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    "title": "Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Documents Fifth HAK Trip [2 of 4]",
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    "ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nI\nreport\nre: Middle East\nn.d.\nB\n2\nmemo\nForsman to Saunders\n5/23/74\nB\n3\nreport\nIsraeli Analysis of the Findings\n5/12/74\nB\n4\nmemo\nSaunders to Hoskinson\nn.d.\nB\n5\nreport\nForeign Forces in Syria\n5/23/74\nB\n6\ntelegram\nSecState to Amconsul Jerusalem\n5/28/74\nB\n7\ntelegram\nSecState to Amconsul Jerusalem\n5/28/74\nB\n8\nbrief\nPlan for the Golan Heights\nn.d.\nB\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nNSC\n1190\nFOLDER TITLE\n11\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nGPO;\n1989-235-084/00024\nDECLASSIFIED\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\ntotal\nis\nTOP SECRET\n25.3.74\nSEPARATION OF FORCES PLAN\nISRAELI PROPOSAL\nlegend:\n67 CEASE FIRE LINES\n73 CEASE FIRE LINE\nMOVE\nLIGHT FORCES ZONE\n2 INF. BATTALIONS\n60 TANKS\n3000 MEN\nLIMITED FORCES AREA\n1 INF. DIV.\n16 ARMOUR DIV. (300 TANKS)\nART. BATTALIONS (100 GUNS)\n(to cover only own forceskline)\nMISSILE FREE AREA\nISRAELI SIDE\nwt OF SHOE unsu\nCOMPLETE RESTRICTION ON ANY\nMISSILES & SITES (GROUND TO AIR\nSYRIAN SIDE\nGROUND TO GROUND\n30m\n25km\nLimited Forces Area\nLight Forces Zone\n10 km\nLight - Forces Zone\nLimited Forces Area\n10km\n25km\n30km\nMiseile Free Area\nU.N.E.F.\nMissile Free Area\nBuffer\nZone\nTOP SECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSHEMONA\nBERU\nlegend:\nJUNE 67 LINES\nOCT. 73 LINE\nISRAELI SETTLEMENT\nSYRIAN ABANDONED VILLAGE:\nOVER 500 INHABITANTS\nLESS THEN 500 INHABITANTS\nSYRIAN INHABITED VILLAGE:\nOVER 500 INHABITANTS\nLESS THEN 500 INHABITANTS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\nSTRATEGY IN EVENT OF FAILURE IN\nSYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS\nObjectives:\nIf our current round of negotiations in the area fails to\nproduce Syrian-Israeli agreement on the main elements of dis-\nengagement, our objectives will be:\n1. To manage the diplomatic situation in such a way that the\nSecretary leaves the area without there being a major blowup.\n2. Rio retain US credibility and influence in key Arab countries,\nincluding in particular Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Algeria.\n3. To preserve the elements of a negotiating process that can\nbe picked up and re-started when circumstances are more propitiousl.\nTwo Possible Scenarios\nThe courses of action open to us will be determined in large\nmeasure by the circumstances under which the negotiations break\ndown. For analytical purposes, we are likely to face one of the following\ntwo situations:\n1. A breakdown in circumstances where (a) Israel will have\ntaken a position that moderate Arab opinion (meaning Egypt in particular)\nperceives as a reasonable result of our efforts, and (b) Syria balks.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n2\nThis could arise, for example, if Israel agrees to a disengagement\nline that returns Kuneitra to Syrian civilian administration, and\nSyria insitts on a significantly larger withdrawal. (Scenario 1)\n2. A breakdown which is widely perceived in the area and\nelsewhere as the result of Israeli inflexibility -- e.g., Israel\nstands on its present position - something close to it with respect\nto the location of the disengagement line (Scenario 2).\nScenario 1 (Syria to blame)\nThis is cheiezsier of the two situations for us to manage. Our\nimmediate task will be to make sure that the facts are clearly under-\nstood in key Arab and European capitals, since we can expect the\nSyrians and their supporters, especially the Soviets, to seek to\nobfuscate and misinterpret the issues.\nWe should:\n(a) Make sure Sadat, Boumediene and Faisal understand the\nreasons for the impasse and seek their assurances they will not be\ndrawn into military of political support of Syria if it goes to war.\nThis would best be accomplished by further visit to those capitals,\nas well as a full briefing of NATO and of the Soviets on the specific\npositions adopted by each side.\n(b) Adopt a public postable of willingness to continue our efforts\nthrough diplomatic channels.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n3\n(c) Avoid public criticism of Syria, while continuing our\ndialogue with Asad to keep the door open to further negotiations if\nhis position later becomes more flexible.\n(d) Make a factual written report on the status of thennegotiations\nto the UN Secretary General and to the participants in the Geneva\nPeace Conference.\n(e) If the issues goes to the Security Council, adopt a position\nsupportive of Israel and seek to line up as many other members as\npossible.\n(f) Intensify our bilateral cooperation activities with key Arab\ncountries.\nScenario 2 (Israel to blame)\nThis situation would place us in a difficult position, and our\nmaneuverability would be greatly circumscribed.\nWe should:\n(a) Elicit from Israel maximum flexibility on as many elements\nof disengagement as possible with a view to obtaining Israeli agreement\nto terms that, except for the Israeli position on the disengagement line,\nare as close as possible to the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian agreement.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n4\n(b) Adopt a public posture that disassociates us from the positions\nof both sides to the extent that they deviate from the model of the\nEgyptian-Israeli agreement.\n(c) If the issue goes to the Security Council, avoid supporting\nthe Israeli position; this might be the time for us to \"non-participate\"\nin any vote, on the grounds that participation would be inconsistent\nwith our middleman role in the negotiations.\n(d) Agree, if others press, to a meeting of the Geneva\nConference to review the status of the negotiations and to consider\nnext steps.\n(e) Seek Israeli and Syrian agreement to a statement defining\nprinciples of disengagement on which both sides could agree as well\nas the areas remaining to be negotiated. Such a statement could be\nforwarded to the UN Secretary General and the Geneva Conference\nparticipants as a basis for future negotiations when either side\nindicated an interest in resuming talks.\n(1) While continuing scheduled military deliveries and economic\naid to Israel, defer decisions on new items of equipment sought by\nIsrael and leave the optional $500 million under the Emergency Security\nAssistance Act as a loan rather than connecting it to grant aid.\n(g) Undertake intensive diplomatic efforts with key Arab countries\nto (1) persuade them that the stalemate innegotiations is a transitory\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Kissinger's Luncheon Toast, May 3, 1974\nSome months ago when we first started in our Middle East\nefforts, it was as if Syria were on the other side of the\nmoon. That is why we proposed that Mr. Sisco come here.\nSeriously, relations have been frozen for two decades and\npublic opinion in the United States viewed Syria as a hostile\ncountry and one allied to our opponent.\nSince my first visit four months ago there has been a tremen-\ndous change. We have learned that Syrians are a proud and\nindependent people and that Syria is nobody's tool.\nWe have experienced tremendous Syrian hospitality. I am grate-\nful that the Foreign Minister arranged for only a light lunch\ntoday. We have become convinced that the freezing of relations\nthat had taken place was not natural. We are committed to a\nrapid improvement in our relations. We ask nothing from Syria\nexcept what is natural to Syria, which is to be true to its\nown national interest. On this basis, we are prepared to\ncooperate in the reconstruction of Syria and are prepared to\nhave the same close relations with Syria as with any other\nArab country. We realize that some objective difficulties\nhave to be overcome before we can continue on this road. But\nwe consider cooperation our natural relationship.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nI am here on a very difficult mission to begin the process\nof making peace between Syria and its neighbor. While Syria\nhas proved that it has a great capacity for friendship, it\nhas also proved an implacable enemy to its enemies. There\nis a generation of distrust and warfare between Israel and\nSyria. Therefore, it is difficult to take the first step.\nAfter one of my earlier trips here, I made the point that it\nis a tremendous step for Syris to engage in this process at\nall and to be prepared to do it on a step-by-step basis.\nI cannot report that my argument met with universal appro-\nbation in the Israel government. But I do believe a possi-\nbility exists for a first step, and once that is taken, the\nprocess becomes irreversible. We are interested in the first\nstep not to draw another permanent line but to start the\nprocess leading toward a lasting peace. In assessing specific\nproposals, it is important to keep in mind our ultimate destina-\ntion as well as the independent proposals themselves. I will\ndiscuss all of this in detail with His Excellency, the President.\nWe will make a major effort. We have our own ideas that are\nnot bound by the ideas of anyone else, and I have great hope\nthat we can accomplish on the northern front what we have\naccomplished on the southern front. In this spirit, my colleagues\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nand I will be returning as often as necessary to make sub-\nstantial progress and perhaps to complete an agreement.\nI would like to thank my colleague, the Foreign Minister, for\nthe understanding which he has shown and for the attitude\nwhich has been important in the transformation of our relations.\nMay I ask you to join me in a toast to the Foreign Minister.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Kissinger's Luncheon Toast, May 3, 1974\nSome months ago when we first started in our Middle East\nefforts, it was as if Syria were on the other side of the\nmoon. That is why we proposed that Mr. Sisco come here.\nSeriously, relations have been frozen for two decades and\npublic opinion in the United States viewed Syria as a hostile\ncountry and one allied to our opponent.\nSince my first visit four months ago there has been a tremen-\ndous change. We have learned that Syrians are a proud and\nindependent people and that Syria is nobody's tool.\nWe have experienced tremendous Syrian hospitality. I am grate-\nful that the Foreign Minister arranged for only a light lunch\ntoday. We have become convinced that the freezing of relations\nthat had taken place was not natural. We are committed to a\nrapid improvement in our relations. We ask nothing from Syria\nexcept what is natural to Syria, which is to be true to its\nown national interest. On this basis, we are prepared to\ncooperate in the reconstruction of Syria and are prepared to\nhave the same close relations with Syria as with any other\nArab country. We realize that some objective difficulties\nhave to be overcome before we can continue on this road. But\nwe consider cooperation our natural relationship.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nI am here on a very difficult mission to begin the process\nof making peace between Syria and its neighbor. While Syria\nhas proved that it has a great capacity for friendship, it\nhas also proved an implacable enemy to its enemies. There\nis a generation of distrust and warfare between Israel and\nSyria. Therefore, it is difficult to take the first step.\nAfter one of my earlier trips here, I made the point that it\nis a tremendous step for Syris to engage in this process at\nall and to be prepared to do it on a step-by-step basis.\nI cannot report that my argument met with universal appro-\nbation in the Israel government. But I do believe a possi-\nbility exists for a first step, and once that is taken, the\nprocess becomes irreversible. We are interested in the first\nstep not to draw another permanent line but to start the\nprocess leading toward a lasting peace. In assessing specific\nproposals, it is important to keep in mind our ultimate destina-\ntion as well as the independent proposals themselves. I will\ndiscuss all of this in detail with His Excellency, the President.\nWe will make a major effort. We have our own ideas that are\nnot bound by the ideas of anyone else, and I have great hope\nthat we can accomplish on the northern front what we have\naccomplished on the southern front. In this spirit, my colleagues\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nand I will be returning as often as necessary to make sub-\nstantial progress and perhaps to complete an agreement.\nI would like to thank my colleague, the Foreign Minister, for\nthe understanding which he has shown and for the attitude\nwhich has been important in the transformation of our relations.\nMay I ask you to join me in a toast to the Foreign Minister.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Kissinger's Luncheon Toast, May 3, 1974\nSome months ago when we first started in our Middle East\nefforts, it was as if Syria were on the other side of the\nmoon. That is why we proposed that Mr. Sisco come here.\nSeriously, relations have been frozen for two decades and\npublic opinion in the United States viewed Syria as a hostile\ncountry and one allied to our opponent.\nSince my first visit four months ago there has been a tremen-\ndous change. We have learned that Syrians are a proud and\nindependent people and that Syria is nobody's tool.\nWe have experienced tremendous Syrian hospitality. I am grate-\nful that the Foreign Minister arranged for only a light lunch\ntoday. We have become convinced that the freezing of relations\nthat had taken place was not natural. We are committed to a\nrapid improvement in our relations. We ask nothing from Syria\nexcept what is natural to Syria, which is to be true to its\nown national interest. On this basis, we are prepared to\ncooperate in the reconstruction of Syria and are prepared to\nhave the same close relations with Syria as with any other\nArab country. We realize that some objective difficulties\nhave to be overcome before we can continue on this road. But\nwe consider cooperation our natural relationship.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nI am here on a very difficult mission to begin the process\nof making peace between Syria and its neighbor. While Syria\nhas proved that it has a great capacity for friendship, it\nhas also proved an implacable enemy to its enemies. There\nis a generation of distrust and warfare between Israel and\nSyria. Therefore, it is difficult to take the first step.\nAfter one of my earlier trips here, I made the point that it\nis a tremendous step for Syris to engage in this process at\nall and to be prepared to do it on a step-by-step basis.\nI cannot report that my argument met with universal appro-\nbation in the Israel government. But I do believe a possi-\nbility exists for a first step, and once that is taken, the\nprocess becomes irreversible. We are interested in the first\nstep not to draw another permanent line but to start the\nprocess leading toward a lasting peace. In assessing specific\nproposals, it is important to keep in mind our ultimate destina-\ntion as well as the independent proposals themselves. I will\ndiscuss all of this in detail with His Excellency, the President.\nWe will make a major effort. We have our own ideas that are\nnot bound by the ideas of anyone else, and I have great hope\nthat we can accomplish on the northern front what we have\naccomplished on the southern front. In this spirit, my colleagues\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nand I will be returning as often as necessary to make sub-\nstantial progress and perhaps to complete an agreement.\nI would like to thank my colleague, the Foreign Minister, for\nthe understanding which he has shown and for the attitude\nwhich has been important in the transformation of our relations.\nMay I ask you to join me in a toast to the Foreign Minister.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMay 22, 1974\nMr. Secretary:\nWe believe Assad is frozen against the Egyptian\nmodel for the reasons given. The three of us are\nconvinced we have to alter the approach somewhat.\nThis approach would be based on giving Israel as\nearly a warning of attack as possible rather than\ntrying to get the guns out of range of opposing lines.\nThe space is too small, and Assad won't accept such\nrestrictions. Thus instead of applying the Egyptian\nmodel, we would try to provide detection of indi-\ncations of possible offensive action.\nWe suggest it be discussed in general with\nIsrael this morning and then tried out on Assad this\nafternoon.\nJoe Sisco\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAU.S.PROPOSAL\nA. Mount Hermon\nThe Red Line would be moved three to four kilometers to the\nwest toward the peak as indicated in Israel Tuesday\nmorning.\nIsrael would turn over to the U. N. the positions\nit did not occupy on October 6.\nB. Limitations\n1. Within 10 kilometer zone, deployment would con-\nsist of no more than 5,000 men, 70 tanks, and\n36 artillery pieces (short range).\n2. U. N. Disengagement Observer Force would inspect\nthese deployments.\n3. In a second 10 kilometer zone:\n(a) in the southern sector Syria would be\npermitted to retain the present strength\nof its forces and equipment;\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\n(b) in northern sector where Israel pulls back,\nSyria would, after moving forward into the area\nvacated by Israel, with forces consistent with\nwhat is allowed in the 10 kilometer zone,\nredeploy its troops towns in positions normal for the\ndefense of Damascus. Syria would specify in\nadvance to us what their deployment would be.\n(c) Syria would keep its SAM's where they are\nand provide following commitments:\n(1) There would be no SAM's in second 10 kilometer\nzone,\n(2) Syria will not move them forward x from where they\nare,\n(3) Syria will not shoot at any Israeli airplanes\nflying on the Israeli side of the line.\n(d) US aerial reconnaissance would be the form of\nmonitoring, not UN inspection. Purpose of this\ninspection would be not to check on a firm stand-\nstill of deployment, but rather to detect whether\neither change of equipment or its increase in num-\nbers or disposition indicate intention to mount\noffensive action. Intelligence would be made\navailable to both sides.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\n4. Syria would agree to this as a US proposal, and give\nus a private assurance rather than this being\nreflected in the agreement.\nC. The Red Line\nThe Red Line would be moved westward in accordance with\nthe following general principles:\none to two kilometers west in the area opposite the\nQuneitra area on grounds that this would be part of\nan effort to lessen the possibility that the people\nof Quneitra will be involved in future military\nactivity;\nthree to four kilometers west in the area to the north\nof that.\nD. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force\n1,500 men\nE. Area of Separation\nThere would be no military forces or equipment and a maximum\nnumber of 150 police forces.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSYRIAN OR GANIZATION\nDivision has 3 brigades (3000 men each)\nDivision alsohas 2 battalious of artillery\nEach brigade has a battalion of artillery (122mm. is organic)\nAn armored brigade has 93 tanks\nAn infantry brigade has 31 tanks (Asad said sometimes 41)\n9- BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT : TANKS\nBest case : 9 infantry brigades = 279 tanks\nFirst probable: 6 infantry brigades (186)\n3 armored brigades (279) = 465\ntanks\nSecond probable: 7 infantry brigades (217)\n(Best attainable) 2 armored brigades (186) = 403\ntanks\nTheoretical\ncase worst. : 9 armored brigades = 837 tanks\nPresent deploymentwithin 25km. of front:\n49.000 men\n752 tanks\n369 artillery pieces\n\"Normal\" peacetime deployment (July 1,1973) in 25km. area\n34,500 men\n465 tanks\n276 artillery\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nCURRENT EMPLOYMENT\n7th Infantry Division Area of Operation\n124 Tanks\n30'\nXX\n72 Artillery Pieces\n3\n14000 Personnel\nDamascus\n9th Infantry Division\n217 Tanks\n1\nazraat Beit Jinn\nXX\n126 Artillery Pieces\n1024\n1\n15250 Personnel\nSassa\n5th Infantry Division\n217 Tanks\n126 Artillery Pieces\nX\n15250 Personnel\nKuneitra\nRIA\nKafr\n68th Independent Armor Brigade\nNaffakh\nDEMILITA\nONE\n93 Tanks\nX9\n18 Artillery Pieces\nKhushing\n33° 00'\n2250 Personnel\nRafid\n80th Independent Armor Brigade\n93 Tanks\n18 Artillery Pieces\n5\n2250 Personnel\nELAL\nTOTALS\n45'\n752 Tanks\n369 Artillery Pieces\n49000 Personnel\nJORDAN\n45'\n36'0\n15'\nATT 1\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe Arab-Israeli Handbook\n1723/73\nNORMAL DEPLOYMENT\n1 July 1973\no\nAn Nasariyah\nBEIRUT\n26\n3\n13\nLebanon\nAr Ruhaybah\n213\nAI Qutayfah\nSF\nHarasta al Basal\nRealat Asad\n0\nAI Qabun\nArmd Dr ense\nO\nDAMASCUS\nForce\nYalfur\nAI Mezzah\nAtid\nQatana\nAI Kiswah,\nMazra'at Bayt Jinn\nHadar\nSa'Sa'\nJabbata\nAI Khashab\nKanakir\n7th Infantry Division\n*Maás\nKhan Arnabah\nGhabaqhib\n186 Tanks\n102 Artillery Pieces\nAgraba\nGOLAN\n12000 Personnel\nAs Sanamayr\nNab' As Sakhr\nBasir\nRuhin\n9th Infantry Division\nHEIGHTS\nQasim\nIsrael\nAr Rafid\n62 Tanks\nNawa\nAyn Dhakar\n\"Izra\n48 Artillery Pieces\nLake\nAsh Shaykh Said\n7000 Personnel\nTiberias\n\"Ash Shaykh\nMiskin\nJallin\nTafas\n5th Infantry Division\n217 Tanks\nSC'\n126 Artillery Pieces\n15500 Personnel\nTOTALS:\n465 Tanks\n276 Artillery Pieces\n34500 Personnel\n13,000 = one broyade of\nATT TT 2\neach of above\nforward\n(\n3000\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nARMOR DIV\n2 Armor Bdes.\nContains: 186 Tanks; 36 Artillery Pieces; 4,500 Personnel\n1 Artillery Bde.\nContains: 54-71 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel\n1 Mechanized Inf Bde.\nContains: 31 Tanks; 18 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel\nTOTALS FOR ONE (1) DIVISION: 217 Tanks; 107 Artillery;\n10,500 Personnel\nINFANTRY DIV\n2 Infantry Bdes.\nContains: 62 Tanks; 48 Artillery Pieces; 7,000 Personnel\n1 Mechanized Inf Bde.\nContains: 31 Tanks; 6 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel\nx\n1 Armor Bde.\nContains: 124 Tanks; 18 Artillery Pieces; 2,250 Personnel\n1 Artillery Bde.\nContains: 54 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel\nTOTALS FOR ONE (1) DIVISION: 217 Tanks; 126 Artillery Pieces;\n15,250 Personnel\nTHERE ARE TWO (2) ARMOR DIVISIONS PLUS ONE (1) ARMOR TASK FORCE.\nWE HAVE A TOTAL BREAK OUT AS FOLLOWS:\nTANKS: 713\nARTY : 268\nPERS : 27,750\nTHERE ARE THREE (3) INFANTRY DIVISIONS.\nWE HAVE A TOTAL BREAK OUT AS FOLLOWS:\nTANKS: 651\nARTY : 378\nPERS : 45,750\nATT.4 4\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nIt a\nESTIMATED POST DISENGAGEMENT\nDAMASCUS\nXX\n3\n30\nLEBANON\nXX\n1\n7th Infantry Division\n186 Tanks\nx\nX\n66 Artillery Pieces\n68\n78\n12250 Personnel\n15\nX\nX\n85\nX\n9th Infantry Division\n12)\n7\n155 Tanks\nXX\n48 Artillery Pieces\n9\nx\n52\n9250 Personnel\nSYRIA\nX\nDEMILITARIZED\nx\nZONE\n43\n33\n5th Infantry Division\n33° 00\nxx\n217 Tanks\n5\nX\n72 Artillery Pieces\nx\n112\nX\n12500 Personnel\n46\nx\nLake\n61\nx\nTOTALS:\nTiberias\n132\nX\n132\n558 Tanks\n45\n186 Artillery Pieces\n34000 Personnel\nJORDAN\n30'\n45'\n36°00'\n15'\nATT. 3\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 2 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nOPTIONAL FORM NO. 10\nMAY 1962 EDITION\nGSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6\nUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT\nMemorandum\nTO\n:\nMr. Saunders\nDATE:\nMay 5, 1974\nFROM :\nCol. B. B. Forsman, USAF, Defense Attache\nSUBJECT:\nIDF Peacetime Golan Heights Deployment\n1. The attached map depicts the pre-October 1973 normal IDF deployment\non the Golan Heights. The information was derived from numerous brief-\nings. Our observations on road trips confirm the general deployment,\nbut not all units were continuously deployed in the positions shown.\n2. You will note the outposts along the ceasefire line. Those under-\nlined were continuously manned, as far as we can determine. These\noutposts were designed to withstand attack as opposed to the trip-wire\nconcept on the Bar Lev line. The Arman units behind the line were\ndeployed in platoon strength (three tanks) as a general rule.\n3. Hope this satisfies your request.\nAttachment:\nAs stated.\nBilly B Farm\nDAO:Col.BBForsman:p1r--5/5/74\nBuy U.S. Savings Plan\n5010-108\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n102\nN\n230\nQ\nNo\nN\n40\n0001\n300000\nDeir Sirjane\nMaz, Sarda\nKherouiaa\nHadai\nKafer Kela\nAridla\n193\nTaibe\nVazzani\nHarfa\nhajar\ndilpi\nMughs\nShab'a\n104\n11111\n11\nMayan Baruk\nPAL\nQuiya\n1188\nLahoussa\nGrannje\nMarkabe\nHay\nH. Mamri Dafna 0\n.165\nShe ar\nEn\nYashuv LIV'AT\nFill\n198\nTELL EL AHMAR\nKoum Marj\nlim\nQiryat\nHaGosherim\nMIZPE\nZa'ura\n226\nBarrhoure\nHould\nMargaliyyot\nShemona\n197'\nGOLAN\nRass 1023 enn Nouriye\"\nOBet Hillel\n05\n290\n1029\nQainal Donbed\nHARE\nOutain\nKetar Szold\n100\nHAR\nThat Erennbe\nSede\nNehemya\nJibab Meis\ndrom\nD\nIONIT\n124\nTELL ECH CHAAR\nNa'am\nAmir\nMeiss Jebell\nKefar Blum\nUyun el Hajal\nEin of Haur\nJabaa\n33° 10'\nShamir\nQata\nNe'ot\nhmadiya\n4107\n©Samdapiye\n2\nMordekha\nSariaqa\nBab et Hawä\nSanstan\nLahayot HaBishan\nMansura\nGharbiya\nBlidal\nNäsil\nMeroin (\nQana\nYiftah\nHAR BENT\nOumm Batne\nunditra\nGonen\nRawiya\nAiraroun\nMezudat esha'\nDarahta\n280\nHAR\nMudariya\nOumm Tine Q\nRast\nMalkiyya\nS\nRamot Naftali\nNoterd\nDalwa\n529\nQEREN\nHafar\nZiwan\nEin\nZiwan\nMrabaate\nEmeg Hula\n109\nMnaithate\nO\nNAFTALI\nMughaiyir\nKammouniye ©Nabaa\nDishor\nx\nRibaniye\nes Sakhr\nown\n*807\nHuseiniya\nHAR SHIFON\nMajdouliye\nHAR GERSHOM\n549\n977\nKhuweikho\n3\n1110\nYesud\nKafr Naffikh\n720\nHAB OSIFON\n8 110\nHaMa'ala\nHAR\n'Aleiqa\nDalhamiyg\nAjam\nEin Eisha\nSAlma\nELIEZER\nHulata\n$66.)\nDabbura\nSindiyäna\nQadiripa\n900\nKoum Ain\nel Pacha\nY\nH. Oazyon Sede Eli'ezer\nJuwer\nBriqa\nTELL AKASHA\nran\n270\nRamthaniya\n1029\nsign\n1(-)\nFasara\nKodna\nPrior to the Tom Kippur War the IDF\nDabiya\n900\nya\nIII\nSoueisse\n998\n33°00'\nKhushniya\nmanned the 12 ceasefire line positions\n*877\nQasrin\nTULUL\nUMUR\nwith, for the most part, reservists.\nQusbiya\nAsbah\n758\nAsha\n4\nThe Total INfantry strength was\nHAR\nFarj\nRafid\napproximately 7 companies. The 188 ш\nNahal Geshur\nButimy414\nARMOR Bde\nTuiyiba\nUmm ed Dananir\nwith approximately\n260\nMansüra\nOld Fort\nShabba\nP\n1115\n80 tanks manned tank platoon\n-\nMaalaqa\nCr.\nGIVAT BAZAQ\nBassa\nRhadir el Boustane\nMeskine\npositions located normally quite\n498 Jurnaya\nA\n116\nRoad\nnear the ceasefire OP positions\no\nZeita Jurnaya\n:.Maz. Quneitra\nMazraa\n5\n(Capernanm)\ngu. all\nMas'adiya\nRoman Road\nEr Razoniya\nJike Raggad\nKare Deshe\nMaz. Kanaf Deir Asiz\nJise Masri\nLite aruf AMERICA\nEn Sheva (Heptapegon)\n1) m (Täbigha)\nKafr Aqab\nQ\ntamot\n7\nAin Dakar\nBiq'at\nTEL HODIM\nAmarat el Fareij\nHAR RAVID\nSabahiya\nKhisfir\n250\nGinnosar\nLawiyn\nRamar\nSavyona\n117\n50'\nWeradin\nVilla Melchet\nHutiya\nab\nKursi\nAdeisa\n7)\nH.Arbet\nZetim\nMarjahiya\nKafr el Ma\nNaf'a\nBiarai\nArbel\nArbel\nTel Raqqat\nYo'ay,\nNabal\nBiresh\nV\nHittin\nHeitil\nTTM\nNugeib\n6\nShuqum Sukufiy Bene Yehuda\nNafrali\nHeta\nalahal Gola\nSahm el Joulane\nTiberias\n'En Gev\n\" O\"\nAbdine\nZayatine\n441*\n9. Mara Ditsuerya\n9.\ngusito\nNe'ot Golan\nAarda\nHammat\nChajara\nRabbi\nMenora\nMaariye\nMo.