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Henry A. Kissinger's (HAK) Office Files
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December 31st 1968
Memorandum to Dr. Kissinger
From V.A. Walters
Subject: Eastern Europe
Following the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine most of
Eastern Europe is in a state of ill concealed shock. What had seemed to be the road
to greater freedom and participation in the political process has now been brutally
blocked. et all eyes are on Czechoslovakia to see whether the Czech passive resistance
is or is Not effective against Soviet tanks.
Poland is engaged in a power struggle within its own Comminist
Party between Gomulka and Noccar. Each has an interest in ingratiating themselves with
the Soviets while bearing inmind Bakish nationalism andxenophobia
Ramania is frightened of a Soviet Invasion uncertain whether a
manifest disposition to resist any invasion will deter or provoke the Soviets. Romanian
military personnel say they will fight and are more accessible than ever. "erein lie
considerable opportunities in the intelligence field.
Bulgaria as always is the Soviet Unions most loyal satellite
and seems to be a pawn to threaten and intimidate *ugoslavia by means of irredentist
territorial claims on Yugoslav Macedonia
"ungary still disillusioned from its own experience of 1956
wearily and unenthusiastically follows the Soviet dictates
East Germany is perhps the most fragile, yet the most prosperous
of allthe satellites. Yet the Soviets have had some success in engendering arivalry
with West Germany. But the wall must remain for it is the only way to hide the failure
of Communism as an economic system, andthis to the Soviets is more grave than its
failure as a political system.
There has been as yet no purge in the Czech Armed forces and here
too lie opportunities.
The Soviets and official propaganda machine of the satellites have
done everything they could to portray the US as a sick society, torn by racial and social
conflicts that has nothing to teach the countries of Eastern Europe. Multiple contacts
between the Eastern European countries and us will help dissipate this illusion.
Yet these must be measured so that we do not seem to be supporting or approving the
regimes. The knowledge that the United States is a healthy strong society, capable of the
immense technological achievement of sending men to the moon, that it has a strong
purposeful government, that it willnot compromise on principle though it seeks peace
will best sustain those who oppose the regimes of Eastern Europe as they await the
day of the Russian Dubcek.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Retacked
December 12, 1968
Mr. Eric G. Lindahl
10401 Grosvenor Place
Rockeille, Maryland
20852
Dear Mr. Lindahl:
Thank you for your note of November 30 and for your paper
on the German-European question. I hope to have the
opportunity of reading it soon.
Best regards,
Sincerely yours,
Henry A. Kissinger
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DEC 9 1968
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
November 30, 1968
Dear Professor Kissinger:
I sincerely believe you will find
interesting an informal paper I
submitted in 1958 from Yokohama
concerning, primarily, the German-
European question. I submitted
others in 1953, from Munich, and
in 1960, in Copenhagen. In 1943-44
I recorded convictions against the
"unconditional surrender" policy.
With 26 years in Service I am plan-
ning to take off a year (and probably
quit after that), to write a small
book on the unwisdom of American
"positions (laws, etc.) on "morality"
questions.
Sincerely,
Eric G. Lindahl
10401 Grosvenor Place, Rockville, Md.
20852
Yokohama, December 15, 1958
A Foreign Policy Suggestion
Relating Principally To The
Gorman Question
This policy contribution has as its main theme the "German
Problem", but its initial proposal is a basic policy concept. While
my suggestions regarding Germany may well prove to be unacceptable
at this time to the Administration for reasons I do not understand,
I believe that my first position is one which may be conceded by
many policy planners to be essentially sound.
The most compelling American policy and foreign relations need
In my view has long boon to embrace a humblor approach or philosophy.
I think it would be a vory happy thing if we could somehow assume the
attitude that 1) a great many of the wisest political minds in the
world are found outside of the United States, and, 2) our own not
infrequent unwisdom during the first half of this century has left
I
us with many tangible moral obligations toward other countries. In
other words, we should liston with open minds and with respect to the
views of political thinkers in other lands, be they statosmen, dip-
lomats, writers, or leaders in other fields. We should also face up
to the undeniable fact that our own mistakes have had much to do with
I
creating the terrible situations in which some countries now find
thomselves. Our mistakes wore not those of the evil doer, but they
were the mistakes of inadequate statesmanship, and some of thom have
been fearfully costly.
Our intervention in the first World War with our subsequent
withdrawal from international responsibility was disastrous to
Europe's
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
- 2 -
Europe's postwar dovelopmont. Our intervontion in the second
World War was sound and right, but promature demobilization and
unwillingness to face realities after that war were catastrophic.
If wo had stayed out of the first war it would have ended in a com-
promise and Germany would have found its natural and inovitable place
World War II
in Europe. Our demobilization and our readiness to gamble on Russia's
honorable intentions gave that country the opportunities that "any
cab drivor" in Europe know she was waiting for. Intervention fol-
lowed by immature and inadequate postwar actions constitute moddling.
"Unconditional Surrender" was a policy 30 unwise as to make it
stand out as ono of history's most tragic mistakes. And those who
had access to main-line diplomatic corrospondence during the war will
recall that We were urged by some of the best minds in Europe to aban-
don or greatly modify this concept.
We have dono many acts of gonuine statesmanship for which we
all should be proud, but it will be admitted by any astuto student
of our foreign relations that our policies have all too often borno
the mark of immaturity. In any event We are now in the gamo for fair
and we owe oursolves and our friends the wisest performance we can
achieve, which I believe requires groater floxibility and accommodati
than we are in the habit of practicing.
Why do I Indulge in this national solf-examination at such longt
and emphasize our apparont past weakness? Because I am hauntod by
11
the fear that the immaturity that 101 us pursue the policy of "un-
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
conditional surronde
- 3 -
conditional surronder" has not yet passed. It is easy to say that
wo as individuals did not create that policy and to put it from our
minds, but that policy was in a way typical of American moral-
political thought.
