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Subj.: Confessional
consultation
January 2, 1968
HAK
Subject: Congressional Consultations Prior to the Announcement
of the new NSC Organization
I have talked to Bill Macomber about the above subject (Macomber has
been asked to stay on in his present job for the time being). Bill
agrees that a few phone calls to appropriate Senators and Congressmen
prior to the announcement yould be a good idea. He has offered to do some
of the consulting himself if you wish.
I suggest that you call Senators Fulbright, Jackson and Mundt.
Macomber could take care of Senator Aiken, Congressman Morgan (Chairman
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee) and Congressman Adair (ranking
Republican on the HERC).
Macomber says that he sees no need for consultations with the
Senate or House Armed Services Committees, but suggests that you
ask Laird if he wants to touch base with anyone on the committees.
(The Armed Services Committees have responsibility for the NSC legislation.)
LSE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
HAIL
WASHINGTON
SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY November 26, 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY
Subject: Near East
1. Attached memcon on yesterday's Near
East meeting with Gene Rostow. Also present were
Joe Sisco (Assistant Secretary - IO), Pete Hart
(Assistant Secretary - NEA) and Bob Grey (Staff
Aide to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs).
2. I've done this in terms of my recollections
of Rostow's talking points. We'll have something
more substantial on arms for the next round.
Biu
William Leonhart
Attachment
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SENSITIVE
TALKING POINTS
Near East
1. U. S. Policy seeks to bring about a basic Arab-
Israeli settlement along the lines of the SC Resolution
of November 22, 1967 (attached) ; and in the short-term
to avoid escalation of armed incidents or reprisals.
2. Jarring Mission. U. S. strongly backs Jarring
(Swedish Ambassador to Moscow) appointed under 11/22/67
SC Resolution as Secretary General's Special Representative.
Jarring has concentrated on UAR, Jordan, and Israel but
has failed to bring them together or to narrow policy con-
flict. Jarring will leave New York after GA and return to
Moscow after another round of area talks. Department
regards him as skilled and competent professional. Indica-
tions are that he will continue to serve in 1969.
3. UAR probably key to Arab position. Nasser has
reinforced his domestic position, as Soviets have
replenished his arms (fully back to pre-June 1967 levels).
UAR motivations and actions, especially with regard to
Suez, remain inconsistent and confused. Have rejected
direct Israeli talks or formal peace treaty. May be some
give in their position, but likely remain obscure until
new Administration. Present US attitude on resumption
of relations is that Cairo must take initiative, since it
broke on false charge of US participation in war on
Israeli side.
4. Jordan probably more flexible than UAR. Some
reason believe Hussein holding secret talks with Israelis
(possibly during frequent visits to London hospital).
Central aims are return of West Bank, concessions on
Jerusalem, containment of radical Arab domestic pressures.
Soviets offering military and economic aid on soft terms
which Hussein thus far refusing.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
TIVE
-2-
5. Israel beginning shift from straight territorial
claims to concept of "secure and recognized boundaries" in
context of contractual security agreements with Arab
neighbors. Department believes Israeli leaders split on
precise territorial demands and will probably not take
hard decisions until concrete agreement prospects more in
evidence. Substantial returns of Arab territory likely
(90% mentioned). Jerusalem, Syrian Golan Heights, and
Tiran Straits seen critical in Israeli thinking. Probably
also waiting on new Administration.
6. Others: Saudi Arabia has crucial role, particularly
on Gulf. Faisal maintains strong distaste for Egyptians,
Israelis, and Russians, but appears beginning question US
interest in area and in Saudis. Syria worst of radical
Arabs and terrorist launching-pad. Only state in area to
refuse receive Jarring. US lacks assets deal with character
of its regime. Turkey exerts steadying influence but less
active in area than formerly.
7. Soviet aims. Entirely unclear. Have proposed time-
table settlements to be guaranteed by outside major powers.
