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AUSTRALIA - Prime Minister Gorton Vol. 1 of 2 May 6-7, 1969 [1 of 2]
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AUSTRALIA - Prime Minister Gorton Vol. 1 of 2 May 6-7, 1969 [1 of 2]
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VISIT OF
JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
MAY 6-7, 1969
CONTENTS
GENERAL
TAB
President's Briefing Memorandum and Talking Points
A
Secretary's Briefing Meorandum and Talking
Points
B
Scope Paper
C
Suggestions on Approaching Australians
D
Schedule and Official Party
E
Background Notes
F
BACKGROUND PAPERS
Situation in Australia
A
Malaysia/Singapore Defense and Legal Analysis
B
Singapore Naval Ship Facility
C
Australia and Viet-Nam
D
Paris Negotiations
E
Meat
F
Wool Textiles
G
U.S. Investment in Australia
H
Defense Purchases/Offset Procurement
I
The Non-Proliferation Treaty
J
Regional Cooperation in the Asia/Pacific Area
K
Philippine/Malaysian Dispute over Sabah
L
Civil Aviation
M
Defense Space Communications Facility
N
Scientific/Military Cooperation
O
Japan's Role in Asia
P
Indonesia
Q
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Projects
R
PUBLIC STATEMENTS
President's Toast
A
Secretary's Toast
B
Statement' for the Press
C
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/EXDIS
- 2 -
BIOGRAPHIES
TAB
John G. Gorton, Prime Minister of
Australia
A
Mrs. Gorton, Wife of the Prime
Minister
B
Sir Keith Waller, Ambassador of
Australia
C
Lady Waller, Wife of the Ambassador
D
Mr. C.L.S. Hewitt, Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department
E
Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary,
Department of External Affairs
F
Mr. A.T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary,
External Relations and Defense
Branch
G
Miss Ainsley Gotto, Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister
H
Mr. Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary
to the Prime Minister
I
Miss Jean Lester, Private Secretary
to Mrs. Gorton
J
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
April 29, 1969
s/s-6643
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Your Meeting with the Prime Minister
of Australia
Summary
The Points to Stress
1. Our intention to maintain a continued firm
posture in Asia.
2. Our continued firm adherence to ANZUS and SEATO.
3. The importance we attach to Australia's
contribution to Southeast Asian regional affairs,
including its commitment to the defense of Malaysia/
Singapore.
4. Our hope that Australia will continue to play
a leading role in the region.
5. Our appreciation for Australia's Viet-Nam
support.
6. Our desire for continued close consultations
with Australia on Viet-Nam and other regional security
matters.
The Points to Avoid
1. Pressuring Gorton to sign the NPT.
2. Asking for more Australian troops for Viet-Nam.
SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
The big question mark in Gorton's mind is the
continued firmness of U. S. Asia policy under your
administration. This underlies the three main subjects
he will want to discuss.
These are:
-- Malaysia/Singapore defense.
-- Viet-Nam.
-- Post-Vietnam Southeast Asia.
A. Malaysia/Singapore Defense
On February 25, Gorton announced that Australia will
maintain forces, including ground troops, in Malaysia/
Singapore after the British pull out in 1971. This
announcement put an end to a year-long, meandering,
public foreign-policy debate on "forward defense" versus
'fortress Australia.' Forward defense has won, and
Australia is headed in the direction of increasing
involvement in regional affairs -- a development which
is in our interest as well as Australia's.
The fact that Gorton made his announcement before
his visit to Washington has simplified our task.
Previously, he seemed likely to seek a specific U. S.
guarantee of the safety of his ground forces before
committing them. Now, it is clear we will not be asked
to pay this price for an Australian ground-force presence
in Malaysia/Singapore.
On the other hand, the announcement has also put
us on a spot, challenging us to be as firm and forth-
right as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that
Australia has met our requirement to do all it can;
now what will we do to support its commitment?
In this connection Gorton may still ask for specific
assurances of U. S. support for his forces. At the very
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
3
least, he will wish to assess the general posture your
administration will assume in Southeast Asia. It must
be assumed that the impressions he receives from you
on this question may affect the confidence and vigor
with which Australia assumes its heightened role in
regional affairs.
Gorton will:
-- try to get a feel for how much help he can
expect from the United States if his forces run into a
situation they cannot handle;
-- possibly ask you directly what we would do if
the peninsula were invaded by Communist China or North
Viet-Nam, or if an externally supported insurgency got
out of control;
-- possibly ask you whether the ANZUS Treaty will
apply to Australian forces stationed in Malaysia/Singapore
after 1971.
You should:
-- say that (as you told him in a personal message)
you welcome the Australian decision as a valuable
contribution to the stability and security of Southeast
Asia;
-- say that Australia's decision makes it easier
for us to go on making our own contribution, which
consists mainly of our forces deployed elsewhere in the
Western Pacific area as a deterrent to Communist expansion;
-- add that in this connection we were heartened
by Gorton's recent assurance to our Ambassador that
Australian forces would fight beside ours in Thailand if
the need arose;
-- stress that although we are not a party, we
are keenly interested in the Five-Power (Australia, U.K.,
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
4
New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore) consultations on new
defense arrangements for Malaysia/Singapore;
-- add that we would like to encourage this
development in any way we can, such as through the
possible joint use of a Singapore naval facility (which
our two navies are now discussing);
-- assure Gorton we fully understand that (as he
said in his speech) a situation could conceivably arise
with which Australia and her allies could not cope, and
that Australia would then have to look for support to
"allies outside the region" and decide what to do "in
the light of circumstances then prevailing;"
-- assure him that, as Australia's principal ally
in the Pacific, we would of course stand ready to consult
fully and promptly on what support we might give;
-- tell him we agree with his view (in his speech)
that we cannot now know what those circumstances might
be and, therefore, cannot now make precise decisions.
With respect to the ANZUS Treaty, you should:
-- avoid raising the question of the specific
applicability of ANZUS to Australian forces in Malaysia/
Singapore;
-- (if Gorton raises it) say that we recognize
Malaysia and Singapore are within the treaty area, that
the continuing presence of Australian forces there
serves the interests of both of us, and that questions
concerning our obligations under the treaty may someday
arise;
-- stress that we would want, therefore, to maintain
close consultation about future Australian commitments
to Malaysia and Singapore and future deployments of
Australian forces;
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
5
-- (if Gorton presses you for details on how
ANZUS applies) say you doubt that it is necessary or
desirable to speculate on theoretical applications of
the Treaty;
-- note that Gorton has said he would prefer
"general understandings" to "specific treaty obligations"
in Australia's future defense relations with Malaysia
and Singapore;
-- say that, similarly, we feel that maintenance
of the general understanding represented by the ANZUS
Treaty is better than trying to delimit specific treaty
obligations in hypothetical contingencies.
(For more precise language in responding on this
subject, see Background-Position Paper.)
B. Viet-Nam
The Australians have contributed 8000 troops.
Gorton has announced that that is the limit. Public
support for the war, over 60 per cent eighteen months
ago, has now slipped to below 50 per cent. Gorton is
sensitive about being fully consulted as an ally. He is
also worried about our possibly agreeing to a weak
settlement that would lead to a deterioration in Southeast
Asia.
Gorton will:
-- ask your assessment of the current situation in
Viet-Nam;
-- ask about the outlook for the Paris talks.
You should:
-- solicit his views;
-- give him the picture as you see it;
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
6
-- give him the feeling that you are taking him
fully and frankly into your confidence;
-- tell him how highly we value Australia's
contribution, in both military and non-military assistance;
-- not ask for more Australian troops.
C. Post-Vietnam Southeast Asia
Gorton, like many Australians, is nervous about a
possible U. S. withdrawal from Asia after Viet-Nam.
You should reassure him.
Gorton will:
-- probe your intentions on maintaining a U. S.
presence in the area;
-- be interested in your thoughts on future trends,
including Japan's role in the area.
You should:
-- assure him that our interest in the security
and economic development of Southeast Asia will continue
after Viet-Nam;
-- stress the importance we will continue to attach
to ANZUS and SEATO;
-- outline your thinking on post-Vietnam Asia,
highlighting the leading role we foresee Australia
playing in Southeast Asia, and the increasing contribution
we hope to see Japan make.
-- ask Gorton's views on the future of his part of
the world; the problems he foresees; how he envisions
Australia's role and those of the United States and Japan.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
7
These are the high points. Additional talking
points, and Background on the Visit, are enclosed.
wm
William P. Rogers
Enclosures:
1. Additional Talking Points.
2. Background on the Visit.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Additional Talking Points
Other possible topics which Gorton may raise include:
-- U. S. trade restrictions.
-- offset military purchases.
-- nuclear excavation study.
-- Non-proliferation Treaty.
-- Defense Space Communications Facility.
-- your visiting Australia.
Topics you may wish to raise:
-- EC-121 incident.
-- scientific cooperation.
Topics Gorton may raise
1. U. S. Import Restrictions
(For the record, Gorton may mention various standing
Australian complaints against U. S. import restrictions.
While we do have restraints on Australia's principal
exports to us, we are still its third best customer,
taking about 14 per cent of total exports. Australia's
economic situation today is excellent. You should
listen sympathetically, but avoid promising more liberal
treatment.)
Gorton may:
-- complain about U. S. restraints on -- or
protectionist moves against -- meat, dairy products, wool,
woolen textiles, lead, zinc or steel, asserting that
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
such restrictions are inconsistent with our professed
devotion to free trade and that Australia should enjoy
freer access to the U. S. market;
-- point out that the bilateral balance of trade
runs 2 to 1 in favor of the U. S.;
-- allege that our voluntary restraint program on
meat imports (in which Australia is cooperating under
protest) is unfair because it restricts Australia to less
than its historical share of the U. S. market;
-- thank you for relaxing (at his request) the
May 1 deadline for Australian compliance with sanitary
provisions of our meat inspection law.
You should:
-- not raise the subject;
-- (if Gorton raises it) say we will give the most
sympathetic possible consideration to Australia's position
on trade questions, consistent with our own balance of
payments problem and the difficulties of some American
industries;
-- note that Australia's overall balance of payments
is currently healthy;
-- state your position on trade policy, declaring
that you intend to resist protectionist moves in the
U.S.;
-- stress that to head them off, you will need
the cooperation of other countries. Australia's
agreement to the voluntary restraint program on meat
was most helpful in this regard.
-- (if Gorton says the meat program is unfair)
point out that giving Australia its historical share
of the market would have meant imposing cutbacks on
other suppliers, who would have refused to cooperate
in the voluntary program;
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
3
-- point out that this would have necessitated
the imposition of country quotas, which both we and
the Australians wish to avoid;
-- point out that it would be very difficult for
us to force cutbacks on the small, poor Central American
countries, developing nations whose meat industries
we have assisted;
-- note that under the voluntary restraint program,
Australia will still be able to sell us 41/2 per cent
more meat in 1969 than in 1968 -- more than in any
previous year except one.
2. Offset Military Purchases
(Australia is a major purchaser of U. S. military
equipment. To offset their expenditures partially,
we try to do as much DOD purchasing as possible in
Australia. The problem is that the Australians are not
competitive in most lines. We have taken a few special
measures to assist them, which have lessened the gap
slightly.)
Gorton may:
-- press for increased Department of Defense
procurement in Australia, as a further offset to their
large purchases of military equipment from us.
You should:
-- not raise the subject;
-- (if Gorton raises it) reply that we want to be
as helpful as we can;
-- note that discussions are taking place regularly
on the subject between the Department of Defense and the
Australian Embassy;
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
4
-- suggest that Gorton explore this in depth
with Secretary Laird.
3. Nuclear Excavation Study
(A detailed study of the feasibility of constructing
a harbor with nuclear explosions at Cape Keraudren fell
through when the mining company involved declined to
contribute financially. In developing the agreement
for this study, Gorton had reacted indignantly to what
he took as an indication that we intended to use the
project to "pressure" him into signing the NPT. The
Australian and American Atomic Energy Commissions have
just agreed to undertake a preliminary feasibility survey
of potential sites on the west coast of Australia to
determine their general suitability for a nuclear
excavation project. This agreement is expressly not
a commitment on the part of either Government to proceed
to a detailed survey of a specific site, as was planned
at Cape Keraudren.)
Gorton may:
-- hope the current survey of potential harbor
sites will ultimately lead to a nuclear excavation project;
-- possibly ask you point-blank whether there
would be a relationship between our willingness to
perform such a project and Australia's signing the NPT.
You should:
-- not raise the subject;
-- if Gorton raises it, be pleased that the two
Atomic Energy Commissions are able to continue their studies
of possible nuclear explosion projects in Australia,
since a useful project -- if it proved technically and
economically feasible and did not violate the Limited
Test Ban Treaty -- could be a major advance in the peace-
ful utilization of nuclear energy;
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
5
-- stress that prospects for international
acceptance of such projects will be enhanced if the
parties seek to gain international approval as the
study proceeds. We can dispel suspicions by conducting
the study openly, recognizing the interest of other
countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency;
-- assure Gorton once again that we would have
no thought of using such a project to "pressure" him
into signing the NPT;
-- note, however, that we cannot avoid the fact
that performing the first international PNE project
for a non-signatory country would create problems with
potential NPT adherents. This point was brought out
during Senate hearings on the NPT.
4. Non-Proliferation Treaty
(Because of fears of industrial espionage by IAEA
safeguards inspectors and lurking doubts of the
effectiveness of our nuclear umbrella, Australia has
not yet signed the NPT. Gorton will probably sign it
sooner or later -- sooner if no one pushes him.)
Gorton may:
- bring up Australia's doubts about the NPT.
You should:
-- if Gorton does not raise the subject, mention that
you hope he will discuss it with the Secretary of State;
-- if Gorton does bring it up, say the NPT is an
important foreign policy objective of ours; we believe
in the long run it will be equally important to Australia;
and we hope Australia will sign in the not too distant
future;
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
6
-- reassure Gorton that (as we have specifically
confirmed to the GOA) the ANZUS and SEATO treaties place
Australia under the nuclear protection of the United
States;
-- assure him that we are convinced that IAEA
safeguards will not be a cover for industrial espionage
nor otherwise impair progress in peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. We are willing to place our nuclear
facilities under such safeguards, except those with
national security significance;
-- invite him to discuss his reservations about
the NPT further with the Secretary of State, and offer
further consultation between U. S. and Australian
technical experts if desired.
5. Defense Space Communications Facility
See Background Paper.
6. Your visiting Australia
Gorton will:
-- probably invite you to pay a return visit to
Australia.
You should:
-- say you would like very much to do so, but
cannot fix a date at this time.
Topics you may wish to raise
1. EC-121 Incident
You should:
-- take Gorton fully into your confidence, outlining
the reasons for our restrained response.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
7
2. Scientific Cooperation
You should:
-- tell Gorton how much we appreciate Australia's
wholehearted cooperation with us in science, space
and military research;
-- say we are pleased with the agreement on
scientific cooperation concluded last fall when a team
of U. S. scientists visited Australia;
-- add that we would welcome a return visit by
Australian scientists this year.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Background on the Visit
What Gorton is Like
Gorton is a distinctively Australian Prime Minister.
In this he contrasts with Menzies, who said he was
"British to his boot-heels," and Holt, who said he
would go "all the way with LBJ. Much more than they,
Gorton personifies -- and manipulates -- his countrymen's
feelings of nationalism and egalitarianism. Specifically:
-- in personality, he projects an image of the
"typical Australian" -- masculine, direct, tough, down-
to-earth, "the casual knockabout bloke next door."
(The image is accurate but incomplete: he is also an
Oxford honors graduate in history.)
-- in policy, he appeals to nationalist and populist
sentiments, criticizing foreign investment, flirting
with a more independent foreign policy, moving toward
the left on social welfare. (His policy changes have
been more rhetorical than real, but they have contributed
to his image.)
Gorton is a popular Prime Minister. Erratic,
abrasive and high-handed behavior during his first year
has made him many enemies among newspapermen, politicians
and bureaucrats, but polls show the people like him.
Sixty-two per cent approve of the way he is handling
his job, the same percentage as six months ago.
Despite a recent furor over his public attentions to
young women, he is currently favored to win his first
general election (which must be held by November this year)
by an impressive margin.
Gorton is such a strong Prime Minister that he
has been accused of "Americanizing" Australian politics
and trying to smuggle in the Presidential system. He has
been compared to Andrew Jackson because he:
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
-- has rural origins, a glamorous war record and
an earthy political style which irks the establishment.
-- is strong-willed and hot tempered.
-- is blunt and direct.
-- prizes action over reflection.
-- runs the government as a one-man show with an
iron hand and a "kitchen cabinet."
-- gives jobs to his supporters ("spoils system").