If my approach soems presumtuous in view of the fact that I
have not had a "roporting" career in my 16-yoar service, may I
((
point with prido to a paper I wrote in October 1943 urging that
the United States adopt a somowhat philosophic and more roalistic
viow of the origins of the war. I took the position then and hold
1t from then on that you cannot blame a people for its history.
Our war was with the ovil Gorman leadership. I was convinced that
"collective guilt" was rubbish and said so frequently. I was so
saddened by our policy in 1944 that I Very nearly accepted an offor
by United Press to become a corrospondent. If our Government had
understood the German problem, men like Claus von Stauffonborg and
Ludwig Beck and the others would have been able to save Germany from
the tragic destiny fashioned by the Ilitlor Loadorship. Germany
would have surrendered and we would have a different Europe today,
a Europe froo from Russian terror. I am of course not in the least
unaware of how very much we have done for Western Europe in the
past ton years, but I do think that we should not lose sight of
our blunders. Undorstanding thom and admitting them 1s a very good
way to avoid further costly mistakes.
The following views regarding the existing German problem
have
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
- L/- --
have boon in the making for many years, subject 00 they no doubt
are to cortain obvious limitations, and they are presented frabily
knowing vory well that thoy are not popular views in Washington
today. I hope, howover, that these views will not be brushed asido
as representing a position alroady rejected by the Department.
Those who do not fear Gormany, and those who do not reject out-
of-hand, ideas that appear to make substantial concessions to the
Russians, may acknowledge that my thesis holds some promise of suc-
cess. Its acceptance could result in & genuino improvement of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. relations and it could altornatively at least put Russia on
the spot for its rejection.
I first presented this thosis in a letter to a friend on the
Policy Planning Staff in April 1953 from Munich. My thought at that
time was to offer an alternative to EDC, which I considered doomed.
My ideas were based among other things on the view that France should
bo a major force in a HATO which unconditionally guarantood Germany's
safety-rather than include Germany in an organization that she was
bound to dominate. Another hypothesis was that we had nothing to
foar, roally, from Gormany in this now ora. In any event this was
a calculated risk (at the worst) that TO must take. In other words,
we must gamble on Germany.
I recognize that much has takon place since 1953 and that we
cannot go back to 1953, but what did not prove to be feasible thon
might now be, or eventually become, the only moans of achioving a
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
complete
- 5 -
complete rounification of Germany. A Gorman "confedoration" is
presumably the first stop on the road to rounification now, but the
basic unalterable condition for such rounification is the acceptance
by us of Gormany's loss from NATO. Dr. Arnold Toynbeo was undoubt-
edly corroct when he stated in January of 1956 that Germany could
be reunited only if the East and West mutually plodged not to ad-
mit O. unifiod Germany into either camp. Our commitments to Dr.
Adonauor may make substantial modifications in our position oxtreme-
1y difficult, but is he not also sincerely determined to rounito
Germany without war? Is he not detormined to make some genuine
progross toward a settlement during his own lifetime of Germany's
torrDtorial claims in the East? And doos not Dr. Adonauor really
want to holp bring about the liberation of tho captive peoples in
the Satellite countries? Suroly he does not roally believe that
standing on our existing policies can bring about those objectives.
I wroto in April 1953 that we should not bring Gormany into
NATO. Working together with the Gormans in NATO has no doubt been
valuable in many ways. I think, for one thing, that it has in-
creased the likolihood that our friendship will endure, and in the
event of an oventual breakdown of all efforts to obtain peace in
Europe and between East and Wost, Germany's participation and part-
norship in NATO vill greatly facilitate our combining of arms and
joining forces again. However, Gormany must bo given a "rugged,
armod neutral" status. Russia would have no further excuse in the
eyes of the world to maintain the Rod Army West of her own borders.
Short of war, I Ebotadic ic hope for honoring
- 6 -
our
promises and our obligations to the Eastern European prison states
lics in a guarantood, adoquately armod, "noutral" Cormany.
The procise details of tho eventual solution are not all-
important, but no must be ready to offer an unallied Gormany, and
I think we would be wiso to capture the initiative by suggesting
such a plan at the earliest possible point. We should consult our
good friends in Europo first, of courso, and thon arrive at a plan
of action. What do the French and West German and British Foroign
Ministers think? What do Winston Churchill and Anthony Edon beliovo?
What does Spaak think? How about Robort Schumann? Has anyone asked
the former Swedish Ambassador in Washington, Erik Bohoman, what his
views aro? Thore are many vory wiso and able statemen to consult.
A plan such as that proposed by a group of noutral countrios in
Europe in the fall of 155 may be as good as any, beginning with the
negotiations between the two Germanies. That plan has the advantage
of proposing the adhorance of a unified Germany to both the West
and East European dofense pacts without being included in the Genor-
al Staffs of either. Germany would, in other words, be a sort of
independent third force without boing "noutral". Thus, Germany
would be included in defense agreements but would not be a party
to an "alliance".
All foreign troops would presumably be withdrawn to West and
the
East German border areas for/poriod of the Gorman "confederation"
negotiations and perhaps for a trial period boyond that. All of
our negotiations would of course press our position regarding
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
aerial inspection
- 7 -
aerial inspection in the hope that this important objective of
ours could be realized.
There is no doubt that making Gormany an indopondent force
in the middlo of Europe entails some risks. Russia has very much
to offer Germany, both in connection with Gormany's formor Eastern
territorios and in connection with the industrialization of the Com-
munist world from Poland to China. But risks have to bo taken in
all ovents. I say, lot us gamble on Germany. Aftor all, if Gormany
can oxpand her trade and her industrial development activ-
ities Eastward, a cortain amount of competitive prossure on the other
European states will be relaxed. The world of trade will expand gen-
orally, and we will all participate in it and benefit from it. And
if no accommodation is reached betwoon Russia and the West, what are
our prospects? War on, one hand, and an endless, dangerous and immonse-
ly costly state of tension on the other hand. The only hope for a
reasonable co-existonce in our times 18 through the solution of the
German problem.