\" Tomb\nYogusa\nH. Menorim\nKafr Harib\nBeit Erré\n240\nH. Sirgond\nHospital\nOffeite\nok.ouaiye\nIaZore'im\nQoussair ©\nresid HAR ADAMI\nW. Khond\n:H.Ordesh\nlevellamma\nPoriyya 'Ittil\nSharona\nHaOn\nKair\n# Zedata\nMosha\nMEZOQE\nAgraba\nShajara\nMaqarin\nseizoun\nKanna\nPoriyya\nKåziye\nSemudar\nYIN'AM\nand Bet Derah\nMisimur HaShe osha\nOholah\nMa'agan,\nRafid\n9\n7\nBitanya\nO\nTel Qagir\nOMukheiba\n411\nYavneer\nAlummor\nDavor\nDegany\nRhiet\nagafig\nOSa\nHarta\nDhune\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON\nPRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n3\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nSTATE 105745\n21 MAY\n16\n52z\n0 211422Z MAY 74 ZFF6\nTo SEC 863\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nTO RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0711\nINFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 0521\nRUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 5872\nBT\nCONFIDENTIAL\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 3 STATE 105745/1\nTOSEC 863\nE.O. 11652: N/A\nTAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)\nSUBJ: UNTSO MANDATE\nREF: JERUSALEM 1003\nFOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM\nFOLLOWING IS MATERIAL REQUESTED REFTEL:\n1. FIRST SUBSTANTIVE DIRECTIONS TO UNTSO OBSERVERS BY\nSECURITY COUNCIL APPEARED IN COUNCIL RESOLUTION 73 OF 11\nAUGUST 1949 IN PARA 6 WHICH READ:\n\"REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ARRANGE FOR THE\nCONTINUED SERVICE OF SUCH OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE PRESENT\nTRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION AS MAY BE REQUIRED IN\nOBSERVING AND MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND AS MAY BE\nNECESSARY IN ASSISTING THE PARTIES TO THE ARMISTICE\nAGREEMENTS IN THE SUPERVISION OF THE APPLICATION AND\nOBSERVANCE OF THE TERMS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS, WITH\nPARTICULAR REGARD TO THE DESIRES OF THE PARTIES AS\nEXPRESSED IN THE RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENTS;\"\n2. ENTIRE TEXT OF THIS RESOLUTION (73) READS AS FOLLOWS:\n\"THE SECURITY COUNCIL:\n\"HAVING NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE SEVERAL\nARMISTICE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS\nBETWEEN THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT IN\nPALESTINE IN PURSUANCE OF ITS RESOLUTION 61 (1948) OF\n16 NOVEMBER 1948,\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPg.2 2 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nPa\nSTATE\n105743\n\"1. EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENTS AND\nAUTHORITIES CONCERNED, HAVING UNDERTAKEN BY MEANS OF\nNEGOTIATIONS NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY THE PALESTINE\nCONCILIATION COMMISSION, TO FULFIL THE REQUEST OF THE\nGENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ITS RESOLUTION OF 11 DECEMBER 1948\nTO EXTEND THE SCOPE OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO\nSEEK AGREEMENT BY NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDED EITHER WITH THE\nCONCILIATION COMMISSION OR DIRECTLY, WILL AT AN EARLY\nDATE ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF ALL\nQUESTIONS OUTSTANDING BETWEEN THEM;\n\"2. FINDS THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS CONSTITUTE\nAN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT\nPEACE IN PALESTINE AND CONSIDERS THAT THESE AGREEMENTS\nSUPERSEDE THE TRUCE PROVIDED FOR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL\nRESOLUTIONS 50 (1948) OF 29 MAY AND 54 (1948) OF\n15 JULY 1948;\n\"3. REAFFIRMS, PENDING THE FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT,\nTHE ORDER CONTAINED IN ITS RESOLUTION 54 (1948) OF\n15 JULY 1948 TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND AUTHORITIES\nCONCERNED, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER OF THE\nUNITED NATIONS, TO OBSERVE AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASE-FIRE\nAND, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE SEVERAL ARMISTICE AGREE-\nMENTS INCLUDE FIRM PLEDGES AGAINST ANY FURTHER ACTS OF\nHOSTILITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND ALSO PROVIDE FOR THEIR\nSUPERVISION BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, RELIES UPON THE\nPARTIES TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED APPLICATION AND OBSER-\nVANCE OF THESE AGREEMENTS;\n\"4. DECIDES THAT ALL FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED TO THE\nUNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR ON PALESTINE HAVING BEEN\nDISCHARGED, THE ACTING MEDIATOR IS RELIEVED OF ANY\nFURTHER RESPONSIBILITY UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS;\n\"5. NOTES THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS PROVIDE\nTHAT THE EXECUTION OF THOSE AGREEMENTS SHALL BE SUPER-\nVISED BY MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS WHOSE CHAIRMAN IN\nEACH CASE SHALL BE THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF STAFF OF\nTHE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION OR A SENIOR OF THAT\nORGANIZATION DESIGNATED BY HIM FOLLOWING CONSULTATION\nWITH THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENTS;\n\"6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ARRANGE FOR\nTHE CONTINUED SERVICE OF SUCH OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE\nPRESENT TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION AS MAY BE REQUIRED\nIN OBSERVING AND MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND AS MAY\nBE NECESSARY IN ASSISTING THE PARTIES TO THE ARMISTICE\nAGREEMENTS IN THE SUPERVISION OF THE APPLICATION AND\nOBSERVANCE OF THE TERMS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS, WITH\nPARTICULAR REGARD TO THE DESIRES OF THE PARTIES AS\nEXPRESSED IN THE RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENTS;\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPq.3\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USESTATE 105743\n\"7. REQUESTS THE CHIEF OF STAFF MENTIONED ABOVE TO\nREPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE OBSERVANCE OF THE\nCEASE-FIRE IN PALESTINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF\nTHIS RESOLUTION; AND TO KEEP THE PALESTINE CONCILIATION\nCOMMISSION INFORMED OF MATTERS AFFECTING THE COMMISSION'. S\nWORK UNDER THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194 (III) OF\n11 DECEMBER 1948.\"\n3. AFTER THE 1967 WAR, SC ADOPTED RES 236 ON JUNE 11,\n1967 WHICH READ AS FOLLOWS:\n\"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,\n\"TAKING NOTE OF THE ORAL REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY\nGENERAL ON THE SITUATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, MADE\nAT THE 1354TH, 1355TH, 1356TH AND 1357TH MEETINGS AND\nTHE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION SUPPLIED IN DOCUMENTS\nS/793Ø AND ADD.1-3,\n\"1. CONDEMNS ANY AND ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE\nCEASE-FIRE;\n\"2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS\nINVESTIGATIONS AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS\nPOSSIBLE;\n\"3. AFFIRMS THAT ITS DEMAND FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND\nDISCONTINUANCE OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES INCLUDES A\nPROHIBITION OF ANY FORWARD MILITARY MOVEMENTS SUBSEQUENT\nTO THE CEASE-FIRE;\n\"4. CALLS FOR THE PROMPT RETURN TO THE CEASE-FIRE\nPOSITIONS OF ANY TROOPS WHICH MAY HAVE MOVED FORWARD\nSUBSEQUENT TO 163Ø HOURS GMT ON 10 JUNE 1967;\n\"5. CALLS FOR FULL COOPERATION WITH THE CHIEF OF\nSTAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZA-\nTION AND THE OBSERVERS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE,\nINCLUDING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS\nFACILITIES.\"\n4. RES 34ø OF OCTOBER 25, 1973 WHICH ESTABLISHED UNEF\nALSO PROVIDED ROLE FOR UNTSO. FULL TEXT OF RES 34Ø\nFOLLOWS:\n\"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,\n\"RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 338 (1973) OF 22 OCTOBER\nAND 339 (1973) OF 23 OCTOBER 1973,\n\"NOTING WITH REGRET THE REPORTED REPEATED VIOLATIONS\nOF THE CEASE-FIRE IN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS 338\n(1973) AND 339 (1973),\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPq.4\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nSTATE 105743\n\"NOTING WITH CONCERN FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S\nREPORT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS HAVE\nNOT YET BEEN ENABLED TO PLACE THEMSELVES ON BOTH SIDES\nOF THE CEASE-FIRE LINE,\n\"1. DEMANDS THAT IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE CEASE-FIRE\nBE OBSERVED AND THAT THE PARTIES RETURN TO THE POSITIONS\nOCCUPIED BY THEM AT 1650 HOURS GMT ON 22 OCTOBER 1973;\n\"2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AS AN IMMEDIATE\nSTEP, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY\nOBSERVERS ON BOTH SIDES;\n\"3. DECIDES TO SET UP IMMEDIATELY UNDER ITS\nAUTHORITY A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE TO BE COMPOSED\nOF PERSONNEL DRAWN FROM STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED\nNATIONS EXCEPT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY\nCOUNCIL, AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT\nWITHIN 24 HOURS ON THE STEPS TAKEN TO THIS EFFECT;\n\"4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT TO\nTHE COUNCIL ON AN URGENT AND CONTINUING BASIS ON THE\nSTATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, AS\nWELL AS RESOLUTIONS 338 (1973) AND 339 (1973);\n\"5. REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES TO EXTEND THEIR FULL\nCOOPERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF\nTHE PRESENT RESOLUTION, AS WELL AS RESOLUTIONS 338 (1973)\nAND 339 (1973).\"\n5. SYG REPORTED TO SC ON 27 OCTOBER 1973 SPECIFYING\n\"TERMS OF REFERENCE\" OF UN FORCE AS FOLLOWS:\n\"(A) THE FORCE WILL SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF\nOPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF RESOLUTION 34Ø (1973), WHICH\nREADS AS FOLLOWS:\n'1. DEMANDS THAT IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE CEASE-\nFIRE BE OBSERVED AND THAT THE PARTIES RETURN TO THE\nPOSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THEM AT 1650 HOURS GMT ON\n22 OCTOBER 1973;'.\n\"(B) THE FORCE WILL USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO PREVENT\nA RECURRENCE OF THE FIGHTING, AND COOPERATE WITH THE\nINTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS IN ITS\nHUMANITARIAN ENDEAVOURS IN THE AREA.\n\"(C) IN THE FULFILMENT OF ITS TASKS, THE FORCE WILL\nHAVE THE COOPERATION OF THE MILITARY OBSERVERS OF\nUNTSO.\"\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon-Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPq.5 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nSTATE 105743\n6. SC APPROVED FOREGOING REPORT OF SYG IN RES 341\nADOPTED OCTOBER 27, 1973.\n7. WHILE PERHAPS LESS RELEVANT TO YOUR CURRENT NEEDS,\nSHOULD YOU WISH LANGUAGE ESTABLISHING ORIGINAL UN TRUCE\nCOMMISSION, IT APPEARS IN SC RES 48 OF APRIL 23, 1948\nAS FOLLOWS:\n\"REFERRING TO ITS RESOLUTION OF 17 APRIL 1948,\nCALLING UPON ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO COMPLY WITH\nSPECIFIC TERMS FOR A TRUCE IN PALESTINE,\n\"THE SECURITY COUNCIL\n\"ESTABLISHES A TRUCE COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE\nCOMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE MEMBERS OF THE\nSECURITY COUNCIL WHICH HAVE CAREER CONSULAR OFFICERS IN\nJERUSALEM, NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF\nSYRIA HAS INDICATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS NOT PREPARED\nTO SERVE ON THE COMMISSION. THE FUNCTION OF THE\nCOMMISSION SHALL BE TO ASSIST THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN\nSUPERVISING THE IMPLEMENTATION BY THE PARTIES OF THE\nRESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 17 APRIL 1948;\n\"REQUESTS THE COMMISSION TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT\nOF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN FOUR DAYS REGARDING ITS\nACTIVITIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION, AND\nSUBSEQUENTLY TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL CURRENTLY\nINFORMED WITH RESPECT THERETO.\n\"THE COMMISSION, ITS MEMBERS, THEIR ASSISTANTS AND\nITS PERSONNEL SHALL BE ENTITLED TO TRAVEL, SEPARATELY OR\nTOGETHER, WHEREVER THE OMMISSION DEEMS NECESSARY TO\nCARRY OUT ITS TASKS.\n\"THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS SHALL\nFURNISH THE COMMISSION WITH SUCH PERSONNEL AND ASSIST-\nANCE AS IT MAY REQUIRE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIAL\nURGENCY OF THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO PALESTINE.\"\n8. YOU ARE, OF COURSE, FAMILIAR WITH DIVERGENT POSITIONS\nOF ISRAEL AND SYRIA RE APPLICABILITY OF ORIGINAL 1949\nARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ASSUME YOU FINESSING THIS QUESTION\nAND THEREFORE AM NOT HOLDING UP THIS MESSAGE TO INCLUDE\nLENGTHY TEXT OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ITSELF. HOWEVER,\nAM SENDING IT OUT IN SUBSEQUENT SEPTEL IN CASE YOU\nNEED IT. RUSH\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nCHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS\nMr. Sisco-May 28\n1. Convey Israeli decision and map.\n2. If Asad agrees, you can show him a final copy of the Agreement\nand of the U. N. Protocol and ask his representative somehow\nto identify the copies as texts they have verified for\nsigning. (These copies will have been typed in Damascus. You\nwill have a binder with you to put them in. When the Syrians\nhave verified the text you should get it back; the U. S. will\ncarry it to Geneva for signing.)\n3. You can give Asad the original of the letter signed by the\nSecretary transmitting the U. S. proposal on limitations.\nAsk him to have his representative sign the proposal and turn\nit over to our representative in Geneva at the signing.\n4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the\nU. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original\nwhen the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the\ncopy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.\n5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph\nA of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the\ndemarcation line.\n6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued\nsimultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that\nan agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.\n7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two\nor three weeks.\n8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of\nseparation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).\n9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nCHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS\nMr. Sisco-May 28\n1. Convey Israeli decision and map.\n2. If Asad agrees, you can show him a final copy of the Agreement\nand of the U. N. Protocol and ask his representative somehow\nto identify the copies as texts they have verified for\nsigning. (These copies will have been typed in Damascus. You\nwill have a binder with you to put them in. When the Syrians\nhave verified the text you should get it back; the U. S. will\ncarry it to Geneva for signing.)\n3. You can give Asad the original of the letter signed by the\nSecretary transmitting the U. S. proposal on limitations.\nAsk him to have his representative sign the proposal and turn\nit over to our representative in Geneva at the signing.\n4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the\nU. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original\nwhen the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the\ncopy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.\n5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph\nA of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the\ndemarcation line.\n6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued\nsimultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that\nan agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.\n7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two\nor three weeks.\n8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of\nseparation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).\n9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nCHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS\nMr. Sisco-May 28\n1. Convey Israeli decision and map.\n2. If Asad agrees, you can show him a final copy of the Agreement\nand of the U. N. Protocol and ask his representative somehow\nto identify the copies as texts they have verified for\nsigning. (These copies will have been typed in Damascus. You\nwill have a binder with you to put them in. When the Syrians\nhave verified the text you should get it back; the U. S. will\ncarry it to Geneva for signing.)\n3. You can give Asad the original of the letter signed by the\nSecretary transmitting the U. S. proposal on limitations.\nAsk him to have his representative sign the proposal and turn\nit over to our representative in Geneva at the signing.\n4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the\nU. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original\nwhen the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the\ncopy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.\n5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph\nA of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the\ndemarcation line.\n6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued\nsimultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that\nan agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.\n7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two\nor three weeks.\n8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of\nseparation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).\n9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nCHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS\nMr. Sisco-May 28\n1. Convey Israeli decision and map.\n2. If Asad agrees, you can show him a final copy of the Agreement\nand of the U. N. Protocol and ask his representative somehow\nto identify the copies as texts they have verified for\nsigning. (These copies will have been typed in Damascus. You\nwill have a binder with you to put them in. When the Syrians\nhave verified the text you should get it back; the U. S. will\ncarry it to Geneva for signing.)\n3. You can give Asad the original of the letter signed by the\nSecretary transmitting the U. S. proposal on limitations.\nAsk him to have his representative sign the proposal and turn\nit over to our representative in Geneva at the signing.\n4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the\nU. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original\nwhen the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the\ncopy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.\n5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph\nA of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the\ndemarcation line.\n6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued\nsimultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that\nan agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.\n7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two\nor three weeks.\n8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of\nseparation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).\n9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nCHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS\nMr. Sisco-May 28\n1. Convey Israeli decision and map.\n2. If Asad agrees, you can show him a final copy of the Agreement\nand of the U. N. Protocol and ask his representative somehow\nto identify the copies as texts they have verified for\nsigning. (These copies will have been typed in Damascus. You\nwill have a binder with you to put them in. When the Syrians\nhave verified the text you should get it back; the U. S. will\ncarry it to Geneva for signing.)\n3. You can give Asad the original of the letter signed by the\nSecretary transmitting the U. S. proposal on limitations.\nAsk him to have his representative sign the proposal and turn\nit over to our representative in Geneva at the signing.\n4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the\nU. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original\nwhen the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the\ncopy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.\n5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph\nA of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the\ndemarcation line.\n6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued\nsimultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that\nan agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.\n7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two\nor three weeks.\n8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of\nseparation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).\n9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON\nPRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER\nFOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n4\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nCHECKLIST FOR JERUSALEM\nSUNDAY, MAY 26\nLimitations\n--New positions taken by Asad:\n--36 short-range 122mm in 10 km-zone.\n--Agreed to measure the 10 km zone from the Red Line.\n--Asad is willing to accept either:\n--All guns are acceptable within 25 km except\nthe 130 mm,. which would be beyond the 25 km line.\nOr:\n--If the second area were 20 km, he would position\nall guns with a range of more than 20 km beyond\nthe 20 km line.\n--You have the \"impression\" that he will move all non-Syrian\nforces beyond 25 km provided there is no Israeli publicity.\n-(Confirmed that SAMs would be beyond 25 km.)\n-Issues that remain to be resolved:\n--36 short-range 122 mm in 10 km zone.\n--Decision on guns in 20-25 km zone.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n-2-\n(9 brigade deployment in 25 km zone.)\n--The format in which the limitations would be recorded.\nRed Line\n--Must be moved as far west as possible.\nUnited Nations\n--Asad still wants less than 1000. &\n---\nMount Hermon\n--Asad position is uncertain.\n--(Israel wants a sentence in The Protocol on the -Area of\nSeparation reading: \"No liaison officers of any side will\nbe present and no persons other than UNDOF will be permitted\ninto that area. \" This has not been raised.)\nArea of Separation\n(Police: Israel wants a limited number, 30 in Quneitra and\n30 elsewhere in the area. Not raised yet. )\n(Fedayeen: We have put this issue in terms of preventing\nborder-crossing. This is reflected in Paragraphs A and D\nof the Agreement and in The Protocol on the Area of\nSeparation. This has not been discussed yet.)\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nCHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS\nSunday, May 26\nLimitations\n-- In the 10 km. zone measured from the Red Line, the\nfollowing is now agreed:\n-- 6000 men,\n--- 75 tanks,\n-- 36 122 mm. guns of less than 15 km. range.\n-- In the area behind the 10 km. limitations area the\nfollowing needs to be decided or confirmed:\n-- There may be up to 162 guns of 122 mm. of\nless than 15 km. range.\n-- For other artillery, there are three possi-\nbilities, the last two to be used only to\nbreak an impasse on the Red Line:\n-- Israel accepts the proposal to\nstation all guns with a range of\nmore than 20 km. behind a line\n20 km. from the Red Line.\n-- (Apply the above limitation in\nan area of 25 km. measured from\nthe Blue Line.)\n-- (Apply the above restriction in\nan area of 20 km. measured from\nthe Syrian October 6 line, or\nPurple Line.)\n-- The following is confirmed:\n-- SAMs will be 25 km. from the Red Line (or 30 km.\nfrom the Blue Line).\n-- (You will provide the Israelis a written state-\nment of your understanding that it is Asad's\nintention to station about 9 brigades in the\n10-25 km. area.)\n-- It is necessary to decide the format in which\nthe above limitations would be expressed.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n2.\nRed Line\n-- Show the new map.\n-- (Use moving the line another kilometer west in\nconnection with one of the fallbacks on drawing the\nline for artillery limitations to break an impasse.)\nUnited Nations\n-- Number: Israel prefers 1500 but gives you some\nflexibility (say, to 1300).\n-- Name remains undecided.\nMount Hermon\n-- The Red Line has been moved west in this area.\n-- Israel will turn over to the UN all its positions in\nthe area of separation.\n-- Israel wants a sentence in the Protocol saying: \"In\nthe Mount Hermon sector, the UN (presence) will be the\nonly and exclusive presence. No liaison officers of\nany side will be present and no persons other than\nthose of the UN (presence) will be permitted into\nthat area.\"\nArea of Separation (in addition to the last point on\nMount Hermon above)\n--- Police: Israel wants a limited number, 30 in Quneitra\nand 30 elsewhere in the area.\n-- Fedayeen control: Israel wants the following language\nin the Protocol: \"The UN shall deny access to any\nmilitary or para-military forces into the area of\nseparation.\" We have put this in the Agreement in terms\nof preventing \"hostile actions\" (Paragraph A) and\npreventing border-crossing (Paragraph D). If we can\nretain the former, the latter might drop out of the\nagreement as the Syrians are already insisting. Then\nthere are two possibilities:\n-- We also have the language of Paragraph Dion\nbörder-crossing in the Protocol on the Area of\nSeparation.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n3.\n-- If that language drops out of the Protocol also,\nperhaps you could elicit a statement of intent\nby Asad on keeping the border quiet and provide\nthis to Israel in a letter.\nDocuments\nYou will be trying to get the following documents into\nfinal form:\n-- Agreement,\n-- Protocol on UN,\n-- Protocol on area of separation,\n-- paper on limitations,\n-- letter on Quneitra hills,\n-- letter on next stage. In this connection,\nyou may also want to discuss how you see\nthe diplomacy evolving through the rest\nof 1974.\nProcedures at Geneva\nYou may want to discuss our role there.\nSyrian Jewry\n-- You promised to take this up in the context of US-Syrian\nrelations.\nPOWs\n-- Israel has agreed to release \"all prisoners captured\non the Syrian front.\" Israel wants to assure release\nof its two pilots in Lebanon.\nCivilian Repatriations\n-- Asad was going to give you a list of \"Arabs in Israeli\nJails.\n-- Asad said he would look into the question of the body\nof Eli Cohen.\n-- (The question of release of Albert Elias, Secretary-\nGeneral of the Lebanese Jewish Community, was left\nthat Israel would furnish further information if\npossible.)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n4.\nRecess of Negotiations (if necessary)\n-- The issue is how to recess the negotiations. The\nchoice is between the appearance of blow-up and\nmaintaining the appearance of a continuing process.\n--- Joint statement.\n-- Backgrounding the press.\nBilateral Relations\n-- Timing of improved relations, i.e., raising interests\nsections to Ambassadorial level.\n-- Timing of the President's trip.\n-- Economic cooperation (see attachment).\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nEconomic Cooperation\nAs a concrete manifestation of closer relations, you\nwould be prepared to instruct Mr. Scotes to pursue the\nfollowing if Asad agreed:\n-- The US is prepared to resume educational and cultural\nexchanges between the US and Syria. (Note: The\nSyrians felt the time was not yet ripe for such\ncontacts when Scotes made the offer for FY 1974.\nIn FY 1975, we are aiming for 5 international visitor\ngrants, 4 graduate student or professors' research\ngrants, and at least one US professor teaching at\nDamascus University.)\n-- A representative of the Department of Commerce will\nbe visiting Syria shortly to explore the possibilities\nof increasing trade. (Note: One Commerce official\nis in the area for this purpose and will come to\nSyria. The only big commercial deal pending is the\nsale of aircraft by Lockheed or McDonnell Douglas\nto Syrian Arab Airlines.)\n-- The US is ready to enter into talks with the\ngovernment of Syria for the settlement of economic\nclaims by both sides with a view to opening new\npossibilities of economic and commercial cooperation\nbetween the US and Syria. (Note: The two main\nissues are (a) the status of 21 million Syrian\npounds from counterpart funds frozen by Syria in\n1967 and (b) about $75,000 owed to Ex-Im Bank\nfollowing nationalization of a textile firm. We\ncould presumably agree to Syrian use of the 21\nmillion pounds for appropriate Syrian economic\nactivity, e.g., rehabilitation of villages. Settle-\nment of the nationalization claim would permit Ex-Im\nfinancing. Several US firms have recently sought\nUS financing.\n-- The US would be prepared to participate in the\n1974 Damascus Fair if we were invited. (Note: The\nfair takes place in July. We have not yet been\ninvited, but if invited promptly, we could still\narrange a commercial presence.)\n-- We will let key Congressmen know of Asad's interest\nin having them visit Syria. Perhaps Dr. Kabbani\ncould follow this up.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nor\nDepartment of State\n,\nTELEGRAM\n/\nof\nS/S - 15\n0 212251Z MAY 74\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\n21 MAY 74 - 23:07Z\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nClassification\nTO RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5890\nINFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0535\nBT\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 106493\nTOSEC 878\nE.O. 11652: N/A\nTAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)\nSUBJECT: UNEF'S MANDATE\nREF: SECTO 56\nFOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM\n1. WHILE YOUR REQUEST INVOLVED ONLY INFO ON UNTSO, WHICH\nHAS BEEN TRANSMITTED, IN EVENT YOUR DISCUSSIONS INVOLVE\nAVAILABILITY OF UNEF ON SYRIAN FRONT WITHIN SCOPE OF\nPRESENT MANDATE, FOLLOWING REMINDER MAY BE USEFUL:\nSC RESOLUTION 346 OF APRIL 8, 1974 RENEWED UNEF'S\nMANDATE FOR SIX MONTHS AND IN EFFECT PROVIDED FOR THE\nTRANSFER OF UNEF CONTINGENTS TO ISRAELI/SYRIAN FRONT\nWITHOUT FURTHER SC ACTION BY THE INSERTION OF THE FOLLOW-\nING LANGUAGE:\n\" OTES THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S VIEW THAT THE DIS-\nENGAGEMENT OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES IS ONLY A FIRST\nSTEP TOWARDS THE SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST problem\nAND HAT THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS\nEMERGENCY FORCE IS ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY FOR THE MAINTENANCE\nOF THE PRESENT QUIET IN THE EGYPT-ISRAEL SECTOR BUT ALSO\nTO ASSIS:, IF REQUIRED, IN FURTHER EFFORTS FOR THE\nESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE\nEAST AND ACCORDINGLY DECIDES THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH\nTHE RECOMMENDATION IN PARAGRAPH 68 OF THE SECRETARY\nGENERAL'S REPORT OF 1 APRIL 1974 (S/11248), THE MANDATE\nOF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, APPROVED BY THE\nSECURITY COUNCI.. IN ITS RESOLUTION 341 (1973) OF\n27 OCTOBER 1973, SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A FURTHER PERIOD\nOF SIX months, THAT IS, UNTIL 24 OCTOBER 1974.