In his dealings with us, Gorton has shown himself
to be:
-- sensitive about being taken for granted. He
wants his and Australia's views to be fully considered.
-- angered by any suggestion of pressure or arm-
twisting.
-- resistant to persuasion. He tends to come
around if left alone, but digs his heels in if he feels
he is being pushed.
-- contemptuous of what he construes as flattery
or eagerness to please.
Why He is Coming to Washington
Gorton's purpose is to get better acquainted with
you and senior officials of your administration and to
explore in greater depth subjects he raised during his
visit at the time of the Eisenhower funeral. Embassy
Canberra reports he is quite relaxed about the visit
and seemingly anticipates friendly discussions on a range
of subjects rather than hard bargaining or attempts
to find solutions to specific problems.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
3
However, he will be extremely interested in East
Asian security matters, and will certainly probe your
intentions with respect to future U. S. policies
in Southeast Asia.
Suggestions on Handling Gorton
Gorton is a prickly, aggressive man who can be
extremely charming but also extremely difficult to
handle. Foreign relations for him are primarily a
matter of personal relationships between leaders.
In general, with Gorton you should be especially careful to:
-- make him feel he is an equal partner; ask his
opinions.
-- be as frank as you can.
-- avoid appearing eager to please.
-- avoid pushing him but don't let him push you
(he respects toughness).
You are starting with an advantage in that he
wound up rather jaundiced about the Johnson administration,
but reportedly has a high opinion of you. Also, he is
under some pressure to get along with you because it is
widely believed in Australia that he did not make a good
impression on President Johnson. He WELS accordingly on
his best behavior when he met you in April, and was
effusive in his praise of you when he returned to
Australia ("I like the guy.").
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
6764
TO:
The Secretary
New
THROUGH:
s/s
FROM:
EA - Marshall Green
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with Prime Minister Gorton
of Australia -- BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
1. You have an appointment to see Prime Minister John Gorton
of Australia in your office at 3:00 P.M. May 6. Prime
Minister Gorton will be accompanied by Australian Ambassador
Sir Keith Waller, C.L.S. Hewitt (Secretary of the Prime
Minister's Department) and Sir James Plimsoll (Secretary of
the Department of External Affairs). Robert Moore (Country
Director for Australia) and I will also attend.
2. This is Gorton's second official visit to the United
States since he became Prime Minister in January 1968.
The first was in May, 1968.
3. Originally scheduled for April 1, the present visit had
to be postponed because of the death of General Eisenhower.
Gorton came anyway to represent Australia at the funeral and
to have such substantive discussions as could be fitted in.
He saw the President, you, Secretaries Laird and Kennedy,
and Dr. Kissinger. On this trip, he is scheduled to see
the President, you, Secretary Laird and Senator Fulbright.
4. Attached at Tab B of the briefing book is a copy of the
memorandum prepared for the President's meetings with Gorton.
The same topics may come up in your own discussion.
SECRET
Group 1
?
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
MICROFILMED
BY S/S: CMS
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
5. Gorton raised with you in April the subject of
Australia's doubts about the NPT, saying that he would
like to go into this in detail when he returned in May.
You should seek to impress him with the importance we
attach to the NPT and Australia's eventual adherence to
it. Special Talking Points are attached. (See also the
Background Paper, and the briefer talking points in the
Memorandum for the President.)
6. Other possible topics include:
a. Meat Inspection. You may wish to express satisfaction
that, in discussions with the GOA initiated in response to
Gorton's April request, it has been possible to reach
agreement on a later target date (August) for Australian
compliance with certain sanitary provisions of our Meat
Inspection Law.
b. Non-Aggression Pacts. Gorton may again mention his
idea for non-aggression pacts among Southeast Asian countries,
and seek your reaction. If he does, you might respond along
the following lines:
-- we would be interested in hearing a fuller exposition
of what the Prime Minister has in mind;
-- we share Australia's concern that intra-regional
disputes and suspicions impede development and the growth
of regional cooperation; we welcome creative thinking on
this subject by Australia and recognize that non-aggression
agreements might be one way to dampen disputes, create a
greater sense of security and foster greater willingness to
cooperate;
-- prospects for a formal, multilateral non-aggression
pact are not encouraging; there is little apparent sentiment
in the region for such an agreement, which might, moreover,
raise the unwelcome question of the possible need for an
external guarantor;
-- may not specific, somètimes quite informal, bilateral
arrangements (such as those which Malaysia has with Thailand
and Indonesia covering cooperation in border security)
represent a more practicable and promising - if slower -
approach to the problem?
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
3
-- we appreciate the GOA's imaginative approach and
would be pleased to consult with them on the question at
any time.
7. A supplementary memorandum with a talking point on the
next ANZUS Council meeting will be sent to you when your
July travel plans become firm.
Attachments:
1. Copy of Memorandum for the President.
2. Talking Points - NPT
Concurrences:
EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
EA/ANZ:CCBrower:jab 4/29/69
EA/RA - Mr. Donald
ACDA
- Mr. Neidle
E/ORF
- Mr. Erickson
EA
- Amb. Brown
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
TALKING POINTS
NPT
BACKGROUND
Discussions with PM Gorton concerning the NPT should
have the following aims: (1) Convince Gorton that the USG
is committed to the success of the NPT, and that we consider
Australian adherence important to that success; (2) Ascertain
what the GOA's true concerns are concerning the Treaty;
(3) Provide frank answers to any questions Gorton may
have regarding the Treaty; and (4) Leave the door open for
further NPT discussions, if necessary, in Washington or
Canberra.
DISCUSSION
- Say that every country makes its own decisions on important
matters, and that the USG fully appreciates the fact that
Australia wants to look very closely at the NPT before
becoming a party.
Say that the US is very serious about its commitment to the
NPT.
- Four US Presidents have considered non-proliferation
central to our security.
- We consider a successful NPT a necessary precondition
to further meaningful steps to control presently-held
nuclear arms.
- We view with great concern the large amounts of
fissionable material which will be readily available
in a few' years in many .countries if such material is
not brought under effective international control.
Since this material could be used to produce tens
of thousands of nuclear weapons, the risk of nuclear
war would greatly increase without the NPT.
GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
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INTERVALS; NOT
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Add that in view of Australia's important position in Asia,
and the close relationship between our two countries, the
US considers eventual adherence to the NPT by Australia
especially important to the success of the Treaty.
Security
Say that the USG recognizes at this time that the
governments of East Asia must carefully evaluate
their future security; the USG appreciates that
it is important for the GOA to assure itself that
the NPT will neither impair its present security
nor prejudice its security in the future.
-Point out the continuing validity of our
Aide Memoire of May 1968, in which we tried to
show that nuclear. activities of interest to
Australia were not prohibited by the NPT.
--Mention also the availability of the withdrawal
article which permits each party to determine for
itself when the provisions of the article justify
withdrawal.
-Reiterate the US commitment to the defense of
Australia. Should Gorton raise the Security
Assurancesgiven in connection with the NPT, stress
that these were given for the benefit of non-
aligned countries and do not effect in any way our
specific mutúal security arrangements with Australia.
Safeguards
- Remind Gorton that last year we also answered several
GOA questions about IAEA safeguards under the NPT.
Our Aide Memoire of May 1968 made it clear that
safeguards have as their sole purpose the verifica-
tion that no diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful purposes is taking place.
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Point out that Australia's membership on the IAEA
Board of Governors will allow the GOA to make its
own contribution to IAEA safeguards policy.
Say that we would be happy to answer any detailed
questions which Australia might still have
regarding safeguards.
Peaceful Uses
-Emphasize that we believe that NPT safeguards will
facilitate, rather than impede, international peaceful
nuclear commerce by providing nations with greater
assurance that nuclear materials being transferred to
other countries are not being used in the manufacture
of nuclear weapons.
- -Mention that this is in keeping with the spirit
of the peaceful uses provisions of the Treaty, which
are designed to facilitate the flow of the benefits
of nuclear energy to all parties to the NPT.
If Gorton wishes to discuss a project such as
Cape Keraudren, state that the US would cooperate
in any technical studies. However, we could not
commit ourselves to go forward with the actual
provision of nuclear explosion services in
connection with such studies. This would have to be
considered in light of the results of the studies
and of existing treaty obligations, specifically
the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the NPT. Regarding
the NPT, our decision on the provision of PNE
services would have to take into consideration,
among other things, whether and to what extent
this would effect international support for the
Treaty.
Other Considerations
If Gorton inquires about the current NPT thinking of either
Japan or Germany
Say we think there is a reasonable chance that
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Japan will sign the Treaty by mid-summer.
-- Say that we feel confident that Germany will
adhere; however, their signature has been delayed
by a unique set of circumstances.
If Gorton raises the matter of signature implying speedy
ratification, say that the US would not read such an
implication into the Australian signature. We ourselves
will have had a considerable lapse of time between our
signature and the deposit of our ratification instrument.
--Stress that Australian signature, of itself, would
have a helpful effect on the progress of the NPT.
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March 12, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
SCOPE PAPER
I. The Setting
Prime Minister Gorton's visit comes at a turning
point in the history of Australian foreign policy. On
February 25, Gorton announced his Government's decision
to maintain Australian forces -- including ground forces --
in Malaysia/Singapore after the British withdrawal in 1971.
This is perhaps the most important step Australia has
taken since its entrance as an independent actor on the
world stage in the 1940's. Gorton's main purpose in
coming is to plumb United States attitudes and intentions
regarding East Asia as they bear on the Australian decision.
The impressions he receives can be expected to affect the
vigor with which Australia assumes its new, heightened
role in Southeast Asia.
The Australian Government's historic decision resulted
from the interplay of several factors. These included
anticipated changes in British and U. S. deployments in
Southeast Asia; the accession of a strong-minded,
nationalistic Prime Minister with heterodox foreign policy
leanings; the approach of a general election; and the
stirrings of a new nationalism in Australia.
"Forward Defense" or "Fortress Australia"?
Since World War II, Australia has increasingly sought
to develop closer relations with Southeast Asian countries.
While this course has been carried out through economic aid,
diplomacy and participation in regional organizations, it
has also had an important military component -- the policy
of "forward defense." Based on the idea of stopping
the enemy as far as possible from Australian shores, forward
defense has justified Australian participation in regional
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security efforts including Korea, SEATO and Viet-Nam and,
since 1955, its support of British undertakings to defend
Malaysia and Singapore. Conscious of its relative
weakness, however, and feeling isolated and vulnerable
in its corner of Asia, Australia has been careful to risk
its limited forces only in close association with one
or both of its "great and powerful friends", Britain and
the United States.
In 1968, two developments combined to thrust Australia
into a dilemma. The first was Britain's decision, made
public in January, to accelerate withdrawal of its forces
from Malaysia/Singapore and complete the pull-out by
the end of 1971. The second was President Johnson's
announcement on March 31, 1968 of a unilateral halt in
the bombing of North Viet-Nam and his own retirement from
politics. This surprising and dramatic development, and
the subsequent change of leadership in a United States
which as seen from Australia has seemed increasingly
preoccupied with internal problems, have created uncertainty
and anxiety in Australian minds about the future course
of America's Asia policy. One of Australia's "powerful
friends", the U.K., was preparing to leave the scene.
Would the other, the U. S., also drift away? In view of
this possibility, was forward defense still a wise policy?
Debate on this question could not remain theoretical,
since Australia was faced with a pressing practical
decision. It now has ground, air and naval forces in
Malaysia/Singapore alongside the British. Should it keep
its forces there after the British leave (as Malaysia
and Singapore have requested), or should it pull them out?
Keeping them there would be a historic and possibly
dangerous departure from the traditional policy of
stationing Australian forces overseas only alongside a major
power -- the British or the Americans. Pulling them out
would imply abandonment of forward defense, and perhaps
a fundamental reorientation of Australia's Southeast Asia
policy. The decision could not be long deferred, since
the five Commonwealth powers concerned (Malaysia, Singapore,
Australia, New Zealand and the U.K.) have begun consultations
looking toward a new arrangement for the defense of the
area post-1971. Australian participation is the key to
the emergence of any such new arrangement which promises
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to be effective, and Australian indecision has already
seriously hampered the five-power consultations.
In the debate in Australia, the traditional forward
defense policy has had powerful advocates, including the
Ministers of External Affairs and Defense, the top civil
servants in these departments, and the military services.
The alternative strategy, dubbed "fortress Australia" by
the press, calls for less involvement in Southeast Asia
and increased concentration upon internal economic
development, military preparedness and continental and
immediate offshore defense, focusing on the mainland and
Papua/New Guinea. In an extreme, isolationist form it has
been espoused by Jim Cairns, spokesman for the powerful
left-wing faction in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and
a good bet to become Leader of the Opposition in 1970.
A still more important figure who early disclosed strong
leanings toward "fortress Australia" -- although his
position was often contradictory and unclear -- was the
complex, controversial man who became Prime Minister in
January 1968, John Grey Gorton.
Gorton's Indecision
Gorton at various times has given numerous indications
of doubts about forward defense and a predisposition
towards its opposite. At his first press conference as
Prime Minister, he made a startling off-the-cuff announcement
that no more Australian troops would be sent to Viet-Nam.
A strong nationalist, he has charted a course assertive
of distinctively Australian interests and has shown that
in his thinking domestic economic development enjoys first
claim on national resources. Seeming to split sharply
with his Ministers of External Affairs and Defense over
Southeast Asia policy and the Malaysia/Singapore question,
he brought no advisers and requested no briefing papers
from their departments when he visited Washington in May 1968.
He repeatedly expressed skepticism as to the wisdom or
desirability of stationing Australian forces, especially
ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971 -- at least
without being sure of being able to get them out if they
got into serious trouble. This attitude reflects his
personal experience; as a fighter pilot in action over
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Singapore in 1942, he saw an entire Australian division --
one fourth of his country's combat infantry -- trapped
and forced to surrender to the Japanese. As Prime Minister,
he is understandably determined not to be responsible
for a repétition of this debacle.
With Britain's decision to withdraw from Malaysia/
Singapore by 1971 apparently irrevocable, Gorton's concern
appeared to focus sharply on the course of U. S. Asia
policy under President Johnson's successor. After
Johnson's March 31, 1968 speech, Gorton told the Liberal
Party caucus and the press that he was convinced there
would be a major U. S. retrenchment in Asia -- possibly
amounting to a return to pre-World War II isolationism --
under the next U. S. administration, and that this might
well necessitate abandonment of "the Menzies concept of
forward defense" in favor of "an Israeli-type defense
scheme. Although this topic dominated his discussions
in Washington in May 1968 almost to the exclusion of all
others, he left unconvinced by the Johnson administration's
protestations of continued U. S. firmness in East Asia.
He subsequently reiterated in public that no decision
would be made on the commitment of Australian ground forces
until certain "imponderables" -- meaning primarily U. S.
Asia policy under the new administration -- became clear
to him. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference
in mid-January, he privately took the position with the
British that he could not run the risk of involvement,
particularly of his ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore
until he knew in advance who would "back him up". He
therefore planned to make no decision on post-1971 deployment
of ground forces, he said, until he had talked to
President Nixon.
With characteristic directness and persistence, Gorton
successfully sought an early meeting with the new President.
On February 7, "Len" Hewitt, Secretary of the Prime Minister's
Department and Gorton's closest adviser, told our
Ambassador that Gorton had only one thing on his mind in
coming to Washington other than getting acquainted with
the President, and that was to learn exactly what was the
U. S. position on the stationing of Australian troops in
Malaysia/Singapore. Gorton would make it clear that if
Australian troops were stationed there, they would never
get involved in local conflicts or hostilities with
Indonesia or the Philippines. However, he would want to
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know from President Nixon what the United States would do
if Australian troops became involved in countering aggression
by Red China or North Viet-Nam. Gorton himself reiterated
this to our Ambassador the next day, adding that if the need
arose he would commit troops to fight with us in Thailand.
The Election and Gorton's Decision
Meanwhile -- with a general election coming up in
November 1969 at the latest -- there were signs that the
Australian public was making up its mind on the foreign policy
debate. The fact that British withdrawal implied increased
Australian responsibility, while it had its alarming aspect,
appealed at the same time to Australia's growing national
pride. Australia -- economically the third most powerful
nation in Asia and technologically second only to Japan --
was being called upon to play a new, more independent role.
Surely it would not be too timid to rise to the challenge?
"Fortress Australia", from this point of view, could easily
be depicted as un-Australian. Gorton's Christmas message to
Australian troops in Viet-Nam, written in ringing "forward-
defense" tones, met with a warm response. The Liberal Party
organization began advising him that a strong defense policy
was his election winner. This advice was reinforced by the
press, most of which favored staying on after 1971, and by
the views of the Liberal Party's two election allies, the
Country Party and the hawkish Democratic Labor Party.
