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    "ocrText": "LSE recommendation- -\nno letter. vor\nDecember 23, 1968\nKISSINGER/ALLEN\nDEC2 6 1968\nMr. W. A. Kelley\nLany 1 make\n5415 Duvall Drive\nme this is unsiden\nWashington, D. C. 20016\nDear Spike:\nby em man Japan Okinana\nMerci for the thoughtful study on the\nOkinawan problem. It is in the right\nhands -- those of Dr. Kissinger, to be\nexact -- and I'm sure it will receive\nthe close attention it deserves.\nI have also your December 10 note with\nthe copy of your letter to Mr. Knudsen,\nstill there is nothing definite to re-\nport, but then in the chaos of transition,\nprogress is slow!\nThe best to you and yours in these holiday\ntimes.\nWarmly,\nBryce N. Harlow\nAssistant to the\nPresident-Elect\nBNH:ph\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\n5415 Duvall Drive\nWashington, D. C. 20016\nDecember 2, 1968\nMr. Bryce N. Harlow\nAssistant to the President-Elect\nPierre Hotel\n61 Street and Fifth Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\nDear Bryce:\nMany thanks for your letter of November 19 that unaccount-\nably was received after my letter to you of November 25.\nI realize thatthe top jobs must be decided upon before any\nthought is given to the lower positions. Meanwhile, in an\neffort to be helpful, I have prepared staff studies of\nseveral sensitive areas that you can hand on to whoever is\nassigned responsibility for the areas.\nThe first of these on \"Okinawa\" is attached. It is one of\nthe most important bases we have in the world. However,\nunless some decisive action is taken shortly, we not only\nwill lose Okinawa, but our bases in Japan.\n1 am leaving here Tuesday for Washington and will be staying\nwith J. D. Burrus, Jr., 5415 Duvall Drive, Washington, D. C.\n20016 Telephone 202 Oliver 4 - 6030. You may remember\nJeff as one of the best tennis players in Washington. He\nis in the Legislative Division of the Bureau of the Budget.\nWith kindest regards and best wishes,\nSincerely yours,\nSpike W. A. Kelley\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nOKINAWA\nA Staff Study by W. A. Kelley, Former\nAssistant Civil Administrator of Okinawa\nThe Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, the largest island, is\nadministered by the United States under provisions of Section III\nof the U. S. - Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952. As the most heavily\nfortified base in the world, it is the key to the U. S. position\nin the Far East and it is the only base on foreign soil where a\nstatus of forces agreement is not necessary, permitting us complete\nfreedom of action.\nHowever, we are on the point of being forced out of Okinawa. The\nOkinawa legislature has sent petitions to the Japanese Diet, to\nthe United Nations, and to the U. S. Congress. Last week the\nRyukyuan people elected Chobyo Yara as Chief Executive. He ran on\na platform of immediate reversion to Japan. His defeated opponent\nran on a platform of gradual reversion. This is more galling when\nit is realized that the Ryukyuan people were never happy under the\nJapanese rule. There was a highly developed Okinawan culture long\nbefore there was a Japanese Empire. Over four hundred years ago\nunder the Okinawa kings a flourishing trade was carried on all over\nthe Pacific and Indian Oceans and particularly with the great\nChinese empire.\nJapanese war lords coveted this trade and moved in gangster style\nto control it. Finally, the Japanese Government in 1879 took\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\n2\ncaptive the King of Okinawa at the point of the sword and placed\nhim under house arrest in Tokyo. At the same time they filled\nall of the administrative jobs in Okinawa with Japanese and the\nOkinawa people were forced to accept second class status. The\nRyukyu Islands became a Prefecture of Japan.\nThe Okinawa people attempted to stay out of World War II and\nbegged the Japanese not to fortify Okinawa. When the Japanese\ndid fortify the island, no provision was made for civil defense\nfor the inhabitants. On the contrary, they were exposed to the\nheavy gunfire in the war's bloodiest battle, SO that there were\n147,000 casualties among the civilians.\nConsequently with the end of hostilities there was rejoicing\namong the Ryukyuan people that the United States was victorious.