minister in January 1968,
succeeding Prime Minister Harold Holt, who drowned while
swimming near Melbourne December 17, 1967.
-- Prime Minister Gorton visited the United States in
1963 as Minister of the Navy, and paid an official visit
to Washington on May 27-28, 1968, nfter becoming Prime
Minister.
-- Prime Minister Gorton is an irrigation farmer and
orchardist, and still owns a citrus farm in the State of
Victoria. He has been married since 1935 to an American
citizen, the former Bettins Brown of Bangor, Maine, whom
he met while both were students in Europe. The couple has
two sons and a daughter. Mrs. Corton 18 a graduate of the
School of Oriental Studies at Australian National University,
and speaks Indonciian. She accompanied her husband to the
United States in 1968. We do not yet know whether she will
accompany him this time.
:
We have no record of any previous meeting between
the Prime Minister and the President.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL RELEASED
February 11, 1969
MEMO FOR RON ZIEGLER
Ru
FROM:
Richard M. Moose
We would like to have you announce at this afternoon's
briefing (embargoed for 5 PM) the visit of Prime Minister
Gorton of Australia, and suggest the following language:
"The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, Prime
Minister of Australia, has accepted the President's invitation
to make a visit to Washington on March 31, 1969. The visit
will provide an opportunity for discussions on matters of
interest to both Australia and to the United States. Prime
Minister Gorton last visited Washington on May 27-28, 1968. "
attached
Background information to follow.
CC: Mr. Sneider
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
file
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
note
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
February 10, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Prime Minister Gorton Visit
Prime Minister Gorton, after receiving the
President's invitation, expressed his pleasure and
accepted. He also asked Ambassador Crook that the
visit be announced on February 11 or 12. The State
Department has proposed the attached message authorizing
the announcement and setting forth the text of the announce-
ment.
I recommend that we concur in this telegram.
QV
Richard L. Sneider
LOK by Priss office
Haldemon decrause
pendy the
715 is pun
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
/- Smith 295
2.Rey Sualso
256
LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM
Hsg. No.
1. Sent by:
2. TO: White House 322
CATE
3. Transmitted by: Blill
It. Received by: WNSR
Date & Time:
Date & Time 1650
5. Description Tel to Canberra re Gorton visit
6, Classification & Controls: Confidential
7. No. of Pgs. 1
IMMEDIATE
B. Procedence
9. Validated
by
20. Deliver to: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
For: Clearance
X
The White House
Information
Att: Mr. Sneider
Per Request
Dis
5Pm Wash This is
8 Am Australia _oh for Canbava 1
2
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
295
chared
JTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
w/o change
ONLY
CATE Dource
(ARGE 10
SECRET
W/Havley 2/10/08 (S/S)
Classification
Sreiden1
7: 7:50pm FOR
Origin
ACTION:
Amembassy CANBERRA
IMMEDIATE
Runoose
for
SUBJECT: Announcement Gorton Visit
REF: CANBERRA 802
1. Suggested timing for simultaneous White House
announcement 5 P.M. EST Washington, Tuesday February 11.
Proposed text follows: "The Right Honorable John G. Gorton,
Prime Minister of Australia, has accepted the President's
invitation to make a private visit to Washington on March 31,
1969. The visit will provide an opportunity for discussions
on matters of interest to both Australia and to the United
States. Prime Minister Gorton last visited Washington on
May 27-28, 1968".
2, Please advise if timing and text are suitable.
Also
forward text of Australian announcement,
END
one) by:
is' 10.
Polographic transmittion and
WID
/P:RKilpatrick:bd 2/10/69
5360
classification approved by
EA - Winthrop G. Brown
EA/ANZ " Mr. Brower
WH
EA/P - Mr. Levine prt
P ? Mr. Stevenson
ALP
S/S -
SECRET
Classification
MDS.322
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
February 10, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Prime Minister Gorton Visit
Prime Minister Gorton, after receiving the
President's invitation, expressed his pleasure and
accepted. He also asked Ambassador Crook that the
visit be announced on February 11 or 12. The State
Department has proposed the attached message authorizing
the announcement and setting forth the text of the announce-
ment.
I recommend that we concur in this telegram.
QV.
Richard L. Sneider
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
February 1, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY ROGERS
SUBJECT:
Visit by Prime Minister Gorton
Prime Minister Gorton of Australia called the President on
Thursday morning (January 30), and in the President's absence
I spoke to him. Gorton said he was anxious to come to Washing-
ton to see the President, and suggested the period March 30-
April 12. I told him that the President was anxious to see him
and to establish the closest possible personal relationship. The
only question was to find mutually convenient dates. I also
mentioned that there may be some possible conflict between the
dates Gorton suggested and the April 10 NATO meeting.
When the President was informed of the call, he indicated that
he would like to see Gorton as close to the earlier date as possible.
He asked for your thoughts and recommendations, including how
it would fit in with other possible visits during the spring.
HK
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET
Dispatched 2/1/69 Rept no. 122
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
File
SECRET
February 1. 1969
EMORANDUN FOR SECRETARY ROGERS
SUBJECT:
Visit by Prime Minister Gorton
Prime Minister Gorton of Australia called the President on
Thursday morning (January 30), and in the President's absence
I spoke to him. Gorton said he was anxious to come to Washing-
ton to see the President, and suggested the period March 30-
April 12. I told him that the President was anxious to see him
and to establish the closest possible personal relationship. The
only question was to find mutually convenient dates. I also
mentioned that there may be some possible conflict between the
dates Gorton suggested and the April 10 NATO meeting.
When the President was informed of the call, he indicated that
he would like to see Gorton as close to the earlier date as possible.
He asked for your thoughts and recommendations, including how
it would fit in with other possible visits during the spring.
Heary A. Kissinger
sent
(cc: R. sneider (2/1/69)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Ed R
SECRET
March 15, 1969
(Material attached)
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD SNEIDER
FROM:
Al Haig
Henry was extremely grateful for this fine analysis
preparatory to the Gorton visit. He asked me to pen you a
personal note expressing his appreciation.
SECRET
(material attached)
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 13, 1969
SECRET
NAK-
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
has
secure
FROM:
Richard L. Sneider
or
SUBJECT: Visit of Australian Prime Minister
As you know, Prime Minister Gorton's visit is scheduled
for March 31-April 1. Preparations are in hand and appear to
pose no particular problem
It may be worthwhile to put down some observations
concerning the style and manner of our expected visitor, the
purposes which he hopes to serve by the visit and our own
interests in the visit.
Gorton the Man: For your purposes, these are probably
the salient aspects of Gorton's personality and approach:
- - He is tough, brusque and impatient of formalities.
-- As a fighter pilot in 1942, Gorton saw an Australian
division stranded in Singapore by the lack of effective
external support. His own experience probably makes
him unusually sensitive to the danger of Australia's
getting out on a limb in Southeast Asia.
-- He is prickly and sensitive, and does not like to be
taken for granted or pressured. He was annoyed with
our failure to consult more fully with Australia in
the policy decisions of March 31 and October 31 last
year; and he has complained that he was subjected to
pressure in Washington last year.
- -- - He is a strong Australian nationalist, has been at
least until recently suspicious of foreign commitments.
He seemed upon taking office to be toying with a
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2.
"fortress Australia" policy; and in one press conference
he said that he would not send any more Australians to
Vietnam. He must be shown the advantages of a
particular policy for Australia, rather than offered
broad generalities.
He is suspicious of intellectuals, of theorists and of
bureaucrats. He came to Washington without briefing
papers in 1968, and it is still uncertain whether he will
bring any professional defense or foreign affairs
advisers on this trip. He will probably not be interested
in detail or prepared to discuss issues in depth.
He came to office as a dark horse candidate without
international experience, and without intellectual
pretensions. He is particularly conscious of living in
the shadow of Menzies and Holt and now wishes to
establish himself as a leader in his own right and an
independent authority in foreign affairs.