Only a dissolution of our alliance with West Germany can bring
about Gorman rounification. Only a dissolution of that alliance
will make possible the withdrawal to Russia of the Rod Army, and
only thon is thore any hopo for frooing the captive peoples through-
out Eastorn Europe.
It is all very well to admire the Hungarians and commisorate
with all the captive peoples, but what are wo going to do about it?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
There is
- 8 -
There is something in this connection that we should not pormit
ourselves to forgot, the memory of which should sting us into
bold and detormined action to relievo these peoples. But for our
wartime policy and our postwar failures, those people would be
froe today. Big powers, like big mon, have b1c responsibilitios.
Sticking pig-hoadodly to our "unconditional surrendor" policy and
thon later disbanding our annies aftor the war in the Bace of
cortain danger vis-a-vis the Russians caused untold mischief. We
simply cannot sit tight in our present. positions and wait for the
inevitable explosion. We really helped cause all this and we must
make hard decisions, take considerable risks, and do bold things
in a dotermined offort to bring about Russia's withdrawal from
the Satellite States. The damage will never be undono by our
simply pointing the finger of guilt at the Russians, howover true
1t of course is that Russia in the villain. Russia's guilt is an
established fact; now lot us concontrato on practical stops to
free the Eastorn Europeans. That is in short our duty.
What we may lose in terms of absolute military socurity by
the loss of Germany as an ally and as a military baso we will more
than make up in other ways. The importance of Russia's military
withdrawal behind hor own borders cannot bo overestimated. With-
drawing our forces to France, Britain, and Spain hardly loavos us
defenceless, in any event. Incidentally, agrood limitation of arm-
amont oxpenditures will in time make of Gormany an example of the
benefits which Trade the Richard Looyld bring to all.
TROU
January 15, 1969
Mr. Vladimir Petrov
Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies
George Washington University
Washington, D. C. 20006
Dear Mr. Petrov:
Thank you for your letter of January 8,
and your short piece on Czechoslovakia. I
read it with great interest.
Best regards,
Henry A. Kissinger
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
ach feerak
JAN 10 1969
Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies
January 8, 1969
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Office of the President-elect
450 Park Avenue, NYC.
Dear Mr. Kissinger:
Thank you for your note. From what I hear from
Fritz Kraemer and a few other friends, you are living through a
very difficult period; it may last another few months, I fear.
I have had a few prolonged conversations with
Soviet officials and visiting Soviet "Americanologists" in recent
weeks, and I have an overall impression that Moscow is thinking
in terms of a "package deal" which might include a Vietnam settle-
ment, an arrangement regarding the Middle East, the ratification
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (particularly by some of
the present non-signers such as est Germany and Japan - they are
not concerned so much about the United States), and the future of
Washington-Peking relations which worries them more than they are
willing to admit.
Enclosed please find a short piece I wrote a
few months ago on one problem which I see as rather crucial; it
came out only yesterday but is only moderately dated.
Sincerely
Vládimir Petrov
THE
GEORGE
WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY
Washington, D.C. 20006
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
LIFE
TIME & LIFE BUILDING
rockefeller CENTER
NEW YORK 10020
UNITED STATES
6c
UNITED STATES
6c
UNITED STATES
6c
Gene Farmer
237 St. Marks Place
Staten Island, N.Y. 10301
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Office of the President-Elect
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Czechoslovakia
And
The
Experts'
Myopia
by Vladimir Petrov
ne of the curious things about
White, of the University, points out
O
inability of the observers to
the Soviet occupation of
in his recent book (Nobody Wanted
put themselves into the shoes
Czechoslovakia is that it
War, Doubleday, 1968) "mispercep-
(in this instance) of Soviet
caught by surprise practically all
tion might explain how normally sane
leaders and see things their way.
communist world-watchers. News-
human beings can unwittingly, with-
paper correspondents in Prague, Mos-
out intending the consequences, in-
do not absolve political analysts. The
cow and other capitals, and staff ex-
volve themselves step by step in
latter were not obligated to forecast
perts on communist affairs in their
actions that lead to war." And he
the timing and the scope of the inter-
government offices suffered acute pro-
shows how self-delusions and the in-
fessional embarrassment when the
vention, but they certainly could be
ability to perceive the enemy's view-
news about the appearance of Soviet
expected to predict its probability on
point were a major factor in the
the basis of their knowledge of com-
tanks in the streets of Czechoslovak
histories of wars.
munist behavior and modes of opera-
cities was announced over Radio
In the specific case of Czechoslo-
tion, of the specific situation in
Prague. From all evidence, Western
vakia, the United States has not been
Czechoslovakia, and of the Soviet re-
intelligence services were also caught
a direct party to the conflict. While
action to the developments in Prague
flat-footed. President Johnson report-
the Czechoslovaks have been regarded
edly learned about the invasion from
in the preceding months and weeks.
as "good guys" and the hardline So-
none other than Soviet Ambassador
That they didn't poses a question
viet leaders, together with their fol-
Dobrynin. Even more distressing is
of the general misperception on the
lowers in Eastern Europe, as "bad
that, judging by their expressions of
part of so many Western observers
guys," the emotional involvement of
of the communist world, their appar-
"shock and dismay" in the interviews
the American public has been rela-
ent inability to take adequate cogni-
immediately following the events of
tively limited. The sad memory of
zance of relevant facts and draw from
August 21, most leading American
Hungary in 1956, the craving for
them rational conclusions. To a
Sovietologists on university campuses
détente with Moscow, the growing
were equally unprepared for this
large extent, the fault lies with the
isolationism in the country, and the
excitable reporters on the scene, and
development.
spectaculars of the Presidential cam-
The failure of the CIA to antici-
it was admittedly difficult even for
paign all served to dilute public in-
seasoned analysts to pinpoint what
pate the Soviet move is perhaps
terest in the Czechoslovak crisis.
