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AUSTRALIA - Prime Minister Gorton Vol. 2 of 2 May 6-7, 1969 [2 of 2]
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AUSTRALIA - Prime Minister Gorton Vol. 2 of 2 May 6-7, 1969 [2 of 2]
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SECRET
- 3 -
-- to spell out in general terms U.S. interests and
objectives in Southeast Asia emphasizing our
continuing commitmentsto its security, while
pointing out you are still considering the specific
elements of our policies to meet these commitments.
-- to establish through the Gorton visit that your
Administration intends to give equal priority to
Asia and is not European-oriented as some Asians
now fear.
-- to reassure an Australia, moving away from UK
tutelage to an independent power position in Asia,
that in the United States it has a steadfast and
special friend who will not desert Australia if it
faces hostile aggression beyond its own capability
to handle.
9. Special Subjects to Raise: Gorton will probably raise
on his own initiative Malaysia/Singapore defense, Vietnam, and
post-Vietnam war Asian prospects. This discussion will give you
an opportunity to bring Gorton up to date on your thinking in
Vietnam and reassure him on our commitments in Asia. I suggest
that you may also wish to mention --
-- your personal appreciation for Gorton's attendance
at General Eisenhower's funeral.
-- appreciation for Australia's contribution in Vietnam.
(There are 8000 Australian troops there.)
--
Australia's helpfulness in representing our interests
in Cambodia, particularly during our current efforts
to resume relations with Sihanouk.
-- appreciation for Australia's cooperation in science and
space, and an invitation for Australia to send a high-
level science mission to the U.S.
SECRET
SECRET
- 4 -
10. Sensitive Areas: Gorton reacts negatively to pressure
tactics and is particularly allergic to pressure to sign the NPT.
Gorton also does not like to be photographed close up, because of
the scars on his face from a war injury.
11. The Gorton Personality: Gorton is tough, blunt and
impatient of formalities. He is likely to launch into a discussion
of major policy problems almost immediately after meeting you.
He likes straight answers. He is prickly, and does not like to be
taken for granted. (He thought that the last U.S. Administration did
just that, and was therefore particularly appreciative of his first
meeting with you.) He feels strongly that he has, in his own fashion,
gone out of his way to accommodate our interests in his part of the
world. He will be seeking, not legal precision, but a real and
personal feeling that we intend to stick by Australia.
12. I have also attached the scope paper (Tab F) and a paper
on Malaysia/Singapore defense (Tab G). In addition, the State
Department has prepared a number of background papers which you
may want to look over (they are in the accompanying briefing book).
Attachments
SECRET
(Huebner) JK
April 30, 1969
Suggestions for the President's Toast to
John Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia
Just about one year from now Australia will celebrate the 200th
anniversary of the landing of Captain James Cook and the crew of the
ENDEAVOUR at Botany Bay, near what is now Sydney.
Your government, Mr. Prime Minister, asked ours to send a ship
to join in the celebration. Unfortunately, we had to decline because you
asked us to send a sailing ship, and in the whole United States Navy,
not a single, old-fashjoned, wind-powered vessel capable of making
the journey could be found.
I hasten to say, however, that this security gap is not quite as bad
as it might sound. This country does have a famous sailing ship -- a
12 meter called the Intrepid. I wish I could tell you tonight that the
Intrepid will sail to Australia to represent us at the Cook bicentenary,
even though it is not a government ship. But when I suggested this to
the skipper, our Chief of Protocol, "Bus" Mosbacher, he seemed
somehow reluctant. I think he is afraid someone would suggest that --
now that he's in diplomacy -- he should take along the America's Cup
rather than wait for Australia to come and get it.
Your celebration of the anniversary of Captain Cook's landing is
a fine reminder of your country's exciting past. An American writer,
Mark Twain, once said of Australian history: "It does not read like
history, but like the most beautiful of lies. "
2
And now, of course, your country is still paced toward the future.
The Australian writer, George Johnston, placed that point in perspec-
tive when he wrote: "In a world where SO many have come to fear the
beginning of the end, Australia has come only to the end of the
beginning."
In the worried world of 1969, Australia and the United States are
partners in many ways - - in spirit, in the ANZUS and SEATO alliances,
in our defense of freedom in Korea and Vietnam, in our goal of develop-
ment for the countries of the Pacific, in our quest for a better world.
In this high purpose, I pledge you the unfailing support and continued
loyal friendship of the United States of America.
And now I would like to offer a riddle: What does Australia have
in common with Monaco and Sikkim? The answer, of course, is that
the leaders of all three are married to beautiful American women.
This is a little-known form of international cooperation. We are
delighted to welcome your lovely lady from Maine back to our shores
as one of us - - and as one of you.
####
(HUEBNER) JK
May 1, 1969
Suggestions for Remarks at the Departure of
John Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia
This visit has been enormously useful for me and for this govern-
ment. It has given us all a chance to get acquainted with an outstanding
statesman from a land that has been aptly described by one of its poets
as "the land of reliance and never-give-in and help-your-mate."
The spirit of "help-your-mate" is deeply involved in the coopera-
tion between our countries. I might point out that our space program
has six tracking stations in Australia. And Australia is a member of
ANZUS and SEATO, two alliances which are fundamental to our policy
in Southeast Asia. Australian troops are fighting beside ours and those
of other free world nations in Vietnam even as they fought beside us in
World War I, World War II, and in Korea.
While Australia has been called "a prophecy still to be fulfilled,"
it is making an outstanding contribution to peaceful cooperation and
economic development in its part of the world. It participates whole-
heartedly in the Colombo Plan, the Asian Development Bank, and
many other regional activities. In percentage of national income
devoted to foreign aid, Australia ranks second in the world, a record
of which any nation can be proud. Australia and America can both be
proud of the contribution we are making, as partners, to the security
and progress of the Pacific region. That partnership and that contri-
bution will continue.
2
These two days have provided opportunities for us to discuss a
wide range of subjects, including, not only Vietnam and regional
security questions, but also a number of topics outside the security
field. Australia is geographically closer to some of these problems
than we are, SO I have very much appreciated the opportunity to
exchange views with its Prime Minister. I have obtained a number
of new insights, but fundamentally, I find the perspective from "down
under" is very much the same as it is from Washington.
Now you return to your homeland - - exchanging the beauties of
a Washington spring for the beauties of an Australian autumn - - -
without even going through a hot summer.
An Australian writer has said that the flame of freedom will never
die in Australia because it is fanned by "a wind blowing out of the far
country. " That wind is the democratic spirit of our forefathers which
is the product of the old frontier in both Australia and America.
At a time when democratic ideals are under attack all over the
world, all free nations can turn to Australia as they have often turned
to America, and they can be grateful that the winds of freedom are still
blowing "out of that far country."
####
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
April 29, 1969
S/S-6643
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Your Meeting with the Prime Minister
of Australia
Summary
The Points to Stress
1. Our intention to maintain a continued firm
posture in Asia.
2. Our continued firm adherence to ANZUS and SEATO.
3. The importance we attach to Australia's
contribution to Southeast Asian regional affairs,
including its commitment to the defense of Malaysia/
Singapore.
4. Our hope that Australia will continue to play
a leading role in the region.
5. Our appreciation for Australia's Viet-Nam
support.
6. Our desire for continued close consultations
with Australia on Viet-Nam and other regional security
matters.
The Points to Avoid
1. Pressuring Gorton to sign the NPT.
2. Asking for more Australian troops for Viet-Nam.
SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification
SECRET
2
The big question mark in Gorton's mind is the
continued firmness of U. S. Asia policy under your
administration. This underlies the three main subjects
he will want to discuss.
These are:
-- Malaysia/Singapore defense.
-- Viet-Nam.
-- Post-Vietnam Southeast Asia.
A. Malaysia/Singapore Defense
On February 25, Gorton announced that Australia will
maintain forces, including ground troops, in Malaysia/
Singapore after the British pull out in 1971. This
announcement put an end to a year-long, meandering,
public foreign-policy debate on "forward defense" versus
"fortress Australia." Forward defense has won, and
Australia is headed in the direction of increasing
involvement in regional affairs -- a development which
is in our interest as well as Australia's.
The fact that Gorton made his announcement before
his visit to Washington has simplified our task.
Previously, he seemed likely to seek a specific U. S.
guarantee of the safety of his ground forces before
committing them. Now, it is clear we will not be asked
to pay this price for an Australian ground-force presence
in Malaysia/Singapore.
On the other hand, the announcement has also put
us on a spot, challenging us to be as firm and forth-
right as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that
Australia has met our requirement to do all it can;
now what will we do to support its commitment?
In this connection Gorton may still ask for specific
assurances of U. S. support for his forces. At the very
SECRET
SECRET
3
least, he will wish to assess the general posture your
administration will assume in Southeast Asia. It must
be assumed that the impressions he receives from you
on this question may affect the confidence and vigor
with which Australia assumes its heightened role in
regional affairs.
Gorton will:
-- try to get a feel for how much help he can
expect from the United States if his forces run into a
situation they cannot handle;
-- possibly ask you directly what we would do if
the peninsula were invaded by Communist China or North
Viet-Nam, or if an externally supported insurgency got
out of control;
-- possibly ask you whether the ANZUS Treaty will
apply to Australian forces stationed in Malaysia/Singapore
after 1971.
You should:
say that (as you told him in a personal message)
you welcome the Australian decision as a valuable
contribution to the stability and security of Southeast
Asia;
-- say that Australia's decision makes it easier
for us to go on making our own contribution, which
consists mainly of our forces deployed elsewhere in the
Western Pacific area as a deterrent to Communist expansion;
-- add that in this connection we were heartened
by Gorton's recent assurance to our Ambassador that
Australian forces would fight beside ours in Thailand if
the need arose;
-- stress that although we are not a party, we
are keenly interested in the Five-Power (Australia, U.K.,
SECRET
SECRET
4
New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore) consultations on new
defense arrangements for Malaysia/Singapore;
-- add that we would like to encourage this
development in any way we can, such as through the
possible joint use of a Singapore naval facility (which
our two navies are now discussing);
-- assure Gorton we fully understand that (as he
said in his speech) a situation could conceivably arise
with which Australia and her allies could not cope, and
that Australia would then have to look for support to
"allies outside the region" and decide what to do "in
the light of circumstances then prevailing;"
-- assure him that, as Australia's principal ally
in the Pacific, we would of course stand ready to consult
fully and promptly on what support we might give;
-- tell him we agree with his view (in his speech)
that we cannot now know what those circumstances might
be and, therefore, cannot now make precise decisions.
With respect to the ANZUS Treaty, you should:
-- avoid raising the question of the specific
applicability of ANZUS to Australian forces in Malaysia/
Singapore;
-- (if Gorton raises it) say that we recognize
Malaysia and Singapore are within the treaty area, that
the continuing presence of Australian forces there
serves the interests of both of us, and that questions
concerning our obligations under the treaty may someday
arise;
-- stress that we would want, therefore, to maintain
close consultation about future Australian commitments
to Malaysia and Singapore and future deployments of
Australian forces;
SECRET
SECRET
5
-- (if Gorton presses you for details on how
ANZUS applies) say you doubt that it is necessary or
desirable to speculate on theoretical applications of
the Treaty;
-- note that Gorton has said he would prefer
"general understandings" to "specific treaty obligations"
in Australia's future defense relations with Malaysia
and Singapore;
=- say that, similarly, we feel that maintenance
of the general understanding represented by the ANZUS
Treaty is better than trying to delimit specific treaty
obligations in hypothetical contingencies.
(For more precise language in responding on this
subject, see Background-Position Paper.)
B. Viet-Nam
The Australians have contributed 8000 troops.
Gorton has announced that that is the limit. Public
support for the war, over 60 per cent eighteen months
ago, has now slipped to below 50 per cent. Gorton is
sensitive about being fully consulted as an ally. He is
also worried about our possibly agreeing to a weak
settlement that would lead to a deterioration in Southeast
Asia.