Background - the February 25th Speech: Gorton's
February 25 commitment to keep land, naval and air forces
in Singapore/Malaysia after 1971 is a major development
integrally related to his forthcoming visit.
In the Australian internal context, his speech established
Prime Minister Gorton in the foreign policy field with a powerful
statement of the forward defense position. It flanked the
opposition, which finds itself in an election year in a weak straddle
on the basic issue of forward defense VS. "fortress Australia".
Having been made before rather than after the Washington visit,
the speech stands as an Australian policy rather than a response
to American pressure.
In the specific context of the visit, Gorton has made a major
decision for which we had been asking. He has done so although he
had been holding back because he did not want to get Australia
committed without a commitment from us. He has now made the
commitment without demanding any quid pro quo. He comes to
us as a man with "clean hands" asking the President to be equally
forthcoming.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
3.
Gorton has, probably consciously, helped to shape the
nature of our response by the specific character of his speech.
First, he himself indicated a preference for general understandings
rather than specific treaty commitments. Second, he pointed
very clearly to his expectation that the U.S. would come to
Australia's help if subversion from outside or some other threat
were too much for Australia to handle alone, but he went on to
say that "Australia's continued effort would in that case have to
be decided in the light of all the circumstances prevailing at that
time. 11 Gorton can hardly expect us to be more specific or
committed than he is, and by these remarks he has provided us
with the rationale for answering him with broad and non-specific
reassurances of our continuing commitment to Southeast Asia and
the importance we attach to ANZUS.
What Gorton will be Seeking: Above all, Groton will focus
on the area of reassurances concerning the U.S. role in Southeast
Asia. He will want to have something for public consumption to
reassure the Australian voters that his commitment to Malaysia/
Singapore has not overextended his country's defense resources.
He will particularly need some specific reference to ANZUS.
Gorton's second purpose is to develop a personal relationship
with the President which would be valuable in itself and which
would enhance Gorton's political position for the elections.
Gorton will wish to talk about other issues, particularly
the outlook for the Paris talks, and the situation in Vietnam,
trade problems, and the Cape Keraudren project.
The U.S. Interest: Our most fundamental interests vis-a-vis
Australia fit in closely with Gorton's February 25 statement and
with his interests in this trip. By his action in undertaking a responsibility
within the area, he has made it more feasible for the U.S. to maintain
a role in supporting security arrangements in Southeast Asia.
We should try --
1. To reassure him that we are prepared to maintain
U.S. commitments in Asia and that we view ANZUS as an important
element in these commitments.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
4.
2. To keep him in our confidence concerning the
Vietnam situation and the Paris negotiations.
3. To establish a personal relationship between the
President and Prime Minister Gorton.
There will of cour se be specific recommendations from
the Department of State concerning recommended U.S. positions
on all issues.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Ed
SECRET
March 15, 1969
(Material attached)
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD SNEIDER
FROM:
Al Haig
Henry was extremely grateful for this fine analysis
preparatory to the Gorton visit. He asked me to pen you a
personal note expressing his appreciation.
SECRET
(material attached)
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
2.
March 13, 1969
SECRET
AAR-
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
has seen
FROM:
Richard L. Sneider
EV
SUBJECT: Visit of Australian Prime Minister
As you know, Prime Minister Gorton's visit is scheduled
for March 31-April 1. Preparations are in hand and appear to
pose no particular problem
It may be worthwhile to put down some observations
concerning the style and manner of our expected visitor, the
purposes which he hopes to serve by the visit and our own
interests in the visit.
Gorton the Man: For your purposes, these are probably
the salient aspects of Gorton's personality and approach:
Februa-
He is tough, brusque and impatient of formalities.
in Singap
integrall As a fighter pilot in 1942, Gorton saw an Australian
division stranded in Singapore by the lack of effective
In external support. His own experience probably makes
Prime him unusually sensitive to the danger of Australia's
getting out on a limb in Southeast Asia.
on
the
He is prickly and sensitive, and does not like to be
Having
be taken for granted or pressured. He was annoyed with
the
our failure to consult more fully with Australia in
to
Amer the policy decisions of March 31 and October 31 last
year; and he has complained that he was subjected to
in pressure in Washington last year.
decision for
had
7
been- He is a strong Australian nationalist, has been at
committe
least until recently suspicious of foreign commitments.
commium
He seemed upon taking office to be toying with a
us
SECRET
S
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2.
"fortress Australia" policy; and in one press conference
he said that he would not send any more Australians to
Vietnam. He must be shown the advantages of a
particular policy for Australia, rather than offered
broad generalities.
He is suspicious of intellectuals, of theorists and of
bureaucrats. He came to Washington without briefing
papers in 1968, and it is still uncertain whether he will
bring any professional defense or foreign affairs
advisers on this trip. He will probably not be interested
in detail or prepared to discuss issues in depth.
He came to office as a dark horse candidate without
international experience, and without intellectual
pretensions. He is particularly conscious of living in
the shadow of Menzies and Holt and now wishes to
establish himself as a leader in his own right and an
independent authority in foreign affairs.
Background - the February 25th Speech: Gorton's
February 25 commitment to keep land, naval and air forces
in Singapore/Malaysia after 1971 is a major development
integrally related to his forthcoming visit.
In the Australian internal context, his speech established
Prime Minister Gorton in the foreign policy field with a powerful
statement of the forward defense position. It flanked the
opposition, which finds itself in an election year in a weak straddle
on the basic issue of forward defense vs. "fortress Australia".
Having been made before rather than after the Washington visit,
the speech stands as an Australian policy rather than a response
to American pressure.
In the specific context of the visit, Gorton has made a major
decision for which we had been asking. He has done so although he
had been holding back because he did not want to get Australia
committed without a commitment from us. He has now made the
commitment without demanding any quid pro quo. He comes to
us as a man with "clean hands" asking the President to be equally
forthcoming.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
3.
Gorton has, probably consciously, helped to shape the
nature of our response by the specific character of his speech.
First, he himself indicated a preference for general understandings
rather than specific treaty commitments. Second, he pointed
very clearly to his expectation that the U.S. would come to
Australia's help if subversion from outside or some other threat
were too much for Australia to handle alone, but he went on to
say that "Australia's continued effort would in that case have to
be decided in the light of all the circumstances prevailing at that
time. " Gorton can hardly expect us to be more specific or
committed than he is, and by these remarks he has provided us
with the rationale for answering him with broad and non-specific
reassurances of our continuing commitment to Southeast Asia and
the importance we attach to ANZUS.
What Gorton will be Seeking: Above all, Groton will focus
on the area of reassurances concerning the U.S. role in Southeast
Asia. He will want to have something for public consumption to
reassure the Australian voters that his commitment to Malaysia/
Singapore has not overextended his country's defense resources.
He will particularly need some specific reference to ANZUS.
Gorton's second purpose is to develop a personal relationship
with the President which would be valuable in itself and which
would enhance Gorton's political position for the elections.
Gorton will wish to talk about other issues, particularly
the outlook for the Paris talks, and the situation in Vietnam,
trade problems, and the Cape Keraudren project.
The U.S. Interest: Our most fundamental interests vis-a-vis
Australia fit in closely with Gorton's February 25 statement and
with his interests in this trip. By his action in undertaking a responsibility
within the area, he has made it more feasible for the U.S. to maintain
a role in supporting security arrangements in Southeast Asia.
We should try
1. To reassure him that we are prepared to maintain
U.S. commitments in Asia and that we view ANZUS as an important
element in these commitments.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
4.
2. To keep him in our confidence concerning the
Vietnam situation and the Paris negotiations.
3. To establish a personal relationship between the
President and Prime Minister Gorton.