understandable. Although the Warsaw
truly mattered in the flood of news
However, precisely because of this
from Eastern Europe. But it also ought
Pact troops had been massing along
relative detachment, our surprise at
to be admitted that many scholars -
the Czechoslovak borders for some
the Soviet move appears even more
and government experts - had been
time, this action could conceivably
puzzling, carrying with it far-reaching
emotionally inclined to accept the in-
have been interpreted as an instrument
and ominous implications. If objective
credibly optimistic slant of the news
of political pressure; the Soviet field
political analysts cannot foresee such
at face value.
commanders themselves probably did
a cataclysm in a well-studied area, if
Misperception in critical situations
not receive the signal to open a cer-
trained and experienced news reporters
is a very serious matter. As Ralph K.
tain envelope with the orders to cross
cannot adequately detect major devel-
the border until shortly before the
opments in the onrush of fast-breaking
zero hour. But whatever the excuses
American Sovietologists on uni-
news, we must assume that something
to which the searchers for "hard evi-
versity campuses were equally
is inherently wrong with their overall
dence" might be entitled, such excuses
unprepared.
approach to their task.
7
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
The answer, I submit, should be
looked for in one of the forms of
...
remember the Suez cam-
ing dominoes. Having reconciled
misperception analyzed by White,
paign of 1956, the Bay of Pigs,
themselves to being unloved by
or the overthrow of the Diem
their satellites, how far, I was asking
namely in the lack of empathy - the
government in Saigon?
myself, were they prepared to go in
apparent inability of the observers to
a display of self-restraint in dealing
put themselves into the shoes (in this
instance) of Soviet leaders and see
late 1960's, the general weaken-
with Czechoslovakia? Would they
follow the example of the United
things their way. To be sure, Soviet
ing of Moscow's grip on the com-
States? Or would they prove to be true
reasons for intervention had been
munist regimes of Eastern
to their own nature?
spelled out numerous times in news
Europe (underscored by neutral-
Whatever optimism I had vanished
reports, background articles, and in
ist tendencies in Yugoslavia and
when Pravda published (on July 18)
elaborate and intelligent discussions
Rumania), the presumed need
the text of the joint Warsaw Pact
of the crisis by eminent authorities-
for the Soviets to keep open the
nations' (Rumania and, of course,
channels of communication with
the Soviet fear of the contagious
Czechoslovakia being absent) message
the United States, thereby foster-
effects of the Czechoslovak peace-
to the Central Committee of the
ing dissent and disarray within
ful revolution, the expressions of
Czechoslovak Communist Party. The
the NATO alliance.
distrust and poorly concealed hos-
ultimatum sternly ordered Dubcek and
Some analysts even reasoned that
tility towards Moscow in the un-
his colleagues to put their house in
the Soviets would abstain from any-
censored Czechoslovak press, the
order and asserted the right of the
thing drastic as their contribution to
economic reforms and the pene-
other communist states to intervene
the "stop Nixon" campaign in the
tration of Western private capital
in the internal affairs of Czechoslo-
U. S. Considerable evidence exists
into Czechoslovakia, Prague's
vakia. This document, of such over-
that the White House itself entertained
general rapprochement with West
riding importance, should have left
such hopes while secretly planning a
Germany, the growing independ-
no doubt as to the top priority Mos-
Johnson-Kosygin summit meeting and
ence of the reformist leadership
cow attached to the Czechoslovak
praying for a breakthrough in the
and its reluctance to permit
crisis. From then on, it was only a
Paris peace talks.
Warsaw Pact maneuvers on
question of whether the Czechoslovaks
Most of this speculation was very
Czechoslovak territory, the "lib-
themselves could carry out the terms
clever, very sophisticated, and to a
erals" attacks on the "conserva-
of the ultimatum and, perhaps, of
large extent, plausible. I myself was
tives" and other pro-Soviet figures,
what position the United States would
convinced last spring that such con-
the excitement of the youth and
take. In retrospect, it also appears
siderations were present in the minds
intelligentsia, the disclosures of
clear, judging by the remarkable
of the Soviet leaders. I expected them
the crimes of the Stalin era, and,
efficiency of the invasion, that military
to take into account the fate of the
of course, obnoxious to Moscow,
contingency plans of the Soviet com-
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the
the cheers from the West every
mand were also approved about that
heavy burdens of the armaments race
time Czechoslovakia appeared to
time if not earlier.
resulting from the increase of tension
be moving further towards in-
To my knowledge very few Russia-
in international relations, the Soviet
ternal democratization and ex-
watchers recognized the threat and
image abroad, and the reaction within
ternal independence.
sounded the alarm. (Victor Zorza of the
the Soviet Union itself, particularly
At the same time, however, the
Manchester Guardian was an excep-
among the youth and the intellectuals.
tion.) To others, the events of August
prevailing feeling among political
At the same time I wondered about
21 fell like a bolt out of the blue. As
analysts (and, consequently, of the
two unknowns in this complex equa-
the military occupation became an
American public and the government)
tion. One was the never openly
accomplished fact, expressions of
was that the Soviets had no choice
acknowledged, almost irrational fear of
"shock and dismay" were heard
but to bow to the forces of change
Germany - divided or reunited
everywhere. Even at this late date,
and to adjust to the new situation,
rooted in the trauma of World War
some analysts refuse to admit their
much as the U. S. does in analagous
II. Another was an equally unspoken
situations. To that end, the press, in-
but doubtlessly cumulative effects of
failure, insisting quite irrelevantly
that the Soviets had acted against their
cluding the analyses of many reputable
the defections in Eastern Europe from
specialists, cited a multitude of
the Soviet fold. The revolts in East
own best interests, that they would
Germany in 1953 and in Poland and
be forced to withdraw before too long
reasons —
under all kinds of pressure, that it
the continuing Soviet preoccu-
Hungary in 1956; the breakaways of
pation with the hostile Chinese
Tito and Ceausescu; the angry assaults
was Moscow's leaders who misper-
ceived and miscalculated.