\nThe feeling of friendship was increased by the Americans providing\nfood and shelter and medical assistance to attempt to alleviate\nthe desperate condition of the people. Every building in Naha,\nthe capital, had been razed by bombing and gunfire.\nAlthough the Okinawans were not consulted when the U. S. - Japan\npeace treaty was negotiated, they happily accepted the transfer\nof the Administration of the islands to the United States. They\nexpected to regain their old freedom, to re-establish the old\nkingdom, and resume the prosperous trade of pre-Japanese years.\nIn this happy, hopeful period we could have negotiated an agree-\nment mutually helpful to both the U. S. and the Ryukyuan people,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\n3\nby which we would have guaranteed the security, freedom, and\npolitical stability of the islands and given economic assistance\nin return for the right to maintain our bases free of any status\nof forces limitations or any interference whatever. This relation-\nship could have existed indefinitely and grown stronger with the\npassage of time. Instead, we are on the verge of losing the base\nentirely, in spite of the herculean efforts of the last two U. S.\nHigh Commissioners.\nBefore attempting to propose any remedial action, it is necessary\nto review the causes of the loss of such a priceless opportunity.\nInstead of being treated as free, friendly equals, the Ryukyuan\npeople have been treated as conquered subjects. In fact, one\nrecent High Commissioner openly treated them as such and made\nthem grovel for everything they needed. In a speech to their\nyoung leaders of the Golden Gate Club, he told them they had\nneither the intelligence nor the integrity to govern themselves.\nInstead of being given the opportunity to set up their own in-\ndependent government, the Military Government established after\nthe battle of Okinawa has been continued. The name was changed\nto U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR);\nthe military doffed their uniforms for mufti; but nothing else\nwas changed. The military High Commissioner continued to issue\nordinancesand retained the authority to review and approve all\nacts of the puppet legislature. Not until this November were\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\n4\nthe people allowed to elect their Chief Executive. The local\nbudget had to be approved by the Hicom.\nThose United States civilians who staffed the USCAR departments\nunder the military heads used their official authority to their\nown advantage and looked upon their positions as personal fiefs.\nMany of them were incompetent and incapable of carrying out their\nresponsibilities.\nThe control of United States funds appropriated for the local\neconomy was inadequate; this looseness generated misunderstanding.\nCongress also contributed to the erosion of the United States\nposition by deciding that funds for the development and operation\nof the Ryukyus came under Foreign Aid and were subject to the\nlimitations and regulations of that program. Actually such funds\nwere no more Foreign Aid than any expense incurred in the operations\nof any other base under the United States flag - Fort Myer, Fort\nLewis, Fort Benning or the Presidio. Okinawa is one vast United\nStates base completely under the command of a Lieutenant General\nacting as High Commissioner. Appropriations for Okinawa should\nbe reviewed by the Armed Services Committees and not by the Foreign\nAid Committees.\nOver the past twenty-six years under constant pressure from both\nthe Ryukyuan people and the Japanese Government, various concessions\nhave been made by the United States; but each one was granted un-\nwillingly and ungraciously. Consequently the United States became\nidentified as the oppressor and Japan as their savior.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\n5\nWe also have made the mistake of believing that money andjobs in\nthe military installations can buy Ryukyuan cooperation and friend-\nship. More important to them is a loss of face by being forced to\nbe a nation lacking in identity in world affairs and not even\nallowed to fly their own flag.\nRecommendations\nA military base in the Ryukyu Islands is essential for the United\nStates position in the Far East and as an early warning station\nfor any attack on the United States mainland or on the Free World.