There will of cour se be specific recommendations from
the Department of State concerning recommended U.S. positions
on all issues.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED 306
PAGE 01 CANBER 00967 140855Z
17
ACTION EA 15
INFO EUR CIAE 00,DODE 00,JPM 04,H 02, INR 07,L NSAE 00, NSC 10,
P 04,RSC 01.SP 02,SS PO,USIA 12,AID 28,SAH 02,E 15,ACDA 16,10 13,
RSR 01,/170 W
127317
R 1407362 FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3450
INFO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
Honder
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
CINCPAC
UNCLAS CANBERRA 967
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
SUBJ: PRESS REACTION TO PM GORTON'S FORTHCOMING
WASHINGTON VISIT
1. ANNOUNCEMENT FORTHCOMING GORTON VISIT TO WASHINGTON
HAS RECEIVED MODERATE NEWSPLAY AND TOUCHED OFF
SEVERAL EDITORIALS. STRAIGHT REPORTAGE HAS GIVEN HEAVY
EMPHASIS FACT GORTON WILL BE FIRST HEAD OF GOVERNMENT
VISIT WASHINGTON SINCE INAUGURATION. SEVERAL NEWSPAPERS
SPECULATE THIS INDICATIVE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"
WHICH EXISTED BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND US UNDER
PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE.
2 . IN TERMS PURPOSE VISIT, ALL REPORTAGE UNDERLINES
VISIT WILL BE "WORKING" RATHER THAT OF PROTOCOL NATURE,
AND GORTON'S PRIMARY PURPOSE WILL BE ASCERTAIN "WHAT
HELP AUSTRALIA COULD EXPECT FROM AMERICA IF AUSTRALIAN
FORCES REMAIN IN MALAYSIA . AND SINGAPORE AFTER 1971,
AND IF THESE FORCES ARE ATTACKED." OTHER MAJOR DIS-
CUSSION ITEMS ANTICIPATED BY PRESS ARE US ROLE IN GENERAL
UNCLASSIFIED
4
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
ORLINO
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 CANBER 00967 140855Z
ASIA, PARTICULARLY POST-VIETNAM: CONDUCT
VIETNAM WAR AND LIKELY OUTCOME PARIS TALKS: AND Us
AND AUSTRALIAN ROLE IN VIETNAM FOLLOWING ANY PEACE
SETTLEMENT. SOME NEWSPAPERS STATE HE WILL ALSO TOUCH,
AT LEAST BRIEFLY, ON NPT, TRADE ISSUES, INVESTMENT
IN AUSTRALIA, AND US DEFENSE PROCUREMENT IN AUSTRALIA
3° ALL STORIES NOTE GORTON MUST HAVE AT LEAST SOME
IDEA OF NATURE POSSIBLE US BACKING FOR AUSTRALIAN
FORCES IN MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE PRIOR FORTHCOMING CANBERRA
FIVE-POWER TALKS, BUT SOME ADD IT IS PROBABLY
TOO EARLY FOR NEW ADMINISTRATION INDICATE MORE THAN
"TREND OF THINKING" RE FUTURE US ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
4 º EDITORIAL COVERAGE THUS FAR RATHER LIMITED.
EDITORIALS THAT HAVE APPEARED ARE CONSISTENT IN NOTING
NOT TOO MUCH CAN BE EXPECTED AT THIS TIME IN WAY OF
FIRM COMMITMENTS BY WASHINGTON. FOLLOWING ARE KEY
EXCERPTS FROM MAJOR EDITORIALS.
5. MELBOURNE AGE, FEB 13: "TIMING COULD NOT HAVE
BEEN BETTER VISIT MAY HELP RESTORE SPECIAL RELATION-
SHIP WHICH EXISTED WITH MIGHTY 1 ALLY DURING JOHNSON-
HOLT HONEYMOON. IT WILL ALSO DRAW PUBLIC ATTENTION
AWAY FROM CERTAIN SIGNS VACILLATION IN OUR FOREIGN
POLICIES AND CERTAIN DUBIOUS MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS...
GORTON HAS TO FIND OUT NEW PRESIDENT'S REAL THINKING
ON PARIS PEACE TALKS, FORTHCOMING MEETINGS OF SEATO
AND VIETNAM ALLIES AND, ABOVE ALL, FIVE-POWER TALKS
ON DEFENSE MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE. HOW FAR WILL US GO
IN STRETCHING ANZUS PACT TO COVER SOUTHEAST ASIA?...
ONE CANNOT EXPECT FIRM DECISIONS TO FRERGE FROM BRIEF
AND INFORMAL TALKS BUT, IF SOME GENERAL OUTLINES OF
AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED THESE CAN BE HANDED OVER
TO NORMAL CHANNELS OF DIPLOMACY. PRIME MINISTER'S
RECENT FORM SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR IN WASHINGTON THAT
HE WILL NOT BE PARADING LIKE A WELL-GROOMED BUTLER
TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS."
6. THE AUSTRALIAN, FEB 13: "SOME BLUNT TALKING FROM
OUR SIDE IS OVERDUE FOR HEALTHY CONTINUANCE AUSTRALIAN=
AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP AND THERE ARE GOOD GROUNDS
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 CANBER 00967 140855Z
FOR BELIEVING MR. NIXON FEELS SAME FROM HIS SIDE...
SECURITY ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE ENTIRE PREOCCUPATION
OF WASHINGTON TALKS. SEVERAL CURRENT ISSUES IN TRADE,
DEFENSE BUYING AND GENERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS
ARE VITAL TO FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES..
AUSTRALIA CAN HARDLY EXPECT THAT MESSAGE ON
REGIONAL SECURITY WILL BE ANYTHING BUT TOUGH ONE...
WHATEVER HAPPENS AT WASHINGTON TALKS, AUSTRALIA CANNOT
EXPECT SERIES OF CLEARCUT SIGNPOSTS INTO FUTURE.
MR. GORTON'S FIRST MEETING WITH AMERICAN PRESIDENT
IS, HOWEVER, OPPORTUNITY ESTABLISH NEW PHASE IN THE
ALLIANCE, NOT BASED ON MYSTIQUE OF PERSONALITIES, BUT
ON PRACTICALITIES PARTNERSHIP AND MUTUAL RESPONSIBILI-
ITIES."
7. SYDNEY DAILY TELEGRAPH, FEB 14: AFTER NOTING
GORTON WILL BE FIRST
HEAD OF GOVERNMENT VISIT WASHINGTON
UNDER NEW ADMINISTRATION. TELEGRAPH EDITORIALIZED:
"THIS MAY OR MAY NOT BE 'GREAT COUP', BUT IT CERTAINLY
IS A POINTER TO IMPORTANCE WHICH BOTH LEADERS ATTACH
TO PROBLEMS - OF PACIFIC ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE TOO MUCH
TO EXPECT PRESIDENT GIVE HARD AND FAST DECISIONS ON
SPECIFIC SITUATION, MR. GORTON SHOULD AT LEAST BE ABLE
GAIN SOME INSIGHT INTO TREND OF HIS THINKING."
80 SYDNEY SUN, FEB 13: "WE CANNOT EXPECT MR. GORTON
TO COME HOME FROM WASHINGTON WITH THE ANZUS TREATY
REINFORCED BY PRESIDENT NIXON'S PERSONAL PLEDGE NEVER
TO ABANDON US. THE "ALL THE WAY COMMITTAL WENT OUT
WITH LBJ (BUT) AUSTRALIA DARE NOT BARK IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA WITHOUT THE CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE THAT THE US WILL
BITE IF NEED BE." CRONK
UNCLASSIFIED
4
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
ORITING STATES OF AMOUNT
TELEGRAM
SECRET 998
PAGE 01 CANBER 01391 110313Z
02
85
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
011181
R 1102202 MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3526
SECRET CANBERRA 1391
EXDIS
SUBU: GORTON VISIT: DISCUSSIONS ONI SEA DEFENSE
REF : STATE 32568: CANBERRA 1351
1. EMBASSY CONCURS IN DEPT. VIEW THAT COMMITMENT
GORTON HAS ALREADY MADE IN HIS DEFENSE POLICY
STATEMENT TO KEEP AUSTRALIAN FORCES, INCLUDING
GROUND FORCES, IN MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE AFTER 1971
HAS ALTERED SITUATION. IF GORTON'S STATEMENT HAD
LIMITED AUSTRALIAN POST-1971 COMMITMENT TO AIR AND
NAVAL FORCES AND HAD LEFT QUESTION OF GROUND FORCES
UP TO "IMPONDERABLES" TO BE WEIGHED SUBSEQUENTLY,
HE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN POSITION TO ASK FOR SPECIFIC
COMMITMENT FROM PRESIDENT NIXON AS QUID PRO QUO
FOR COMMITTING AUSTRALIAN GROUND FORCES AFTER 1971.
IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES HE MIGHT HAVE ASKED FOR OR
INSISTED ON SOMETHING LIKE KENNEDY.BARWICK UNDERSTANDING.
BUT WE ASSUME HE DECIDED THAT TIME AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WERE NOT RIGHT FOR US TO GIVE SUCH
AN UNDERSTANDING AND HENCE WENT AHEAD ON HIS OWN
EXCESS
IN ORDER TO END DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CRITICISM OF
HIS DEFENSE POLICY OR LACK THEREOF. HE MAY ALSO
HAVE REASONED THAT THIS INITIATIVE WOULD IMPROVE
HIS STANDING IN WASHINGTON. IN ANY CASE, GORTON
PROBABLY REALIZES THAT HIS GENERALI (ALL OPTIONS
OPEN) STATEMENT IS UNLIKELY TO ELICIT MORE THAN A
GENERAL RESPONSE FROM US EVEN THOUGH HEWITT HAS
INTIMATED THAT GORTON WILL INQUIRE WHAT US POSITION
WILL BE IN EVENT SERIOUS EMERGENCY TCANBERRA 1351).
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
EXCE
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
of
SECRET
PAGE 02 CANBER 01391 110313Z
WE DO NOT THINK THAT GORTON WILL BE GENUINELY
SATISFIED WITH US ASSURANCES WHICH GO NO FURTHER
THAN THOSE IN BERGER LETTER TO WALLER BUT WE DO
NOT EXPECT HIM AT THIS JUNCTURE TO ASK FOR OR
EXPECT ANYTHING MORE SPECIFIC. EMBASSY BELIEVES
FORMULATION OF GENERALI ASSURANCES SUGGESTED IN
PARA 2 REFTEL APPROPRIATE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES.
WE BELIEVE, IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, PRESIDENT
SHOULD NOT OFFER MORE, EVEN IF GORTON, CONTRARY TO
OUR EXPECTATIONS. SHOULD ASK FOR IT.
2. CONVERSATIONS IN LAST FEW DAYS WITH BOOKER OF
EXTAFF AND GRIFFITH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN PM'S
DEPT., TEND CONFIRM FOREGOING ANALYSIS. BOOKER
OBSERVED THAT ALTHOUGH EXTAFF WAS PREPARING BRIEFING
PAPERS IT WOULD NOT KNOW FOR SURE WHAT GORTON WOULD
SAY. NEVERTHELESS, HIS OPINION IS THAT SINCE GORTON
HAS ALREADY COMMITTED HIMSELF TO POLICY OF REGIONAL
COOPERATION AND FORWARD DEFENSE, HE PROBABLY WOULD
NOT ASK FOR ANYTHING SPECIFIC FROM! US IN TERMS OF
NEW UNDERTAKINGS IN RELATION TO MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE
DEFENSE. HOWEVER IT WOULD BE MOST BENEFICIAL,
BOOKER SAID, IF PRESIDENT WOULD REASSURE GORTON OF
CONTINUING (POST VIETNAM) AMERICAN INTEREST IN
SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AND SEA.
WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO SEATO AND
ANZUS COULD BE UNDERLINED
3. GRIFFITH, IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION, LARGELY
CONFIRMED BOOKER'S VIEWS. WHILE GORTON HAD ALREADY
MADE AUSTRALIANC OMMITMENT TO CONTINUE TO ASSIST IN
DEFENSE OF MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE, GRIFFITH SAID THERE
IS CERTAIN NERVOUSNESS AMONG AUSTRALIANS ABOUT
EXCES
POSSIBLE US WITHDRAWAL FROM ASIA AFTER VIETNAM.
SOME PUBLIC INDICATION BY PRESIDENT OF CONTINUING
US INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN AREA--HOPEFULLY
HIGHLIGHTED IN COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL.
GRIFFITH ALSO REFLECTED CONCERN OVER GROWING SOVIET
PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN WHICH HE SAID GOA HOPES
CAN BE COUNTER-BALANCED BY PERIODIC VISITS IN
INDIAN OCEAN OF US NAVAL VESSELS WHILE HE SAID
THIS NEED NOT BE REFERRED TO PUBLICLY, PRIVATE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUC W OUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMOUNT
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 CANBER 01391 110313Z
EXCE EXEMS
ASSURANCE TO GORTON OF OUR INTEREST IN INDIAN OCEAN
WOULDI BE USEFULI.
4. EMBASSY BELIEVES IT ESSENTIAL FOR US -AUSTRALIAN
RELATIONS THAT COMMUNIQUE REAFFIRM US INTEREST IN
AND COMMITMENTS: REGARDING SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. CONCUR WITH DEPARTMENT
THAT REAFFIRMATION CAN BE PHRASED SO AS TO AVOID
APPEARANCE OF ASSUMPTION BY US OF ADDITIONAL BURDENS.
5. FROM ALL APPEARANCES, GORTON, HEWITT AND OTHERS
CONCERNED ARE QUITE RELAXED ABOUT VISIT AND SEEM TO
ANTICIPATE FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS ON WIDE RANGE OF
SUBJECTS RATHERI THAN ANY HARD BARGAINING ON SPECIFIC
PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, GORTON BY STYLE AND TEMPERAMENT
IS UNPREDICTABLE AND HE MAY PULLI A FEW SURPRISES
INCLUDING A HARD LINE ON ABOVE SUBJECT. IT'S OUR
BEST JUDGMENT THAT HE WON'T, BUT WITH GORTON WE CAN
NEVER BE SURE OF ANYTHING. CROOK
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT UNITED STATES OF OF STATE AMOUNT
It
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET 807
PAGE 01 CANBER 00871 1122202
88
ACTION EA 15
INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00,CPR 02, JPM 04,H 02, NSC 10.0 02,0PR 02,
P 04, RSC 01.55 20, SY 04,RSR 01/067 W
109977
0 112215Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3434
SECRE T CANBERRA 871
SUBJ: GORTON VISIT
REF: STATE 021663
YOUR REVISED TEXT AGREEABLE. PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
PROCEEDING WITH ANNOUNCEMENT HERE. ASSUME YOU ARE
PROCEEDING THERE. CROOK
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
H
DEPARTMENT 'F
STATE
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 770
PAGE 01 CANBER 00869 112149Z
85
ACTION EA 15
INFO SSO 00,CCO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00,CPR 02,JPM 04.H 02,NSC 10.0 02,
OPR 02,P 04.RSC 01,SS 20,SY 04,RSR 01,1067 W
109800
0 1121382 FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3433
SECR E T CANBERRA 869
SUBJ: ANNOUNCEMENT GORTON VISIT
REF: CANBERRA 868
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT IS NOT AT THIS TIME
PLANNING ISSUE STATEMENT AT 8 A.M. HERE (5P.M. FEB 11
WASHINGTON), BUT WILL WAIT FOR FURTHER COORDINATION
OF TEXT AND TIMING.