and the resulting dependence of
of the tiny and totally helpless Albania
Admittedly, to predict the Soviet
Moscow on the good will of
- all must have been deeply humiliat-
ing to the Kremlin leaders, perennially
move was no easy task. In reaching
"moderate" communist parties
a decision involving multiple and
for the showdown with Peking
worrying over the specter of the fall-
complex considerations, the Soviet
scheduled for the fall, the psy-
leaders themselves were probably far
chological impossibility of re-
the responsibility for Western
from unanimous, and throughout they
peating Hungary in the presum-
inaction must be shared by po-
showed signs of hesitation and un-
ably relaxed atmosphere of the
litical analysts.
certainty. Yet the choice had nar-
8
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
rowed down to a simple choice - -
Whether or not the invasion could
Even at this late date, political
intervene or not intervene, for from
have been thwarted is now a matter
analysts refuse to admit their
Moscow's point of view the situation
for speculation. I personally believe
failure.
in Czechoslovakia was rapidly nearing
that a strong warning from the White
the point of no return, with the Prague
House before the event, noting that
authorities helplessly floundering and
with "moderate" communists. What-
such a move would invalidate the
clearly incapable of stemming the
ever the toughening of Soviet inter-
Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding
tide. Our political analysts first erred
national behavior, many assumed that
following the Cuban missile crisis,
in underestimating the capacity of the
it could be explained by the strains of
might prevent the ratification of the
Soviets to act decisively, probably
the Vietnam War: didn't we ourselves
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
because this capacity is such a scarce
deviate from the "norm" in our be-
could endanger cultural and trade re-
commodity in democratic societies.
havior because of the same war? The
lations and would compel the United
Their second error was in attributing
temptation to attribute to alien politi-
States to transfer additional troops
to the Soviet leadership our own
cal systems our own views, judgments,
to West Germany, would have, at the
scale of values, which was plainly an
and concerns seems to be irresistible
very least, made the Soviets pause to
exercise in wishful thinking. The third
to a great many otherwise knowledge-
guess what the next American move
was a characteristic presumption of
able experts.
might be. As in 1956, anti-Soviet feel-
so many experts in international af-
In the end, the watchers of the
ings in Eastern Europe are running
fairs: that of knowing what is good
Czechoslovak crisis had lost sight of
high, making any kind of military
and what is bad for a given foreign
the perception of events from the per-
confrontation with the West unthink-
nation, and a corresponding (but his-
spective of the Kremlin. The Warsaw
able to the Soviets in view of their
torically insupportable) assumption
ultimatum was either played down or
extended and vulnerable communica-
that "civilized" governments normally
dismissed altogether by Western anal-
tions across the countries with deeply
act in their own best interests as such
ysts. The Soviet-Czechoslovak en-
divided populations.
are defined by detached and dispas-
counters at Cierna and Bratislava,
Alternatively, it is also possible that
sionate scholars. This is often not true
with the unprecedented attendance of
the United States could have extracted,
even in democratic societies where big
the full membership of the Politburo
in return for a hands-off stand regard-
issues are freely discussed - remem-
of the Communist Party of the Soviet
ing Czechoslovakia, concessions on
ber the Bay of Pigs, the Suez cam-
Union, as well as the initial with-
some other outstanding issues: in the
paign of 1956, or the overthrow of
drawal of the Warsaw Pact troops
form of a cease-fire in Vietnam, a
the Diem government in Saigon? It
from the maneuvers in Czechoslovakia,
tolerable agreement on the Middle
is much less true in the communist
were interpreted as signs of Soviet
East, or a return of the Pueblo crew.
world.
weakness or rationality. The Czecho-
But in order to take a firm stand,
Finally, there was an error - quite
slovaks, on the other hand, supported
the American government and public
widespread among liberal Sovietolo-
by the vast majority of the world's
needed a much clearer picture of
gists - in assuming that there exists,
communist parties, appeared to dis-
what was going on, and an authorita-
basically, the same logic and the same
play cool defiance and determination
tive forewarning about the likelihood
way of reasoning among all modern
to defend their newly won freedoms.
of Soviet action. To the extent that
leaders and that, perhaps with minor
Under such circumstances most ana-
neither was forthcoming, the respon-
variations - attributable to prejudices,
lysts thought Moscow would avoid
sibility for Western inaction must be
ideology, upbringing, or insufficient
military occupation, even if it could
shared by political analysts, within
sophistication - all leaders behave
be certain the West would take no
and outside the government, who had
more or less the same way. The im-
action. Events proved them wrong,
misread the mind of the Soviets and
pressive Soviet record indicating
and the appearance of half a million
grossly exaggerated the Czechoslovak
certain substantial differences be-
Soviet troops in the heart of Europe,
ability to resist, thereby helping to
tween the communist and, say,
in a country that had never been oc-
create a climate in which no action
American behavior, was consciously
cupied before, has upset the strategic
was possible.
or subconsciously dismissed. Aren't
balance of power in Europe no less
There is no assurance the United
we all changing, becoming more en-
than the placing of Soviet missiles in
States would have acted even had the
lightened and subtle in exercising
Cuba upset the balance in the West-
climate been different and the advice
power and self-restraint, and in tak-
ern Hemisphere in October, 1962.
The significance of this drastic change
been sound. But this is an entirely
ing into account the enormous com-
plexities of the modern world?
is still given scant notice in the Ameri-
different matter. For the moment, we
Of course, alarming signs during
can press, although it has been fully
will do well to examine our embar-
the last few years came from within
realized in Europe and, somewhat
rassing lack of empathy in this par-
the Soviet Union suggesting a wither-
belatedly, by the United States Gov-
ticular episode, keeping in mind that
ing away of the "liberalism" of the
ernment.
the next time around American in-
immediate post-Stalin era. But those
terests may be involved much more
had been regarded as purely internal
directly and that our failure to per-
Whether or not the invasion
developments, not necessarily transfer-
ceive through the eyes of the adver-
could have been thwarted is
able to the international arena where
sary may have much more dangerous
the Soviets appeared to be aligned
now a matter for speculation.
consequences.