\nTherefore the following actions are recommended:\nI. While the United States still retains \"the right to exercise\nall and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdic-\ntion over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including\ntheir territorial waters\" (U. S. - Japanese Peace Treaty), and\nwhile we still have the support of the ruling Japan Liberal\nDemocratic Party (JLDP), we should negotiate with the Govern-\nment of the Ryukyu Islands the agreement that we should have\noffered twenty-six years ago. This should be done with the\nhelp and support of the JLDP.\nThis agreement should include:\nA. The abolishment of USCAR\nB. The appointment of a Civilian Advisory Staff consisting\nof competent, qualified, capable specialists on leave from\nappropriate departments in Washington and headed by a civilian\nDirector.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\n6\nC. A Ryukyu Islands Corporation should be established under\na Deputy Director to be responsible for and to administer all\nUnited States funds used for or by the local people. The Ryukyu\nDevelopment Loan Corporation, the Ryukyu Water Development\nCorporation, the Ryukyu Electric Power Corporation, the Ryukyu\nTourist Development Board and the Bank of the Ryukyus would be\ntransferred to and become part of the Corporation.\nD. The people of the Ryukyu Islands could proceed to establish\ntheir own form of government not antagonistic to the security\nof Japan or the United States.\nE. The United States could continue indefinitely to maintain\nand operate military bases in the Islands with the same degree\nof freedom that exists today.\nF. The civilian Director would be a member of the Area Committee\nconsisting of the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force.\nThe Commanding General of the Army IX Corps would continue to\nact as the Representative of the Commander in Chief Pacific\n(CINCPAC) and as such would act as Chairman of the Committee.\nG. Funds appropriated for civil purposes in the Islands\nshould be distributed where possible on a loan basis with\nreasonable interest except for ememgency purposes, such as\ntyphoon damage repair. This should permit a revolving fund\nto be built up.\nH. Overall plans for economic, political, educational,\njudicial, and foreign trade development as well as for internal\nsecurity should be worked out by the local government assisted\nby the Civilian Advisory Group.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\n7\nI. The United States would reserve the right to take any\nnecessary action to protect the security of the Islands.\nII. As insurance against the possibility of being driven out of\nOkinawa, the United States should purchase outright from Okinawa\nthe island of Iriomote, solely as a base. It is located 250\nmiles southwest of Okinawa almost within sight of Taiwan.\nIn 1962 a study made by the Civil Administration revealed the\nfollowing facts about Iriomote:\nAREA. About 110 square miles.\nTOPOGRAPHY. Mountains about 1600 feet high sloping off to the east.\nWATER. Ample water throughout the year with two rivers.\nCLIMATE. Semi-tropical, much like that of Taiwan.\nHARBOR. The finest natural harbor in the Far East, 210 foot\ndepth surrounded by mountains. Large enough to hold the entire\nJapanese fleet in World War II. The fleet used it when threatened\nby a typhoon.\nPOPULATION. Practically unpopulated. Malaria had driven the\npopulation away. The U. S. Army cleared the island of mosquitoes\nand malaria has been eradicated. The former inhabitants, however,\nnever returned.\nTRANSPORTATION. Accessible by boat. There is a small grass\nlanding area for small planes at the eastern end. There is enough\nflat area plus the filling in of shoal water to make runways for\nlarge planes. At present there are almost no roads.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\n8\nINDUSTRY. Fishing and agriculture are the main occupations.\nA Japanese company does some lumbering under a license granted\nby the United States.\nMILITARY USE. A few troops are trained in jungle warfare on\nthe heavily wooded mountainsides.\nRECREATIONAL FACILITIES. Iriomote has some of the finest beaches\nin the Ryukyus. There is space available for a sporty golf\ncourse, tennis, and archery. Taiwan is almost in sight on a\nclear day, and Ishigaki is only a few minutes away by plane or\nboat.\nThe report of the study concluded with a recommendation that the\nisland be purchased and plans initiated for the location of\nvarious military installations. The report pointed out that\nIriomote could be defended more easily than could Okinawa.