\" RUSH\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nFORM\nClassification\n4-68\nFS-412(H)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\n8\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nWALING\nTELEGRAM\nor\nS/S - 15\n0 211551Z MAY 74\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE 21 MAY 74 - 18:32Z\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nClassification\nTO RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0716\nINFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0525\nRUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5878\nBT\nLIMITED OFFICIAL use STATE 105761\nTOSEC 866\nE.O. 11652: N/A\nTAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)\nSUBJECT: UNTSO MANDATE\nREF: 105745, TOSEC 853\nFOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM\n1. AS PROMISED REFTEL, WHILE THIS MAY NOT BE ESSENTIAL,\nFOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ISRAELI-SYRIAN GENERAL ARMISTICE\nAGREEMENT OF JULY 20, 1949:\n\"THE PARTIES TO THE PRESENT AGREEMENT,\n\"RESPONDING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF\n16 NOVEMBER 1948, CALLING UPON THEM, AS A FURTHER PRO-\nVISIONAL MEASURE UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER OF THE\nUNITED NATIONS AND IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE TRANSITION\nFROMTHE PRESENT TRUCE TO PERMANENT PEACE IN PALESTINE, TO\nNEGOTIATE AN ARMISTICE:\n\"HAVING DECIDED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS UNDER\nUNITED NATIONS CHAIRMANSHIP CONCERNING the IMPLEMENTATION\nOF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948;\nAND HAVING APPOINTED REPRESENIATIVES: EMPOWERED TO\nNEGOTIATE AND CONCLUDE AN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT;\n\"THE UNDERSIGNED REPRESENTATIVES, HAVING EXCHANGED\nTHEIR FULL powers FOUND TO BE IN GOOD AND PROPER FORM,\nHAVE AGREED UPON THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS:\n\"ARTICLE I. WITH A VIEW TO PROMOTING THE RETURN OF\nPERMANENT PEACE IN PALESTINE AND IN RECOGNITION OF THE\nIMPORTANCE IN THIS REGARD OF MUTUAL ASSURANCES CONCERNING\nTHE FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE PARTIES, THE\nFOLLOWING PRINCIPLES, WHICH SHALL BE FULLY OBSERVED BY\nboth PARTIES DURING THE ARMISTICE, ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED:\n\"1. THE INJUNCTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGAINST\nClassification\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 2 S'ATE 105761 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nRESORT TO MILITARY FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE\nPALESTINE QUESTION SHALL HENCEFORTH BE SCRUPULOUSLY\nRESPECTED BY BOTH PARTIES. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN\nARMISTICE BE'WEEN THEIR ARMED FORCES IS ACCEPTED AS AN\nIND: SPENSABLE STEP TOWARD THE LIQUIDATION OF ARMED\nCONFICT AND THE RESTORATION OF PEACE IN PALESTINE.\n\"2. NC AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY THE ARMED FORCES --\nLAND, SEA OR AR ⑉⑉ OF EITHER PARTY SHALL BE UNDERTAKE,\nPLANNED, OR THEATENED AGAINST THE PEOPLE OR THE ARMED\nFORCES OF THE (THER; IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT THE USE OF\nTHE TERM PLANNE) IN THIS CONTEXT HAS NO BEARING ON NORMAL\nSTAFF PLANNING S GENERALLY PRACTISED IN MILITARY\nORGANIZATIONS.\n\"3. THE RIGHT OF EACH PARTY TO ITS SECURITY AND\nFREEDOM FROM FEAR OF ATTACK BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE\nOTHER SHALL BE FULY RESPECTED.\n⑉ \"ARTICLE II. WITH 1 SPECIFIC VIEW TO THE IMPLE-\nMENTATION OF the RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF\n16 NOVEMBER 1948, THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES\nARE AFFIRMED:\n\"1. THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO MILITARY OR POLITICAL\nADVANTAGE SHOULD BE GAINED UNDER THE TRUCE ORDERED BY\nTHE SECURITY COUNCIL IS RECOGNIZED.\n\"2. IT IS ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT NO PROVISION OF\nTHIS AGREEMENT SHALL AN ANY WAY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS,\nCLAIMS AND POSITIONS or EITHER PARTY HERETO IN THE\nULTIMATE PEACEFUL. SETTIEMENT OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION,\nTHE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT BEING DICTATED EXCLUSIVELY\nBY MILITARY, AND NOT BY POLITICAL, CONSIDERATIONS.\n\"ARTICLE III.\n\"i. IN PURSUANCE OF THE TOREGOING PRINCIPLES AND OF\nTHE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948,\nA GENERAL ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE\nTWO PARTIES -- LAND, SEA AND AIR -- IS HEREBY ESTABLISHED.\n\"2. NO ELEMENT OF the LAN), SEA OR AIR, MILITARY OR PARA-\nMILITARY, FORCES OF EITHE PARTY, INCLUDING NON-REGULAR\nFORCES, SHALL COMMIT ANY MARLIKE OR HOSTILE ACT AGAINST THE\nMILITARY OF PARA-MILITARY FORCES OF THE OTHER PARTY, OR\nAGAINST CIVILIANS IN TERRITORY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THAT\nPARTY; 0R SHALL ADVANCE BEYOND OR PASS OVER FOR ANY PURPOSE\nWHATSOEVER THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE SET FORTH IN\nARTICLE V OF THIS AGREEMENT: OR ENTER INTO OR PASS THROUGH THE\nAIR SPACE OF THE OTHER PARTY OR THROUGH THE WATERS WITHIN\nTHREE MILES OF THE COASTLINE OF THE OTHER PARTY.\n\"3. NO WARLIKE ACT OR ACT OF HOSTILITY SHALL BE CONDUCTED\nFROM TERRITORY CONTROL Reproduced Riche Richard residential Library THIS\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed.pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE\n3\nSTATE\n105761\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nAGREEMENT AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY OR AGAINST CIVILIANS IN\nTERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF THAT PARTY.\n\"ARTICIE IV.\nthe LINE DESCRIBED IN ARTICLE V OF THIS AGREEMENT\nSALL BE DESIGNATED AS THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE AND\nIS DELINEATED IN PURSUANCE OF THE PURPOSE ANDINTENT OF\nTHE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 15 NOVEMBER 1948.\n\"2. The BASIC PURPOSE OF THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE\nIS TO INEATE THE LINE BEYOND WHICH THE ARMED FORCES OF\nTHE RESP. TIVE PARTIES SHALL NOT MOVE.\n\"3. RULES Ain REGULATIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE\nPARTIES, WHIC, PROMIBIT CIVILIANS FROM CROSSING THE FIGHTING\nLINES OR ENTER.NG THE AREA BETWEEN THE LINES, SHALL REMAIN\nIN EFFECT AFTER :HE SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT, WITH APPLICATION\nTO THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE DEFINED INNVRZVCLE v,\nSUBJECT TO THE PROV-SIONS OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THAT ARTICLE.\n\"ARTICLE v.\n\"1. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS\nFOR THE ARMISTICE DEMARCAT. LINE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI\nAND SYRIAN ARMED FORCES AND FOR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE\nARE NOT TO BE INTERPRETED AS HAVING ANY RELATION WHATSOEVER\nTO ULTIMATE TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING THE TWO PARTIES\nTO THIS AGREEMENT.\n\"2. IN PURSUANCE OF THE SPIRIT OF : HE SECURITY COUNCIL\nRESOLUTION OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948, THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE\nAND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE HAVE BEE DEFINED WITH A VIEW TOWARD\nSEPARATING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE two PARTIES IN SUCH MANNER\nAS TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF FRICTION AND INCIDENT,\nWHILE PROVIDING FOR THE GRADUAL RESIORATION OF NORMAL\nCIVILIAN LIFE IN THE AREA OF THE DEMILIARIZED ZONE, WITHOUT\nPREJUDICE TO THE ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT.\n\"3. THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE SHALL BE AS DELINEATED\nON THE MAP ATTACHED TO THIS AGREEMENT IS ANNEX I. THE\nARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE SHALL FOLLOW A LINE MIDWAY BETWEEN\nTHE EXISTING TRUCE LINES, AS CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED NATIONS\nTRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION FOR THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN\nFORCES. WHERE THE EXISTING TRUCE LINES RUN ALONG THE INTERNATIONAL\nBOUNDARY BETWEEN SYRIAN AND PALESTINE, THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION\nLINE SHALL FOLLOW THE BOUNDARY LINE.\n\"4. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO PARTIES SHALL NOWHERE\nADVANCE BEYOND THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE.\n\"5. (A) WHERE THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE DOES NOT CORRES-\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 4 STATE хникх 105761 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nPOND TO THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN SYRIA AND PALESTINE,\nTHE AREA BETWEEN THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE AND THE BOUNDARY,\nPENDING FINAL TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES,\nSHALL BE ESTABLISHED AS A DEMILITARIZED ZONE FROM WHICH THE ARMED\nFORCES OF BOTH PARTIES SHALL BE TOTALLY EXCLUDED, AND IN\nWHICH NO ACTIVITIES BY MILITARY OR PARA-MILITARY FORCES SHALL\nBE PERMITTED. THIS PROVISION APPLIES TO THE EIN GEV AND\nDARDARA SECTORS WHICH SHALL FORM PART OF THE DEMILITARIZED\nZONE.\n\"(B) ANY ADVANCE BY THE ARMED FORCES, MILITARY OR PARA-\nMILITARY, OF EITHER PARTY INTO ANY PART OF THE DEMILITARIZED\nZONE, WHEN CONFIRMED BY THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVES\nREFERRED TO IN THE FOLLOWING SUB-PARAGRAPH, SHALL CONSTITUTE\nA FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT.\n\"(C) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION\nESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE VII OF THIS AGREEMENT AND UNITED\nNATIONS OBSERVERS ATTACHED TO THE COMMISSION SHALL BE RESPON-\nSIBLE for ENSURING THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ARTICLE.\n\"(D) THE WITHDRAWAL OF such ARMED FORCES AS ARE NOW FOUND IN\nTHE DEMILITARIZED ZONE SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULE\nOF WITHDRAWAL ANNEXED TO THIS AGREEMENT CANNEX II),\n\"(E) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL\nBE EMPOWERED TO AUTHORIZE THE RETURN\nOF CIVILIANS TO VILLAGES AND SETTLEMENTS IN THE DEMILITARIZED\nZONE AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF LIMITED NUMBERS OF LOCALLY RECRUITED\nCIVILIAN POLICE IN THE ZONE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES,\nAND SHALL BE GUIDED IN THIS REGARD BY THE SCHEDULE OF WITH-\nDRAWAL REFERRED TO IN SUB-PARAGRAPH (D) OF THIS ARTICLE.\n\"6. ON EACH SIDE OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE THERE SHALL BE\nAREAS, AS DEFINED IN ANNEX III TO THIS AGREEMENT, IN WHICH\nDEFENSIVE FORCES ONLY SHALL BE MAINTAINED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH\nTHE DEFINITION OF DEFENSIVE FORCES SET FORTH IN ANNEX IV TO\nTHIS AGREEMENT.\n\"ARTICLE VI. ALL PRISONERS OF WAR DETAINED BY EITHER PARTY\nTO THIS AGREEMENT AND BELONGING TO THE ARMED FORCES, REGULAR\nOR IRREGULAR, OF THE other PARTY, SHALL BE EXCHANGED AS\nFOLLOWS:\n\"1. THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR SHALL BE UNDER\nUNITED NATIONS SUPERVISION AND CONTROL throughout, THE\nEXCHANGE SHALL TAKE PLACE AT THE SITE OF THE ARMISTICE CON-\nFERENCE WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF THE SIGNING OF THIS\nAGREEMENT.\n\"2. PRISONERS OF WAR AGAINST WHOM A PENAL PROSECUTION MAY BE\nPENDING, AS WELL AS THOSE SENTENCED FOR CRIME OR OTHER OFFENCE,\nSHALL BE INCLUDED IN THIS EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nLIMITED DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 5 S'ATE 105761 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE\n\"3. ALL ART.CLES OF PERSONAL USE, VALUABLES, I.ETTERS,\nDOCUMENTS, IDENTIFICATION MARKS, AND OTHER PERSONAL EFFECTS\nOF WHATEVER NATURE, BELONGING TO PRISONERS OF WAR WHO ARE\nBEING EXCHANGE), SHALL BE RETURNED TO THEM, OF: IF THEY HAVE\nESCAPED OR DIEL. TO THE PARTY TO WHOSE ARMED FORCES THEY BE-\nLONGED.\n\"4. ALL MATTERS NO: SPECIFICALLY REGULATED IN THIS AGREEMENT\nSHALL BE DECIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRICAIPLEELAID DOWN\nIN THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF\nPRISONERS OF WAR, SIGNED AT GENEVA ON 27 JOLY 1929.\n\"5. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED IN\nARTICLE VII OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL ASSIME RESPONSIBILITY\nFOR LOCATING MISSING persons, WHETHER MILITARY OF CIVILIAN,\nWITHIN THE AREAS CONTROLLED BY EACH PATTY, TO FACILITATE\nTHEIR EXPEDITIOUS EXCHANGE. EACH PART'. UNDERTAKES TO EXTEND\nTO THE COMMISSION full COOPERA: AND ASSISTANCE IN THE\nDISCHARGE OF THIS FUNCTION.\n\"ARTICLE VII.\n\"1. THE EXECUTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL\nBE SUPERVISED BY A MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION COMPOSED OF\nFIVE MEMBERS, OF WHOM EACH PART? TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL\nDESIGNATE TWO, AND whose CHAIRMAN SHALL BE THE UNITED NATIONS\nCHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION OR A SENIOR\nOFFICER FROM THE OBSERVER PERSONNEL OF THAT ORGANIZATION DE-\nSIGNATED BY HIM FOLLOWING CONSULTATION WITH BOTH PARTIES TO\nTHIS AGREEMENT.\n\"2. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION, SHALL MAINTAIN ITS HEAD-\nQUARTERS AT THE CUSTOMS HOUSE NEAR JISR BANAT YA QUB AND AT\nMAHANAYIM, AND SHALL hold ITS METINGS AT SUCH PLACES AND\nAT SUCH TIMES AS IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY FOR THE RFFECTIVE CON-\nDUCT OF ITS WORK.\n\"3. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL BE CONVENED IN ITS\nFIRST MEETING BY THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE\nSUPERVISION ORGANIZATION NOT LATER THAN ONE WEEK FOLLOWING THE\nSIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT.\n\"4. DECISIONS OF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION, TO THE EXTENT\nPOSSIBLE, SHALL BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY.\nIN THE ABSENCE OF UNANIMITY, DECISIONS SHALL BE TAKEN BY\nMAJORITY VOTE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION PRESENT AND\nVOTING.\n\"5. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL FORMULATE ITS OWN\nRULES OF procedure. MEETINGS SHALL BE HELD ONLY AFTER DUE\nNOTICE TO THE MEMBERS BY THE CHAIRMAN. THE QUORUM FOR ITS\nMEETINGS SHALL BE A MAJORITY OF ITS MEMBERS.\n\"6. THE COMMISSION SHALI Reproduc ed at the Nixon esidential OBSERVERS,\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE #6 STATE 105761 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nWHO MAY BE FROM AMONG THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE\nPARTIES OR FROM THE MILITARY PERSONNEL OF THE UNITEDNAL IONS\nTRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION, OR FROM BoTH, IN SUCH NUMBERS\nAS MAY BE CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF .TS\nFUNCTIONS. IN THE EVENT UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS SHOULD BE so\nEMPLOYED, THEY SHALL REMAIN UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE\nUNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION.\nASSIGNMENTS OF A GENERAL OR SPECIAL NATURE GIVEN TO ANITED\nNATIONS OBSERVERS ATTACHED TO THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION\nSHALL BE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF\nSTAFF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COMMISSION,\nWHICHEVER IS SERVING AS CHAIRMAN.\n\"% CLAIMS OR COMPLAINTS PRESENTED BY EITHER PARTY RELATING\nTO THE APPLICATION OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE REFERRED IMMED-\nIATELY TO THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN.\nTHE COMMISSION SHALL TAKE such ACTION ON ALL SUCH CLAIMS OR\nCOMPLAINTS BY MEANS OF ITS OBSERVATION AND INVESTIGATION\nMACHINERY AS IT MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE, WITH A VIEW TO EQUITABLE\nAND MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT.\n\"8. WHERE INTERPRETATION OF THE MAINING OF A PARTICULAR\nPROVISION OF THIS AGREEMENT, OTHER THAN THE PREAMBLE AND\nARTICLE I AND II, IS AT ISSUE, THE COMMISSION'S INTERPRE-\nTATION SHALL PREVAIL. THE COMMISSION, IN ITS DISCRETION AND\nAS THE NEED ARISES, MAY FROM TIME TO TIME RICOMMEND TO THE\nPARTIES MODIFICATIONS IN THE PROVISION SOF THIS AGREEMENT.\n\"9. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL SUBMIT TO BOTH\nPARTIES REPORTS ON ITS ACTIVITIES AS FREQUENTLY AS IT MAY\nCONSIDER NECESSARY. A COPY OF EACH SUCK REPORT SHALL BE\nPRESENTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS\nFOR TRANSMISSION TO THE APPROPRIATE ORGAN OR AGENCY OF THE\nUNITED NATIONS.\n\"10. MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS OBSERVERS SHALL BE\nACCORDED SUCH FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ACCESS IN THE AREA\nCOVERED BY THIS AGREEMENT AS THE COMMISSION MAY DETERMINE\nTO BE NECESSARY, PROVIDED THAT WHEN SUCH DECISIONSOF THE\nCOMMISSION ARE REACHED BY A MAJORITY VOTE UNITED NATIONS\nOBSERVERS ONLY SHALL BE EMPLOYED.\n\"11. THE EXPENSES OF THE COMMISSION, OTHER THAN THOSE RELATING\nTO UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS, SHALL BE APPORTIONED IN EQUAL\nSHARES BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT.\n\" \"ARTICLE VIII.\n\"1. THE PRESENT AGREEMENT IS NOT SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION AND\nSHALL COME INTO FORCE IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING SIGNED.\n\"2. THIS AGREEMENT, HAVING BEEN NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED IN\nPURSUANCE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 16\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nLIMITED OFFOECLASSIFIEDE\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 7 STATE 105761\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nNOVEMBER 1948, CALLING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARMISTICE\nIN ORDER TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT TO THE PEACE IN PALESTINE AND\nTO FACILITATE THE TRANSITION FROM THE PRESENT TRUCE TO PERMANENT\nPEACE IN PALESTINE, SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A PEACEFUL\nSETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS ACHIEVED, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED\nIll PARAGRAPH 3 OF THIS ARTICLE.\n\"3. THE PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT MAY, BY MUTUAL CONSENT,\nREVISE THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY OF ITS PROVISIONS, OR MAY SUSPEND\nITS APPLICATION, OTHER THAN ARTICLES I AND III, AT ANY TIME.\nIN THE ABSENCE OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT AND AFTER THIS AGREEMENT\nHAS BEEN IN EFFECT FOR ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF ITS SIGNING,\nEITHER OF THE PARTIES MAY CALL UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF\nTHE UNITED NATIONS TO CONVOKE A CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES\nOF THE TWO PARTIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEWING, REVISING, OR\nSUSPENDING ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT OTHER\nTHAN ARTICLES I AND III. PARTICIPATION IN SUCH CONFERENCES\nSHALL BE OBLIGATORY UPON THE PARTIES.\n\"4. IF THE CONFERENCE PROVIDED FOR IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THIS\nA.TICLE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN AGREED SOLUTION OF A POINT IN\nDI:PUTE, EITHER PARTY MAY BRING THE MATTER BEFORE THE SECURITY\nCOUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE RELIEF SOUGHT,\nON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED IN PUR-\nSUANCTOF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION TOWARD THE END OF ACHIEVING\nPEACE IN PALESTINE.\n\"5. THIS AGREEMENT, OF WHICH THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXTS\nARE EQUALLY AUTHENTIC, IS SIGNED IN QUINTUPLICATE. ONE COPY\nSHALL BE RETAINED BY EACH PARTY, TWO COPIES COMMUNICATED TO\nTHE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR TRANSMISSION\nTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION\nCOMMISSION ON PALESTINE, AND ONE COPY TO THE ACTING MEDIATOR\nON PALESTINE.\" RUSH\nBT\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nChanges in Paragraph A\n1.\n\"\nwill refrain from\nall hostile actions against each\nother\n\"\n2.\n\"\nwill refrain from\nall actions against each other\n\"\n3.\n\"\nwill refrain from\nall acts of violence against each\nother\n\"\nPrivate assurances\n1. To PM Meir: \"I have conveyed to President Asad the U. S. interpretation\nthat raids by armed groups or individuals across the demarcation line\nare contrary to the ceasefire. President Asad has reaffirmed his\nintention to see that the ceasefire is scrupulously observed.\"\n/Or: \"President Asad understands this. \"I\n2. To PM Meir: \"On the basis of my conversations with President Asad,\nI have the impression that he expects the ceasefire to be scrupulously\nobserved all along the front the front to be quiet7 as long as there\nis hope for the full implementation of Resolution 338, including the\nlegitimate interests of the Palestinian people.'\n3. To PM Meir: \"President Asad has stated that all forces under the\ncontrol of the Syrian government will scrupulously observe the casefire.\"\n4. To PM Meir: \"President Asad has assured me that he understands the\nimportance of the ceasefire in creating an atmosphere conducive to\nfurther negotiation and will do all in his power to see that it is\nscrupulously observed.\"\n5. To PM Meir: \"I fully understand your government's concern over\npossible armed attacks across the disengagement line. It is my\nconviction that the best way to thwart these is, on the one hand,\nto offer hope of a negotiated settlement and, on the other, to build\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2\ntrust between the parties by scrupulous observance of the ceasefire.\nI have conveyed this view to President Asad, and I have particularly\ninformed him of the U. S. view that armed attacks\n6. To PM Meir: \"President Asad understands the position of the U. S.\nthat raids by armed groups or individuals across the demarcation\nline are contrary to the ceasefire. It is my impression that he\nintends to see that the ceasefire is scrupulously observed.'\n7. To PM Meir: \"President Asad in his discussions with me has indicated\nhis understanding that Resolutions 338 and 339 in calling for a\nceasefire includes all kinds of firing and all military action.'\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nChanges in Paragraph A\n1.\n\"\nwill refrain from\nall hostile actions against each\nother\n\"\n2.\n\"\nwill refrain from\nall actions against each other\n\"\n3.\n\"\nwill refrain from\nall acts of violence against each\nother\n\"\nPrivate assurances\n1. To PM Meir: \"I have conveyed to President Asad the U. S. interpretation\nthat raids by armed groups or individuals across the demarcation line\nare contrary to the ceasefire. President Asad has reaffirmed his\nintention to see that the ceasefire is scrupulously observed.\"\n/Or: \"President Asad understands this. \"I\n2. To PM Meir: \"On the basis of my conversations with President Asad,\nI have the impression that he expects the ceasefire to be scrupulously\nobserved all along the front / the front to be quiet7 as long as there\nis hope for the full implementation of Resolution 338, including the\nlegitimate interests of the Palestinian people.'\n3. To PM Meir: \"President Asad has stated that all forces under the\ncontrol of the Syrian government will scrupulously observe the casefire.\"\n4. To PM Meir: \"President Asad has assured me that he understands the\nimportance of the ceasefire in creating an atmosphere conducive to\nfurther negotiation and will do all in his power to see that it is\nscrupulously observed.\"\n5. To PM Meir: \"I fully understand your government's concern over\npossible armed attacks across the disengagement line. It is my\nconviction that the best way to thwart these is, on the one hand,\nto offer hope of a negotiated settlement and, on the other, to build\nRepróduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2\ntrust between the parties by scrupulous observance of the ceasefire.\nI have conveyed this view to President Asad, and I have particularly\ninformed him of the U. S. view that armed attacks\n6. To PM Meir: \"President Asad understands the position of the U. S.\nthat raids by armed groups or individuals across the demarcation\nline are contrary to the ceasefire. It is my impression that he\nintends to see that the ceasefire is scrupulously observed.\"\n7. To PM Meir: \"President Asad in his discussions with me has indicated\nhis understanding that Resolutions 338 and 339 in calling for a\nceasefire includes all kinds of firing and all military action.\"\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 5\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSYRIAN OR GANIZATION\nDivision has 3 brigades (3000 men each)\nDivision alsohas 2 battalious of artillery is\nEach briqade has a battalion of artillery (122mm. is organic)\nAn armored brigade has 93 tanks\nAn infantry brigade has 31 tanks (Asad said sometimes 41)\n9- BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT : TANKS\nBest case : 9 infantry brigades = 279 tanks\nFirst probable: 6 in fautry brigades (186)\n3 armored brigades (279) =\n465 tanks\nSecond probable: 7 infantry brigades (217)\n(Best attainable) 2 armored briqades (186) = 403 tanks\nTheoretical\ncase worst, : 9 armored brigades = 837 tanks\nPresent deployment within 25km. of front:\n49,000 men\n752 tanks\n369 artillery pieces\n\"Normal\" peacetime deployment (July 1,1973) in 25km. area\n34,500 men\n465 tanks\n276 artillery\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nCURRENT EMPLOYMENT\n7th Infantry Division Area of Operation\n30\n124 Tanks\n72 Artillery Pieces\n3\nDamascus\n14000 Personnel\n9232\n9th Infantry Division\n217 Tanks\nPazraat BeitJinn\n126 Artillery Pieces\n1024\n1\nJassa\n15250 Personnel\n15'\n5th Infantry Division\n217 Tanks\nx\n126 Artillery Pieces\n15250 Personnel\nKuNeitra\nSYRIA\nKafr\n68th Independent Armor Brigade\nNaffakh\nDEMIL TARIZED\nZONE\n93 Tanks\n18 Artillery Pieces\nKhushiye\n33° 00\n2250 Personnel\nRafid\n80th Independent Armor Brigade\n93 Tanks\n18 Artillery Pieces\n5\n2250 Personnel\nELAL\nTOTALS\n45'\n752 Tanks\n369 Artillery Pieces\n49000 Personnel\nJORDAN\n45'\n36°00'\n15'\nATT.1\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe Arab-Israeli Handbook\n1723/73\nNORMAL DEPLOYMENT\n1 July 1973\n3\nAn Nasariyah\nBEIRUT\n2103\n26\n3\n13\n3\nLebanon\nAr Ruhaybah\nHQ\nXXX\n213\nAl Qutayfah\nSF\n90\nX\nIndep\nHarasta al Basal\nRifa'at Asad\n1\nXXX\nAI Qabun\nArmd Defense\n211\n*\nDAMASCUS\nForce\nYa'fur\n7\nX\nAI Mezzah\n41\nX\n7\nAfld.\nQatana\nAI Kiswah\nMazra'at Bayt Jinn\nHadar\nSa'Sa'\nJabbata\n68\nAI Khashab\n78\nKanakir\n7th Infantry Division\n7\nMaâs\nKhan Arnabah\nGhabaqhib\n186 Tanks\n70\n7\n102 Artillery Pieces\nGOLAN\nAqraba\n52\n9\n12000 Personnel\nAs Sanamayr\nNab' As Sakhr\n.\nBasir\nRuhin\nRiver\n33\\9\n12\n5\n9th Infantry Division\nJordan\nHEIGHTS\nQasim\nIsrael\nAr Rafid\n86\nX\n5\n62 Tanks\nNawa\n50\n5\nAyn Dhakar\n45\n5\nIzra\n48 Artillery Pieces\nLake\nAsh Shaykh Said\n7000 Personnel\nTiberias\n61X5\nAsh Shaykh\nMiskin\nJallin\n. Tafas\n5th Infantry Division\n217 Tanks\n126 Artillery Pieces\n15500 Personnel\nTOTALS:\n465 Tanks\n276 Artillery Pieces\n34500 Personnel\n13,000 In one brigade of\nATT TT 2\neach of above\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nforward\nDECLASSIFIED\n2 000\n+\nextras.\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTALKING POINTS\nCongressional Briefings\non Syrian-Israeli Disengagement\nThe Setting\nSince the October war, our strategy has been\n-- to consolidate the ceasefire;\n-- to create a realistic diplomatic alternative to war\nas a way of settling the Arab-Israeli dispute;\n-- to convince the Arabs that the US and not the USSR\nis the effective power in the Middle East.\nSpecifically:\n-- The Six Point Agreement in November between Egypt\nand Israel stopped the shooting on that front and\nset the stage for disengagement.\n-- The Geneva Peace Conference in December established\na framework for negotiation acceptable to both sides.\n-- The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement agreement in\nJanuary:\n-- made war less likely;\n-- established the fact that negotiation between\nIsrael and an Arab government could produce\nan agreement that works;\n-- demonstrated that US diplomacy is effective;\n-- gave hope of further movement toward a peace\nagreement.\nIn this context, Syrian-Israeli Disengagement was crucial.\n-- If the negotiation failed:\n-- the fighting would have escalated and even\nEgypt might have been drawn in;\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\n-- negotiations would have been set back\nand the radicals who oppose making peace\nwith Israel would have been strengthened;\n-- the oil embargo could soon have been reimposed.\n-- If the negotiation succeeded:\n-- the chances would be good that the Middle\nEast could remain at peace for the rest of\nthe year;\n-- further diplomatic steps toward peace could\nbe taken;\n-- political moderates in the Middle East would\nbe strengthened;\n-- opponents of peacemaking would be undercut\nif radical Syria committed itself to the process;\n-- re-imposition of the oil embargo this year\nwould be very unlikely;\n-- the US would have time to strengthen its relations\nwith the Arab states and to give them a stake\nin not acting against US interests.\nIt was the realization of the consequences of failure that\nkept us going at moments in the negotiation when there\nseemed little alternative but to suspend the negotiation.\nTHE NEGOTIATION\nThis negotiation was far more difficult than the Egyptian-\nIsraeli disengagement negotiation:\n-- Above all, in January both sides had decided they\nwanted an agreement. In this negotiation, both Asad\nand the Israelis made up their minds during the\nnegotiation.\n-- The pressures on both sides were less. The Syrian\nfront was more stable, and armies were not behind\neach other.\n-- Technically, the problems were more difficult:\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\n-- There was less space to create a buffer.\n-- Populated areas were involved on both sides.\n-- Before January, the Egyptians and Israelis had\nactually negotiated quite seriously at Kilometer 101\nin November and December. They had developed\nrealistic positons that took into account the needs\nof the other side. They had brought those positions\nwithin negotiating range. All this we had to do\non this trip.\nThe negotiation nearly broke down at three key points but\nwe kept going because of our concern for the consequences\nof failure.\nThe negotiations developed through the following stages:\n-- Before we left, the visits of General Dayan (March 29)\nand General Shihabi (April 13) to Washington had\nproduced a formal proposal from each side (Map 1).\nThe lines were far apart, but some agreement had\nemerged on a general concept of disengagement\nessentially following the Egyptian-Israeli model.\n-- On the basis these talks in Washington and the analysi\nwe did before leaving, we developed the following\nobjective:\n-- a disengagement line just enough west of the\n1967 ceasefire line to establish the principle\nof movement toward final borders;\n-- but a line not so far west that it would touch\nIsraeli settlements, which in some cases\nare quite close to the 1967 line.