Probably wish avoid major Arab-Israeli hostilities or risk
of direct confrontation with US. Continuing, lower-level
"no war - no peace" tension in area possibly serves them
best, as they seek political control of Near East and its oil.
8. ChiComs have recently appeared with some aid and
arms shipments to Syrians and Aden radicals. Not serious
yet but beginning.
9. Arms Balance, with Russian resupply to Arabs, rough
equilibrium probably exists except in planes. UAR may have
4-1 overall advantage (2-1 in operational high performance
aircraft). Current negotiations with Israelis for sale of
F-4s designed remedy, but no agreement on terms, delivery
dates, or conditions yet reached.
10. NPT. Israel has thus far refused sign. US
ratification would perhaps increase pressure for signature,
but not decisively, self-interest will control. Indications of
very advanced nuclear technology.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
TEXT OF RESOLUTION 12
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave sit-
uation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and
lasting peace in which every State in the area can live
in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their
acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have
undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with
Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles
requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East which should include the application
of both the following principles
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from terri-
tories occupied in the recent conflict ;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belliger-
ency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity and political independence
of every State in the area and their right to live in
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free
from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation
through international waterways in the area; ;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee
problem;
12 U.N. doc. S/RES/242 (1967) (S/8247) ; adopted
unanimously on Nov. 22.
843
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability
and political independence of every State in the area,
through measures including the establishment of de-
militarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a
Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East
to establish and maintain contacts with the States
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and assist
efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in
with the provisions and principles in this
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"ocrText": "Subj.: Confessional\nconsultation\nJanuary 2, 1968\nHAK\nSubject: Congressional Consultations Prior to the Announcement\nof the new NSC Organization\nI have talked to Bill Macomber about the above subject (Macomber has\nbeen asked to stay on in his present job for the time being). Bill\nagrees that a few phone calls to appropriate Senators and Congressmen\nprior to the announcement yould be a good idea. He has offered to do some\nof the consulting himself if you wish.\nI suggest that you call Senators Fulbright, Jackson and Mundt.\nMacomber could take care of Senator Aiken, Congressman Morgan (Chairman\nof the House Foreign Affairs Committee) and Congressman Adair (ranking\nRepublican on the HERC).\nMacomber says that he sees no need for consultations with the\nSenate or House Armed Services Committees, but suggests that you\nask Laird if he wants to touch base with anyone on the committees.\n(The Armed Services Committees have responsibility for the NSC legislation.)\nLSE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nHAIL\nWASHINGTON\nSENSITIVE - EYES ONLY November 26, 1968\nMEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY\nSubject: Near East\n1. Attached memcon on yesterday's Near\nEast meeting with Gene Rostow. Also present were\nJoe Sisco (Assistant Secretary - IO), Pete Hart\n(Assistant Secretary - NEA) and Bob Grey (Staff\nAide to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs).\n2. I've done this in terms of my recollections\nof Rostow's talking points. We'll have something\nmore substantial on arms for the next round.\nBiu\nWilliam Leonhart\nAttachment\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSENSITIVE\nTALKING POINTS\nNear East\n1. U. S. Policy seeks to bring about a basic Arab-\nIsraeli settlement along the lines of the SC Resolution\nof November 22, 1967 (attached) ; and in the short-term\nto avoid escalation of armed incidents or reprisals.\n2. Jarring Mission. U. S. strongly backs Jarring\n(Swedish Ambassador to Moscow) appointed under 11/22/67\nSC Resolution as Secretary General's Special Representative.\nJarring has concentrated on UAR, Jordan, and Israel but\nhas failed to bring them together or to narrow policy con-\nflict. Jarring will leave New York after GA and return to\nMoscow after another round of area talks. Department\nregards him as skilled and competent professional. Indica-\ntions are that he will continue to serve in 1969.