\nCONCLUSION. There is no middle ground. We either accept one or\nboth of the above recommendations or something similar, or the\nUnited States will lose its base in the Ryukyus. If we continue\nto pursue our present course of making piecemeal concessions without\nattempting to find an overall, permanent solution, the Japanese\nLiberal Democratic Party will within three years fall on the issue\nof Okinawa; then not only will we be forced out of Okinawa, but\nthe U. S. - Japan Mutual Security Pact will not be renewed.\nIt must be kept in mind that some of our Allies during World War II\nnever concurred in our continued occupation of Okinawa. Our policies\nand procedures in the Ryukyus during the past twenty-six years\nhave strengthened their doubts.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nOPTIONAL FORM NO 10\n5010-108\nMAY 1962 EDITION\nGSA GEN. REG. NO. 27\nRead\nUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT\nSECRET/EXDIS\nMemorandum\nTO\n:\nEA - Mr. Bundy\nDATE: December 24, 1968\nEA - Ambassador Brown\nFROM : EA/J - Richard L. Sneider\nW\nSUBJECT: Trip Report: Okinawan Reversion on the Front Burner\nThe overwhelming impression I have after ten days in\nJapan and Okinawa is that we have reached the point of\nno return on the reversion issue. The pressures have\nbuilt up in both Japan and Okinawa to the point where\nI can see virtually no hope of stalling off beyond the\nend of next year a decision on the timing of reversion,\nalthough the actual return would take place later.\nParticularly worrisome is the turn of events in Okinawa\nsince Yara's election. There, our problems could indeed\nmount up very rapidly. At the same time, there is little\nindication that we are as yet any closer to a mutually\nsatisfactory solution covering our post-reversion base\nrights than we were a year ago.\nJapan and the Sato Pledge\nOnce again, Sato has easily overcome the threats to his\npower from his rivals within the Party and has put into\noffice a cabinet, which is by far the ablest and most\nunderstanding of the vitals of U.S. -Japanese relations.\nBut, the strength of Sato's position can prove to be\ntransitory: he is an acknowledged lame duck and the\nconsequential intra-party maneuvering to succeed him has\nonly now begun. Furthermore, by publicly committing his\nregime to solution of the Okinawa problem, he has given\nhis rivals within the party and his foes outside the party\na major test of success.\nWith the onset of 1969, there is no doubt that Okinawa is\nthe number one national issue in Japan. It may be argued\nSECRET/EXDIS\nSECRET/EX\nL.\nthat Sato placed hi\n£ in his\ne\npredi\nent of\nneeding an agreemen\nth the U\nn\naw\nuring\n1969 by stressing t\nssue over\nP\ne'\nears.\nHowever, for bette\nwor\nhe\ndor\nso\nI think\nhis political ju\nit was\nbab\nat any\neffort to pla\nthe i\nyou]\nlave\nd\nis\nopposition\na\ntron\nint\nattac\nevent, not\nonser a ves 1:\nU\nllia\ncoul\n1 be at\nake\nn\n\"fort\nsolve t\nnawa\nto continue\nproceed\ns1\ng\nplans on Oki\nNeither\n:\ntl\nForeig\nOf\nas\nreached any\nusion on\n'lic'\nto\nrds\nst\nrsion\nbase rights\nthough\nOV\ng\nIW\nthat\nan offer of C\ninued n\ntoral\nCO\nb\nolitical\nsuicide. The\nreign o\nto wi\nsome\nconcept\nconvention\nfree us\nS\nthoug : thre gh the\ndetails, part\nilarly hc\nell\nto t Japane e public.\nIn fact, the\nappears\nCO\nious fort to avoid\ndeciding the\nDJ posit\nil\nn\nU.S.\nAdmin\ntr\nion\nis thoroughl\ntested.\nsado\nJol\nkeeps re\nidin\nthe GOJ, on\nother h\nthat t\nfirst t'\nthrough\nits policies terms of\nal\nic\nsessmen\nof\nt\nsecurity nee\nof Japan\nhe\nun\nes ad\nnt to\nwhose securi is vital\nIn the meant\ne, the Sat\nerni\nS try\no clear\nthe decks on\n11 other U\napan\nes an\nlop a\npackage of\npful\" act\nis\nin As\nhich\nten\nthe Okinawan\nckage fr\nIS.\nTypi\nLy, a\nby\nAmbassador J\nson to\ne Minist\nshiba\nGOJ\nmight give C\nidera\nto how i\nuld pa\nte in the\ndefense of t\nRyuky\nfter reve\non sent\nficials\nimmediately\nrryin\nvn to Oki\na to st\nproblem.\nThe Japanese\ne, th\nin the p'\nratory\nE policy\nmaking and I\nmovin\ncipitou\nTheir\nble calls\nfor careful\nnding\noughout\n2\nspring\nto be followed by al summit meeti in Washi\nthe\nfall. Threy have accepted the wisdom of not pushing the\nSEC\nT/EXDIS\nSECRET/EXDIS\n3.\nnew Administration for'an immediate decision on the\nRyukyus, but are worried lest it be put off tdb far\nand bring them into 1970 without an agreement.