\n-- Much of the first week was spent building a base of\nsupport for our general approach through talks with\nGromyko, Boumediene, Sadat, Hussein and Faisal.\n-- We adopted the strategy of trying first to achieve\nagreement on the disengagement line on the assumption\nthat other issues would fall into place once there\nwas agreement on the line.\nReaching that agreement\ntook two weeks (May 7-20).\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4-\n-- First there was the issue of getting the\nline west of the 1967 line. (Map 2 shows\nthe first Israeli line on the map of May 7-8\nand the line of May 20 reflecting the US\nproposal on Quneitra.)\n-- Second, the discussion on the line narrowed\nto the question of Quneitra (Blow-up photo\nof Quneitra is marked to show the dividing\nlines the Israelis tried to establish in\nQuneitra, the hills, and the final arrangement.)\n-- The problem in Quneitra: the two\nIsraeli settlements.\n-- The discussion stalemated, and on May 18\nwe had actually drafted a statement recessing\nthe talks and put our luggage on the plane to\ngo on to Cairo that night. President Asad\nbroke that deadlock by dropping his insistence\non holding the two high hills just west of\nQuneitra. This permitted us to develop a\nUS proposal combining a line and an assurance\nfrom Israel conveyed by us to Syria that there\nwould be no Israeli forces on the hills or\nweapons that could fire into Quneitra.\n-- The next issues were the related questions of (a)\nlimitations on armament and forces behind the\ndisengagement line and (b) the location of the Syrian\nmilitary line.\n-- Again the negotiations deadlocked. The Israelis\ninsisted on detailed limitations, and Asad\nresisted any restrictions on the exercise of\nhis sovereignty.\n-- Again we drafted a statement recessing the\ntalks and on May 23 (Thursday) felt we could\nnot carry the talks further.\n-- This time it was the Israelis who gave us the\nlatitude to develop and refine a US proposal\n(May 24-27).\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Orderi13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-5-\n-- Throughout all this was the question of Mount Hermon.\nReaching agreement on putting the positions there\nunder the UN was largely a matter of sticking to\na position and wearing the Syrians down.\n-- When there seemed to be agreement on substance, we\nturned to the documents (May 26-27), and much of what\nwe thought was agreed was re-opened. After our talks\nSunday night, May 26, we concluded that agreement\nwas not possible. The following morning, we were on\nthe verge of leaving when Asad pulled back. We agreed\nto make a major effort to see whether we could\ncomplete the documents that day. Ten hours of\ntalk followed.\n-- The final issue was the question of whether Asad\nwould assume responsibility for preventing terrorists\nfrom operating across the border. This was the\ncause of our final trip to Damascus May 28.\nTHE AGREEMENT\nMap 3 shows the final agreement. That agreement is recorded\nin these documents:\n-- Agreement restoring the ceasefire, establishing the\nlines, describing procedures for signing and planning\nimplementation, and relating disengagement to final\npeace.\n-- Protocol establishing the UN Disengagement Observer\nForce.\n-- A secret paper recording the limitations in armament\nand forces which both sides have agreed to.\n-- We also conveyed in letter form certain assurances\nwhich were stated to us. This was done because\nthere were some subjects that each side was willing\nto discuss with us but not with each other. (Example:\nforces on Quneitra hills.)\nThe main elements of the agreement are:\n-- the two disengagement lines.\n-- Area of separation with UNDOF.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\n-6- -\n-- Mount Hermon in the area of separation.\n-- Special demilitarized area around Quneitra.\n-- 10 kilometer limitation area behind each disengagement\nline.\n-- Further limitations in the 10-25 km area.\n-- No missiles closer than 25 kilometers.\nWHAT NEXT\nWe need a month or two for carrying out the Syrian-Israeli\ndisengagement.\nThen we will turn to possible next steps in the move toward\nan overall peace.\nNSC: : HHSaunders CV\n5/31/74\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTALKING POINTS\nCongressional Briefings\non Syrian-Israeli Disengagement\nThe Setting\nSince the October war, our strategy has been\n-- to consolidate the ceasefire;\n-- to create a realistic diplomatic alternative to war\nas a way of settling the Arab-Israeli dispute;\n-- to convince the Arabs that the US and not the USSR\nis the effective power in the Middle East.\nSpecifically:\n-- The Six Point Agreement in November between Egypt\nand Israel stopped the shooting on that front and\nset the stage for disengagement.\n-- The Geneva Peace Conference in December established\na framework for negotiation acceptable to both sides.\n-- The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement agreement in\nJanuary:\n-- made war less likely;\n-- established the fact that negotiation between\nIsrael and an Arab government could produce\nan agreement that works;\n-- demonstrated that US diplomacy is effective;\n-- gave hope of further movement toward a peace\nagreement.\nIn this context, Syrian-Israeli Disengagement was crucial.\n-- If the negotiation failed:\n-- the fighting would have escalated and even\nEgypt might have been drawn in;\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\n-- negotiations would have been set back\nand the radicals who oppose making peace\nwith Israel would have been strengthened;\n-- the oil embargo could soon have been reimposed.\n-- If the negotiation succeeded:\n-- the chances would be good that the Middle\nEast could remain at peace for the rest of\nthe year;\n-- further diplomatic steps toward peace could\nbe taken;\n-- political moderates in the Middle East would\nbe strengthened;\n-- opponents of peacemaking would be undercut\nif radical Syria committed itself to the process;\n-- re-imposition of the oil embargo this year\nwould be very unlikely;\n-- the US would have time to strengthen its relations\nwith the Arab states and to give them a stake\nin not acting against US interests.\nIt was the realization of the consequences of failure that\nkept us going at moments in the negotiation when there\nseemed little alternative but to suspend the negotiation.\nTHE NEGOTIATION\nThis negotiation was far more difficult than the Egyptian-\nIsraeli disengagement negotiation:\n-- Above all, in January both sides had decided they\nwanted an agreement. In this negotiation, both Asad\nand the Israelis made up their minds during the\nnegotiation.\n-- The pressures on both sides were less. The Syrian\nfront was more stable, and armies were not behind\neach other.\n-- Technically, the problems were more difficult:\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\n-- There was less space to create a buffer.\n-- Populated areas were involved on both sides.\n-- Before January, the Egyptians and Israelis had\nactually negotiated quite seriously at Kilometer 101\nin November and December. They had developed\nrealistic positons that took into account the needs\nof the other side. They had brought those positions\nwithin negotiating range. All this we had to do\non this trip.\nThe negotiation nearly broke down at three key points but\nwe kept going because of our concern for the consequences\nof failure.\nThe negotiations developed through the following stages:\n-- Before we left, the visits of General Dayan (March 29)\nand General Shihabi (April 13) to Washington had\nproduced a formal proposal from each side (Map 1).\nThe lines were far apart, but some agreement had\nemerged on a general concept of disengagement\nessentially following the Egyptian-Israeli model.\n-- On the basis these talks in Washington and the analysi\nwe did before leaving, we developed the following\nobjective:\n--- a disengagement line just enough west of the\n1967 ceasefire line to establish the principle\nof movement toward final borders;\n-- but a line not so far west that it would touch\nIsraeli settlements, which in some cases\nare quite close to the 1967 line.\n-- Much of the first week was spent building a base of\nsupport for our general approach through talks with\nGromyko, Boumediene, Sadat, Hussein and Faisal.\n-- We adopted the strategy of trying first to achieve\nagreement on the disengagement line on the assumption\nthat other issues would fall into place once there\nwas agreement on the line.\nReaching that agreement\ntook two weeks (May 7-20).\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4-\n-- First there was the issue of getting the\nline west of the 1967 line. (Map 2 shows\nthe first Israeli line on the map of May 7-8\nand the line of May 20 reflecting the US\nproposal on Quneitra.)\n-- Second, the discussion on the line narrowed\nto the question of Quneitra (Blow-up photo\nof Quneitra is marked to show the dividing\nlines the Israelis tried to establish in\nQuneitra, the hills, and the final arrangement.)\n-- The problem in Quneitra: the two\nIsraeli settlements.\n-- The discussion stalemated, and on May 18\nwe had actually drafted a statement recessing\nthe talks and put our luggage on the plane to\ngo on to Cairo that night. President Asad\nbroke that deadlock by dropping his insistence\non holding the two high hills just west of\nQuneitra. This permitted us to develop a\nUS proposal combining a line and an assurance\nfrom Israel conveyed by us to Syria that there\nwould be no Israeli forces on the hills or\nweapons that could fire into Quneitra.\n-- The next issues were the related questions of (a)\nlimitations on armament and forces behind the\ndisengagement line and (b) the location of the Syrian\nmilitary line.\n-- Again the negotiations deadlocked. The Israelis\ninsisted on detailed limitations, and Asad\nresisted any restrictions on the exercise of\nhis sovereignty.\n-- Again we drafted a statement recessing the\ntalks and on May 23 (Thursday) felt we could\nnot carry the talks further.\n--- This time it was the Israelis who gave us the\nlatitude to develop and refine a US proposal\n(May 24-27)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-5-\nThroughout all this was the question of Mount Hermon.\nReaching agreement on putting the positions there\nunder the UN was largely a matter of sticking to\na position and wearing the Syrians down.\n-- When there seemed to be agreement on substance, we\nturned to the documents (May 26-27), and much of what\nwe thought was agreed was re-opened. After our talks\nSunday night, May 26, we concluded that agreement\nwas not possible. The following morning, we were on\nthe verge of leaving when Asad pulled back. We agreed\nto make a major effort to see whether we could\ncomplete the documents that day. Ten hours of\ntalk followed.\n-- The final issue was the question of whether Asad\nwould assume responsibility for preventing terrorists\nfrom operating across the border. This was the\ncause of our final trip to Damascus May 28.\nTHE AGREEMENT\nMap 3 shows the final agreement. That agreement is recorded\nin these documents:\n-- Agreement restoring the ceasefire, establishing the\nlines, describing procedures for signing and planning\nimplementation, and relating disengagement to final\npeace.\n-- Protocol establishing the UN Disengagement Observer\nForce.\n-- A secret paper recording the limitations in armament\nand forces which both sides have agreed to.\n-- We also conveyed in letter form certain assurances\nwhich were stated to us. This was done because\nthere were some subjects that each side was willing\nto discuss with us but not with each other. (Example:\nforces on Quneitra hills.)\nThe main elements of the agreement are:\n-- the two disengagement lines.\n-- Area of separation with UNDOF.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-6-\n-- Mount Hermon in the area of separation.\n-- Special demilitarized area around Quneitra.\n-- 10 kilometer limitation area behind each disengagement\nline.\n-- Further limitations in the 10-25 km area.\n-- No missiles closer than 25 kilometers.\nWHAT NEXT\nWe need a month or two for carrying out the Syrian-Israeli\ndisengagement.\nThen we will turn to possible next steps in the move toward\nan overall peace.\nNSC: HHSaunders: CV\n5/31/74\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTALKING POINTS\nCongressional Briefings\non Syrian-Israeli Disengagement\nThe Setting\nSince the October war, our strategy has been\n-- to consolidate the ceasefire;\n-- to create a realistic diplomatic alternative to war\nas a way of settling the Arab-Israeli dispute;\n-- to convince the Arabs that the US and not the USSR\nis the effective power in the Middle East.\nSpecifically:\n---- The Six Point Agreement in November between Egypt\nand Israel stopped the shooting on that front and\nset the stage for disengagement.\n-- The Geneva Peace Conference in December established\na framework for negotiation acceptable to both sides.\n-- The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement agreement in\nJanuary:\n-- made war less likely;\n-- established the fact that negotiation between\nIsrael and an Arab government could produce\nan agreement that works;\n-- demonstrated that US diplomacy is effective;\n--- gave hope of further movement toward a peace\nagreement.\nIn this context, Syrian-Israeli Disengagement was crucial.\n-- If the negotiation failed:\n-- the fighting would have escalated and even\nEgypt might have been drawn in;\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been!determined to be declassified.\n-2-\n--- negotiations would have been set back\nand the radicals who oppose making peace\nwith Israel would have been strengthened;\n-- the oil embargo could soon have been reimposed.\n-- If the negotiation succeeded:\n-- the chances would be good that the Middle\nEast could remain at peace for the rest of\nthe year;\n-- further diplomatic steps toward peace could\nbe taken;\n-- political moderates in the Middle East would\nbe strengthened;\n-- opponents of peacemaking would be undercut\nif radical Syria committed itself to the process;\n-- re-imposition of the oil embargo this year\nwould be very unlikely;\n-- the US would have time to strengthen its relation\nwith the Arab states and to give them a stake\nin not acting against US interests.\nIt was the realization of the consequences of failure that\nkept us going at moments in the negotiation when there\nseemed little alternative but to suspend the negotiation.\nTHE NEGOTIATION\nThis negotiation was far more difficult than the Egyptian-\nIsraeli disengagement negotiation:\n-- Above all, in January both sides had decided they\nwanted an agreement. In this negotiation, both Asad\nand the Israelis made up their minds during the\nnegotiation.\n--- The pressures on both sides were less. The Syrian\nfront was more stable, and armies were not behind\neach other.\n-- Technically, the problems were more difficult:\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\n--- There was less space to create a buffer.\n-- Populated areas were involved on both sides.\n-- Before January, the Egyptians and Israelis had\nactually negotiated quite seriously at Kilometer LOI\nin November and December. They had developed\nrealistic positons that took into account the needs\nof the other side. They had brought those positions\nwithin negotiating range. All this we had to do\non this trip.\nThe negotiation nearly broke down at three key points but\nwe kept going because of our concern for the consequences\nof failure.\nThe negotiations developed through the following stages:\n-- Before we left, the visits of General Dayan (March 29\nand General Shihabi (April 13) to Washington had\nproduced a formal proposal from each side (Map 1)\nThe lines were far apart, but some agreement had\nemerged on a general concept of disengagement\nessentially following the Egyptian-Israeli model.\n-- On the basis these talks in Washington and the analys.\nwe did before leaving, we developed the following\nobjective:\n--- a disengagement line just enough west of the\n1967 ceasefire line to establish the principle\nof movement toward final borders;\n-- but a line not so far west that it would touch\nIsraeli settlements, which in some cases\nare quite close to the 1967 line.\n-- Much of the first week was spent building a base of\nsupport for our general approach through talks with\nGromyko, Boumediene, Sadat, Hussein and Faisal.\n-- We adopted the strategy of trying first to achieve\nagreement on the disengagement line on the assumption\nthat other issues would fall into place once there\nwas agreement on the line.\nReaching that agreement\ntook two weeks (May 7-20).\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4-\n-- First there was the issue of getting the\nline west of the 1967 line. (Map 2 shows\nthe first Israeli line on the map of May 7-8\nand the line of May 20 reflecting the US\nproposal on Quneitra.)\n-- Second, the discussion on the line narrowed\nto the question of Quneitra (Blow-up photo\nof Quneitra is marked to show the dividing\nlines the Israelis tried to establish in\nQuneitra, the hills, and the final arrangement.\n-- The problem in Quneitra: the two\nIsraeli settlements.\n-- The discussion stalemated, and on May 18\nwe had actually drafted a statement recessing\nthe talks and put our luggage on the plane to\ngo on to Cairo that night. President Asád\nbroke that deadlock by dropping his insistence\non holding the two high hills just west of\nQuneitra. This permitted us to develop a\nUS proposal combining a line and an assurance\nfrom Israel conveyed by us to Syria that there\nwould be no Israeli forces on the hills or\nweapons that could fire into Quneitra.\n-- The next issues were the related questions of (a)\nlimitations on armament and forces behind the\ndisengagement line and (b) the location of the Syrian\nmilitary line.\n-- Again the negotiations deadlocked. The Israelis\ninsisted on detailed limitations, and Asad\nresisted any restrictions on the exercise of\nhis sovereignty.\n-- Again we drafted a statement recessing the\ntalks and on May 23 (Thursday) felt we could\nnot carry the talks further.\n-- This time it was the Israelis who gave us the\nlatitude to develop and refine a US proposal\n(May 24-27)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-5-\nThroughout all this was the question of Mount Hermon.\nReaching agreement on putting the positions there\nunder the UN was largely a matter of sticking to\na position and wearing the Syrians down.\n-- When there seemed to be agreement on substance, we\nturned to the documents (May 26-27), and much of what\nwe thought was agreed was re-opened. After our talks\nSunday night, May 26, we concluded that agreement\nwas not possible. The following morning, we were on\nthe verge of leaving when Asad pulled back. We agreed\nto make a major effort to see whether we could\ncomplete the documents that day. Ten hours of\ntalk followed.\n-- The final issue was the question of whether Asad\nwould assume responsibility for preventing terrorists\nfrom operating across the border. This was the\ncause of our final trip to Damascus May 28.\nTHE AGREEMENT\nMap 3 shows the final agreement. That agreement is recorded\nin these documents:\n-- Agreement restoring the ceasefire, establishing the\nlines, describing procedures for signing and planning\nimplementation, and relating disengagement to final\npeace.\n-- Protocol establishing the UN Disengagement Observer\nForce.\n-- A secret paper recording the limitations in armament\nand forces which both sides have agreed to.\n-- We also conveyed in letter form certain assurances\nwhich were stated to us. This was done because\nthere were some subjects that each side was willing\nto discuss with us but not with each other. (Example:\nforces on Quneitra hills.)\nThe main elements of the agreement are:\n-- the two disengagement lines.\n--- Area of separation with UNDOF.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-6-\n-- Mount Hermon in the area of separation.\n-- Special demilitarized area around Quneitra.\n-- 10 kilometer limitation area behind each disengagement\nline.\n-- Further limitations in the 10-25 km area.\n-- No missiles closer than 25 kilometers.\nWHAT NEXT\nWe need a month orstwo for carrying out the Syrian-Israeli\ndisengagement.\nThen we will turn to possible next steps in the move toward\nan overall peace.\nNSC: HHSaunders : CV\n5/31/74\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTALKING POINTS\nCongressional Briefings\non Syrian-Israeli Disengagement\nThe Setting\nSince the October war, our strategy has been\n-- to consolidate the ceasefire;\n-- to create a realistic diplomatic alternative to war\nas a way of settling the Arab-Israeli dispute;\n-- to convince the Arabs that the US and not the USSR\nis the effective power in the Middle East.\nSpecifically:\n-- The Six Point Agreement in November between Egypt\nand Israel stopped the shooting on that front and\nset the stage for disengagement.\n-- The Geneva Peace Conference in December established\na framework for negotiation acceptable to both sides.\n-- The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement agreement in\nJanuary:\n-- made war less likely;\n-- established the fact that negotiation between\nIsrael and an Arab government could produce\nan agreement that works;\n-- demonstrated that US diplomacy is effective;\n-- gave hope of further movement toward a peace\nagreement.\nIn this context, Syrian-Israeli Disengagement was crucial.\n-- If the negotiation failed:\n-- the fighting would have escalated and even\nEgypt might have been drawn in;\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\n--- negotiations would have been set back\nand the radicals who oppose making peace\nwith Israel would have been strengthened;\n--- the oil embargo could soon have been reimposed.\n--- If the negotiation succeeded:\n-- the chances would be good that the Middle\nEast could remain at peace for the rest of\nthe year;\n-- further diplomatic steps toward peace could\nbe taken;\n-- political moderates in the Middle East would\nbe strengthened;\n-- opponents of peacemaking would be undercut\nif radical Syria committed itself to the process;\n-- re-imposition of the oil embargo this year\nwould be very unlikely;\n-- the US would have time to strengthen its relations\nwith the Arab states and to give them a stake\nin not acting against US interests.\nIt was the realization of the consequences of failure that\nkept us going at moments in the negotiation when there\nseemed little alternative but to suspend the negotiation.\nTHE NEGOTIATION\nThis negotiation was far more difficult than the Egyptian-\nIsraeli disengagement negotiation:\n--- Above all, in January both sides had decided they\nwanted an agreement. In this negotiation, both Asad\nand the Israelis made up their minds during the\nnegotiation.\n-- The pressures on both sides were less. The Syrian\nfront was more stable, and armies were not behind\neach other.\n-- Technically, the problems were more difficult:\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive DECLASSIFIED Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\n-- There was less space to create a buffer.\n-- Populated areas were involved on both sides.\n-- Before January, the Egyptians and Israelis had\nactually negotiated quite seriously at Kilometer 101\nin November and December. They had developed\nrealistic positons that took into account the needs\nof the other side. They had brought those positions\nwithin negotiating range. All this we had to do\non this trip.\nThe negotiation nearly broke down at three key points but\nwe kept going because of our concern for the consequences\nof failure.\nThe negotiations developed through the following stages:\n-- Before we left, the visits of General Dayan (March 29\nand General Shihabi (April 13) to Washington had\nproduced a formal proposal from each side (Map 1).\nThe lines were far apart, but some agreement had\nemerged on a general concept of disengagement\nessentially following the Egyptian-Israeli; model.\n-- On the basis these talks in Washington and the analys\nwe did before leaving, we developed the following\nobjective:\n-- a disengagement line just enough west of the\n1967 ceasefire line to establish the principl\nof movement toward final borders;\n-- but a line not so far west that it would touc\nIsraeli settlements, which in some cases\nare quite close to the 1967 line.\n-- Much of the first week was spent building a base of\nsupport for our general approach through talks with\nGromyko, Boumediene, Sadat, Hussein and Faisal.\n-- We adopted the strategy of trying first to achievé\nagreement on the disengagement line on the assumption\nthat other issues would fall into place once there\nwas agreement on the line.\nReaching that agreement\ntook two weeks (May 7-20)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4- -\n-- First there was the issue of getting the\nline west of the 1967 line. (Map 2 shows\nthe first Israeli line on the map of May 7-8\nand the line of May 20 reflecting the US\nproposal on Quneitra.)\n-- Second, the discussion on the line narrowed\nto the question of Quneitra (Blow-up photo\nof Quneitra is marked to show the dividing\nlines the Israelis tried to establish in\nQuneitra, the hills, and the final arrangement. )\n-- The problem in Quneitra: the two\nIsraeli settlements.\n-- The discussion stalemated, and on May 18\nwe had actually drafted a statement recessing\nthe talks and put our luggage on the plane to\ngo on to Cairo that night. President Asad\nbroke that deadlock by dropping his insistence\non holding the two high hills just west of\nQuneitra. This permitted us to develop a\nUS proposal combining a line and an assurance\nfrom Israel conveyed by us to Syria that there\nwould be no Israeli forces on the hills or\nweapons that could fire into Quneitra.\n-- The next issues were the related questions of (a)\nlimitations on armament and forces behind the\ndisengagement line and (b) the location of the Syrian\nmilitary line.\n-- Again the negotiations deadlocked. The Israelis\ninsisted on detailed limitations, and Asad\nresisted any restrictions on the exercise of\nhis sovereignty.\n-- Again we drafted a statement recessing the\ntalks and on May 23 (Thursday) felt we could\nnot carry the talks further.\n-- This time it was the Israelis who gave us the\nlatitude to develop and refine a US proposal\n(May 24-27).\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-5-\nThroughout all this was the question of Mount Hermon.\nReaching agreement on putting the positions there\nunder the UN was largely a matter of sticking to\na position and wearing the Syrians down.\n-- When there seemed to be agreement on substance, we\nturned to the documents (May 26-27), and much of what\nwe thought was agreed was re-opened. After our talks\nSunday night, May 26, we concluded that agreement\nwas not possible. The following morning, we were on\nthe verge of leaving when Asad pulled back. We agreed\nto make a major effort to see whether we could\ncomplete the documents that day. Ten hours of\ntalk followed.\n-- The final issue was the question of whether Asad\nwould assume responsibility for preventing terrorists\nfrom operating across the border. This was the\ncause of our final trip to Damascus May 28.\nTHE AGREEMENT\nMap 3 shows the final agreement. That agreement is recorded\nin these documents:\n-- Agreement restoring the ceasefire, establishing the\nlines, describing procedures for signing and planning\nimplementation, and relating disengagement to final\npeace.\n-- Protocol establishing the UN Disengagement Observer\nForce.\n--- A secret paper recording the limitations in armament\nand forces which both sides have agreed to.\n-- We also conveyed in letter form certain assurances\nwhich were stated to us. This was done because\nthere were some subjects that each side was willing\nto discuss with us but not with each other. (Example:\nforces on Quneitra hills.)\nThe main elements of the agreement are:\n-- the two disengagement lines.\n-- Area of separation with UNDOF.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-6-\n-- Mount Hermon in the area of separation.\n-- Special demilitarized area around Quneitra.\n-- 10 kilometer limitation area behind each disengagement\nline.\n-- Further limitations in the 10-25 km area.\n-- No missiles closer than 25 kilometers.\nWHAT NEXT\nWe need a month or two for carrying out the Syrian-Israeli\ndisengagement.\nThen we will turn to possible next steps in the move toward\nan overall peace.\nNSC: HHSaunders : CV\n5/31/74\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT\nBETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES\nA. Israel and Syria will scrupulously observe the\nceasefire on land, sea and air and will refrain from all\nmilitary actions against each other, from the time of the\nsigning of this document, in implementation of United\nNations Security Council Resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.\nB. The military forces of Israel and Syria will be\nseparated in accordance with the following principles:\n1. All Israeli military forces will be west\nof the line designated as Line A on the map attached\nhereto, except in the Quneitra area, where they will\nbe west of Line A-1.\n2. All territory east of Line A will be under\nSyrian administration, and Syrian civilians will return\nto this territory.\n3. The area between Line A and the line designated\nas Line B on the attached map will be an area of\nseparation. In this area will be stationed the United\nNations Disengagement Observer Force established in\naccordance with the accompanying protocol.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\n4. All Syrian military forces will be east of\nthe line designated as Line B on the attached map.\n5. There will be two equal areas of limitation\nin armament and forces, one west of Line A and one\neast of Line B as agreed upon.