Gorton will:
-- ask your assessment of the current situation in
Viet-Nam;
-- ask about the outlook for the Paris talks.
You should:
-- solicit his views;
-- give him the picture as you see it;
SECRET
SECRET
6
-- give him the feeling that you are taking him
fully and frankly into your confidence;
-- tell him how highly we value Australia's
contribution, in both military and non-military assistance;
-- not ask for more Australian troops.
C. Post-Vietnam Southeast Asia
Gorton, like many Australians, is nervous about a
possible U. S. withdrawal from Asia after Viet-Nam.
You should reassure him.
Gorton will:
-- probe your intentions on maintaining a U. S.
presence in the area;
-- be interested in your thoughts on future trends,
including Japan's role in the area.
You should:
-- assure him that our interest in the security
and economic development of Southeast Asia will continue
after Viet-Nam;
-- stress the importance we will continue to attach
to ANZUS and SEATO;
-- outline your thinking on post-Vietnam Asia,
highlighting the leading role we foresee Australia
playing in Southeast Asia, and the increasing contribution
we hope to see Japan make.
-- ask Gorton's views on the future of his part of
the world; the problems he foresees; how he envisions
Australia's role and those of the United States and Japan.
SECRET
SECRET
7
These are the high points. Additional talking
points, and Background on the Visit, are enclosed.
Wm
William P. Rogers
Enclosures:
1. Additional Talking Points.
2. Background on the Visit.
SECRET
SECRET
Additional Talking Points
Other possible topics which Gorton may raise include:
-- U. S. trade restrictions.
-- offset military purchases.
-- nuclear excavation study.
=- Non-proliferation Treaty.
-- Defense Space Communications Facility.
-- your visiting Australia.
Topics you may wish to raise:
-- EC-121 incident.
-- scientific cooperation.
Topics Gorton may raise
1. U. S. Import Restrictions
(For the record, Gorton may mention various standing
Australian complaints against U. S. import restrictions.
While we do have restraints on Australia's principal
exports to us, we are still its third best customer,
taking about 14 per cent of total exports. Australia's
economic situation today is excellent. You should
listen sympathetically, but avoid promising more liberal
treatment.)
Gorton may:
-- complain about U. S. restraints on -- or
protectionist moves against -- meat, dairy products, wool,
woolen textiles, lead, zinc or steel, asserting that
SECRET
SECRET
2
such restrictions are inconsistent with our professed
devotion to free trade and that Australia should enjoy
freer access to the U. S. market;
-- point out that the bilateral balance of trade
runs 2 to 1 in favor of the U. S.;
-- allege that our voluntary restraint program on
meat imports (in which Australia is cooperating under
protest) is unfair because it restricts Australia to less
than its historical share of the U. S. market;
-- thank you for relaxing (at his request) the
May 1 deadline for Australian compliance with sanitary
provisions of our meat inspection law.
You should:
-- not raise the subject;
-- (if Gorton raises it) say we will give the most
sympathetic possible consideration to Australia's position
on trade questions, consistent with our own balance of
payments problem and the difficulties of some American
industries;
-- note that Australia's overall balance of payments
is currently healthy;
-- state your position on trade policy, declaring
that you intend to resist protectionist moves in the
U.S.;
-- stress that to head them off, you will need
the cooperation of other countries. Australia's
agreement to the voluntary restraint program on meat
was most helpful in this regard.
-- (if Gorton says the meat program is unfair)
point out that giving Australia its historical share
of the market would have meant imposing cutbacks on
other suppliers, who would have refused to cooperate
in the voluntary program;
SECRET
SECRET
3
-- point out that this would have necessitated
the imposition of country quotas, which both we and
the Australians wish to avoid;
-- point out that it would be very difficult for
us to force cutbacks on the small, poor Central American
countries, developing nations whose meat industries
we have assisted;
-- note that under the voluntary restraint program,
Australia will still be able to sell us 41/2 per cent
more meat in 1969 than in 1968 -- more. than in any
previous year except one.
2. Offset Military Purchases
(Australia is a major purchaser of U. S. military
equipment. To offset their expenditures partially,
we try to do as much DOD purchasing as possible in
Australia. The problem is that the Australians are not
competitive in most lines. We have taken a few special
measures to assist them, which have lessened the gap
slightly.)
Gorton may:
-- press for increased Department of Defense
procurement in Australia, as a further offset to their
large purchases of military equipment from us.
You should:
-- not raise the subject;
-- (if Gorton raises it) reply that we want to be
as helpful as we can;
-- note that discussions aretaking place regularly
on the subject between the Department of Defense and the
Australian Embassy;
SECRET
SECRET
4
-- suggest that Gorton explore this in depth
with Secretary Laird.
3. Nuclear Excavation Study
(A detailed study of the feasibility of constructing
a harbor with nuclear explosions at Cape Keraudren fell
through when the mining company involved declined to
contribute financially. In developing the agreement
for this study, Gorton had reacted indignantly to what
he took as an indication that we intended to use the
project to "pressure" him into signing the NPT. The
Australian and American Atomic Energy Commissions have
just agreed to undertake a preliminary feasibility survey
of potential sites on the west coast of Australia to
determine their general suitability for a nuclear
excavation project. This agreement is expressly not
a commitment on the part of either Government to proceed
to a detailed survey of a specific site, as was planned
at Cape Keraudren.)
Gorton may:
-- hope the current survey of potential harbor
sites will ultimately lead to a nuclear excavation project;
-- possibly ask you point-blank whether there
would be a relationship between our willingness to
perform such a project and Australia's signing the NPT.
You should:
-- not raise the subject;
-- if Gorton raises it, be pleased that the two
Atomic Energy Commissions are able to continue their studies
of possible nuclear explosion projects in Australia,
since a useful project -- if it proved technically and
economically feasible and did not violate the Limited
Test Ban Treaty -- could be a major advance in the peace-
ful utilization of nuclear energy;
SECRET
SECRET
5
-- stress that prospects for international
acceptance of such projects will be enhanced if the
parties seek to gain international approval as the
study proceeds. We can dispel suspicions by conducting
the study openly, recognizing the interest of other
countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency;
-- assure Gorton once again that we would have
no thought of using such a project to "pressure" him
into signing the NPT;
-- note, however, that we cannot avoid the fact
that performing the first international PNE project
for a non-signatory country would create problems with
potential NPT adherents. This point was brought out
during Senate hearings on the NPT.
4. Non-Proliferation Treaty
(Because of fears of industrial espionage by IAEA
safeguards inspectors and lurking doubts of the
effectiveness of our nuclear umbrella, Australia has
not yet signed the NPT. Gorton will probably sign it
sooner or later -- sooner if no one pushes him.)
Gorton may:
-- bring up Australia's doubts about the NPT.
You should:
-- if Gorton does not raise the subject, mention that
you hope he will discuss it with the Secretary of State;
-- if Gorton does bring it up, say the NPT is an
important foreign policy objective of ours; we believe
in the long run it will be equally important to Australia;
and we hope Australia will sign in the not too distant
future;
SECRET
SECRET
6
-- reassure Gorton that (as we have specifically
confirmed to the GOA) the ANZUS and SEATO treaties place
Australia under the nuclear protection of the United
States;
-- assure him that we are convinced that IAEA
safeguards will not be a cover for industrial espionage
nor otherwise impair progress in peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. We are willing to place our nuclear
facilities under such safeguards, except those with
national security significance;
-- invite him to discuss his reservations about
the NPT further with the Secretary of State, and offer
further consultation between U. S. and Australian
technical experts if desired.
5. Defense Space Communications Facility
See Background Paper.
6. Your visiting Australia
Gorton will:
-- probably invite you to pay a return visit to
Australia.
You should:
-- say you would like very much to do so, but
cannot fix a date at this time.
Topics you may wish to raise
1. EC-121 Incident
You should:
-- take Gorton fully into your confidence, outlining
the reasons for our restrained response.
SECRET
SECRET
7
2. Scientific Cooperation
You should:
-- tell Gorton how much we appreciate Australia's
wholehearted cooperation with us in science, space
and military research;
-- say we are pleased with the agreement on
scientific cooperation concluded last fall when a team
of U. S. scientists visited Australia;
-- add that we would welcome a return visit by
Australian scientists this year.
SECRET
SECRET
Background on the Visit
What Gorton is Like
Gorton is a distinctively Australian Prime Minister.
In this he contrasts with Menzies, who said he was
"British to his boot-heels,' and Holt, who said he
would go "all the way with LBJ." Much more than they,
Gorton personifies -- and manipulates -- his countrymen's
feelings of nationalism and egalitarianism. Specifically:
-- in personality, he projects an image of the
"typical Australian" -- masculine, direct, tough, down-
to-earth, "the casual knockabout bloke next door."
(The image is accurate but incomplete: he is also an
Oxford honors graduate in history.)
-- in policy, he appeals to nationalist and populist
sentiments, criticizing foreign investment, flirting
with a more independent foreign policy, moving toward
the left on social welfare. (His policy changes have
been more rhetorical than real, but they have contributed
to his image.)
Gorton is a popular Prime Minister. Erratic,
abrasive and high-handed behavior during his first year
has made him many enemies among newspapermen, politicians
and bureaucrats, but polls show the people like him.
Sixty-two per cent approve of the way he is handling
his job, the same percentage as six months ago.
Despite a recent furor over his public attentions to
young women, he is currently favored to win his first
general election (which must be held by November this year)
by an impressive margin.
Gorton is such a strong Prime Minister that he
has been accused of "Americanizing" Australian politics
and trying to smuggle in the Presidential system. He has
been compared to Andrew Jackson because he:
SECRET
SECRET
2
-- has rural origins, a glamorous war record and
an earthy political style which irks the establishment.
-- is strong-willed and hot tempered.
-- is blunt and direct.
-- prizes action over reflection.
-- runs the government as a one-man show with an
iron hand and a "kitchen cabinet.'
-- gives jobs to his supporters ("spoils system").
In his dealings with us, Gorton has shown himself
to be:
-- sensitive about being taken for granted. He
wants his and Australia's views to be fully considered.
-- angered by any suggestion of pressure or arm-
twisting.
-- resistant to persuasion. He tends to come
around if left alone, but digs his heels in if he feels
he is being pushed.
-- contemptuous of what he construes as flattery
or eagerness to please.
Why He is Coming to Washington
Gorton's purpose is to get better acquainted with
you and senior officials of your administration and to
explore in greater depth subjects he raised during his
visit at the time of the Eisenhower funeral. Embassy
Canberra reports he is quite relaxed about the visit
and seemingly anticipates friendly discussions on a range
of subjects rather than hard bargaining or attempts
to find solutions to specific problems.
SECRET
SECRET
3
However, he will be extremely interested in East
Asian security matters, and will certainly probe your
intentions with respect to future U. S. policies
in Southeast Asia.
Suggestions on Handling Gorton
Gorton is a prickly, aggressive man who can be
extremely charming but also extremely difficult to
handle. Foreign relations for him are primarily a
matter of personal relationships between leaders.
In general, with Gorton you should be especially careful to:
-- make him feel he is an equal partner; ask his
opinions.
-- be as frank as you can.
-- avoid appearing eager to please.
-- avoid pushing him but don't let him push you
(he respects toughness).
You are starting with an advantage in that he
wound up rather jaundiced about the Johnson administration,
but reportedly has a high opinion of you. Also, he is
under some pressure to get along with you because it is
widely believed in Australia that he did not make a good
impression on President Johnson. He was accordingly on
his best behavior when he met you in April, and was
effusive in his praise of you when he returned to
Australia ("I like the guy.").
SECRET
SECRET - LIMDIS
Date: April 1, 1969
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Time: 10:30 A.M.
