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    "title": "Seven Nation/TCC/SEATO Conference",
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    "ocrText": "Mr. President:\nAttached is the memorandum for\ndistribution to the departments\nJSE\nwhich you requested.\nle past two weeks at\nWashington and Paris\nHenry A. Kissinger\nposition.\n: statement on Vietnam\nvernmentally approved\nof April 1, 1969. Further,\nats dealing with troop\nHenry\nletter\nSECRET/NODIS\nPRESERVATION COPY\nI\nFile\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n/\nREWIND\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nI have become increasingly disturbed over the past two weeks at\nthe confusing press stories emanating from Washington and Paris\nwhich may undermine our Paris negotiating position.\nConsequently, I hereby direct that any public statement on Vietnam\nbe carefully checked for consistency with governmentally approved\npolicy, especially that contained in NSDM 9 of April 1, 1969. Further,\nfor the time being, I want all public statements dealing with troop\nwithdrawals on any basis to be terminated.\nSECRET/NODIS\nPRESERVATION COPY\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nINFORMATION\nCONFIDENTIAL\nApril 22, 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nRichard Sneider\nSUBJECT: SEATO Meeting\nI reviewed last week wi th the Department preparations\nfor the SEATO and Troop Contributors meetings at Bangkok\nscheduled the week of May 19. There is attached the first draft\nof the Scope Paper covering both meetings for your background.\nIt is unexceptionable, if a bit pallid.\nThe basic objective of the exercise will be to reaffirm\nand reassure on our commitments to the area, but in general\nterms. The key problem at the meeting will be the degree to\nwhich we are prepared to consult in a meaningful way on our\npolicies with respect to Vietnam. This of course relates\nparticularly to the question of unilateral troop withdrawals and\nthe extent to which such withdrawals take place including also\nthe troops of our allies.\nI have requested that a memorandum be sent over to the\nWhite House outlining to the President our general plans for the\nSEATO and TCC meetings and recommending the policy decisions\nthat need to be made prior to the meetings. I will keep after this\none so that it arrives reasonably ahead of time.\nAttachment\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nSAIGON VISIT/SEATO/SEVEN-NATION/CENTO MEETINGS\nSAIGON/BANGKOK/TEHRAN\nMay, 1969\nScope Paper\n1. The Secretary's visit to the 14th SEATO Council Meeting\nand the Seven-Nation (troop-contributing) Meeting in Bangkok\nwill provide Asian leaders with their first opportunity, with\nthe exception of the brief and hectic exposure some of them\nreceived at the funeral of General Eisenhower, to meet with\nthe new Administration. The representatives of the six\nAsian countries (Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Philippines,\nThailand and Viet-Nam) with whom he will be meeting in Saigon\nand Bangkok will be listening anxiously and probing for\nindications of the Administration's intended course with\nregard to the Paris negotiations and our posture and involve-\nment in a post Viet-Nam East Asia.\n2. Awareness of the critical importance of U.S. intentions\nto these countries has been heightened by the background of\nViet-Nam dissent and disenchantment in the United States and\nthe fear that the United States is embarked on a course of\nSECRET\nGROUP 3\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n2.\ndisengagement from direct involvement in Asian affairs.\nMost recently the President's visit to Europe has been\nparochially interpreted in some sectors in the Far East\nas suggesting that the President may have relegated East\nAsia to a secondary position in terms of U.S. interests.\n3,\nAgainst this background, the following questions will\nbe central to the discussions in Saigon and Bangkok:\na. What are the prospects at Paris?\nb. What are the minimum U.S. conditions for a\nnegotiated settlement of the Viet-Nam war?\nC. What will be the U.S. role in Southeast Asia\nafter the settlement?\nd. What degree of determination and involvement\nwill the United States attach to this role?\n4.\nThe key objective is to be responsive to the need\nfor reassurance felt by the countries of Southeast Asia\nwithout extending U.S. commitments and without creating\nan atmosphere of overconfidence which will set back our\nobjectives of increased responsibility, self-help and\ncooperation on the part of the nations of the area them-\nselves. The Secretary's task will be complicated by the\nvariety of circumstances, concerns and special interests\nrepresented by the nations at the two meetings. Much of\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n3.\nrefining and tailoring of the reassurance must come during\nthe bilateral discussions he will hold.\n5.\nSpecifically, our overall objectives are:\na. to make clear that our commitments in the area,\nwhich we fully intend to honor, are a reflection of our\nnational interest in a Southeast Asia of viable free nations;\nb. to make clear that we intend to continue to play\na role in the area in pursuit of this interest. We consider\nthe nature and extent of our present commitments adequate\nfor this role;\nC. to assure our Asian allies of our determination\nto hold firm in Viet-Nam and Paris until a settlement is\nsecured giving the people of South Viet-Nam the opportunity\nto determine their future without external interference;\nd. to stress the importance which we attach to\nmeaningful consultations with our allies;\ne. to emphasize our conviction that a meaningful\nsolution to the problem of the area can only be found through\nthe cooperative efforts of the nations of the area; and\nf. to reaffirm our intention to support, to the extent\npossible, the constructive programs of the mations of the\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n4.\narea for improving their internal strength and viability\nand for helping one another.\nSAIGON VISIT\n1. This will be not only the Secretary's first visit to\nViet-Nam but the first visit by a Secretary of State since\nDecember, 1966. As the ranking member of the new Adminis-\ntration to visit that country, he can expect to receive\nparticular attention from the Government of Viet-Nam and\nfrom the large world and South Vietnamese press contingent\nin Saigon. Secretary Lairdvisited Viet-Nam on March 6-10, 1969.\n2. The Secretary's visit will give him an important oppor-\ntunity to meet and become acquainted with the leaders of\nthe GVN and, incidentally, of our own U.S. Mission in Saigon.\nIt will give him the opportunity to follow up on the National\nSecurity Council discussions of the Viet-Nam problem held\nin April during. Ambassador Bunker's visit. Finally, he will\nbe able to expand upon the discussions which Vice President\nKy had with President Nixon, the Secretary, and Mr. Richardson\nduring Ky's attendance at the Eisenhower funeral.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n5.\n3.\nVietnamese government officials will be eager to inform\nhim of the progress they have made, particularly in the\npolitical field. This includes the establishment of con-\nstitutional government, the election of national leaders,\nthe functioning of a bicameral legislature and Supreme Court,\nthe election of hamlet and village leaders, and renewed\npolitical party activity looking toward the creation of a\npossible two-party system.\n4. The Vietnamese will be anxious to receive the Secretary's\nreassurance of the continuing commitment of the United States\nto support them. In addition, they will want his pledge to\ncontinue regular close consultation between the GVN and USG\non Vietnamese affairs.\nSEATO MEETING\n1.\nSEATO Council Meetings are normally largely of symbolic\nimportance. However, the May 20-21 meeting and particularly\nthe attendant bilaterals provide the first comprehensive\nopportunity for our Asian allies to meet the Secretary and\nthe new Administration. It will furnish them the chance\nto probe regarding the new Administrations East Asian\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n6.\npolicy, and similarly will provide the Secretary with a\nmajor opportunity for creating an impressiom conducive\nto furthering our objectives.\nMarcos ann has cooled fairly this . 2.\nOur allies' probing will take a variety of forms. For\ninstance, Philippine Foreign Secretary Romulo has told us\nhe will wish to discuss with the Secretary the replacement\nof SEATO by a more effective organization. Some may take\nthe line of inquiring about possible policy changes by the\nnew Administration toward Communist China. Others will\nwant to hear his views on the Manila Communique and the\nThais will certainly be interested in his views on Laos and\non the Rusk-Thanat Communique.\n3.\nPrincipal U.S. objectives are to demonstrate continued\nUnited States interest in the security of the area, to fore-\nclose speculation that the United States is moving away from\nwholehearted support of SEATO, and to forestall related\nefforts to precipitate changes in SEATO which would be\ndirected, in all probability, at seeking more specific\ncommitments from the United States. The following points\nare designed to accomplish these objectives=\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n7.\na. reaffirming our support for SEATO as an effective\nforce in being and as an organization that can grow and\nchange to meet new conditions as they arise;\nb. stressing the importance we continue to attach to\nSEATO as a vital multilateral defense organization for the\narea and as a demonstration of the desire on the part of\nthe member nations of the area to provide for their own\ndefense;\nc. placing the United States on record as maintaining\nour support for SEATO in the constructive role we believe\nit must play in Southeast Asia's future; and\nd. emphasizing the growing importance of SEATO's\nefforts to assist nember nations in combating internal\nsubversion.\nSEVEN-NATION MEETING\n1. The Foreign Ministers of the seven nations contributing\ntroops in Viet-Nam will meet at Bangkok for the first time\nsince the Paris talks began. The seven participants --\nrepresenting Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines,\nThailand, the United States and Viet-Nam -- last met: in\nWellington in April, 1968. The seven nations' Foreign\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n8.\nMinisters are supposed to consult annually on the implementa-\ntion of the Manila Communique of October 25, 1966 per\nArticle 30.\n2.\nAs the host, Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat has\nindicated his belief that the Seven-Nation Meeting should\nbe highly substantive and meaningful, and has added a second\nday to the meeting which required only one last year in\nWellington. He also wants a more substantive communique\nthan previous meetings have generated.\n3.\nThe other participating governments will be most inter-\nested in getting a firsthand report on the Paris meetings.\nThey will also be eager to discuss with us future strategy\nand tactics in the negotiations. Up until now we have kept\nthe troop-contributing governments informed as to progress\nin 'Paris through our Missions in the various capitals. This\nhas been largely an information exercise and has not pro-\nvided an opportunity for the other governments to comment\non or influence the direction in which the talks were\nmoving. This meeting will be their first opportunity for\nthe other governments to comment on or influence the direction\nin which the talks were moving. This meeting will be their\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n9.\nfirst opportunity to exchange with us and the other member\ngovernments ideas regarding the form of a final settlement.\n4.\nThe military situation on the ground in Viet-Nam. will\nalso be of primary interest to the seven nations. They will\nwelcome an authoritative up-to-date briefing on this subject\nand can be counted upon to discuss progress in the military\nsphere. They will also be interested in any plans we may\nhave regarding troop withdrawals and reduction, particularly\nas it may affect their own forces in South Viet-Nam.\n5. Since this is the only meeting in which the Koreans\nwill participate, they will want to play an important role.\nTheir forces in Viet-Nam are exceeded only by those of the\nUnited States and the Vietnamese themselves. They, like the\nThais and Filipinos, are already thinking about their post-war\nposition in Viet-Nam and are particularly anxious to obtain\neconomic concessions from us and the Vietnamese.\n6.\nThe Filipinos' participation in this meeting is likely\nto reflect domestic political problems to a greater extent\nthan the Thais' or Koreans', particularly since this is an\nelection year in the Philippines. As indicated, they are\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n10.\nvery interested in obtaining an important economic role in\ndown alrog to\npost-war Viet-Nam. Domestic political pressure may force\nthem to change the nature of their contingent in Viet-Nam\nto a civilian, medical group, which would bring into question\ntheir eligibility for membership in the seven-nation \"club. \"\n7. As the other participants in the Seven-Nation Meeting\nare likely to be less reserved and formal than during the\nSEATO Meeting, they will probably expect the Secretary to\nbe the same. They will be eager to hear his assessment of\nthe Paris talks and will give particular attention to his\nremarks on post-war planning.\n8.\nWe should view the Seven-Nation Meeting primarily as\nan occasion for reassuring our allies, especially the\nViętnamese and Thais, about our intentions in Viet-Nam and\nAsia, and also for demonstrating to the other side and the\nworld at large the determination of all the allies to\nattain our mutually agreed objectives in Viet-Nam. We will\nalso wish to reaffirm our commitment to the concept of close\nconsultation among the allies.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n11.\n9.\nAt the same time, it is difficult to see how we will\nbe able to produce a truly substantive communique acceptable\nto all the allies (from the hawkish Koreans to dovish\nFilipinos) and which will not be interpreted by the other\nside and by the world at large as a hardening of our position.\nWe will, therefore, have to pay particular attention to the\ndrafting of the communique.\n10. Even though the Seven-Nation Meeting will be considerably\nless formal than SEATO, completely frank discussions will\nstill be hampered by the size and composition of the dele-\ngations. Last year there were about seven delegates plus\nstaff advisers on each delegation, far too many for intimate\ngive-and-take. In addition, the Korean and Philippine Foreign\nMinisters, and perhaps also the Vietnamese, will not be fully\nbriefed on Paris. For these reasons, the most sensitive and\nsignificant discussions will have to take place in private\nbilateral meetings with the Foreign Ministers.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n12.\nBILATERAL DISCUSSIONS\n1.\nThe bilateral discussions with three key countries\n(Thailand, Korea and the Philippines) offer the opportunity\nfor tailoring the reassurance regarding the Administration's\nview of Southeast Asia and the Viet-Nam negotiations to\ntheir particular concerns. Thailand will view Laos as the\nkey issue in terms of Thailand's own security. Our objective\nwill be to reassure the RTG that if the situation in Laos\nshould result in identifiable external Communist aggression\nagainst Thailand the United States would, in accordance\nwith our intent to fully honor our SEATO obligations take\nappropriate measures as may be required to meet the situation.\nIn addition, Thailand will seek a reaffirmation by the new\nAdministration of a bilateral commitment within the SEATO\ncontext to the defense of Thailand.\n2.\nIn the case of the Philippines, we will wish to dis-\ncourage initiatives regarding a revision of SEATO, believing\nthese to be inspired more by interest in probing U.S.\nintentions than by a constructive interest in strengthening\nAsian participation in Asian regional security arrangements.\nWe would also not wish to see any watering down of Philippine\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n13.\nparticipation in the defense of Viet-Nam, but will not\nwish to succumb to Philippine pressure to pay the entire\ncost.\n3. With the Koreans, we should recognize the important\nrole they are playing in Viet-Nam. We will want to reassure\nthem that this recognition encompasses acceptance by the\nUnited States of the need for meaningful consultations on\nViet-Nam and recognition of their security and economic\ninterests. Additionally, if they express their concern over the\nOkinawa reversion, we will wish to discourage them from\npublicly involving themselves in the issue.\n4. The other bilaterals will be routine, with the minor\nexception of New Zealand. New Zealand has not enjoyed the\nsame degree of contact with the new Administration that our\nother Asian allies, notably Australia has had, and particular\nwarmth on the part of the Secretary would be welcome and\nuseful.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n361\nHAK did are\nINFORMA TION\nSECRET\nApril 30, 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nRichard L. Sneider\nSUBJECT: TCC Meeting\nAttached is a telegram sent out to the field for comment\nsetting forth tentative plans for the Troop Contributing Countries\nmeeting in Bangkok following the SEATO session. I have had\nsome fairly extensive discussions with EA on this meeting and I\nthink that the proposed format looks good. It sticks to our game\nplan and basic position on Vietnam. I thought, however, you would\nwant to look it over. We will have another crack when comments\ncome in.