The uncertainty created by Gorton's previous, conflicting
statements helped build up suspense for his promised announce-
ment of a new defense policy when Parliament reconvened on
February 25. Most observers expected him to announce a
decision to maintain air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore
after 1971, but to postpone a decision on ground forces
because of "imponderables". The moderate leader of the
Opposition (ALP), Gough Whitlam, evidently anticipated such
a position and tried to pre-empt it by adopting in advance
a very similar one. Whitlam came out for air and naval
deployments but rejected the commitment of ground forces, in
favor of maintaining a "mobile striking force" in Australia
which could be sent if needed -- an idea originally advanced
by Gorton.
Gorton made one quiet, preparatory move -- he announced
the resignation of Paul Hasluck as Minister for External
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Affairs and his elevation to Governor General. With
Hasluck thus out of the way, Gorton had the spotlight
entirely to himself when he made his surprise announcement
on February 25 that Australia would go all the way with
the policy of which Hasluck had been the leading advocate --
forward defense including a commitment of ground forces
to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.
Gorton's speech was his finest hour and a political
masterstroke. Lucid, forthright, statesmanlike, it won
warm applause both at home and abroad. (Prime Minister
Holyoake of New Zealand, who had been urging this course
on Gorton all along, made a simultaneous and similar
announcement.) The Australian press was unanimously
laudatory. Whitlam, neatly outmaneuvered, was obliged to
attack the commitment of ground forces, thus making this
the only foreign policy issue in an election which the
bitterly divided ALP seems sure to lose. Gorton, on the
other hand, seems likely to emerge from the election with
increased stature, firmer control, and an enhanced image
as a truly Australian Prime Minister leading his country
into a new era of its nationhood.
Significance for the Visit
Gorton's decision to announce a commitment of ground
forces to Malaysia/Singapore in advance of his visit to
Washington has simplified our task. Previously, he seemed
likely to seek a specific U. S. guarantee of the safety
of his forces as a precondition for committing them.
Obviously it would have been difficult to give such a
guarantee, especially in a form which would have been
politically useful to Gorton. The February 25 speech has
made it clear that the U. S. will not have to pay this price
in order to get an Australian ground-force presence in
Malaysia/Singapore.
On the other hand, the speech has also in a sense put
us on a spot, challenging the U. S. to be as firm and
forthcoming as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that
Australia is meeting the American requirement to do all
it can; now what will Washington do to support that commitment?
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His speech made it clear that contingencies were conceivable
with which Australian forces could not cope, and that "if
such a situation should arise we would have to look to the
support of allies outside the region". In this connection
Gorton may still ask for specific assurances of U. S.
support. At the very least, he will seek to sound out the
temper of the new administration and the general posture it
will take in Southeast Asia. The answers and impressions
he receives will have a bearing on the confidence and vigor
with which Australia pursues the new path in regional affairs
on which it is taking the first step.
II. The Visitor
Personally, Prime Minister Gorton is conservative,
with a brusque and flamboyant style. He is quick on his
feet and tends to say what comes first into his mind.
Prickly and sensitive, he refuses to be pressured or taken
for granted. (For example, he reacted angrily and resentfully
when he felt President Johnson had not consulted sufficiently
with the GOA before announcing the partial bombing halt
on March 31, 1968.) He can be extremely charming, but is
instinctively aggressive with a streak of toughness and
possibly nastiness just below the surface. He is inclined
to be impetuous, abrasive and cocksure, restricts his
advisers to a small inner circle, and has at times seemed
lackadaisical in his approach to his work. These qualities
have earned him a bad press and poor personal relations
in the Government, but this has not seemed to bother him.
He projects a charismatic toughness which Australians like,
and his standing with the man in the street is high.
Recently, both his performance and his press have improved.
Australia's top political journalist provides a vivid
sketch bringing out Gorton's political appeal: "Oxford
educated, a Victorian orchardist, he had been when young
a very good-looking man, but in World War II, as a fighter
pilot, he drove his face into the instrument panel of his
bullet-damaged Hurricane in landing on the Singapore
aerodrome as an RAAF-Japanese dogfight proceeded overhead.
His rebuilt features are attractively ugly, mobile,
conveying on TV screens a pleasant impression of battered
strength and homely charm. His later war service has about
it some of the romantic charm that surrounded that of the
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late John F. Kennedy
Back on active service, a
crumpled-faced veteran, he crashlanded on an island in
the Timor Sea and lived for days on turtles' eggs and
fish before being rescued. Lean, wiry, six feet one inch
tall, a careless dresser with hair that succumbs only
temporarily to the discipline of comb and brush, laconic,
direct and irreverent, addicted to swimming and tennis,
an easy mixer who is impatient with formality, protocal,
the establishment, and 'longhaired' intellectuals,
Gorton represents what Australians have chosen to believe
is the traditional Australian, both in his masculinity
and derisive distaste for those who parade pretentiously
intellectual accomplishments or academic qualifications."
Gorton has been married since 1935 to an American
citizen, nee Bettina Brown of Bangor, Maine. Mrs. Gorton
is a shy, intelligent, gray-haired woman who has some
competence in Indonesian studies. She is reportedly
embittered by her husband's reputation as a lady-killer.
III. Australian Aims
The new administration's strategy in Southeast Asia,
as it relates to Australia's involvement in the defense
of the region, will be uppermost in the Prime Minister's
mind.
He will:
-- assess the firmness of the new administration's
posture in Southeast Asia;
-- ask to what extend the U. S. is prepared to back
up Australian forces committed to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971;
-- ask the President's thoughts on strategy and
prospects for the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
-- be interested in the President's thinking on
post-Vietnam Asia;
-- argue for better treatment from the United States
in the economic field;
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-- size up the President.
IV. United States Aims
Our aim is to secure continued strong Australian
leadership in Southeast Asia. We should try:
-- without increasing our commitments, to give
Gorton sufficient reassurance to encourage him to make
a whole-hearted contribution to regional security;
-- to consult fully and frankly with him on the
Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
-- fully to share our thoughts - and elicit his -
on post-Vietnam Asia;
-- to establish a good personal relationship
between the President and Gorton;
-- to reassure Gorton and, through him, the
Australian people that the United States is and will
remain a close, steadfast and special friend which can be
relied upon to play a leading role in checking Communist
expansion in Asia.
Drafted by: EA/ANZ : CCBrower
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
EA/RA - Mr. Donald
EA - Amb. Brown
EA - Amb. Godley
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard
Approved by: The Secretary
hillfr
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OU
JGA/G-1
March 10, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
Suggestions on Approaching Australians and
Conversational Topics
Australians are outgoing and straightforward, and
mix exceptionally well with Americans. In fact, they
have a special fondness for us, not untinged with envy
at our greater affluence. Similarities in culture and
outlook are great, and there are very few special
sensitivities to beware of. Australia was first settled
as a penal colony, and many of its citizens today are
descended from convicts; this is a joking matter with
most but a few may be touchy about it. Also, Australia
today has a developed, dynamic economy and a sophisticated
and predominantly urban culture. There is a growing sense
of nationalistic pride. Australians sometimes resent
questions which imply a rural stereotype (sheep, kangaroos
and boomerangs) in the mind of the questioner.
Australia has no racial problems. The indigenous
aborigines have a status similar to that of American
Indians, and the "White Australia" immigration policy,
while no longer officially referred to as such and slightly
liberalized, remains substantially in effect. It enjoys
solid public support, reinforeed recently by our well-
publicized racial troubles and those of Great Britain.
Before he became Prime Minister, John Gorton firmly
advocated the continued exclusion of colored immigrants,
and expressed sympathy for the racial policies of Rhodesia
and South Africa.
Conversational Topics
Australians are keenly competitive, a trait which is
reflected in their excellence in several sports. Since
World War II they have produced a number of great swimmers,
including Dawn Frazer, Murray Rose and Mike Wenden (who
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won two gold medals at Mexico City). Milers John Landy
and Herb Elliott have a place in history, as do tennis
stars Lew Hoad, Ken Rosewall and Rod Laver. The Davis
Cup in tennis has been completely dominated by the
U. S. and Australia during the 23 years since World War II
(15 wins for Australia vs. 8 for the U. S.). In 1968
at Adelaide, a U. S. team headed by Arthur Ashe and
Clark Graebner recaptured the cup after a long string
of Australian victories. President Nixon received the
team on February 11, 1969 to congratulate them and view
the cup; he was presented with a team necktie.
In recent years Australia and the U. S. have begun
to vie in the America's Cup in yachting. This cup was
first awarded at the London Exposition of 1851 after a
race around the Isle of Wight open to all comers; it
was named the America's Cup after the winning U. S. entry.
The U. S. has defended the cup twenty times since and
won every time. Australia has challenged twice, in 1962
with the Gretel and in 1967 with the Dame Pattie (named
for the wife of former Prime Minister Menzies). The
skipper of the victorious U. S. yachts in both encounters
(Weatherly in 1962 and Intrepid in 1967) was Emil "Bus"
Mosbacher Jr., now Chief of Protocol of the United States.
On the more serious side, Australia has been
experiencing a remarkable boom in the discovery and
exploration of mineral resources, including iron, nickel,
bauxite and petroleum. This is often a good subject for
conversation with Australian men.
Conversing with Gorton
Gorton is a complex personality who combines the
shrewd, homespun quality of a man of the land with the
sophistication of an honors graduate in history at Brasenose
College, Oxford. While he has a typical Australian's
rough contempt for intellectual pretensions, he has also
(as Minister for Education and Science) come into intimate
contact with the problems of the intellectual community
and technology in a rapidly evolving modern society.
His conversational range is broad. Topics for light
conversation may be suggested by his student days, his
marriage, his war experiences, or his recreational interests.
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Gorton's father owned a fruit farm in Victoria and,
though the family could afford to send him to Melbourne's
fashionable Geelong Grammar School, young John also had
to work on the family property to help pay his way.
When he finished at Oxford he went to Spain for a holiday
and there met an American girl, Bettina Brown, of Bangor,
Maine, a student at the Sorbonne who was vacationing in
Spain. They were married in 1935 in the chapel at
Brasenose College. Mrs. Gorton has retained her American
citizenship to this day, although since her husband became
Prime Minister she has traveled on an Australian diplomatic
passport.
The couple returned to Australia and Gorton was making
a big success of running his father's farm when the war
broke out. He joined the Royal Australian Air Force as
a fighter pilot and was shot down over Singapore. As he
puts it, "My face got rather mixed up with the instrument
panel. He was left with amiably crumpled features which
today make him look rather like an aging former prize
fighter. Swathed in bandages, he was evacuated from
Singapore aboard a ship which was torpedoed and sunk.
He spent 24 hours aboard a life raft in the Java Sea before
being rescued by an Australian destroyer. Returning to
active duty, he was shot down again in 1944 and lived for
days on turtle eggs and fish on an island in the Timor Sea.
Although Gorton no longer farms actively, he still
spends much time outdoors at tennis and swimming. He likes
bridge and "mucking around in the garden. He reads
avidly -- anything from spy fiction to scientific reports --
but describes his taste in entertainment as somewhat
philistine. "I was brought up as a kid on a diet of flying
arrows in Nottingham Forest and books where Buffalo Bill
Cody harried redskins on every page, he told an interviewer.
"Give me Laramie, not Lohengrin. I'm not a boor, but I'm
no culture-vulture either.'
However, Gorton and his wife share an interest in the
theater which is not "philistine." On their visit to the
United States in May last year, they reserved an evening
in New York to see Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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DRAFTED BY:
EA/ANZ: CCBrower: per 1w 3/6/69
CONCURRENCES:
EA/ANZ P Mr Moore
S/S-S: WSShepard
X-4155
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APRIL 28, 1969
FOR THE PRESS
NO. 93
CAUTION D FUTURE RELEASE
FOR RELEASE AT MID-NIGHT, MONDAY, APRIL 28, 1969. NOT TO BE
PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FOR OR USED IN ANY WAY.
OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN
G. GORTON, M.P., PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, AND MRS. GORTON
May 1 - 8, 1969
Members of the Official Australian Party
The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, M.P.
Prime Minister of Australia
Mrs. Gorton
His Excellency Sir Keith Waller, C.B.E.
Ambassador of Australia
Lady Waller
Mr. C. L. S. Hewitt
Secretary, Prime Minister's Department
Sir James Plimsoll, C.B.E.
Secretary, Department of External Affairs
Mr. A. T. Griffith
Assistant Secretary, External Relations and Defense Branch
Prime Minister's Department
Miss Ainsley Gotto
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Mr. Anthony Eggleton
Press Secretary to the Prime Minister
Miss Jean Lester
Private Secretary to Mrs. Gorton
THURSDAY, MAY 1
7:55 a.m.
HST
The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, M.P.
Prime Minister of Australia, and Mrs.
Gorton and their party will arrive at
Honolulu International Airport, Honolulu,
Hawaii, aboard QANTAS Airlines Flight 596.
9:00 a.m.
HST
Departure from Honolulu, Hawaii, aboard
QANTAS Airlines Flight 596.
THURSDAY (Cont'd.)
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PR 93
- 2 -
THURSDAY, MAY 1 (Continued)
4:50 p.m.
PDT
Arrival at San Francisco International
Airport, San Francisco, California.
5:20 p.m.
PDT
Departure from San Francisco, California,
aboard a United States Air Force special
flight. (Flying time: 4 hours and 50
minutes; 3 hours change in time.)
FRIDAY, MAY 2
1:10 a.m.
EDT
Arrival at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.
1:20 a.m.
Departure from Langley Air Force Base by
limousine.
2:05 a.m.
Arrival at Williamsburg, Virginia.
SATURDAY, MAY 3
At Williamsburg.
SUNDAY, MAY 4
At Williamsburg.
MONDAY, MAY 5
2:25 p.m.
Arrival at the Williamsburg Inn Golf Course.
2:30 p.m.
EDT
Departure from Williamsburg, Virginia, aboard
a United States Marine Corps special helicopter
flight. (Flying time: 1 hour)
3:30 p.m.
EDT
Arrival at the Pentagon Heliport, Washington,
D.C. The Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton will
be greeted by the Honorable Emil Mosbacher,
Jr., Chief of Protocol of the United States,
and Mrs. Mosbacher.
3:35 p.m.
Departure from the Pentagon Heliport.
3:45 p.m.
Arrival at Blair House.
7:50 p.m.
Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton will depart
from Blair House.
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PR 93
- 3 -
MONDAY, MAY 5 (Continued)
8:00 p.m.
His Excellency Sir Keith Waller, C.B.E.,
Ambassador of Australia, and Lady Waller
will give a dinner in honor of Prime
Minister and Mrs. Gorton at the Embassy
of Australia, 3120 Cleveland Avenue,
Northwest.
Dress: Black tie.
TUESDAY, MAY 6
10:25 a.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will depart from
Blair House.
10:30 a.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will arrive at the
White House where he will be greeted by
the Honorable Richard Nixon, President
of the United States.
Prime Minister Gorton will meet with
President Nixon at the White House.
Following the meeting, Prime Minister
Gorton, accompanied by Ambassador
Mosbacher, will return to Blair House.
Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton will
have luncheon privately at Blair
House.
2:55 p.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will depart from
Blair House.
3:00 p.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will meet with the
Honorable William P. Rogers, Secretary
of State, at the Department of State.
2:40 p.m. Mrs. Gorton, accompanied by
Mrs. Mosbacher, will depart
from Blair House.
2:50 p.m. Mrs. Gorton will visit L'Enfant
Plaza.
3:45 p.m. Mrs. Gorton will depart from
L'Enfant Plaza and return to
Blair House.
8:00 p.m.
President and Mrs. Nixon will give a
dinner in honor of Prime Minister and
Mrs. Gorton at the White House.
Dress: White tie.
WEDNESDAY
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NO. 93
- 4 -
WEDNESDAY, MAY 7
10:30 a.m. Mrs. Gorton, accompanied by
Mrs. Mosbacher, will depart
from Blair House.
10:40 a.m. Mrs. Gorton will visit
Dumbarton Oaks.
11:25
a.m. Mrs. Gorton will depart from
Dumbarton Oaks and return to
Blair House.
11:55 a.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will depart from
Blair House.
12:00 noon
Prime Minister Gorton will meet with
President Nixon at the White House.
12:15 p.m. Mrs. Gorton, accompanied by
Mrs. Mosbacher, will depart
from Blair House.
1:00 p.m.
Mrs. Rogers will give a
luncheon in honor of Mrs.
Gorton at the Naval Academy
Alumni House, Annapolis,
Maryland.
Following the luncheon, Mrs.
Gorton will return to Blair
House.
1:00 p.m.
Secretary Rogers will give a luncheon in
honor of Prime Minister Gorton in the
James Madison Room, Department of State.