Place: White House
SUBJECT: Prime Minister Gorton's Meeting with the President
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister John G. Gorton
Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
Cyrus Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's
Department,
Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the
President
Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia-
New Zealand Affairs , Department of State
The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the
latter's visit to Washington would be rescheduled for May 6-7.
Project 949
The Prime Minister opened the substantive discussion
by commenting on Project 949 (a U. S. proposal to establish
a Surveillance Satellite Ground Station in Australia). He said
the GOA was in favor of the project but hoped that it could
be announced soon and that the announcement could reveal the
defense nature of the project in order to forestall the curiosity
and questions of Australians should the sort of generalized
cover story desired by the U. S. be used.
Mr. Kissinger saidthe Defense Dept. would prefer not
to reveal yet the capability of the 949 system. The President
SECRET - LIMDIS
Group 1 - Excluded from automatic down-
grading and declassification
SECRET as LIMDIS
2
said the USG would try to work out an announcement that would
neither compromise the security aspects of 949 nor embarrass
the GOA. Gorton said the GOA would go along with the
U. S. decision in the matter, but added that an agreed
announcement should be made soon before rumors begin to
circulate.
Sabah Dispute
Prime Minister Gorton explained Australia's attitude
towards the Sabah dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines.
He said Australia has a continuing interest in Southeast Asia
and will be increasingly involved in the affairs of the
region, but wants to avoid getting mixed up in its internal
quarrels. He said the GOA has told the Malaysians this and
has told them that they, themselves, should handle small
incursions, subversion, etc., if any, by the Filipinos,
noting that the presence of Australian forces in the Malay
peninsula frees Malaysian armed forces for such action in
East Malaysia. In case of major Philippine action, the GOA
would be prepared to consider what else it might do to help
Malaysia.
The President characterized the Australian position in
this matter as responsible. He said one of the greatest
pitfalls statesmen face is getting involved in quarrels that
do not directly concern their countries. Gorton agreed,
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describing Southeast Asia as the present "Balkans of the
world." He said the GOA was doing what it could to discourage
Malaysia from buying sophisticated jet fighers, which France
and Canada were urging the Malaysians to buy. On April 2,
he said, Australia would be offering Malaysia Sabres (it was
unclear whether they were offered for sale or on loan) to
induce the GOM not to waste its resources buying other aircraft.
The President applauded the constructive Australian approach
to the problem, agreeing with Gorton that Malaysia does not
need sophisticated fighters.
Israeli Desire to Purchase Mirage Spares
Gorton said Australia had been approached by the Israelis
who wished to purchase spare parts -- which France would not
supply -- for their Mirage aircraft. Australia could not do
this under the terms of their licensing agreement with the
French. Gorton said he thought it would be a mistake to
allow the Israeli air force to deteriorate vis a vis the Arab
air forces, and he wondered if the U. S. would perhaps have
enough interest in this question to put in a word with the
French Government that might enable Australia to supply the
desired spares. The President said he would look into it.
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Meat Inspection
The next topic on the Prime Minister's agenda was a
problem concerning inspection of Australian meat destined
for the export to the U. S. Gorton said Australia has
made every effort over the years to meet USDA requirements
in this regard. Recently, however, the USDA imposed a May 1
deadline for certain changes in inspection procedures which
Australia cannot meet, although they will comply as promptly
as possible. Gorton said he was not asking for a bigger
meat quota, just hoping for relaxation of the May 1 deadline
so that Australian meat exports can keep moving. He noted
that Australia is a good U. S. customer and must be able
to sell to this country in return. The President agreed to
have the Department of Agriculture look into the Prime
Minister's request.
Viet-Nam
Gorton asked the President to comment on the Viet-Nam
situation. The President first expressed gratitude for
Australia's support of the U. S. in Viet-Nam. He said
we want to end the war, but it must be in a way that we can
live with, that will not plant the seeds of another war.
It is impossible for us just to pull out. The time is ripe
to seek a negotiated settlement, but he was not sure, he
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5
said, that it was possible in the short run.
More likely to succeed, he said, is a phased withdrawal
that would eventually reduce the conflict to a level that
the GVN itself could handle. He said that the U. S. is
exploring all avenues but expects the next three months to
show little visible movement and to be marked by increasing
public pressure -- probably on the GOA as well as the USG --
for a hasty withdrawal. The war must notbe allowed to end,
however, in a way that could be interpreted as a defeat for
the U. S. and its allies, thereby encouraging aggressive
elements in the Communist world. Gorton expressed agreement,
saying that Australia has much at stake in Viet-Nam and seeks
neither a precipitate withdrawal nor what he described as
a "Laotian solution. "
The President said the so-called domino theory is
spoken of disparagingly these days, but in fact our posture
in Viet-Nam affects the countries of Southeast Asia; countries
such as Japan, which would not wish to see a solution in
Viet-Nam that encouraged the "hawks" of the Communist world,
and in fact our whole relationship with the Communist powers
on the world scene. The Viet-Nam war poisons our relations
with certain European countries, the President said; they
are not interested in it and do not care about it. The Latin
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6
American countries tend to feel the same way. Domestic
opposition is substantial. Nevertheless we must persevere
in our effort to achieve a workable peace, orchestrating
the diplomatic and military instruments we have at hand for
the purpose. He said one point that bears emphasis is that
we cannot achieve an effective peace without the cooperation
of the South Vietnamese. President Thieu is coming along
well and is quitereasonable, but he cannot be rushed unduly.
Malaysia/Singapore
After the war in Viet-Nam has ended, Gorton asked, what
interest will the U. S. retain in the Malaysia/Singapore
area, which Britain is leaving and in which Australia is
deeply committed. The President said this should be the
major topic of discussion during the Prime Minister's visit
to Washington in May. Speaking broadly, however, the President
said, the U. S. would remain interested in and concerned with
East Asia, a vast area, possessed of a large population and
extensive natural resources, with China at its heart. During
the last quarter of this century, he said, "the action will
be in the Pacific.
The U. S. interest therein must continue. It will not
take the form of domination but will seek new forms of
cooperation. The resources of power in the region are great;
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there is a bigger role in regional activities for Japan,
for example, even though the Japanese military role must
remain limited. New devices to promote regional cohesion
are needed. Gorton agreed with what the President said.
He said the major thrust should be in the direction of
economic development. He commented that defensive military
alliances among the Southeast Asian countries seem not to
be in the cards at this time, but speculated that non-aggression
agreements might be a useful approach to furthering regional
cooperation and security.
Gorton observed that the Southeast Asian countries need
the protection of an external military shield while they are
developing. Australia is doing its part to help provide that
protection, he said, but it is a country of only 12 million
inhabitants and its military capacity is limited. He noted
that the British are not prepared to commit themselves to do
any more than consult if contingencies arise which are beyond
Australia's ability to handle. Gorton voiced concern at the
conceivable prospect of Australian forces fully committed to
Southeast Asia, still unable to do the job there, and leaving
Australia itself unprotected.
The President said he could not conceive of the U. S.
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8
abandoning Southeast Asia. He said the U. S. hopes for a
continuing British interest in the area. He said the
U. S. does not wish to be the only power on the scene
-- "we would like some company." Gorton replied, "So would
we," and the President responded "Well, you have us."
EA/ANZ: RWMoore: rlw 4/1/69
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TALKING PAPER FOR THE GORTON VISIT
THE US VIEW OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
Prime Minister Gorton's prime objective during his visit will
be to probe your thinking about future US policy in Asia, particularly
Southeast Asia. After intensive internal debate about future Australian
policy with regard to Malaysia/Singapore, both within the Australian
Government and his own mind, Gorton has recently announced his
intention to station Australian ground as well as air forces in Malaysia
and Singapore beyond the British exit in 1971. He does this in the
hope/expectation that the US will support Australia (and New Zealand)
in a crunch.
During his first visit here, Gorton specifically suggested that
during his May visit, you discuss with him American interests and
objectives in Southeast Asia.
We do not believe that he will be looking for specific US com-
mitments under ANZUS concerning Malaysia/Singapore, and you should
not be precise on this question. He will be looking for a general
reassurance that our Vietnam experiences, our renewed emphasis on
Europe, and our domestic problems will not add up to a substantial US
disengagement from Asia after Vietnam.
Attached are suggested talking points on this subject, designed
to reassure Gorton about continuing US interest in Southeast Asia,
without laying out specific policy commitments in advance of the
intensive consideration of our post-Vietnam Asian policy now going on.
These talking points draw in part upon an interagency paper, drafted
at your request and considered in the NSC Review Group, which provides
an interim analysis of US interests and objectives in Southeast Asia.
This paper (also attached) represents an accelerated input to the
thoroughgoing exploration of our post-Vietnam Asian policy alternatives
that will be submitted in July.
As the paper brings out, there are important differences within
the Government about: the relative priority of Southeast Asia; the nature
of the threats; and the proper US role. You will probably not want to
discuss these differences with Gorton.
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TALKING POINTS
1.
Introduction: I asked our Government to study US interests
and objectives in Southeast Asia in preparation for our discussions, on
the basis of your expressed wish to discuss these questions in depth. We
are still in the midst of a major review of our policies in Southeast Asia
as they relate to the post-Vietnam War period. We have reached some
preliminary conclusions of a largely general nature but have not yet
reached definitive conclusions on a number of key specific issues.
2.
Current US Commitments:
-- Direct commitments to Japan, South Korea, Republic of
China, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand,
plus SEATO protocol states.
-- Many assurances given to Thailand that we will assist her
in combating communist subversion.
-- Commitment to Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand
includes cases where armed forces, public vessels or
aircraft come under attack anywhere in the Pacific.
-- This is an extensive network of obligations. We intend to
maintain these commitments. The question arises as to the
US interests and objectives which underlie these commitments
and as to how we will maintain them.
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3.
US Strategic Interests in Southeast Asia:
-- Direct strategic interest. Free movement and access to
the Indian Ocean. Southeast Asia's critical strategic
location in Asia.
-- The vast distances in the Pacific. The importance of a
US presence in Southeast Asia in order to make our East
Asian commitments credible.
-- The importance to the US of Australia and Japan. Our
close relations with these countries are keystones of the
US presence in the Western Pacific. Free passage through
Southeast Asian waters is a vital lifeline for these allies,
and thus indirectly assumes larger importance for the US.
4.
US Economic Interests:
-- US trade with Southeast Asia is less than 4% of our total
trade; and total American investment in the area is only
$1 billion, most of it in the Philippines.
-- Nevertheless, Southeast Asia has 250 million people,
growing economies and an expanding market. The economic
importance of Southeast Asia to the US, though limited, has
increased since World War II and will continue to increase.
-- Although none of the commodities produced by Southeast Asia
is irreplaceable, we import the bulk of our rubber and tin
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from there and they would be much more expensive if we
were denied access to that region's suppliers.
-- Japan's business interest in Southeast Asia is important to
the Japanese economy and, therefore, indirectly important
to us.
5.
US Objectives in Southeast Asia:
To safeguard these basic interests, we have several principal
objectives in Southeast Asia:
a. Prevention of the domination of the region by powers hostile
to us.
b. The independent national development of the nations of the
area, their economic well-being and development of political
systems.
c. The evolution of regional cooperation to cope with common
economic and political issues, and to help protect the
countries of the area from subversion and ultimately from
external aggression.
d. The maintenance of US access to military facilities in the
area as necessary to support our commitments.
e. The development over the long term of a relaxation of tensions
between communist and non-communist states in the region,
and in our relations with Communist China and North Vietnam,
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in order to avoid the permanent condition of hostility
with its concomitant military and economic coststo us.
However, in the absence of a relaxation of tensions, we
seek the means to minimize these costs without increasing
the risk of aggression.
f. Support for Australia and New Zealand in their efforts to
promote the security of the region, and to sustain them in
their role in Malaysia and Singapore, in order to realize
mutual objectives.