\n6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted\nto operate up to their respective lines without\ninterference from the other side.\nC. In the area between Line A and Line A-1 on the\nattached map there shall be no military forces.\nD. This agreement and the attached map will be signed\nby the military representatives of Israel and Syria in Geneva\nnot later than May 30, 1974, in the Egyptian-Israeli Military\nWorking Group of the Geneva Peace Conference under the aegis\nof the United Nations, after that group has been joined by a\nSyrian military representative, and with the participation\nof representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union.\nThe precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the\nimplementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked\nout by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the\nEgyptian-Israeli Military Working Group who will agree on the\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nstages of this process. The Military Working Group described\nabove will start their work for this purpose in Geneva under\nthe aegis of the United Nations within 24 hours after the\nsigning of this agreement. They will complete this task\nwithin five days. Disengagement will begin within 24 hours\nafter the completion of the task of the Military Working\nGroup. The process of disengagement will be completed not\nlater than twenty days after it begins.\nE. The provisions of paragraphs A, B and C shall be\ninspected by personnel of the United Nations comprising the\nUnited Nations Disengagement Observer Force under this\nagreement.\nF. Within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement\nin Geneva all wounded prisoners of war which each side holds\nof the other as certified by the ICRC will be repatriated.\nThe morning after the completion of the task of the Military\nWorking Group, all remaining prisoners of war will be\nrepatriated.\nG. The bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side\nwill be returned for burial in their respective countries\nwithin ten days after the signing of this agreement.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 4 -\nH. This agreement is not a peace agreement. It is\na step toward a just and durable peace on the basis of\nSecurity Council Resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.\nFor Israel:\nFor Syria:\nWitness for the United Nations:\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nDear Mr. Minister:\nI am transmitting the attached proposal to assist\nin the implementation of the agreement between Israel\nand Syria on the disengagement of their forces. I am\nalso transmitting the attached proposal to the Israeli\ngovernment.\nReceipt of your signature or that of an appropriate\nrepresentative designated by the Syrian government on\nthe attached proposal will constitute acceptance, subject\nto the signature of the proposal by an appropriate repre-\nsentative of the Government of Israel.\nSincerely,\nHenry A. Kissinger\nHis Excellency\n'Abd al-Halim Khaddam,\nMinister of Foreign Affairs,\nDamascus.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nDear Mr. Minister:\nI am transmitting the attached proposal to assist\nin the implementation of the agreement between Iornel\nand Syria on the disengagement of their forces. I am\nalso transmitting the attached proposal to the Syrian\ngovernment.\nReceipt of your signature or that of an appro-\npriate representative designated by the Israeli govern-\nment on the attached proposal will constitute acceptance,\nsubject to the signature of the proposal by an appropriate\nrepresentative of the Government of Syria.\nSincerely,\nHenry A. Kissinger\nHis Excellency\nAbba Eban,\nMinister for Foreign Affaire,\nJerusalem.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nU. S. PROPOSAL\nIn order to facilitate agreement between Israel and Syria\nand in implementation of that agreement, and to assist in main-\ntaining scrupulous observance of the ceasefire on land, air and\nsea, the United States proposes the following provisions:\n(1) That the area of limitation in armament and forces\nwest of Line A and east of Line B will be 10 kilometers in\nwidth. In each area, respectively, the following are permitted:\n(a) two brigades of armed forces, including 75 tanks and 36\npieces of short-range 122-mm artillery; and (b) the entire force\nof each party shall not exceed 6,000 men. The United Nations\nDisengagement Observer Force will inspect these provisions in\nthe 10 kilometer zone.\n(2) That in the area between 10 and 20 kilometers west of\nLine A and east of Line B: (a) there will be no artillery\npieces whose range exceeds 20 kilometers; and (b) the total\nnumber of artillery pieces permitted is 162 with a range of not\nexceeding 20 kilometers; and (c) surface-to-air missiles will\nbe stationed no closer than 25 kilometers west of Line A and\neast of Line B.\n(3) Inspection of the provisions in paragraph 2 above will\nbe performed by the U. S. aerial reconnaissance and the results\nwill be provided to both sides.\n(4) The area of separation between Lines A and B will not\nhave any military forces. In the towns and villages in the\narea there will be stationed police forces of a size and\ncharacter similar to those stationed in other Syrian towns\nand villages of comparable size.\n(5) The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force will\ntake over the positions in the area of separation on Mount\nHermon. No military observation of any kind may be conducted\nin that area.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPROTOCOL TO AGREEMENT ON\nDISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES\nConcerning the United Nations\nDisengagement Observer Force\nIsrael and Syria agree that:\nThe function of the United Nations Disengagement\nObserver Force (UNDOF) under the Agreement will be to\nuse its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and to\nsee that it is scrupulously observed. It will super-\nvise the Agreement and protocol thereto with regard\nto the areas of separation and limitation. In carry-\ning out its mission, it will comply with generally\napplicable Syrian laws and regulations and will not\nhamper the functioning of local civil administration.\nIt will enjoy freedom of movement and communication and\nother facilities that are necessary for its mission.\nIt will be mobile and provided with personal weapons\nof a defensive character and shall use such weapons\nonly in self-defense. The number of the UNDOF shall\nbe about 1,250, who will be selected by the Secretary\nGeneral of the United Nations in consultation with the\nparties from members of the United Nations who are not\npermanent members of the Security Council.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nThe UNDOF will be under the command of the United\nNations, vested in the Secretary General, under the\nauthority of the Security Council.\nThe UNDOF shall carry out inspections under the\nAgreement, and report thereon to the parties, on a\nregular basis, not less often than once every fifteen\ndays, and, in addition, when requested by either party.\nIt shall mark on the ground the respective lines shown\non the map attached to the Agreement.\n# * *\nIsrael and Syria will support a resolution of\nthe United Nations Security Council which will pro-\nvide for the UNDOF contemplated by the Agreement. The\ninitial authorization will be for six months subject\nto renewal by further resolution of the Security\nCouncil.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET\nDear Mr. President:\nI have the honor to transmit the following\ntext of a letter from President Nixon:\nDear Mr. President:\nAs you begin to rebuild and re-\npopulate Quneitra, I want you to know\nthat the United States is prepared to\nconsider how it might assist in the re-\nhabilitation of that area. One impor-\ntant objective we share in seeking a\nlasting peace in the Middle East is to\nhelp people return to normal lives. It\nis a source of great satisfaction to me\nto know that the agreement on the dis-\nengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces\nwill make it possible for some of the\npeople displaced by war to return to\ntheir homes.\nSincerely,\n(Richard Nixon)\nThe signed original of this letter will be\nforwarded to you.\nSincerely,\nHenry A. Kissinger\nHis Excellency\nHafiz al-Asad,\nPresident of the Syrian\nArab Republic,\nDamascus.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nwashington\nSECRET\nDear Mr. President:\nI have the honor to transmit the following\ntext of a letter from President Nixon:\nDear Mr. President:\nIn connection with the arreement\nbetween Syria and Israel on the dis-\nengagement of their forces, the Govern-\nment of the United States has received\nthe assurances below from the Govern-\nment of Israel with respect to the\nIsraeli presence on Tell abou Nida and\nTell el Aaram, the two hills just to\nthe west of Quneitra.\nFirst, Israel will scrupulously\nobserve the consefire, including obser-\nvance with respect to the people and\ncity of Quncitra.\nSecond, there will be no Isracli\nforces or weanons on the eastern slopes\nof the two hills.\nI want to assure you, Mr. President,\nthat the United States will do its ut-\nmost to assure that these conditions are\nscrupulously observed.\nSincerely,\n(Richard Nixon)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nThe signed original of this letter will\nbe forwarded to you,\nSincerely,\nHenry A. Kissinger\nHis Excellency\nHafiz al-Asad,\nPresident of the Syrian\nArab Republic,\nDamascus.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT\n\"The discussions conducted by United States Secretary\nof State Dr. Henry Kissinger with Syria and Israel have led\nto an agreement on the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces.\nThe agreement will be signed by Syrian and Israeli military\nrepresentatives in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working\nGroup of the Geneva Conference on Thursday, May 30, 1974, in\nGeneva. \"\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSADAT-KISSINGER REMARKS TO PRESS\n5:00 p.m., May 30, 1974 - Giza Residence, Cairo\nQuestion: Mr. President, did you agree on the next steps?\nSadat:\nWe agreed upon everything!\nQuestion:\nWhen will you go to Geneva?\nSadat:\nFirst, I have a statement. [Reads]\n\"Egypt welcomes reaching an agreement on the disengagement\nof forces on the Syrian front as another step on the road\ntowards a durable peace based on justice in accordance with\nthe Security Council resolutions.\n\"The agreement, even though it is merely a military one\nfor the consolidation of the ceasefire, is an important\nstep that will generate momentum towards the realization\nof the Arab national goal which is the total Israeli\nwithdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories as well\nas the restoration of the legitimate rights of the\nPalestinian people. Furthermore, it confronts all the\nparties concerned with their responsibilities and paves\nthe way for the activation of the Geneva Conference.\n\"We hail, in particular, the wisdom and farsightedness\nof President Hafez Al-Assad, and the positive and\neffective role of the United States of America which\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nproved that it is capable and qualified, under the\nleadership of President Nixon, to assume its responsi-\nbilities as a great power. In recognition of this role\nwe welcome the forthcoming visit of President Richard\nNixon and we trust that it will be a further step for\nintensifying mutual understanding and consolidating\nthe friendship between the American and Arab peoples.\n\"The tireless efforts undertaken by Dr. Henry Kissinger\nand his colleagues represent a new page in the field\nof human creative achievement which would never have\ncome about had it not been founded on a deep humanistic\nvision and a genuine commitment to the cause of peace. \"\nBy all measures, Dr. Kissinger has done again a miracle.\nI myself am proud because Dr. Kissinger is my friend and\nmy brother, and since the beginning I was sure -- and\nmaybe you remember in Alexandria I told you this -- and in\nspite of all the difficulties and all the tireless efforts\nthat were needed, DR. Kissinger spared no effort and no\ntime to do his best to perform -- as I told you ---- another\nmiracle.\nMy congratulations to President Nixon, and I am sure he is\nmuch more proud than me for what you have done, and my\ncongratulations to the American people.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nKissinger:\nMr. President, I would like to express appreciation\nfor your very generous words. Six months ago I had the\nhonor for the first time of meeting President Sadat,\nwho since then has become my friend, on whose advice we\nrelied, and whose inspiration has guided our efforts.\nThe United States is dedicated to achieving a permanent\npeace based on justice in the Middle East. And we\nengaged ourselves in the efforts on disengagement with\nEgypt and Syria because we were convinced it was a\nnecessary first step.\nThe negotiations concluded yesterday between Syria and\nIsrael could not have succeeded without the advice and\nconstant support of President Sadat and the Egyptian\nGovernment.\nThe relations between the United States and Egypt have\nimproved and will continue to improve. In order to\nintensify this cooperation, President Sadat and President\nNixon have agreed to establish a Joint Cooperation Commission\nbetween the United States and Egypt to work in various\nfields to the mutual benefit. A further announcement\nof the details will be made tomorrow in Cairo and Washington.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nIt remains only to thank my friend, President Sadat,\nfor the warm hospitality we received and for his constant\nfriendship.\nQuestion:\nWhen will President Nixon leave [for the Middle East] ?\nKissinger:\nThe date will have to be set after I return to Washington.\nQuestion:\nWill the PLO be invited to Geneva?\nSadat:\nWe have to discuss the whole thing with the Arabs first.\nQuestion:\nDr. Kissinger, do you expect a resumption of diplomatic\nrelations with Syria?\nKissinger:\nAt the airport in Damascus Monday night, by agreement with\nthe Syrian Government, I stated that the United States\nand Syria agreed to engage in a rapid improvement in relations,\nthat will begin immediately. I don't want to speculate\non any given step at any given time. I know I speak for\nthe Syrian Government when I say this.\nQuestion:\nWhen will the Geneva Conference reconvene?\nSadat:\nWe must discuss the whole thing among ourselves ---- Egypt,\nSyria, Jordan, the Palestinians. We must have some time\nfor that. And after that we will approach the two super\npowers on reconvening.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nQuestion:\nIs that weeks or months?\nSadat:\nHow long, I don't know.\nQuestion:\nThe next step is the immediate fulfillment of 242?\nOr will it be other steps?\nSadat:\nSure, the aim of Geneva is fulfillment of 242.\nQuestion:\nDr. Kissinger, will you have time to complete the solution\nin the term of President Nixon?\nKissinger:\nWe are committed to a major effort to. achieve a just and\ndurable peace. We are determined to succeed.\nQuestion:\nWill you go to the Middle East before or after you go to\nMoscow?\nKissinger:\nI will report to President Nixon on my travels here and\nwill discuss it.\nQuestion:\nWhat will be the level of this Joint Commission?\nKissinger:\nThere will be an announcement.\nQuestion:\nWhat is its function?\nKissinger:\nThere will be a formal announcement tomorrow in Washington\nand Cairo.\nQuestion:\nDo you expect to come back, Sir?\nKissinger:\nI always expect to come back. [Laughter]\nQuestion:\nWhen will be the next disengagement negotiation?\nSadat:\nAsk Dr. Kissinger.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSituation When the Trip Began (April 28 )\nThe Dayan (March 29) and Shihabi (April13) visits had achieved The\nfollowing points of agreement:\n-- Separation of forces is just a first step\ntoward an overall peace agreement.\n-- Both sides would observe the ceasefire.\n-- There would be two disengagement lines\nwith a disengagement zone between them\n-- Syrian administration would be restored\nup to the Isracti disengagement line.\n-- Behind the disengagement lines, force and\nequipment limitations can be negotiated\non a reciprocal basis.\n-- There would be a UN presence in the\ndisengagement zone, the exact nature of\nthat presence to be negotiated.\n-- Prisoners would be exchanged.\nThe hey points that remained to be clarified were:\n-- The disengagement lines. the The Quneitra\nhills and The mount Hermon positions\nwere seen as the critical issues\n-- How many areas of limited armament\nthere would be and the nature of the\nlimitations.\n-- The function and strength of the UN presence.\n-- The timing of the prisones exchange\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2\nLaying the Ground work ( April 29- May 7)\nThe first week was spent establishing\na framework Talks with Gromyko in\nGeneva, Boumechine, sadat and Three then to\nfour sessions week's end, from sessions\nin (Thursday Saturday Mon\nHussein and an emersary sent to\nKing Faisal and and Then, at week's\nend, The first two stops in Jerusalem\nand Damascus. Over that weekend,\nan emissary from the party was sent to\nKing Faisal and back to Boumediene and\nyou had a second meeting with sadat.\nThe Blue Line\nThe Diseng agement Line-- ( May 8-12)\nThe first Israch to map of Haller the dising agement\nin response your\ntime A was presented in\nin Jesul Jerusalem was presented in\nthe to President asad on Wednesday,\nmay 8. The result of this was\nto focus the negotiation on (1)\nQuneitra and (2) pressures to \"straighten\nout\" The blue line.\nQuneitra and the US Proposal (May 13-18) 20\nThis phase began with the long Israeli\nCabinet meeting of May 13. This produced\nan Israeli position which removed Israeli\nand the UM\nforces, N from Quneitra, put the hills just north\nof town in Reproduced to atthe DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential The Library culmination The village of\nThis document has been d reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nof\n-\nwe meeting with on a draft may the talks st 90 atement on and to\nhad gone to the 18,\nprep on we is cessing were cairo acted that night\nthis phase was the formulation of the us\nproposal on Quneitra which led to asad's\nsaying on May 18 that he would \"forego\nThe question of the hills A The one remaining\nstep in this phase was having the\nIsraelis put the Quneitra arrangements\non a map. This map was shown to\nasad may 20.\nRed Line and Limitations (may 20-27)\nThis phase began with the Isractes saying they\ncould consider The Red Line only when\nthe question of limitations was settled The\nSyrians took the opposite position The\nnegotiations again seemed on the verge of\nstatemate when Tuesday, we returned to Jerusalem\nthe night of a May 21, The morning of May 23\neach member of The Israeli team endorsed\nMrs. Meir's position that without realistic\nlimitations this would be nothing more than\na one -sided with drawal and ceasefire.\nhe came back from Damasars that Thursday\nnight prepared to suspend The talks,\nIt was Then the Israeli group on Friday\nmorning May 24, that gave Secretary\nKissinges enough latitude to develop a us\nProposal on limitations. This was developed Friday,\nrefined over Reproduced the at the Richard weekend Nixon Presidential and Library finally concluded\nMonday, may 2 (DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe Documents (may 26-27)\nTerrorism ( may 28)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAsad\n1.\nBilateral commission\n2.\nRelations after desengagement\n3.\nEmissary to Coash to discuss how\nThis to he done\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSyrian Map\nJan. 20\nIsrael Map # 1 A\nMarch 29, 1974\nSyria Map #\nApri ( 13, 1974\nIsrael Map # 2 May 7, 1974\nSyrian Observations May 8, 1974\nInali Map # 3\nMay 12, 1974\nSyrian observations\nE\nQuneitra\nMay 12 -\nM\nMay 17 - developin 9 us proposal are Q\nMay 18 - arad caved on the hills - us prop.\nFast suspension statement\nMap # 4\n#\nLimitations\nMay 20 (gaus them agreement + ure protocol\nMap # 5\nMay 26,1974\nwrited\n85\nAt\nwe\nmapli\ny\nrell and\nO E\nnext\nLeft 5:30\nin\nmoM bew\nan. Dam 6:3alormal\nS port out\n7:30 Dam. time prom int\nBegin meeting 8: 30-9:00 Dam time MA 7:30-Israel Time\nYSI returned\n-nommed\n4\n8:30\nnoused\nnot\nme\npeo\nit\nwelanuraf\nd\nMA\nEr\nwill\n5\nat\nwas woll\n8\nbew\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPay you\nIndian Words\n/\nHTP1.PS straff\n#\nG\nlawel\n1\nLinga\n+\nNFPI room\nS # qoM\ncy\nlearn]\n>\nNSPI , 8 non monght\nGraundwork\nMay 3-4 Israel Ayria towneds wind\n2-3\nE # quall\nQ\nMay 4 Egypt 51 artiened\n4mg (May 4-7 Saunders trip)\nMay 5-6 Jordan It rael N de 90M\nMay PI 765 Gromyko\n# ₦1 quelli\nSun. Apr. 28\nGeneva\n29\nalgien\nThes\n30\nCairo alex\nwed May /\nCaro alex the\nThurs May 2\nJenesalem with nið\nFri May 3 envit Damasies\newit lury Sat Ma 4 evit Cairo alex ed\n4\namman\nsun\nSaunder in Riy.\nSun\nin\namman\nNon\n6\n\"\nJesusalem\nto alg\nThes\n7\nCyprus-\nCyp.\nwed\n8\nDaviasues\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- -will also want\npage size\nMaps on The disengagement line: :\n-- Syrian map, January 20\nbrought to washing ton by Dayan,\n- Israeli map March 29\nbrought to Washington by Shihabi,\n- Syrian map 1 April 13\n1\n- Israeh map, May 7-8\n2\n- Israeli map, May 12\n3\n- Israeh map, May 20 (showing\nQuneitra proposal)\n4\n- Israeli map, May 26\n5\n- Agreement map, May 28\n6.\n- Composite showing all of above\non one map\nQuneitra\n- Checklist of May 12 Gur- Sisco - Sameless - UN strip\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n(lozogorg\nas from\nWent 50 well\nSpioda tovodo 70 11s\nd\nfan\nero\nX\nX\nrtiered\nX\nx\npatzin\norti?\nand\nsipan SI to taildeen -\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSyrian position 5/16-17\nwest of 1967 line\n1.\nSyria needs position on mount Hermon, that\nGrad says Israel re-ompried after October 22\ncearefire.\n2.\nsecretary told asad us prepared to propose what\nhe considered maximum he would \"impose \"based\non talks with indivials fake into account\n7\n- In. obsers\n- widen The pocket about / km. north and south\nto produce a substantially straight line,\n- To west, move line 1/4 km. to west. Create\na DM2 from there to foot of wills\nfrom foot of hills to other side of hills only\nThe lightest of weapons us would give\nNixon asad letter guaranteeing only lightest\nof weapons\nstraight line north south 1km. bey and map 2,\nmove west 200 meters, Israeli military\nline at foot of hill, main Israeli forces on other\nside of hill.)\n3.\nasad:\n- Line on peak of hill\n- straight north and south to hook up with\nNap# 2 line\n- No, cultivate. Israeli settlers cultivating fields Aprians would not\nNo marqin for give any more. If hill in enemy\nhands Q is aseless\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\njust to put help orystallize thoughts on where we\nstand, I offer the following.\nnegotiation on\nThis A disengagement of forces is hung up over an issue\nthat really belongs in negotiation the of The first phase\nof Israeli withdrawal over two from 1967 line -- the constriction\nor removal of A Isracti settlements.\nthree possible\nTheoratically there are two ^ ways out of This\nstatemate :\n1. To seek less -- a simple separation of forces.\nThis could range from withdrawal tothe A tober 6\nline to Israel's present offer with some\nadjustments north and south of Qunertra\none way to do this would he to eta true to arrange some Joraeli fallback\nquickly in exchange for a ceasefire while continuing negotiations on\nQuneitra until the new Isralli government is formed\n$ asad sepms accept This because he would have\nunlikely to\nto give up his war of attrition, which he sees\nas his main card in playing for a first phase\nof Inaeli withdrawal behind the 1967 lines\nwhich would permit him to begin resettling\n1967 refugees. The Israelis would # not accept\nwithout a ceasefire and probably some agreement on\nforce and arms limitations.\n2. To seek more -- Israeli withdrawal from the\ncultivated fields between Quneitra and Tel\nabou Nida. This even is asad's proposal. The\nIsractis seem unable, to consides consider this until They\nhave a new government, and acceptance\nseems unlikely even then unless they feel\na lot more pressure them they do now,\n4 The argument for This approach is that it\nwould create a situation that could last\nfor some time. It would require the\npassa Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon-Presidential the Library Israeti political\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- -\nsituation to stabilize. for the us administration\n₹ to build understanding in the us for where\nfrom was of attrition and\napproach, and for pressures ^ in the middle\nEast to work on Inal\n3. To 90 on trying to split the difference between\nthe Ayrian and Isracti positions by persuading\nIsrael to give up enough fields and accept\nto give Quentra \"breathing space.\" with this,\nof course, would go assurances that the hills\nwould not be used for Israch harrassment or\noffensive operations.\nneither side seems able to give enough to\nmake this possible. also, it would. not create\na stable the setuation as long as Serian and\nIsraeti civilians are within sight of each\nother.\nThe present negotiation suggests to me that a real\ndisengagement of forces agreement is not possible\nin present circumstances because Syria does not\nwant to give up its military option now.\nHere are some possible approaches:\n1. we can let The war of attrition go on while\ntrying to keep alive for a time the semblance\nof disengagement talks, letting each side\nreflect. This is The course we are on now,\n2.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nWATMENT\nOz.\nDEP\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\n/ AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nS/S 10\nof\nSECRET\nNODIS\nClassification\n15 MAY 131ø\n0 150920Z MAY 74\nFM USINT DAMASCUS\nTO RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 126\nINFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 538\nBT\nSECRE T DAMASCUS 0721\nEXDIS CHANDLE AS NODIS)\nNO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE NEA\nJERUSALEM FOR ATHERTON\nE.O. 11652: GDS\nTAGS: OVIP CHENRY A. KISSINGER), SY\nSUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMIN SHOWING CLOSER US-SYRIAN RELATIONS\nREF: A. JSAUSALEM 845 ; B. STATE 100589\n10 AFTER A LONG NIGHT OF WRESTLING WITH THE PROS AND\nCONS OF THE PROPOSAL DESCRIBED IN REFTEL, I HAVE CONCLUDED\nTHAT I HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATION ABOUT ITS MERITS. BELOW\nI HAVE LISTED WHAT I BELIEVE ARE SOME SALIENT QUESTIONS\nABOUT THE PROPOSAL, WITH MY ANSWERS WHICH TO MY SATISFACTION\nAT LEAST SHOW WHY WE SHOULD PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY WITH THIS\nKIND OF \"PUBLIC IMPACT\" STATEMENT AT THIS TIME.\n1. IS SUCH AN AD HOC PROCEDURE WARRANTED? I AM SURE THAT\nYOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS\nWITH OUR ASSISTANCE AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS IN THE PAST HAS\nOFTEN BEEN THE SLAPDASH NATURE OF THE APPROACH. THERE WAS\nAN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM, E.G., IRAN AFTER MASADEQ, so WE JUMPED\nIN WITH GOOD INTENTIONS, PLENTY OF MONEY AND QUITE OFTEN\nHALFBACKED IDEAS. WHILE THERE WERE MANY SUCCESSES, THERE\nWERE ALSO MANY EGREGIOUS MISTAKES. AS I MENTIONED IN MY\nCABLE (DAMASCUS 235) WE MUST APPROACH THE PROBLEM OF WHAT\nWE INTEND FOR THE MIDDLE EAST POST-DISENGAGEMENT AND MORE\nIMPORTANTLY POST-OVERALL SETTLEMENT IN A RATIONAL, REALISTIC\nMANNER. I SUGGESTED IN THAT CABLE THAT WE BEGIN THINKING\nNOW ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS SO THAT WE WOULD BZJPN A POSITION\nTO MAKE PROPOSALS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WHICH WOULD\nINDICATE TO THE AREA THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING REGIONAL\nPROBLEMS NOT IN SOME SUPERFICIAL ONE-TIME MANNER BUT RATHER\nSECRET\nFORM FS-412(H)\nClassification\n4-68\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 2\nDAMASCUS 0721\nSECRET\nNODIS\nIN A STUIDED LONG-TERM FASHION WHICH AMONG OTHER THINGS WOULD\nOPERATE ON THE BASIS OF \"PARTNERSHIP\" AND NOT SIMPLY OF\nUNILATERAL, IF YOU WILL PARDON THE EXPRESSION, GIMMICKRY. I\nFULLY APPRECIATE THE NEED FOR IMAGINATION, FLECIBILITY AND\nDEFT UTILIZATION OF CURRENT OPPORTUNITIES BY FRANKLY, I\nDO NOT THINK THE CURRENT SITUATION REQUIRES THAT WE NOW\nRUSH IN AS I WILL EXPLAIN LATER. I THINK WE HAVE TIME\nAND FOR THIS REASON I THINK WE SHOULD DO A LITTLE MORE\nTHINKING ABOUT WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE NOT ONLY IN\nSYRIA BUT IN THE ARAB WORLD AS A WHOLE. WITHOUT FURTHER\nBELABORING THE POINT, I STRONGLY OPPOSE THIS KIND OF AD\nHOC APPROACH.\n3. CAN WE OFFER SYRIA ANYTHING AT THIS TIME THAT IS\nCREDIBLE? I HAVE JUST SEEN WHAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS COME\nUP WITH. ALTHOUGH THE LIST IS LONG, IN FACT IT IS PIDDLING.\n1 FEW MORE SCHOLARSHIPS, SEVERAL ADDITONAL INTERNATIONAL\nWSITORS GRANTS, LOOSENING UP OF EX-IM, SETTLEMENT OF DEBTS,\nET.. THE QUESTION, HOWEVER, IS WILL THIS \"PEANUTS\" KIND\nOF PPROACH HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE SYRIANS. IN THIS REGARD,\nI RECALL SOME OF THE COMMENTS WHICH I HEARD HERE IN DAMASCUS\nAFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR FY 1975 AID BILL IN WHICH\nALLUSIONS WERE ALSO MADE THAT PROVISIONS FOR ASSISTANCE\nTO SYRIA WAS ALSO BEING CONSIDERED ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS.\nTHE COMPARISON BETWEEN WHAT WE WERE PROPOSING FOR ISRAEL,\nNOT TO MENTION JORDAN, AND WHAT WE MIGHT POSSIBLY SET ASIDE\nFOR SYRIA WAS NOT LOST ON SEVERAL OF MY OBSERVANT\nCONTACTS. FRANKLY, I JUST DO NOT THINK THERE IS VERY MUCH\nWE CAN OFFER THE SYRIANS AT THIS TIME THAT WILL HAVE AN\nINPACT. MOREOVER, AS YOU HAVE LONG KNOWN, THE SYRIANS\nHAVE NEVER REALLY BEEN IMPRESSED BY OUR AID PROGRAMS IN\nTHE PAST. I WOULD VENTURE TO SAY THIS HAS BECOME EVEN\nMORE TRUE SINCE THE BAATHI TAKEOVER WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON\nNATIONALISM AND SELF-RELIANCE. FINALLY, IN VIEW OF THE HUGE\nINFUSION OF ARAB OIL MONEY INTO SYRIA OVER THE LAST SEVERAL\nYEARS AND PARTICULARLY SINCE THE OCTOBER WAR, I THINK THAT\nSYRIA WOULD BE EVEN LESS IMPRESSED BY OUR PALTRY GESTURES.\nTHEREFORE, HERE AGAIN I MUST CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS LITTLE\nWE CAN DO AT THIS TIME TO CATCH THE PUBLIC EYE IN SYRIA\nIN THE DRAMATIC AND SUSTAINED WAY WHICH I THINK WE should\nIF WE ARE REALLY GOING TO SET LONG-TERM MILAGE OUT OF NOT\nONLY PUBLIC STATEMENTS BUT FROM THE FOLLOW-THROUGH AS WELL.\n4. WOULD SUCH PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS\nTIME? AS FAR AS THE SYRIANS ARE CONCERNED BOTH AS A REGIME\nAND AS A PEOPLE, THE MAIN PURPOSE FOR THE SECRETARY' CURRENT\nMUCH ADMIRED AND MUCH APPRECIATED EFFORT IS DISENGAGEMENT.\nONCE ACHIVED, I BELIEVE THAT THE USG IS ON ITS WAY TO\nCLOSER AND MORE COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS. HOW-\nEVER, IF DISENGAGEMENT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED, I SERIOUSLY QUESTION\nTHE APPROPRIATENESS OF AMKING ANNOUNCEMENTEAOF THIS KIND IN\nTHE WAKE OF THE AGREEMENT. HERE AGAIN THE PALTRINESS OF\nWHAT WE WOULD Reproduced at the Richard BE Library BUT MORE IMPORTANT,\nI THINK MANY PEOPLE IN THDECLASSIFIEDOULD INTERPRET THIS AS\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 3\nDAMASCUS 0721\nSECRET\nNODIS\nSOME SORT OF APYOFF WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY NOT WHAT WE INTEND\nTO CONVEY. IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU MAY RECALL THAT WHEN I\nBEGAN DISCUSSING CULTURAL EXCHANGES WITH THE FOEIGN\nMINISTRY A FEW MONTHS AGO, I WAS TOLD THAT THE SYRIAN\nGOVERNMENT WAS APPRECIATIVE OF OUR INTEREST BUT THIS WAS\nNOT THE TIME TO BE PUSHING TOO HARD FOR THESE KINDS OF\nPROGRAMS. IN EFFECT I WAS TOLD, \"LET'S WAIT UNTIL WE SEE\nWHAT HAPPENES WITH DISENGAGEMENT.\" (DAMASCUS 321) MORE-\nOVER, YOU MAY ALSO RECALL I REPORTED THAT I WAS ASSURED\nTHAT TPB SYRIANS WERE GOING TO BE BUYING AMERICAN\nAIRCRAFT FOR SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES AND THAT THE DECISION\nWOULD BE TAKEN VERY SHORTLY (SEE DAMSCUS 417). THAT\nDECISION HAS NOT YET BEEN TAKEN AND I STRONGLY SUSPECT\nTHAT IT, TOO, IS BEING DEFERRED UNTIL THE SYRIANS SEE WHAT\nHAPPENS WITH DISENGAGEMENT. FINALLY, NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF\nDISENGAGEMENT IS NOT ACHIEVED, THEN I SCARCELY BELIEVE\nTHAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SOME RELATIVELY MINOR SYMBOLIC\nGEST URES WILL HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON WHAT WILL DOUBTLESS BE\nA DISILLUSIONED AND DISAPPOINTED REGIME AND PUBLIC.\nALL IN ALL, THERFORE, I JUST DO NOT SEE THAT THIS KIND\nOF ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME.\n5. RECOMMENDATIONAN I BELIEVE THE BEST THING THAT WE\nCOULD DO UWOULD BE FOR THE SECRETARY AT ONE OF HIS MEETINGS\nWITH ASAD OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS TO SOLICIT FROM\nHIM HS IDEAS ON HOW HE VIEWS THE FUTURE OF U.S. AND SYRIAN\nRELATIONS, NOTING AS THE SECRETARY HAS IN THE BAST SEVERAL\nAREAS IN WHICH FE BELIEVES THERE IS ROOM FOR \"COOPERATION\nAND PARTNERSHIP\" CAND THE SECRETARY SHOULD EMPHASIZE THESE\nTWO CONCEPTS). DEPENDING ON PRESIDENT ASAD'S REWGTION,\nTHE SECRETARY COULD THEN THROW OUT THE IDEA THAT\nPERHAPS THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT WISH TO COME UP WITH\nSOME SUGGESTIONS WHICH COULD IN TURN BE CONSIDERED BY OUR\nPEOPLE OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS. SECRETARY MIGHT,\nFOR EXAMPLE, SUGEST A JOINT COMMISSION SIMILAR TO ONES\nSET UF FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT. IN THIS WAY I THINK\nWE COULD SIGNAL PRESIDENT ASAD OF OUR INTEREST AND AT\nTHE SAME TIME GET IDEAS OF WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND,\nRATHER THAN TRYING TO PRESENT PRESIDENT AYRD WITH SUGGESTIONS\nWHICH MAY NOT, !N FACT, BE WHAT THEY WANT. FINALLY, IF\nTHE SECRETARY BELIEVES THERE IS UTILITY IN\nSOME SORT OF PUBLIC ANNOUCMEMENT, HE MIGHT AGAIN INQUIRE\nFROM PRESIDENT ASAD HOW HE BELIEVES THE TWO OF THEM COULD\nHANDLE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OR JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO INDICATE TO\nTHE WORLD THAT EYRIAN/U.S. RELATIONS ARE NOW ENTERING A\nCLOSER PHASE AS EVIDENCED BY THEH NTENTION TO BEGIN DIS-\nCUSSIONS ABOUT FUTURE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS. IN\nTHIS WAY AGAIN THE SECRETARY COULD GIVE PRESIDENT AND THE\nOPPORTUNITY OF HELPOUNG GUIDE THE PUBL IC. RELATIONS ASPECT OF THIS\nat the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSORT OF PROPOSAL.\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 4\nDAMASCUS 0721\nSECRET\nNODIS\n6. I AM SORRY TO TAKE A NEGATIVE POSITION ON WHAT IN\nPRINCIPLE IS SOMETHING WHICH MANY OF US IN THE BUREAU HAVE\nBEEN WORKING FOR A LONG TIME, I.le, WAYS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS\nBETWEEN SYRIA AND THE UNITED STATES. I CERTAINLY HOPE\nTHAT YOU WILL NOT ACCUSE ME OF LACKING IMAGINATION OR\nINITIATIVE BUT THIS IS THE WAY I SEE THINGS FROM MY LOW\nPOINT ON THE TOTEM POLE. IN ANY EVENT, I AM SURE THAT MY\nRESERVATIONS WILL BE TAKEN IN THE SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND\nMUTUAL EXCHANGE WHICH HAS MADE THE DEPARTMENT THE EXCITING\nPLACE IT IS NOW TO WORK IN SINCE THE SECRETARY ASSUMED ITS\nLEADERSHIP.\nSCOTES\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDepartment of State\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nS/S-10\nSECRET NODIS\n15 MAY°754//0221Z\nClassification\n0 150113Z MAY 74XX\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nTO RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5580\nINFO RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0655\nBT\nS E C R E T STATE 100589\nEXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS) TOSEC 641\nE.O. 11652: GDS\nTAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)\nSUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT SHOWING CLOSER US-SYRIAN RELATIONSHIPS\nREF: JERUSALEM 845 (SECTO 401)\nFOR ATHERTON\n1. FOLLOWING IS LISTING OF ITEMS THAT MIGHT BE\nCONSIDERED. EACH ITEM IS DRAFTED ACCORDING TO FORMAT\nREQUESTED REFTEL, I.E. INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE THAT COULD BE\nUSED IN PUBLIC STATEMENT FOLLOWED BY BACKGROUND EXPLANATION:\nA. TALKS ON ECONOMIC CLAIMS: THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-\nMENT IS READY TO ENTER INTO TALKS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF\nSYRIA FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING ECONOMIC CLAIMS\nBY THE TWO SIDES, WITH A VIEW TO THE OPENING OF NEW POSSI-\nBILITIES OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN\nTHE UNITED STATES AND SYRIA. BACKGROUND: TWO MAIN OUT-\nSTANDING ISSUES ARE (1) STATUS OF US-OWNED 21 MILLION\nSYRIAN POUNDS FROM COUNTERPART FUNDS FROZEN BY SARG AS\nRESULT OF UNILATERAL USG CANCELLATION IN FEBRUARY 1967\nOF GRAIN SILO CONSTRUCTION PROJECT AND (2) APPROXIMATELY\nDOLLARS 75,000 OWED EX-IM BANK BY SARG AS RESULT OF SARG'S\nFAILURE TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPAYMENT OF EX-IM\nLOAN TO BOUSTANY TEXTILE FIRM FOLLOWING SARG'S NATIONALI-\nZATION OF FIRM IN MID-196ØS CKNOWN AS \"THE BOUSTANY\nCLAIM\"). IN TALKS CONDUCTED IN ATMOSPHERE OF IMPROVED\nUS-SYRIAN RELATIONS WE COULD PRESUMABLY AGREE TO USE BY\nSARG OF 21 MILLION POUNDS FOR APPROPRIATE ECONOMIC DEVEL-\nOPMENT ACTIVITY, OR SIMPLY TO WRITE-OFF OF FUNDS. RE\nBOUSTANY CLAIM, ITS RESOLUTION would BE PARTICULARLY HELP-\nFUL SINCE EX-IM UP TO NOW HAS BEEN UNWILLING EVEN TO\nCONSIDER REQUESTS FOR CREDIT FOR SYRIA UNTIL IT IS\nSETTLED.\nB. DAMASCUS FAIR: THE UNITED STATES LOOKS FORWARD TO\nRENEWING IN 1974 ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD FAMOUS\nFORM\nClassification\nFS-412(H)\n4-68\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 2\nSTATE 1005₦89\nSECRET NODIS\nDAMASCUS FAIR. BACKGROUND: STATE AND COMMERCE ARE\nPREPARED TO FUND WHAT IS CALLED \"COMMERCIAL PRESENCE\"\nTRADE FAIR PRESENTATION; THIS WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL\nPAVILLION WITH PARTICIPATION BY INTERESTED U.S. COMPANIES.\nMAIN COMPLICATION HERE IS THAT PARTICIPATION IN DAMASCUS\nFAIR IS BY INVITATION AND THUS FAR SARG HAS NOT INVITED\nUS. THERE ARE ALSO PROBLEMS OF CLEARING EXHIBITS THROUGH\nSYRIAN CUSTOMS IN RELATIVELY SHORT TIME BEFORE FAIR'S\nOPENING, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND NOW SCHEDULED FOR JULY, AND\nRECRUITMENT OF U.S. PARTICIPANT FIRMS, BUT THESE CAN\nPROBABLY BE HANDLED IF DECISION IS MADE PROMPTLY AND WE\nARE PREPARED MAKE ALL-OUT URGENT EFFORT.\nC. DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE: A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WILL BE VISITING SYRIA SHORTLY\nTO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR INCREASED TRADE BETWEEN\nTHE U.S. AND SYRIA. VARIOUS COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS\nARE CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION BETWEEN PRIVATE u.s.\nFIRMS AND SYRIA. BACKGROUND: VISIT REFERRED TO IS THAT\nOF FS0 PATRICK KILLOUGH, NOW ON DETAIL TO COMMERCE, WHO\nIS CURRENTLY IN AREA CONSULTING WITH POSTS. ONLY BIG\nCOMMERCIAL DEAL PENDING BETWEEN u.s. AND SYRIA IS\nPOSSIBLE PURCHASE BY SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES OF THREE WIDE-\nBODY AIRCRAFT. ALTHOUGH FRENCH MANUFACTURERS ARE\nSTILL IN THE RUNNING, INDICATIONS POINT TO ACQUISITION OF\nEITHER LOCKHEED'S 1ø11 TRISTARS OR MC DONNELL'S\nDC-10-30'S. SCOTES MAY HAVE MORE RECENT INFO; SALE HAD\nBEEN EXPECTED TO BE CONCLUDED THIS PAST WEEK. (ALSO,\nCOMMERCE DEPARTMENT HAS RUMORS THAT CHRYSLER IS CONSIDER-\nING APPROACHING THE SYRIANS TO put UP AN AUTO ASSEMBLY\nPLANT, BUT NEITHER THEY NOR WE ABLE TO OBTAIN IMMEDIATE\nCONFIRMATION OF THIS.)\nD. EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES: THE UNITED\nSTATES IS PLEASED TO PROPOSE THE RESUMPTION OF EDUCATION-\nAL AND CULTURAL EXNHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND\nSYRIA. WE LOOK FORWARD TO BEING ABLE TO RECEIVE PROMINENT\nSYRIANS, IN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE, AS OUR GUESTS\nIN THE UNITED STATES AND TO RENEW EXCHANGES OF STUDENTS\nAND OTHER ACADEMIC PERSONNEL. BACKGROUND: WE ARE AIMING\nAT PROVIDING FUNDS FOR 5 INTERNATIONAL VISITOR (IV) GRANTS,\n4 GRADUATE STUDENT OR PROFESSORS' RESEARCH GRANTS, AND AT\nLEAST ONE u.s. PROFESSOR TEACHING AT DAMASCUS UNIV. IN\nFY 1975. ORIGINALLY, TWO IV GRANTS WERE TO BE MADE\nAVAILABLE FOR THE REMAINDER OF FY 74, BUT THE SYRIANS\nINDICATED THE TIME WAS NOT RIPE FOR SUCH CONTACTS. 1975\nCULTURAL EXCHANGE PLANS, AS PRESENTED ABOVE, HAVE NOT BEEN\nDISCUSSED WITH THE SYRIANS, PENDING OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT\nDISENGAGEMENT TALKS.\nSECRETNODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 3\nSTATE 100589\nSECRET NODIS\nE. JOHNS HOPKINS EXPEDITION TO THE EUPHRATES VALLEY:\nAN AMERICAN ARCHEOLOGICAL EXPEDITION, ORGANIZED BY A\nJOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, ARRIVED IN DAMASCUS\nEARLIER THIS MONTH IN COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT\nOF ANTIQUITIES OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. THE EXPEDITION\nWILL BE EXCAVATING SITES ALONG THE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY\nSOON TO BE INUNDATED AS A RESULT OF THE NEW EUPHRATES\nDAM. BACKGROUND: LEADER OF EXPEDITION HAD BEEN IN\nCONTACT WITH MUSEUM AND ANTIQUITIES OFFICIALS FOR SOME\nTIME SEEKING PERMISSION FOR THIS DIG, WHICH WAS GRANTED\nEARLIER THIS YEAR. WOULD SUGGEST THAT IF THIS ITEM IS\nUSED DEPT. BE INFORMED so THAT WE CAN EXPLAIN IN\nADVANCE TO JOHNS HOPKINS BACKGROUND OF ANNOUNCEMENT.\nF. USGS TECHNICAL COOPERATION: THE UNITED STATES\nGEOLOGICAL SURVEY HAS RESPONDED TO A QUERY BY AN OFFICIAL\nOF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF\nMAKING AVAILABLE ONE OF ITS EMPLOYEES TO WORK AS A\nCONSULTANT, FOR THE MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND ELECTRICITY,\nIN THE FIELD OF BAUXITE EXPLORATION. THE UNITED STATES\nGOVERNMENT WILL BE PLEASED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO SYRIA\nTHE SERVICES OF A QUALIFIED EXPERT IN THIS FIELD SHOULD\nTHE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT SO DESIRE. BACKGROUND: SEVERAL\nMONTHS AGO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF GEOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND\nMINERAL RESOURCES IN SYRIAN MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM\nCONTACTED A USGS EXPERT ON BAUXITE EXPLORATION DIRECTLY\nAND ASKED IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK AS A CONSULTANT\nTO THE MINISTRY. USGS OFFICER REPLIED DIRECTLY TO\nTHE DIRECTOR GENERAL THAT IT would BE NECESSARY FOR\nA FORMAL REIMBURSABLE SERVICE ARRANGEMENT TO BE\nCONCLUDED BETWEEN USGS AND THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. NO\nREPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED YET FROM THE SYRIAN OFFICIAL.\nIN THE MEANTIME, USGS HAS INITIATED CONTACTS WITH AID, AS\nREQUIRED BY LAW, IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND FAVORABLY\nshould THE SYRIANS DECIDE THEY WANT TO CONCLUDE AN\nARRANGEMENT WITH USGS. IN VIEW OF TENTATIVE NATURE OF\nSYRIAN CONTACT, WE DOUBT IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO USE THIS\nITEM BUT SUBMIT IT IN CASE THERE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPMENTS\nON SYRIAN SIDE OF WHICH WE ARE UNAWARE.\nG. PARLIAMENTARY VISITS: CONGRESSMAN PAUL FINDLEY OF\nILLINOIS VISITED DAMASCUS IN APRIL OF THIS YEAR. THIS\nFOLLOWED A VISIT IN JANUARY 1974 BY SENATOR JAMES\nABOUREZK OF SOUTH DAKOTA. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT\nBELIEVES such VISITS ENHANCE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE\nTWO PEOPLES AND WOULD WELCOME VISITS TO THE UNITED\nSTATES BY SYRIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS. BACKGROUND: FINDLEY\nWAS REPORTEDLY TOLD BY ASAD THAT ALL HIS COLLEAGUES IN\nCONGRESS ARE \"WELCOME\" TO VISIT SYRIA; SCOTES WAS\nSECRET NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 04\nSTATE 100589\nSECRET NODIS\nSUBSEQUENTLY TOLD (DAMASCUS 536) THAT SARG WOULD BE\nSENDING INVITATIONS TO VARIOUS U.S. CONGRESSMEN TO VISIT\nSYRIA FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT TALKS.\nH. FLOOD ASSISTANCE: DURING THE RECENT FLOODING OF THE\nEUPHRATES RIVER IN NORTHERN SYRIA, THE UNITED STATES\nGOVERNMENT, AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED NATIONS, MADE\nAVAILABLE TENTS AND BLANKETS FOR VICTIMS OF THE FLOOD.\nTHE UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE WAS PROVIDED VIA THE UN\nRELIEF ORGANIZATION. BACKGROUND: AT TIME ASSISTANCE\nWAS GIVEN, SARG DID NOT WANT PUBLICITY ON USG CONTRIBU-\nTION. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SARG MIGHT NOW BE DISPOSED\nTO GIVE USG PUBLIC CREDIT BUT MENTION THIS ITEM IN CASE\nYOU WANT TO CHECK IT WITH SYRIANS.\n2. REGARDING EX-IM DEALINGS WITH SYRIA, SEVERAL U.S.\nFIRMS HAVE RECENTLY SOUGHT BANK'S ASSISTANCE IN FINANCING\nSALES TO SYRIA BUT THE BANK HAS ADAMANTLY MAINTAINED ITS\nREFUSAL TO CONSIDER DOING BUSINESS IN SYRIA UNTIL\nBOUSTANY CLAIM IS PAID BY SARG. SOBER TRIED TO REACH\nCASEY BY PHONE AFTERNOON MAY 14 TO SEE WHETHER WE MIGHT\nGET AUTHORIZATION TO ANNOUNCE EX-IM 1 WILLINGNESS IN\nPRINCIPLE TO ASSIST IN PROMOTION OF US-SYRIAN TRADE BUT\nCASEY WAS ABSENT FROM WASHINGTON AND NOT IMMEDIATELY\nAVAILABLE.\n3. THERE ARE NUMBER OF OTHER SENSITIVE ITEMS INVOLVING\nREQUESTS BY SARG FOR SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY U.S.\nFIRMS. WE DOUBT THEY WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR INCLUSION IN\nPUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BUT NOTE THEM HERE FOR YOUR BACK-\nGROUND: (A) SYRIAN APPROACH TO LOCKHEED IN APRIL ON\nPOSSIBLE SALE OF C-13ø'S; (B) PENDING MUNITIONS CONTROL\nAPPLICATIONS FILED BY RF COMMUNICATIONS (NEW YORK STATE\nFIRM) FOR SALE OF 25 RADIO TRANSCEIVERS TO SYRIAN\nMINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND 100 RADIOS TO MINISTRY OF\nDEFENSE; AND (C) SYRIAN REQUESTS TO MAJOR u.s. AUTOMOBILE\nMANUFACTURERS PERIODICALLY SINCE 1967 TO PURCHASE\nMILITARY-TYPE TRUCKS FOR SYRIAN ARMY; LAST FULL CONSIDER-\nATION GIVEN TO THIS REQUEST WAS IN 1971 WHEN DEPARTMENT\nRECOMMENDED APPROVAL TO WHITE HOUSE BUT WAS TURNED DOWN.\n4. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND PL 480 ACTS. PROHIBITION ON\nASSISTANCE UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT AND\nSALES UNDER PL 480 TO COUNTRIES WITH WHICH DIPLOMATIC\nRELATIONS HAVE BEEN BROKEN (SECTION 62ø(T) OF THE ACT)\nCAN BE WAIVED BY THE PRESIDENT UNDER AUTHORITY OF\nSECRET NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 5\nSTATE 100589\nSECRET NODIS\nSECTION 614(A) OF THE ACT IF HE DETERMINES IT IS IMPOR-\nTANT TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND SO REPORTS,\nIN ADVANCE, TO CONGRESS. WAIVER AUTHORITY MAY BE USED TO\nPROVIDE NO MORE THAN DOLLARS 50 MILLION TO ONE COUNTRY\nIN ANY FISCAL YEAR.\n5. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THERE ARE ALSO OTHER PROHIBITIONS\nAND REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT AND PL 480\nWHICH MAY APPLY TO SYRIA. THESE APPLY TO COUNTRIES WHICH\nEXPROPRIATE PROPERTIES OF U.S. NATIONALS WITHOUT\nCOMPENSATION, WHICH TRADE WITH CUBA OR NORTH VIETNAM, ETC.\nWAIVERS POSSIBLE FOR MOST OF THESE RESTRICTIONS DEPENDING\nON SPECIFIC FORM OF ASSISTANCE IN QUESTION. WE WILL\nPROVIDE MORE DETAIL ON THESE IF YOU WISH. RUSH\nSECRET NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPresident Asad made these observations on the map:\n1. It shows no return behind the October 6 line.\n2. There is no parallel straight line. This complicates the situation.\n3. Israel keeps points occupied after October 22. For example, Israel\nretains positions on Mount Hermon. The only post the 6Israelis had\ntherebbefore the war was right on the October 6 line.\n4. There is no significant area of land from which Israel is\nwithdrawing.\n5. Under these circumstances, I could not send civilians back to\nQuneitra. (Note: He later phoned to say that he could not send\ncivilians back to Quneitra unless the hills west of Quneitra were\nin Syrian hands.)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSun. Apr. 28\nGeneva\nApr. 29\nAlgiers\nApr. 30\nAlexandria\nwill\nWed May 1\nAlexandria primark\nThurs May 2\nJerusalem\n3\nDamasas\npan\nSat\n4\nAlexandria\n4\nAmman Jerusalem (Saunders in Riyadh)\nmoM\nbew\n5\nAmman\nMon\n6\nJerusalem ( Saunders to Algiers\n7\nCyprus (Gromyter) (Man and Atherton in Jerusalem)\n7\nJerusalem\nlued 8\nDamasous\n(first map presented)\n8\nJerusalem\nthe\nThurs. 9\nRiyadh\n9\nCatro\nFri. 10\nJerusalem\ns\nworld\nID\nSat. 11\nJerusalem\n(Sisco-Saunders to as Quneitra)\nSun. 12\nwamascus second map presented)\nAlan 12\nJerusalem\nMon 13\nJerusalem\n( full Cabinet cabinet until monday 130a.m )\nTues. 14\nDamasas\n( New Israeli position removes Israeli forces\nand the UM from the town; puts the wills north\nin UN handl; puts all Ahmadiya in UM hands)\n14\nJerusalem E\nhed 15\n[Maialot Jernisalem (statement on recess drafted)\nThus 16\nDamasas\nn\nleft with asad\n16\nJarusalam\nFri.\nSat 18\nDamas us (asad said he would forego the hills\nSun\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nProsplA\nrgA\nMon. May 20\nDamas wer Map presented\nshowing us proposal on\nQuneitra)\nwalservat\nS M\nTues.\nMay 21\nSyrians give us their revisions in\nmount Hermon + Limitations discussed to?\ndraft agreement and UN Protocol.\nwed.\nMay 22 ?\nmount\nmust)\nnew Red Line.\nwommA\nnd\nThuss.\nMay 23279iplA Limitations, mount Hermon\nJ\nNOM\nNi motrentA his Prepared to make a) us proposal\n5\n5\nAri 24 gam terit)\n8 ben\nSat\n25 $28 relevuret\n8\nSun\n26\nMayin\nP P.m.T must\nsatus\na\nnon 27\nwelnurete\n01 int\n91\nThe 20\n(orkiened of areburst )\nwelmmet\n11.ther 11 this\n(betuency from Avoura)\nSI with\nwelsong\n51 moths\n( litur tends llst ) melanural\n{} will\nMary 211ml sit 2 tiving protot in my MU it woll)\nweld idearal revanuer niting ideas\nPI newt\n(Naman HN Ni its atug; HN Ni\n& meloring\nNI\n(setforb were NY\nwelming\nal bed\nbial this the\n2\noil must\nA welsoning\nJl\nint\nest openate bloow el birs boad) NW asswft\n81 to?\nand\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nCHECKLIST FOR CAIRO\nMay 30\nIsrael-Syria Disengagement\n-- Your reflections on the negotiation.\n-- Thanks for Gamasy's efforts.\n-- Give Sadat copies of the Agreement, the UN Protocol,\nand perhaps the US Proposal on limitations since an\nEgyptian military representative will be in Geneva.\nIf you give him the US Proposal, you should probably\nask him not to tell the Syrians he has it. (Copies\nto give Sadat are in your folder. A map is also\nthere.)\n--- You are counting on the Egyptian representative to\nhelp the talks in the Military Working Group at Geneva\ngo smoothly.\n-- You may want to explain particularly how the fedayeen\nissue has been handled.\nSoviet Union\n-- Gromyko in Damascus. Your courtesy call.\n-- Grechko in Algiers and USSR-Libyan communique.\nThe Pace of Further Peace-making\n--- Syrian-Israeli disengagement will occupy most of June.\n--- Sadat said at your last meeting he wants most of the\nsummer to straighten out his relations with the USSR\nand in the Arab world. But you will want to discuss\nhis needs in connection with a next step on the Sinai\nfront. (One approach would be to design the next step\nso as to expand the UN zone \"for the purpose\" of putting\ninto place and testing some of the techniques for\nassuring demilitarization over a broader area. This\nwould maintain momentum while still not addressing the\nfinal border.)\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n-2-\n-- You will want to discuss the elements affecting the\ntiming of a move on the Jordan-Israel front. (The\nimportant issue to discuss with Sadat is whether a\npolitical process can be developed which draws the\nmoderate Palestinians into the negotiation in informal\nconsultation with the Jordanians rather than confront-\ning formally the issue of Palestinian representation\nat Geneva.\n-- The issue implicit in the question of next steps with\nJordan or Egypt is whether to keep someone busy at\nGeneva, for instance discussing a future agenda.\nEgyptian-US Relations\n-- The President's trip.\n--- Announce Egyptian-US commission on economic coopera-\ntion (statement attached).\nIsraeli-Egyptian Relations\n-- The Israelis have raised the question of some sort of\ndirect emergency communications link between the Israeli\nand Egyptian military in the disengagement area to\navoid incidents over straying helicopters, etc. There\nis no longer an easy meeting point such a Kilometer 101\nprovided, and apparently the UN machinery for arranging\na meeting when problems arise is slow.\n-- The Israelis on May 19 gave you a paper (attached)\nasking you to raise again with the Egyptians the\nquestion of the body search. They thought the exercise\nwas being undercut by Egyptians at lower levels.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT\nThe Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed\ntoday to the formation of a Joint Economic Commission which\nwill be designed to promote more intensified economic\ncooperation between the two countries. Both governments are\nconvinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United\nStates and Egypt to develop mutually beneficial programs in\nthe areas of trade, investment and industrial development.\nToday's agreement is a result of a series of discussions\nbetween President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry\nA. Kissinger and is consistent with the desire of the two\ncountries to strengthen their overall relationships. In\nagreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments\nare further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the\nMiddle East will be realized and thereby the people of the\narea may enjoy the rewards of stability and development.\nOn the American side, the Commission's efforts will\nbe directed by\nMinister of\nwill coordinate\n.\nthe work of the Commission for Egypt. Representatives of\nthe\nand\nwill meet soon to outline jointly agreed\ngoals and to establish working groups to carry on the day to\nday work of the Commission.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nSEARCH FOR MISSING BODIES\nWe have reliable information of deliberate efforts by higher and\nlower Egyptian echelons to undermine the joint plan for the renewed search\nof missing bodies in the Canal vicinity.\nThe joint operation (UN, Egypt and Israeli military chaplains) is\nsupposed to resume this coming week.\nWe believe that the Egyptian intention is to sabotage the search\nSO that no bodies will be discovered. The probable purpose is to discredit\nany possible Israeli claim that bodies are still to be found in the Egyptian-\nheld area, despite the allegedly thorough search already conducted by the\nEgyptian Army. We view this as an attempt to discourage Israeli requests\nfor additional searches.\nIt is our belief that intervention with the highest Egyptian echelon\nis required to assure Egyptian good-faith in this matter.\n19 May 1974\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nCHECKLIST FOR CAIRO\nMay 30\nIsrael-Syria Disengagement\n--- Your reflections on the negotiation.\n-- Thanks for Gamasy's efforts.\n-- Give Sadat copies of the Agreement, the UN Protocol,\nand perhaps the US Proposal on limitations since an\nEgyptian military representative will be in Geneva.\nIf you give him the US Proposal, you should probably\nask him not to tell the Syrians he has it. (Copies\nto give Sadat are in your folder. A map is also\nthere.)\n- You are counting on the Egyptian representative to\nhelp the talks in the Military Working Group at Geneva\ngo smoothly.\n-- You may want to explain particularly how the fedayeen\nissue has been handled.\nSoviet Union\n--- Gromyko in Damascus. Your courtesy call.\n-- Grechko in Algiers and USSR-Libyan communique.\nThe Pace of Further Peace-making\n-- Syrian-Israeli disengagement will occupy most of June.\n---- Sadat said at your last meeting he wants most of the\nsummer to straighten out his relations with the USSR\nand in the Arab world. But you will want to discuss\nhis needs in connection with a next step on the Sinai\nfront. (One approach would be to design the next step\nso as to expand the UN zone \"for the purpose\" of putting\ninto place and testing some of the techniques for\nassuring demilitarization over a broader area. This\nwould maintain momentum while still not addressing the\nfinal border.)\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n-2-\n-- You will want to discuss the elements affecting the\ntiming of a move on the Jordan-Israel front. (The\nimportant issue to discuss with Sadat is whether a\npolitical process can be developed which draws the\nmoderate Palestinians into the negotiation in informal\nconsultation with the Jordanians rather than confront-\ning formally the issue of Palestinian representation\nat Geneva.\n-- The issue implicit in the question of next steps with\nJordan or Egypt is whether to keep someone busy at\nGeneva, for instance discussing a future agenda.\nEgyptian-US Relations\n- The President's trip.\n-- Announce Egyptian-US commission on economic coopera-\ntion (statement attached).\nIsraeli-Egyptian Relations\n--- The Israelis have raised the question of some sort of\ndirect emergency communications link between the Israeli\nand Egyptian military in the disengagement area to\navoid incidents over straying helicopters, etc. There\nis no longer an easy meeting point such a Kilometer 101\nprovided, and apparently the UN machinery for arranging\na meeting when problems arise is slow.\n-- The Israelis on May 19 gave you a paper (attached)\nasking you to raise again with the Egyptians the\nquestion of the body search. They thought the exercise\nwas being undercut by Egyptians at lower levels.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT\nThe Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed\ntoday to the formation of a Joint Economic Commission which\nwill be designed to promote more intensified economic\ncooperation between the two countries. Both governments are\nconvinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United\nStates and Egypt to develop mutually beneficial programs in\nthe areas of trade, investment and industrial development.\nToday's agreement is a result of a series of discussions\nbetween President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry\nA. Kissinger and is consistent with the desire of the two\ncountries to strengthen their overall relationships. In\nagreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments\nare further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the\nMiddle East will be realized and thereby the people of the\narea may enjoy the rewards of stability and development.\nOn the American side, the Commission's efforts will\nbe directed by\nMinister of\nwill coordinate\n.\nthe work of the Commission for Egypt. Representatives of\nthe\nand\nwill meet soon to outline jointly agreed\ngoals and to establish working groups to carry on the day to\nday work of the Commission.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nSEARCH FOR MISSING BODIES\nWe have reliable information of deliberate efforts by higher and\nlower Egyptian echelons to undermine the joint plan for the renewed search\nof missing bodies in the Canal vicinity.\nThe joint operation (UN, Egypt and Israeli military chaplains) is\nsupposed to resume this coming week.\nWe believe that the Egyptian intention is to sabotage the search\nSO that no bodies will be discovered. The probable purpose is to discredit\nany possible Israeli claim that bodies are still to be found in the Egyptian-\nheld area, despite the allegedly thorough search already conducted by the\nEgyptian Army. We view this as an attempt to discourage Israeli requests\nfor additional searches.