Following the luncheon, Prime Minister
Gorton will depart from the Department
of State and return to Blair House.
3:50 p.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will depart from
Blair House.
4:00 p.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will meet with the
Honorable Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of
Defense, at the Department of Defense.
5:00 p.m.
Departure from the Department of Defense
and return to Blair House.
Private evening.
THURSDAY
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 5 -
PR 93
THURSDAY, MAY 8
12:20 p.m. Mrs. Gorton will depart from
Blair House.
12:30 p.m.
Lady Waller will give a luncheon
in honor of Mrs. Gorton at the
Embassy of Australia, 3120
Cleveland Avenue, Northwest.
12:50 p.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will depart from
Blair House.
1:00 p.m.
The Honorable J. W. Fullbright, Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
will give a luncheon in honor of Prime
Minister Gorton in the Foreign Relations
Committee Room (Room S-116) at the
Capitol.
2:00 p.m. Mrs. Gorton will depart from
the Embassy of Australia and
return to Blair House.
2:30 p.m.
Prime Minister Gorton will depart from
the Capitol and return to Blair House.
Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton will depart
from Washington, D.C. on their journey to
Australia.
* * *
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
TATE
MARCH 1969
COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA
BACKGROUND NOTES
Population: 12 million (1968 est.)
the absence of striking physical features make it
Capital: Canberra (Australian Capital
less subject to extremes of weather than other
Territory)
similar areas. The seasons are opposite those
of the Northern Hemisphere. Much of southern
Australia is the smallest continent and the
Australia has warm summers and long hours of
largest island in the world. Its area, including
sunshine. Snow is unusual outside the mountain
the State of Tasmania, is 2,974,581 square miles,
regions. Of the total area of Australia, nearly
or just under that of the continental United States
40 percent lies within the tropics. The nation
(3,026,789 square miles). By sea, Fremantle, on
suffers intermittently from disastrous droughts
the west coast, is approximately 9,500 miles from
and floods.
London, 4,500 miles from Cape Town, and 3,000
Australia lies within the zones of prevailing
miles from Colombo. Sydney, on the east coast,
westerly winds and the southeast trades, both of
is 6,500 miles from San Francisco and 1,200
which condition the rainfall. On the coast rainfall
miles from New Zealand.
generally is plentiful, but a great part of the in-
The whole continent is, roughly speaking, a
terior has less than 10 inches of rain per year.
low, irregular plateau. Its center is flat, barren,
Parts of the tropical north have been compared
and arid, much of it resembling the Sahara Desert.
with the monsoon area of India, with a rainfall
The mountain chains, for the most part, lie close
of from 60 to more than 100 inches annually.
to the coast. The southeastern quarter of the
But between the parts affected by these extremes
continent is a great expanse of fertile plain,
of aridity and heavy rainfall are extensive areas,
500,000 square miles in extent. Average elevation
especially in the southeast and southwest, which
above sea level is little more than 900 feet. The
enjoy adequate and gentle rains of about 40 inches
long coastline of more than 12,000 miles is
a year.
singularly free from deep indentation, the most
The Australian flag depicts the red, white, and
remarkable exceptions being the Gulf of Carpen-
blue Union Jack of the British Commonwealth in
taria in the north and the Great Australian Bight
the top left corner. A large white star directly
in the south. The Great Barrier Reef, the longest
beneath symbolizes federation. The right half of
coral reef in the world, stretches for 1,200 miles
the banner carries five smaller white stars, rep-
off the coast of Queensland.
resenting the Southern Cross Constellation. The
The mountain masses lie mainly along and
flag's background is blue.
roughly parallel to the east coast, in the center of
the continent, and in Western Australia. Chief of
the eastern group is the Great Dividing Range,
THE PEOPLE
which runs from north to south almost the length of
the coast, and the Australia Alps, extending as a
The population of Australia, estimated to have
continuation for about 300 miles through New South
reached 12 million in April 1968, is predominantly
Wales and Victoria. The highest point in the
Anglo-Saxon and of British origin, although its
country, 7,314 feet, is the summit of Mt. Kosciusko
complexion is changing slowly with the continued
in the southeast corner of the continent.
influx of migrants from continental Europe. It
In general, the coastal region is well watered
is estimated that there are only about 40,000 full-
by the rivers, although many are short, swift, and
blooded aboriginal natives (the indigenous people).
unfit for navigation. The greatest of the rivers
Of the nonindigenous population, an estimated 10
is the Murray (1,609 miles), which forms the
percent of those born in Australia are of non-
major part of the boundary between New South
British origin, and two-thirds of the overseas-
Wales and Victoria before entering the sea in
born were British subjects.
South Australia to the southeast of Adelaide. Its
A key element in Australia's economic de-
chief tributaries are the Darling (1,150 miles),
velopment is the Government's ambitious im-
the Murrumbidgee (1,050 miles), and the Lachlan
migration program. Since 1945 more than 2.7
(850 miles). There are many other rivers, but
million immigrants have been admitted, mostly
a number of them dry up to mere trickles in the
from Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands. About
dry season. Availability of water is the dominant
1,350,000 of these immigrants, including 250,000
factor in settlement, one-third of Australia being
refugees, have received financial assistance for
desert and another third consisting of marginal
their passage. The current target is 125,000 im-
grazing areas.
migrants per year.
Because of its size Australia experiences wide
Two-thirds of the population is concentrated
variations in climate, but its insular position and
in the States of New South Wales and Victoria,
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
120
132
INDONESIA
NEW GUINEA
ERRITORY OF
INDONESIA
PAPUA AND
PORTUGUESE
NEW GUINEA
TIMOR
ARAFURA SEA
CAPE
YORK
Darwin
-12
GULF
12
a
OF
INDIAN
CARPENTARIA
Wyndham
Cooktown
OCEAN
CORAL
Derby
@
Cairns
SEA
Townsville
Cloncurry
0
Alice Springs
Rockhampton
-24
24
Charlesville
Brisbane
Geraldton
Bourke
Coolgardie
Darling
Perth
Port Augusta
Adelaide
Newcastle
Albany
Murray
Sydney
*CANBERRA
Melbourne
36
AUSTRALIA
International boundary
*
National capital
TASMANIA
Railroad
INDIAN OCEAN
Hobart
Road
0
200
400
600 Miles
0
200
400
600 Kilometers
120
132
144
156
48
75156 12-68
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
with one-third living in the two cities of Sydney
of Westminster Adoption Act on October 9, 1942.
and Melbourne. Substantially all of Australia's
This officially established Australia's complete
population and industry are found in the area
autonomy in both internal and external affairs,
corresponding geographically to our southern
although its passage merely formalized a situa-
States.
tion which had existed for years.
More than half of Australia's population is
located in her State capitals. Following are the
populations of the capital cities as of June 1967.
GOVERNMENT
Capital City
Population
The Commonwealth of Australia consists of
Sydney, New South Wales
2,591,720
six federated States: New South Wales, South
Melbourne, Victoria
2,277,000
Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, Vic-
Brisbane, Queensland
795,400
toria, and Queensland. The Australian Capital
Adelaide, South Australia
784,100
Territory has a status similar to that of the
Perth, Western Australia
579,500
District of Columbia; the Northern Territory and
Hobart, Tasmania
143,279
Papua resemble the former territorial status of
Canberra, Australian
Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands; and New Guinea
Capital Territory
114,930
is under a U.N. trusteeship.
Darwin, Northern Territory
21,065
The Commonwealth Government was created
with a written constitution patterned in part
There is no state church in Australia. The
on the U. S. model. In the distribution of powers
distribution of churchgoers is approximately as
between the Commonwealth and the State Govern-
follows:
ments, those of the former are specifically de-
Anglican
35%
fined, the residual powers remaining with the
States (as in the United States).
Catholic
25%
Australia is a fully independent nation within
Methodist
10%
the British Commonwealth. The Queen of England
Presbyterian
9%
is the sovereign, represented throughout Australia
Baptist
1.5%
Other
19.5%
by the Governor-General and in each State by a
Governor. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet
Australia's literacy rate is estimated to be 98.5
wield actual power and are responsible to the
percent.
Federal Parliament, to which they must be elected
members. Each of the States has its own elected
HISTORY
legislature, the prime ministers of which are
Little is known of Australia before its dis-
called Premiers to distinguish them from the
covery by Dutch explorers in the 17th century.
Commonwealth Prime Minister.
It was not until 1770 that Captain Cook ex-
The Federal Parliament is bicameral, con-
plored the east coast and annexed it for Great
sisting of a Senate and a House of Representa-
Britain. On January 26 (Australia Day), 1788, the
tives. There are 60 Senators, 10 from each State,
Colony of New South Wales was founded by Cap-
elected for 6-year terms, with half coming up
tain Phillip and formal proclamation on the site
for election every 3 years. The House consists
of Sydney followed on February 7. Many, but by
of 123 members elected every 3 years (plus one
no means all, of the first settlers were convicts,
member representing the Northern Territory,
a number of them condemned for offenses which
who may vote only on certain motions). In
today would be thought trivial. Around the middle
ordinary legislation the two chambers have co-
of the 19th century, a policy of emancipation of
ordinate powers, but all proposals for ap-
the convicts and assisted immigration of free men
propriating revenue or imposing taxation must be
emerged. The discovery of gold led to increased
introduced in the House of Representatives.
population, wealth, and trade.
Elections normally are held every 3 years.
The dates of the creation of the six colonies
The last general election was on November 26,
which now comprise the States of the Common-
1966.
wealth are: New South Wales, 1823; Tasmania,
1825; Western Australia, 1838; South Australia,
1842; Victoria, 1851; Queensland, 1859. Settle-
POLITICAL PARTIES
ment had preceded these dates in most cases.
Desire for a close union resulted, after discus-
Essentially, Australia has a three-party sys-
sions between Australian representatives and the
tem, consisting of the Australian Labor Party,
British Government, in the Commonwealth of
which draws its strength from the trade unions;
Australia Constitution Act of 1900.
the Liberal Party, representing business in-
The first Federal Parliament was opened in
terests; and the Country Party, representing
Melbourne in May 1901 by King George v, then
agricultural interests. The Country Party, how-
Duke of York. In May 1927 the seat of govern-
ever, is relatively small and traditionally has
ment was transferred to Canberra, and the first
maintained a close alliance with the Liberals
session of Parliament was opened by King George
against Labor. In the November 1966 election the
VI, then Duke of York. Australia passed the Statute
Liberal-Country Party coalition increased its
3
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
substantial majority in the House of Representa-
ECONOMY
tives. The present distribution of seats in the
House is: Liberal-Country Party coalition, 81
Australia is a land rich in basic natural re-
(Liberals, 60; Country Party, 21); Australian La-
sources and capable, with the application of
bor Party, 41; Independent, one. The division in
modern technology and large amounts of capital,
the Senate is: Liberal-Country Party coalition,
of supporting a population many times its present
28; Democratic Labor Party, four (see below);
12 million. Its standard of living, with a per capita
Australian Labor Party, 27; andIndependent, one.
output of approximately $2,260 in fiscal year 1968,
Robert Gordon Menzies, leader of the Liberal
is among the highest in the world.
Party, was Prime Minister for 17 years (1949-
66), longer than anyone before him. Harold Holt
Although mineral exports are rising rapidly,
replaced Menzies upon his retirement in January
agriculture continues to be the principal source
1966. While swimming in heavy surf in December
of Australia's essential overseas income.
1967, Holt disappeared and was presumed drowned;
Australian agriculture resembles that of the
his body was swept out to sea and not recovered.
United States in being largely mechanized and
John G. Gorton succeeded Holt as Prime Minister
highly efficient, but differs in being based largely
and Leader of the Liberal Party in January 1968.
on pastures and winter grains, with a limited
The voting strength of the Australian Com-
acreage of row crops. Both Australia and the
munist Party is negligible; it has never wona seat
United States are exporters of grains, dairy pro-
in the Federal Government. The Communists have
ducts, fruit, and certain livestock products, and
managed, however, to gain considerable influence
the marketing of these commodities is therefore
in several important Australian trade unions. Dra-
a matter of common concern. Also a matter of
matic progress in ousting Communists from trade
concern is the potential economic impact on
union positions was made in 1951-53. The tech-
Australia of the proposed United Kingdom entry
nique of accomplishing this, in which the Catholic
into the European Common Market, which would
wing of the labor movement played a conspicuous
disturb present marketing arrangements under
part, led to a serious split in the Australian Labor
the system of Comonwealth preference.
Party. In 1957 rightwing elements in the party
Mineral resources are very great, including
broke away to form the Democratic Labor Party,
coal reserves estimated at 15 billion tons, vast
which, although it has been unable to winany seats
iron ore reserves, and substantial amounts of gold,
in the House, holds the balance of power in the
lead, zinc, copper, nickel, tungsten, tin, manga-
Senate and has effectively harassed and handi-
nese, and antimony, all of which are exploited
capped its parent party. In early 1960 Dr. Herbert
commercially. A major deposit of bauxite, esti-
Evatt resigned as parliamentary leader of the
mated at 1 billion tons, was discovered in northern
Australian Labor Party, a position he had held
Queensland and is being developed jointly by
since 1951. The leader of the Labor Party, and
British, Australian, and U.S. capital. Petroleum
Leader of the Opposition from 1960 until 1967,
has recently been found in substantial quantities,
was Arthur A. Calwell. E. G. Whitlam became
believed sufficient to supply more than a half of
Leader of the Opposition in 1967.
Australia's needs by the early 1970's.
ANNUAL STATISTICAL DATA
1967-68
1966-67
1965-66
1964-65
1963-64
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Gross National Product
27, 128
25, 516
22, 850
21, 920
20, 056
Defense
1, 250
1, 120
830
669
580
Exports
Total
3, 411
3, 387
3, 053
2, 631
2, 762
to United Kingdom
471
454
532
516
511
to Japan
720
656
529
440
487
to United States
451
403
372
280
264
Imports
Total
3, 661
3, 411
3, 291
2, 904
2, 372
from United Kingdom
810
811
840
761
659
from United States
941
875
787
692
542
from Japan
384
332
313
258
162
Capital Inflow
1,272
601
1,063
538
556
NOTE: The unit of currency is the Australian dollar, equivalent to U.S. $1.12.
4
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Power Project
percent ($2.4 billion) came from the United States
and about 49 percent came from the United King-
In the mountainous area of New South Wales,
dom. In recent years U.S. investment has become
the Australian Government is pushing through one
relatively more important and U.K. investment
of the world's greatest engineering projects, the
less SO.
Snowy Mountains hydroelectric power scheme.
Currently there are about 400 U.S. companies
When completed in about 1975, this vast complex of
with subsidiaries or joint ventures in Australia.
dams, tunnels, and power stations will have cost
Another 1,100 firms have licensing arrangements
more than $1 billion; will produce annually 3 mil-
or other agreements with Australian companies.
lion kilowatts of power; and will divert 2 million
U. S. investment has been primarily in manu-
acre-feet of water per year from the fertile valleys
facturing, but this is now being overtaken by
east of the mountains, where there is ample rain-
investment in minerals exploration and in the
fall, to the arid plains on the west, where it will be
development of recent discoveries of iron ore,
used for irrigation. Parts of the scheme have
bauxite, coal, petroleum, etc. U.S. investments in
been completed and already are in operation. The
petroleum refining and marketing are estimated to
U. S. Bureau of Reclamation in Denver has as-
be about $700 million, in automobile production
sisted the project actively, and U. S. firms have
about $575 million, and in exploration and pro-
played an important part in it. The American group
duction of petroleum and minerals about $500
of Kaiser, Walsh, Perrini, and Raymond built the
million. Among the more prominent U.S. firms
Eucumbene Dam, the second-highest earth- and
active in Australia are General Motors, Interna-
rock-filled dam in the world, in 2 years.
tional Harvester, Mobil Oil, Goodyear, Monsanto
Chemical, Armco, International Business Ma-
Manufacturing
chines, Ford, and Chrysler.
While Australia continues to be dependent pri-
Trade
marily on agricultural products for its export
income, the outstanding feature of the Australian
Overseas trade plays a relatively large role in
scene in the past decade has been the rapid growth
Australia's economy, export earnings accounting
of manufacturing. More than 25 percent of the
for about 13 percent of gross national product (as
total work force is now employed by manu-
against 5 percent in the United States), and im-
facturing, as against 21 percent in the United
ports representing about 15 percent of total goods
States. While originally Australian manufacturing
available for sale (as against 4 percent in the
was directed primarily toward supplying internal
United States). Historically, Australia has been
markets, it now accounts for an increasing pro-
dependent on wool and other farm crops for most
portion of exports. The greatest recent expan-
of its overseas income, and this pattern continues.
sion in manufacturing has been in heavy industry;
Wool, wheat, meat, sugar, dairy products, and
for example, steel-producing capacity has more
fruits accounted for 54 percent of exports in 1968.
than quadrupled to more than 6 million tons, and
The United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States
further major expansion is underway. Australia's
are Australia's principal partners. In 1967 Japan
industrial expansion has been made possible by a
replaced the United Kingdom as Australia's big-
high rate of domestic investment and by extensive
gest customer, and the United States replaced the
private investment from overseas.