9
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
K/0001 I 16/03
The Apotheosis
and Descent
of Chairman Mao
by James T. Myers
KENSION
ear as our mother and
"D
pared to the life-giving forces of na-
little red book's chapter on "Investi-
father to us are, Chair-
ture, and it is claimed, his "thought"
gation and Study":
man Mao is dearer by
is for all faithful Chinese the "soul
"Investigation may be likened to
far." Thus do the school children of
of their being." The Chinese scientists
the long months of pregnancy, and
the Chinese People's Republic eulo-
who successfully synthesized protein
solving a problem to the day of birth.
gize their nation's leader. In China
insulin, as well as the atomic scien-
To investigate a problem is, indeed,
today Mao Tse-tung is lauded as the
tists who detonated China's first nu-
to solve it."
Great Helmsman of the Chinese revo-
clear device are said to have reached
Mao's thought is not relevant only
lution, the Great Leader, Great
the pinnacle of success only after
to men of science. He is the recog-
Teacher, and Great Supreme Com-
drawing inspiration from the writings
nized authority on every other subject
mander of the Chinese people. He is
and thought of Mao Tse-tung. These
- from ping-pong to night soil
said to be the Red Sun in the hearts
scientists may have been relying on
collection. Mao's physical presence
of his countrymen, is frequently com-
the following bit of wisdom from the
is reputed to have inspired senior
10
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FARMER
Eastern Europe
December 31, 1968
Mr. Gene Farmer
Senior Editor
Life Magazine
Time and Life Building
Rockefeller Center
New York, New York
Dear Mr. Farmer:
I very much appreciated your letter
of December 17, and its many thoughtful
comments on the situation in Eastern Europe.
It is one of the best reviews of what is going
on in that area that I have seen for some time.
Please keep writing me. This is the
sort of fresh thinking government produces too
rarely.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Kissinger
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Dear Dr. Kissinger:
Thank you for your kind note of 9 December. I should have
responded earlier but for the fact that my entire household
has been struck down by whatever it is that has put half
the city under the care of doctors, who seem to know little
more about Hong Kong flu than I do.
During my recent trip I mₐde no attempt to do the whole Iron
Curtain bit; I picked Yugoslavia and Rumania because I thought
the element of fear and/or nervousness made it likely that
in those two countries people would talk to me. I did not
attempt to see Tito or Ceaucescu; I have acquired a personal
distrust for the gimmick of journalistic summitry, and I
thought Sulzberger's column, written after he saw Ceaucescu,
was misleading. Anyway, for what they are worth, here are
the impressions I brought back.
The period of genuine fear lasted from the time of the Czech
takeover until about the end of September. The Yugoslavs
oiled their guns, called up some reserves and made all sorts
of contingency plans for a quick withdrawal into the hills
should the Red Army start pouring down across the Hungarian
border. (They would not fight the "ussians in the open
field, of course.) The Rumanians called up some workers'
militia, a kind of local National Guard. Ceaucescu has
denied that these men were given arms, but the prevailing
opinion is that at least some of them were. And De Gaulle
remarked that for the first time since he had returned to
power in 1958 he now had to take into account the possibil-
ity of war in Europe. I heard this as a rumor when I
passed through Paris at the start of my trip; I didn't
quite believe it, since this was tantamount to admitting
that the General's whole "eastward" policy had been fatally
compromised. But the British Embassy in Belgrade confirmed
it; the remark had been made in Paris to the British Ambassador.
In Yugoslavia the guns are still oiled, but there has been
some relaxation of tension. In early September emissaries
from the Soviet and Bulgarian Embassies were charging around
Belgrade, buttonholing intellectuals in general and journal-
ists in particular to warn them they were being watched and
that there was "a little list." Marko Nikezic, the foreign
minister, says this personal intimidation has stopped, but
at the time I was there Yugoslavia was still being blasted
in the Soviet press. In any event the climate was still such
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that a rumor could get out of hand the last night I was in
Belgrade (5 November) the Russians were supposed to have
invaded Rumania. This got people at the Hotel Metropol bar
ordering doubles instead of singles, and--I heard later--
thoroughly upset a party at the Italian Embassy. I don't
think a line was ever filed on the rumor, because I checked
the Associated Press that night by telephone and was informed
that the talk was indeed all over the town but no confirma-
tion had surfaced. The next morning I told Nikezic about it;
he seemed genuinely surprised. Then he guessed that the rumor
had started because of a shipment of Soviet military aircraft
to the Romanian Air Force which Nikezic had heard about over
the weekend. This must have been the case, since the following
day I was told by the Rumanian Foreign Office in Bucharest
that the planes had been delivered, that the ferry pilots
were Russian, and the planes were 30 in number. The Ruman-
ians also insisted that the planes were now Rumanian property.
I don't know how literally to take that, of course.
The big thing on Yugoslav minds is the Middle East and the
"confrontation" possibilities which lie in that area. They
are very bothered about the presence of a Soviet fleet in the
Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and when they look at a map
they see that the land road to the Mäditerranean runs right
through their front parlor. I tried to argue this point with
Nikezic, suggesting that Russia's new status as a first-rate
salt-water power made it unnecessary for the Red Army to over-
extend itself on land. He shot me down. "I see your point, he
said, "but it is not valid. The Russians are not accustomed to
scattering fleets all over the world and using them as instru-
ments of power, the way the British did for so long. We think
we know their military thinking very well, and they still want
everything land-connected.' Since Nikezic appears to be the
only one in Belgrade who thought to the last that the Soviets
would invade Czechoslovakia (Tito figured the danger was past),
perhaps his opinion should be taken seriously.