\nIt is our belief that intervention with the highest Egyptian echelon\nis required to assure Egyptian good-faith in this matter.\n19 May 1974\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nCHECKLIST FOR CAIRO\nMay 30\nIsrael-Syria Disengagement\n-- Your reflections on the negotiation.\n-- Thanks for Gamasy's efforts.\n--- Give Sadat copies of the Agreement, the UN Protocol,\nand perhaps the US Proposal on limitations since an\nEgyptian military representative will be in Geneva.\nIf you give him the US Proposal, you should probably\nask him not to tell the Syrians he has it. (Copies\nto give Sadat are in your folder. A map is also\nthere.)\n-- You are counting on the Egyptian representative to\nhelp the talks in the Military Working Group at Geneva\ngo smoothly.\n-- You may want to explain particularly how the fedayeen\nissue has been handled.\nSoviet Union\n-- Gromyko in Damascus. Your countesy call.\n-- Grechko in Algiers and USSR-Libyan communique.\nThe Pace of Further Peace-making\n--- Syrian-Israeli disengagement will occupy most of June.\n-- Sadat said at your last meeting he wants most of the\nsummer to straighten out his relations with the USSR\nand in the Arab world. But you will want to discuss\nhis needs in connection with a next step on the Sinai\nfront. (One approach would be to design the next step\nso as to expand the UN zone \"for the purpose\" of putting\ninto place and testing some of the techniques for\nassuring demilitarization over a broader area. This\nwould maintain momentum while still not addressing the\nfinal border.)\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n-2-\n-- You will want to discuss the elements affecting the\ntiming of a move on the Jordan-Israel front. (The\nimportant issue to discuss with Sadat is whether a\npolitical process can be developed which draws the\nmoderate Palestinians into the negotiation in informal\nconsultation with the Jordanians rather than confront-\ning formally the issue of Palestinian representation\nat Geneva.\n- The issue implicit in the question of next steps with\nJordan or Egypt is whether to keep someone busy at\nGeneva, for instance discussing a future agenda.\nEgyptian-US Relations\n-- The President's trip.\n-- Announce Egyptian-US commission on economic coopera-\ntion (statement attached).\nIsraeli-Egyptian Relations\n--- The Israelis have raised the question of some sort of\ndirect emergency communications link between the Israeli\nand Egyptian military in the disengagement area to\navoid incidents over straying helicopters, etc. There\nis no longer an easy meeting point such a Kilometer 101\nprovided, and apparently the UN machinery for arranging\na meeting when problems arise is slow.\n--- The Israelis on May 19 gave you a paper (attached)\nasking you to raise again with the Egyptians the\nquestion of the body search. They thought the exercise\nwas being undercut by Egyptians at lower levels.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT\nThe Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed\ntoday to the formation of a Joint Economic Commission which\nwill be designed to promote more intensified economic\ncooperation between the two countries. Both governments are\nconvinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United\nStates and Egypt to develop mutually beneficial programs in\nthe areas of trade, investment and industrial development.\nToday's agreement is a result of a series of discussions\nbetween President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry\nA. Kissinger and is consistent with the desire of the two\ncountries to strengthen their overall relationships. In\nagreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments\nare further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the\nMiddle East will be realized and thereby the people of the\narea may enjoy the rewards of stability and development.\nOn the American side, the Commission's efforts will\nbe directed by\nMinister of\nwill coordinate\n.\nthe work of the Commission for Egypt. Representatives of\nthe\nand\nwill meet soon to outline jointly agreed\ngoals and to establish working groups to carry on the day to\nday work of the Commission.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nSEARCH FOR MISSING BODIES\nWe have reliable information of deliberate efforts by higher and\nlower Egyptian echelons to undermine the joint plan for the renewed search\nof missing bodies in the Canal vicinity.\nThe joint operation (UN, Egypt and Israeli military chaplains) is\nsupposed to resume this coming week.\nWe believe that the Egyptian intention is to sabotage the search\nSO that no bodies will be discovered. The probable purpose is to discredit\nany possible Israeli claim that bodies are still to be found in the Egyptian-\nheld area, despite the allegedly thorough search already conducted by the\nEgyptian Army. We view this as an attempt to discourage Israeli requests\nfor additional searches.\nIt is our belief that intervention with the highest Egyptian echelon\nis required to assure Egyptian good-faith in this matter.\n19 May 1974\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nSEARCH FOR MISSING BODIES\nWe have reliable information of deliberate efforts by higher and\nlower Egyptian echelons to undermine the joint plan for the renewed search\nof missing bodies in the Canal vicinity.\nThe joint operation (UN, Egypt and Israeli military chaplains) is\nsupposed to resume this coming week.\nWe believe that the Egyptian intention is to sabotage the search\nSO that no bodies will be discovered. The probable purpose is to discredit\nany possible Israeli claim that bodies are still to be found in the Egyptian-\nheld area, despite the allegedly thorough search already conducted by the\nEgyptian Army. We view this as an attempt to discourage Israeli requests\nfor additional searches.\nIt is our belief that intervention with the highest Egyptian echelon\nis required to assure Egyptian good-faith in this matter.\n19 May 1974\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT\nThe Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed\ntoday to the formation of a Joint Economic Commission which\nwill be designed to promote more intensified economic\ncooperation between the two countries. Both governments are\nconvinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United\nStates and Egypt to develop mutually beneficial programs in\nthe areas of trade, investment and industrial development.\nToday's agreement is a result of a series of discussions\nbetween President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry\nA. Kissinger and is consistent with the desire of the two\ncountries to strengthen their overall relationships. In\nagreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments\nare further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the\nMiddle East will be realized and thereby the people of the\narea may enjoy the rewards of stability and development.\nOn the American side, the Commission's efforts will\nbe directed by\nMinister of\nwill coordinate\n.\nthe work of the Commission for Egypt. Representatives of\nthe\nand\nwill meet soon to outline jointly agreed\ngoals and to establish working groups to carry on the day to\nday work of the Commission.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nCHECKLIST FOR CAIRO\nMay 30\nIsrael-Syria Disengagement\n-- Your reflections on the negotiation.\n-- Thanks for Gamasy's efforts.\n--- Give Sadat copies of the Agreement, the UN Protocol,\nand perhaps the US Proposal on limitations since an\nEgyptian military representative will be in Geneva.\nIf you give him the US Proposal, you should probably\nask him not to tell the Syrians he has it. (Copies\nto give Sadat are in your folder. A map is also\nthere.)\n-- You are counting on the Egyptian representative to\nhelp the talks in the Military Working Group at Geneva\ngo smoothly.\n-- You may want to explain particularly how the fedayeen\nissue has been handled.\nSoviet Union\n--- Gromyko in Damascus. Your courtesy call.\n-- Grechko in Algiers and USSR-Libyan communique.\nThe Pace of Further Peace-making\n-- Syrian-Israeli disengagement will occupy most of June.\n-- Sadat said at your last meeting he wants most of the\nsummer to straighten out his relations with the USSR\nand in the Arab world. But you will want to discuss\nhis needs in connection with a next step on the Sinai\nfront. (One approach would be to design the next step\nso as to expand the UN zone \"for the purpose\" of putting\ninto place and testing some of the techniques for\nassuring demilitarization over a broader area. This\nwould maintain momentum while still not addressing the\nfinal border.)\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n-2-\n-- You will want to discuss the elements affecting the\ntiming of a move on the Jordan-Israel front. (The\nimportant issue to discuss with Sadat is whether a\npolitical process can be developed which draws the\nmoderate Palestinians into the negotiation in informal\nconsultation with the Jordanians rather than confront-\ning formally the issue of Palestinian representation\nat Geneva.\n--- The issue implicit in the question of next steps with\nJordan or Egypt is whether to keep someone busy at\nGeneva, for instance discussing a future agenda.\nEgyptian-US Relations\n-- The President's trip.\n-- Announce Egyptian-US commission on economic coopera-\ntion (statement attached).\nIsraeli-Egyptian Relations\n-- The Israelis have raised the question of some sort of\ndirect emergency communications link between the Israeli\nand Egyptian military in the disengagement area to\navoid incidents over straying helicopters, etc. There\nis no longer an easy meeting point such a Kilometer 101\nprovided, and apparently the UN machinery for arranging\na meeting when problems arise is slow.\n-- The Israelis on May 19 gave you a paper (attached)\nasking you to raise again with the Egyptians the\nquestion of the body search. They thought the exercise\nwas being undercut by Egyptians at lower levels.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT\nThe Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed\ntoday to the formation of a Joint Economic Commission which\nwill be designed to promote more intensified economic\ncooperation between the two countries. Both governments are\nconvinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United\nStates and Egypt to develop mutually beneficial programs in\nthe areas of trade, investment and industrial development.\nToday's agreement is a result of a series of discussions\nbetween President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry\nA. Kissinger and is consistent with the desire of the two\ncountries to strengthen their overall relationships. In\nagreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments\nare further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the\nMiddle East will be realized and thereby the people of the\narea may enjoy the rewards of stability and development.\nOn the American side, the Commission's efforts will\nbe directed by\nMinister of\nwill coordinate\n.\nthe work of the Commission for Egypt. Representatives of\nthe\nand\nwill meet soon to outline jointly agreed\ngoals and to establish working groups to carry on the day to\nday work of the Commission.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nSEARCH FOR MISSING BODIES\nWe have reliable information of deliberate efforts by higher and\nlower Egyptian echelons to undermine the joint plan for the renewed search\nof missing bodies in the Canal vicinity.\nThe joint operation (UN, Egypt and Israeli military chaplains) is\nsupposed to resume this coming week.\nWe believe that the Egyptian intention is to sabotage the search\nSO that no bodies will be discovered. The probable purpose is to discredit\nany possible Israeli claim that bodies are still to be found in the Egyptian-\nheld area, despite the allegedly thorough search already conducted by the\nEgyptian Army. We view this as an attempt to discourage Israeli requests\nfor additional searches.\nIt is our belief that intervention with the highest Egyptian echelon\nis required to assure Egyptian good-faith in this matter.\n19 May 1974\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPresident Asad made these observations on the map:\n1. It shows no return behind the October 6 line.\n2. There is no parallel straight line. This complicates the situation.\n3. Israel keeps points occupied after October 22. For example, Israel\nretains positions on Mount Hermon. The only post the had\ntherebbefore the war was right on the October 6 line.\n4. There is no significant area of land from which Israel is\nwithdrawing.\n5. Under these circumstances, I could not send civilians back to\nQuneitra. (Note: He later phoned to say that he could not send\ncivilians back to Quneitra unless the hills west of Quneitra were\nin Syrian hands.)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMIL\nM\nISR.\nL\nINE LAND\nKUN\n200\nis\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive DECLASSIFIED Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nUNITED STATES or AMERICA\nDepartment of State\nNDICATE:\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nPOL-32\nMay 20, 1974//15152\nDISTRIBUTION\nCG\nACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC\nDPO\nPOL\nINFO:\nAmembasay AMMAN\nS/S\nchron\nAmembassy BEIRUT\nAmembassy CAIRO\nAmembassy TEL AVIV\nCONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM 994\nLIMDIS\nE.O. 11652: GDS\nTAGS: pfor, PINT, JO, IS\nSUBJECT: Palestinian representation: Current WEst Bank attitudes\nREF: Jerusalen 474\n1. SUMNARY: Increasing possibility of Israeli-Syrian disengagewent\nraises question of what next. While some West Bankers expect they\nwill be next, others seam to prefer further delay. It is realized\nthat if settlement efforts non turn to West Bank, Palestinian\nrepresentation question becomes acute. If PLO continues negative\nstance, Hussein would be only available negotiator to bring end to\n[sraeli occupation. If PLO takes positive turn, Arabs have some\njeorting out to do. END SUMMARY\n2. As possibility of Syrian-Israeli disengagement has became\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING date 11\nTEL. ext.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCG:ARDay:er\n5/20/74\nConsul General\nCLEARANCES:\nPOL.BJJones\n-BJohns\nJey\nCONFIDENTIAL\nClassification\nFORM\nFS-413(H)\n4-68\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nincreasingly roal, question hus inovitably arisen--what next?\nSome West Bankers Bo3a to expect they will be next. Arabic\ndaily EL Quda says May 19 that Golan disengagement should lead\nto similar disengagement on Jordanian front. WE do not sense\nreal impatience to get shead with it, howaver. Others seen\nactually to prefer further delsy, primarily, NO gather, to allow\nDOPS time for sorting out Palestinian issues in fashion more\nfavorable to Palestinians. Several West Bankers have said to\nassumed\nus they ansuand a second Egyptian stage would be next. One\nadded ho thought his compatriots considered they stood\nbetter chance of getting a good deal 1f their issue were dealt\nwith after final Egyptian and Syrian agreements reached.\n3. Scze of more politically active Arabs realize that when WEst\nDank's turn cases Palestinian representation issue will be raised\nin declsive way. E1 Quds May 19 editorial vent OR to stress need\nfor Palestinian participation in any talks. With Hussein back in\nthe game, there is appreciation that PLO will have to pull itself\ntogether and move definitively onto Geneva track if it is in fact\nto have any chance of representing Palestinians. PLO summit neet-\ninga reported recontly in Beirut were watched for indications. Pro-\nHashemite Amar Khatib was gratified that news out of Beirut Demos had\nPLO rejecting Genava, resolution 242 and separate West Bank/Gaza\nstate concept. Ho 88¥ this as leaving Hussein as only Arab player\non the field. Hikmat el Maari and other Nabulsis, on other hand\n(PLO/Sadat oriented), vere optimistic PLO would take constructive\nCONFIDENTIAL\nClassification\n4-68 FORM FS-412(H)a\n(CONTINUATION SHEET)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nposition as scon as Syrian-Israeli disengagement became reality.\nThey looked to June 1 Cairo PNC meeting as vehicle. Masri\nconceded disarray on Arab side over Palestinian issue and said\nArabs would have to meet at summit and work it out definitively\nnegotiations\nbefore could tako place about West Bank.\n4. Prominent pro-PLO doctor Ibrahim Tisel (recently threatened\nby Israelis with expulsion for public support of PLO representa-\nticn) told us, however, lie believed Palestinian organizations\nwould not negotiate for West Bank. To sign any such agreement\nwould invelve recognition of Israel, which they could not do. He\nagreed reluctantly that in the circumstances Hussein was only avail-\nable negotlator. Since first priority was getting rid of Israeli\noscupation, West Bankers would accept his representation.\n5. COMMENT: If PLO persists in rejecting negotiations and leaves\nthe field to Hussein, the representation issue for the territorial\naspect of the negotiations is uncontested. In what seens to be\nthe unlikely event the PLO switches to a Geneva course, Masri is\nprobably right that the Arab establishment will have to make a\ndefinitive deuision on how their side conducts negotiations\n(it may already havd done 80, but the signals are ambiguous to say\nwill\nthe least). If Hussein carries the ball, the West Bank mihk hope\nwith skeptieisu that the outcome will provide for some autonomy.\nThey will have going for them a point made Juyz to US by a knowledge-\nable Israeli (septel), that in a de-militarized West Bank, the\nJerdanians will have to allow the local population essentially to\nCONFIDENTIAL\nClassification\n4-68 FORM FS-413(H)a\n(CONTINUATION SHEET)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nrule itself. No one seens to take very seriously Hussein's pro--\nposal that the PLO negotiate, at some subsequent stage presumably,\n\"Palostiniun rights.\"\nDAY\nA\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCiassification\n4-68 FORM F5-413(M)=\n(CONTINUATION SHEET)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDepartment of State\nINDIÇATE\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nPOL-28\nCHARGE\nMay 20, 1974//1515Z\nDISTRIBUTION\nCO\nACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC\nDPO\nPOL\nINFO: Amembassy AMMAN\nS/S\nCHRON\nAmembassy BEIRUT\nAmonbassy CAIRO\nAmembassy TEL AVIV\nCONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM 995\nLIMDIS\nE.O. 11652: GDS\nTAGS: PFOR, PINT, JO, IS\nSUBJECT: Future status of West Bank: Current attitudes\nREF: Jerusalem 474\n1. SUMMARY: While emotional opposition to Hashemites remains,\nthere is greater willingness to accept idea that some ties to\nJordan will be necessary for any West Bank entity. Jordanian\ninfluence is up somewhat, but in demilitarized West Bank (without\npresence of Jordan army) Алимна could not reassert its authority\nas before. West Bank acceptance of King's representation will be\nenhanced if some way can be found to assure that Amman will in\nfact permit Palestinians to have a voice in determining their\nfuture status. END SUMMARY\norafted @V:\ndrafting DATE\ntel. ext.\napproved by:\nCG:ARDay:er\n5/20/74\nConsul General\nCLEARANCES:\nPOL BJJones\none BJohns\nB\nCONFIDENTIAL\nClassification\nFORM 4-68 FS-413(H)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2. Average West Banker continues to have a blurred and shifting\npicture of what rest of Arab world intends to do about\nPalestinians. Not surprisingly, attitudes of West Bankers have\nbecome increasingly and fractionated and layered. Bi-polarity of\nloyalties--Hussein on one hand and PLO/Sadat on other--has con-\ntinued to blur. There seems to be more sentiment that West Bank\nshould have more to say. Azis Shehadeh (politically-active\nRamallah attorney) is mulling over organizing \"third force\" eschewing\noutside Links, to speak for silent majority when time comes to\naccept ressonable settlement bringing end to occupation. On radical\nflanks wa hear Syria has become a third external pole, looked to\nby somo PLO supporters who feel Sadat is selling out Palestinians.\n3. Haaretz West Bank correspondent Litani tells us he finds even\nmore support expressed for separate Palestinian entity than after\nOctober war, but people now mean something different by it. AS\npost-war emotional state has dissipated, majority have como to\nbelieve some links with Jordan are necessary. (Shehadeh feels\nthis is view of his silent majority.) Support for totally inde-\npendent state has decreased, Litani believes. We continue to hear\nthat linkage with Jordan would be far more acceptable if King would\nbring more trustworthy men into Government and above all if political\nsystem were more democratic. At same time, we hear more often even\namong PLO supporters reservations about M PLO \"coming back\" to\nWest Bank after Isrueli withdrawal.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nClassification\nFORM\n4-68\nFS-413(H)o\n(CONTINUATION SHEET)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4. We frequently hear that Jordan is buying influence on West\nBank with lavish spending. Other reports confirm at least\nthat local municipalities have been receiving large leans from\nJordanian influence seens to be up somewhat, though\nenotional opposition to Hashemites is unabated.\n5. We asked David Farhi, until recently political adviser to\nWest Bank Mikkiting: Military Governor, whether he thought Jordanian\ninfluence on West Bank was enough to assure their control if they\nreturned. He said they could reassert Amman's control if they\nreturned with ATTy. Israel would not permit Jordanian Army on\nWest Bank, however. Jordan would therefore be obliged to grant\nsufficient autonomy to satisfy West Bank desire for local rule.\nS. Problem pointed to by many who are prepared to accept King as\nnegotiator but want autonomous status is that of ensuring Ammun\nactually fulfills its commitment on this score (there is great\ndistrust of Hashemites). Plebiscite in some form is mentioned\nby almost everyone as one device to this end. Idea usually\naccompanied by proposal for political hiatus under outside authority\nsuch as Areb League (hardly likely to fill Israelis with confidence)\nor UN. Many seem to feel some pariod, perhaps no longer than year,\nis aseded, during which Palestinians could organize for self-govern-\nment. Pro-Hashemite notable Anwar Khatib, not hitherto a plebiscite\nadvocate, mentioned with some approval a plan Palestinian elder\nstatesman Musa Alami once prepared for UN. It called for 5-year\nCONFIDENTIAL\nClassification\nFORM\n4-68\nFS-413(H)a\n(CONTINUATION SHEET)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nperiod under UN control, after which West Bankers would form\ngovernment and negotiate their relationship with Israel.\nShehadeh euggested plebiscite after Isreel-Jordanian agreement but\nbefore Israeli withdrawal. Agreement would be presented for\nPalestinians' approval (to make them take responsibility for it)\nan Hell as choice of future West Bank status. (We were surprised\nat thought vote could occur under Israeli occupation, but Shehadsh\nthought it could, especially if UN had role.)\n7. COMMENT: If Farhi is right, and his point makes a good deal\nof sense, the West Bankers have less to fear from the Hashemites\nthan most of them seen to think. Nonetheless, it will be import-\nant to try to build into any agreement, whether \"disengagement\" or\nthe final settlement, some assurance that the Palestinians will\nhave some voice in their future status. We have always thought a\nplebiscite would give the Israelis problems, since they would\nunderstandably want to be sure what takes their place before they\nwithdrav. Shehadeh's idea of a plebiscite before withdrawal might\nhelp here, partieularly if it has been possible by then to lay soma\ngroundwork for an autonomous West Bank Palestinian administration\nwith ties to Jordan.\nDAY\nCONFIDENTIAL\nClassification\nFORM\n4-68\nFS-413(H)a\n(CONTINUATION SHEET)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDepartment of State\nAMERICA UNITED\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES of\nS/S-10\nSECRET\n24MAY72//1:32am\n0 232013Z MAY 74 ZFF6\nClassification\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nTO ZEN/USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE\nINFO UEHCR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5972\nBT\nSECRET STATE 10839ø\nNODIS\nTOSEC 951\nFOLLOWING FROM BEIRUT REPEATED YOUR INFO:\nQUOTE\nSECRET BEIRUT 5816\nNODIS\nE.O. 11652: GDS\nTAGS: PFOR US XF\nSUBJECT: \"ARAFAT REQUEST FOR ENCOURAGEMENT FROM USG\nREF: A. STATE 8970.; B. BEIRUT 5250\nSUMMARY: ACCORDING 10 WALID KNALIDI, ®ARAFAT KEENLY\nINTERESTED IN MESSAGE OF MAY 1 CREF A) ABOUT WHICH\nKHALIDI INFORMED °ARAFAT ONLY ON MAY 21. \"ARAFAI\nSHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN REFERENCES TO PRIVATE\nOFFICIAL DECLARATION OF DEPT INTEREST IN \"PALESTINIAN\nROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT,\" THAT \"LEGITIMATE INTERESTS\nOF PALESTINIANS\" MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SETTLE-\nMENT, AND THAT DEPT \"HAS NOT EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE\nANY POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT.* \"ARAFAT WAS RELATIVELY\nOPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS OF GETTING PLO AGREEMENT\nON IDA OF \"PALESTINIAN NA: IONAL AUTHORITY\" FOR WEST\nBANK AND GAZA, ALTHOUGH HY SAID PLO COULD NOT PARTICIPATE\nIN GENEVA TALKS IF THEY WITHIN EXCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK SC\nRES 242 (WHICH HAS NO EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO PALESTINIAN\nPEOPLE). ARAFAT ALSO DEPLORED MAALOT INCIDENT,\nBECAUSE IT INVOLVED CHILDREV, BUT SAID NEITHER HE NOR\nANY OTHER PALESTINIAN LEADER COULD OPPOSE OPERATIONS\nINSIDE ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.\n1. ON MAY 22 EMBOFF MET PALESTINIAN INTELLECTUAL WALID\nKHALIDI IN ORDER HEAR REPORT ON CONVERSATION LATTER\nFORM FS-412(H)\nCinssification\n4-68\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHAD WITH YASSER \"ARAFAT ON MAY 21. KHALIDI EXPLAINED\nTHAT DUE TO 'ARAFAT'S RECENT ABSENCES FROM LEBANON\nAND ALMOST COMPLETE PREOCCUPATION WITH HIGH-LEVEL\nMEETINGS WHILE HERE, ONLY ON MAY 21 HAD HE BEEN ABLE\nDISCUSS WITH \"ARAFAT CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH EMBOFF\nON MAY 6 DURING WHICH LATTER CONVEYED TO KHALIDI MESSAGE\nCONTAINED REF A. KHALIDI SAID THAT HE HAD INFORMED\n\"ARAFAT IN DETAIL OF MESSAGE WHICH HAD BEEN CONVEYED\nTO HIM, AND THAT °ARAFAT HAD BEEN KEENLY INTERESTED.\nKHALIDI SAID THAT, AFTER TALKING TO \"ARAFAT, IN\nINTEREST OF AVOIDING ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING,\nHAD WRITTEN OUT A REPLY TO DEPT'S MAY 1 MESSAGE\nWHICH \"ARAFAT HAD APPROVED.\n2. TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM KHALIDI WHICH HE GAVE\nEMBOFF ON MAY 22 READS AS FOLLOWS:\n\"I GREATLY APPRECIATED THE MESSAGE YOU TRANSMITTED\n'0 ME; AND THOUGHT FIT TO SHOW IT INFORMALLY TO A\nLEADING PALESTINIAN PERSONALIY. HE CAREFULLY\nRiAD IT AND SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN IT BECAUSE\nOF ITS REFERENCE TO \"HIGH LEVELS OF THE\nDE:ARTMENT\". HIS ATTENTION WAS ALSO ATRACTED\nBY \"HE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WHOLE\nQUESTION OF A PALESTINIAN ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT\"\nHAS BEEN AND REMAINS VERY MUCH ON THE DEPARMENT'S\nMIND; AND THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS \"NOT EXCLUDED\nIN ADVANCE ANY POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT\". LIKEWISE\nHIS AT:ENTION WAS ATTRACTED BY THE STATEMENT\nTHAT \"AVY SETTLEMENT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE\nLEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIANS\" AS WELL\nAS BY THE REFERENCE TO A JUST SETTLEMENT\".\n3. KHALIDI SAID \"ARAFAT HAD TOLD HIM THAT, APROPOS\nOF CONTAC'S WITH USG, SOVIET FONMIN GROMYKO HAD PRESSED\nHIM DURING RECENT MEETING IN DAMASCUS ABOUT WHAT CON-\nTACTS HE, 'ARAFAT, HAD WITH AMERICANS. \"ARAFAT HAD\nTOLD GROMYK) THAT HE TRYING EXTABLISH CONTACT THROUGH\nVARIOUS PALESTINIAN, LEBANESE AND OTHER FRIENDS BUT\nHAD NOT AS YET DONE so. EMBOFF REMARKED TO KHALIDI\nTHAT SITUATION APPEARED UNCHANGED IN THIS REGARD.\nKHALIDI SAID TO BEST OF HIS KNOWLEGE IT WAS UNCHANGED\nAND THAT A LEAS™ FOR PRESENT \"ARAFAT SEEMED CONTENT\nWITH STATUS QUO, ALTHOUGH HE VERY APPRECIATIVE OF\nWHAT KHALIDI HAD TO TELL HIM ABOUT OFFICIAL POSITION\nOF DEPT.\n4. ACCORDING TO KHALIDI, GROMYKO CONTINUING PRESS\n\"ARAFAT FOR PLO PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA TALKS.\n\"ARAFAT HAD TOLD KHALIDI THAT QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN\nPARTICIPATION REMAINS TO BE DECIDED, BU THAT IN ANY EVENT\nplo COULD NOT AGREE 0 PARTICIPATION IF TALKS CONDUCTED\nEXCISIVELY WITHIN FRAMEWORK SC RES 242. THIS RES\nDOES NOT CONTAIN EXPLICIT REFERNCE TO PALESTINIANS\nAS PEOPLE OR THEIR INTEREST OR RIGHTS. KHALIDI THEN\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 3 STATE 108399 SECRET\nADDED, ON PERSONAL BASIS, THAT PERHAPS SOLUTION TO\nTHIS PROBLEM MIGH BE FOUND BY EXTRAPOLATION CAND\nIMPROVEMENT) OF PAST STATEMENTS WHICH APPEAR LINK\nGENEVA WITH PALESTINIANS, SUCH AS THAT SECRETARY\nKISSINGER MADE AT FIRST SESSION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE\nLAST DECEMBER AND THAT WHICH APPEARED IN JOINT US-\nUSSR COMMUNIQUE WHICH REFERRED TO INTERESTS OF PALESTINIAN\nPEOPLE AND GENEVA CONFERENCE IN SAME DOCUMENT. PERHAPS,\nVHEN PROPER TIME AROSE, CO-CHAIRMAN COULD FIND SOME\nLANGUAGE WHICH WOULD REMOVE THIS OBSTACLE TO PLO\nAPPROVAL OF PARTICIPATION. EMBOFF TOLD KHALIDI HE WOULD\nREPORT THIS, AS WELL AS OTHER REMARKS, TO DEPT.