6. Issues:
As I mentioned to you in March, we are intensively reviewing
our Asian policies for the 1970s. We are attempting to define
the best means of pursuing the interests and objectives that I
have just outlined. We are measuring these objectives -- and
will pursue them -- keeping in mind:
-- The nature of the threats -- the extent and types of likely
challenges to our common interests and objectives in Southeast
Asia.
-- The global context -- the impact of events in Southeast Asia
on the rest of the region and worldwide.
I welcome your views on the proper US role in the context of the
likely Asian environment and our own global responsibilities. We
face some major issues.
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Nuclear forces: What is the best means to underline our firm
commitments against nuclear aggression or blackmail?
Conventional forces: What should be the nature and deployment
of our general purpose forces to deter overt aggression against
our allies ?
Insurgencies assisted by external forces: What are the proper
roles for the target country, its neighbors, and ourselves' ?
Bases: How do we weigh our needs for logistic support for our
commitments against the attendant political and economic problems ?
Military and economic assistance: What should be the level of
our aid ? Who should receive it ? Should it be bilateral or multilateral?
Regionalism: Can the US better promote regional cooperation in a
leading or supporting role ? Can we expect present Asian groupings to
evolve into security arrangements ?
China: How do we go about deterring her aggressive designs while
trying to moderate her policies and ease tensions?
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JGA/G-3
March 12, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
SCOPE PAPER
I. The Setting
Prime Minister Gorton's visit comes at a turning
point in the history of Australian foreign policy. On
February 25, Gorton announced his Government's decision
to maintain Australian forces -- including ground forces --
in Malaysia/Singapore after the British withdrawal in 1971.
This is perhaps the most important step Australia has
taken since its entrance as an independent actor on the
world stage in the 1940's. Gorton's main purpose in
coming is to plumb United States attitudes and intentions
regarding East Asia as they bear on the Australian decision.
The impressions he receives can be expected to affect the
vigor with which Australia assumes its new, heightened
role in Southeast Asia.
The Australian Government's historic decision resulted
from the interplay of several factors. These included
anticipated changes in British and U. S. deployments in
Southeast Asia; the accession of a strong-minded,
nationalistic Prime Minister with heterodox foreign policy
leanings; the approach of a general election; and the
stirrings of a new nationalism in Australia.
"Forward Defense" or "Fortress Australia"?
Since World War II, Australia has increasingly sought
to develop closer relations with Southeast Asian countries.
While this course has been carried out through economic aid,
diplomacy and participation in regional organizations, it
has also had an important military component -- the policy
of "forward defense." Based on the idea of stopping
the enemy as far as possible from Australian shores, forward
defense has justified Australian participation in regional
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Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified
JGA/G-3
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security efforts including Korea, SEATO and Viet-Nam and,
since 1955, its support of British undertakings to defend
Malaysia and Singapore. Conscious of its relative
weakness, however, and feeling isolated and vulnerable
in its corner of Asia, Australia has been careful to risk
its limited forces only in close association with one
or both of its "great and powerful friends", Britain and
the United States.
In 1968, two developments combined to thrust Australia
into a dilemma. The first was Britain's decision, made
public in January, to accelerate withdrawal of its forces
from Malaysia/Singapore and complete the pull-out by
the end of 1971. The second was President Johnson's
announcement on March 31, 1968 of a unilateral halt in
the bombing of North Viet-Nam and his own retirement from
politics. This surprising and dramatic development, and
the subsequent change of leadership in a United States
which as seen from Australia has seemed increasingly
preoccupied with internal problems, have created uncertainty
and anxiety in Australian minds about the future course
of America's Asia policy. One of Australia's "powerful
friends", the U.K., was preparing to leave the scene.
Would the other, the U. S., also drift away? In view of
this possibility, was forward defense still a wise policy?
Debate on this question could not remain theoretical,
since Australia was faced with a pressing practical
decision. It now has ground, air and naval forces in
Malaysia/Singapore alongside the British. Should it keep
its forces there after the British leave (as Malaysia
and Singapore have requested), or should it pull them out?
Keeping them there would be a historic and possibly
dangerous departure from the traditional policy of
stationing Australian forces overseas only alongside a major
power -- the British or the Americans. Pulling them out
would imply abandonment of forward defense, and perhaps
a fundamental reorientation of Australia's Southeast Asia
policy. The decision could not be long deferred, since
the five Commonwealth powers concerned (Malaysia, Singapore,
Australia, New Zealand and the U.K.) have begun consultations
looking toward a new arrangement for the defense of the
area post-1971. Australian participation is the key to
the emergence of any such new arrangement which promises
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to be effective, and Australian indecision has already
seriously hampered the five-power consultations.
In the debate in Australia, the traditional forward
defense policy has had powerful advocates, including the
Ministers of External Affairs and Defense, the top civil
servants in these departments, and the military services.
The alternative strategy, dubbed "fortress Australia" by
the press, calls for less involvement in Southeast Asia
and increased concentration upon internal economic
development, military preparedness and continental and
immediate offshore defense, focusing on the mainland and
Papua/New Guinea. In an extreme, isolationist form it has
been espoused by Jim Cairns, spokesman for the powerful
left-wing faction in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and
a good bet to become Leader of the Opposition in 1970.
A still more important figure who early disclosed strong
leanings toward "fortress Australia" -- although his
position was often contradictory and unclear -- was the
complex, controversial man who became Prime Minister in
January 1968, John Grey Gorton.
Gorton's Indecision
Gorton at various times has given numerous indications
of doubts about forward defense and a predisposition
towards its opposite. At his first press conference as
Prime Minister, he made a startling off-the-cuff announcement
that no more Australian troops would be sent to Viet-Nam.
A strong nationalist, he has charted a course assertive
of distinctively Australian interests and has shown that
in his thinking domestic economic development enjoys first
claim on national resources. Seeming to split sharply
with his Ministers of External Affairs and Defense over
Southeast Asia policy and the Malaysia/Singapore question,
he brought no advisers and requested no briefing papers
from their departments when he visited Washington in May 1968.
He repeatedly expressed skepticism as to the wisdom or
desirability of stationing Australian forces, especially
ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971 -- at least
without being sure of being able to get them out if they
got into serious trouble. This attitude reflects his
personal experience; as a fighter pilot in action over
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Singapore in 1942, he saw an entire Australian division --
one fourth of his country's combat infantry -- trapped
and forced to surrender to the Japanese. As Prime Minister,
he is understandably determined not to be responsible
for a repetition of this debacle.
With Britain's decision to withdraw from Malaysia/
Singapore by 1971 apparently irrevocable, Gorton's concern
appeared to focus sharply on the course of U. S. Asia
policy under President Johnson's successor. After
Johnson's March 31, 1968 speech, Gorton told the Liberal
Party caucus and the press that he was convinced there
would be a major U. S. retrenchment in Asia -- possibly
amounting to a return to pre-World War II isolationism --
under the next U. S. administration, and that this might
well necessitate abandonment of "the Menzies concept of
forward defense" in favor of "an Israeli-type defense
scheme.' Although this topic dominated his discussions
in Washington in May 1968 almost to the exclusion of all
others, he left unconvinced by the Johnson administration's
protestations of continued U. S. firmness in East Asia.
He subsequently reiterated in public that no decision
would be made on the commitment of Australian ground forces
until certain "imponderables" -- meaning primarily U. S.
Asia policy under the new administration -- became clear
to him. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference
in mid-January, he privately took the position with the
British that he could not run the risk of involvement,
particularly of his ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore
until he knew in advance who would "back him up". He
therefore planned to make no decision on post-1971 deployment
of ground forces, he said, until he had talked to
President Nixon.
With characteristic directness and persistence, Gorton
successfully sought an early meeting with the new President.
On February 7, "Len" Hewitt, Secretary of the Prime Minister's
Department and Gorton's closest adviser, told our
Ambassador that Gorton had only one thing on his mind in
coming to Washington other than getting acquainted with
the President, and that was to learn exactly what was the
U. S. position on the stationing of Australian troops in
Malaysia/Singapore. Gorton would make it clear that if
Australian troops were stationed there, they would never
get involved in local conflicts or hostilities with
Indonesia or the Philippines. However, he would want to
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5
know from President Nixon what the United States would do
if Australian troops became involved in countering aggression
by Red China or North Viet-Nam. Gorton himself reiterated
this to our Ambassador the next day, adding that if the need
arose he would commit troops to fight with us in Thailand.
The Election and Gorton's Decision
Meanwhile -- with a general election coming up in
November 1969 at the latest -- there were signs that the
Australian public was making up its mind on the foreign policy
debate. The fact that British withdrawal implied increased
Australian responsibility, while it had its alarming aspect,
appealed at the same time to Australia's growing national
pride. Australia -- economically the third most powerful
nation in Asia and technologically second only to Japan --
was being called upon to play a new, more independent role.
Surely it would not be too timid to rise to the challenge?
"Fortress Australia", from this point of view, could easily
be depicted as un-Australian. Gorton's Christmas message to
Australian troops in Viet-Nam, written in ringing "forward-
defense" tones, met with a warm response. The Liberal Party
organization began advising him that a strong defense policy
was his election winner. This advice was reinforced by the
press, most of which favored staying on after 1971, and by
the views of the Liberal Party's two election allies, the
Country Party and the hawkish Democratic Labor Party.
The uncertainty created by Gorton's previous, conflicting
statements helped build up suspense for his promised announce-
ment of a new defense policy when Parliament reconvened on
February 25. Most observers expected him to announce a
decision to maintain air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore
after 1971, but to postpone a decision on ground forces
because of "imponderables". The moderate leader of the
Opposition (ALP), Gough Whitlam, evidently anticipated such
a position and tried to pre-empt it by adopting in advance
a very similar one. Whitlam came out for air and naval
deployments but rejected the commitment of ground forces, in
favor of maintaining a "mobile striking force" in Australia
which could be sent if needed -- an idea originally advanced
by Gorton.
Gorton made one quiet, preparatory move -- he announced
the resignation of Paul Hasluck as Minister for External
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6
Affairs and his elevation to Governor General. With
Hasluck thus out of the way, Gorton had the spotlight
entirely to himself when he made his surprise announcement
on February 25 that Australia would go all the way with
the policy of which Hasluck had been the leading advocate --
forward defense including a commitment of ground forces
to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.
Gorton's speech was his finest hour and a political
masterstroke. Lucid, forthright, statesmanlike, it won
warm applause both at home and abroad. (Prime Minister
Holyoake of New Zealand, who had been urging this course
on Gorton all along, made a simultaneous and similar
announcement.) The Australian press was unanimously
laudatory. Whitlam, neatly outmaneuvered, was obliged to
attack the commitment of ground forces, thus making this
the only foreign policy issue in an election which the
bitterly divided ALP seems sure to lose. Gorton, on the
other hand, seems likely to emerge from the election with
increased stature, firmer control, and an enhanced image
as a truly Australian Prime Minister leading his country
into a new era of its nationhood.
Significance for the Visit
Gorton's decision to announce a commitment of ground
forces to Malaysia/Singapore in advance of his visit to
Washington has simplified our task. Previously, he seemed
likely to seek a specific U. S. guarantee of the safety
of his forces as a precondition for committing them.
Obviously it would have been difficult to give such a
guarantee, especially in a form which would have been
politically useful to Gorton. The February 25 speech has
made it clear that the U. S. will not have to pay this price
in order to get an Australian ground-force presence in
Malaysia/Singapore.
On the other hand, the speech has also in a sense put
us on a spot, challenging the U. S. to be as firm and
forthcoming as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that
Australia is meeting the American requirement to do all
it can; now what will Washington do to support that commitment?