United Kingdom as its biggest supplier. Communist
China is the principal market for exports of Aus-
tralian wheat.
Current economic conditions are prosperous.
Investment in Australia
Diversification of the economy and of exports,
especially in the minerals field, helped Australia
The Australian Federal Government, as well
to stand firm in the face of sterling devaluation
as the State Governments, have traditionally fol-
in the fall of 1967. Devaluation together with se-
lowed a policy of welcoming private investment
vere drought in 1967 created problems, particu-
from overseas. They have recognized that an in-
larly in the agricultural sector, but the long-term
flow of capital is necessary if Australia is to de-
outlook was for continued dynamic growth and a
velop as rapidly as it might. Foreign-owned
healthy balance of payments after 1970, when the
firms have suffered little if any discriminatory
minerals boom should begin to be fully reflected
treatment with regard to their operations. (Aus-
in exports.
tralia has since World War II refused to allow the
establishment of foreign banks, however.) Although
exchange control formalities are maintained, there
DEFENSE
has been no barrier to repatriation of earnings
and capital. With a stable political climate and
In March 1957 the Australian Government an-
good growth prospects, Australia has been re-
nounced a new defense program which would place
garded as a favorable area for U.S. investors.
emphasis on "mobility, hitting power, and modern
Of the total of U.S. $6.3 billion invested in
equipment.' It included the decision to make
Australia from abroad as of June 1967, about 38
Australian land and air weapons compatible with
5
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
U.S. equipment, a marked departure from Austra-
show expenditures of more than $1.3 billion in ex-
lia's traditional military connections with the
ternal aid since World War II. (This figure includes
United Kingdom. In November 1959 a further plan
aid to the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.)
was announced, the main features of which were
suspension of compulsory military training, coup-
led with a 35 percent increase in the strength of
U.S. -AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS
the Regular Army; disbandment in 1963 of the Fleet
Air Arm; and reorganization of army operational
On most international issues Australians and
units on the pattern of the U.S. Army's pentomic
Americans are in broad agreement and cooperate
division.
closely in pursuit of mutual objectives.
Arrangements were completed in June 1961 for
Both the Government and the Labor Party fully
the construction of two new destroyers in the
realize that Australia's security depends on firm
United States, the vessels to be equipped with the
ties with the United States. The ANZUS Treaty
most modern offensive and defensive equipment.
and SEATO have had, in effect, bipartisan support.
Agreement on construction of a third destroyer
From the inception of the United Nations, Aus-
was reached in 1963. In the same year Prime
tralia has been a firm supporter of the organiza-
Minister Menzies announced a 15 percent increase
tion and, whether under Labor or Liberal govern-
in defense expenditures over the next 5 years. In
ments, has sided with the United States on major
1964 a further large increase in defense spending
controver sies in the United Nations. Australia was
was announced, and Australia contracted to buy
one of the first countries to respond to the U.N.
24 F-111 aircraft. Defense expenditures have con-
appeal for aid to Korea.
tinued at a high level-$1.4 billion in 1968-69,
U.S. relations with Australia, because of the
about 19 percent of the total federal budget. The
World War II experience as well as similarities
only sizable U.S. military installation in Aus-
in culture and historical background, are excep-
tralia is U.S. Naval Communication Station Harold
tionally close and friendly. Minor frictions some-
E. Holt, at Northwest Cape in Western Australia.
times arise in trade relations, and the Australians
in recent years have protested against what they
consider U.S. protectionist barriers against their
FOREIGN RELATIONS
exports such as wool, meat, dairy products, or
lead and zinc. They have also been perturbed at
Australia has pursued its principal objective,
U.S. balance-of-payments measures curbing in-
the security of its own underpopulated island con-
vestment in Australia, and have expressed appre-
tinent, through support of U.N. collective security
nension that U.S. disposals of agricultural sur-
measures (sending ground, air, and naval forces
pluses abroad would injure their position in world
to Korea); through defense treaties [Southeast Asia
markets.
Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Australia-New
Expressive of the friendship Australians feel
Zealand-United States (ANZUS)]; through a good-
for Americans is the warm welcome they have ex-
neighbor policy and technical assistance program
tended to U.S. servicemen on rest and recupera-
(the Colombo Plan) with South and Southeast Asia;
tion leave from Viet-Nam, a program initiated in
and by an ambitious program of immigration from
October 1967. About 6,800 servicemen now visit
Britain and Europe. Australia's traditional de-
Australia each month on such leave. The 100,000th
pendence on the protection of the Royal Navy
is expected in April 1969.
ended with the fall of Singapore in 1942, and since
then the country has looked more and more to-
Cooperation in Scientific Activities
ward the United States. Although still interested
in the security of the Middle East, where its
Australia is the locus of an increasing number
troops fought in both World Wars, Australia is
of U.S. scientific activities because of its geo-
more concerned with the closer threat of Com-
graphical position, large landmass, advanced tech-
munist expansion in Southeast Asia. Australia is a
nology, the well-developed Woomera Range, and,
signatory of SEATO and in 1955 assumed Com-
above all, the ready cooperation of its Government
and scientists.
monwealth defense obligations in Malaya. It has
NASA maintains its largest and most important
also contributed an 8,000-man combat contingent
to the defense of South Viet-Nam.
overseas program in Australia, including a num-
ber of tracking facilities which are vital to our
To meet the Communist threat in South and
space program. An agreement concluded in 1968
Southeast Asia, Australia has provided military
promises to broaden existing scientific coopera-
and economic assistance to the underdeveloped
tion in arid zone research, oceanography, and
countries of the region. Australia played a leading
other fields.
role in setting up the Colombo Plan and has since
contributed more than $216 million in economic and
technical aid through the Plan. Australia is also a
PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
charter member of the Asian Development Bank.
Thousands of Asian students have been trained in
Prime Minister-John G. Gorton
Australian institutions of higher learning or tech-
Minister for Trade and Deputy Prime Minister-
nical institutions. Australian Government figures
John McEwen
6
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Treasurer-William McMahon
READING LIST
Minister of External Affairs-Gordon Freeth
Minister for Defense-Allen Fairhall
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Leader of the Australian Labor Party-Edward
Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of
G. Whitlam
Australia.
Deputy Leader, Australian Labor Party-Lance
Barnard
Governor-General of Australia-Lord Casey
Blunden, Geoffrey, Australia and Her People,
London, Lutterworth Press, 1959.
Australia maintains an Embassy in the United
States at 1700 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Wash-
Condliffe, J. B., The Development of Australia,
ington, D.C. 20036.
Sydney, Ure Smith, 1964.
Horne, D., The Lucky Country; Australia in the
PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS
Sixties, Penguin, 1964.
Huxley, Elspeth, Their Shining Eldorado, Morrow,
Ambassador-William H. Crook
1967.
Deputy Chief of Mission-Edwin M. Cronk
McLeod, A. L., ed., The Pattern of Australian
Political Counselor-James V. Martin
Culture, New York, Cornell University Press,
Economic Counselor-Albert V. Nyren
1963.
The United States maintains an Embassy in
McNally, W., Australia; The Challenging Land,
Australia at Warra Lumla, Canberra.
London, Hale, 1965.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8149
Revised March 1969
Office of Media Services
Bureau of Public Affairs
NOTE: This special revision of the Background Notes on the Commonwealth of Australia, prepared for official use in connection with the visit of Prime
Minister Gorton to the United States, is not for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. The most recent edition avail-
able for general distribution (see reverse for how to order) is dated May 1968; it is scheduled for revision and sale early next year.
7
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LIST OF COUNTRIES
Write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for any item, or
combination of items, from among the following: (1) complete set of all looseleaf Background Notes currently in stock (at least
125) $6.00 per set, plus $1.50 for foreign mailing; (2) 1-year subscription service for approximately 75 updated or new Background
Notes-$3.50 per year, plus $3.00 for foreign mailing; (3) plasticized binder-$1.50 each, plus 40 cents for foreign mailing; and (4)
individual Background Notes chosen from the list below-10 cents each, plus 25 percent for foreign mailing. (Orders of 100 copies or
more of the same Note sent to the same address are sold at a 25 percent discount.)
Available January 1969
Afghanistan (pub. 7795)
Ghana (pub. 8089)
Nigeria (pub. 7953)
Albania (pub. 8217)
Greece (pub. 8198)
Norway (pub. 8228)
Algeria (pub. 7821)
Guadeloupe (pub. 8319)
Pakistan (pub. 7748)
Angola (pub. 7962)
Guatemala (pub. 7798)
Panama (pub. 7903)
Argentina (pub. 7836)
Guinea (pub. 8057)
Paraguay (pub. 8098)
Australia (pub. 8149)
Guyana (pub. 8095)
Peru (pub. 7799)
Austria (pub. 7955)
Haiti (pub. 8287)
Philippines (pub. 7750)
Bahamas (pub. 8329)
Honduras (pub. 8184)
Poland (pub. 8020)
Bahrain (pub. 8013)
Hong Kong (pub. 8126)
Portugal (pub. 8074)
Barbados (pub. 8242)
Hungary (pub. 7915)
Portuguese Guinea (pub. 7966)
Belgium (pub. 8087)
Iceland (pub. 8227)
Qatar (pub. 7906)
Bermuda (pub. 7907)
India (pub. 7847)
Romania (pub. 7890)
Bhutan (pub. 8334)
Indonesia (pub. 7786)
Rwanda (pub. 7916)
Bolivia (pub. 8032)
Iran (pub. 7760)
Saudi Arabia (pub. 7835)
Botswana (pub. 8046)
Iraq (pub. 7975)
Senegal (pub. 7820)
Brazil (pub. 7756)
Ireland (pub. 7974)
Seychelles (pub. 8246)
British Honduras (pub. 8332)
Israel (pub. 7752)
Sierra Leone (pub. 8069)
Bulgaria (pub. 7882)
Italy (pub. 7861)
Singapore (pub. 8240)
Burma (pub. 7931)
Ivory Coast (pub. 8119)
Somali Republic (pub. 7881)
Burundi (pub. 8084)
Jamaica (pub. 8080)
South Africa (pub. 8021)
Cambodia (pub. 7747)
Japan (pub. 7770)
South West Africa (pub. 8168)
Cameroon (pub. 8010)
Jordan (pub. 7956)
Southern Rhodesia (pub. 8104)
Canada (pub. 7769)
Kenya (pub. 8024)
Southern Yemen (pub. 8368)
Central African Republic (pub. 7970)
Korea (North) (pub. 8396)
Spain (pub. 7800)
Ceylon (pub. 7757)
Korea (South) (pub. 7782)
Spanish Sahara (pub. 7905)
Chad (pub. 7669)
Kuwait (pub. 7855)
Sudan (pub. 8022)
Chile (pub. 7998)
Laos (pub. 8301)
Surinam (pub. 8268)
China, Communist (pub. 7751)
Lebanon (pub. 7816)
Swaziland (pub. 8174)
China, Republic of (pub. 7791)
Lesotho (pub. 8091)
Sweden (pub. 8033)
Colombia (pub. 7767)
Liberia (pub. 7991)
Switzerland (pub. 8132)
Congo, Brazzaville (pub. 7896)
Libya (pub. 7815)
Syria (pub. 7761)
Congo, Kinshasa (pub. 7793)
Luxembourg (pub. 7856)
Tanzania (pub. 8097)
Costa Rica (pub. 7768)
Macao (pub. 8352)
Thailand (pub. 7961)
Cuba (pub. 8347)
Malagasy Republic (pub. 8015)
Togo (pub. 8325)
Cyprus (pub. 7932)
Malawi (pub. 7790)
Trinidad and Tobago (pub. 8306)
Czechoslovakia (pub. 7758)
Malaysia (pub. 7753)
Trucial Shaikhdoms (pub. 7901)
Dahomey (pub. 8308)
Maldive Islands (pub. 8026)
Tunisia (pub. 8142)
Denmark (pub. 8298)
Mali (pub. 8056)
Turkey (pub. 7850)
Dominican Republic (pub. 7759)
Malta (pub. 8220)
Uganda (pub. 7958)
Ecuador (pub. 7771)
Martinique (pub. 8320)
United Arab Republic (pub. 8152)
El Salvador (pub. 7794)
Mauritania (pub. 8169)
United Kingdom (pub. 8099)
Equatorial Guinea (pub. 8025)
Mauritius (pub. 8023)
Upper Volta (pub. 8201)
Ethiopia (pub. 7785)
Mexico (pub. 7865)
Uruguay (pub. 7857)
Finland (pub. 8262)
Mongolia (pub. 8318)
U.S.S.R. (pub. 7842)
France (pub. 8209)
Morocco (pub. 7954)
Vatican City (pub. 8258)
French Guiana (pub. 8321)
Mozambique (pub. 7965)
Venezuela (pub. 7749)
French Territory of Afars and Issas
Muscat and Oman (pub. 8070)
Viet-Nam, Republic of (pub. 7933)
(pub. 8429)
Nepal (pub. 7904)
Western Samoa (pub. 8345)
Gabon (pub. 7968)
Netherlands (pub. 7967)
Yemen (pub. 8170)
The Gambia (pub. 8014)
Netherlands Antilles (pub. 8223)
Yugoslavia (pub. 7773)
Germany, Federal Republic of
New Zealand (pub. 8251)
Zambia (pub. 7841)
(pub. 7834)
Nicaragua (pub. 7772)
Germany, Soviet Zone of (pub. 7957)
Niger (pub. 8293)
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
A/BP-2-Rev. 1
ril 22, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
Background Paper
SITUATION IN AUSTRALIA
Summary
For the past year the Australian political skies have
been dominated by the acrobatics of ex-fighter pilot
John Gorton, Prime Minister since January 1968. After a
series of dizzy maneuvers and near-crashes, which
fascinated the public and confused his opponents, Gorton
has emerged in a good position to shoot the opposition
down in flames in the 1969 general election. A "typical
Australian," he personifies and skillfully manipulates
his countrymen's egalitarianism and growing national
pride. However, rumors about his private life may have
somewhat clouded his political future.
Main points are:
Conservative Dominance. When John Gorton succeeded
the drowned Harold Holt as Prime Minister and Leader of
the Liberal Party in January 1968, he inherited a generally
secure political situation. The Liberal-Country Party
coalition currently holds the largest majority in the
history of the House of Representatives (81 seats out of 123),
and the Liberals by themselves are only three seats short
of a majority. The coalition lacks a majority in the
Senate, but in view of the limited powers of the upper
body this is not a serious inconvenience. In Holt's last
months there had been signs that the Government's popularity
was slipping, but the slate was wiped clean by Gorton's
accession and the disposition of the public to give the
new man "a fair go."
Opposition Disarray. Gorton's task has been simplified
by the disorder in the ranks of the opposition. In April,
CONFIDENTIAL
Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-2-Rev. 1
CONFIDENTIAL
2
the moderate leader of the Australian Labor Party (ALP),
Gough Whitlam, was badly hurt politically in a spectacular
showdown with left-wing opponents in his battle to oust
them from control of the party machine. The rift is deep
and bitter, and the divided party is given almost no
chance to take power in the general election which must
be held by November, 1969. Anti-Whitlam elements, in fact,
are reportedly counting on an election defeat to give
them a chance to topple Whitlam and install the leftist
Jim Cairns in his place.
Gorton's Controversial Personality. Gorton's early
course was notably erratic. He made a number of rash,
off-the-cuff public statements on which he was obliged
to backtrack. Impetuous, abrasive and cocksure, sloppy
in Parliamentary debate, restricting his advisers to a
tiny "kitchen cabinet," he quickly earned a bad press
and poor personal relations in the Government. He shrugged
off criticism, however, and concentrated on gaining
maximum public exposure - - in person and on television
for his charismatic personality, which has been described
as that of "an off-duty fighter pilot" or "the casual,
knockabout bloke next door." This exposure has paid off.
His masculine, "typically Australian,' irreverent ruggedness
has strong appeal, and his standing with the public has
remained high. His somewhat uncontrolled behavior in the
company of women, however, has given rise to rumors and
public criticism which could be damaging.
Gorton's Policies and the Election Outlook. Like his
public image, Gorton's policies appear to have been shrewdly
tailored to Australian egalitarianism and growing nationalism.
Without really changing the Government's traditional policy
of welcoming needed foreign capital almost without
restriction, he has made a number of statements and moves
which appeal to the widespread feeling that there should
be greater Australian participation in foreign business
ventures in Australia. In so doing he has, at least
rhetorically, moved close to the traditional ALP position.