\nAttachment\nSECRET\nCy pint Anesder 5/7/69\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENTS\nOF\nSTATE\n*\nDepartment of State\nGRANG\nVOIRSITY\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nof\nSECKE\n758\nC\nPAGE 01 STATE 066205\n41\n3\nORIGIN SS 30\nINFO OCT 01/031 R\nDRAFTED BY: EA/VN:HFMATTHEWS, JR.\nAPPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY\nC = - MR. PEDERSEN S/S - MR= BROWN EA/VN = MR. BURKE\nEA c WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN\n050069\nR. 291550Z APR 69\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nTO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY\nINFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY\nSECRE T STATE 066205\nEXDIS\nSUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE\nREF: STATE 62693\n1. WE HAVE BEEN GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT TO MATTERS\nDISCUSSED IN PARA 3 REFTEL. THIS TELEGRAM SETS FORTH OUR\nTENTATIVE IDEAS ABOUT CONTENT OF TCC COMMUNIQUE AND TIMING OF\nOUR CONSULTATIONS ABOUT IT WITH OTHER TCC COUNTRIES\n2. TIMING. SINCE AT PREVIOUS TCC MEETINGS IN WELLINGTON\nIND WASHINGTON HOST COUNTRY HAS PRODUCED A FIRST DRIFT OF\nCOMMUNIQUE, WE ASSUME THAIS PLAN TO PRODUCE DRAFT 480 ARE\nPROBABLY WORKING ON IT NOW. WELHOPE THAT UNGER WILL BE ABLE RISCUSS\nIDEAS EN THIS CABLE WITH THANAT THIS MEEK AND SECURE HIS EXPOY\nAGREEMENT TO THEM IN GENERAL TERMS. WE RANT THEM TO\nFIRST DRAFT INCORPORATING AGREED US/THAI IDEAS WITH BUI DIEM\nHERE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE AROUND MAY 7 FOR SANSON *:\nCOULD CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY IN SAIRONA\nAND WE WOULD HOPE TO FIRM UP AGREEMENT ON X DRAFT DUPING\nSECRETARY'S VISIT MAY 14-19. NE WOULD PLAN TO KEEP\nAUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS INFORMED IN GENERAL TERMS HERE AS\nWELL AS THAIS IN BANGKOK: BUT WOULD WAIT TO DISCUSS !TH YOREINS\nAND FILTHINOS UNTIL FORMATION OF COMMUNIQUE 00 CRASSING\n00\nSECREF\n29\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNOTTO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nCLINO\nMAERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 STATE 066205\nIN BANGKOK, PRESUMABLY BEGINNING MAY 19.\n3.0 CONTENT OF TCC COMMUNIQUE, (THIS OUTLINE FOLLOWS THE\nROUGH ORDER OF THE APRIL 1968 COMMUNIQUE AT WELLINGTONW\nA o INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH LISTING PARTICIPANTS AND DATES.\nB. PURPOSE OF MEETING\n(A) REVIEW OF SITUATION IN VIET-NAM\n(B) WAYS TO IMPROVE TCC EFFORTS\nIC! REVIEW OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS\nID) EXAMINATION OF SECURITY SITUATION IN ASIA, REFERENCE\nTO BROAD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AMONG TCC'S AND ENDORSEMENT OF\nCONTINUING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION.\nC : SITUATION IN VIET-NAM DESCRIPTION OF STATEMENT BY VIET-\nNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER COVERING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS\nMILITARY SITUATION, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MEASURES OF GVN\nENDORSEMENT HERE WOULD BE MADE OF THIEU'S STATEMENTS GF MARCH 25\nAND APRIL 7, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO ESSENTIALITY OF SETTLEMENT\nOF POLITICAL ISSUES BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND TO WILLINGNESS\nOF GVN TO TALK TO NLF ON THIS ISSUE. BEGIN FYI. WITHOUT\nSPECIFICALLY ENDORSING THIEU'S SIX POINTS OF APRIL 7, THIS\nSECTION WOULD INCLUDE A GENERAL STATEMENT CONSISTENT WITH THOSE\nPOINTS, BUT PHRASED IN TERMS WHICH WOULD NOT FORECUOSE DIFFERENT\nFORMULATION CF SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS. END FYI, MILITARY SECTION\nWOULD INCLUDE REFERENCE TO \"YIETNAMIZATION OF THE WARG\"\nDESCRIBING VIETNAMESE EFFORTS AT MOBILIZATION, MODERNIZATION AND\nACCEPTANCE OF GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES: THIS SECTION WOULD\nALSO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO SUPPORT OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FOR\nPOLICIES OF GVN, THEIR REJECTION OF COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND\nTACTICS AND THEIR BASIC DESIRE FOR PEACE\nD : TCC EFFORTS REFERENCE TO MILITARY BRIEFING BY ADMIRAD\nMCCAIN AND MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY US AND OTHER TOOIS TO IMPROVE\nVIETNAMESE ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AS PART OF\n\"VIETNAMIZATION\" OBJECTIVE, ALLUSIONS TO DETERMINATION OF\nTOGAS TO MAINTAIN THEIR SUPPORT OF GVN UNTIL IMPROVEMENT\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been détermined to be declassified.\nOF STATE\nULINA\nDepartment of State\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 STATE 066205\nCAPABILITIES: REDUCTION OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION OR PROGRESS\nIN PARIS PEACE TALKS PERMIT REDUCTION IN THEIR TROOP CONTRIBU-\nTIONS. ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN VIET-NAM IN TERMS OF\nPERMITTING VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT\nEXTERNAL INTERFERENCE\nE : EFFORTS FOR PEACE. TCC ENDORSEMENT OF PROPOSALS MADE BY\nUnS. AND GVN IN PARIS REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, OBSER-\nVANCE OF DMZ, RESPECT FOR AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA,\nAND RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WARK REFERENCE To WITHDRAWAL OF\nFORCES WOULD INCLUDE SIMULTANEOUS COMMENCEMENT: REQUIREMENT FOR\nWITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM\nAND FROM SANCTUARIES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND HO CHI MINH TRAIL)\nPLUS NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF 80TH MITHORAWAL AND CES-\nSATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF FORCES, IBEGIN FYI. THIS\nSECTION WOULD BE STATED IN TERMS OF SECRETARY'S APRIL 21 SPEECH\nRATHER THAN IN MANILA COMMUNIQUE TERMS. END FYI, TCC AGREEMENT\nON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAMALS WOULD BE INCLUDED, AND MUTUAL\nWITHDRAWALS AS RESULT OF AGREEMENT WITH THE ENEMY WOULD BE\nDISTINGUISHED FROM REDUCTION IN ALLIED FORCES PERMITTED BY\nRVNAF IMPROVEMENTS THIS SECTION WOULD GIVE A GENERAL ENDORSE-\nMENT TO OUR PARIS NEGOTIATING POSTURE AND WOULD ALSO INCLUDE\nSTATEMENT OF DESIRE FOR PEACE ON PART OF TCC'S.\nF , POST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES. THIS SECTION WOULD\nAFFIRM TCC DESIRE TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND\nDEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA AFTER CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES)\nINCLUDING REFERENCE TO THUC/LILIENTHAL REPORT. IT WOULD ALSO\nREFER TO NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION BOTH FOR ECONOMIC AND ROCIAL\nADVANCEMENT AND TO PRESERVE SECRUTY OF THE AREA (BEGIN FYI.\nTHE LANGUAGE OF THIS SECTION WOULD HAVE TO BE SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE\nTO AVOID IMPLICATION OF ANY NEW COMMITMENTS) BUT AT SAME TIME\nCULD NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT KOREAN, THAN AND SOUTH\nVISTNAMESE DESIRES FOR SOMETHING APPROACHING INTERNATIONAL\n\"GUARANTEES! OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. END FYI.)\nG. SOUTHEAST ASIA. REFERENCE HERE WOULD BE MADE TO MEED FOR\nINCLUSION OF PROBLEMS OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA IN ANY PEACE SETTLE-\nMENT\nH, KOREA. SOME REFERENCE SUCH AS IN LAST YEAR'S COMMUNIQUE\nTO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN KOREA STHOUT EMPLYING DIRECT\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDOWARTMENT OF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nAMERICA UNITED\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 04 STATE 066205\nS\nCONNECTION BETWEEN SITUATION THERE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.\nI: CONCLUSION. FINAL ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN\nSOUTHEAST ASIA AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE EFFORTS THERE AND\nIN PARIS IN CLOSE COORDINATION.\nGP-4. ROGERS\nCC\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHAK\n361\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nINFORMATION\nSECRET\nApril 30, 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nRichard L. Sneider\nSUBJECT: TCC Meeting\nAttached is a telegram sent out to the field for comment\nsetting forth tentative plans for the Troop Contributing Countries\nmeeting in Bangkok following the SEATO session. I have had\nsome fairly extensive discussions with EA on this meeting and I\nthink that the proposed format looks good. It sticks to our game\nplan and basic position on Vietnam. I thought, however, you would\nwant to look it over. We will have another crack when comments\ncome in.\nAttachment\nSECRET\nCy Reproduced pent 5/7\nat the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDIFANTMENT OF STATE\n*\nCHING\nDepartment of State\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nto\nSECRET\n768\nPAGE 01 STATE 066205\n41\n3\nORIGIN SS 30\nINFO OCT 01/031 R\nDRAFTED BY: EA/VN:HFMATTHEWS, JR.\nAPPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY\nC - MR. PEDERSEN S/S a MR. BROWN EA/VN = MR. BURKE\nEA C WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN\n050069\na 291550Z APR 69\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nTO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY\nALLEN\nBERGSTEN\nINFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY\nCHAPIN\nHALPERIN\nSECRE T STATE 066205\nHOUDEK\nKEENY R\nLEMNITZER\nEXDIS\nLYNN\nMOOR\nSUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE\nMORRIS\nSAUNDERS\nREF: STATE 62693\nNEIDER\nSONNENFELDI\nVAKY\n10 WE HAVE BEEN GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT TO MATTERS\nDISCUSSED IN PARA 3 REFTEL THIS TELEGRAM SETS FORTH OUR\nTENTATIVE IDEAS ABOUT CONTENT OF TCC COMMUNIQUE AND TIMING OF\nOUR CONSULTATIONS ABOUT IT WITH OTHER TCC COUNTRIES.\n2% TIMING. SINCE AT PREVIOUS TCC MEETINGS IN WELLINGTON\nAND WASHINGTON HOST COUNTRY HAS PRODUCED A FIRST DRAFT OF\nCOMMUNIQUE, WE ASSUME THAIS PLAN TO PRODUCE DRAFT AND ARE\nPROBABLY WORKING ON IT NOW. WE HOPE THAT UNGER WILL BE ABLE RISCUSS\nIDEAS IN THIS CABLE WITH THANAT THIS WEEK AND SECURE HIS EARLY\nAGREEMENT TO THEM IN GENERAL TERMS. WE WANT THEN TO DISCUSS A\nFIRST DRAFT INCORPORATING AGREED US/THAI IDEAS WITH BUI DIEM\nHERE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE AROUND MAY 7 FOR SAIGON HE AND BUNKER\nCOULD CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY IN SAIGON\nAND WE WOULD HOPE TO FIRM UP AGREEMENT ON A DRAFT DURING\nSECRETARY1S VISIT MAY 14-19. WE WOULD PLAN TO KEEP\nAUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS INFORMED IN GENERAL- TERMS HERE AS\nWELL AS THAIS IN BANGKOK, BUT WOULD WAIT TO DISCUSS WITH KOREINS\nAND FILIPINOS UNTIL FORMATION OF COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING CONMITTEE\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\n*\nDepartment of State\nOF STATES AMERICA CLINO\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 STATE 066205\nIN BANGKOK, PRESUMABLY BEGINNING MAY 19.\n30 CONTENT OF TCC COMMUNIQUE. (THIS OUTLINE FOLLOWS THE\nROUGH ORDER OF THE APRIL 1968 COMMUNIQUE AT WELLINGTON.\nA o INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH LISTING PARTICIPANTS AND DATES.\nB. PURPOSE OF MEETING\n(A) REVIEW OF SITUATION IN VIET-NAM\n(B) WAYS TO IMPROVE TCC EFFORTS\n(C) REVIEW OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS\n(D) EXAMINATION OF SECURITY SITUATION IN ASIA. REFERENCE\nTO BROAD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AMONG TCC'S AND ENDORSEMENT OF\nCONTINUING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION.\nC o SITUATION IN VIET=NAM DESCRIPTION OF STATEMENT BY VIET-\nNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER COVERING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT\nMILITARY SITUATION, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MEASURES OF GVN\nENDORSEMENT HERE WOULD BE MADE OF THIEU'S STATEMENTS OF MARCH 25\nAND APRIL 7, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO ESSENTIALITY OF SETTLEMENT\nOF POLITICAL ISSUES BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND TO WILLINGNESS\nOF GVN TO TALK TO NLF ON THIS ISSUE. BEGIN FYI. WITHOUT\nSPECIFICALLY ENDORSING THIEU'S SIX POINTS OF APRIL 7, THIS\nSECTION WOULD INCLUDE A GENERAL STATEMENT CONSISTENT WITH THOSE\nPOINTS, BUT PHRASED IN TERMS WHICH WOULD NOT FORECLOSE DIFFERENT\nFORMULATION OF SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS. END FYI. MILITARY SECTION\nWOULD INCLUDE REFERENCE TO \"VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR\nDESCRIBING VIETNAMESE EFFORTS AT MOBILIZATION, MODERNIZATION AND\nACCEPTANCE OF GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES THIS SECTION WOULD\nALSO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO SUPPORT OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FOR\nPOLICIES OF GVN, THEIR REJECTION OF COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND\nTACTICS AND THEIR BASIC DESIRE FOR PEACE\nDo TCC EFFORTS. REFERENCE TO MILITARY BRIEFING BY ADMIRAL\nMCCAIN AND MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY US AND OTHER TCC'S TO IMPROVE\nVIETNAMESE ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AS PART OF\n\"VIETNAMIZATION\" OBJECTIVE. ALLUSIONS TO DETERMINATION OF\nTCCSS TO MAINTAIN THEIR SUPPORT OF GVN UNTIL IMPROVEMENT IN RNNAF\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nOF STATE\nDepartment of State\nGLINO\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nS\nPAGE 03 STATE 066205\nCAPABILITIES, REDUCTION OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION, OR PROGRESS\nIN PARIS PEACE TALKS PERMIT REDUCTION IN THEIR TROOP CONTRIBU-\nTIONS. ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN VIET-NAM IN TERMS OF\nPERMITTING VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT\nEXTERNAL INTERFERENCE\nE : EFFORTS FOR PEACE. TCC ENDORSEMENT OF PROPOSALS MADE BY\nU.S. AND GVN IN PARIS REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, OBSER-\nVANCE OF DMZ, RESPECT FOR AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA,\nAND RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL OF\nFORCES WOULD INCLUDE SIMULTANEOUS COMMENCEMENT: REQUIREMENT FOR\nWITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM\nS\nAND FROM SANCTUARIES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND HO CHI MINH TRAIL\nPLUS NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF BOTH WITHDRAWAL AND CES-\nSATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF FORCES (BEGIN FYI. THIS\nSECTION WOULD BE STATED IN TERMS OF SECRETARY APRIL 21 SPEECH\nRATHER THAN IN MANILA COMMUNIQUE TERMS. END FYI.) TCC AGREEMENT\nON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE INCLUDED, AND MUTUAL\nWITHDRAWALS AS RESULT OF AGREEMENT WITH THE ENEMY WOULD BE\nDISTINGUISHED FROM REDUCTION IN ALLIED FORCES PERMITTED BY\nRVNAF IMPROVEMENTS. THIS SECTION WOULD GIVE A GENERAL ENDORSE=\nMENT TO OUR PARIS NEGOTIATING POSTURE AND WOULD ALSO INCLUDE\nSTATEMENT OF DESIRE FOR PEACE ON PART OF TCC'S.\nF . POST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES. THIS SECTION WOULD\nAFFIRM TCC DESIRE TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND\nDEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA AFTER CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES,\nS\nINCLUDING REFERENCE TO THUC/LILIENTHAL REPORT, IT WOULD ALSO\nREFER TO NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION BOTH FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL\nADVANCEMENT AND TO PRESERVE SECRUTY OF THE AREA (BEGIN FYI.\nTHE LANGUAGE OF THIS SECTION WOULD HAVE TO BE SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE\nTO AVOID IMPLICATION OF ANY NEW COMMITMENTS, BUT AT SAME TIME\nWOULD NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT KOREAN, THAI AND SOUTH\nVIETNAMESE DESIRES FOR SOMETHING APPROACHING INTERNATIONAL\n\"GUARANTEES\" OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. END FYI.)\nG : SOUTHEAST ASIA. REFERENCE HERE WOULD BE MADE TO NEED FOR\nINCLUSION OF PROBLEMS OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA IN ANY PEACE SETTLE-\nMENT.\nH. KOREA. SOME REFERENCE SUCH AS IN LAST YEAR'S COMMUNIQUE\nTO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN KOREA WITHOUT IMPLYING ANY DIRECT\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSTATES AMERICA UNITED * state 40 DEPARTMENT\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 04 STATE 066205\nS\nCONNECTION BETWEEN SITUATION THERE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.\nI. CONCLUSION. FINAL ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN\nSOUTHEAST ASIA AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE EFFORTS THERE AND\nIN PARIS IN CLOSE COORDINATION.\nGP-4. ROGERS\nS\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNOTIO RF PEPPODICED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EVECUTINE\nKissinger\nACTION\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nMay 7, 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nRichard L. Sneider\nSUBJECT: Rogers' SEATO Trip\nWe received late this afternoon a memorandum of\nrecommendations to the President on issues likely to arise\nduring Rogers' trip. They cover virtually the same points\nthat were in my briefing memorandum for the meeting with\nRogers. Attached is a memorandum to the Presidents endorsing\nmost of Rogers' recommendations, with the exception of those\non the Rusk-Thanat Communique and Vietnamization of the war.\nthe positions that I have recommended for you, I believe, are\nconsistent with your previou S memos to the President.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you sign the memorandum to the President at\nTab A.\nAttachment\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nRLSneider/pmh (5/7/69)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nACTION\nTOP SECRET-SENSITIVE\nMay 7, 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT:\nSecretary Rogers' Trip to Asia\nSecretary Rogers has sent you the attached memorandum outlining his\nplans for his Asian trip and asking your approval for recommendations on\nthe major policy issues likely to arise during the trip (Tab A). Most of\nthe points discussed in Rogers' memorandum are covered in the memo-\nranda I sent to you prior to the meeting with Rogers on May 7 (Tab B).