CROOK
[
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 832
PAGE 01 CANBER 00868 111027Z
HOUDER
21
ACTION EA 15
INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00,USIE 00,CPR 02, JPM 04,H 02.NSC 10.0 02,OPR 02,
P 04,RSC 01.SS 20,SY 04,CCO 00,RSR 01,/067 W
106270
0 111000Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3432
S ECR E T CANBERRA 868
SUBJ: ANNOUNCEMENT GORTON VISIT
REF: STATE 021585
1. PROPOSED TEXT FOR SIMULTANEOUS WHITE HOUSE
ANNOUNCEMENT STATES GORTON HAS ACCEPTED PRESIDENT'S INVITATION
MAKE "A PRIVATE VISIT" TO WASHINGTON. PRIME MINISTER'S DEPART-
MENT (SECY HEWITT) INFORMS EMBASSY THAT "PRIVATE VISIT" HAS
SPECIFIC CONNOTATION IN AUSTRALIAN USAGE WHICH WOULD CARRY
UNDESTRABLE CONNOTATION. WOULD PREFER "AN OFFICIAL VISIT." OR
IF THAT PRESENTS DIFFICULTIES, "A VISIT."
2. IF EITHER OF THESE ALTERNATIVE WORDINGS ACCEPTABLE TO
WHITE HOUSE, TIMING SUITABLE FOR PRIME MINISTER.
3. TEXT OF AUSTRALIAN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE IDENTICAL WITH
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT IF EITHER OF ALTERNATIVE
WORDINGS "OFFICIAL VISIT" OR "VISIT" ACCEPTABLE WHITE HOUSE.
CROOK
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Houdek
DEPARTMENT P STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMOUNT
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 940
PAGE 01 CANBER 00810 100142Z
82
3
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
098328
R 100130Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3417
CONFIDENT I A L! CANBERRA 80
EXDIS
S
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR
SUBJ: GORTON VISIT
1. HEWITT CALLED ME LAST NIGHT TO SAY IT VERY IMPORTANT
TO GORTON POLITICALLY THAT HE BE INVITED STAY AT
BLAIR HOUSE, EVEN THOUGH THIS PRIVATE VISIT, SINCE
AUSTRALIANS WOULD OTHERWISE DRAW UNFAVORABLE COMPARISON
WITH HIS PREVIOUS VISIT. ASSUME HE WOULD STAY BLAIR
HOUSE IN ANY EVENT, THOUGH I DID NOT TELL HEWITT
SO. TOLD HEWITT I WOULD CONVEY HIS COMMENTS.
2. IF EXCHANGE GIFTS TO BE MADE, MIGHT KEEP IN MIND
GORTON A CIVIL WAR CONFEDERATE BUFF.
S
3. SORRY TO BOTHER YOU WITH SUCH TRIVIA.
GP = 3. CROOK
S
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
UNITED DIPARTMENT STATES OF OF STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
Handreds
CONFIDENTIAL 060
PAGE 01 CANBER 00726 0500132
83
ACTION EA 15
INFO CPR 02, JPM 04,H 02,NSC 10,0 02,OPR 02,P 04,RSC 01,SS 20,SY 03,
USIA 12,RSR 01,1078 W
068430
R 0500052 FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3398
CONFIDENTIAL CANBERRA 726
FOR BUNDY FROM CROOK
REF: STATE 292079, DEC 24, 68
LOCAL PRESS HAS REPORTED THAT PRIME MINISTER GORTON
INTENDS TO VISIT WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA DURING FIRST
TWO WEEKS OF APRIL WHICH COINCIDES: WITH PARLIAMENTARY
EASTER RECESS. REPORTS SAY PRESIDENT NIXON IS
REPORTED TO HAVE AGREED TO SEE GORTON ALTHOUGH NO
ANNOUNCEMENT HAS YET BEEN MADE ON DATE OF MEETING.
NO SOURCE GIVEN FOR THESE REPORTS AND MAY BE MERELY
PRESS: SPECULATION. WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER
THERE HAS BEEN ANYTHING FURTHER ON POSSIBILITY OF
VISIT SINCE RECEIPT REFTEL. CROOK
CONFIDENTIAL 45
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT > STATE
epartment of Stare
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SUMMARY
Houdek
SECRET 838
PAGE 01 CANBER 00802 0905082
[8
ACTION EA 15
INFO CPR 02, JPM 04,H 02,NSC 10,0 02,0PR 02,P 04,RSC 01,SS 20,SY 04,
USIA 12,RSR 01,1079 W
096342
P 090450Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3416
S E C R E T CANBERRA 802
SUBJ: GORTON VISIT
REF: STATE 020598
1. DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO GORTON DURING COURSE
OF SOCIAL VISIT MRS. CROOK AND I WERE PAYING AT LODGE LATE
SATURDAY AFTERNOON. GORTON WAS VERY PLEASED AND ACCEPTED
DATE PROPOSED REFTEL. HE EXPRESSED HOPE VISIT COULD BE
ANNOUNCED TUESDAY ELEVENTH OR WEDNESDAY TWELFTH CANBERRA
TIEM. WAS PLEASED PROTOCOL WOULD BE KEPT MINIMUM AND
HOPED THERE WOULD BE "NO FIRING OF GUNS AND ALL THAT."
THE ONE DAY WITH PRESIDENT WOULD SUFFICE HIM BUT HE
HOPED SPEND TOTAL OF 3 - 4 DAYS "IN AMERICA" (PRESUMABLY
IN WASHINGTON) DURING WHICH HE WOULD DESIRE MEET WITH
SECSTATE, SECDEF, SEC COMMERCE AND OTHER. I TOLD HIM
THESE DETAILS COULD BE DISCUSSED WHEN WE GOT INTO
ACTUAL PROGRAMMING.
2. GORTON REITERATED WHAT HEWITT HAD TOLD ME NIGHT BEFORE
THAT HE WANTED TO OBTAIN ASSURANCE FROM UNITED STATES THAT
IT WOULD BACK AUSTRALIA UP IF HER TROOPS GOT INTO TROUBLE
IN MALAYSIA DEFENDING IT AGAINS ATTACK FROM NORTH--
RED CHINA OR NORTH VIETNAM. HE FLATLY STATED
THAT IF SOMETHING SHOULD GO WRONG IN THAILAND HE
WOULD COMMIT TROOPS TO FIGHT WITH US TO HELP THAIS.
FYI WHILE AUSTRALIA IS COMMITTED UNDER SEATO TO DO AT
LEAST SOMETHING ON THAILAND'S BEHALF, THIS IS THE FIRST
TIME I HAVE HEARD AN EXPLICIT PROMISE OF THIS SORT IN
CANBERRA. IT SEEMED TO ME TO BE BOTH AN INDICATION OF
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
the
STATE
Department of State
of STATES and AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 CANBER 00802 0905082
SOLIDARITY WITH US AND IMPLIED SUGGESTION THAT WE
SHOULD BE WILLING TO DO THE SAME FOR THE AUSTRALIANS IN
MALAYSIA. END FYI.
3. GORTON REFERRED To HIS LAST VISIT TO WASHINGTON, AND
IN PARTICULAR TO ASSISTANT SECSTATE BUNDY--
"A TOUGH NEGOTIATOR WHO PRESSED MEI TOO HARD LAST TIME."
HE WONDERED IF BUNDY WOULD STILL BE OCCUPYING THAT POSITION.
4. GORTON WAS VERY CHARMING, BUT IT IS A CHARM WHICH HE
TURNS OFF QUITE EASILY. HE SEEMED TO FEEL POLITICAL NEED
TO GET SOMETHING OUT OF WASHINGTON IN NEAR FUTURE.
5. GORTON ALSO REFERRED TO DISCUSSION I HAD WITH HEWITT
PREVIOUS EVENING ABOUT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN AUSTRALIA. HE AGREED WITH ME THAT CLARIFICATION WAS
IN ORDER TO REASSURE AMERICAN INVESTORS THAT THEY ARE STILL
WANTED HERE AND THAT GROUNDRULES ARE NOT GOING TO BE
CAPRICIOUSLY CHANGED. APPARENTLY HE PLANS TO
MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT SOON TO ACCOMPLISH PURPOSE.