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7
His speech made it clear that contingencies were conceivable
with which Australian forces could not cope, and that "if
such a situation should arise we would have to look to the
support of allies outside the region". In this connection
Gorton may still ask for specific assurances of U. S.
support. At the very least, he will seek to sound out the
temper of the new administration and the general posture it
will take in Southeast Asia. The answers and impressions
he receives will have a bearing on the confidence and vigor
with which Australia pursues the new path in regional affairs
on which it is taking the first step.
II. The Visitor
Personally, Prime Minister Gorton is conservative,
with a brusque and flamboyant style. He is quick on his
feet and tends to say what comes first into his mind.
Prickly and sensitive, he refuses to be pressured or taken
for granted. (For example, he reacted angrily and resentfully
when he felt President Johnson had not consulted sufficiently
with the GOA before announcing the partial bombing halt
on March 31, 1968.) He can be extremely charming, but is
instinctively aggressive with a streak of toughness and
possibly nastiness just below the surface. He is inclined
to be impetuous, abrasive and cocksure, restricts his
advisers to a small inner circle, and has at times seemed
lackadaisical in his approach to his work. These qualities
have earned him a bad press and poor personal relations
in the Government, but this has not seemed to bother him.
He projects a charismatic toughness which Australians like,
and his standing with the man in the street is high.
Recently, both his performance and his press have improved.
Australia's top political journalist provides a vivid
sketch bringing out Gorton's political appeal: "Oxford
educated, a Victorian orchardist, he had been when young
a very good-looking man, but in World War II, as a fighter
pilot, he drove his face into the instrument panel of his
bullet-damaged Hurricane in landing on the Singapore
aerodrome as an RAAF-Japanese dogfight proceeded overhead.
His rebuilt features are attractively ugly, mobile,
conveying on TV screens a pleasant impression of battered
strength and homely charm. His later war service has about
it some of the romantic charm that surrounded that of the
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8
late John F. Kennedy
Back on active service, a
crumpled-faced veteran, he crashlanded on an island in
the Timor Sea and lived for days on turtles' eggs and
fish before being rescued. Lean, wiry, six feet one inch
tall, a careless dresser with hair that succumbs only
temporarily to the discipline of comb and brush, laconic,
direct and irreverent, addicted to swimming and tennis,
an easy mixer who is impatient with formality, protocal,
the establishment, and 'longhaired' intellectuals,
Gorton represents what Australians have chosen to believe
is the traditional Australian, both in his masculinity
and derisive distaste for those who parade pretentiously
intellectual accomplishments or academic qualifications."
Gorton has been married since 1935 to an American
citizen, nee Bettina Brown of Bangor, Maine. Mrs. Gorton
is a shy, intelligent, gray-haired woman who has some
competence in Indonesian studies. She is reportedly
embittered by her husband's reputation as a lady-killer.
III. Australian Aims
The new administration's strategy in Southeast Asia,
as it relates to Australia's involvement in the defense
of the region, will be uppermost in the Prime Minister's
mind.
He will:
-- assess the firmness of the new administration's
posture in Southeast Asia;
-- ask to what extend the U. S. is prepared to back
up Australian forces committed to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971;
-- ask the President's thoughts on strategy and
prospects for the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
-- be interested in the President's thinking on
post-Vietnám Asia;
-- argue for better treatment from the United States
in the economic field;
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9
-- size up the President.
IV. United States Aims
Our aim is to secure continued strong Australian
leadership in Southeast Asia. We should try:
-- without increasing our commitments, to give
Gorton sufficient reassurance to encourage him to make
a whole-hearted contribution to regional security;
-- to consult fully and frankly with him on the
Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
-- fully to share our thoughts - and elicit his -
on post-Vietnam Asia;
-- to establish a good personal relationship
between the President and Gorton;
-- to reassure Gorton and, through him, the
Australian people that the United States is and will
remain a close, steadfast and special friend which can be
relied upon to play a leading role in checking Communist
expansion in Asia.
Drafted by: EA/ANZ: CCBrower
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
EA/RA - Mr. Donald
EA - Amb. Brown
EA - Amb. Godley
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard
Approved by: The Secretary
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JGA/BP-4-Rev. 2
April 29, 1969
VISIT OF JOHN G. GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
Background-Position Paper
U.S. INTEREST IN AUSTRALIAN COMMITMENT TO FIVE-POWER
ARRANGEMENT FOR THE DEFENSE OF SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA
BACKGROUND
On January 16, 1968, Britain announced it would with-
draw all its military forces from the Malaysia/Singapore
area by the end of 1971 (instead of by the "mid" 1970's as
previously announced), and that the United Kingdom intended
to revise its defense agreement with Malaysia, under which
British, Australian and New Zealand forces are stationed
in the area.
Britain's four Commonwealth partners thereupon began
to consider how they would adjust to the British decision.
Finding a strong desire on the part of Singapore and
Malaysia for continued Australian military presence, the
GOA announced that although it could not fill the gap left
by the British, it would "be prepared to discuss the size
and role of an Australian contribution to combined defense
arrangements which embrace a joint Singapore/Malaysia
defense effort.'
Ministers of the Five Powers, meeting in June 1968,
agreed that they had a continuing interest in the stability
of the area and that the defense of Malaysia and Singapore
was indivisible. The British promised to help ease the
transition, but made clear their determination to proceed
with the scheduled withdrawal. The groundwork for prompt
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development of Commonwealth defense arrangements seemed to
have been laid. Five-Power Advisory Working Groups were
set up to do detailed planning on air, army and naval
matters, and a second ministerial conference was planned
for the first half of 1969 (now scheduled for June).
However, progress was soon halted by a change in the
attitude of Australia. Signs of this change had begun to
appear even before the initial Five-Power Conference.
Following President Johnson's March 31, 1968 announcement
of the bombing halt, Prime Minister Gorton publicly ex-
pressed doubts about Australia's tentative decision to
station forces in Malaysia and Singapore after 1971. His
uncertainty regarding the firmness of United States' in-
tentions in East Asia was reflected among other Asian
leaders, who tend to believe that Australia's cultural
affinity and close relationship with the United States give
Australia a special insight. Talks with President Johnson
and others during his visit here in May 1968 did not fully
reassure Prime Minister Gorton. The GOA avoided committing
itself on the post-1971 question pending the outcome of a
prolonged fundamental defense policy review.
Finally, on February 25, 1969, Prime Minister Gorton
issued a defense policy statement which announced
Australia's intention, along with New Zealand, to commit
ground as well as naval and air units to Malaysia and
Singapore in the post-1971 period, thus paving the way for
a renewal of Five-Power defense planning.
The defense policy statement outlines a course of
action essentially fulfilling U.S. objectives. Mr. Gorton
committed Australia to deploy small but symbolically im-
portant elements of the Australian Army, Navy and Air Force
in Malaysia and Singapore after 1971 without a specific
terminal date. Their mission will be to contribute to the
internal stability of the region, to build up indigenous
defense capacity, and to be available "for use against
externally promoted and inspired Communist infiltration
and subversion." Mr. Gorton pledged continued military
and economic assistance to Malaysia and Singapore. He
identified Australian interests with those of the region
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in a manner well calculated to reassure Malaysia and
Singapore. The way has thus been opened to further close
coordination among the Five Powers which can lead to a
workable Five-Power defense arrangement.
Prime Minister Gorton took care to keep Australia's
options open and to avoid commitments to automatic response.
The availability of Australian forces for use in insurgency
situations is "subject to the usual requirement for the
Australian Government's prior consent,' and the scale of
Australian effort should the threat exceed Australian re-
sources alone "would have to be decided in the light of
all circumstances prevailing at the time. " Should the
Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement (which by association is
the basis for Australian presence in the area) become in-
operative, Mr. Gorton said, "we would wish general under-
standings rather than specific treaty obligations to be
worked out
"
Prime Minister Gorton stressed that Australia could
not fully substitute for a major power in the region, and
"the potential military protection of great nations outside
the region will be needed" to ensure stability. He pointed
out that a situation could conceivably arise in which the
scale of subversion and infiltration from outside, or some
other organized threat to the region, might be such that
Australian resources alone would not be sufficient to sup-
port successfully the forces of Malaysia and Singapore.
"If such a situation should arise,' he said, "we would have
to look to the support of allies outside the region and the
scale of Australia's continued effort would in that case
have to be decided in the light of all the circumstances
prevailing at the time. What they would be we cannot now
know and we cannot therefore make, now, precise decisions."
These references underline Australia's determination
to maintain its freedom of action in the Malaysia/Singapore
area, and consequently the importance which Australia will
continue to attach to the American attitude in determining
the degree of Australian commitment and the vigor with
which it is pursued.
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United States' Objectives
Principal U.S. objectives with regard to Australian
policy and the security of the Malaysia/Singapore area
are:
1. To sustain Australia in an active, outwardly-
directed policy which will increasingly involve it in the
affairs of East Asia and thus contribute to our efforts to
maintain the security of the area.
2. To see created a military alternative in the wake
of the British withdrawal which will:
a. Contribute to the stability of Malaysia and
Singapore so they can play a constructive
role in an increasingly close-knit com-
munity of Southeast Asian states;
b.
Cause Malaysia and Singapore to cooperate
rather than compete militarily;
C. Be capable of helping Malaysia and Singapore
cope with externally supported insurgency;
d. Provide insurance against the possibility of
renewed Indonesian confrontation; and
e. Assist in the defense of Malaysia and Singa-
pore against overt Communist attack.
3. To provide for the continued availability of support
facilities in Singapore for use by Commonwealth and United
States military forces.
4. To provide for the continued access by the United
States and other states to the international waters and
air space of the subregion.
5. To see created a regional defense arrangement
which, useful under present circumstances, might stimulate
emergence of a larger Southeast Asian security arrangement.
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6. To accomplish the foregoing without increasing
our current commitments abroad.
Existing Obligations and Commitments
The United States has no defense commitments to
Malaysia or Singapore. Under the ANZUS Treaty, we are
committed to act if Australian (or New Zealand) forces in
Malaysia/Singapore are attacked (Article V of the Treaty
defines an armed attack on any of the parties as including
an attack "on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft
in the Pacific"). In 1963 we reached a secret understanding
with Australia (Kennedy-Barwick Memorandum) spelling out
at some length the circumstances under which we would re-
gard the Treaty as applicable and the types of actions we
might take if Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore were
attacked by Indonesia. This understanding established
four main points:
1. The United States acknowledged that Malaysia and
Singapore are in the Pacific area to which the Treaty
applies;
2. The United States recognized an obligation to
act should Australian forces be overtly attacked by Indo-
nesian armed forces, but not in the case of subversive
acts or guerrilla attacks;
3. The United States would expect to be consulted
prior to any redeployment of Australian forces in Malaysia/
Singapore; and
4. Use of armed forces, particularly ground forces,
would depend upon requirements and could not be assured.
In October 1967, the Australians raised the question
of the applicability of ANZUS. to Australian forces which
might remain in Malaysia/Singapore after British with-
drawal, and asked whether further understandings might be
necessary. Our reply (Berger-Waller letter January 17,
1968) was guarded, stating that we recognized the continuing
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presence of Australian forces in the peninsula "might some
day give rise to questions concerning the application of
the Treaty" and would want, therefore, to maintain close
consultations. The Australians did not press the Johnson
Administration for further assurances.
What Does Prime Minister Gorton Seek in Washington?
We do not have an altogether clear idea of what Prime
Minister Gorton will seek in Washington -- but, very
probably, neither does he. He is a changeable, impulsive,
unpredictable man, and has given us varying indications as
his thinking on Malaysia/Singapore defense has evolved.