He has also moved to the left -- and stolen the opposition's
thunder -- on social welfare questions including social
security and medical benefits.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-2-Rev. 1
CONFIDENTIAL
3
With Viet-Nam fading as an issue, Gorton moving to the
left, and the ALP under Whitlam striving to present a more
middle-of-the-road image, the election was shaping up as
an issue-less, Tweedledum-Tweedledee affair. On February 25,
however -- after a year of backing and filling -- Gorton
came out with a ringing speech proclaiming a strong defense
policy, including a commitment of ground troops to Malaysia/
Singapore after 1971. The ALP was stuck with a weaker
policy opposing the ground troop commitment in favor of
a "mobile striking force" in Australia -- a position which
Gorton himself had originally advanced a year before.
There seems little doubt that Gorton has correctly gauged
the public mood and wound up on the more popular side of
the issue. The Government's victory in the election is all
but assured. Its magnitude may depend in part on voter
reaction to a recent furor brought on by the Prime Minister's
public attentions to young women.
Prosperity Helps the "Ins". The Government's election
prospects are brightened by the prosperous economic situation.
Strong expansion in activity and demand are continuing.
Industrial production in most sectors is running well ahead
of a year ago. Agricultural production for FY 1969 will
run about 23% over FY 1968 (a year affected by drought).
Consumer spending is buoyant and is expected to remain
strong under conditions of almost full employment and a
six to seven per cent increase in average weekly earnings
resulting from 1968 Arbitration Commission wage decisions.
Growth in 1969 is expected to be seven percent in real terms,
high even for Australia (which has been averaging 5.5 per
cent for the past five years.) There has been upward
pressure on prices and wages, but otherwise there are few
signs of strain.
Capital inflow has continued strong, exports are surging
ahead, and foreign exchange reserves increased during 1968.
The outlook is bright for 1970 and after, when the dynamic
growth in minerals exports will begin to make a substantial
impression in the balance of payments.
Drafted by: EA/ANZ: CCBrower
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard x4155
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/EXDIS
JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
April 29, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN G. GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
Background-Position Paper
U.S. INTEREST IN AUSTRALIAN COMMITMENT TO FIVE-POWER
ARRANGEMENT FOR THE DEFENSE OF SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA
BACKGROUND
On January 16, 1968, Britain announced it would with-
draw all its military forces from the Malaysia/Singapore
area by the end of 1971 (instead of by the "mid" 1970's as
previously announced), and that the United Kingdom intended
to revise its defense agreement with Malaysia, under which
British, Australian and New Zealand forces are stationed
in the area.
Britain's four Commonwealth partners thereupon began
to consider how they would adjust to the British decision.
Finding a strong desire on the part of Singapore and
Malaysia for continued Australian military presence, the
GOA announced that although it could not fill the gap left
by the British, it would "be prepared to discuss the size
and role of an Australian contribution to combined defense
arrangements which embrace a joint Singapore/Malaysia
defense effort."
Ministers of the Five Powers, meeting in June 1968,
agreed that they had a continuing interest in the stability
of the area and that the defense of Malaysia and Singapore
was indivisible. The British promised to help ease the
transition, but made clear their determination to proceed
with the scheduled withdrawal. The groundwork for prompt
SECRET/EXDIS
GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12-YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET/EXDIS
2.
development of Commonwealth defense arrangements seemed to
have been laid. Five-Power Advisory Working Groups were
set up to do detailed planning on air, army and naval
matters, and a second ministerial conference was planned
for the first half of 1969 (now scheduled for June).
However, progress was soon halted by a change in the
attitude of Australia. Signs of this change had begun to
appear even before the initial Five-Power Conference.
Following President Johnson's March 31, 1968 announcement
of the bombing halt, Prime Minister Gorton publicly ex-
pressed doubts about Australia's tentative decision to
station forces in Malaysia and Singapore after 1971. His
uncertainty regarding the firmness of United States' in-
tentions in East Asia was reflected among other Asian
leaders, who tend to believe that Australia's cultural
affinity and close relationship with the United States give
Australia a special insight. Talks with President Johnson
and others during his visit here in May 1968 did not fully
reassure Prime Minister Gorton. The GOA avoided committing
itself on the post-1971 question pending the outcome of a
prolonged fundamental defense policy review.
Finally, on February 25, 1969, Prime Minister Gorton
issued a defense policy statement which announced
Australia's intention, along with New Zealand, to commit
ground as well as naval and air units to Malaysia and
Singapore in the post-1971 period, thus paving the way for
a renewal of Five-Power defense planning.
The defense policy statement outlines a course of
action essentially fulfilling U.S. objectives. Mr. Gorton
committed Australia to deploy small but symbolically im-
portant elements of the Australian Army, Navy and Air Force
in Malaysia and Singapore after 1971 without a specific
terminal date. Their mission will be to contribute to the
internal stability of the region, to build up indigenous
defense capacity, and to be available "for use against
externally promoted and inspired Communist infiltration
and subversion." Mr. Gorton pledged continued military
and economic assistance to Malaysia and Singapore. He
identified Australian interests with those of the region
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET/EXDIS
3.
in a manner well calculated to reassure Malaysia and
Singapore. The way has thus been opened to further close
coordination among the Five Powers which can lead to a
workable Five-Power defense arrangement.
Prime Minister Gorton took care to keep Australia's
options open and to avoid commitments to automatic response.
The availability of Australian forces for use in insurgency
situations is "subject to the usual requirement for the
Australian Government's prior consent,' and the scale of
Australian effort should the threat exceed Australian re-
sources alone "would have to be decided in the light of
all circumstances prevailing at the time. Should the
Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement (which by association is
the basis for Australian presence in the area) become in-
operative, Mr. Gorton said, "we would wish general under-
standings rather than specific treaty obligations to be
worked out "
Prime Minister Gorton stressed that Australia could
not fully substitute for a major power in the region, and
"the potential military protection of great nations outside
the region will be needed" to ensure stability. He pointed
out that a situation could conceivably arise in which the
scale of subversion and infiltration from outside, or some
other organized threat to the region, might be such that
Australian resources alone would not be sufficient to sup-
port successfully the forces of Malaysia and Singapore.
"If such a situation should arise, " he said, "we would have
to look to the support of allies outside the region and the
scale of Australia's continued effort would in that case
have to be decided in the light of all the circumstances
prevailing at the time. What they would be we cannot now
know and we cannot therefore make, now, precise decisions."
These references underline Australia's determination
to maintain its freedom of action in the Malaysia/Singapore
area, and consequently the importance which Australia will
continue to attach to the American attitude in determining
the degree of Australian commitment and the vigor with
which it is pursued.
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET/EXDIS
4.
United States' Objectives
Principal U.S. objectives with regard to Australian
policy and the security of the Malaysia/Singapore area
are:
1. To sustain Australia in an active, outwardly-
directed policy which will increasingly involve it in the
affairs of East Asia and thus contribute to our efforts to
maintain the security of the area.
2. To see created a military alternative in the wake
of the British withdrawal which will:
a. Contribute to the stability of Malaysia and
Singapore so they can play a constructive
role in an increasingly close-knit com-
munity of Southeast Asian states;
b. Cause Malaysia and Singapore to cooperate
rather than compete militarily;
C. Be capable of helping Malaysia and Singapore
cope with externally supported insurgency;
d. Provide insurance against the possibility of
renewed Indonesian confrontation; and
e. Assist in the defense of Malaysia and Singa-
pore against overt Communist attack.
3. To provide for the continued availability of support
facilities in Singapore for use by Commonwealth and United
States military forces.
4. To provide for the continued access by the United
States and other states to the international waters and
air space of the subregion.
5. To see created a regional defense arrangement
which, useful under present circumstances, might stimulate
emergence of a larger Southeast Asian security arrangement.
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET/EXDIS
5.
6. To accomplish the foregoing without increasing
our current commitments abroad.
Existing Obligations and Commitments
The United States has no defense commitments to
Malaysia or Singapore. Under the ANZUS Treaty, we are
committed to act if Australian (or New Zealand) forces in
Malaysia/Singapore are attacked (Article V of the Treaty
defines an armed attack on any of the parties as including
an attack "on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft
in the Pacific"). In 1963 we reached a secret understanding
with Australia (Kennedy-Barwick Memorandum) spelling out
at some length the circumstances under which we would re-
gard the Treaty as applicable and the types of actions we
might take if Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore were
attacked by Indonesia. This understanding established
four main points:
1. The United States acknowledged that Malaysia and
Singapore are in the Pacific area to which the Treaty
applies;
2. The United States recognized an obligation to
act should Australian forces be overtly attacked by Indo-
nesian armed forces, but not in the case of subversive
acts or guerrilla attacks;
3. The United States would expect to be consulted
prior to any redeployment of Australian forces in Malaysia/
Singapore; and
4. Use of armed forces, particularly ground forces,
would depend upon requirements and could not be assured.
In October 1967, the Australians raised the question
of the applicability of ANZUS to Australian forces which
might remain in Malaysia/Singapore after British with-
drawal, and asked whether further understandings might be
necessary. Our reply (Berger-Waller letter January 17,
1968) was guarded, stating that we recognized the continuing
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET/EXDIS
6.
presence of Australian forces in the peninsula "might some
day give rise to questions concerning the application of
the Treaty" and would want, therefore, to maintain close
consultations. The Australians did not press the Johnson
Administration for further assurances.
What Does Prime Minister Gorton Seek in Washington?
We do not have an altogether clear idea of what Prime
Minister Gorton will seek in Washington -- but, very
probably, neither does he. He is a changeable, impulsive,
unpredictable man, and has given us varying indications as
his thinking on Malaysia/Singapore defense has evolved.
Until his speech of February 25, it seemed likely
that Gorton would seek some specific guarantee of the
safety of his ground forces before committing them. His
speech made clear that this was not the case, but never-
theless reflected concern with the possible need for U.S.
support in case his forces encountered a situation which
they could not handle. He has not spelled out just what
support he is looking for, or what threat most concerns
him. Before his February 25 speech, he informally indi-
cated to our Ambassador that the principal purpose of his
meeting with the President would be to inquire what the
United States would do if Australian troops in Malaysia/
Singapore became involved in countering an attack by Red
China or North Viet-Nam. The speech itself, on the other
hand, made only oblique reference to overt aggression and
concentrated on the possibility of externally promoted
Communist infiltration and subversion.
When he came to Washington for the Eisenhower funeral,
the main topic Gorton opened up in his discussions with
USG leaders was the extent of U.S. interest in Southeast
Asia generally and Malaysia/Singapore specifically after
the war ends in Viet-Nam, with particular reference to the
support Australia might expect if her forces became in-
volved in a situation which got out of control. He raised
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET/EXDIS
7.
this only in the broadest terms, however, and it was
agreed that discussions in depth should be postponed
until he returned in May.
It is likely that several considerations are at work
in Gorton's mind, including:
1. A vague need for psychological reassurance,
growing out of Australia's relatively limited national
power, its feeling of isolation and its traditional
reliance upon powerful friends in pursuing its forward
defense policy. This need for reassurance has been
accentuated by Britain's announced withdrawal and uncer-
tainty as to the future course of U.S. Asia policy. On
this point Gorton reflects the feelings of his country-
men.
2. A specific concern with the safety of the Aus-
tralian forces which will be in Malaysia/Singapore after
1971, especially the ground forces. This is reinforced
by Gorton's experience as a World War II fighter pilot,
when he saw an entire Australian division trapped at
Singapore and forced to surrender to the Japanese.
3. A realization that Malaysia/Singapore defense
must be viewed in the total context of Southeast Asia
security. A key concern, therefore, is the continued
firmness of the U.S. posture in areas to the north of
Malaysia, especially Thailand and Laos, and the avoidance
of an outcome in Viet-Nam which would lead to Communist
advances in other Southeast Asian countries.
4. A desire for straight talk. Gorton is a blunt,
direct man who respects frankness and dislikes evasiveness.
5. A realization that the new administration is
engaged in a foreign policy reassessment and cannot be
expected to have all the answers at this early stage.
Coupled with this is a natural desire -- even the right,
as a close, loyal ally -- to talk the problems over with
us and share in our thinking process.
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET/EXDIS
8.
6. A desire to elicit some public expression of
U.S. support of his foreign policy initiative in Malaysia/
Singapore which will be politically useful to him. Gorton
faces his first general election later this year, and the
commitment of ground troops to Malaysia/Singapore, which
has been attacked by the opposition, is shaping up as a
major election issue.
The precise line Gorton follows when he talks to the
President will depend upon which of the foregoing con-
siderations are uppermost in his mind at the time. All
it is possible to predict is that he will (1) undoubtedly
probe our intentions, with respect to both Southeast
Asian security generally and Malaysia/Singapore in par-
ticular; and (2) probably seek expressions of support
on Malaysia/Singapore, both private and public.
The Alternatives
In private, the President could make one of four
replies to a Gorton request for U.S. assurances in support
of Australia's military commitment to Malaysia/Singapore:
a. give an unqualified pledge of support.
b. give a qualified pledge of support, based on con-
firmation of the specific application of ANZUS.
C. decline to pledge support.
d. give generalized reassurance.
The advantages and disadvantages of each of these ar
briefly discussed below.
A. Unqualified pledge of support. The President
would assure Gorton that the U.S. will give full military
support to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore in any
contingency in which they may be attacked.
SECRET/EXDIS
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SECRET/EXDIS
9.
Advantages:
1. would provide maximum reassurance to Australia.
2. would give strongest possible indication to
Australia (and other nations which learned of it) of a
continued firm U.S. posture in Southeast Asia.
Disadvantages:
1. would maximize risk of U.S. military involvement.
2. goes beyond our obligation under ANZUS; would
expose the administration to charges of enlarging U.S. over-
seas commitments in unconstitutionally establishing a back-
door commitment to defend Malaysia.
3. goes beyond Gorton's needs and reasonable
expectations.
B. Qualified pledge of support. The President would
confirm to Gorton that ANZUS applies to Australian forces
in Malaysia/Singapore and that we would honor our commit-
ment in the event Australian forces there were attacked.
He would have to make clear, however, that our commitment
is limited to situations in which Australian troops are
attacked, as distinct from situations in which Australian
troops enter into combat on their own initiative to assist
Malaysia or Singapore.
Advantages:
1. should provide sufficient reassurance to en-
courage Australia to participate whole-heartedly in
Malaysia/Singapore defense.
2. would signal (though less clearly than A)
continued firmness of the U:S. posture in Southeast Asia,
3. simply acknowledges an obligation which we
already have.
SECRET/EXDIS
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JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET/EXDIS
10.
4. is straightforward, and is an advance over
the Johnson administration position.
5. retains all the flexibility of response
built into the Treaty, which provides for a broad range
of possible actions of which the use of military force
is only one extreme.
6. a precedent exists (Kennedy-Barwick Memoran-
dum) for clearly delineating and in effect narrowing our
responsibilities in the event that a specific threat arises.
Disadvantages:
1. creates a slight additional risk of involve-
ment, since in the Berger-Waller letter we avoided a direct
acknowledgement that ANZUS applies, thus retaining some
freedom to back away from the commitment if this should
later prove expedient.
2. could be attacked (although without sound
justification) as executive enlargement of our overseas
commitments.
3. unless very carefully explained, a simple
statement that the ANZUS Treaty applies to Australian
forces in Malaysia or Singapore could be misleading and
the explanation could cast doubt on the adequacy of the
assurance from the Australian point of view. Australia
could well interpret a general statement of ANZUS Treaty
applicability to their forces in Malaysia and Singapore
as meaning that the U.S. would come to their aid if they
sent their forces into combat pursuant to their defense
commitment to Malaysia or Singapore.
C. Decline to pledge support. The President could
explain frankly that in the prevailing climate of U.S.
opinion, he is not in a position to undertake anything
which might be depicted as a new overseas commitment.
Advantages:
1. minimizes risk of involvement.
SECRET/EXDIS
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SECRET/EXDIS
11.
2. avoids any risk of criticism for allegedly
enlarging our commitments.
Disadvantages:
1. conducive to half-hearted Australian partici-
pation in Malaysia/Singapore defense.
2. conducive to a more inward-looking Australian
foreign policy and a less positive contribution to the
security and development of Southeast Asia.
3. likely to weaken the ANZUS alliance through
lessened confidence in our reliability and firmness of
purpose as an ally.
4. in governmental circles in Australia and
New Zealand, conducive to a feeling we are reneging on
our ANZUS commitment -- which we achnowledged in 1963 was
applic able to Australian forces in Malaysia.
5. might signal to other countries that a U. S.
retreat from our Asian responsibilities is in the offing.