CROOK
08/10/0150
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
02
SECRET 251
PAGE 01 STATE 032568
44
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO 1030 R
DRAFTED BY: EA/ANZ: RWMOORE
APPROVED BY: EA - G. MCMURTRIE GODLEY
S/S 8 MR BRANDT
EXQIN EXCELS
EA/RA MR DONALD
66610
097240
R 031923Z MAR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
S E C R E T STATE 032568
EXDIS:
SUBJECT: GORTON VISIT
i. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PRESENT ESTIMATE OF WHAT SPECIFICALLY
GORTON WILL SEEK FROM PRESIDENT IN WAY OF SECURITY ASSURANCES.
PRIOR TO DEFENSE POLICY STATEMENT, GORTON AND HEWITT INDICATED
THAT PM'S EXCLUSIVE PREOCCUPATION WAS TO OBTAIN The PROMISE OF U. S.
SUPPORT FOR AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE IN EVENT OF
ITTACK BY COMMUNIST CHINA OR NORTH VIET-NAM ICANBERRA 801 AND
8021. WE WONDER WHETHER GORTON STILL LIKELY APPROACH US WITH THIS
BLUNT, NARROW QUESTION, HOWEVER SINCE DEFENSE POLICY STATEMENT
PPEARS TO HAVE MODIFIED SITUATION IN THAT GORTON HAS ON OWN
INITIATIVE COMMITTED AUSTRALIAN FORCES TO REMAIN IN MALAYSIA/
SINGAPORE FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD AFTER 1971. THUS HE IS NOT COMING
+o WASHINGTON (AS IT APPEARED EARLIER HE INTENDED DO) TO EXACT
U. S. GUARANTEE OF SUPPORT AS PRICE WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY TO
ACHIEVE OUR DESIRED OBUECTIVE OF AUSTRALIAN PRESENCE (INCLUDING
GROUND FORCES IN MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE.
" WITH CIRCUMSTANCES THUS CHANGED, MAY GORTON'S APPROACH TO
PRESIDENT NOT CHANGE ALSO WHEN IT APPEARED HE SOUGHT OUR
UPPORT BEFORE COMMITTING AUSTRALIAN FORCES TO MALAYSIA/
SINGAPORE, WE TENDED ASSUME HE MIGHT WELL BE SATISFIED WITH
NOTHING LESS THAN NEW, EXPLICIT UNDERSTANDING UNDER ANZUS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed SECRET pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
25
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE Ø32568
REATY ALONG LINES OF KENNEDY-BARWICK UNDERSTANDING. IT WOULD BE
EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE GIVE GORTON SUCH
INDERSTANDING (WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED AS NEW OR EXTENDED
-OMMITMENT IN PRESENT PERIOD OF REVIEW OF U. S. COMMITMENTS.
HEREFORE, WE WOULD HOPE BE ABLE SATISFY GORTON WITH MORE
GENERAL ASSURANCES OF CONTINUED (A) U. S.
CONCERN WITH OVERALL SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (SPECIFICALLY
RECOGNIZING RELEVANCE THERETO OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURITY
oF MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE AS WE DID NIN BERGER-WALLER LETTER) AND
(B) ADHERENCE TO EXISTING U. S. COMMITMENTS (INCLUDING ANZUSI
EXPIS EXCLUS EXPIS
IN THAT AREA. THAT SUCH POSTURE ON
OUR PART WOULD BE REASONABLE RESPONSE TO GORTON AND WOULD MEET
HIS EXPECTATIONS IS SUGGESTED BY TACK HE TOOK IN DEFENSE
POLICY STATEMENT INDICATING GOA PREFERENCE FOR GENERAL UNDER-
TANDINGS OVER SPECIFIC TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND RESERVING GOA
OPTION TO RE-EXAMINE ROLE IN MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE IF FACED
WITH THREAT BEYOND ITS ABILITY TO HANDLE. REQUEST EMBASSY'S
COMMENTS.
3. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTE CANBERRA 967, CITING WIDESPREAD
EDITORIAL OPINION THAT GORTON COULD EXPECT TO GET, THIS EARLY IN
NEW ADMINISTRATION, NOT FIRM COMMITMENTS BUT ONLY GENERAL
TREND OF U. S. THINKING RE ITS FUTURE ROLE IN SEA. TO WHAT EXTENT
MAY THIS BE GORTON'S OWN BELIEF, DESPITE HIS AVOWED INTENTION
[CANBERRA 801 AND 8021 TO PRESS PRESIDENT FOR EXPLICIT
ISSURANCES?
1. WOULD APPRECIATE ALSO EMBASSY COMMENT ON WHAT GORTON MAY
WANT OR NEED TO SAY PUBLICLY, IN COMMUNIQUE OR AFTER RETURNING
HOME REGARDING COMMENTS BY OR ASSURANCES RECEIVED FROM
BRESIDENT WITH RESPECT TO SEA SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. WE HOPE
BE ABLE TREAT SUBJECT IN WAY WHICH WILL MINIMIZE CONCERN
HERE THAT U. S. ASSUMING OR SEEMING ASSUME NEW COMMITMENTS.
ROGERS
EEO/10/0160
SECRET
Reproduced a
E.O.
13526 and
THE WHITE HOUSE
HAK
THE WHITE House
WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON
Junz
AUSTRALIA: Prime Minister Gorton
may visit Washington during a
Dr.K.
parliamentary recess 30 March to
12 April. Amb Crook believes that
stall advised of
this will be an extremely important
your comesn m date
visit--Gorton will attempt to
resolve sensitive problems of major
importance to Australia. The three
major areas are US backup of forces
or uturn with analysis
committed to Singapore/Malaysia;
How-no
Haig
,
post-Vietnam policy; Pres. and trade re-
strictions.
TO: R. Allen
F. Bergsten
F. Chapin
D. Davidson
L. Eagleburger
M. Halperin
A. Haig
S. Keeny
R. Houdek
W. Lemnitzer
A. McCafferty
L. Lynn
L. Moock
R. Morris
H. Saunders
A. Caubet
R. Sneider
File
H. Sonnenfeldt
V. Vaky
note for unit
file
FROM: R. Moose
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 087
PAGE 01 CANBER 00383 200415Z
85
ACTION EA 15
INFO SAH 02,SAL 01,CPR 02,GPM 04.H 02,NSC 10,0 02,OPR 02,P 04, RSC 01,
SS 20.SY 03, USIA 12. CIAE 00,INR 07, NSA 02,DODE 00,RSR 01,1090 W
108327
R 2004002 JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3344
C ONFIDENTIAL CANBERRA 0383
REF: STATE 292779
i. AS INDICATED REFTEL, PRIME MINISTER GORTON IS
-
INTERESTED IN VISITING WASHINGTON AT EARLY DATE,
AND I THINK IT LIKELY HE WILL PURSUE SUGGESTION OF
VISIT DURING PERIOD MARCH 30-APRIL 12 WHICH COINCIDES
WITH PARLIAMENTARY RECESS. I BELIEVE THIS WILL BE
AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT VISIT WITH GORTON SEEKING NOT
ONLY TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT
NIXON AND OTHER SENIOR US OFFICIALS BUT ALSO TRYING
TO RESOLVE SEVERAL SENSITIVE PROBLEMS OF MAJOR
IMPORTANCE TO AUSTRALIA. US COMMITMENT TO BACKUP
AUSTRALIAN FORCES COMMITTED TO SINGAPORE/MALAYSIA:
US POST-VIETNAM POLICY IN SEA: AND US QUOTA AND OTHER
TRADE RESTRICTIONS ARE THREE OF MOST DIFFICULT QUES-
TIONS WHICH GORTON UNDOUBTEDLY WILL HAVE ON HIS AGENDA.