\nOkinawa, a Potential Trigger\nThe new factor in the Okinawa reversion equation is the\npressures developing within Okinawa on reversion. In\nthe past, it has been the implicit assumption of both\nourselves and the Japanese that the big boys (the U.S.\nand Japan) will settle the problem and the Okinawans will\ndocilely accept our joint decision. This assumption can\nno longer be counted upon. The Okinawan intrusion into\nthe reversion negotiations can come in two ways, through\nagitation leading to open incidents with U.S. forces, and\nthrough the evangelistic pressures for action on the part\nof the new Chief Executive, Yara.\nThe potential for an incident involving an open clash\nbetween demonstrators and American military forces\nprotecting our bases is much higher today than ever\nbefore. Given the limited capabilities of the Ryukyuan\npolice, such an incident has always been possible. The\nodds have been considerably shortened in recent weeks by\nthree factors:\n(1) The increased militancy and radicalism of the\nstudents who are beginning to mimic the tactics of their\nJapanese brethren;\n(2) the ambiguous position of Yara who at the same\ntime is the accepted leader and spokesman of the anti-\nbase movement and is now responsible for controlling it\n-- nobody knows how he will react when the crunch comes;\nand,\n(3) the development of an issue that binds almost\nall Okinawans and strikes a sympathetic, emotional chord\n-- the B-52 operations at Kadena and the danger of another\nincident.\nSECRET/EXDIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSECRET/EXDIS\n4.\nIn this climate, our insistance upon exercising our\nunrestricted rights for B-52 operations, SSN visits,\netc. becomes not only a focal point for potentially\ndangerous demonstrations, but further an incentive to\nseek as soon as possible reversion of Okinawa at the\n\"homeland level\" where the Japanese Government will\n\"protect\" the Okinawans against the U.S. General\nUnger is making every effort to reach a modus vivendi\nwith Yara without making serious concessions on base\nrights. But it is a precarious task given the pressures\nYara is under from his left-wing coalition and the\ninherent desire of the conservative opposition to see\nhim fail.\nYara, moreover, has cast himself as the confirmed and\nauthentic spokesman of Okinawan reversion sentiments.\nIn his grand tour of Japan, he constantly pushed the\ntheme of early reversion. But, of even more concern\nto us is his effort at the same time to inject himself\ninto the debate on the conditions for reversion. Yara\nhas publicly urged not only \"homeland level\" but a thinning\nout of U.S. bases. He has made it clear that he, as\nOkinawa's elected leader, is going to resist efforts to\nignore the Okinawan view on post-reversion U.S. base rights.\nThus, it is not impossible that the pace of events in\nOkinawa could press the Japanese Government to accelerate\nits current timetable. Certainly, an incident involving\na clash between demonstrators and U.S. military guards\naround bases will put the Japanese Government on a very\ndifficult spot. The spectre of such a development constantly\nplagues the Foreign Office and other Japanese officials.\nThe General State of Health of U.S. Japan Relations\nOutside the Okinawan issue, there are some encouraging\nnotes of progress in resolving current U.S. -Japan problems,\nparticularly with respect to trade restrictions against\nU.S. imports, and the reasonably quiet visit of the nuclear\nsub. In very large part these actions taken by the\nSECRET/EXDIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSECRET/EXDIS\n5.\nJapanese are in their own self-interest and cued to\nclearing the decks for a favorable decision on reversion.\nBut, they also reflect the dedication of the current\nleadership to maintaining a close relationship with us.\nSymptomatically, after lengthy consideration, the\nJapanese Government has accepted our offer for space\ncooperation rather than going it alone.\nHowever, below the surface there are bubblings of\nserious discontent from within the ranks of the next\ngeneration of leaders about the character of the U.S. -\nJapan alliance and Japan's great dependence on the U.S.