\nRogers has recommendations on five policy issues, in addition to requesting\nyou to sign a letter to President Thieu which has been sent separately for\nyour consideration along with other letters to government leaders at the\ncapitals he is visiting. My views on his recommendations areaas follows:\n1. Reaffirmation of our SEATO commitment. Rogers recommends\nand I concur that he be authorized to reaffirm U. S. support for SEATO and\ndetermination to meet our obligations under the Treaty.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nOther\n2. Reaffirmation of Rusk-Thanat Coramunique. The Thais are\nexpected to seek a bilateral defense treaty with us or at a minimum a\nreiteration of our commitment to Thailand under the 1962 Rusk-Thanat\nCommunique, which stated that our obligation under SEATO is individual,\nas well as collective, and does not require agreement of all other Treaty\nParties.\nRogers' preferred recommendation is a brief statement accepting\nthe interpretation of the SEATO Treaty in the Rusk-Thanat Communique.\nBut, he requests authorization to make public, if pressed, an identical\nstatement to that issued in 1962. My recommendation is that we issue an\nidentical statement so as to leave no sense of doubt among the Thais.\nTOP SECRET-SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET-SENSITIVE\n- 2 -\nYour preference is requested:\nOffer to issue a statement identical to the Rusk-Thanat Communique\nonly if pressed.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nOffer to issue an identical statement immediately.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nOther\nSecretary Rogers also recommended that he strongly discourage a\nrequest for a bilateral treaty. I would concur.\nApprove\nDisapprove\n3. Vietnamization of the war. Rogers fears there may be a possibility\nthat MACV may not be going far enough and fast enough on Vietnam to meet\npolitical requirements in the United States. He plans to discuss this\nthoroughly with Bunker and Abrams and has asked your authorization.\nI recommend that Rogers not push too hard on this issue and take the\nposition in Saigon that we wish to move ahead with Vietnamization but only\non the basis of well-considered plans and not to the point of leaving the\nimpression that we are pulling out too rapidly, thereby endangering the\nsecurity of the South Vietnam or the American forces remaining in the\ncountry.\nApprove\nDisapprove\n4. Post-war Guarantees. Rogers anticipates that some of the Troop\nContributing Countries may seek a new American commitment to guarantee\nany future settlement in Southeast Asia. He recommends that we take the\nposition that the present commitments are adequate and that new Treaty\ncommitments are not necessary. He would argue the case on philosophical\nand public opinion grounds.\nI agree we should not make any new Treaty commitments but only on\nthe grounds that the present commitments are adequate. Stress of public\nopinion reasons might increase current Asian anxiety about our post-Vietnam\nwar posture in Asia.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nTOP SECRET-SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET-SENSITIVE\n- 3 -\n5. Manila Communique. Rogers anticipates that at the Troop\nContributors meeting some of the members may wish to refer to the Manila\nCommunique on mutual troop withdrawals. He intends to restate our\nposition in accordance with the mutual withdrawal paper approved by you\nand now concurred to, in general terms, by President Thieu. However,\nif pressed, he asks to be authorized to accept a reference to the Manila\nCommunique without spelling out its terms. I agree.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nAttachments\nTOP SECRET-SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\n7050\nMay 7, 1969\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nSubject: Issues Which Will Arise\nDuring My May Trip to Asia\nI am leaving May 12 on a trip which will take me to\nSaigon for talks with our Mission and with the Government\nof Viet-Nam; to Bangkok for the SEATO and Seven-Nation\nMeetings; to India and Pakistan for brief meetings with\nIndian and Pakistani leaders; to Afghanistan for a brief\nmeeting with the Prime Minister and possibly the King;\nand to Tehran for the CENTO Meeting and a meeting with\nthe Shah. I plan to return to Washington on May 29.\nSaigon\nThe purposes of my visit to Saigon are:\n1. To learn as much as I can about the problem on\nthe ground and from our senior officials there, with\nemphasis on the prospects for Vietnamization of the war.\n2. To meet President Thieu and other senior\nVietnamese and American officials whom I do not know.\n3. To consult with President Thieu on our negoti-\nating position in Paris, with particular emphasis on the\nmatters of mutual troop withdrawals, internal political\nsettlement and our over-all strategy.\n4. To consult with the GVN on our objectives and\ntactics at the Seven-Nation Meeting.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n2.\nDuring my meetings with Vietnamese officials I\nintend to outline your policy on the war, including the\nrelationships between American public opinion, Vietnam-\nization of the war, and the pressure of time. At the\nsame time, I would hope to deliver to President Thieu a\nletter (enclosed) from you which reaffirms the commit-\nment of the United States Government to its objective\nof assuring that the South Vietnamese people will be able\nto determine their own future without external inter-\nference. I intend to discuss the question of mutual\nwithdrawal of forces in some depth with President Thieu\nwho has just given his concurrence in our policy as\napproved in the National Security Council.\nSEATO Council Meeting\nMy objectives at the SEATO Council Meeting will be:\n1. to reassure the member nations of United States\nsupport for the treaty;\n2. to reassure the member nations of continued\nUnited States interest in the security of Southeast Asia;\n-3. to reassure the regional members regarding our\nover-all strategy in Viet-Nam and our negotiating position\nin Paris; and\n4. to meet, in many cases for the first time, the\nforeign ministers of our SEATO allies.\nBilaterals\nThe important bilateral conversations I will hold\nwill be with the Filipinos and the Thais. In the case\nof Secretary Romulo, I will be:\n1. listening to the views he wants to express on\nthe future of SEATO;\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n3.\n2. discouraging him from proposing any substantive\nchanges in SEATO at the Council Meeting; and\n3. seeking to obtain a continuation of PHILCAG on\nthe present basis.\nIn the case of Prime Minister Thanom and Foreign\nMinister Thanat, my objectives will be:\n1. to reassure them that your Administration sup-\nports our SEATO commitment to Thailand; and\n2. to reassure them regarding our intentions in\nViet-Nam and at the Paris talks.\nSeven-Nation Meeting\nOur objectives at the Seven-Nation Meeting would be:\n1. to present to our enemies, to our allies and to\nthe world at large a picture of allied unity, determined\nto proceed toward the objective of a negotiated settle-\nment of the war under conditions in which the people of\nSouth Viet-Nam will have the right to choose their own\npolitical future free of external pressure from anyone;\n2. to obtain the concurrence of our allies in our\nover-all strategy and our negotiating position in Paris,\nincluding a specific endorsement of the public proposals\nwe have made on mutual troop withdrawal, the DMZ, Laos\nand Cambodia, and prisoners of war.\n3. to show to interested public opinion that the\nallies are consulting together; and\n4. to provide as genuine an opportunity for con-\nsultation as security considerations will permit.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n4.\nProblems\nThe pitfalls related to Viet-Nam along the path\ninclude attempts by the press to exaggerate such differ-\nences in outlook as exist among the seven allies, ranging\nfrom the hawkish Koreans to the dovish Filipinos. More-\nover, major substantive problems will face us in Saigon\nand in both the SEATO and Seven-Nation Meetings.\nOne of these is the desire of some of our allies,\nmost notably the South Vietnamese, for an American com-\nmitment to \"guarantee\" any future settlement in Southeast\nAsia. I propose to take the position that the United\nStates intends to live up to its present commitments,\nwhich are adequate for the maintenance of the security\nof the area; that, as we have amply demonstrated, we are\nas interested in the security of Southeast Asia as our\nallies; but that we do not intend to make any new treaty\ncommitments to the area for both philosophical and public\nopinion reasons.\nAnother issue is the already evident desire of the\nallies, and especially the Vietnamese, for a specific\nreaffirmation of the terms of the Manila Communique con-\ncerning mutual troop withdrawals. This we will try to\navoid by restating our position as we have in the Paris\ntalks; but, to avoid alarming our allies about our in-\ntentions, we may have to accept a reference to the Manila\nCommunique without spelling out its terms.\nThere is the possibility that we may have some diffi-\nculty in persuading MACV, in connection with Vietnamization,\nto go far enough and fast enough to meet the realities of\nthe political requirements in this country. I plan to go\ninto this thoroughly with Ambassador Bunker and General\nAbrams.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n5.\nIndia\nThe primary objective of my visit to New Delhi is\nto signify the importance we attach to India in our view\nof Asia, and our desire to keep in close touch with its\nleaders on matters of broad common interest.\nPakistan\nMy objectives in visiting Pakistan are to demon-\nstrate continuing United States interest in Pakistan;\nto take the measure of President Yahya, Chief of the\nMartial Law Regime; to assess the chances of his returning\nthe country to a more representative system of govern-\nment; and to get a feel for future decisions on two\nimportant policy questions: U.S. military sales policy\nand future AID levels.\nAfghanistan\nMy stop in Kabul will indicate to the Afghans and\nto King Zahir that the United States remains interested\nin their country's independence and welfare. This is\nimportant to them in their efforts to maintain an inde-\npendent foreign policy despite their heavy dependence on\nthe U.S.S.R.\nCENTO Meeting\nThe main objective of my visit to Tehran is to\nsignify to the regional members of CENTO, particularly\nIran and Turkey, that we continue to be deeply inter-\nested in the future of our relations with them. The\ncollateral objective is a \"holding action\" on CENTO\nitself while we seek a clear idea of the value the mem-\nbers attach to the alliance and while we reassess its\nfuture.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n6.\nBilaterals with the Shah and Other Iranian Officials\nDuring my Tehran visit I will also meet with the\nShah of Iran, with the Iranian Foreign Minister and with\nother members of government. These meetings continue\nour efforts to maintain our close ties with Iran. Our\ninterests in Iran have been increasing as a result of\nthe announced British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf\nin 1971, continuing instability and Soviet inroads in\nthe Arab world, and difficulties we have encountered in\nmaintaining our communications and intelligence facil-\nities in neighboring countries.\nPolicy Issues Likely to Arise\nSpecific policy questions which will arise are as\nfollows. I include my recommendation on each.\nReaffirmation of Our SEATO Commitment\nSEATO and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense\nTreaty symbolize our concern with the security of the\narea, serve as a basis for our military actions re-\nlated to Viet-Nam and assistance to Southeast Asian\nnations, provide us with flexibility of action without\nexplicitly committing us to any specific course, and\nencompass our only formal security link with Thailand.\nRecommendation:\nThat I be authorized to reaffirm United States sup-\nport for SEATO and determination to meet our obligations\nunder the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nThailand\nI anticipate that the Thais may request a bilateral\ndefense treaty, but at a minimum will wish a public re-\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n7.\niteration of our commitment to Thailand. I believe I can\nsatisfy the Thai needs without in any way extending our\nexisting commitments by making the following statement:\n\"I accept the interpretation of the Southeast\nAsia Collective Defense Treaty set forth in the\nRusk-Thanat Communique of March 6, 1962 as being,\nunder international law, the proper interpretation\nof the Treaty.'\nRecommendation:\nThat I be authorized to make publicly the statement\nquoted above.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nIf the Thais press for a more specific statement of\nour position, I would propose to make publicly the\nfollowing statement, which is identical to the operative\nlanguage used in the March 6, 1962 Communique:\n\"I assure you that in the event of direct\nCommunist aggression against Thailand, the United\nStates intends to give full effect to its obliga-\ntions under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense\nTreaty to act to meet the common danger in accord-\nance with its constitutional processes. This ob-\nligation of the United States does not depend upon\nthe prior agreement of all other Parties to the\nTreaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual\nas well as collective.\"\nRecommendation:\nThat I be authorized to make publicly the statement\nabove, if necessary:\nApprove\nDisapprove\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n8.\nThat I strongly discourage any request for a bi-\nlateral treaty with Thailand on the grounds, inter alia,\nthat such a treaty would be unnecessary and redundant.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nViet-Nam\nI recommend that I be authorized to make the following\nactions:\n1. With GVN leaders: I intend to spell out in\nfairly frank detail the policies adopted by the National\nSecurity Council, especially with respect to the Vietnam-\nization of the war.\nApprove\nDisapprove\n2. With our TCC allies as regards U.S. \"guarantees\"\nfor any future settlement in Southeast Asia: I propose\nto take the position that the United States intends to\nlive up to its present commitments, which are adequate\nfor the maintenance of the security of the area; that,\nas we have amply demonstrated, we are as interested in\nthe security of Southeast Asia as our allies; but that\nwe do not intend to make any new treaty commitments to\nthe area for both philosophical and public opinion\nreasons.\nApprove\nDisapprove\n3. With our TCC allies with regard to the Manila\nCommunique: We will try to avoid a specific reaffirma-\ntion of the terms of the Manila Communique concerning\nmutual troop withdrawals by restating our position as\nwe have in the Paris talks; but, to avoid alarming our\nallies about our intentions, we may have to accept a\nreference to the Manila Communique without spelling out\nits terms.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n9.\n4. Letter to President Thieu: I have separately\nproposed to you the text of a letter to President Thieu\nfor me to deliver when I meet with him in Saigon.\nPresident Thieu may desire to release the text of the\nletter.\nRecommendation:\nThat you authorize me to agree to the release of the\ntext of the letter should President Thieu so request.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nI know of no other major policy questions which are\nlikely to arise and which should be brought to your at-\ntention.\nwm\nWillian P. Rogers\nEnclosure:\nProposed Letter to\nPresident Thieu.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nACTION\nSECRET\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM: Henry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT: Secretary Regers' Trip to Southeast Asia\nBackground:\nTrip Schedule: Secretary Rogers départs on May 12. He will first\nvisit Saigon, May 14 - 19. He will then be in Bangkok May 19 - 23 for\nthe SEATO meeting on May 20 - 21, the meeting of the Troop Contributing\nCountries on May 22 - 23, and for bilateral meetings with the Thais and\nother participating countries.\nProposed Objectives:\nOverall Objectives in Southeast Asia:\n(1) To reaffirm US treaty commitments in Southeast Asia,\nparticularly SEATO, and to reassure the countries con-\ncerned of continued US interest in Southeast Asia's security.\n(2) To affirm that the US objective in Vietnam is to assure that\nSouth Vietnamese people will be able to determine their own\nfuture without external interference.\n(3) To consult meaningfully with our allies on Vietnam and\nother common security issues.\n(4) To obtain the views and hopefully the support of our allies\nfor current US strategy in Vietnam and at the Paris peace\nnegotiations.\n(5) To stimulate greater self-help efforts on the part of the\nSoutheast Asian countries without creating anxiety about\nthe credibility of US commitments.\nSECRET\nRSneider:pas:5/5/69\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nSECRET\nAdditional Specific Objectives:\n(1) Saigon: To consult with senior Vietnamese and American\nofficials on negotiating strategy and the Vietnamization of\nthe war and to gain a general familiarization with Vietnam.\n(2) SEATO: To discourage embryonic efforts to revise or\notherwise amend the treaty and current SEATO arrangements.\n(3) Troop Contributing Meeting: Tb consult on negotiating\nstrategy and in particular to discuss the concerns of some\ncountries with respect to the Manila Communique and\nunilateral US troop reductions.\nIssues for Decision and Recommended Positions:\n(1) Reaffirmation of Existing Commitments: Throughout the trip,\nthe countries involved in Southeast Asia will be seeking both\nreaffirmation of US treaty commitments and the basic US com-\nmilment to Vietnam.