2. IN ANTICIPATION OF GORTON'S VISIT, I AM HAVING EM-
BASSY PREPARE FOR DEPT'S REVIEW BACKGROUND PAPERS AND
SUGGESTED POLICY POSITIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES CONFRONTING
TWO COUNTRIES. I SHALL PLAN TO GET THESE PAPERS To
DEPT IN DRAFT FORM BY MID-FEBRUARY TO PERMIT DEPT
EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH EMBASSY ON THEM IF DESIRED BEFORE
DEPT PUTS ITS PAPERS IN FINAL FORM. CROOK
CONFIDENTIAL
6
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
1014
departm
OF state
1.Smirter
2.
Ref.
Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL
a
sis class 3/15
RVY Place clear
March 14, 1969
or
Orland
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.
John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary
Enclosure:
Telegram to Canberra re Gorton visit
and ald.sls
given
CONF IDENTIAL
on Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determi
TELECO UNICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISIO'
WORK COPY
1014
CONFIDENTIAL
Amembassy CANBERRA
RECEPTION CENTER HONOLULU
INFO: CINCPAC
STATE
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
SUBJECT: Gorton Visit
1. Dept making authoritative arrangements for Gorton's program
through Australian Embassy Washington, but for your information
there follow major elements in schedule as it now stands:
a. March 29
(1) Party picked up at San Francisco at 6:15 p.m. and
transported to Langley Air Force Base, Virginia by USAF aircraft.
(2) Drive to Williamsburg for private visit until
March 31.
b. March 31
(1) Afternoon: Fly from Williamsburg to Washington
by USMC helicopter. (Party will stay at Blair House throughout
visit to Washington.)
(2) 8:00 p.m. Black tie dinner given by Amb. and
Lady Waller.
EA/ANZ: RWMoore:rlw 3/14/69 2996
EA - Winthrop G. Brown
EA/P - Mr. Kilpatrick
S/CPR - Mr. King
S/S -
as
White House -
CONFIDENTIAL
Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other
FORM
Reproduced at DS-322 the Nixon Library. DEClaSSIFIED Ebjsi dodument haslibeen determined to be declassified.
TELECO IUNICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISIO
WORK COPY
CONFIDENTIAL
Amembassy CANBERRA
page 2
c. April 1
(1) 10:30 a.m. Arrival ceremony (informal) at White
House, followed by meeting with President.
(2) 1:00 p.m. Lunch given by Mrs. Rogers in honor
of Mrs. Gorton. (PM will lunch privately.)
(3) 2:30 p.m. Meeting with Secretary of State.
(4) 4:00 p.m. Meeting with Secretary of Defense.
(5) 8:00 p.m. White tie dinner at White House
d. April 2
(1) 10:00 a.m. Farewell call on President.
(2) 11:30 a.m. Courtesy call on Vice President.
(3) 1:00 p.m. Lunch given by Secretary Rogers in
honor of PM (tentative, not finally approved).
(4) 3:30 p.m. Meeting with Secretary of Treasury.
(5) 4:30 p.m. Departure for Ottawa by Canadian
Government airceft.
CONFIDENTIAL
Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other
FORM
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED E.O. has been determined to be declassified.
TELECO UNICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISIO'
WORK COPY
CONFIDENTIAL
CANBERRA
page 3
2. RECEPTION CENTER HONOLULU: Gorton and party scheduled
travel to U. S. via Qantas flight 530 which is due Honolulu
9:35 a.m. March 29, departing for San Francisco 11:00 a.m.
Please meet and arrange airport courtesies during stopover.
CINCPAC may wish send rep to greet Prime Minister also.
END
CONFIDENTIAL
Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other
FORM
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIEN 03526 been determined to be declassified.
STATES UNITED AMERICA * STATE OF DEPARTMENT
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
Houdek
UNCLASSIFIED 439
PAGE 01 STATE 024970
52
ORIGIN EA 15
INFO CPR 02,JPM 04,H 02,NSC 10,0 02.OPR 03,P 04,RSC 01 , SS 20.SY 04,
USIA 12,1079 R
DRAFTED BY/ EA/ANZ: RMOORE
EA/ANZ - ROBERT W. MOORE
S/S - MR. SHEPHARD (SUBS)
66610
012101
R 1715252 FEB 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
UNCLAS STATE 024970
SUBJ: GORTON VISIT
PLEASE SUPPLY SOONEST NAMES OF MEMBERS OF GORTON PARTY
WITH BIO DATA FOR EACH
ROGERS
THE
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed rsuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES MMMZ AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 348
PAGE 01 STATE 021663
HOLDER
43
ORIGIN EA 15
INFO sso 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00,CPR 02,JPM 04,H 02,NSC 10,0 02,OPR 02,
P 04,RSC ø1,SS 20,SY 04 / 066 R
DRAFTED BY: EA/ANZ:CCBROWER
APPROVED BY: EA:AMB. BROWN
EA/P -MR. LEVINE P - MR. STEVENSON S/CPR a MR. KING
S/S 0 MR. WALSH WH - MR. MOOSE EA/ANZ - MR. MOORE
108301
0 111704Z FEB 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
SECRET STATE 021663
SUBJECT: GORTON VISIT
REF: CANBERRA 868
to AGREE REVISE FIRST SENTENCE ANNOUNCEMENT TO READ AS
POLLOWS: "THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON, PRIME MINISTER
OF AUSTRALIA, HAS ACCEPTED THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO VISIT
WASHINGTON ON MARCH 31, 1969."
2. WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH ANNOUNCEMENT REVISED TEXT AT
AGREED TIME. ROGERS
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been 21 reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 292
PAGE 01 STATE 021585
92
ORIGIN EA 15
INFO CPR 02,JPM 04,H 02,NSC 10,0 02,OPR 02,P 04,RSC 01,SS 20,SY 04,
USIA 12,SSO 00,/078 R
DRAFTED BY: EA/P: RKILPATRICK
APPROVED BY: EA: WGBROWN
EA/ANZ: MR BROWER
EA/P: MR LEVINE
WHS RMOOSE
P : MR STEVENSON
S/S: JMHAWLEY
66633
104214
0 110151Z FEB 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
SECR E T STATE 021585 -australia
SUBJ: ANNOUNCEMENT GORTON VISIT
REF CANBERRA 802
1 ° SUGGESTED TIMING FOR SIMULTANEOUS WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
5 PM EST WASHINGTON, TUES FEB 11* PROPOSED TEXT FOLLOWS:
"THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON, PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA,
HAS ACCEPTED THE PRESIDENT*S INVITATION TO MAKE A PRIVATE VISIT
TO WASHINGTON ON MARCH 31, 1969. THE VISIT WILL PROVIDE AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSIONS ON MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH
AUSTRALIA AND TO THE UNITED STATES. PRIME MINISTER GORTON LAST
VISITED WASHINGTON ON MAY 27-28, 1968".
2° PLS ADVISE IF TIMING AND TEXT ARE SUITABLE. ALSO FORWARD
TEXT OF AUSTRALIAN ANNOUNCEMENT ROGERS
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF
Honder
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 110
PAGE 01 STATE 020598
88
ORIGIN EA 15
INFO CPR 02,JPM 04,H 02,NSC 10,0 02,OPR 02,P 04,RSC 01,SS 20,SY 04,
USIA 12,/078 R
DRAFTED BY: EA/ANZ: RMOORE
APPROVED BY: S/S: JPWALSH
EA 8. MR DUEMLING
J : MR DILLON
EA/P:
S/CPR: MR KING
S/S: RM WALSH
WH: MR KISSINGER
66633
092396
R 080039Z FEB 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
CONFIDENTIALSTATE020598
REF CANBERRA 726
SUBJ: GORTON VISIT
1. PLS INFORM PRIMIN GORTON THAT PRESIDENT WILL BE HAPPY TO
RECEIVE HIM FOR PRIVATE VISIT MARCH 31, IF THAT DATE CONVENIENT
FOR GORTON. WE WILL PROPOSE DETAILED SCHEDULE OF MEETING AND
SOCIAL EVENTS LATER.