\nThese younger men are not necessarily dissatisfied with\na partnership with the U.S. but are concerned that the\npresent relationship gives too little freedom to the\nnew Japanese nationalism -- a vague and still far from\nwell-defined concept. They are not now seeking or even\nnecessarily desirous of a break with the U.S. and embarking\non a deGaullist path. They do look for a new relationship\nwith the U.S. by 1980 which meets their principal criterion\nof \"equality\" with us. In the context of this new nationalism,\nOkinawa has become a serious test of U.S. willingness to\ntreat Japan on more equal terms.\nis\nEA/J:RLSneider/pmh\nSECRET/EXDIS\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nIN REPLY REFER TO:\nSECRET\nJanuary 11, 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kissinger\nFROM\n: Richard L. Sneider\nSUBJECT\n: Policy Issues for NSC Consideration\nShort-term (within the next two months)\n1. U.S. policy on Okinawan reversion in the context\nof a full review of U.S.-Japanese relations.\n2. Review of Indonesian policy. (Our current policy\nis basically sound but needs review and confirmation.)\n3. U.S. policy towards the Philippines. This should\ncover both U.S.-Philippine relations and the potential\nfor major internal upheaval in the Philippines.\nMid-term (four to five months)\n1. China policy.\n2. U.S. policy towards Cambodia and Laos in the context\nof a Viet-Nam settlement.\n3. U.S. policy towards Thailand.\n4. U.S. policy towards Korea. (SIG has a major study\nof Korean policy under consideration but no decisions\nhave been made.)\nLong-term (The problems below are essential starting points\nfor any reframing of our Asian policy but have less\noperational urgency than the problems set forth above.)\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSECRET\n2.\n1. U.S. interests, commitments and role in Asia.\n2. The future structure of regional associations in\nAsia and the U.S. role therein.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nIN REPLY REFER TO:\nSECRET\nJanuary 11, 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kissinger\nFROM\n: Richard L. Sneider\nSUBJECT\n: Major Issues Anticipated During the\nNext Six Weeks in East Asia -- Addendum\nYou have my previous memorandum of January 7 listing the\nmajor anticipated issues. Set forth below is a further\nelaboration on the options available, the status of\ncurrent policy consideration and my recommendations.\n1. Issue: Korea - Pueblo\nProblem: With the return of the Pueblo crew there\nremains the requirement to register a formal protest\non the treatment of the crew for the record at\nPanmunjom and the UN and to come to a decision on\nwhat we do about the ship. Our protest on the treatment\nof the crew presents no problems. However, the Navy\nis disposed to take punitive action (e.g. seizure of a\nNorth Korean ship) if the Pueblo is not returned.\nThe State Department feels we should protest at\nPanmunjom and the UN but go no further.\nStatus: The Korean Task Force is developing plans\nfor next steps on both problems.\nRecommendation: Punitive action would be very risky\nand is not likely to get the Pueblo back. The State\nDepartment line makes more sense, particularly since\nthey would combine this with an occasional show of\nNaval force outside North Korean territorial waters.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSECRET\n2.\n2. Issue: North Korean provocation\nProblem: There is a possibility that the North\nKoreans may intensify guerrilla warfare or otherwise\ntake provocative actions in the next months.\nStatus: There are contingency plans available and\nNorth Korean actions are under close watch.\nRecommendation: I suggest these contingency plans\nbe checked out at an early date.\n3. Issue: Warsaw talks\nProblem: The Chinese Communists have opened the\ndoor slightly for the February 20 Warsaw talks,\nindicating they would like to talk about peaceful\nco-existence and Taiwan. They may be prepared to\ngive us further signals and/or test out the new\nAdministration.\nStatus: EA has under consideration several options\nranging from a willingness to hear out any Chicom\nproposals along with a restatement of our Taiwan\npolicy to a more positive offer of sounding out the\nChinese on normalization of relations.\nRecommendation: At this stage I would be inclined\nto move very cautiously with the Chinese and put the\nmonkey on their backs to come up with any specific\nproposals for peaceful co-existence but leaving the\ndoor open for reconsideration of our policies with\nthe exception of our commitment to Taiwan.