\nRecommended Position: That Secretary Rogers be authorized\nto reaffirm both of these commitments.\n(2) New Commitments: Pressure for new US commitments may\narise in two specific cases. First, both the Thais and the\nPhilippines have been discussing strengthening and revising the\nSEATO commitment, while the Thais have also refurbished their\npast request for a bilateral treaty with the US to replace SEATO.\nSecond, it Is possible that some of the allies, particularly the\nSouth Vietnamese, may seek a new American commitment to\nguarantee any future settlement in Southeast Asia. In both cases,\nour current treaty commitments appear for the present adequate\nto meet the legitimate security concerns. of the Southeast Asians,\nwhile any new commitments would raise Congressional problems.\nThe Thais, however, will probably find reassuring a reaffirma-\ntion of the 1962 Rusk-Thanant Communique in which wa stated that\nour obligation under SEATO, in the face of communist armed\nattack on Thailand, is individual an well as collective and does\nnot require prior agreement of all other treaty Parties.\nRecommendation: That you authorize Secretary Rogern to reaffirm\nthe Rusk-Thanent communique in linguage generally similar but\notherwise not 80 beyond a reaffirmation of current US treaty\ncommitments.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nSECRET\n(3) Troop Reduction: US intentions to reduce its forces in Vietnam\nunilaterally will be intensively probed both in Saigon and Bangkok.\nThere are indications that Korea and the Filipinos, but not the\nother troop contributing countries, would particularly desire to\nwithdraw some of their forces if we decided to reduce our forces\nin Vietnam.\nRecommended Position: That Secretary Rogers assure the troop\ncontributors of full consultation with them If we decide to reduce\nthe US forces in Vietnam, and inform them that no decisions have\nas yet been made, and that troop withdrawals will depend on\nthree circumstances -- an agreement on mutual withdrawals, an\nimprovement in the military situation, and/or an improvement in\nSouth Visinamese military capabilities. He should also seek to\ndiscourage parallel reductions by other troop contributors, but\nleave the door open for possible token withdrawals, particularly\non the part of the Koreans, If we decide to reduce the US forces\nin Vietnam.\n(4) Manila Communique: Since the troop contributing countries parti-\ncipated in and are committed to the Manila Communique language\non withdrawal, there is concern among some of them about a\npossible US repudiation of the communique.\nRecommended Position: That Secretary Rogers stress the new\nUS position on mutual withdrawal as approved by you and concurred\nin by President Thicu, but, if pressed by the troop contributors,\naccept a reference in the final communique to the Manila Commu-\nnique without spelling out its terms.\nOther Talking Points:\nIn addition to setting forth your views on the above issues, it is\nsuggested that you make the following additional points to Secretary Rogers:\n(1) Your strong personal interest in Asia and conviction that over the\nnext decade Asia will provide the major opportunity for constructive\nAmerican foreign policy approaches.\n(2) Your desire to maintain as close as possible rapport with the\nleaders in South Vietnam, and consult fully with our Asian allies.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n(3) Our confidence that we can outlast Hanol, If It chooses not to\nnegotiate a fair settlement, and that time works more in our\nfavor than in Hanoi's. Therefore, It is to Hanoi's advantage\nto enter now into meaningful negotiations.\n(4) We seek peace in Vistnam, but it is essential that we not appear\noveranxious to either Hanoi or our allies.\n(5) We wish to move ahead with Vistnamization of the war but only\non the basis of well-considered plans. We are looking forward\nto the recommendations of Saigon on Vieinamization.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nACTION\nSECRET\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM: Henry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT: Secretary Rogers' Trip\nThe issue that fundamentally concerns the countries of Southeast Asia is\nwhether the end of the Vietnam war will result in a major disengagement\nof the United States from that area. The Thais are particularly concerned\nthat our treaty commitment under SEATO will become so hedged and\nwatered down that it will be ineffective and useless. They fear that this\nis the very objective of the pressures manifested in the Senate Foreign\nRelations Committee today. Therefore, they -- with the support of the\nFilipinos and others -- are seeking to strengthen and amend SEATO.\nEven deeper concerns of the same fundamental nature are evident in South\nVietnam. There, the current issue centers on the rate of unilateral US\ntroop withdrawals. The South Vietnamese fear that we will put out\nAmerican forces more rapidly than warranted by the military situation or\nthe state of their preparedness. As a result, they would be left seriously\ndisadvantaged in the face of the North Viemamese and the VC.\nFor this reason, I suggest that in discussing with Secretary Rogers the\ndetails of this trip (covered in the attached memorandum), you stress the\nfollowing points:\n1. Your Administration intends to fulfill US commitments in South-\neast Asia fully, without continuously looking over its shoulder at domestic\ncritics In a manner that will vitiate the credibility of these commitments.\n2. US troop reductions from Vietnam will be decided on the basis of\nwell-considered military plans and we will not push Vietnamization to the\npoint of endangering the security of either South Vietnam or the American\nforces remaining in South Vietnam.\nRSneider:pas?5/6/69\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nMay 6, 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT:\nGuidance for Secretary Rogers' Visit to Saigon\nSecretary Rogers has requested your guidance for his visit to\nSaigon on May 14-19. I suggest the following points:\nBasic Elements of U.S. Policy\n1. The U.S. objective in Vietnam is to assure that the\nSouth Vietnamese people will be able to determine their own future\nwithout external interference. The U.S. will not agree to any\nproposal for Vietnam peace which does not meet this objective.\n2. In all elements of U.S. policy toward, Vietnam, the U.S.\nwill consult fully with the Vietnam leadership and maintain the\nclosest possible rapport.\nNegotiating Policy\n1. Our posture on the pace of the talks should be ready\nbut not eager. We want to avoid giving Hanoi the impression we\nare acting from weakness or under pressures.\n2. In the private talks, we visualize separate discussions\nbetween the U.S. and Hanoi and between the South Vietnamese\nGovernment and the NLF, but are prepared to undertake private\ntalks including all four participants if proposed by the Communists.\n3. During the present stage of private talks, we skould:\na. Stress mutual withdrawal based upon the plan\nagreed to by President Thieu. Mutual withdrawal\nshould include provisions for:\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n- 2 -\n(1) Verification of supervision of withdrawal;\n(2) Withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces all\nthe way back to North Vietnam;\n(3) Measures to maintain the agreement.\nb. Secondary but significant emphasis on restoring\nthe DMZ.\nc. Keeping after the question of primoners.\nd. Entering into no de-escalation agreements except\nas an outgrowth of mutual troop withdrawal.\n4. While the U. S. would focus on mutual withdrawal,\ndiscussions of the settlement of political structure in the south would\nbe left to the South Vietnamese Government, In this connection, we\nwish to urge the South Vietnamese to develop negotiating positions on\npolitical structure and coordinate closely with them.\nVietnamization of the War\n1. We attach major importance to Vietnamization of the war\nand are looking forward to receiving plans developed by our senior\nofficers in Saigon to accomplish this objective in coordination with the\nGVN.\n2. You anticipate some unilateral troop withdrawals, possibly\nas early as this summer, but this will depend on the military situation\nand the state of preparedness of the South Vietnamese armed forces.\n3. We must do nothing to give the Vietnamese the impression\nthat we are using Vietnamization of the war as an excuse for a pull-out.\n4. Vietnamization of the war, if it is accomplished as an\nact of strength rather than weakness, will enhance our negotiating position\nin Paris. Hanoi is concerned about Vietnamization, and therefore we\nshould do everything to convince Hanoi that it is to its advantage to enter\ninto meaningful negotiations now rather than trying unsuccessfully to\noutlast us.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nHaig\nW It\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES or AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\n7.\nCONTROL: 6 8 3 3 Q\nP 290525Z APR 69\nFM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA\nAPR, 29, 1969\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3730\n2:50 A.M.\nSTATE GRNC\nBT\nSECRET CANBERRA 2286\n0\nNODIS\nREF: STATE 62693\nSUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE\n1. CONCUR STATEMENT REFTEL THAT AUSTRALIA PREPARED\nLIVE WITH SOME REDUCTION IN US FORCES IN VIETNAM\nWHILE RETAINING ITS FORCES AT PRESENT LEVEL. PRIME\nMINISTER, DEFENCE MINISTER AND ARMY MINISTER HAVE\nSAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY (CANBERRA 1996, 2035 AND 2136).\nTHEIR POSITION IS THAT PRESENT AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN\nVIETNAM ARE WELL-BALANCED UNIT AND ANY REDUCTION\nWOULD MATERIALLY REDUCE EFFECTIVENESS. ALSO THAT,\nIN ANY CASE, TOTAL NUMBERS ARE SMALL IN COMPARISON\nOTHER CONTRIBUTING POWERS.\n2. GOA OFFICIALS HAVE NOT INDICATED EXTENT THEIR\nINTEREST IN SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE, BUT GOA CLEARLY\nPLACES FAR MORE IMPORTANCE ON GORTON VISIT TO\nWASHINGTON WHICH PRECEDES SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE\nBY ABOUT TWO WEEKS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY\nWILL NOT EXPECT TO LEARN ANYTHING NEW FROM US AND\nTHEY CERTAINLY WILL HAVE NOTHING OF IMPORTANCE TO\nTELL US OR OTHERS THAT WASN'T ALREADY THOROUGHLY\nCOVERED IN WASHINGTON TALKS. FREETH, WHO WILL HEAD\nGOA DELEGATION, IS NOT - PARTICULARLY FORCEFUL AND IS\nSTILL PRETTY GREEN TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO AND\nWE DOUBT HE WILL PLAY VERY ACTIVE ROLE. PLIMSOLL,\nWHO WILL BE TRAVELING TO WASHINGTON WITH GORTON, TOLD\nCHARGE HE HOPES TO AVOID TCC MEETING AND SEND SOMEONE\nELSE FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS PERHAPS\nINDICATIVE OF DEGREE OF GOA INTEREST IN FORTHCOMING\nMEETINS.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nPAGE TWO, CANBERRA 2286, CONTROL 6833Q\n3. ALTHOUGH GOA IS UNLIKELY TAKE ANY INITIATIVE AT\nMEETING, IT WILL DEFINITELY WISH TO KNOW IN ADVANCE\nWHAT WE PLAN TO SAY AND WHAT WE HOPE WILL COME OUT OF\nMEETING. WE BELIEVE THEY EXPECT THAT QUESTION OF TROOP\nWITHDRAWALS WOULD BE MAJOR SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION (IN\nWHICH, APART FROM OUR SPECIAL SITUATION, THEY WOULD\nURGE OTHERS TO HOLD THE LINE) AND THAT DETAILED\nBRIEFING PARIS TALKS WOULD BE GIVEN BY US AND GVN\nREPRESENTATIVES. THEY MAY ALSO WISH TO GET INTO\nSUBJECTS OF POST-VIETNAM PEACE- KEEPING OPERATION,\nDISCUSSION OF INSURGENCY IN. THAILAND AND LAOS, AND\nPOSTWAR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. GOA WILL WISH\nTO HAVE A STRONG JOINT COMMUNIQUE THAT DEMONSTRATES\nFIRM SOLIDARITY AND INTENT ALL TCC'S TO STAND BY\nBASIC OBJECTIVE. CRONK\nBT\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSeven\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nMay 22, 1969\nFOR THE PRESS\nP.R. No. 132\nCOMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT CONCLUSION\nSEVEN NATIONS CONFERENCE\nBangkok, Thailand\nMay 22, 1969\nThe Minister for External Affairs of Australia, Mr. Gordon Freeth;\nthe Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Kyu Hah Choi;\nthe Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of New Zealand, Mr.\nKeith Holyoake; the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Mr.\nC arlos P. Romulo; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Mr. Thanat\nKhoman; the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. William\nP. Rogers; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam,\nMr. Tran Chanh Thanh met in Bangkok, at the invitation of the Royal Thai\nGovernment, on 22 May 1969.\nPURPOSES\nThe meeting was held to permit the Ministers to continue their prac-\ntice of regular consultations on important matters of mutual interest. Specifi-\ncally, they wished (1) to review the current situation in Viet-Nam, (2) to\nconsider the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, (3) to dis-\ncuss ways in which their governments might strengthen their efforts to help\nthe people of Viet-Nam, (4) to examine the security situation in Asia.\nSITUATION IN VIET-NAM\nThe Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam described\nthe important developments which had taken place in his country over the past\ntwelve months. He emphasized the broadly based representative nature of the\nGovernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and noted the successful establishment\nof the new and elected institutions, such as the Supreme Court of Justice and\nthe Inspectorate called for by the Vietnamese Constitution. He also described\nthe current efforts of Vietnamese non-Communist political parties to unite to\nfurther their common goal. The Ministers expressed their gratification at the\ncontinued strengthening of Vietnamese political institutions, in particular the\neffective functioning of the elected National Assembly.\nThe Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam also out-\nlined the efforts being made to raise the standard of living of his countrymen\nand to bring them greater social well-being, making particular reference to\nhis Government' S new land reform program and rural development policy.\nHe described the increased autonomy and financial resources given to local\nauthorities to foster a functioning democracy for the benefit of the people. He\nunderlined the achievements of the pacification program, which have made\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed possible pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nPR 132\npossible the election of additional village councils and hamlet chiefs.\nHe described how urban housing projects had been put into effect to\nresettle the victims of Communist indiscriminate shellings. He pointed out\nthat, in spite of the ravages of war, primary, secondary, and higher education\nhad progressed at a remarkable rate.\nThe Minister further indicated that the open arms policy had brought\nfruitful results with growing numbers of enemy cadres and officers rallying to\nthe national community.\nThe Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam stressed\nthe strong desire for peace of his Government and of the people of Viet-Nam.\nThe Ministers made it clear that the peoples of all seven nations desired a\njust and lasting peace at the earliest possible time. They welcomed the\nwillingness of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to hold private\ntalks with what the other side called the NLF as demonstrated by President\nNguyen Van Thieu's statements of March 25, and April 7, 1969.\nThe Ministers examined the military situation and received a briefing\nfrom Vietnamese and American military commanders. They were encouraged\nat the progress being made by allied forces and the increasing difficulties\nencountered by the other side. They agreed that the failure of the other side\nto achieve their objectives should convince them of their inability to gain a\nvictory by military means. The Ministers noted the modernization and improve-\nment of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, welcomed their determination to assume\ngreater responsibilities for the defense of their homeland, and commended the\nprogress they have already made in that direction. They noted with appreciation\nthe substantial increase in the strength of the armed forces contributed by\nThailand to the defense of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Ministers expressed\ntheir admiration and gratitude for the courage and devotion of the allied soldiers\nserving in Viet-Nam.\nThe Ministers emphasized that their forces were in Viet-Nam to help\nthe Vietnamese people defend themselves against outside aggression and\nto ensure that such aggression shall not be rewarded. They reaffirmed that their\nobjective was to bring about a peace in which the people of South Viet-Nam are\nable to exercise their unconditional right of self-determination free from\nexternal interference and terrorism. The Ministers of the seven nations re-\naffirmed their determination to help the Vietnamese people resist this aggression\nand accordingly to continue their support of the Republic of Viet-Nam. They\nrecognized that this support will be related to the progress of the peace negotia-\ntions, the level of offensive actions by the enemy, and the relative strength\nof the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam and their capability of taking\nover an even greater share of the fighting.\nThe Ministers viewed with grave concern the continuing presence of a\nlarge number of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and their use of Laotian\nterritory in violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements.\nEFFORT FOR PEACE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPR 132\n-3-\nEFFORT FOR PEACE\nThe Ministers also reviewed the developments in the negotiations\ntaking place in Paris and welcomed the proposals which had been made\nthere by the governments of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United\nStates concerning mutual troop withdrawals. They agreed that withdrawals\ncould commence simultaneously and proceed expeditiously on the basis of\na mutually acceptable timetable; that all externally introduced forces\nwould have to be withdrawn not only from South Viet-Nam but also from\nLaos and Cambodia; and that the further introduction of forces must be\nprohibited. They also agreed that a clear need existed for adequate\nverification and supervision of compliance with both the withdrawal of\nforces and the prohibition against further introduction of forces.\nThe Ministers also noted with approval the proposals put forward by\nthe Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States for observance of the\nDemilitarized Zone, the release of prisoners of war, and full compliance\nwith existing international agreements on Laos and Cambodia.\nThe Ministers examined the positions the other side has taken in\nParis. In contrast to the reasonable nature of the proposals put forward\nby the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States, the other side has\ndemanded unilateral and unconditional withdrawal of the allied forces\nassisting the Republic of Viet-Nam and destruction of the democratic\ninstitutions and procedures which have been emerging there during the past\nseveral years. From these positions the Ministers concluded with regret\nthat the other side was still intransigent and was seeking to wear down\nthe resistance of the allied nations and to impose upon the Republic of\nViet-Nam a totalitarian regime contrary to the wishes of its people.\nThey reiterated their common resolve to reject any attempt to impose\nupon the Republic of Viet-Nam any system or program, including the spurious\ncoalition government demanded by the other side, without regard to the\nwill of the people of South Viet-Nam.\nThe Ministers agreed that all possibilities leading to peace and\nnational reconciliation should be thoroughly explored, and they endorsed\nthe efforts in this direction of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United\nStates. They welcomed the comprehensive statements by the President of\nthe Republic of Viet-Nam on April 7, 1969, and the President of the\nUnited States on May 14, 1969, as important contributions to this effort.\nThey agreed that all of the nations which are making available armed\nforces to help defend the Republic of Viet-Nam must participate in the\nsettlement of the conflict.\nThe Ministers discussed the need for international cooperation to\nsupport economic reconstruction and development in Viet-Nam after the\ncessation of hostilities. They noted in this regard the great potential\nfor economic and social progress revealed by the recently released joint\ndevelopment group report prepared at the request of the United States\nand the Republic of Viet-Nam. They agreed to consult closely on the\nimportant goal of assisting the people of South Viet-Nam to achieve the\nbetter future their sacrifices have earned. They expressed the hope that\nNorth Viet-Nam will come to realize the advantages of living in peace-\nful cooperation and friendly harmony with its neighbors rather than in\nconfrontation with them; and that North Viet-Nam will take advantage of\narrangements for regional cooperation for the benefit of its own people\nand for the progress of Southeast Asia as a whole.\nThe\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPR 132\n-4-\nThe Ministers also agreed that a general settlement in Southeast\nAsia will reugire the participation by Asian powers in measures to assure\npeace and security for this part of the world. They considered it de-\nsirable that the Asian countries themselves should have the primary re-\nsponsibility for their own future well-being and peaceful development.\nThey agreed that the Asian countries mightin exercise of this responsi-\nbility assume certain duties in connection with a peace settlement for\nViet-Nam, possibly under the aegis of the United Nations. Again, closest\nconsultation among the interested parties could be beneficial in this\nconnection.\nThe Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea gave an\naccount of the continuing and intensified acts of provocation and\naggression against the Republic of Korea perpetrated by the North Korean\nCommunists, as evidenced by the series of infiltrations by armed raiders\ninto the Republic of Korea and the increased violation during the past\nyear of the Armistice Agreement of 1953. The Ministers expressed their\nindignation over these continuing and intensified acts of provocation\nand aggression, and renewed their previous agreement that such acts by\nthe North Korean Communists are a matter of grave concern and directly\nthreaten the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and the area\nsurrounding it.\nThe Ministers reaffirmed their support for the Republic of Korea in\nresisting such North Korean aggression. The Ministers welcomed the in-\ntention of the Republic of Korea to keep them and other interested\ngovernments informed of any future developments through ambassadors in\nSeoul.\nCONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES\nThe Ministers noted that actions taken in pursuance of the policies\nherein stated should be in accordance with their respective constitutional\nprocesses.\nCONCLUSION\nThe Ministers of the seven nations reiterated their continued\nsupport to the Republic of Viet-Nam to preserve the unconditional right\nof the people of South Viet-Nam to decide their own destiny by demo-\ncratic and peaceful means and without outside interference. The Ministers\nstated their determination to continue their efforts towards this goal,\nwhile a just and peaceful solution to the conflict is pursued through the\nParis Meetings. Finally, in view of the situation in Korea and Southeast\nAsia, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the Declaration on\nPeace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific promulgated at the Summit\nConference in Manila in October 1966, and agreed to continue the close\ncooperation which has existed among the Seven Nations.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nMAY 21, 1969\nFOR THE PRESS\nNO. 126\nFINAL COMMUNIQUE\nOF THE\nFOURTEENTH SEATO MINISTERIAL MEETING\nBANGKOK, THAILAND\nMAY 21, 1969\nThe Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization held its\nFourteenth Meeting in Bangkok from 20 May to 21 May 1969, under the\nchairmanship of His Excellency Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs\nof Thailand.\nGENERAL OBSERVATIONS\nThe Council agreed that the most significant development during the\npast year has been the prospects for peace in the area opened up by the\nParis Meetings and by the determined efforts of the United States and the\nRepublic of Viet-Nam in close consultation with their allies to bring.\nabout a peaceful and just solution to the Viet-Nam conflict.\nThe Council noted that economic and social progress had continued\nduring the past year within the Treaty area. The Council agreed that\nthis progress had been achieved mainly by the individual efforts of the\ncountries in the region, and by the further strengthening of regional\ncooperation which reflects a growing consciousness of mutual interests.\nThe Council also noted that this achievement had been made without\nsacrifice of human liberty and fundamental freedoms.\nThe Council noted that these political, economic and social advances\nwould not have been possible without the shield which the Manila Treaty\nhas helped to provide over the past fourteen years.\nThe Council agreed that aggression, both overt and by subversion,\ninfiltration and terrorism, instigated or supported by external communist\nmovements, remains a major threat to the peace and security of the area.\nThe Council expressed its conviction that the threat in the Treaty area\ncannot be considered in isolation from problems of international peace\nand security, and that the outcome of the struggle now going on against\nsuch aggression in Southeast Asia will have profound effects throughout\nthe world. The Council expressed its determination that this aggression\nmust not be allowed to succeed.\nTHE SEARCH FOR PEACE\nThe Council commended the determination of the Republic of Viet-Nam,\nand the governments helping to defend it, to bring a peace in Viet-Nam\nunder which the people of South Viet-Nam will be assured of their right\nto determine their own future, free from outside interference and terrorism.\nThe\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNO. 126\n-2-\nThe Council noted with approval the proposals which have been made\nby the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States for the mutual with-\ndrawal of external forces from South Viet-Nam, for respect for the\nDemilitarized Zone, for full implementation of the 1962 Geneva Agree-\nments on Laos, for respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality\nand territoiral integrity of Cambodia and for the release of all\nprisoners of war. The Council noted that these proposals not only\nrecognize the realities of the situation in Southeast Asia today, but\nare firmly based on the precedents of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements.\nThe Council noted that the Paris Talks have been going on for a year and\nexpressed the hope that the other side would now respond constructively\nto the proposals.\nThe Council expressed its conviction that serious negotiations\nbased on the above proposals would lead to an end of hostilities and to\npeace and reconciliation in Viet-Nam. The Council noted that the\nfundamental allied objective in Viet-Nam is to ensure the unconditional\nright on self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam. The\nCouncil agreed that, whatever the difficulties, the intensive search for\na just and lasting peace must continue until this objective is attained\nand stability and security are assured.\nVIET-NAM\nThe Council heard with deep interest a statement by the Minister\nof Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Council expressed\nits concern and sympathy for the Vietnamese people who have suffered\nso long. It affirmed its admiration for the courage with which the\ngovernment and people of the Republic of Viet-Nam are defending their\nfreedom.\nThe Council noted the commendable progress being made by the armed\nforces of the Republic of Viet-Nam in improving their ability to with-\nstand the armed aggression and to counter subversive activity. The\nCouncil warmly welcomed the expressed determination of the Government of\nthe Republic of Viet-Nam progressively to assume responsibility for the\ndefence of its territory.\nThe Council also welcomed the continued progress that has been made\nby the Republic of Viet-Nam in the political, economic and social fields,\nin particular, the evolution and strengthening of democratic and\nrepresentative government.\nThe Council noted with deep concern North Viet-Nam's continuing\naggression by means of armed attack against the Republic of Viet-Nam.\nThe Council deplored the conduct of North Viet-Nam, particularly while\npeace negotiations are in progress, in continuing indiscriminate attacks\non the civilian population. The Council noted with regret that this\naggression is sustained by a heavy flow of weapons and supplies from\nother communist regimes.\nThe Council noted with appreciation the increases during the past\nyear in the military, economic and humanitarian assistance by member\ngovernments to the Republic of Viet-Nam, in fulfillment of or consistent\nwith their obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defence\nTreaty. The Council also noted with appreciation the substantial\nassistance\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nNO. 126\nassistance which the Republic of Viet-Nam has continued to receive from\nthe Republic of Korea and other countries which are not members of SEATO.\nThe Council stated its conviction that the effective defence of the\nRepublic of Viet-Nam in its current struggle is essential to the security\nof Southeast Asia and will demonstrate that communist expansion through\naggression of this kind will not be permitted.\nThe Council noted that reconstruction in Viet-Nam, which awaits\nthe achievement of peace, will open the way to a new era of development\nand progress for the peoples and nations of the entire region. The\nCouncil noted the intention of the member nations of SEATO to continue\ntheir aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam and to contribute to the work\nof reconstruction.\nThe Council welcomed the expressions of intent by other nations\naround the world to participate in this urgent task.\nLAOS\nThe Council noted with grave concern that North Viet-Nam, in\nviolation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements, continues to maintain military\nforces, including large units of its regular army, in Laos, to commit\narmed attacks on the forces of the Royal Government of Laos, and to use\nLaotian Territory for infiltrating troops and supplies into the Republic\nof Viet-Nam and to support insurgency in Thailand. The Council reiterated\nits call for full implementation by all signatories of the 1962 Geneva\nAgreements on Laos and expressed support for the earnest efforts of\nPrime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the Royal Government of Laos to\nsecure peace and to preserve the sovereignty, independence, neutrality,\nunity and territorial integrity of Laos.\nPHILIPPINES\nThe Council was pleased to note the recent successes achieved by\ngovernment forces against insurgents in Central Luzon and the vigorous\nefforts by all agencies of the Government of the Philippines, with\nsupport of member nations, to implement an integrated socio-economic\nprogramme designed to eliminate the root cause of the complex insurgency\nproblem in Central Luzon. Since one of the causes of agrarian unrest\namong the masses is the land problem, the Council also noted with\napproval the efforts of the Philippine Government to accelerate the\nimplementation of the land reform code. The Council further noted the\nachievements of the Government of the Philippines in the development of\nits rural areas and expressed its gratification at the continuing high\npriority given to irrigation, feeder roads , health, electrification,\ncredit and agricultural productivity programmes.\nThe Council noted proposals by the Philippines for a youth volunteer\ncorps, a special problem office, a university of Southeast Asia, a rural\nhealth training centre, and refugee rehabilitation.\nTHAILAND\nThe Council noted the Royal Thai Government had increased during the\nyear the major contribution it is making to the defence of the Republic\nof Viet-Nam. In addition to air and naval units already in Viet-Nam,\nit dispatched a division of ground forces to aid in the struggle. This\nwas done despite the continued threat of communist-inspired insurgency\nwithin Thailand itself.\nThe\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4-\nNo. 126\nThe Council was gratified by the determined endeavours of the\nRoyal Thai Government and people to encourage economic and social develop-\nment and to counter subversive activities directed from outside Thai\nborders. Their efforts have continued under the newly formed government\nfollowing the national elections held early this year.\nThe Council expressed concern at the increase in communist in-\nfiltration and terrorist activities particularly in remote areas of\nNorth and Northeast Thailand. The Council noted with satisfaction the\nintensive efforts of the Royal Thai Government to provide greater\nsecurity and a higher standard of living for the rural population and\nthe vigorous measures taken by Thai authorities to eliminate the threat\nof communist insurgency. The Council reiterated its determination to\ncontinue to assist Thailand in meeting this threat.\nCOUNTER-SUBVERSION\nThe Council again affirmed its support for SEATO activities designed\nto aid member countries in the Treaty area to counter communist sub-\nsersion. It noted the high degree of success achieved by the Secretary-\nGeneral in the provision of such assistance and requested him to continue\nhis efforts in this field.\nAUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS\nThe Council welcomed as a substantial contribution to the security\nof the area the decisions of the Governments of Australia and New\nZealand to maintain military forces in Malaysia and Singapore at the\nrequest of those governments.\nThe Council also welcomed the proposed consultations in Canberra\nbetween the Governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore\nand the United Kingdom.\nTHE ORGANIZATION\nThe Council reaffirmed the importance which it attaches to the\norganization as a deterrent to communist aggression and as a source of\nsupport to member nations in the area in countering communist subversion.\nThe Council was convinced that greater emphasis should be placed\non political consultations, counter-insurgency, and economic and\nand cultural cooperation, to make the organization's role more effective\nand more responsive to the new communist tactics being employed to\nundermine the stability and orderly progress of free societies. The\nCouncil expressed its support for cooperative endeavours to this effect.\nThe Council noted the report of the military advisers and commended\nthe work of the Military Planning Office during the past year, in\nparticular the excellent work done in keeping plans up-to-date and in\ndesigning military exercises.\nThe Council expressed its satisfaction at the progress achieved by\nthe organization in programmes related to economic development, cultural\naffairs and medical research. It commended the efforts of the organiza-\ntion to keep these programmes under review to ensure that they proved\ncomplementary to programmes for counter-insurgency and civic action. The\nCouncil agreed that the value of these programmes has been fully\ndemonstrated and that they deserve the active support of all members.