There is no ideological clutter in such thinking; the Yugoslavs
threw their ideological Bible away some time ago. But there is
a renewed consciousness of Great Russian imperialism in the
manner of Cathering the Great, who also sent a Russian fleet
to the Mediterranean. I found, not surprisingly, bhat both
Nikezic and Micunavic, who used to be Ambassador to Washing-
ton, had some fairly raw nerves on the subject of "the Socialist
Commonwealth." (I had lost track of Micunavic, but he heard
that I was in town and sent for me; he is now the local equivalent
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of Senator Fulbright at the parliamentary level.) Both
men said in effect: Who, me? "We consider ourselves a
Socialist country," Nikezic said, "but we are not in any-
body's Commonwealth."
There is a good deal of talk in Belgrade to the effect
that Nikezic is marked for bigger things, starting with
the presidency of the Serbian Communist Party. I
couldn't get a line on who successor might be, but
I wouldn't be surprised if it were Micunavic. Ambassador
Elbrick's thoughts on that subject would be worth more
than mine; he had the flu when I was there and I didn
see him. This shift could even put Nikezic in line for
the succession when Tito goes, but I think it worthwhile
to bear in mind something Koca Popovic told me two years
ago: There is only one Tito, there won't be another, and
in any successor government the power will be spread
around differently. At the time Popovic was vice-presi-
dent of Yugoslavia, but he is now old and ailing and is
out of it.
Meanwhile it would appear that Yugoslavia continues to
move more and more in the direction of an "open sciety,"
whether they call it Socialist or not; speech and press
are relatively free, and a traveler has no feeling of
being in a police state. As you know, no visa is required
to enter of leave Yugoslavia. The abolition of the entrance
visa requirement (all this took place two years) encour-
ages tourism, and the abolition of the exit visa requirement
for Yugoslav nationals made their labor force mobile; this
cut out the paper work. They do have an unemployment problem
because their industrialization is undercapitalized; there
just aren't enough jobs. But it is still an odd form of
Communism which permits you to sign for your whole hotel
bill on an American Express card. For that matter, even
the Plaza Athenee in Bucharest will honor a Diners card.
Rumania is still a tight shop; the country seems to me
to be run by a bunch of anti-Soviet Stalinists. There
is also more nervousness in Bucharest (what a drab city,
particularly in an autumn rain!) than Ceaucescu admitted
in his conversation with Sulzberger. My principal source
here was a deputy foreign minister named Malitza;he con-
firmed that the militia had been called up after the Czech
takeover, and he certainly indicated that they had been
armed with something more than their fists.
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When I Was there the Rumanians were playing their relations
with the Soviet Union very, very carefully. Ceaucescu made
a dramatic speech denouncing the Czech invasion the week it
happened; but according to American intelligence the Soviet
Ambassador paid Ceaucescu a sudden visit the following Sunday
morning. For whatever reason, criticism thereafter was mu-
ted. But the Rumanians have a clever way of considering
that, a thing having been said once, that's enough: they
can point to something on the record and say, "That's our
policy, that's all there is to it." Malitza had no illusions
about the duress under which Dubcek & Co. signed the "norm-
alization" agreement with the Soviets, but he took the stand
that it was a legal document, and he said that privately the
Rumanians were encouraging the Czechs to abide by it--that
is, "be good.' A document signed under such duress wouldn't
stand up in a Western court, but this is Rumania and the
Rumanians want no more trouble. They know how much mud
they have thrown in Moscow's eyes in the past--more than
the Czechs ever did.
I would guess that Ceaucescu would resist Warsaw Pact
maneuvers in Rumania next spring, but not to the bitter
end. If he did that, he would go the way of Dubcek, and
his Army would face three awkward choices: 1) a hopeless
all-out resistence; 2) the humiliation of submission; 3)
running Westward for the Yugoslav hills. (The Yugoslavs
give the impression of having allowed for the third pos-
sibility in their contingency planning, although they
consider it a remote possibility.) Meanwhile economic
relations between Rumania and the U.S.S.R. seem a little
cloudy. A new trade treaty, to replace the one which
expired at the beginning of 1968, has been initialed (ac-
cording to Malitza), but it remains uncertain whether
heavy equipment for two new power plants will be delivered
as promised a long time ago. Although the Rumanians make
a good deal of foreign currency by selling petroleum
products, wheat and maize (particularly to West Germany),
they are still vulnerable to economic as well as military
pressures from Moscow.
Malitzabhad one comment on "war danger" which I found
interesting. It went about like this: "You Americans go
from one extreme to the other. All during the 1950s
there was talk about 'war by accident' and 'war by mis-
calculation.' After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962
one heard less such talk, and after the test-ban treaty
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was signed in 1963 the talk died out entirely. You assumed
that more had been settled with the Soviet Union than was
the case. There always was some danger of war, and there is
now.
One reason I undertook this trip was to find out where so
many people, including myself, had gone wrong in judging the
danger of military action against Czechoslovakia to be past
by mid-August. (I would have been much less surprised had
it happened in June.) Of course de Gaulle and Tito were
wrong too, but I was surprised to learn how early Tito had
been cut in on the possibility of such an operation. This
may not be news to you, but it was news to me that when he
passed through Moscow, on his way home from the Far East
during the last week of April, the Soviet leaders told him
they were very worried about what Dubcek was doing, that
military intervention was being considered, and what ddd
Tito think about it? Tito was completely taken aback; he
said it would be "a catastrophe.' If According to one man
who was there (Nikezic), "They didn't react at all. They
just sat there.' Obviously the Soviets were not seeking
Tito's advice; they were just testing his reaction. Finally,
after stating his opinion that what the Czechs were doing
did not constitute a danger to the Socialist system, Tito
said he would work on the Czechs, and he did. He thought
he had worked successfully; there was a political council
of war in Belgrade three or four days before the Red Army
marched, and Nikezic seems to have been the only holdout vote.
It would be easy and a little dangerous to over-emphasize
the role of the Soviet military in the final decision;
the Yugoslavs think that even Grechko may have been against
invading Czechoslovakia, although they think the Red Army's
political commisariat types were probably for it. (I am
inclined to agree on the basis of the evidence in so far.)