\n4. Issue: Japanese trade talks\nProblem: The U.S. has been pushing the Japanese to\nease their restriction on American imports. Favorable\nJapanese action will be quite useful in dealing with\nCongressional pressures for protectionist legislation.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSECRET\n3.\nStatus: Further negotiations are underway with\nsome hope of getting a satisfactory Japanese offer.\nRecommendation: An early statement from the new\nAdministration spokesman stressing its concern\nabout this problem will be necessary.\n5. Issue: B-52s on Okinawa\nProblem: Since an accident in late November, there\nhas been continued and widespread agitation in\nOkinawa against the stationing of B-52s for Viet-Nam\noperations. So far, the agitation has been limited\nto peaceful demonstrations and protests but a general\nstrike is planned in early February. If these\ndemonstrations lead to any bloodshed and the involve-\nment of U.S. troops, our reversion timetable and\nnegotiating position could be upset.\nStatus: EA is planning to raise this issue with the\nSecretary-designate after January 20.\nRecommendation: My inclination is to move the B-52s\nin a carefully prepared scenario to Thailand where\nadditional facilities will be available in early\nFebruary.\n6. Issue: Laos\nProblem: The North Vietnamese offensive in Laos\nhas already begun in earnest, but the level of\nmilitary activity is not yet above previous years.\nStatus: The situation is under close watch and\noptions are under consideration for escalating U.S.\ncountermoves in case the NVN raises the ante.\nRecommendation: No additional U.S. measures would\nseem to be required at the present level of North\nVietnamese activity.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSECRET\n4.\n7. Issue: Cambodia\nProblem: Recent signals from Sihanouk indicate\ngreater interest in resuming relations with us.\nAt the same time, Cambodia remains a major\ninfiltration route and supply area for the NVN\n-- a matter of erratic concern to Sihanouk.\nStatus: The State Department has under consideration\na possible U.S. border declaration, a necessary first\nstep to resumption of relations. The JCS is likely\nto seek authorization for more extended military\naction against the NVN in Cambodia.\nRecommendation: I would be inclined to let\nSihanouk set the pace of any move to resume\nrelations but leave the door ajar for him. Any\nmove in this direction should not involve restraints\nupon our present level of military action against\nVC use of Cambodia and hopefully additional restraints\non the VC. I would not go along with additional\nU.S. military measures against the VC inside\nCambodia.\n8. Issue: Philippines\nProblem: In recent weeks, particularly since\nRomulo took over as Foreign Minister, the Filipinos\nhave been on a rampage. They have focused on the\nbase rights issues. They will inevitably make an\nearly effort - outside normal diplomatic channels\nprobably -- to test their credentials and leverage\nwith the new Administration. They may also raise\nthe Laurel-Langley problem.\nStatus: The Department is watching this closely but\nproposes no immediate ameliorating action.\nRecommendation: I would play it cool and somewhat\ndistant with the Filipinos until an urgent review\nof the Philippines package is completed.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSECRET\n5.\n9. Issue: Outer Mongolian recognition\nProblem: The question of recognizing the\nMongolian Peoples' Republic has been pending\nfor some time but held up largely due to\nanticipated GRC strenuous objections.\nStatus: A recommendation for recognition has\nbeen prepared but held over for the new Administration.\nRecommendation: There is no compelling reason\nto move on this one quickly. But, it makes\ngenerally good sense although any action should\nbe checked for its bearing on broader China policy.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\ndepartment OF STATE\nWashington, D.C. 20520\nSECRET\nJanuary 7, 1968\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kissinger\nFROM\n: Richard L Sneider\nSUBJECT\n: Major Issues Anticipated During\nthe Next Six Weeks in East Asia\n1. Viet-Nam Negotiations: Obviously the key issue\nrequiring immediate decision is the U. S. posture in\nthe Viet-Nam negotiations. I assume you are already\nseized with the details of this one.\n2. Other Potential Crisis Possibilities: EA has\nprepared the attached memorandum for Secretary-\ndesignate Rogers covering the major crisis possibilities.