D. Generalized reassurance. The President could
assure Gorton in general terms of our determination to
stand by our commitments in Asia, not going beyond the
"Berger-Waller" position with respect to the applicability
of ANZUS to Australia's forces in Malaysia/Singapore.
Advantages:
1. would provide sufficient reassurance to
encourage a positive Australian contribution to regional
security.
2. would preserve maximum flexibility.
3. is probably all Gorton really expects.
4. avoids criticism for allegedly enlarging
our commitments.
SECRET/EXDIS
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JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET/EXDIS
12.
5. avoids any increased risk of involvement.
Disadvantages:
1. is no advance over the Johnson administration
position.
2. is somewhat evasive on the specific question
of the applicability of ANZUS.
Public Response
The foregoing alternatives are suggested private
responses. Our public response should probably be the
same in any case -- an affirmation of the continuing impor-
tance we attach to ANZUS and our other commitments in the
area, together with an expression of understanding and
support for the Australian commitment to Malaysia/Singapore.
A possible alternative would be publicly to affirm the
applicability of ANZUS to Australian forces in Malaysia/
Singapore (assuming we decided upon this private response).
Such a public statement, however, would go beyond Gorton's
apparent political needs, draw undue public attention to
the question in the United States, and invite criticism
for alleged executive enlargement of our overseas commitments.
Recommended Response to Gorton
Response "D" (generalized reassurance) is recommended
for the following reasons:
1. The benefits to the United States of a whole-
hearted execution of a forward policy by Australia are
such that it is desirable to reassure Gorton to the maximum
extent possible without enlarging our existing commitments
under the treaties we already have in the area.
2. Among these existing commitments is a commitment
under ANZUS to act if Australian forces in Malaysia/
Singapore are attacked. However, under certain conditions
this could become difficult to distinguish in practical
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET/EXDIS
13.
terms from a commitment to defend Malaysia or Singapore.
President Kennedy's caution in interpreting it was well-
founded, and the Kennedy-Barwick memorandum is a sound
precedent for situations in which a specific threat arises.
It appears prudent to continue to avoid flat statements
that ANZUS applies to Australian forces in third countries;
to insist on prior consultation about such Australian
deployments; and to carefully delineate what is to be
expected of the United States in each specific situation
of a threat to such forces.
3. A threat which might activate our ANZUS commitment
to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore is unlikely to
develop unless there is a serious deterioration in the
region to the north. Probably the most important reas-
surance we can give Gorton on Malaysia/Singapore, therefore,
is a convincing expression of our determination to pre-
vent such a deterioration from occurring.
4. The indication by Mr. Gorton that he may be
interested only in a reassurance from the President regarding
United States' support in the unlikely contingency of a
North Vietnamese or Chinese attack, and his initiative in
commiting Australia to a forward defense position in
advance of his meeting with tge President, suggest that
he may be content with a broad reassurance from the new
administration regarding the firmness of its East Asian
policy and approval of the Australian commitment to
Malaysia/Singapore, rather than some new, explicit under-
standing under the ANZUS Treaty. It is difficult to
imagine the contingency of a Communist Chinese or North
Vietnamese attack on Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore
arising except in a situation of general war in East Asia
or of a Communist Chinese or North Vietnamese invasion of
Thailand. Should this occur, the United States would be,
if not already involved in hostilities against the Com-
munist enemies, consulting urgently with Thailand and other
SEATO allies under Article IV of the SEATO Treaty to
determine what action should be taken. Mr. Gorton's
flat statement when posing this question that "if some-
thing goes wrong in Thailand, he would commit troops to
fight with us to help the Thais" suggests his realization
of this fact.
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET - EXDIS
14
5. Embassy Canberra confirms that, while Gorton has
a particular concern with our backup of his commitment to
Malaysia/Singapore, the main thrust of his interest will
be in much broader regional terms. The Embassy believes
that he will be satisfied, at least for the time being, with
general rather than specific assurances.
A response along the following lines should meet what
we believe to be Gorton's key concerns:
"We welcome the Australian defense policy decision
vis-a-vis Malaysia/Singapore as a responsible, constructive
statesmanlike move which will make a valuable contribution
to the stability and security of Southeast Asia. We are
aware that it represents a historic departure for Australia.
Prime Minister Gorton is to be congratulated on his wisdom
and initiative. (FYI. At this point, the President might
also wish to state that we were heartened by Gorton's
assurance recently to our Ambassador in Canberra that
Australian forces would fight with ours in support of
Thailand if "something should go wrong there. " END FYI.)
"We fully understand the interdependence of all
elements of security in the region. For our part, we
contribute to regional security primarily through our forces
deployed elsewhere in the Western Pacific area as a deterrent
to Communist expansion. We intend to maintain this deterrent
and stand by our commitments in the region.
"At the same time, we continue to be keenly interested
in the progress of the Five-Power consultations looking
toward consolidation of new defense arrangements for
Malaysia/Singapore. We are aware, as Prime Minister Gorton
pointed out in his speech, that Australia cannot fully
substitute for the British presence, and that a situation
could conceivably arise in which the resources of Australia
would be insufficient to support successfully the forces
of Malaysia and Singapore. We understand that in such a
SECRET - EXDIS
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JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET - EXDIS
15
situation, Australia would feel the need to consult allies
outside the region, such as Britain and the United States,
and decide what to do in the light of circumstances then
prevailing. As one of Australia's close allies and a
party to the ANZUS Treaty, we would, of course, stand
ready to consult fully and promptly. We agree that we
cannot now know what these circumstances might be and,
therefore, cannot now make precise decisions.
"With respect to the application of the ANZUS Treaty
to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore, we recognize
that Malaysia and Singapore are within the Treaty Area,
that the continuing presence of Australian forces there
serves our mutual interests, and that questions concerning
our obligations under the Treaty may some day arise. We
would want, therefore, to maintain closest consultation
with the Australian Government regarding commitments it
might make to the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore,
and concerning future deployment of Australian forces.
Should a threat to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore
arise, our two governments would have to consider together
very carefully what actions might be expected of the
United States under the Treaty. "
In the unlikely event that Prime Minister Gorton
presses for a detailed understanding as to how the ANZUS
Treaty applies to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore,
it could be pointed out to him that it is not only unnecessary
but in our view undesirable thus to speculate on theoretical
applications of the Treaty. An attempt precisely to set forth
the circumstances in which the Treaty should apply, and how,
might exclude the very contingency which, when it occurs, we
might well decide is covered by the Treaty. In words
parellel to those of Prime Minister Gorton, himself, (when
referring in his defense policy statement to Australia's
relationship with Malaysia/Singapore), maintenance of the
general understanding represented by the ANZUS Treaty is
preferable to and more meaningful than trying to define and
delimit specific treaty obligations in hypothetical contin-
gencies.
SECRET - EXDIS
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JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
SECRET - EXDIS
16.
situation, Australia would feel the need to consult allies
outside the region, such as Britain and the United States,
and decide what to do in the light of circumstances then
prevailing. As one of Australia's close allies and a
party to the ANZUS Treaty, we would, of course, stand
ready to consult fully and promptly. We agree that we
cannot now know what these circumstances might be and,
therefore, cannot now make precise decisions.
"With respect to the application of the ANZUS Treaty
to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore, we recognize
that Malaysia and Singapore are within the Treaty Area,
that the continuing presence of Australian forces there
serves our mutual interests, and that questions concerning
our obligations under the Treaty may some day arise. We
would want, therefore, to maintain closest consultation
with the Australian Government regarding commitments it
might make to the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore,
and concerning future deployment of Australian forces.
Should a threat to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore
arise, our two governments would have to consider together
very carefully what actions might be expected of the
United States under the Treaty.
In the unlikely event that Prime Minister Gorton
presses for a detailed understanding as to how the ANZUS
Treaty applies to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore,
it could be pointed out to him that it is not only
unnecessary but in our view undesirable thus to speculate
on theoretical applications of the Treaty. An attempt
precisely to set forth the circumstances in which the Treaty
should apply, and how, might well exclude the very
contingency which when it occur
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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SECRET - EXDIS
-
Drafters: EA/ANZ-CCBrowercy
EA/RA-RHDonald
Clearers: EA - Amb. Brown
EA/ANZ - Mr. Moorell,
EA/MS - Mr. Bean()
DOD/ISA - Mr. Dexter
J/PM - Mr. Ausland
L/EA - Mr. Aldrich es
S/S-S: WSShepard
X4155
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/EXDIS
BP/15-Rev. 2
April 28, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
13
May 6-7, 1969
Background Paper
SINGAPORE NAVAL SHIP FACILITY
In planning for the conditions which will follow
the British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, the
Australian Navy after consultations with representatives
of the other Five Powers approached the United States
Navy regarding the desirability of preserving in
Singapore a limited naval facility with a capability
for expansion. The Australian Navy indicated that
without assistance it would be unable to maintain such
a facility. In view of the possible utility of assuring
continuing access to such a facility by the United States
Navy, the latter undertook a feasibility and cost study
jointly with the Royal Australian Navy. The joint team
prepared a variety of options for joint operation which
vary in scope and appear to be within reasonable cost
limits. The details of cost prorating have not been
determined.
The United States Navy survey team's preliminary
report indicates that it is desirable and feasible to
proceed with plans for the facility. The United States
Navy has not yet presented its final views since the
cost factors have not been analyzed to the point where
a choice of possible options can be made. Consequently,
there is as yet no United States Government position on
this matter. Secretary Laird indicated to Prime Minister
Gorton during his last visit that we favor the idea in
general.
SECRET/EXDIS
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
BP/15-Rev. 2
SECRET/EXDIS
2
We should tell Mr. Gorton that we are encouraged
by the feasibility study and have a continuing interest.
While we are not yet able to make a decision we wish
to proceed with the examination of the options so that
an early and mutually satisfactory decision can be made.
Drafted by: EA/RA:JMGammon/RHDona1d:gcr
Cleared by: EA:Mr. Godley My
J/PM:Mr. Wolf VG
DOD/ISA:Adm. Shepherd
Navy Op 61:Adm. Weinel my
EA/MS:Mr. Bean 3M4
EA/ANZ:Mr. Moore 57G
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard
SECRET/EXDIS
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SECRET
JGA/BP-1
March 14, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
Background Paper
AUSTRALIA AND VIET-NAM
Summary
The Australian Government supports the allied effort
in South Viet-Nam both with an 8000-man troop contribution
and with economic assistance. The Government's position
enjoys strong public support which has, however, been
subject to steady erosion in the past eighteen months.
Prime Minister Gorton is sensitive about being fully
consulted on U. S. Viet-Nam policy, and the GOA is uneasy
about our future posture on Viet-Nam.
Main points are -
Troop Contribution. Australia now maintains in
Viet-Nam approximately 8000 troops. These include a
combat brigade and support, a jungle warfare advisory
unit, a Canberra bomber squadron, an air transport unit
and a guided missile destroyer. The first Australian
contingent was sent in early 1965 by Prime Minister
Menzies. Harold Holt as Prime Minister announced two increases
--from 1500 to 6300 troops in January 1966, and from 6300
to 8000 in October 1967. However, his successor, John Gorton,
declared immediately after assuming office in January
1968 that there would be no further troop increases,
barring some major change in the situation.
Economic Aid. Australia has given South Viet-Nam
more than $10.5 million in economic aid since 1964. Goods
and materials furnished have included textbooks in
Vietnamese, corrugated roofing, community windmills, a
radio broadcasting station, hand tools, radios, blankets
and food. About fifty Australian civilian technicians
SECRET
Group 3
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not automatically declassified
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JGA/BP-1
SECRET
2
are serving in Viet-Nam, including surgical teams, civil
engineers and agricultural experts. About 130 Vietnamese
students are studying in Australia.
Public Support. The Government's stand on Viet-Nam
enjoys strong but slowly diminishing public support.
The last general election, in November 1966, was fought
largely on the Viet-Nam issue, with the opposition
Australian Labor Party arguing against military involvement
in the conflict. The election returns gave the Government
the biggest parliamentary majority in Australian history,
and the ALP's new and more flexible leader, Gough Whitlam,
subsequently moderated the party's line on Viet-Nam.
Gallup polls during the past eighteen months have reflected
steady erosion in Viet-Nam support, with those favoring
continuing the war falling from a high of 62% (May 1967)
to 49% in December 1968. (The breakdown in the December 1968
poll was "continue the war," 49%; "bring back our forces,"
37%; undecided 14%.)
Consultation. Prime Minister Gorton was indignant
when President Johnson on March 31, 1968 announced
limitation of U. S. bombing of North Viet-Nam with only
24 hours' prior notice to him and what he felt was
insufficient consultation. The GOA was embarrassed because
less than a week previously Minister for External Affairs
Hasluck and Minister for Defense Fairhall had told
Parliament that the bombing pressure must be kept up until
North Viet-Nam was willing to make a reciprocal reduction
in the level of hostilities.
There has been a full flow of information about the
Paris talks to the Australian Government through briefings
in Paris of Ambassador Anderson (the Australian liaison
officer there) by our negotiators, through briefings of
Ambassador Waller in Washington, and through transmission
of texts and reports by our Embassy in Canberra. However,
the Australian Government is uneasy about the future
posture of the United States with respect to Viet-Nam and
Asia generally.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-1
DRAFTED BY:
EA/ANZ: CCBrower: oh rlw 2/25/69
CONCURRENCES:
EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore of
N
EA/VN - Mr. Flowerree
2021 A
S/S-S: WSShepard
X-4155
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THIS PAPER WILL BE PROVIDED AT A LATER DATE
Reproduced at the Nixon ibrary. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LIMITED FICIAL USE
JGA/PR-9-Rev. 1
April 22, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
Background Paper
MEAT
Summary of the Problem:
In order to avoid the imposition of quotas on meat
under the Meat Import Act we asked all meat exporting
countries to cooperate in a voluntary program to restrain
their exports of meat to the US in 1969. While reluctantly
agreeing to participate, Australia objected that the
restraint program gave it an allocation of only 49% of the
US market, whereas it has historically supplied about 52%
of our meat imports. Since the US is Australia's most
important market for meat (exports exceeded $200 million
in 1968), Australia has always been concerned over our
meat import policy. While this concern has usually been
centered on the avoidance of formal limitations on market
access, our meat inspection regulations have also caused
periodic problems for the Australians. To date these
problems have been resolved through discussions between
American and Australian meat inspection authorities.
Discussion:
1. As a result of sharp increases in estimated imports
of meat, largely from Australia and New Zealand, it became
necessary in September 1968 to request the major meat ex-
porting countries to participate in a voluntary program of
export restraint in order to avoid the triggering of quotas
under the Meat Import Act. Under this program Australia
agreed to limit exports of meat to the US market in 1968.
to 483 million lbs. At that time the Australians noted
that although 483 million lbs. was less than what they
considered to be their fair share of the US market, they
would nevertheless cooperate in the interest of avoiding
quotas and with the understanding that their cooperation
in 1968 would not prejudice their interests in any future
allocation of market shares.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
EXEMPT
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2
2. Since the Department of Agriculture estimated that
meat imports in 1969, in the absence of restraints, would
again exceed the amount requiring quotas, all supplying
countries were asked to participate in a continuation of
the restraint program in 1969. Under the new program all
countries have agreed to limit their shipments to the US
to an amount 4.5% above last year's commitment level.
Australia's complaint is that the new program freezes the
1968 trade pattern, thus holding Australia for the second
consecutive year to a level below its historical market
share.
3. We have told the Australians that while we recognize
the validity of their complaint, a freezing of 1968 trade
patterns was the only way in which a voluntary restraint
program could be worked out. Any readjustment of market
shares in 1969 would have meant that the small suppliers
would have had to reduce the level of their exports to the
US. These countries would not have concurred in a voluntary
program, and thus quotas would have been the only alternative.
However, by freezing market shares at the 1968 level, all
countries including Australia, are able to increase the
absolute level of their meat shipments to the US market;
Australia's allotment, for example, was increased by 22
million lbs. over the 1968 level. In addition, Australia
will receive about one-half of any shortfall in exports by
other countries. We have also pointed out to the Australians
that the other major suppliers of meat to the US market
New Zealand, Mexico and Ireland also received market
shares under the restraint programs which were less than
their historic market shares.