\nPakistan\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNO. 126\n-5-\nPAKISTAN\nThe Pakistan delegate wished it to be recorded that he did not\nparticipate in the drafting of the communique and that the views expressed\nin it do not necessarily reflect the position of the Government of\nPakistan.\nNEXT MEETING\nThe Council accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Government\nof the Philippines to hold its Fifteenth Meeting in the Philippines\nin 1970.\nEXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE\nThe Council expressed gratitude to the Royal Thai Government and\nthe people of Thailand for their generous hospitality and warm welcome,\nand its appreciation for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting.\nLEADERS OF DELEGATIONS\nAll member governments, except France, participated. The Republic\nof Viet-Nam, a protocol state, was represented by an observer.\nThe leaders of the delegations to the Fourteenth Council Meeting\nwere:\nAUSTRALIA\nHonorable Gordon Freeth, M.P.\nMinister for External Affairs\nNEW ZEALAND\nRight Honorable Keith Holyoake,\nC.H., M.P.\nPrime Minister and Minister of\nExternal Affairs.\nPAKISTAN\nH.E. Mr. M. Hayat Junejo,\nAmbassador to Thailand\nPHILIPPINES\nH.E. General Carlos P. Romulo,\nSecretary of Foreign Affairs\nTHAILAND\nH.E. Mr. Thanat Khoman\nMinister of Foreign Affairs.\nUNITED KINGDOM\nRight Honorable Lord Shepherd\nP.C.,\nMinister of State, Foreign and\nCommonwealth Office.\nUNITED STATES\nHonorable William P. Rogers\nSecretary of State.\nREPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM\nH.E. Mr. Tran Chanh Thanh\n(Observer)\nMinister of Foreign Affairs\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\n*\n#\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nCONFIDENTIAL 940\nPAGE 01 STATE 076647\n85\nORIGIN EA 15\nINFO OCT 01,SSO 00,NSCE USIE ØØDCIAE 00,DODE 00 JPM 04,H 02' INR 07 ,\n03, NSAE ØØ,NSC 10.P 04,RSC ø1,SP 02,SS 20, UPW 01 AID 28,10 13,\n/111 R\n66646\nDRAFTED BY EA/K BCROWBERG\nAPPROVED BY EA/K RBPETERS\nDOD/ISA-LT COL BAXLEY\nWHITE HOUSE MR SNEIDER\nS/S MR BROWN\nEA/RA MR FRIEDMAN\nEa\n015725\n0 R 142339Z MAY 69 ZFF4\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nTO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE\nINFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON\nAMEMBASSY SEOUL\namembassy TOKYO\nCINCPAC\nCOMUSKOREA\nCONFIDENTIAL STATE 076647\nCINCPAC FOR POLAD\nSUBJECT: US-ROK DEFENSE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE\nREF: WH 9653-SECTO 12\n10 IN RESPONSE TO ROK PROPOSAL DECISION TO HOLD ANNUAL\nMEETINGS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL BETWEEN US AND ROK DEFENSE\nMINISTRIES \"TO DISCUSS AND CONSULT ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY\nMATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND COMMON CONCERN\" WAS MADE\nDURING COURSE OF VANCE MISSION TO ROK SHORTLY AFTER SEIZURE\nOF PUEBLO AND BLUE HOUSE RAID. DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED IN\nKOREAN-US JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 15, 1968°\nCONFIDENTIAL\n45\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF\nAMERICA STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPAGE 02 STATE 076647\n2. FIRST ANNUAL MEETING WAS HELD IN WASHINGTON MAY 27-28»\n19680 ROK MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CHOI YONG=HUI AND\nDEPUTY SECRETARY PAUL NITZE PARTICIPATED. TO MOLLIFY ROKS,\nWHO HAD HOPED THAT SECRETARY CLIFFORD WOULD PERSONALLY\nPARTICIPATE LATTER HAD PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH CHOI FROM\nUS VIEWPOINT 1968 MEETING WAS PRIMARLY MEANS OF REASSURING\nROKS IN WAKE OF PUEBLO AND BLUE HOUSE RAID® NYTZE SAID\nATTTIME THAT SUCH MEETINGS ARE FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND WILL\nNOT CONSTITUTE SUBSTITUTE FOR NORMAL DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS.\n30 MEETING WILL BE HELD IN SEOUL JUNE 3.4 WITH DEPUTY\nSECRETARY PACKARD REPRESENTING US ON MINISTERIAL LEVEL\nPACKARD'S PARTY WILL INCLUDE: RADM TAZEWELLI To SHEPARD\n(ASDVISA), RICHARD G o CAPEN JR , (ASD/PA), LT. GEN FERDINAND\nTo UNGER (JOINT STAFF REPRESENTATIVED RICHARD B PETERS\n(STATE REPRESENTATIVE) AND CAPT. (USN) JAMES B ® WILSON\n(MILITARY ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY SECRETARY).\n40 TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING NOW BEING PREPARED BY DOD.\nFOLLOWING IS TENTATIVE AGENDA FOR CONFERENCE\nA o ROK BRIEFING ON NORTH KOREAN THREAT AND CAPABILITIES\n(CONVENTIONALI AND UNCONVENTIONALI TO INCLUDE CHICOM REINFORCE-\nMENT CAPABILITIES: DISCUSSION, INCLUDING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN\nAREA.\nB o BREIFING ON CAPABILITIES OF ROKE TO MEET THREAT\nINCLUDING ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES, HOMELAND DEFENSE\nRESERVE FORCES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES\nCo USFK BRIEFING ON CURRENT STATUS OF US FORCES\nIN KOREA®\nDo BRIEFING BY WASHINGTON MEMBERS OF GROUP ON VIET-NAM\nSITUATION AND ON CHICON THREAT.\nE lo DISCUSSION OF STATUS, FUTURE, AND ROLE OF US: AND\nROK FORCES IN VIET-NAM IN POST-HOSTILITIES SITUATION\nFle USFK BRIEFING ON INCREASING 0&M COSTS OF ROK\nFORCES.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT DEP OF\n*\nUNITED STATES\nOF STATE *\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPAGE 03: STATE 076647\nG. ROK BRIEFING ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE.\nHo DISCUSSION OF I MAP FUNDING\nI. DISCUSSION ON FUTURE OF FREE WORLD AND US IDEAS AND\nCONCEPTS FOR SECURITY OF FREE ASIA.\n40 TALKING POINTS COVERING ITEMS: E G , AND I ARE INCLUDED\nIN BILATERAL TALKING PAPER FOR SEVEN-NATION MEETING. SUGGEST\nTHAT IF CHOE RAISES OTHER QUESTIONS RELATING TO DEFENSE MATTERSA\nHE BEI INFORMED THAT BETTER FORUM FOR DISUCSSION THESE SUBJECTS\nIS FORTHCOMING DEFENSE MINISTRIES MEETING. RICHARDSON\nCONFIDENTIALI\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nEXE™S EXCES\nSECRET 271\nPAGE 01 140408Z\n16\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01,000 00,550 00, FILE 01, NSCE 00 W\n1969 MAY 14 009975 3 07\nKISSINGER'S OFFICE\nRECEIVED\n0 142200Z MAY 69\nFM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC\nTO AMEMB BANGKOK\nINFO DEPT OF STATE\nAMEMB SAIGON\n2\nSEC R El T EXDIS WH9650\nFROM MCCLOSKEY ABOARD SAM 86971\nSECTO 7\nREF BANGKOK 6055\nBANGKOK 6053\nBANGKOK 5973\nI APPRECIATE NATURE OF PROBLEM YOU HAVE ENCOUNTERED\nWITH THANAT AND WITH THAI SENSITIVITIES ABOUT DRAFT TCC\nCOMMUNIQUE. IN VIEW OF THESE AND YOUR STRONG\nPOSITIVE RECOMMENDATION/ I AGREE TO ACCEPT THANAT'S BREAKFAST\nINVITATION FOR MAY 21 AND WOULD HOPE THAT I CAN SET MOST OF\nHIS CONCERNS AT REST DURING THAT SESSION. I AM COUNTING ON\nYOU TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR THIS MEETING, BUT AM SURE YOU\nREALIZE THAT WE CAN NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE THANAT FULL SATISFACTION\nPAGE 2 RUEADWW 1161 SECRET EXDIS\nON ALL HIS DESIRES, AS WE WANT TO PRESERVE A COMMUNIQUE\nEXCES\nPOINTING TOWARD PEACE AND AVOIDING AS MUCH HARSH LANGUAGE\nAS POSSIBLE.\n2. AS FOR THE COMMUNIQUE, YOU CAN TELL THAIS WE CAN\nOF COURSE ACCEPT A NUMBER OF THEIR PROPOSALS, INCLUDING SUCH THINGS\nAS THE MENTION OF THEIR TROOP AUGMENTATION AND THE REJECTION OF AN\nIMPOSED COALITION AND ASSURE THEM WE WANT TO BE COOPERATIVE AND\nBELIEVE AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED WITHOUT TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY.\nHOWEVER (REF 59731 WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT FURTHER EFFORT TOWARDS\nDETAILED NEGOTIATION CF LANGUAGE BE DEFERRED UNTIL OUR ARRIVAL\nIN BANGKOK. WE WILL, IN THE MEANTIME ,, HAVE WORKED OUT SOME UNDER-\nSTANDINGS WITH THE VIETNAMESE IN SAIGON. ALSO, WE ASSUME THAT DEPT.\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESARORITATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nof STATES AMERICA UNITED\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 1404082\nWILL CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND\nREPRESENTATIVES.\n3. I WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE\nAFTER OUR ARRIVAL IN BANGKOK, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR,\nBIRABHONGSE, FREEMAN MATTHEWS AND GEORGE ALDRICH MEET IN A\nWORKING AND DRAFTING SESSION TO TACKLE AN AGREED VERSION OF OUR\nDIVERGENT TEXTS. IF WE CAN ENTER THE TCC MEETINGS WITH AS\nCOMPATIBLE CONDITIONS AS POSSIBLE, IT WILL, I AM SURE, IMPROVE\nPAGE 3 RUEADWW 1161 S ECRET EXDIS\nTHE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETINGS THEMSELVES AND WILL\nCERTAINLY EASE YOUR BILATERAL PROBLEMS WITH THANAT.\nBT\nSEPRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\n076253\nOUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State\nINDICATE:\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nSECRET\n37: B\nOR OC/T USE ONLY\nClassification\nOrigin\nACTION:\nAmembassy SAIGON PRIORITY\nI 4 MAY 69 20 02%\nInfo:\nSTATE\n076253\nNODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS\nSUBJ:\nSeven-Nation Meeting - Withdrawals\nREF:\nSaigon 9313\nhaving\nYour assumption is correct, and we have no objection to gaving GVN\nprovide withdrawal paper to Foreign Ministers of TCC countries in\ntheir capitals just before Bangkok meeting, preferably not before\nFriday, May 16, Saigon time.\nGP-1\nEND\nRICHARDSON\nH.\nwg\nDrafted by:\nTel. Ext.\nTelegraphic transmission and\nEA: HIsham:pb 5/14/69\n2831\nEA - Mr. Green\nclassification approved by:\nClearances:\nS/S - Mr. XXXXX\nWalsh\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n8-65 FORM DS-322\n1. Sent OF STATE\n7. TO:\nWH\n(Msg. No.) 345\n3. Transmitted by: BP Belin\n4. Received '69 MAY by: 8 AM 11 08\nDate & Time: 1100\nDate & Time:\n5. Description:\nTel to Saigon re Seven Nation Meeting\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\n6. Cisin & Controls:\n7. No. of Pgs.\n2\n8. Precedence\nIMM\n9. Validated by: RLBrown\n10. Deliver to: Dr. Kissinger\nFor: Clearance\nXX\nThe White House\nInformation\nATTN: Mr. Sneider\nPer Request\nAneider cleared\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nBEFORE THE IELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243\nITGOING TELEGRAM Department of State\nCATE: COLLECT\nARGE to\nTOP SECRET\n69 MAY 8 AM\nClassification\nFOR OC/T USE ONLY\n08\nigin\nACTION:\nAmembassy SAIGON\nIMMEDIATE\nSTATE\nNODIS\nFOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER\nSUBJECT: Seven Nation Meeting\n1. We have been considering how we should handle question of\nUS troop reductions (in context of President's three points in\nhis April18 press conference) in the TCC Meeting. We are con-\ncerned that some of the TCC's will read too much into what we\nmay say on this subject, especially in light of excited press\nspeculation. It has occurred to us that the problem could be\nput in its proper light if the GVN were to take the lead in\nnoting\ndiscussing the prospects for such reductions in the context of\nincreased RVNAF capabilities and as a demonstration of confidence\nin their abilities to take on added responsibilities. If Thanh\ncould include a statement along those lines in his prepared\nremarks at the TCC Conference, with perhaps additional support\nfrom General Du, the Secretary would have a very useful peg on\nwhich to hang his own remarks on the subject.\nred by:\nTel. Ext,\nTelegraphic transmission and\nA/VN:HFMatthewsJr./fm1o\n8731\nclassification approved by:\nEA - William H. Sullivan\nranses:\nC-Ambassador Pederseny\nEA/VN-Mr. Burke\nS/S- Mr. Brown\nWH-\nTOP SECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHUNS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON\nES\nBEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Rozam\nGOING TELEGRAM Department of State\nTE:\nCOLLECT\nGE TO\nTOP SECRET\nClassification\nFOR oc/T USE ONLY\nACTION:\nPAGE 2 to NODIS TELEGRAM TO SAIGON IMMEDIATE\n2. If you concur that it would be useful and feasible, could\nyou explore the possibility of setting up such a scenario with\nThieu and Thanh?\nGP-1.\nEND\nEal. Ext,\nTelegraphic transmission and\nby:\nclassification approved by:\ncas\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential. Library This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nW A\n072654\nOUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State\nINDICATE:\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nTOP SECRET\n30B\noc/T use ONLY\nClassification\n9 MAY 69 00 012\nOrigin\nACTION:\nAmembassy SAIGON\nIMMEDIATE\nInfo:\nSTATE 072654\nNODIS\nFOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER\nSUBJECT: Seven Nation Meeting\n1. We have been considering how we should handle question of\nUS troop reductions (in context of President's three points in\nhis April18 press conference) in the TCC Meeting. We are con-\ncerned that some of the TCC's will read too much into what we\nmay say on this subject, especially in light of excited press.\nspeculation. It has occurred to us that the problem could be\nput in its proper light 1f the GVN were to take the lead in\nnoting\ndisansaing the prospects for such reductions in the context of\nincreased RVNAF capabilities and as a demonstration of confidence\nin their abilities to take on added responsibilities. If Thanh\ncould include a statement along those lines in his prepared\nremarks at the TCC Conference, with perhaps additional support\nfrom General Du, the Secretary would have a very useful peg on\nwhich to hang his own remarks on the subject.\nDrafted by:\nEA/VN:HFMattnewsJr./fmlc Has/7/69\n5/7/69\nTol. Ext.\nTelegraphic transmission and\n8731\nEA - William H. Sullivan\nclassification approved by:\nClearances:\nC-Ambassador Pedersen\nOPP\nS/S- МиххВаюки\nWH-Mr.\nMe. Gleysteen\nfir\nTOP SECRET\nFORM Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDS-322\n8-65\nOUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State\nINDICATE:\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nTOP SECRET\nClassification\nFOR oc/T USE ONLY\nOrigin\nACTION:\nInfoi\nPAGE 2 to NODIS TELEGRAM TO SAIGON IMMEDIATE\n2. If you concur that 1t would be useful and feasible, could\nyou explore the possibility of setting up such a scenario with\nThieu and Thanh?\nGP-1.\nEND\n[ROGERS]\nDrafted by:\nTel. Ext.\nTelegraphic transmission and\nclassification approve d by\nClearances:\nTOP SECRET\nFORM Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This docume reviewoù pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n8-65 DS-322\nINFARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nEXE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\n791\nPAGE 01 SAIGON 09433 01 OF 03 151227Z\n44\nACTION SS 30\n3\nINFO OCT 01,CCO 00,FILE 01,/032 W\n019255\nEXCES EX@\nPI R 151125Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY SAIGON\nTO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY\nAMEMBASSY CANBERRA\nAMEMBASSY MANILA\nAMEMBASSY SEOUL\nAMEMBASSY WELLINGTON\nINFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3974\nS: EC R ET SECTION 1 OF 3 SAIGON 9433\nEXDIS\nSECTO 17\nSUBJ: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE - WITHDRAWAL PAPER\nA. FOREIGN MINISTER THANH HAS REQUESTED, AND WE HAVE AGREED,\nTHAT IN INTEREST OF SPEED, EFFICIENCY AND SECURITY, OUR COMMUNI-\nCATIONS FACILITIES SHOULD BE USED TO HELP GVN REPRESENTATIVES\nIN TCC CAPITALS DISTRIBUTE TEXT OF US/GVN PAPER ON WITHERAWALS TO\nHOST GOVERNMENTS. ACCORDINGLY, ACTION ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT WELLING-\nTON) SHOULD GIVE TEXT OF PAPER TO THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR OR\nCHARGE, REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE EITHER HAS RECEIVED\nFROM GVN OR WILL SHORTLY RECEIVE, TO PRESENT IT TO THE FOREIGN\nMINISTER OF THE HOST GÜVERNMENT BEFORE THE MINISTER'S DEPARTURE\nFOR BANGKOK. PAPER WILL. BE DISCUSSED IN THE SEVEN NATION CONFER-\nENCE. THE IMPORTANCE OF SECRECY SHOULD BE STRESSED.\nB. AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON SHOULD PRESENT THE PAPER TO FOREIGN\nMINISTER ON BEHALF OF THE GVN, POINTING OUT THAT THIS IS AN AGREED\nGVN/US PAPER AND WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE.\nC. TEXT OF PAPER FOLLOWS:\nBEGIN TEXT\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been oviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\n#\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nMAKE\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 SAIGON 09433 01 OF 03 151227Z\nWITHDRAWAL OF FORCES\n1. BASIC OBJECTIVES\nOUR BASIC OBJECTIVES IN THE MATTER OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE:\n(A) TO OBTAIN THE WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES AND OTHER ELEMENTS\nFROM NORTH VIET NAM INTO SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA AT ANY\nTIME:\n(B) TO INSURE THAT SUCH PERSONNEL RETURN ALL THE WAY TO NORTH\nVIET NAM:\n(C) TO GET ADEQUATE ASSURANCE, THROUGH VERIFICATION AND SUPER-\nVISION MACHINERY, THROUGH THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN\nTHE AGREEMENT (FOOTNOTE), AND THROUGH OUR OWN RESOURCES, THAT\nHANOI COMPLIES WITH THE CONDITIONS WE HAVE SPECIFIED FOR AGREED\nMUTUAL WITHDRAWALS.\n(FOOTNOTE) FOR EXPLANATION OF THE TERM \"MEASURES NECESSARY TO\nMAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT\", SEE THE SUGGESTED POSITION FOR ITEM 6.\n2. DEFINITION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS SUBJECT TO\nWITHDRAWAL\nWE SHOULD INSIST, IN PRINCIPLE, UPON THE WITHDRAWAL TO NORTH\nVIET NAM OF NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULAR FORCES, NORTH VIETNAMESE\nSOLDIERS SERVING IN NOMINALLY VIET CONG UNITS, AND ALL OTHER\nPERSONNEL (E.G., REGROUPEES) INFILTRATED FROM NORTH VIET NAM\nINTO THE SOUTH AT ANY TIME, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING THE\nEFFORT TO SEIZE CONTROL OF SOUTH VIET NAM.\nIT IS DOUBTFUL THAT WE WILL BE ABLE, EVEN WITH A SUPERVISORY\nORGANIZATION, TO IDENTIFY ALL POLITICAL AND SUPPORTING ELEMENTS\nINTRODUCED FROM THE NORTH. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF NATIVE\nSOUTHERNERS. YET, DESPITE THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES, IT SEEMS\nWISE TO PUT FORWARD A FIRM POSITION AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.