Both the Rumanians and the Yugoslavs agree that Ulbricht
and Gomulka, who had their own job security to worry about,
were yelling their heads off to Moscow during the late winter
and early spring, although there is no concensus on how much
influence their yelling had; Malitza seems to think it counted
for quite a lot. Then there is the traditional Russian fear
of Germany; military habits die hard, particularly in the
case of a land animal like the Soviet Union, and I suppose
the Soviet generals still tend to think of the Bohemian hills
the way Bismarck did.
My own view is that the Soviets moved out of panic when they
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saw, or thought they saw, the dismantling of a Socialist
state in an intolerable place. Czechoslovakia's geoggaphy
has been one of the curses of that country, and its location
invokes, in the Russian mind, the old fear of Germany, some
of which they fake for their own purposes but some of which
I think is real. I think, however, that the fear is more
psychological than military. The Soviet generals can't
really be afraid of the mighty Bundeswehr, which has never
been up to strength anyway. But Nikezic thinks the Russians
were genuinely frightened of the economic consequences of
a Czech getaway, particularly if West German banks started
ponying up big credits. After all, even after the Communist
takeover in 1948 the Czechs had to be slapped down when they
wanted to come into the Marshall Plan.
I put the gist of this syllogism to Wilfred Burchett, the
Australian journalist whose Communist connections you know.
He professed to be shaken by what the Russians did ("Outraged?
Let's say I was very upset"). His reaction: "That's about
it, but you forgot two things. Even the pro-Dubcek Czechs
now tell me that Dubcek was not as strong a man as they had
thought, which indicates to me that the reforms may really
have been getting away from him to a degree that the Russians
could not tolerate. Also, the Czechs are Slavs and the
Russians think of them as family. They think of the Rumanians
as a bunch of romantic and harmless Latins.' (And, of course,
there was no "media nonsense" in Rumania.)
I might add that I take Burchett seriously within his known
limits; it is in his interest to tell the truth, even if it
is not the whole truth. He has a nice racket shuttling back
and forth between Hanoi and Paris with merchandise nobody
else can get, and this makes him about $20,000 a year. There-
fore he would be foolish to tell too many outright lies.
Moreover he said one thing in this conversation, which took
place in Paris, that I thought damned odd, to wit: "The big
problem of the Socialist states ts to find the means for
official dissent and then learn to tolerate the dissent.
If they don't solve that one, I don't know whether the system
will survive. A couple of weeks later he was in New York
(he got a visa in Montreal on a Cuban passport). I saw him
for a drink and asked him if I had heard him correctly; I had.
All this leaves unanswered two questions:
1. Why did the Soviets stop short of turning Prague into
another Budapest? Even allowing for the fact that the Czechs
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did not fight like Hungarian Freedom Fighters, it still seemed
inconceivable at the end of August that Dubcek and his associates
would be around, even in positions of nominal power, at the begin-
ning of December. I deduce that the Soviets realized they had
made a considerable political miscalculation and therefore rewrote
the script as they went along. Although it appears that Dubcek
was roughed up physicallywhen he was taken to Moscow, the Soviets
didn't shoot him and probably won't. They were even "negotiating"
with him in the first week of December, although the presence at
that meeting (in Kiev) of Shelest, the Ukrainian party boss, may
have been significant. The Yugoslavs think he was the biggest
hawk of all on the Czech matter.
2. Was the Czech takeover a 100% politically defensive measure?
If so it's too bad about the Czechs, who are a historically un-
lucky people, but the military power balance has not been crit-
ically deranged and that does not mean we are in imminent danger
of war. Or was the military operation designed in part to
shore up the Czech-Serman border with Soviet troops with some-
thing else in mind? That old German word drang is back in
conversation. Great Russian drang, that is. Micunavic says,
"If there is drang in this, it is drang to the South, and
that means us." On this question I have heard "I don't know"
in half a dozen languages, including the Romanian and the
Australian.
My guess is that we are entering a period of "gelatinous"
cold war, neither all hard nor all soft, with all hands
playing it safe, taking no wooden nickels and--to a degree,
anyway--going back to the dreary practice of reading tea
leaves. Like a lot of other people, I had hoped we were
about out of that period; but considering the Russian men-
tality, which was pretty secretive èven in the days of the Czars,
maybe we will never be out of it entirely. Janos Radvanyi,
the defected Hungarian who is now at Stanford, once told me
he had seen documentary proof (in Budapest files) of a first-rate
row in early 1967 which nearly cost Kosygin and Brezhnev their
jobs. I suspect that that sort of thing happens more frequently
than we can know.
During the first week of November the Yugoslavs were nervous
not only because of a late and spectacularly warm Indian
summer (this looked like good tank weather) but because of a
dawning fear that the U.S. might fail to elect anyone President.
I walked a Yugoslav editor Julius, of Politika) through the
jungle of the 12th Amendment one morning and he literally
began to turn pale. When I had finished he went to the cupboard
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and brought out a bottle of what he called "the good slivovitz";
he thought we both needed one.
I was in Bucharest the day following the U.S. election, and I
spent most of that day at the American Embassy trying to keep
score. I broke at 1 p.m., Bucharest time, to visit the Foreign
Office and present my journalistic credentials. I was mildly
surprised to find the Press Section openly pulling for Nixon;
at that time, of course, the result was not yet known. My
conversation with Malitza turned up the reasons why: 1) Nixon
apparently got on well with Ceaucescu and the Rumanians liked
him rather than otherwise ("He asked a lot of questions and he
listened to the answers"); 2) Humphrey was in Johnson's shadow
and, like the Yugoslavs, the Rumanians liked the idea of a
change; 3) things being how they are, the Rumanians are not
at all unhappy about a U.S. President who is definitely not
pro-Soviet.
I think that ends it, and it's about time, since this letter
is too long already. If any of this is remotely useful to
you, I shall be glad.
With respect, and every good personal wish as always.
Sincerely,
Sen Jarme
Gene Farmer
Senior Editor
(as from: 237 St. Marks Place
Staten Island, New York
10301)
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Office of the President-elect
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
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