4. As a matter of general trade policy we have sought
to avoid import quotas whenever possible. In addition one
of the major reasons for undertaking the voluntary restraint
program on meat was to avoid the sizeable cut in exports
which the Central American and Caribbean countries, whose
efforts at diversification we have encouraged and assisted,
would suffer were quotas necessary. In 1968 the five
Central American countries exported 110 million lbs. of
meat to the US, equal to only about 10% of total US meat
imports. Under quotas meat imports from CA would probably
be limited to under 80 million lbs.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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5. While avoidance of rigid limitations on access
to the US market has been Australia's principal worry,
our Wholesome Meat Act, which requires that foreign meat
products exported to the US must be prepared under
sanitary conditions equivalent to those applied to US
meat products, has also presented periodic difficulties
for the Australians. In this regard officials of
Australia and the United States concluded discussions
on April 14 concerning certain deficiencies in the GOA
meat inspection system. As a result of the discussions
the Department of Agriculture agreed to lift a May 1
deadline for delisting of Australian meat plants lacking
sufficient veterinary supervision of slaughter operations.
(Prime Minister Gorton had complained that this deadline
did not allow sufficient time.) The Australians indicated
that the requisite supervision would be provided by
August 1.
Drafted by: E: ORF : OFP: FPD: EPEricksen
Cleared by: E/OFP - Mr. Arnold
E/FPD - Mr. Calingaert
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
USDA/FAS - Mr. Rubel
STR - Mr. Schlechty
S/S-S WSShepard, Ext. 4154, Room 7237
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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FICIAL USE
JGA/BP-7
March 20, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
Background Paper
Wool Textiles
Summary of the Problem
The U.S. is preparing for approaches to principal trading
countries to secure agreement on restraint of exports to the U.S.
of wool textiles. Australia is not a principal supplier of wool
textiles overall (about 5 percent of current imports), but may be
affected by controls since it is a major supplier of wool tops.
(This is raw wool that has been cleaned and combed.) More im-
portantly, however, an international arrangement on wool textile
trade might affect Australia's exports of raw wool to countries like
Japan and the United Kingdom which produce and export fabric and
apparel from imported wool.
It is not likely that the Prime Minister will raise the subject.
If he does, however, the President might wish to comment on his
support for an overall trade policy of freer trade, but add that the
textile and apparel industries involve special problems. He might
wish to add that imports make up approximately 25 percent of the
U.S. market for wool textiles. This is of great concern to the
Congress and to the industry, and failing the conclusion of voluntary
arrangements, the possibility of legislated quotas is very real.
Since Australia is a minor supplier of wool textiles, there is
little reason for the President to take the initiative to raise this
subject with the Prime Minister.
Drafter: E/FTD: WMCadette
Clearer: E/FTD-HHopp, E/ICD-SSchiff, E/ORF-Mr. Katz
E/OT-REwing, EA/ANZ-CCBrower,
Treasury-RAnderson, STR-DSchlechty,
Commerce-AGarel, Labor-IKramer, USDA-
Mrs. Hornbeck
S/S-S: WSShepard
X-4155
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Decontrol 3/31/70 )
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
JGA/BP-3-Rev. 1
April 21, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
Background Paper
U.S. INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIA
Summary of the Problem:
As a. rapidly developing country Australia utilizes capital
inflows to help finance economic growth. U.S. private direct
investment has greatly expanded in recent years, especially in
natural resource industries. Despite initial fears the Foreign
Direct Investment Program (FDIP) in 1968 does not appear to have
hampered American investment in Australia. Extensive foreign
control of Australian industry and resources has led to increasing
criticism of foreign ownership during the past year and demands
for Australian participation. Present uncertainties as to the
Australian government's attitude may lead to some contraction of
U.S. investment in 1969 but the long range outlook is for
continuing expansion.
The Interest Equalization Tax (IET) has restricted U.S.
lending activities to Australia. The Australian government,
however, has been able to borrow extensively in Europe and other
arrangements have mitigated the program's effects on Australia.
Despite the recent reduction on the effective IET rate, high
interest costs in the U.S. relative to Switzerland and Germany
continue to make raising of funds prohibitive in the U.S. market.
Major Issues Are:
Direct Investments - Since 1959 U.S. direct private investment
in Australia has grown by 218 percent to a total of $2.4 billion at
the end of 1967 (the last year for which complete data is available).
Although investments in the manufacturing sector remain the largest
($1.3 billion) single area of direct investment, the greatest
growth in recent years has been in the mining industry (1085 percent
since 1959). Recent discoveries of tremendous reserves of iron ore
and large deposits of nickel, oil, gas, bauxite and phosphate have
CONFIDENTIAL
Downgraded at three-year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after date of origin
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JG/BP-3-Rev. 1
CONFIDENTIAL
2
led to a minerals boom. British direct investment remains the
largest (about 49 percent); but U.S. investment has now grown to
almost 40 percent of the total outstanding foreign direct investment.
The announcement of the U.S. Balance of Payments Program in
January 1968, especially restrictions on direct investment, was
initially met with concern by Australian officials. While it
appears capital outflows from the U.S. declined substantially from
the extraordinarily large amount of $324 million in 1967 to an
estimated $160 million in 1968, the latter represents a more
normal increase in U.S. capital outflows in line with past flows
($136 million in 1965 and $147 million in 1966). The continuation
of large capital inflows together with an unexpected strengthening
of exports at the end of 1968 has muted fears of the effects of
the FDIP. Contrary to expectations expressed in early 1968,
Australian reserves of gold and foreign exchange actually increased
in 1968 by $64 million to $1,288 million.
In general Australians have welcomed foreign capital to assist
the country's development as Australia has been faced with static
or declining world demand for her traditional agricultural commodity
exports. Since the end of World War II foreign private capital has
made a larger contribution to capital formation in Australia than
any other developed country except Canada. According to an Australian
study of a few years ago about one-quarter of the assets of all
Australian corporations at that time was financed by foreign investment,
including reinvested earnings and depreciation. Direct foreign
investment has been concentrated in the automotive, chemical, petroleum,
and metals and mining industries.
During the past year criticism of large scale foreign direct
investment, and especially takeovers of Australian companies, has
increased. The opposition has charged foreign investment "system-
atically milks" Australia of her resources. The Government is
preparing legislation to regulate more effectively foreign takeovers
and is expected to announce in the near future that it will prevent
foreign acquisitions of any "sensitive" industry. The Federal
Treasurer, while noting Australia has not changed its policy of
welcoming foreign investment, stated in October the government's
increased desire for "Australian participation in both the management
and equity ownership of foreign enterprises." Such sentiments have
been also expressed on various occasions by the Prime Minister which
has led some local observers to describe him as an "economic
nationalist.' The Prime Minister has stated, however, his opposition
to proposals to compel foreign investors to permit more local
participation. Although recent government statements have been
restrained, restrictive actions and various statements have introduced
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JG/BP-3-Rev.
1
CONFIDENTIAL
3
a\ feeling of uncertainty as to the present Australian government's
policy toward foreign investment within the business community.
In many respects - although not all, since the U.S. is not the
dominant investor - the situation is similar to that in Canada
where extensive foreign control of industry and resources has led
to increasing criticisms and minor restrictions without dampening
the long run enthusiasm of foreign investors. Australia, like
Canada, does not produce the domestic savings needed to finance
the investment required to maintain the desired rapid rate of
growth; and despite nationalist frustrations, there remain few
viable alternatives to present policies of promoting foreign
investment. The present uncertainty as to the government's
attitude might cause a leveling off or decline in U.S. direct
investment in 1969. (The American Chamber of Commerce in Australia
reported in February an expected drop of $45 million in capital
expenditures by existing U.S. firms in Australia). Because of its
newly found mineral wealth, however, the current boom marks only
the beginning of a new era in Australia's economic development
which should involve a substantial amount of foreign investment.
Interest Equalization Tax - The IET has restricted the new
issue market in the U.S. for Australia. The Commonwealth Government
has turned to European markets, including the Eurodollar market, for
long term financing. In 1968 $75 million was raised in Germany and
a public loan of $15 million was floated in Switzerland. On
several occasions the Australian government has asked for exemption
from the IET on borrowings in the U.S. capital market for the
amount of $25-40 million, presumably on an annual base. The USG
has noted that Australia does not meet the conditions under IET
legislation allowing administrative determination of exemption:
(a) threat to stability of the international monetary system or
(b) status as a developing nation. To assist Australia, however,
a special arrangement was agreed upon in 1967 permitting Australia
to borrow limited amounts from the Export-Import Bank with the
understanding that the loan paper would then be resold in private
markets. A $25 million loan was so arranged in late 1967 and a
further $50 million (in two $25 million tranches) in 1968. This
first tranche was drawn in December 1968 (the arrangements made
with the GOA assure that this facility does not adversely affect
the U.S. balance of payments).
Drafted by: E/OMA/IP: JAKlemstine x3384
Cleared by: E/OMA/IP - Mr. Heginbotham
Commerce - Mrs. Blacky
Treasury - Mr. Edmonds
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
S/S-S: WSShepard x4155/
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
JGA/BP- 17-Rev. 2
April 25, 1969
CONFIDENTIAL
VISIT OF JOHN G. GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
Background Paper
DEFENSE PURCHASES/OFFSET PROCUREMENT
SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM
Australia purchases most of the military hardware she buys overseas
from the U.S., and at the same time traditionally experiences deficits
with the U.S. both in the military account and for merchandise trade.
Recognizing that U.S. defense procurement is subject to some degree of
policy direction by the government, Mr. Gorton may press further for
increased U.S. expenditures in Australia, particularly subcontracts,
associated with Australian defense procurements from the U.S. Since we
desire the Australians to continue buying equipment from us, we should
buy enough from them to maintain good relations but without losing sight
of our own balance of payments difficulties.
BACKGROUND
Defense-related transactions have not accounted for a major part of
Australia trade in recent years, making up less than 10% of the dollar
value of Australian exports and imports with the U.S. and only about 1-2%
of Australia's trade with all countries. Australian purchases of U.S.
military equipment have risen sharply in recent years, however, as it is
either unique or competitive in price and meets Australia's needs. Since
these purchases are subject to control by the Australian Government, it
is in a good position to stress the need for more U.S. defense-related
expenditures in Australia to help offset their military procurement in the
U.S.
CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-17-Rev. 2
CONFIDENTIAL
2.
Defense-related transactions with Australia, over the ten-year period,
1964-1973, will have provided the U.S. with an estimated net gain which
averages about $55 million per year. Australian use of U.S. military hard-
ware, moreover, is favorable to our interests and relations with Australia
for a variety of reasons. At this time, we have no formal agreement with
Australia to offset their defense expenditures with equivalent purchases;
we have stated, however, we would cooperate and work closely with the
Australians in defense procurement. This has been difficult to do; high
transportation costs and high labor rates compared to other suppliers in
the Western Pacific area make Australia basically noncompetitive in many
commodity areas. On balance, we should do what we can to retain their
defense business and maintain good relations, with due regard for our own
overall balance of payments problem.
Both Mr. Gorton and Defence Minister Fairhall have made recent
public statements emphasizing the Australian policy to relate large military
orders abroad with opportunities for Australian industry to obtain offset
orders. This presents two distinct advantages to the Australians: (1) It
minimizes the foreign exchange costs of military equipment purchases
from overseas; (2) It maximizes the technological fallout for local manu-
facturers and enhances their developing industries. It would appear that
Australia's future thrust will stress a steadily increasing role for Aus-
tralian industry in the manufacture of components and assemblies of U.S. -
origin military equipment purchased from the U.S. The Prime Minister
also indicated that, although direct U.S. purchases are welcomed, their
primary concern is with increasing the amount of subcontracting for Aus-
tralian firms.
DISCUSSION
Past Accomplishments
Australian purchases of supplies and equipment from the U.S. for
support of their forces in Viet-Nam average about $12 million annually;
these have been, in effect, fully compensated for by U.S. purchases of
sugar ($6. 1 million) and 105 mm ammunition ($6. 4 million). We have
also increased our Rest and Recuperation (R&R) program in Australia to
a current annual rate of $22-25 million. In addition, at Australia's request,
we recently authorized an exception to current "Buy American" policies
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP- 17-Rev. 2
CONFIDENTIAL
3.
for $3 million of potential orders for sheet steel, which will give Australia
a good opportunity to compete for the business and could result in some
cost savings to the U.S. Another exception recently granted involved a
subcontract for helicopter spare parts; this could result in procurement of
approximately $400, 000 - $500, 000 annually. Notwithstanding these sig-
nificant expenditures in the Australian economy, these actions probably
will not satisfy the Australians and additional exceptions will have to be
considered on a case-by-case basis, based on specific Australian requests.
Current Actions
In essence, the present approach used by the Defense Department is
that we have agreed to work closely with the Australians for the purpose
of identifying opportunities for Australian suppliers to participate more
effectively in competition for U.S. defense procurement. In consonance
with this policy, the following measures are being taken:
1. List of Australian Suppliers - To facilitate solicitation of
Australian bids by Defense procurement offices, the Australians
prepared a brochure identifying the name of the Australian firm,
their major products, the number of employees and if there is a
U.S. affiliate. These brochures were recently disseminated to the
Services and Defense Supply Agency for use by contracting officers.
2. U.S./Australian Liaison Meeting - At the request of
Minister of Defence Fairhall in his meeting with Secretary of
Defense Clifford last August, we established a liaison group to
consider procurement matters of mutual interest. The initial
meeting, held last October, was devoted to an elaboration and
clarification of selected problem areas. Policy and procedural
guidance were issued to both the U.S. Military Services procure-
ment offices and Australian governmental and industrial activities.
Preliminary planning is underway for the second of these liaison
meetings during the week of 19 May 1969.
3. Commercial Counselor - Defence Supply - The Australians
have established a new position in their Washington Embassy, a
Commercial Counselor - Defence Supply, which provides a focal
point to work with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-17-Rev. 2
CONFIDENTIAL
4.
(Installations & Logistics). Efforts are directed toward consi-
deration of selected commodity items (e. g., the sheet steel and
helicopter spares cited above) to be identified and justified on a
specific case basis.
4. Australian Aero Industry - Under the day-to-day liaison
arrangement between Defense Department and the Australian
Embassy, a conference was held recently to discuss the capabilities
and capacities of the Australian aero industry. Australian Govern-
ment and commercial representatives described their aircraft
overhaul and maintenance capability and the Military Services are
presently evaluating their FY 1970 requirements in the Western
Pacific area. In the event any subsequent Australian bids are
low, this could result in some work for this key Australian industry
for aircraft overhaul and rework which is now performed offshore
elsewhere (Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand and Viet-Nam).
5. Loan of a U.S. Logistician - Australian defense officials
have requested the loan of a senior U.S. logistician to assist
Australia in strengthening their logistic organization. Secretary
Clifford and General Wheeler both agreed this was a good idea.
The Australians wanted to assign the American to a very senior
decision-making position directly in the line of authority, and
proposed a three-year contract under which Australia will fully
reimburse the U.S. for all costs incurred in the assignment.
The U.S. consensus is that we should cooperate with
Australia by supplying a senior logistician as agreed, but that
we should insist that he serve in an advisory or consulting capacity.
(This would avoid any political or legal complications.) On 16
April 1969, the Secretary of Defense approved the recommendation
to furnish a logistician in an advisory capacity, not in the line of
authority. Defense Department officials are currently discussing
details of this arrangement with the Australians.
6. U.S. /DoD Procurement Information Office (PIO),
Australia - Active operation of this office, which was established
in November 1966, is continuing. The officer-in-charge serves
as a catalyst between Australian industry and military procurement
offices in the Western Pacific area.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
JGA/BP-17-Rev. 2
CONFIDENTIAL
5.
7. Subcontracting F-111 Wing Tanks - The General Dynamics
Corp. has isolated the 600 gallon external wing tank for the F-111
aircraft as a possible production item for subcontracting from
Australia. General Dynamics is presently evaluating potential
cost savings of proposals submitted by two Australian candidates,
and a decision may be forthcoming prior to Mr. Gorton's visit.
The initial order quantity is about 480 units with an estimated
value of $2.3 million. (May be updated.)
8. Subcontracting to Australian Firms - The Buy American
Act and the 50% bid evaluation factor does not apply in cases where
U.S. prime contractors subcontract with Australian firms as long
as the end item has less than 50% foreign components. There has
been some Australian concern that use of customs duties might
cause their prices to be higher than those of U.S. competitors.
To assist in this respect, DoD agreed to help inform U.S. con-
tractors that duty-free entry certificates can be easily obtained
for this purpose where appropriate. U.S. Customs regulations
facilitate easy passage of DoD destined materiel through customs,
but it is incumbent upon the sender to properly address the items
as destined for the appropriate U.S. Military Service consigned to
the U.S. contractor's plant. Further efforts are planned to identify
those cases where subcontracting would be useful.
Drafted By: OSD/I&L - Mr. Claussenius
Cleared By: ASD/I&L - Mr. Shillito
OSD/Compt - Mr. Kovarikt)
OSD/ISA - CDR Kuhnel.
Mr. Alnecv,
EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
S/S-S -WSShepard, Ext. 4154/Rm 7237
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Nixon Library. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.