\n3. DEFINITION OF US AND ALLIED FORCES AND ELEMENTS SUBJECT OT\nWITHDRAWAL\nWE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ALL COMBAT FORCES FROM\nSOUTH VIET NAM IF HANO I MEETS SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF A MUTUAL\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library This document has been determined to be declassified\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nOF STATE VO.\nDepartment of State\nUNITED EDWARD STATES OF AV\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 SAIGON 09433 01 OF 03 1512272\nWITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT. THESE CONDITIONS SHOULD INCLUDE PROVISIONS\nFOR:\nSECRET\neproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential and has been determined to be declassified\nNOT 10 BE REPRODUCED AUTHORIZATION OF I AUTHORIZATION OF AUTHORIAOTE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nOF STATE\nDepartment of State\nORLINED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET 871\nPAGE 01 SAIGON 09433 02 OF 03 151345Z\nKIGIS\n47\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01,CCO 00,FILE 01,/032 W\n019707\nPR 151125Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY SAIGON\nTO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY\nAMEMBASSY CANBERRA\nAMEMBASSY MANILA\nAMEMBASSY SEOUL\nAMEMBASSY WELLINGTON\nINFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3975\nS E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SAIGON 9433\nEXDIS\n(A) VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION OF WITHDRAWAL.\n(B) THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM LAOS AND\nCAMBODIA, AS WELL AS FROM SOUTH VIET NAM.\n(C) MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT. OBVIOUSLY EACH\nOF THESE CONDITIONS, AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY WILL BE ATTAIN-\nABLE, REQUIRES DISCUSSION. ONE QUESTION CONCERNS THE DEFINITION\nOF THE TERM \"MILITARY FORCES\". WE WILL HAVE AN INTEREST IN NOT\nFORECLOSING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF US\nMILITARY PERSONNEL IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES, IF THIS IS THE DESIRE\nOF THE GVN. THESE CATEGORIES MIGHT INCLUDE US MILITARY ADVISORY\nAND LOGISTIC PERSONNEL YET WE MUST BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO\nCOMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF US AND ALLIED COMBAT FORCES AND UNITS IF\nHANOI COMPLIES WITH THE AGREED [ CONDITIONS.\n4. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO ANY INITIATION OF US AND ALLIED\nWITHDRAWAL\nWE WOULD BEGIN PHASE-CUT OF US AND ALLIED FORCES AS NORTH\nVIET NAM BEGINS ITS WITHDRAWALS AND THE FLOW OF NEW MANPOWER\nHAS CEASED.\nWITH RESPECT TO THE LEVEL OF VOLENCE, REMOVAL OF THE NORTH\nSECRET\nReproduced BE Richard ODUCED THE ed pursuant to E.O. OF THE 13526 EXECUTIVE and has been determined SECRETARY to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nDEP\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 SAIGON 09433 02 OF 03 151345Z\nVIETNAMESE SHOULD LOWER THE VIET CONG CAPABILITY FOR VIOLENCE.\nTHUS, WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF VOLENCE\nIS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE INITIATION OF WITHDRAWALS,\nFAILURE TO REALIZE A REDUCTION OF VIOLENCE AFTER WITHDRAWAL HAD\nAPPARENTLY BEEN BEGUN WOULD BE A STRONG INDICATION THAT THE\nNORTH VIETNAMESE WERE NOT CARRYING THROUGH THE WITHDRAWAL IN\nGOOD FAITH.\n5. ELEMENTS OF AN AGREED WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE: INITIATION,\nPHASING, AND COMPLETION\nWE WOULD INDICATE IN PARIS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK OUT A\nWITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE THAT COULD INCLUDE\n(A) PHASING OF AGREED WITHDRAWALS ON EACH SIDE,\n(B) SIMULTANEOUS INITIATION OF THE FIRST INCREMENTS OF WITHDRAWAL,\n(C) A COMPLETION SCHEDULE UNDER WHICH NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES\nAND ELEMENTS WOULD BE FULLY WITHDRAWN BEFORE WE WERE REQUIRED\nTO COMPLETE OUR WITHDRAWALS UNDER THE AGREEMENT.\nWE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONTROL THE TIMING OF THE\nEXCLUS EXCLUS\nCOMPLETION OF OUR WITHDRAWAL, SINCE WE CAN DETERMINE IF HANOI\nHAS FULLY MET THE CONDITIONS OF THE MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT.\nTHE KEY POINT WILL NOT BE THE TIMETABLE BUT RATHER GETTING HANOI\nTO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL.\n60 SUBSEQUENT CONDITIONS AFFECTING PHASING AND COMPLETION OF\nWITHDRAWALS\nWE WOULD MAKE CLEAR, AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS,\nTHAT WE COULD NOT CARRY THROUGH OUR WITHDRAWALS, WHATEVER THE\nTIMETABLE, IF THE TOTAL PATTERN OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ACTIONS\nINDICATED THAT THEIR WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT BEING CARRIED THROUGH\nIN GOOD FAITH.\nMEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT MIGHT INCLUDE NOT\nONLY THE REQUIRED ASSURANCE THROUGH VERIFICATION THAT FORCES\nAND ELEMENTS WERE BEING AND HAD BEEN REMOVED TO THE NORTH AND\nTHAT INFILTRATION HAD CEASED BUT SUCH ELEMENTS AS RESPECT FOR\nTHE DMZ, ABSENCE OF INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS ON MAJOR CITIES, AND\nSECRET\nReproduced ERCHERNIXO Presidential/Library. Ohis document has been reviewed pursuant toE.O 13526 and EXECUTIVE has been determined SECRETARY to be declassified.\nDIPARTMENT\nOF\nDEPARTMENT\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 SAIGON 09433 02 OF 03 151345Z\nABSENCE OF ATTACKS ON US AND ALLIED FORCES BEING WITHDRAWN OR\nBEING DEPLOYED FOR WITHDRAWAL.\n7. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MUTUAL WITHDRAWALS AND PROGRESS TOWARD\nA POLITICAL SETTLEMENT\nTHE ISSUE HAS TWO ASPECTS:\nON THE ONE HAND, WE SEE NO REASON WHY WE NEED TO ESTABLISH ANY\nCONNECTION BETWEEN WITHDRAWALS AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WE\nWOULD EXPECT AT LEAST INITIALLY TO PRESS THE ISSUE OF MUTUAL\nWITHDRAWAL WITHOUT OURSELVES RAISING THE QUESTION OF A POLITICAL\nSETTLEMENT. OBVIOUSLY, IF WE COULD OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWALS\nWITHOUT AGREEMENT ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THE SITUATION WOULD\nBE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GVN. THEORETICALLY, ONE CAN ENVISAGE WITH-\nDRAWALS TAKING PLACE INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT\nAMONG THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.\nON THE OTHER HAND, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER IT IS UNLIKELY THAT\nPROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON A MUTUAL TROOP WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT IN\nTHE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THERE\nIS ALSO A LINK IN THE SENSE THAT WE WOULD NOT EXPECT TO CARRY\nWITHDRAWALS TO COMPLETION IF THE TOTAL PICTURE -- INCLUDING THE\nDEGREE OF AGREEMENT REACHED IN NEGOTIATIONS -- GAVE US GROUND\nFOR SERIOUS DOUBT CONCERNING HANDI'S INTENTIONS. WE WOULD THUS,\nFOR INSTANCE, EXPECT TO MAKE A CONTINUING JUDGMENT OF THE\nSERIOUSNESS OF HANOI'S INTENT TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS FOR\nWITHDRAWAL SPECIFIED IN 6 ABOVE.\nEXCES EXCES\nSECRET\n29\nReproduced atRE REPR document AUTHORIZA pursuant THEEXECUTIVE SFCRETARY\nOF STATE\n*\nDepartment of State\nORLINO STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET 161\n2\nPAGE 01 SAIGON 09433 03 OF 03 151316Z\n47\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01,CCO 00, FILE 01,/032 W\n020980\nPR 151125Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY SAIGON\nTO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY\nAMEMBASSY CANBERRA\nAMEMBASSY MANILA\nAMEMBASSY SEOUL\nAMEMBASSY WELLINGTON\nINFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3976\nS ECR ET SECTION 3 OF 3 SAIGON 9433\nEXDIS\n8. THE RELATED ISSUE OF WITHDRAWALS FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA OF\nNORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS, WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE\nEVER IN SOUTH VIET NAM\nAS ALREADY NOTED, WE WOULD INSIST THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES\nEXAIS EXCES\nAND ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIET NAM BE WITHDRAWN ALL THE WAY TO NORTH\nVIET NAM. THIS WOULD INVOLVE REMOVAL OF SUCH FORCES AND ELEMENTS\nFROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA.\nAS WE TAKE THESE POSITIONS IN PRINCIPLE, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND\nTHAT - - IN TERMS OF DESIRED NEGOTIATING RESULTS -- OUR FIRST\nPRIORITY IS THE WITHDRAWALI OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND\nELEMENTS FROM SOUTHI VIET NAM AND CAMBODIA ALL THE WAY TO THE NORTH\nOUR SECOND PRIORITY IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THOSE NORTH VIETNAMESE\nFORCES AND ELEMENTS IN LAOS, CHIEFLY IN THE PANHANDLE, WHICH\nOPERATE IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET\nNAM. OUR THIRD PRIORITY, IN TERMS OF TIMING, IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF\nOF OTHER NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS -- FOR EXAMPLE IN\nTHE MORE REMOTE AREAS OF LAOS. IN THE END, WE AIM TO ACHIEVE ALL\nTHREE OBJECTIVES, BUT IT MAY BECOME DESIRABLE, IN THE NEGOTIATING\nPROCESS, TO ATTACK THEM SEPARATELY AND IN THEIR ORDER OF PRIOR- se\nITIES.\nALLTHREE CATEGORIES WOULD OF COURSE, BE COVERED BY THE\nSECRET\nReproduced at Library This document pursuant OF.OFO THE d\nDEPARTMENT OF S' TATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICAN\nTELEGRAM\nSE RET\nPAGE 02 SAIGON 09433 03: OFi 03. 151316Z\nPOSITIONS OF PRINCIPLE THAT WE WOULD TAKE FROM THE OUTSET.\n9. VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION\nAS ALREADY NOTED, WE WOULD INSIST FROM THE OUTSET THAT AGREED\nWITHDRAWALS MUST BE SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION AND SUPER-\nVISON.\nIN THE OPENING STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WOULD EXPECT TO\nLEAVE OPEN HOW VERIFICATION WOULD BE CONDUCTED. WHAT IS: IMPORTANT\nIS THAT WE TAKE THE CLEAR POSITION IN PRINCIPLE THAT THERE MUST BE\nEXPIS\nCOMPLETE ASSURANCE THAT AGREED WITHDRAWALS ARE BEING CARRIED\nOUT IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT.\nWHILE THUS DEFERRING DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH THE OTHER SIDE ON\nTHE MECHANISMS, WE WOULD EXPECT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR ULTIMATE\nREQUIREMENT EXTENDS NOT ONLY TO VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION OF\nTHE ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL PROCESS, BUT TO ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD\nNOT IN THE FUTURE BE INFILTRATION OR ANY RENEWED AGGRESSION\nFROM NORTH VIET NAM AGAINST SOUTH VIET NAM, LAOS, OR CAMBODIA.\n10. POSSIBLE UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTIONS OR WITHDRAWALS, INCLUDING\nOUR RESPONSE TO ANY UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS BY THE OTHER SIDE\nTHIS IS A QUESTION OF OUR OWN ACTIONS, RATHER THAN ANY INITIAL\nSTATEMENTS OF POSITION IN PARIS.\nUS AND ALLIED FORCE REDUCTIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT AT ANY TIME,\nON THE BASIS OF FULLI CONSULTATION WITH THE GVN AND AN OVER-ALL\nJUDGMENT OF THE SITUATION, INCLUDING THE EFFECT ON OUR NEGOTIATING\nPOSTURE.\nIN ADDITION, IF THERE SHOULD BE UNILATERAL NORTH VIETNAMESE\nWITHDRAWALS TO NORTH VIET NAM, WE WOULD CONSIDER EFFORTS TO OBTAIN\nAN EXPRESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND CONFIRMATION OF SUCH WITHDRAWALS,\nAND WOULD THEN CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF RECIPROCAL US AND\nALLIED WITHDRAWALS IN ADVANCE OF ANY AGREEMENT ON THE SUBJECT.\nANY SUCH DECISIONS AND CONSULTATIONS WOULD OF COURSE TAKE INTO\nACCOUNT THE MILITARY AND OVER-ALLI SITUATION EXISTING AT THE TIME.\nEND TEXT ROGERS\nNeptoduced REPRODUCH Presidential Library UTis document THE has been SECRET reviewed O. EXECUTIVE\nSECRETEXDIS\nHCE820\n01 SAIGON 09362 01 OF 02 141457Z\nRECEIVED\nWHCA\nSS 30\nFO OCT 01,CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/031 W\n1969 MAY 14 15 12Z\n012300\n141340Z MAY 69 ZFF-4\nAMEMBASSY SAIGON\nSECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3923\nFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nC E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 9362\nDIS\nBJ: VIETNAMESE DRAFT SEVEN NATION COMMUNIQUE\nFONMIN MAY 14 GAVE US VIETNAMESE DRAFT OF SEVEN NATION\nMMUNIQUE EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD BASED HIMSELF ON OUR\nNGUAGE, INCORPORTATED A FEW PORTIONS OF THE THAI DRAFT,\nD ADDED SOME IDEAS OF THE VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES.\nSECRETARY'S PARTY HAS MEANWHILE PREPARED REVISED DRAFT OF\nXT CONTAINED IN STATE 73981 TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SAIGON COM-\nNTS AND THOSE OF THAIS. WE WILL BE WORKING WITH VIETNAMESE\nRING VISIT TO REACH A CONSENSUS ON A NEW DRAFT BEFORE\nCRETARY'S DEPARTURE FOR BANGKOK. BANGKOK SHOULD TAKE NO\nRTHER ACTION WITH THAIS UNTIL THIS IS DONE.\nTEXT OF VIETNAMESE DRAFT FOLLOWS. IN CASES WHERE THE VIET-\nMESE TEXT IS THE SAME AS THAT FORWARDED IN STATE 73981 WE\nVE SO INDICATED,\n1. SAME AS DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT.\n2. SAME AS DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT.\n3. SITUATION IN VIET NAM. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS\nTHE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM DESCRIBED THE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS\nICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN HIS COUNTRY OVER THE FAST TWELVE MONTHS.\nNOTED THE SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW ELECTED\nSTITUTIONS, SUCH AS THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE CENSORATE\nLED FOR BY THE VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION. HE ALSO EXPLAINED\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nAGE 02 SAIGON 09362 01 OF 02 141457Z\nHE CURRENT EFFORTS OF VIETNAMESE NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL\nARTIES TO UNITE THEMSELVES TO FURTHER THEIR COMMON GOALS.\nHE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION AT. THE CONTINUED\nTRENGTHENING OF VIETNAMESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.\n4. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF\nIET NAM ALSO OUTLINED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO IMPROVE\nAND TO RAISE THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF HIS COUNTRYMEN AND TO\nBRING THEM GREATER SOCIAL BEMEFITS, MAKING PARTICULAR\nREFERENCE TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S NEW LAND REFORM PROGRAM\nAND RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY. HE DESCRIBED THE INCREASED\nAUTONOMY AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES GIVEN TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES\nTO FOSTER A FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE.\nHE UNDERLINED THE TREMENDOUS SUCCESS OF THE PACIFICATION\nPROGRAM WHICH ENABLES THE ELECTION OF VILLAGE COUNCILS AND\nHAMLET CHIEFS. HE OUTLINED THE HOUSING PROJECT IMPLEMENTED\nIN VARIOUS CITIES IN ORDER TO RESETTLE THE VICTIMS OF COMMUNIST\nINDISCRIMINATE SHELLINGS. HE POINTED OUT THAT IN SPITE OF THE\nDESTRUCTIONS OF WAR, PRIMARY, SECONDARY AND HIGHER EDUCATION\nHAD PROGRESSED AT AN EXTRAORDINARY RATE. THE MINISTER OF\nFOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM FURTHER INDICATED\nTHAT THE OPEN ARMS POLICY HAD BROUGHT FRUITFUL AND SPLENDID\nRESULTS WITH THE EVER INCREASING NUMBER OF COMMUNIST CADRES\nAND OFFICERS RALLYING BACK TO THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY. SO FAR\nOVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND RETURNEES HAVE AVAILED THEMSELVES\nOF THE POLICY TO ENJOY BETTER LIFE.\n5. THE MINISTERS HEARD A STATEMENT BY THE VIETNAMESE\nFOREIGN MINISTER OF THE STRONG DESIRE FOR PEACE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.\nTHEY ENDORSED THE REASONABLE NATURE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY\nPRESIDENT NGUYEN-VAN-THIEU ON MARCH 25 AND APRIL 7 AND\nWELCOMED THIS EVIDENCE OF THE GOOD FAITH AND RESPONSIVENESS\nOF THE GOVERNEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. THE MINISTERS\nWELCOMED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF\nVIET NAM TO HOLD TALKS WITH THE COMMUNISTS.\n6. THE MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN NATIONS REAFFIRMED THEIR\nCONVICTION THAT A BROADLY-BASED REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL\nSYSTEM AS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM\nOFFERS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND\nCONSOLIDATION. THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THE POLITICAL PROGRAM\nOF THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS CALLED FOR ABOLITION OF THE PRESENT\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n03 SAIGON 09362 01 OF 02 141457Z\nNSTITUTION, OF THE ELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND OF THE\nVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AS WELL. THE MINISTERS\nALIZED THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD CONTINUED TO BE INTRANSIGENT\nUNREALISTIC IN THEIR DEMANDS. THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT,\nTHE LIGHT OF THE EXPANSIONIST POLICY, THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC\nVIET NAM MUST BE ASSURED THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN\nTURE THROUGH DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES WITHOUT\nTHER EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE OR TERRORIST PRESSURE. THE\nPOSITION OF ANY FORM OF GOVERNEMENT, INCLUDING THE SPURIOUS\nOALITION' ADVOCATED BY THE COMMUNISTS, WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE\nTHIS PRINCIPLE. AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE REWARDED.\n7. THE MINISTERS RECEIVED A BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY\nTUATION FROM VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN MILITARY COMMANDERS\nWERE ENCOURAGED AT THE PROGRESS BEING MADE BY ALLIED FORCES\nTHE INCREASING DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE OTHER SIDE.