2. PRIVATE VISIT, WHICH IS CONFINED TO ONE DAY AND IS LARGELY
FREE OF PROTOCOL FORMALITIES, IS PROPOSED IN ORDER TO CONSERVE
PRESIDENT'S TIME AND ON ASSUMPTION (BASED ON GORTON'S CORRES-
PONDENCE WITH PRESIDENT AND INDICATIONS RECEIVED FROM AUSTRALIAN
EMB HERE) THAT ESSENTIALLY WORKING VISIT WILL SATISFY GORTON.
PRIVATE VISIT PRECLUDES NEITHER INFORMAL WHITE HOUSE SOCIAL
FUNCTION NOR PUBLICITY, OF COURSE.
3. UPON RECEIPT GORTON'S ACCEPTANCE WE WILL WISH WORK OUT JOINT
UNDERSTANDING WITH GOA RE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF VISIT. ROGERS
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Aushaila
295
LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM
0
Msg. No.
1, Sent by:
2. TO: White House
322
STATE
3. Transmitted by: Blill
4. Received by: WNSR
Date & Time:
Date & Time 1650
5. Description Tel to Canberra re Gorton visit
6. Classification & Controls: Confidential
7. No. of Pgs. 1
IMMEDIATE
B, Procedence
9. Validated
by
10. Deliver to: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
For: Clearance
X
The White House
Information
Att: Mr. Sneider
Per Request
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
295
UTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
ICATE: COURT
MARGI 10
SECRET
Classification
FOR OC/T USE ONLY
Origin
ACTION:
Amembassy CANBERRA
IMMEDIATE
rise
SUBJECT: Announcement Gorton Visit
REF: CANBERRA 802
1. Suggested timing for simultaneous White House
announcement 5 P.M. EST Washington, Tuesday February 11.
Proposed text follows: "The Right Honorable John G. Gorton,
Prime Minister of Australia, has accepted the President's
invitation to make a private visit to Washington on March 31,
1969. The visit will provide an opportunity for discussions
on matters of interest to both Australia and to the United
States. Prime Minister Gorton last visited Washington on
May 27-28, 1968".
2. Please advise if timing and text are suitable. Also
forward text of Australian announcement,
END
Proted by:
Tol 10.
Telepraphic transmission and
/P:RKilpatrick:bd 2/10/69
5360
classification approved by:
EX - Winthrop G. Brown
Insurance
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
WII
:
EA/P - Mr. Levine
PAT ea LEB 10. bW
P I Mr. Stevenson
ALP
S/S -
SECRET
Classification
DS.322
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Custralice
LDX CHANNED MESSAGE COVER FORM
294
Mag. No.
1. Sent by:
2. TO: White House 321
[
ATE
3. Transmitted 10 by: : Blickell
4. Received by:
WNSR
Date & Time:
Date & Time 1648
5. Description Tel to Canberra
re Canberra 802
6. Classification & Controls: Secret
IMMEDIATE
7. No. of Pgs. 1 8. Precedence
9 Validated Бу
J.O. Deliver to: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger For: Clearance X
The White House
Information
Att: Mr. Sneider
Per Request
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
297
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE: (Jecurer
CHARGE 10
CONFIDMITIAL
Classification
FOR OC/T USE ONLY
Origin
ACTION:
Amenbancy CAMBERRA
this
Subj:
Gorbon Visit
1. Part of Blair House being renovated, but Blair-Loe side
(seven bedrooms) will by available for Gorton party nights of
one
March 30 and 31. (FYI Usual limit for private visitors ana
night
signt END FYI.) Please advise soonest who will be members of
party.
2. Under established guideline for private visits (CA 4728,
January 9, 1968), United States aircraft will fly visitor from
location within CONUS to Washington and from Washington to next
stop within COLUS. If desired, We will request aircraft to bring
Gorton party from West Coast ::0 Washington. Advise. Please
confirm aur understanding that Canadian Government aircraft will
teke Gorton from Washington to Otbawa for his official visit
there,
3. FYI There may be other departures from guidelines; e.g.,
we anticipate that President will entertain at dinner or lunch,
and that meetings with President may not necessarily be limited
to one. E/D FYI.
END
Dished
Tel for
Telepraphic transmission and
2/10/69
2092
BA/ANZ
-
School
%
classification enproved by:
Moodo
ea
LEB
10
bW
2
E.L.
S/OPR - Kr. Ring (draft)
3/5 -
EA - Amb. Brown
WS -
CONFIDENTAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
australia
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE: COLLET
CHARGE 10
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
FOR OC/T USE ONLY
Drigin
ACTION: Amembassy CANBERRA
this.
STATE
Ref: Canberra 726
SUBJECT: Gorton Visit
1. Please inform Prime Minister Gorton that President will be happy to
receive him for private visit March 31, if that date convenient for Gorton.
We will propose detailed schedule of meetings and social events later.
2. Private visit, which is confined to one day and is largely free of
protocol formalities, is proposed in order to conserve President's time
and on assumption (based on Gorton's correspondence with President
and indications received from Australian Embassy here) that essentially
working visit will satisfy Gorton. Private visit precludes neither informal
White House social function nor publicity, of course,
3. Upon receipt Gorton's acceptance we will wish work out joint understanding
with GOA re public announcement of visit.
END
Dishod by:
781. (a).
Telegraphic transmission and
s/w
EA/ANZ:RMoore:aw 2/6/69
2996
classification esproved by,
S/S - John P. Walsh
Clearances
Enth
EA - Mr. Duemling
S/CPR - Mr. King
EA/P T - Mr. Dillon Th
S/S -
White H use -
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM
Classification
DS-322
8-63
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Visit by Prime Minister Gorton
RECOMMENDATION:
That you invite Prime Minister Gorton to make a
private visit to Washington on March 31.
Approve
Disapprove
DISCUSSION:
Henry Kissinger has informed me of a recent exchange
with Prime Minister Gorton on the timing of a visit to
Washington, and your preference for the earlier part of
the period which Gorton has suggested (March 30-April 12).
Within the next few days I will be sending you a
memorandum proposing a coordinated schedule of state and
official visits for the next year. A visit by Gorton
would best fit into that tentative schedule on March 31,
I recommend that you invite Gorton for a private
visit (to include a working session and an informal
lunch or dinner), which in effect would restrict his
meeting with you to a single day. It would reduce to the
minimum the demand on your time. It would accommodate
Gorton's main purpose in wishing to talk quietly and
frankly with you at an early date, in advance of a
meeting scheduled for mid-May at which the Five Powers
(Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the
United Kingdom) will discuss security arrangements to
follow British military withdrawal from Southeast Asia.
It would leave open for your later decision the question
of which Asian leader would be the first to be invited
for a formal state or official visit.
wm
William P. Rogers
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
mess age withdraw
252
moope
IXR Snuder 2/6
LDA CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM
1. Sent by:
2. TO:
uH
(Msg. No.)
258
3. Date Transmitted & Time: by:
4. Received by: WNSR
Date & Time:
1116
6
5.
Description: Telegram to Amembassy CANBERRA
6. Clsin & Controls:
CONFIDENTIAL
7. No. of Pgs.
1
8, Precedence IMMEDIATE 9. Validated by: JPWalsh
10. Deliver to: Dr. Henry Kissinger
For: Clearance XXXX
The White House
Information
Per Request
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECOMMONICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISION
252
CONFIDENTIAL
Amembesty CARBERRA
STATE
REF: Canberra 726
FOR AMBASSADOR CROOK
President has agreed in principle to receive Corton for
private visit during March 30-April 12 period butspecific
date not yet fixed. Ambassador Woller 50 informed.
Menutime we unable make any comment on press reports.
END
EA/ANZ RMoore:rlw 2/5/69 2996
EA/ Winthrop C. Brown
EA - Mr. Duemling
White House is
S/S -
EA/P - Mr. Levine (draft)
J
52 Mr. Dillon
P . Mr. Bartch (draft) CONFIDENTIAL
FORM
Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other
05-322
0.55
flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.