\nI would only add two footnotes: (1) the latest reports\nfrom Laos indicate that the North Vietnamese dry season\noffensive has already begun in earnest with activity in\nthree out of the four military regions; (2) the current\npressure point in Okinawa is general agitation over the\nstationing of B-52s for Viet-Nam operations, resulting\nfrom one B-52 accident and one near miss.\n3. Other Policy Issues:\na. Korea: A series of actions will be required\nto finish up on the Pueblo incident.\nb. China: (1) Warsaw talks with Chinese Communists\nare scheduled for February 20, providing the\nfirst clear opportunity for the new Administration\nto sound out Peking and signal its own policy.\n(2) Italian recognition of Peking: Foreign\nMinister Nenni has indicated his Government's\nintention to move toward recognition of Communist\nChina with the timing and other details still\nleft vague.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSECRET\n2.\nC. Japan: (1) Trade talks: We are in mid-\nstream in discussions with the Japanese\non trade liberalization. The first round\nwas only partially satisfactory and more\ndiscussions are scheduled. An early signal\nfrom the new Administration on this issue\nwill be looked for by the Japanese and\nrequired. (2) Meeting schedule: The\nJapanese have been sounding us out on a\nschedule for top level meetings, both\nunofficial and official and including a\njoint cabinet session during the summer and\na Prime Minister visit in the fall. Much of\nthis relates to the Japanese desire for\nreaching an Okinawan settlement by the end\nof the year, but there are other key problems\nto be faced. An early decision on the cabinet\nlevel meeting will be desirable. We shall also\nhave to begin hacking away at the fundamental\npolicy issues invo 1ved in an Okinawan agreement.\nd. Cambodia: The question of a possible U.S. border\ndeclaration leading to a resumption of relations\nwith Cambodia could come up in the early weeks.\ne. Outer Mongolia: The question of recognizing\nthe Mongolian People's Republic has been pending\nfor some time and could be given an early look.\nf. Philippines: The Filipinos will inevitably be\nnosing around very early in the new Administration\nto test their credentials and leverage. They may\nraise their desire to negotiate a new bilateral\ntrade agreement with us, which they have been\npressing for.\ng. Burma: U.S. military assistance to Burma, which\nhas been at modest levels, ran out in 1968.\nThere are hints the Burmese want to continue this\nprogram but a decision has been left to the new\nAdministration.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSECRET\n3.\n4. Future of AID: The bulk of our aid resources are\nexpended in Asia. The future of U.S. assistance programs\nand AID is very shaky. There is a vital need for very\nearly resuscitation and restructuring if we are to avoid\nserious damage to our interests in Asia.\nAttachment:\nMemorandum on Crisis Possibilities\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nSECRET-EXDIS\nCrisis Possibilities in First Two Weeks of the New Administration\nEAST ASIA\n1. Possible crises arising from deliberate, provocative acts\ndesigned to embarrass the new administration:\na. South Viet-Nam - Major VC/NLF attacks on the cities.\nb. Laos - Communist drive against key souther towns\nof FAR strongpoints in the north; NLHX campaign to\ntry captured U.S. pilots for \"war crimes\".\nC. North Korea - Intensified guerrilla warfare against\nSouth Korea; terrorist attacks in major cities,\nviolations of DMZ, inserting guerrilla parties\nby sea. These might be so provocative as to trig-\nger South Korean retaliation.\n6. Communist China - We expect no deliberate provo-\ncations, particularly in view of the CPR's decision\nto meet with us in Warsaw on February 20.\n2. \"Coincidental crises\" not aimed at the U.S. but potentially\nembarrassing to the new administration:\na. Sabah - Outbreak of terrorist activities, air or\nnaval \"incidents\" between the Philippines and\nMalaysia.\nb. Okinawa . Anti-Mase demonstrations which get out\nof control and require the use of U.S. forces to\ncontain them.\nC. South Viet-Nam - Domestic political crisis arising\nfrom factionalism and rivalries in the GVN.\nd. Cambodia - A serious border incident possibly\ninvolving capture of U.S. personnel.\nEA: RWDuenling\nJanuary 6, 1969\nSECRET-EXDIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library"
}