Until his speech of February 25, it seemed likely
that Gorton would seek some specific guarantee of the
safety of his ground forces before committing them. His
speech made clear that this was not the case, but never-
theless reflected concern with the possible need for U.S.
support in case his forces encountered a situation which
they could not handle. He has not spelled out just what
support he is looking for, or what threat most concerns
him. Before his February 25 speech, he informally indi-
cated to our Ambassador that the principal purpose of his
meeting with the President would be to inquire what the
United States would do if Australian troops in Malaysia/
Singapore became involved in countering an attack by Red
China or North Viet-Nam. The speech itself, on the other
hand, made only oblique reference to overt aggression and
concentrated on the possibility of externally promoted
Communist infiltration and subversion.
When he came to Washington for the Eisenhower funeral,
the main topic Gorton opened up in his discussions with
USG leaders was the extent of U.S. interest in Southeast
Asia generally and Malaysia/Singapore specifically after
the war ends in Viet-Nam, with particular reference to the
support Australia might expect if her forces became in-
volved in a situation which got out of control. He raised
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this only in the broadest terms, however, and it was
agreed that discussions in depth should be postponed
until he returned in May.
It is likely that several considerations are at work
in Gorton's mind, including:
1. A vague need for psychological reassurance,
growing out of Australia's relatively limited national
power, its feeling of isolation and its traditional
reliance upon powerful friends in pursuing its forward
defense policy. This need for reassurance has been
accentuated by Britain's announced withdrawal and uncer-
tainty as to the future course of U.S. Asia policy. On
this point Gorton reflects the feelings of his country-
men.
2. A specific concern with the safety of the Aus-
tralian forces which will be in Malaysia/Singapore after
1971, especially the ground forces. This is reinforced
by Gorton's experience as a World War II fighter pilot,
when he saw an entire Australian division trapped at
Singapore and forced to surrender to the Japanese.
3. A realization that Malaysia/Singapore defense
must be viewed in the total context of Southeast Asia
security. A key concern, therefore, is the continued
firmness of the U.S. posture in areas to the north of
Malaysia, especially Thailand and Laos, and the avoidance
of an outcome in Viet-Nam which would lead to Communist
advances in other Southeast Asian countries.
4. A desire for straight talk. Gorton is a blunt,
direct man who respects frankness and dislikes evasiveness.
5. A realization that the new administration is
engaged in a foreign policy reassessment and cannot be
expected to have all the answers at this early stage.
Coupled with this is a natural desire -- even the right,
as a close, loyal ally -- to talk the problems over with
us and share in our thinking process.
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6. A desire to elicit some public expression of
U.S. support of his foreign policy initiative in Malaysia/
Singapore which will be politically useful to him. Gorton
faces his first general election later this year, and the
commitment of ground troops to Malaysia/Singapore, which
has been attacked by the opposition, is shaping up as a
major election issue.
The precise line Gorton follows when he talks to the
President will depend upon which of the foregoing con-
siderations are uppermost in his mind at the time. All
it is possible to predict is that he will (1) undoubtedly
probe our intentions, with respect to both Southeast
Asian security generally and Malaysia/Singapore in par-
ticular; and (2) probably seek expressions of support
on Malaysia/Singapore, both private and public.
The Alternatives
In private, the President could make one of four
replies to a Gorton request for U.S. assurances in support
of Australia's military commitment to Malaysia/Singapore:
a. give an unqualified pledge of support.
b. give a qualified pledge of support, based on con-
firmation of the specific application of ANZUS.
C. decline to pledge support.
d. give generalized reassurance.
The advantages and disadvantages of each of these are
briefly discussed below.
A. Unqualified pledge of support. The President
would assure Gorton that the U.S. will give full military
support to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore in any
contingency in which they may be attacked.
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Advantages:
1. would provide maximum reassurance to Australia.
2. would give strongest possible indication to
Australia (and other nations which learned of it) of a
continued firm U.S. posture in Southeast Asia.
Disadvantages:
1. would maximize risk of U.S. military involvement.
2. goes beyond our obligation under ANZUS; would
expose the administration to charges of enlarging U.S. over-
seas commitments in unconstitutionally establishing a back-
door commitment to defend Malaysia.
3. goes beyond Gorton's needs and reasonable
expectations.
B. Qualified pledge of support. The President would
confirm to Gorton that ANZUS applies to Australian forces
in Malaysia/Singapore and that we would honor our commit-
ment in the event Australian forces there were attacked.
He would have to make clear, however, that our commitment
is limited to situations in which Australian troops are
attacked, as distinct from situations in which Australian
troops enter into combat on their own initiative to assist
Malaysia or Singapore.
Advantages:
1. should provide sufficient reassurance to en-
courage Australia to participate whole-heartedly in
Malaysia/Singapore defense.
2. would signal (though less clearly than A)
continued firmness of the U.S. posture in Southeast Asia,
3. simply acknowledges an obligation which we
already have.
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4. is straightforward, and is an advance over
the Johnson administration position.
5. retains all the flexibility of response
built into the Treaty, which provides for a broad range
of possible actions of which the use of military force
is only one extreme.
6. a precedent exists (Kennedy-Barwick Memoran-
dum) for clearly delineating and in effect narrowing our
responsibilities in the event that a specific threat arises.
Disadvantages:
1. creates a slight additional risk of involve-
ment, since in the Berger-Waller letter we avoided a direct
acknowledgement that ANZUS applies, thus retaining some
freedom to back away from the commitment if this should
later prove expedient.
2. could be attacked (although without sound
justification) as executive enlargement of our overseas
commitments.
3. unless very carefully explained, a simple
statement that the ANZUS Treaty applies to Australian
forces in Malaysia or Singapore could be misleading and
the explanation could cast doubt on the adequacy of the
assurance from the Australian point of view. Australia
could well interpret a general statement of ANZUS Treaty
applicability to their forces in Malaysia and Singapore
as meaning that the U.S. would come to their aid if they
sent their forces into combat pursuant to their defense
commitment to Malaysia or Singapore.
C. Decline to pledge support. The President could
explain frankly that in the prevailing climate of U.S.
opinion, he is not in a position to undertake anything
which might be depicted as a new overseas commitment.
Advantages:
1. minimizes risk of involvement.
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2. avoids any risk of criticism for allegedly
enlarging our commitments.
Disadvantages:
1. conducive to half-hearted Australian partici-
pation in Malaysia/Singapore defense.
2. conducive to a more inward-looking Australian
foreign policy and a less positive contribution to the
security and development of Southeast Asia.
3. likely to weaken the ANZUS alliance through
lessened confidence in our reliability and firmness of
purpose as an ally.
4. in governmental circles in Australia and
New Zealand, conducive to a feeling we are reneging on
our ANZUS commitment -- which we achnowledged in 1963 was
applic able to Australian forces in Malaysia.
5. might signal to other countries that a U. S.
retreat from our Asian responsibilities is in the offing.
D. Generalized reassurance. The President could
assure Gorton in general terms of our determination to
stand by our commitments in Asia, not going beyond the
"Berger-Waller" position with respect to the applicability
of ANZUS to Australia's forces in Malaysia/Singapore.
Advantages:
1. would provide sufficient reassurance to
encourage a positive Australian contribution to regional
security.
2. would preserve maximum flexibility.
3. is probably all Gorton really expects.
4. avoids criticism for allegedly enlarging
our commitments.
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5. avoids any increased risk of involvement.
Disadvantages:
1. is no advance over the Johnson administration
position.
2. is somewhat evasive on the specific question
of the applicability of ANZUS.
Public Response
The foregoing alternatives are suggested private
responses. Our public response should probably be the
same in any case -- an affirmation of the continuing impor-
tance we attach to ANZUS and our other commitments in the
area, together with an expression of understanding and
support for the Australian commitment to Malaysia/Singapore.
A possible alternative would be publicly to affirm the
applicability of ANZUS to Australian forces in Malaysia/
Singapore (assuming we decided upon this private response).
Such a public statement, however, would go beyond Gorton's
apparent political needs, draw undue public attention to
the question in the United States, and invite criticism
for alleged executive enlargement of our overseas commitments.
Recommended Response to Gorton
Response "D" (generalized reassurance) is recommended
for the following reasons:
1. The benefits to the United States of a whole-
hearted execution of a forward policy by Australia are
such that it is desirable to reassure Gorton to the maximum
extent possible without enlarging our existing commitments
under the treaties we already have in the area.
2. Among these existing commitments is a commitment
under ANZUS to act if Australian forces in Malaysia/
Singapore are attacked. However, under certain conditions
this could become difficult to distinguish in practical
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terms from a commitment to defend Malaysia or Singapore.
President Kennedy's caution in interpreting it was well-
founded, and the Kennedy-Barwick memorandum is a sound
precedent for situations in which a specific threat arises.
It appears prudent to continue to avoid flat statements
that ANZUS applies to Australian forces in third countries;
to insist on prior consultation about such Australian
deployments; and to carefully delineate what is to be
expected of the United States in each specific situation
of a threat to such forces.
3. A threat which might activate our ANZUS commitment
to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore is unlikely to
develop unless there is a serious deterioration in the
region to the north. Probably the most important reas-
surance we can give Gorton on Malaysia/Singapore, therefore,
is a convincing expression of our determinati to pre-
vent such a deterioration from occurring.
4. The indication by Mr. Gorton that he may be
interested only in a reassurance from the President regarding
United States' support in the unlikely contingency of a
North Vietnamese or Chinese attack, and his initiative in
commiting Australia to a forward defense position in
advance of his meeting with tge President, suggest that
he may be content with a broad reassurance from the new
administration regarding the firmness of its East Asian
policy and approval of the Australian commitment to
Malaysia/Singapore, rather than some new, explicit under-
standing under the ANZUS Treaty. It is difficult to
imagine the contingency of a Communist Chinese or North
Vietnamese attack on Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore
arising except in a situation of general war in East Asia
or of a Communist Chinese or North Vietnamese invasion of
Thailand. Should this occur, the United States would be,
if not already. involved in hostilities against the Com-
munist enemies, consulting urgently with Thailand and other
SEATO allies under Article IV of the SEATO Treaty to
determine what action should be taken. Mr. Gorton's
flat statement when posing this question that "if some-
thing goes wrong in Thailand, he would commit troops to
fight with us to help the Thais" suggests his realization
of this fact.
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5. Embassy Canberra confirms that, while Gorton has
a particular concern with our backup of his commitment to
Malaysia/Singapore, the main thrust of his interest will
be in much broader regional terms. The Embassy believes
that he will be satisfied, at least for the time being, with
general rather than specific assurances.
A response along the following lines should meet what
we believe to be Gorton's key concerns:
"We welcome the Australian defense policy decision
vis-a-vis Malaysia/Singapore as a responsible, constructive
statesmanlike move which will make a valuable contribution
to the stability and security of Southeast Asia. We are
aware that it represents a historic departure for Australia.
Prime Minister Gorton is to be congratulated on his wisdom
and initiative. (FYI. At this point, the President might
also wish to state that we were heartened by Gorton's
assurance recently to our Ambassador in Canberra that
Australian forces would fight with ours in support of
Thailand if "something should go wrong there. END FYI.)
"We fully understand the interdependence of all
elements of security in the region. For our part, we
contribute to regional security primarily through our forces
deployed elsewhere in the Western Pacific area as a deterrent
to Communist expansion. We intend to maintain this deterrent
and stand by our commitments in the region.
"At the same time, we continue to be keenly interested
in the progress of the Five-Power consultations looking
toward consolidation of new defense arrangements for
Malaysia/Singapore. We are aware, as Prime Minister Gorton
pointed out in his speech, that Australia cannot fully
substitute for the British presence, and that a situation
could conceivably arise in which the resources of Australia
would be insufficient to support successfully the forces
of Malaysia and Singapore. We understand that in such a
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situation, Australia would feel the need to consult allies
outside the region, such as Britain and the United States,
and decide what to do in the light of circumstances then
prevailing. As one of Australia's close allies and a
party to the ANZUS Treaty, we would, of course, stand
ready to consult fully and promptly. We agree that we
cannot now know what these circumstances might be and,
therefore, cannot now make precise decisions.