\n5. \"ARAFAT TOLD KHALIKI THAT HE PLEASE THAT, AT\nLAST, SOME PROGRESS BEING MADE IN MOVING PFLO LEADER\nGEORGI HABASH AWAY FROM CATEGORIC REJECTION OF IDEA\nOF PALESTINIAN \"NATIONAL AUTHORITY\" ON WEST BANK AND\nGAZA. FABASH HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT PHRASE PALESTINIAN\n\"POPULAR ARMED AUTHORITY\" OVER ANY TERRITORIES LIBERATED.\nTHIS IS FIRST TIM HABASH HAS AGREED TO ANYTHING LESS\nTHAN TOTAL AUTHORITY OVER ALL OF FORMER PALESTINIAN\nMANDATE AND \"ARAFAT CONSIDERED IT VERY SIGNIFICANT\nBREAKTHROUGH, ALTHOUGHT MORE WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE TO\nGET HABASH TO ACCEPT \"NATIONAL AUTHORITY3. KHALIDI\nNOTED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO SISCO AND ATHERTON IN WASH-\nINGTON LAS! YEAR ABOUT NEED PROCEDD IN \"STEPS\" TO\nINDUCE PALESTINIAN REALISM. HE CONSIDERS 'ARAFAT'S\nHANDLING OF PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN STATE AS FALLING\nWITHIN T AT CONCEPT. KHALIDI ALSO CONSIDERS HABASH\nMOVEMENT TO BE SIGNIFICANT, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT HABASH'S\nUNYIELDING ATTITUDE IN PRIVATE TALKS WITH KHALIDI THREE\nWEEKS AGO. hovever, HE READILY ADMITTED THAT TO\nPERSONS NOT FILLY STEEPED IN PALESTINIAN THEOLOGY,\nWHICH CAN BE VERY JESUITICAL, IMPORTANCE OF SUCH\nNUANCES WOULD DE HARD TO APPRECIATE.\n6. CONCERNING MA'ALOT INCIDENT AND LIKELIHOOD OF REPE-\nTITIONS, KHALID1 SAID \"ARAFAT HAD DEPLORED FACT\nHAT FEDAYEEN HAD TAKEN CHILDREN HOSTAGE AT\nMA' ALOT AND \"ARAYAT DELIEVES THIS WAS DONE BY MISTAKE,\nTHAT FEDAYEEN HAD NOT PLANNED THIS IN ADVANCE. SAME\nTHING HAD HAPPENED AT KIRYAT SHIMONA. HOWEVER,\n\"ARAFAT HAD ALSO SAID THERE NOTHING HE OR ANY OTHER\nPALESTINIAN LEADER COULD DO TO OPPOSE FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS\nWITHIN ISRAEL. THIS ALL MORE TRUE IN VIEW OF INTENSE\nPALESTINIAN ANGER AFTER DELIBERATE ISARELI DESTRUCTION\nOF NATAIYEH REFUGEE CAMP WITH SO MANY CASUALTIES\nAMONG REFUGESS.\n7. EMBOFF THANKED KHALIDI FOR HIS CONTINUED\nWILLINGNESS TRY AND IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN USG\nAND \"ARAFAT, EVEN AT CONSIDERABLE RISK TO HIMSELF.\nCKHALIDI SAYS HIS PICTURE HAS APPEARED ON FRONT PAGE\nOF JERUSALEM ARABIC-LANGUAGE PAPER AS BEING AMERICA'S\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPAGE 4 STATE 108390\nSECRET\nFAVORITE COLLABORATOR AMONG PALESTINIANS). KHALIDI\nSAID PRESENT PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI SITUATION OBVIOUSLY\nVERY DANGEROUS FOR EVERYONE, ESPECIALLY AFTER MAALOT\n(WHICH HE SEES AS SERIOUS blow TO HOPES OF PLO GETTING\nANY SORT OF HEARING IN ISRAEL) AND ISRAELI RETALIATION.\nHE PROMISED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. GODLEY\nUNQUOTE\nRUSH\nBT\n#839 0\nNNNNCNQ\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n6\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\non\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nSELING\n/\nTELEGRAM\nor\nS/S-15 CG CHRO DPO POL EMB\nLIMITED OFFICIALU USE\n28MAY74//3:50PM\nClassification\nR 281200Z MAY 74\nFM AMEMBASSY CAIRO\nTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6881\nINFO RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3039\nRUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3998\nRUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS 155\nRUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 244\nRUESRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1852\nRUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 517\nRUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3839\nRUGTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1610\nRUEHDT!\"9 7, ,32 694( 3474 USMISSING USUN\nRUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1631\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE CAIRO 3617\nBEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD\nE.O. 11652: NA\nTAGS: PFOR XF\nSUBJ: PNC TO MEET JUNE 1\n1. GUMHURIYYA MAY 28 SAYS AGENDA OF UPCOMING PALESTINE NATIONAL\nCOUNCIL SESSION WILL CENTER ON TWO MAIN ISSUES: GENEVA CONFERENCE\nAND PROSPECTS FOR THE STATE OF WAR IN COMING STAGE. GUMHURIYYA\nADDS THAT PNC WILL ALSO CONSIDER \"A NEW PLAN\" FOR ESCALATION OF\nMILITARY OPERATIONS WITHIN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.\n2. AHRAM MAY 27 REPORTED A \"TENDENCY\" WITHIN PNC TO ENLARGE\nEXCOMM FROM 9 TO 15, so AS TO INCLUDE ALL ORGANIZATIONS,\nINDEPENDENT FIGURES, AND RZZS NATIONAL FRONT WITHIN\nGAZA AND OCCUPIED WEST BANK.\" ROSE AL-YUSUF MAY 27 ALSO\nCLAIMS NEW EXCOMM WILL BE BIGGER.\nEMXKBOAIRO PRESS MAY 28 REPORTS BEIRUT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT\nPLO HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS MEMBER OF WHO.\n4. MFA AND ARAB LEAGUE SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THAT\nPNC IS STILL EXPECTING TO CONVENE AT AL BUILDING RN CAIRO\nON JUNE 1, AS SCHEDULED. GOE DISCLAIMS ANY CONNECTION WITH\nPNC MEETING.\nEILTS\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nClassification\nFORM\nFS-412(H)\n4-68\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n7\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT of STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES of\nTELEGRAM\nAMEMBASSY CAIRO\nINFO\nSECRET\nDAMASCUS 994\nClassification\n30 May 74 1221\nACTION: Z 0 300759Z MAY 74\nSS-10\nFM USINT DAMASCUS\nD.CHRON TO RUESJR/ANCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 257\n10/cfb\nRUESOR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO FLASH 129\nINFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 712\nRUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 064\nBT\nSECRET DAMASCUS 0994\nEXDIS CHANDLE AS NODIS)\nFOR THE SECRETARY FROM SCOTES\nGENEVA FOR MEPC DEL\nEO 11652: GDS\nTAGS: OVIP CHENRY A. KISSINGER)\nSUBJECT: SYRIAN \"OBSERVATIONS\" RE VAP\n1. WHILE AT PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY DABOUL'S OFFICE\nTHIS VORNING (MAY 30), SHIHABI TELEPHONED LOOKING FOR\nME. OVER THE PHONE HE PASSED THE FOLLOWING\n\"SMALL OBSERVATIONS\" CONCERNING THE MAP WHICH 1 HAD\nTRANSMITTED TO DABOUL EARLY THIS MORNING.\n2. ACCORDING TO SHIHABI WHILE YOU WERE HERE\nYOU \"PROMISED\" TO PUSH THE RED LINE MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED\nMETERS TO THE WEST TO INCLUDE THE VILLAGE OF AL-BUTVIYA, LOCATED\nIN THE SEPARATION AREA NEAR TEL AL-FARAS. SHIHABI\nSAID THAT WHEN THE SYRIAN SIDE HAD EXPRESSED THE DESIRE\n/\nFOR THIS AREA YOU HAD REPLIED, \"I'LL DO IT.\"\n3. GENERAL SHIHABI ALSO SAID THAT THE RED LINE IN\nTHE REGION OF KHAN ARNABA IN THE SEPARATION ZONE NEAR\nQUNEITRA IS ALSO A \"LITTLE BIT\" TO THE EASTWARD IN\nCOMPARISON WITH THE MAP WHICH YOU HAD BROUGHT\nTHE LAST TIME.\n4. GENERAL SHIHABI SAID HE WISHED VE TO BRING THIS\nTO YOUR ATTENTION AND THAT THE SYRIAN NEGOTIATING TEAM,\nWHICH HAS ALL THE DETAILN PLANS TO BE IN TOUCH WITH\nVR. ATHERTON IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER.\nSECRET\nClassification\nFORM FS-412(H)\n4-68.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT UNITED . STATES OF STATE .\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nof\nPAGE 2 DAMASCUS 994\nSECRET\nClassification\n5. GENERAL SHIHABI SAID THAT THE SYRIAN TEAM WOULD BE LEAVING\nSHORTLY FOR BEIRUT TO PROCEED ONWARD TO GENEVA. IT CONSISTS\nOF BRIG. ADNAN TAYYARAX AND LT. COL. IBRAHIM AL-UVAR.\nDR. SALAH AL-OIN TARAZI WILL BE \"THE POLITICAL ADVISER\" TO\nTHE TEAV BUT WILL NOT BE PARTICIPATING IN THE TALKS.\n6. GENERAL SHIHABI ALSO ASKED IF WE COULD REQUEST\nTHAT THE SWISS AUTHORITIES PROVIDE SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS\nFOR THE SYRIAN DELEGATION.\n7. COMMENT: GENERAL SHIHABI SOUNDED RELAXED OVER\nTHE TELEPHONE. HOWEVER, IT WAS OBVIOUS HE WANTED TO BE\nSURE THE VESSAGE ABOUT THE \"OBSERVATIONS\" ON THE MAP\nGOT THROUGH TO YOU BECAUSE HE REPEATED IT SEVERAL TIVES,\nBOTH IN ARABIC AND ENGLISH.\nSCOTES\nSECRET\nClassification\nFORM FS-412(H)\n4-68\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n8\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduce at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nJune 8, 1974\nISRAELI-EGYPTIAN DISENGAGEMENT\nPhase II\nThe purpose of this paper is to suggest a concept for a second step in\nEgyptian-Israeli disengagement. Such a step would have two aspects:\n--the extent of further Israeli withdrawal and arrangements for\nproviding security for the new disengagement lines;\n--elements of the agreement which would give Israel a sense of\nmovement toward conditions of peace.\nThe withdrawal must be substantial enough to allow Sadat to concede\nsome of the attributes of peace; Israel must get enough evidence that\npeace is possible to justify the withdrawal.\nA General Concept\nOne way of approaching a second phase of Egyptian-Israeli disengagement\nis as an expansion of the present disengagement agreement, retaining the\npattern of two disengagement lines and a UN buffer between them and areas\nof limited armament and forces just behind the disengagement lines. The\nobjective would be to maintain the momentum of negotiations without\nradically altering the security situation or addressing the issues of final\nborders or final peace.\nThe public rationale for this agreement might be that it would provide\nan opportunity to put in place and begin to test the techniques and\nmechanisms for assuring demilitarization and security in the Sinai. If\nthese are successful, on a small scale, they could then be expanded to\nlarger areas in the next phase of withdrawal and become the basis of\nlong-term security arrangements in a peace settlement. For example,\nit might be desirable to begin experimenting with diminishing the role of\ninternational forces in UNEF and experimenting with an increased\ninvolvement of Israeli and Egyptian forces for jointly inspecting or\npatroling the demilitarized area.\nXGDS - 3\nDECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.\nBYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 2 -\nPossible Geographic Approaches\nThe Egyptian line. The following are possible approaches in drawing\nthe Egyptian disengagement line:\n1. One would be to leave the Egyptian forces behind the north-\nsouth line where they are now and expand the UN zone as\nIsrael pulls back further. The advantages of this approach\nwould be that it would be least threatening to Israel because\nit would continue to minimize the Egyptian presence across\nthe Canal and it would widen the demilitarized area between\nthe forces. If most of the Sinai is to be demilitarized in any\nfinal agreement, this may be the time to limit the eastern\nexpansion of the Egyptian military zone so as to avoid a\nsituation where Egypt would have to pull back in a final\nsettlement. The disadvantage would be that it would not give\nthe Egyptians any sense of moving forward. This approach\nin the north would be more acceptable if Egyptian control were\nexpanded southward to include one or both of the major oil\nfields. (A map showing present disengagement lines is\nattached.)\n2. A second would be to leave Egyptians where they are along\nthe Canal but expand their area southward to include some or\nall of the oil fields on the Gulf of Suez, at least those at Ras Sudr\nor those at Abu Rudeis further to the south as well. The\nadvantage would be giving the Egyptians a major gain. Although\nIsrael's withdrawal east of the passes would in itself be signi-\nficant, a further withdrawal that did not begin expanding the area\nof restored Egyptian control in the south would arouse suspicion\nthat Israel does not intend to withdraw there at all. The disad-\nvantage would be that in Israel this might cause even more\ndifficulty than moving Israeli forces east of the passes.\n3. A third would be to allow the Egyptians without much augmen-\ntation in the size of their forces to advance to the present\nIsraeli line west of the passes. The advantage of this line\nwould be that it would permit a modest Egyptian movement\nforward while still leaving a buffer area that Egyptian forces\nwould have to cross before they reach the passes. The\ndisadvantage would be that, especially if Israel withdrew east\nof the passes, the Israelis might regard this line as putting\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 3 -\nthe Egyptians too close to the passes. If Israel gave up the\noil fields, it might regard that as concession enough at this\nstage. In any case, it would have to be kept in mind that, if\nthe Sinai east of the mountains were to become the demili-\ntarized buffer in a final peace, this line or one close to it\ncould become the final Egyptian military line.\n4. Other lines could be devised by drawing new lines between\nthose above. Another possible variation would be to put the\noil fields in the UN zone but to apply the principle used in the\nIsraeli-Syrian disengagement by extending Egyptian civilian\nadministration into the area of separation.\nThe Israeli line. There will be two issues for Israel: giving up some\nor all of the oil fields and moving their forces east of the passes. The\nIsraelis will bargain hard over either of these steps. These are the\ngeneral choices for the placement of the Israeli line:\n1. The first possibility is to leave the Israeli lines where they\nare now in relation to the passes but to extend Egyptian control\nto the south to put one or more of the oil field areas back in\nEgyptian hands. The advantage of this approach would be to\ngive the Egyptians something significant without addressing\nany important security. issue at this stage. This might be all\nthat the Israeli political situation would allow at this stage\nunless substantial Egyptian concessions were made on the\nconditions of peace. The disadvantage would be that this would\nprovide no further Israeli withdrawal in the main military area.\n2. A minimum Israeli line if Israel moved east of the passes would\nbe one starting near Misfaq on the Mediterranean and drawn\njust barely at the eastern edge of the Gidi and Mitla passes,\nleaving the major Israeli military center at Bir Gifgafa in the\nIsraeli zone. (This is \"Line 1\" on the attached map showing\npossible Israeli disengagement lines.) The advantage would\nbe that this line would provide a significant pullback in that\nIsrael would surrender the key passes to the UNEF while still\nretaining military positions close enough to the passes to\nprevent a major Egyptian breakthrough. The disadvantage would\nlie in the strength of opposition in Israel.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 4 -\n3. A larger withdrawal could be made to a line corresponding\nroughly with the dominant topographical feature of Central\nSinai, the Wadi el-Arish. (This is \"Line 2\" on the attached\nmap showing possible Israeli disengagement lines.) The\nmain advantage of this line is also its main disadvantage:\nIt would be a significant withdrawal which would please the\nEgyptians but arouse sharp opposition in Israel. This may\nwell be more than the traffic will bear in Israel at this stage.\nThis line is the most natural line of defense east of the passes,\nbut it is not so far east as to begin encroaching on the territory\nthat the Israelis are seriously considering keeping in a final\nsettlement. An advantage from the Egyptian viewpoint is that\nthis line would restore Egyptian control over el-Arish, the\nonly major town in the Sinai still under Israeli control.\nA disadvantage would be that Israeli withdrawal this far east\nwould leave little room for a further step without getting into\nthe very difficult issues of a final withdrawal. In fact, a\nwithdrawal this great would create a disengagement line that\nmany Israelis would press to turn into the final border, although\ntheoretically one more line is possible between this one and\nthe 1967 border. Also, a large step in the Sinai could raise\nSyrian pressures for a large step soon.\nOne special aspect of this line that should be noted is that it\nwould result in Israeli abandonment of a settlement in occupied\nterritory, thus setting a principle with implications for the\nJordanian and Syrian fronts. Nahal Sinai, outside el-Arish to\nthe south, is manned by members of the right-wing Herut party,\nnow a part of the opposition Likud bloc. A settlement farther\nwest, Kibbutz Yam near the Bardaweel lagoon, reportedly was\ndisestablished before the October war because it failed to\nbecome viable even with a heavy subsidy.\nThe Elements of Peace in an Agreement\nEither of the steps contemplated above--giving up some or all of the oil\nfields or moving east of the passes--would be a substantial enough step\nthat Israel will insist on major Egyptian concessions in return. The\nIsraelis will probably press for an end of belligerency in return for the\nnext stage of withdrawal; the Egyptians will resist a complete termination\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 5 -\nof belligerency for anything short of total Israeli withdrawal. The\ndegree of the Egyptian concessions will depend on whether the Israeli\npullback at this stage is relatively small or whether there is an\nextensive withdrawal to something like the el-Arish line. Since the\nEgyptians will probably not terminate the \"state of belligerency\" at\nthis stage, the solution probably lies in combining general commitments\nto make peace with certain contractual arrangements that would have\nsome of the attributes of a beginning of normalization in relations.\nThe possibilities include:\n1. Commitment to peace. We are talking here about those words\nin the next Egyptian-Israeli agreement which commit the\nparties to a final peace. There are two parts of the agreement\nin which this would be handled:\na. In describing the commitment to observe the ceasefire\n(opening paragraph of agreement) it would be possible to\ntry again, as we did unsuccessfully in January, to have\neach side commit itself to refrain from \"all belligerent\nactions\". This would have the practical effect of ending\n(a) Egypt's application of the Arab boycott against\ncompanies dealing with Israel and (b) Egypt's practice of\nattaching reservations to international agreements it\nsigns, saying the agreements do not apply to Israel as\nfar as Egypt's responsibilities under the agreement are\nconcerned.\nb. The less desirable but perhaps more realistic alternative\nwould be for both sides to declare their intention to\nterminate all claims and acts of belligerency when a\nfinal peace agreement is concluded. This would, of course,\nbe inherent in a peace agreement, but having it stated\nexplicitly now would still have political/psychological.\nvalue. As a step in that direction, Egypt might state\nprivately that'it will take administrative steps to ease\nthe application of the third-party boycott and will no\nlonger attach reservations to international agreements.\nEither of these steps would--practically if not juridically--\nend all but one of the measures flowing from the continued\nstate of belligerency. The one remaining would be the\nrestriction on Israeli use of the Canal (see below).\nC. In describing linkage with a final settlement, both sides\nmight in the last paragraph of an agreement go a bit\nfarther than in the January 18 agreement by declaring\ntheir intent to negotiate a peace agreement with each other.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 6 -\nd. In addition, it might be possible to talk with Sadat\nabout the kind of relationship he envisions with Israel\nafter a peace agreement is signed and then to write a\nletter to the Israeli Prime Minister describing our\nunderstanding of Egypt's intentions on the normalization\nof relations. If this worked out like the conversation\nwith Asad on control of terrorism, the letter might be\nquite concrete.\n2. Israeli use of the Canal.\na. Egypt might make public, perhaps by incorporating it in\nthe agreement, the commitment it made secretly in January\nto the effect that Israeli cargoes can go through the\nCanal when it is re-opened and that Israeli ships can go\nthrough when a peace agreement is signed. The Canal\nshould be re-opened not long after a second-stage agreement\nis signed.\nb. Presumably Egypt will not go so far as to let Israeli\nships through the Canal in connection with a further\ndisengagement agreement. However, another effort could\nbe made to have Egypt allow Israeli ships through the\nCanal when it is re-opened.\n3. Oil supply. Israel has a strong intrest in both access to\nGulf of Suez oil and in the principle of Egyptian willingness\nto enter into normal commercial relations with Israel.\nIsraeli withdrawal from the Suez oil fields would open these\npossibilities.\na. Egypt might agree privately that Israel may continue to\nimport Suez Gulf oil under arrangements made through\ncommercial channels in quantities comparable to those it\nhas been importing for domestic consumption. Even if\nthese arrangements were made between Israel and Egypt's\nItalian concessionaires with Egypt's tacit acquiescence,\nthis could signify Egypt's willingness to consider some\nnormal commercial arrangements.\nb. Egypt might agree openly to the principle of commercial\nrelations when a peace agreement is signed.\nC. Coupled with the above might be a private Egyptian\nstatement of intent amount to a virtual guarantee of oil\nsupply to Israel in specified quantities. In return for\nguaranteed supply, Israel might be asked to pay some\ncompensation to Egypt for the oil extracted from the\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n1- 7 -\nSuez fields since 1967. Although we do not want to press\nthis on Israel, the total arrangement on supply and com-\npensation would be a major economic agreement between\nEgypt and Israel and a significant step in normalizing\nrelations.\n4. Straits of Tiran. \"In connection with\" the observance of the\nceasefire on the sea and the normalization of activities in\nthe Gulf of Suez if the oil fields are returned to Egypt, the\nfollowing are possible ways of addressing the question of\npassage through the Straits of Tiran:\na. Egypt and Israel might state their views that the Straits\nof Tiran are an international waterway in which all\nnations are entitled to the right of free transit.\nb. Better still would be supplementing this with a joint\nEgyptian-Jordanian-Saudi declaration to the same effect.\nC. Even better would be a supplementary joint Egyptian-\nJordanian-Saudi-Israeli statement. It is probably too\nmuch to expect the Saudis to join Israel in a statement\nat this stage. But in addition to reassuring Israel on\na key issue, the fact of a joint statement recording\nagreement with all three Arab riparians would be a\nsignificant sign of Arab willingness to begin to deal\nwith Israel in a normal way.\nd. Alternatives or other supplements would be parallel\nstatements, arranging these now for future publication, a\nUN Security Council resolution, or U.S. and Soviet\nstatements.\n5. Bab el-Mandab.\na. Any of the procedures described above for the Straits of\nTiran could be applied to a statement by riparians to the\nRed Sea on freedom of passage through the Straits of Bab\nel-Mandab.\nb. There might be agreement in principle to a future con-\nference, perhaps UN-sponsored, of Red Sea riparian states\nwhich could cover freedom of passage in the Straits of\nBab el-Mandab.\n6. UNEF. The objective is to meet the professed Israeli interest\nin more direct and normal contact with the Egyptians without\nbringing Egyptian military units closer to Israel. The possi-\nbilities include:\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 8 -\na. A UN headquarters with permanent Israeli and Egyptian\nliaison missions could be established in the buffer zone.\nThis would provide an immediately available channel for\ndealing with issues of disengagement and administration.\nb. To supplement this, a hot line which the Israelis are\nseeking could be established to provide a direct communi-\ncations link between Israel's Sinai headquarters and\nEgyptian headquarters to prevent military incidents such\nas those that might arise from straying aircraft.\n7. Normalizing relations across the border.\na. Border-crossing. An agreement to permit foreign tourists\nto cross the new line as they presently cross between\nJordan and the West Bank would begin to normalize the\n\"border.\" Also, there might be a simpler arrangement for\nresidents of Gaza, for instance, to travel overland to\nCairo.\nb. Journalists. Some agreement on an exchange of selected\nnewsmen in specified areas might at least be explored.\nC. Jewish community. There might be an agreement on the\ntreatment of Jews and Jewish property in Egypt or perhaps\nEgyptian commitment to encourage Syria to allow Syrian\nJews to emigrate if they wish.\n8. Limitation of armament and forces. It should be noted that a\nminimal movement of the Israeli disengagement line east of\nthe mountain passes would put the Israeli military center at\nBir Gifgafa into the limited armaments area. Because of\npossible Israeli interests in maintaining this center and\nbecause of the widening of the UN zone under this agreement,\nit may be practical to consider increasing the level of forces\nand equipment in the areas of limitation. This would pro-\nbably permit the Egyptians to move more forces across the\nCanal even if the Egyptian disengagement line remained where\nit is now in the north.\nIt seems unlikely that Egypt could agree to all of the above,\neven in connection with an Israeli pullback to the el-Arish\nline which itself seems unlikely at this stage. From the\nabove possibilities, however, a substantial package could be\ndeveloped.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nI 9 -\nAttached is a draft agreement on further disengagement which\nbegins to incorporate the above. Where maximum positions are\nincluded, it will be remembered that some of these could drop\nout into supplementary letters of assurance.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\nWORKING DRAFT\nEGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON THE FURTHER DISENGAGEMENT\nOF FORCES IN PURSUANCE OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE\nA. Egypt and Israel will continue to observe\nscrupulously the ceasefire on land, sea, and air called\nfor by the UN Security Council and as agreed in the\nEgyptian-Israeli Agreement on the Disengagement of forces\nin pursuance of the Geneva Peace conference signed\nJanuary 18, 1974. They will refrain from the time of the\nsigning of this document from all belligerent actions\nagainst each other.\nB. In agreeing to observe the ceasefire on land,\nsea, and air, Egypt and Israel state their position that\nthe Straits of Tiran and the Strait of Bab el Mandab are\ninternational straits and that ships of all nations are\nentitled to free transit through them. Each side con-\nsequently will refrain from interfering with the shipping\nof the other in these areas.\nC. Starting from the situation created by the\nAgreement on Disengagement of January 18, 1974, the\nmilitary forces of Egypt and Israel will be further\nseparated in accordance with the following principles:\n1. All Egyptian forces on the east side of the\nCanal will be deployed west of the line designed as Line\nA on the attached map. All Israeli forces will be deployed\neast of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n-2-\n2. The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines\nwill be a zone of disengagement in which the United\nNations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed. The\nUNEF will continue to consist of units from countries\nthat are not permanent members of the Security Council.\nA UN Liaison Headquarters will be established in this\nzone with Egyptian and Israeli liaison missions assigned\nfor the purpose of coordinating matters relating to\ndisengagement and other questions requiring coordination\nbetween them on a continuing basis.\n3. The area between the Egyptian line (Line A on\nthe attached map) and the Suez Canal or the Red Sea will\nbe limited in armament and forces as agreed.\n4. The area between the Israeli line (Line B on\nthe attached map) and the line designated as Line C on\nthe attached map will be limited in armament and forces\nas agreed.\n5. The limitations referred to in paragraphs 3 and\n4 will be inspected by UNEF. Existing procedures of the\nUNEF will be continued. Each side may fly one reconnais-\nsance aircraft per week over the zone of disengagement\non a schedule coordinated at the UN Liaison Headquarters.\n6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted\nto operate up to their respective lines without inter-\nference from the other side.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n-3-\nD. This agreement will be signed in Egyptian-\nIsraeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Middle\nEast Peace Conference. The detailed implementation\nof the disengagement of forces will be worked out by\nmilitary and civilian representatives of Egypt and\nIsrael, who will agree on the stages of this process\nand on the safe transfer of management over the oil\nfields on the Gulf of Suez. These representatives will\nmeet in the Military Working Group for this purpose\nno later than 48 hours after the signature of this\nagreement at\nunder the aegis of the United\nNations. They will complete this task within five\ndays. Disengagement will begin within 48 hours after\nthe completion of the work of the military represen-\ntatives and in no event later than seven days after\nthe signature of this agreement. The process of\ndisengagement will be completed not later than 56 days\nafter it begins.\nE. This agreement, like the agreement of January 18,\n1974, is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final\npeace agreement. It constitutes a step toward a final,\njust and durable peace according to the provisions of\nSecurity Council Resolution 338 and within the framework\nof the Geneva Conference. Both sides express their\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n-4-\nintention to continue their negotiations with the ob-\njective of achieving peace which will terminate the\nstate and claims of belligerency between them as a basis\nfor the gradual normalization of relations.\nFor Egypt:\nFor Israel:\nWitness:\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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