\n3. UAR probably key to Arab position. Nasser has\nreinforced his domestic position, as Soviets have\nreplenished his arms (fully back to pre-June 1967 levels).\nUAR motivations and actions, especially with regard to\nSuez, remain inconsistent and confused. Have rejected\ndirect Israeli talks or formal peace treaty. May be some\ngive in their position, but likely remain obscure until\nnew Administration. Present US attitude on resumption\nof relations is that Cairo must take initiative, since it\nbroke on false charge of US participation in war on\nIsraeli side.\n4. Jordan probably more flexible than UAR. Some\nreason believe Hussein holding secret talks with Israelis\n(possibly during frequent visits to London hospital).\nCentral aims are return of West Bank, concessions on\nJerusalem, containment of radical Arab domestic pressures.\nSoviets offering military and economic aid on soft terms\nwhich Hussein thus far refusing.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nTIVE\n-2-\n5. Israel beginning shift from straight territorial\nclaims to concept of \"secure and recognized boundaries\" in\ncontext of contractual security agreements with Arab\nneighbors. Department believes Israeli leaders split on\nprecise territorial demands and will probably not take\nhard decisions until concrete agreement prospects more in\nevidence. Substantial returns of Arab territory likely\n(90% mentioned). Jerusalem, Syrian Golan Heights, and\nTiran Straits seen critical in Israeli thinking. Probably\nalso waiting on new Administration.\n6. Others: Saudi Arabia has crucial role, particularly\non Gulf. Faisal maintains strong distaste for Egyptians,\nIsraelis, and Russians, but appears beginning question US\ninterest in area and in Saudis. Syria worst of radical\nArabs and terrorist launching-pad. Only state in area to\nrefuse receive Jarring. US lacks assets deal with character\nof its regime. Turkey exerts steadying influence but less\nactive in area than formerly.\n7. Soviet aims. Entirely unclear. Have proposed time-\ntable settlements to be guaranteed by outside major powers.\nProbably wish avoid major Arab-Israeli hostilities or risk\nof direct confrontation with US. Continuing, lower-level\n\"no war - no peace\" tension in area possibly serves them\nbest, as they seek political control of Near East and its oil.\n8. ChiComs have recently appeared with some aid and\narms shipments to Syrians and Aden radicals. Not serious\nyet but beginning.\n9. Arms Balance, with Russian resupply to Arabs, rough\nequilibrium probably exists except in planes. UAR may have\n4-1 overall advantage (2-1 in operational high performance\naircraft). Current negotiations with Israelis for sale of\nF-4s designed remedy, but no agreement on terms, delivery\ndates, or conditions yet reached.\n10. NPT. Israel has thus far refused sign. US\nratification would perhaps increase pressure for signature,\nbut not decisively, self-interest will control. Indications of\nvery advanced nuclear technology.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nTEXT OF RESOLUTION 12\nThe Security Council,\nExpressing its continuing concern with the grave sit-\nuation in the Middle East,\nEmphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of\nterritory by war and the need to work for a just and\nlasting peace in which every State in the area can live\nin security,\nEmphasizing further that all Member States in their\nacceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have\nundertaken a commitment to act in accordance with\nArticle 2 of the Charter,\n1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles\nrequires the establishment of a just and lasting peace\nin the Middle East which should include the application\nof both the following principles\n(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from terri-\ntories occupied in the recent conflict ;\n(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belliger-\nency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sov-\nereignty, territorial integrity and political independence\nof every State in the area and their right to live in\npeace within secure and recognized boundaries free\nfrom threats or acts of force;\n2. Affirms further the necessity\n(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation\nthrough international waterways in the area; ;\n(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee\nproblem;\n12 U.N. doc. S/RES/242 (1967) (S/8247) ; adopted\nunanimously on Nov. 22.\n843\n(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability\nand political independence of every State in the area,\nthrough measures including the establishment of de-\nmilitarized zones;\n3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a\nSpecial Representative to proceed to the Middle East\nto establish and maintain contacts with the States\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and assist\nefforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in\nwith the provisions and principles in this"
}