"With respect to the application of the ANZUS Treaty
to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore, we recognize
that Malaysia and Singapore are within the Treaty Area,
that the continuing presence of Australian forces there
serves our mutual interests, and that questions concerning
our obligations under the Treaty may some day arise. We
would want, therefore, to maintain closest consultation
with the Australian Government regarding commitments it
might make to the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore,
and concerning future deployment of Australian forces.
Should a threat to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore
arise, our two governments would have to consider together
very carefully what actions might be expected of the
United States under the Treaty. "
In the unlikely event that Prime Minister Gorton
presses for a detailed understanding as to how the ANZUS
Treaty applies to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore,
it could be pointed out to him that it is not only unnecessary
but in our view undesirable thus to speculate on theoretical
applications of the Treaty. An attempt precisely to set forth
the circumstances in which the Treaty should apply, and how,
might exclude the very contingency which, when it occurs, we
might well decide is covered by the Treaty. In words
parellel to those of Prime Minister Gorton, himself, (when
referring in his defense policy statement to Australia's
relationship with Malaysia/Singapore), maintenance of the
general understanding represented by the ANZUS Treaty is
preferable to and more meaningful than trying to define and
delimit specific treaty obligations in hypothetical contin-
gencies.
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situation, Australia would feel the need to consult allies
outside the region, such as Britain and the United States,
and decide what to do in the light of circumstances then
prevailing. As one of Australia's close allies and a
party to the ANZUS Treaty, we would, of course, stand
ready to consult fully and promptly. We agree that we
cannot now know what these circumstances might be and,
therefore, cannot now make precise decisions.
"With respect to the application of the ANZUS Treaty
to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore, we recognize
that Malaysia and Singapore are within the Treaty Area,
that the continuing presence of Australian forces there
serves our mutual interests, and that questions concerning
our obligations under the Treaty may some day arise. We
would want, therefore, to maintain closest consultation
with the Australian Government regarding commitments it
might make to the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore,
and concerning future deployment of Australian forces.
Should a threat to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore
arise, our two governments would have to consider together
very carefully what actions might be expected of the
United States under the Treaty.
In the unlikely event that Prime Minister Gorton
presses for a detailed understanding as to how the ANZUS
Treaty applies to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore,
it could be pointed out to him that it is not only
unnecessary but in our view undesirable thus to speculate
on theoretical applications of the Treaty. An attempt
precisely to set forth the circumstances in which the Treaty
should apply, and how, might well exclude the very
contingency which when it occur
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 30, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Richard L. Sneider
SUBJECT: Gorton Visit -- Your Participation
I attach the proposed briefing book for the President,
with a covering memorandum from you. The Toast and
the final statement are still being reworked by Jim Keogh's
people.
For your scheduling purposes, let me note the specific
times at which your presence will be requested during the course
of the visit:
Tuesday, May 6, 10:30 a.m. - Prime Minister Gorton
arrives at the White House. After a private session, the President
and he will join a group in the Cabinet Room consisting of yourself
and the following persons:
Sir James Plimsoll, Permanent Secretary, Department
of External Affairs
C. L.S. Hewitt, Prime Minister's Secretary
Ambassador Waller
Secretary Rogers
Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East
Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard L. Sneider, NSC Senior Staff Member
Robert Moore, Country Director for Australia/New Zealand
Tuesday, May 6, 8:00 p.m. - White tie dinner at the White
House.
Wednesday, May 7, 12:00 noon - Gorton will pay a farewell
call on the President.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL
April 22, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Richard L. Sneider
SUBJECT: Gorton Visit
*
Early last week, I reviewed the preparations for the
May 6-7 Gorton visit with the Department officials concerned.
For the most part, all that is required is updating the briefing
book.
We agreed on the following additional actions:
1. The Review Group will consider on the week of
April 29 a paper on U.S. objectives and interests in Southeast
Asia, in response to Gorton's request. This paper will then
provide the basis for the President's talk with Gorton on this
problem.
2. A memoran dum will be sent to the President covering
decisions on other key subjects, namely,
(a) The U.S. commitment on ANZUS, including
a public formulation;
(b) Defense procurement in Australia;
(c) U.S. policy with respect to Australia's
commitment in relation to Malaysia and Singapore.
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
/ Smeider
2. Ref.
department OF STATE
LG-
Washington, D.C. 20520
S/S-5912
check #
April 16, 1969
with more
DR
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
to clar
Enclosed for your clearance is a cable to Embassy
Canberra setting forth the proposed schedule for the
visit of Prime Minister Gorton of Australia.
for
John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary
Livil you vest decept motwings settaines times state? and
Enclosure:
As stated.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
cld 2/18/69 cld.5/5, and 5/5 7:00 7:00pm Andrea
MCGREGOR PRINTING CORPORATION 12.66
CORRECTION
MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE
ALL COPIES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Classification
for oc/T use ONLY
Origin
ACTION: Amembassy CANBERRA
Info:
INFO: RECEPTIONCENTER HONOLULU
CINCPAC
STATE
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
SUBJECT: Gorton Visit
1. With Gorton visit to Washington sek rescheduled for May 6-7,
we are working out program with Australian Embassy Washington.
For your info and for discussion with GOA as may be necessary,
t here follow highlights of program as of now:
A. May 3: Travel from Sydney to San Francisco (via
Continue
Honolulu) by Qantas./to Williamsburg by USAF aircraft. Flight
numbers and times not yet confirmed.
B. May 4: At Williamsburg
C. May 5:
(1) 2:30 p.m. PM departs Williamsburg by USMC helicopter.
(2) 3:30 p.m. Party arrives Pentagon heliport.
Proceeds to Blair House. (Party will stay at Blair House through
night of May 7.)
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
EA/ANZ: RUMoore:rlw 4/11/69
WAS
2996
classification approved by: EA - - Amb. Winthrop G. Brown
Clearances: EA - Mr. Duemling
Vice President's Off. -
EA/P - Mr. Kilpatrick
White House :-
MCGREGOR PRINTING CORPORATION 12-66
CORRECTION
ADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE C
LL
COPIES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Classification
for OC/T USE ONLY
Origin
ACTION: CANBERRA
page 2
Info:
(3) 8:00 p.m. Ambassador and Lady Waller give black tie
dinner in honor of PM and Mrs. Gorton.
D. May 6:
12
(1) 10:30 a.m. President receives PM at White House in
informal ceremony, following which they hold discussions.
(2) 3:00 p.m. PM meets with Secretary Rogers.
(3) 8:00 p.m. President and Mrs. Nixon give white tie
dinner at White House in honor of PM and Mrs. Gorton.
E. May 7
(1) 9:30 a.m. PM makes courtesy call on Vice President.
noon
(2) 10:00 a.m. PM makes farewell call on President.
(3) 1:00 p.m. Secretary Rogers gives lunch in honor
of PM.
(4) 4:00 p.m. PM meets with Secretary of Defense.
F. May 8:
No plans yet for morning and lunchtime. PM probably will
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:
Clearances:
MCGREGOR PRINTING CORPORATION 12.66
CORRECTION
ADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE O LL COPIES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
:
CHARGE TO
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Classification
for oc/T use ONLY
Origin
ACTION: CANBERA
page 3
Info:
proceed mid-afternoon from Andrews AFB to San Francisco by USAF
aircraft to pick up Qantas flight for return to Australia via
Honolulu.
END
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:
Clearances:
Gontatil
Ir. Moose,
ote shows State has not been called.
hould they be?
Stateture
A.
Sopy for Gorten
file
exito Chapin
2
Fil
win Chestu)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
4/1/69
To:
R. Moose
From:
HAK's office
Sneider was informed of this while in
our office (he said this has already been
announced). We have not called State.
cy for Mr Sin
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
April 1, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger K
SUBJECT: Gorton Visit
You will recall that we tentatively fixed the dates of
May 13 and 14 for the visit of Prime Minister Gorton of
Australia. Bill Rogers is concerned that his Seato trip
scheduled to commence on May 12 will preclude his participation.
A review of your calendar indicates that the dates
of May 6 and 7 would also be appropriate, with the banquet on
the night of May 6.
With your approval, I will confirm this revised
schedule.
Approve X
Disapprove
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
5
memod
KISSINGER TOTHEPRESIDENT
5-5-69
B
ATTCH
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
WSC FILES
910
FOLDER TITLE
5
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S.GPO:1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
May 6, 1969
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM: Richard Sneider
SUBJECT: President's Farewell Meeting with Prime Minister Gorton
I attach (Tab A) a proposed memorandum to the President outlining
several of the points which the President may wish to bring up in his
farewell meeting with Gorton at noon on Wednesday.
It is particularly important that we get the President's clearance of
the formal statement to the press, which would be made available by
Ziegler's office at the close of the noon meeting. The attached text
was agreed to by Gorton and Secretary Rogers. In addition to the
written statement, the President would say a few words to the press;
suggested language is in his briefing book and is also attached to the
memorandum to him.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A, and seek
his approval of the language of the written statement to the press,
before his noon meeting with Gorton.
Attachment
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger HK
SUBJECT: Your Farewell Meeting with Prime Minister Gorton
Your second business meeting with Prime Minister Gorton will take
place at noon on Wednesday. Gorton will wish to discuss with you the
attached proposed press statement (Tab A). This statement has been
sought by Gorton to reaffirm our ANZUS commitment and agreed to ad
referendum by Secretary Rogers. It would be passed out to the press,
if you concur in its text. In addition, we assume you may wish to say
a few words to the press when you come out of the meeting with Gorton.
Suggested language is attached (Tab B).
At the meeting between Gorton and Rogers on Tuesday afternoon, the
following were discussed:
--The - text of the proposed press statement.
-Agreement to hold the next ANZUS meeting in Canberra in the
first week of August.
The NPT.
Gorton also raised again the desirability of naming an American Ambassador
to Canberra, the question of Mirage spare parts, and the idea of a non-
aggression pact in Southeast Asia. There is no indication that he will
raise any of these topics again with you on Wednesday morning.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize the issuance of the statement to the press at Tab A.
Approved
Disapproved
Change language as noted
I will discuss with Gorton
VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969
DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT
It has been a great pleasure to welcome Prime Minister
and Mrs. Gorton to Washington. Mrs. Gorton is of course
returning to the land of her birth, so we always have a
special greeting for her. Prime Minister Gorton is no
stranger to our shores either, and he has come as the Head
of Government of one of our closest friends and allies in the
world. We will always be delighted to see them both.
This visit has been most useful for me and, I think,
for other officers of this government. It has given us
a chance to get acquainted with an outstanding statesman
with whom we expect to be working very closely in the future.
Australia is a member of ANZUS and SEATO, two
alliances which are fundamental to our strategy and position
in Southeast Asia. As between us, ANZUS, with its provision
for mutual aid in developing our individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack, and its declaration that
"no potential aggressor should be under the illusion that
any of them (Australia, New Zealand or the United States)
2
stand alone in the Pacific area, " is of great importance
to both our countries. Australian troops are fighting
beside ours and those of other free world nations to
help South Viet-Nam preserve its independence.
Australian forces are stationed in Malaysia and Singapore
as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, and Prime
Minister Gorton has recently announced that these forces
will remain after the British forces withdraw in 1971, to
continue making their important contribution to the security
of that area. This is a historic and far-seeing decision,
and needless to say, it has our full understanding and the
decision has our support.
Australia is also making an outstanding contribution
to peaceful cooperation and economic development in its
part of the world. It participates whole-heartedly in the
Colombo Plan, the Asian Development Bank, and many other
regional activities. In percentage of national income
devoted to foreign aid, Australia ranks second in the world.
This is a record of which any nation can be proud. All
things considered, I think Australia and the United States
can both be proud of the contribution we are making, as
partners, to the security and progress of the Pacific region
3
to which we both belong. That partnership and that
contribution will continue.
These two days have provided opportunities for us to
discuss a whole range of subjects, including of course
Viet-Nam and regional security generally, but including
also a number of topics outside the security field.
Australia is georgraphically closer to some of these
problems than we are, and Prime Minister Gorton has been in
office a year longer than I have, so I have very much
appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with him.
I have obtained a number of new insights, but fundamentally,
I find the perspective from "down under" is very much the
same as it is from Washington.
This visit has been both profitable and enjoyable
for us. I hope that you can say the same, Mr. Prime
Minister and that you and your charming wife will come and
see us again.
EA/ANZ: CCBrower: rlw 5/6/69
(HUEBNER) JK
May 1, 1969
Suggestions for Remarks at the Departure of
John Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia
This visit has been enormously useful for me and for this govern-
ment. It has given us all a chance to get acquainted with an outstanding
statesman from a land that has been aptly described by one of its poets
as "the land of reliance and never-give-in and help-your-mate.'
The spirit of "help-your-mate" is deeply involved in the coopera-
tion between our countries. I might point out that our space program
has six tracking stations in Australia. And Australia is a member of
ANZUS and SEATO, two alliances which are fundamental to our policy
in Southeast Asia. Australian troops are fighting beside ours and those
of other free world nations in Vietnam even as they fought beside us in
World War I, World War II, and in Korea.
While Australia has been called "a prophecy still to be fulfilled,"
it is making an outstanding contribution to peaceful cooperation and
economic development in its part of the world. It participates whole-
heartedly in the Colombo Plan, the Asian Development Bank, and
many other regional activities. In percentage of national income
devoted to foreign aid, Australia ranks second in the world, a record
of which any nation can be proud. Australia and America can both be
proud of the contribution we are making, as partners, to the security
and progress of the Pacific region. That partnership and that contri-
bution will continue.
2
These two days have provided opportunities for us to discuss a
wide range of subjects, including, not only Vietnam and regional
security questions, but also a number of topics outside the security
field. Australia is geographically closer to some of these problems
than we are, SO I have very much appreciated the opportunity to
exchange views with its Prime Minister. I have obtained a number
of new insights, but fundamentally, I find the perspective from "down
under" is very much the same as it is from Washington.
Now you return to your homeland -- exchanging the beauties of
a Washington spring for the beauties of an Australian autumn - -
without even going through a hot summer.
An Australian writer has said that the flame of freedom will never
die in Australia because it is fanned by "a wind blowing out of the far
country." That wind is the democratic spirit of our forefathers which
is the product of the old frontier in both Australia and America.
At a time when democratic ideals are under attack all over the
world, all free nations can turn to Australia as they have often turned
to America, and they can be grateful that the winds of freedom are still
blowing "out of that far country."
####
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON,
M.P., PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA & MRS. GORTON
Meeting with President Nixon
Wednesday, May 7, 1969, 12:00 Noon
The White House
PARTICIPANTS
Members of the Australian Party
The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, M.P.
Prime Minister of Australia
His Excellency Sir Keith Waller, C.B.E.
Ambassador of Australia
Mr. C. L. S. Hewitt
Secretary, Prime Minister's Department
Sir James Plimsoll, C.B.E.
Secretary, Department of External Affairs
Mr. A. T. Griffith
Assistant Secretary, External Relations and Defense Branch
Prime Minister's Department
Mr. Anthony Eggleton
Press Secretary to the Prime Minister
Members of the American Party
The Honorable Emil Mosbacher, Jr.
Chief of Protocol of the United States
Mr. Robert W. Moore
Country Director for Australia, New Zealand and
Pacific Islands Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State
Mr. Samuel L. King
Deputy Chief of Protocol of the United States
Mr. David J. Waters
Assistant Chief of Protocol for Public Affairs
Department of State
Mr. Saed Khan
Protocol Officer
Department of State
09/0/05/002
1 1 2
At 11:50 a.m., Ambassador Mosbacher will arrive at Blair
House to escort Prime Minister Gorton to the White House.
At 11:55 a.m., Prime Minister Gorton, accompanied by
Ambassador Mosbacher, will depart from Blair House.
Suggested Car Seating Arrangements:
Car No. 1 - Prime Minister Gorton
Mr. Bennington
Ambassador Mosbacher
Inspector George
Car No. 2 - Ambassador Waller
Mr. Khan
Mr. Hewitt
Car No. 3 - Sir James Plimsoll
Mr. Griffith
Mr. Eggleton
NOTE: Mr. Robert Moore, Mr. Samuel L. King and Mr. David J.
Waters will arrive in advance at the White House
entering the Southwest Gate and proceeding to the
Diplomatic Reception Entrance.
At 12:00 noon Prime Minister Gorton and his party will
arrive at the Southwest Gate and proceed to the Diplomatic
Reception Entrance. Prime Minister Gorton will be escorted
to President Nixon's office and the other members of the
party will be escorted to the Cabinet Room.
Upon conclusion of the meeting, Prime Minister Gorton,
accompanied by Ambassador Mosbacher, will depart from the
White House.
*
*
*
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON, M.P.,
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, AND MRS. GORTON
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ARRIVAL AT THE WHITE HOUSE
TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1969
The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, M.P., Prime Minister of
Australia, and Mrs. Gorton will arrive at the White House by car
from Blair House at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, May 6, 1969. They will
be accompanied by the Honorable Emil Mosbacher, Jr., Chief of
Protocol of the United States, and Mrs. Mosbacher.
Suggested Car Seating Arrangements from Blair House to the White
House:
Car No. 1 - Prime Minister Gorton
Mr. Bennington
Mrs. Gorton
Inspector George
Ambassador Mosbacher
Mrs. Mosbacher
Car No. 2 - Ambassador Waller
Mr. Khan
Lady Waller
Car No. 3 - Mr. Hewitt
Sir James Plimsoll
Arrival at the White House
At 10:25 a.m. President and Mrs. Nixon will walk to the
Diplomatic Reception Room to await the arrival of Prime Minister
and Mrs. Gorton.
At 10:30 a.m., Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton and their party
will enter the Southwest Gate of the White House. The car carrying
Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton will stop at the Diplomatic Entrance
where Ambassador Mosbacher will present Prime Minister and Mrs.
Gorton to President and Mrs. Nixon. Then the Honorable William P.
Rogers, Secretary of State, will be introduced. Mr. Samuel L. King,
Deputy Chief of Protocol, will present the members of the Australian
Party to President and Mrs. Nixon and Secretary Rogers. Photographs
will be taken. (No military honors will be rendered. There will be
no public statements.)
Following the photographs, President Nixon and Prime Minister
Gorton will walk to the President's Office. Ambassador Waller,
Mr. Hewitt and Sir James Plimsoll will follow and be seated in the
Cabinet Room. Secretary Rogers, Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Sneider and
Mr. Moore will also be present in the Cabinet. Room. Following the
conference, President Nixon and Prime Minister Gorton may wish to
include the other members in further discussions.
At the
0910/05/003
- 2 -
At the conclusion of the discussion, President Nixon will
escort Prime Minister Gorton to his car by way of the path
leading from the President's Office to the driveway. (In the
event of inclement weather, the Prime Minister may depart by way
of the Diplomatic Reception Room.) Prime Minister Gorton,
accompanied by Ambassador Mosbacher, will return to Blair House.
Following the photographs, Mrs. Nixon will escort Mrs. Gorton
and the other ladies to the Yellow Oval Room in the residence
apartments. Coffee will be served.
Mrs. Gorton, accompanied by Mrs. Mosbacher, will depart from
the White House and return to Blair House.
Protocol
May 5, 1969
MEMORANDUM
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
May 5, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *
SUBJECT: Gorton Visit: F-111 Aircraft Procurement for Australia
Background: Prime Minister Gorton may raise with you Australian
concerns about the F-111 aircraft. In 1963, Australia agreed to
purchase 24 F-111A aircraft at a program cost of $125 million.
Since then the cost of the total package has risen to $240 million and
may go up further.
The Australians have been continuously concerned about the rising
cost of the F-111s. However, their present anxiety arises from re-
ports that we may be writing off the F-111 program for the US Air Force
due to technical problems and cutbacks in the number of aircraft pur-
chased for the US Air Force. Gorton would probably prefer to cancel
the contract, if this could be done without serious embarrassment.
However, he is probably prepared to continue with the purchase of the
F-111s providing he is assured the US Government does not consider
the plane obsolete for its own purposes, technological problems in the
wing configuration have been worked out, and there will be a sufficient
production run to assure availability of spare parts. The Royal Aus-
tralian Air Force has recently completed a special study raising these
problems.
Gorton discussed the F-111 problem with Secretary Laird during his
first visit here. At that time he was assured that procurement of the
fighter version is being continued for use by the Air Force and that
changes are being made to correct difficulties in the wing. He will
probably seek reiteration of these assurances, possibly in writing, during
his current visit.
Recommended talking points:
1. The US plans to continue the F-111 program and difficulties
in the aircraft are being corrected before the F-111 aircraft are delivered
to Australia.
2. Secretary Laird will be prepared to discuss the problem in
detail with Gorton.
CONFIDENTIAL
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT. OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
MEMORANDUM
THE PRE DENT HAS SEEN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
HK
SUBJECT: Visit of Prime Minister Gorton (May 6 and 7)
1. Prime Minister Gorton will arrive at the White House
at 10:30 a. m. Following a brief informal greeting with no welcoming
remarks planned, you are scheduled to talk privately with him.
When you and he are ready, you and he are scheduled to join a
group of senior officials in the Cabinet Room.
2. You will have a further opportunity for conversation
during your white tie dinner on Tuesday evening, May 6. (Points
for Toast at Tab A.)
3. Gorton will make a brief call on you again on Wednesday
at 12:00 noon, after which there will be brief statements by you and
Gorton to the press. (A draft press statement is at Tab B.)
4. Talking points on issues likely to arise in the talks and
personal background on Gorton are at Tab C.
5. Gorton's view of the Eisenhower funeral talks: Gorton
came away from his initial talk with you after General Eisenhower's
funeral very favorably impressed. When he returned to Australia,
he is reported to have said "I like the guy". He feels that his initial
talk with you just touched the surface of the key issues and largely
disposed of the trivia. Gorton now wants to get down to the vitals.
(Your first conversation with Gorton is attached at Tab D.)
6. Gorton's main purposes in his talks with you will be
-- to consolidate a personal relationship with you
which will both enhance continued consultation
and earn him political credit at home for his
forthcoming general elections.
SECRET
SECRET
- 2 -
-- to test the firmness of U.S. Asian commitments
under your Administration, since he believes
strongly that without U.S. support Australia cannot
carry out on its resources alone its commitments
to Malaysia/Singapore and to regional defense of
Southeast Asia.
-- to question you, in greater depth, on U.S. interests
and objectives in Southeast Asia (you told Gorton
that the NSC would review this problem before he
came here. and the NSC Review Group is considering
on May 2 a paper (Tab E) as a basis for your S from
discussions with Gorton).
-- to probe your thinking on Vietnam including U.S.
planning for unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces,
and post-Vietnam war prospects in Asia.
7. In preparing for the visit Gorton made a calculated
decision that he should announce first his forward defense policy
and Australia's commitment to maintain military forces in Malaysia/
Singapore after the British withdraw in 1971. (He sent a copy of his
February 25 speech to you in London, and you sent him a congratulatory
message.) Now he wants to make sure that he has not overextended
his country's limited defense resources.
8. Your main purposes in these talks will be
-- to reciprocate Gorton's desire for a personal
relationship and establish a basis for continuing
two-way consultation between the two governments.
-- to reassure Gorton that we are prepared to maintain
our Asian commitments, particularly ANZUS and
SEATO, pointing up that in fact Australia's
contribution to regional defense makes it easier
for us to maintain our commitments in Asia.
SECRET