\nON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THE FAILURE OF THE COMMUNISTS TO\nHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF A GENERAL UPRISING AND OF PRODUCING\nIMPACT ON WORLD PUBLIC OPINION BY DEMONSTRATING THEIR\nFENSIVE CAPABILITIES SHOULD CONVINCE THEM AS WELL AS OTHERS\nTHEIR INABILITY TO GAIN A VICTORY BY MILITARY MEANS. THE\nNISTERS ENDORSED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO MODERNIZE AND\nPROVE THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND WELCOMED THEIR\nTERMINATION TO ASSURE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE DEFENSE\nTHEIR HOMELAND. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR ADMIRATION\nGRATITUDE FOR THE COURAGE AND THE DEVOTION OF THE ALLIED\nLDIERS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THEY ALSO NOTED WITH APPRECIATION\nINCREASE IN STRENGTH OF THE FIGHTING FORCE CONTRIBUTED BY\nAILAND DURING RECENT MONTHS TO THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC\nVIET NAM AND THE SAFEGUARD OF FREEDOM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.\nSECRESECRET EXDIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRETE EXDIS\nHCE821\n01 SAIGON 09362 02 OF 02 141445Z\nRECEIVED\nWHCA\nSS 30\n1969 MAY 14 15 23Z\nOCT 01,CCO øø,sso 00,NSCE 00,/031 W\n012224\n141340Z MAY 69 ZFF -4\nAMEMBASSY SAIGON\nSECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3924\nAMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nC R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 9362\n8. THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THEIR FORCES WERE IN VIET NAM\nHELP DEFEND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AGAINST OUTSIDE AGGRESSION.\nREAFFIRMED THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO ASSURE THAT THE PEOPLE\nTHE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM HAVE THE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT TO\n.F-DETERMINATION. THE MINISTERS RENEWED THEIR DETERMINATION\nHELP THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST\nRESSION AND SUBVERSION, AND ACCORDINGLY TO CONTINUE THEIR\nPORT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. THEY REAFFIRMED THAT THE\nORTANCE OF THIS SUPPORT WILL BE IN CORRELATION WITH THE\nGRESS OF THE PARIS MEETINS, THE LEVEL OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS\nTHE ENEMY, AND THE READINESS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE\nUBLIC OF VIET NAM TO TAKE OVER A MAJOR PART OF THE DEFENSE.\n9. THE MINISTERS. ALSO REVIEWED THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE\nOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE IN PARIS, AND ENDORSED THE PROPOSALS\nCH HAD BEEN MADE THERE BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC\nVIET NAM AND THE UNITED STATES. THEY NOTED AND APPROVED\nINTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE\nLING WITH MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED AND NORTH VIETNAMESE\nCES IN THE FORM PRESENTED TO THE MINISTERS BY THE REPUBLIC\nVIET NAM AND U.S. DELEGATIONS. THEY AGREED THAT ALL\nERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN\nONLY FROM SOUTH VIET NAM BUT ALSO FROM THE SANCTUARIES IN\nBODIA AND LAOS AND SPECIFICALLY ALONG THE Ho CHI MINH TRAIL,\nTHAT A CLEAR NEED EXISTED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF BOTH\nWITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND THE CESSATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION\nNEW FORCES.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 SAIGON 09362 02 OF 02 141445Z\n10. THE MINISTERS ALSO ENDORSED THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD\nBY THE U.S. AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM FOR OBSERVANCE OF THE\nDEMILITARIZED ZONE, THE REALEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND FULL\nCOMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON LAOS\nAND CAMBODIA.\n11. THEY EXAMINED THE PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED\nIN PARIS BY THE COMMUNIST SIDE. THEY REGRET THAT IT STILL\nAPPEARS TO BE THEIR OBJECTIVE TO IMPOSE UPON THE REPUBLIC OF\nVIET NAM A PROGRAM AND A SYSTEM WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE\nWISHES OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE. THEY\nENDORSED THE EFFORTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF\nVIET NAM AND THE U.S. IN EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES LEADING\nTO PEACE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THEY AGREED THAT THE\nALLIED NATIONS WHICH HAVE HELPED TO DEFEND THE REPUBLIC OF\nVIET NAM SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY FUTURE SETTLEMENT OF THE\nCONFLICT.\n12. SAME AS NUMBER ELEVEN IN DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT.\n13. THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT\nIN ASIA SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN\nA GUARANTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN VIET NAM AND SOUTHEAST\nASIA. THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE ASIAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES\nMUST SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE 'WELL-BEING\nAND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIBILITY THAT MIGHT WELL BEING\nWITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF THE DUTY OF PEACE-KEEPING NOT ONLY IN\nVIET NAM, BUT ALSO IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, POSSIBLY UNDER THE\nAEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. AGAIN, CLOSEST\nCONSULTATIONS AMONG THEM WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONNECTION. .\n14. SAME AS NUMBER THIRTEEN IN DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT\n15. THE MINISTERS PLEDGED THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT TO\nTHE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AND SPECIFICALLY TO PRESERVE THE\nUNCONDITIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM\nTO DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY BY DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL MEANS\nAND WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THE MINISTERS STATED THEIR\nDETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF THIS GOAL\nWHILE PURSUING WITH EQUAL INSISTENCE A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION\nTO THE CONFLICT THROUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS. FINALLY, THE\nMINISTERS AGREED TO CONTINUED THE CLOSE COORDINATION AND\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 SAIGON 09362 02 OF 02 141445Z\nCONSULTATION WHICH HAVE EXISTED AMONG THE SEVEN NATIONS.\nBUNKER\nSECRET EXDIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nUNITED DIPARTMENT STATES OF AMERICA STATE \"\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nOF\nSECRET\nW I 6\n3079Q\n1969 MAY 14 AM 4:11\nP 140736Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY SAIGON\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3883\nSTATE GRNC\nBT\nSECR E T SAIGON 9313\nNODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS\nSUBJ: SEVEN-NATION MEETING - WITHDRAWALS\nREF: A) SAIGON 9084; B) SAIGON 9174\nMEETING. DISSEMINATION OF THE WITHDRAWALS PAPER TO TCC'S PRIOR TO\n1. FOREIGN MINISTER IS PRESSING US FOR REPLY REGARDING\n2. ON ASSUMPTION DEPARTMENT HAS NO OBJECTION, AND THAT\nMODIFICATIONS REF B SHOULD MAKE THE PAPER MORE READILY\nBT 15 UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE. BUNKER\nMAY ACCEPTABLE, WE PLAN TO GIVE THANH THE GREEN LIGHT TOMORROW MORNING\nNNNN\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\n\"\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OR AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET 161\nPAGE 01 SAIGON 09177 121344Z\n2\n44\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01,000 00,SSO 00, NSCE 00,/031 W\n127140\n0 P 121230Z MAY 69 ZFF-4\nFM AMEMBASSY SAIGON\nTO SECSTATE WASHUC IMMEDIATE 3781\nINFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY\nCINCPAC\nSECR ET SAIGON 9177\nEXDIS\nCINCPAC FOR SECRETARY*S PARTY\nSUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE\nREF: STATE 073981\n10 WE PRESENTED DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TRANSMITTED REFTEL TO\nTHANH MAY 12 WITH REQUEST FOR HIS EARLY COMMENTS, WHICH HE\nPROMISED FOR TOMORROW MORNING, MAY 13. MEANWHILE, WE\nOURSELVES HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION:\n2. IN FINAL SENTENCE PARA 30 WE SUGGEST THAT MINISTERS\nEXPRESS THEIR GRATIFICATION RATHER THAN \"SATISFACTION\",\nAS: FORMER CARRIES LESS OF AN IMPLICATION OF THE TCC'S\nSITTING IN JUDGMENT OVER THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GVNs\n3. THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA FIVE PRAISES THIEU'S\nSTATEMENTS FOR THINGS WE SHOULD TAKE FOR GRANTED- THEIR\n\"REASONABLE NATURE\" AND \"GOOD FAITH\" a AND IMPLIES, THROUGH\nUSE OF THE WORD: \"RESPONSIVENESS\", THAT THESE WERE THE RESULT\nOF ENEMY INITIATIVE OR ALLIED PRESSURE. WE SUGGEST THAT THE\nSENTENCE BE RE-WORDED AS FOLLOWS - \"THEY ENDORSED THE\nCONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT THIEU\nON MARCH 25 AND APRIL 7 AND WELCOMED THIS EVIDENCE OF THE\nIMAGINATIVE THINKING AND SELF-CONFIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT\nOF SOUTH VIET-NAM\".\nSECRET\n29\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\n#\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSEPRET\nEXEMS EXCES\nPAGE 02 SAIGONI 09177 121344Z\n4. WE SUGGEST BREAKING THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA SIX INTO\nTWO SENTENCES, PLACING A PERIOD AFTER \"BY ALLIED FORCES\"\nAND CONTINUING \"THEY NOTED THE INCREASING DIFFICULTIES EN-\nCOUNTERED BY THE OTHER SIDE\", IN ORDER TO AVOID STATING\nTHAT WE ARE ENCOURAGED\" BY SUCH DIFFICULTIES.\n5. WE RECOMMENDI RE-PHRASING THE SECOND SENTENCE OF\nPARA 7 TO READ \"THEY REAFFIRMED THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS\nTO ASSURE THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE ABLE TO EXERCISE\nTHEIR RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE\"\nIN THE NEXT SENTENCE IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO SAY \"THEY REAFFIRMED\nTHEIR DETERMINATION\" THAN \"THEY RENEWED THEIR DETERMINATION\"\nWHICH MIGHT SUGGEST THAT IT HAD BEEN FLAGGING.\n6. THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA 8 COULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLY THAT\nTHE MANILA COMMUNIQUE CONTAINS SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR\n\"SIMULTANEOUS\" WITHDRAWALS, ETC. WE SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT\nTHIS SENTENCE COMMENCE SIMPLY \"THEY AGREED THAT THESE WITH-\nDRAWALS COULD COMMENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY..\" WE WOULD ALSO\nSUGGEST DELETION OF THE WORK \"FURTHER\" IN THE PHRASE \"CESSATION\nOF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF NEW FORCES\" AT THE END OF THE\nSENTENCE\n7. PARAGRAPH 12 GIVES US SOME TROUBLE IN THAT IT SEEMS TO\nENVISAGE PLACING VERY HEAVY RESPONSIBI ITIES \" A GUARANTEE\nOF PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD\" AND \"THE\nDUTY OF PEACE-KEEPING\" B ON THE \"ASIAN POWERS\" WHICH ARE\nCERTAINLY A MIXED BAG AND NOT NECESSARILY CAPABLE OF DIS-\nCHARGING SUCH FAR-REACHING FUNCTIONS. WE THINK IT MIGHT\nBE PREFERABLE TO KEEP THE MATTER MORE IMITED AT THIS STAGE,\nFOCUSSING ON ASSOCIATING THE ASIAN POWERS WITH MEASURES TO\nASSURE PEACE AND HAVING THEM ASSUME SOME OF THE RESPONSIBILITY\nFOR MAKING A SETTLEMENT EFFECTIVE. WE WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST\nTHE FOLLOWING WORDING FOR THIS PARA:\nEXCES\n8. \"THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN\nASIA SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN\nMEASURES TO ASSURE PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE\nWORLD THEY EXPRESSED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE ASIAN COUNTRIES\nTHEMSELVES MUST SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN\nFUTURE WELL-BEING AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIBILITY\nTHAT MIGHT WELL BEGIN WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF CERTAIN DUTIES\nSECRET\n29\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDIPARTMENT OF\nSTATE\nUNITED STATES OF AMOUNT #\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 SAIGON 09177 121344Z\nIN CONNECTION WITH A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN VIET NAM, AND IN\n-\nCONNECTION WITH MAINTAINING THE PEACE ALSO IN LAOS AND\nCAMBODIA POSSIBLY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS\nORGANIZATION. AGAIN, CLOSEST CONSULTATION AMONG THEM WOULD\nBE BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONNECTION BUNKER\nSECRET\n29\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nOF STATE\nWH\nDepartment of State\nSTATES The AMERICA UNITED\nTELEGRAM\nOF\nSECRET\n8\nP 121222Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY SAIGON\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3783\n2554Q\nSTATE GRNC\n1969 MAY 12 AM 11 22\nBT\nSECR E T SAIGON 9174\nNODIS PARIS MEETINGS PLUS\nSUBJ: SEVEN NATION MEETING - WITHDRAWALS\nREF: A. SAIGON 9084\nB. SAIGON 7910\n1. FONMIN THANH ASKED AGAIN WHETHER WE AGREE WITH HIS SUGGESTION\n(PARA 3 REF A) THAT THE PAPER ON WITHDRAWALS BE CIRCULATED TO THE\nRESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THEIR CAPITALS TWO OR THREE DAYS\nBEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE FOR BANGKOK. WE SAID WE EXPECTED INSTRUC-\nTIONS VERY SOON. PROBABLY TOMORROW.\n2. OUR MODIFICATIONS TO THE PAPER TRANSMITTED IN REF B ARE AS\nFOLLOWS:\nA. DELETE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 2 - - \"THIS\nPOSITION OF PRINCIPLE REQUIRES DISCUSSION AMONG US IN THE LIGHT\nOF CERTAIN PRACTICAL PROBLEMS.\"\nB. DELETE SECOND SENTENCE IN SECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 9- \"THESE\nARE COMPLEX ISSUES AND WILL REQUIRE CONTINUING CONSULTATION AS\nTHE NED FOR A FIRMER POSITION ARISES.\"\nC. SUBSTITUTE \"ANY RENEWED AGGRESSION FROM NORTH VIET-NAM\" FOR\n\"ANY THREAT FROM NORTH VIET-NAM\" AT THE END OF THE THIRD PARA\nUNDER ITEM 9. (THIS CHANGE SEEMS TO US TO BRING OUR PAPER MORE\nNEARLY IN LINE WITH THE ACTUAL US POSITION ON THIS POINT.)\nD. DELETE \"AS WE HAVE ALREADY AGREED\" AT THE BEGINNING OF THE\nSECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 10.\nE. DELETE THE PHRASE \" IN FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH THE GVN\"\nFROM THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE THIRD PARA UNDER ITEM 10.\n3. DEPARTMENT PLEASE ADVISE BY MORNING MAY 13, SAIGON TIME, IF\nTHERE ARE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THESE MODIFICATIONS AND IF US CONCURS\nOITH GVN PLAN TO COMMUNICATE THE PAPER TO TCC GOVERNMENTS IN\nADVANCE OF THE BANGKOK MEETING. BUNKER\nRT\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This docum SECRET been pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\n9\nUNITED STATES of\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nTOP SECRET\nR 101000Z MAY 69\n2378Q\nFM AMEMBASSY SAIGON\n1969 MAY 10 AM 8 38\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 3715\nSTATE GRNC\nBT\n@\nTOPSECRET SAIGON 9084\nNODIS\nSUBJ: SEVEN-NATION MEETING - WITHDRAWALS\nREF: A) SAIGON 9008; B) SAIGON 7910\n1. FOLLOWING UP ON MY TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY (REF A)\nFOREIGN MINISTER CALLED THIS MORNING TO RAISE A TACTICAL QUESTION\nIN CONNECTION WITH THE TABLING OF OUR AGREED WITHDRAWAL PAPER IN\nBANGKOK.\n2. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FROM A REPORT OF BUI DIEM THAT DEPARTMENT\nCONTEMPLATES THE GVN TABLING OUR PAPER AT THE MEETING, BUT HE\nWONDERED WHETHER THIS WAS FAIR TO THE TCC FOREIGN MINISTERS WHO\nMIGHT HAVE TO CONSULT THEIR GOVERNMENTS BEFORE THEY COULD GIVE\nTHEIR ENDORSEMENT. ALSO, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF COURTESY WHETHER\nTHEY SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TIME TO STUDY A DOCUMENT OF SUCH IMPORT-\nANCE.\n3. ACCORDINGLY, THANH MADE THE SUGGESTION, WITH WHICH I AGREE,\nTHAT IT MIGHT BE WISER FOR THE GVN TO HAND THE PAPER TO THE\nRESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THEIR CAPITALS TWO OR THREE DAYS\nBEFORE THE THEIR DEPARTURE FOR BANGKOK. PLEASE ADVISE.\n4. WE ARE HAVING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE WITHDRAWAL PAPER AS PER\nREF B WITH A VIEW TO MAKING IT MORE SUITABLE FOR PRESENTATION TO\nTHE TCC'S. FOR INSTANCE, THE SECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 2 STARTS\nWITH THESENTENCE \"THIS POSITION OF PRINCIPLE REQUIRES\nDISCUSSION AMONG US IN THE LIGHT OF CERTAIN PRACTICAL PROBLEMS.\"\nTHIS WAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR THE SUPPORTING\nREMARKS THAT I MADE AT THE CONSULTATION MEETING; BUT IF WE GIVE\nTHE DOCUMENT IN THIS FORM TO THE TCC'S THEY MIGHT INTERPRET SUCH\nA SENTENCE AS INVITING DISCUSSION AT THE SEVEN-NATION MEETING.\nASSUME DEPT HAS NO OBJECTION TO SUCH REVISIONS, WHICH WE INTEND\nTO TELEGRAPH FOR DEPT'S INFORMATION. PLEASE ADVISE.\n5. DEPT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO BANGKOK. BUNKER\nBT\nTOP SECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\n*\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET 289\nPAGE 01 SAIGON 09011 091336Z\n47\n2\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01/031 W\n112792\nR 0912352 MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY SAIGON\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 3670\nINFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOKI\nS: El C R EI T SAIGON 9011\nEXDIS:\nEXCES EXCES EXCES\nSUBJECT: TCC MEETING 8 DRAFT COMMUNIQUE\nREF: A) STATE 71864: B) STATE 66205\nIN ACCORDANCE PARA 3 REF A, WE HANDED FOREIGN MINISTER\nTHANH MAY 9 THE THAI DRAFT AND THE DEPARTMENT'S OUTLINE,\nREQUESTING HIS SUPPORT IN EFFORTS TO HAVE THE THAIS MODIFY\nTHEIR DRAFT so THAT IT WILL CORRESPOND MORE To APPROACH IN\nREF B. THANH PROMISED TO STUDY THEI MATTER AND SEEMED\nAMENABLE TO THE IDEA OF SUBSTITUTING A US DRAFT FOR THE THAI\nDRAFT IF THIS IS WHAT WE DESIRE.\nBUNKER\nSECRET\n29\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nDEPARTMENT any STATUS OF STATE *\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nof\nTOP SECRET\nCN: 2035Q\nRECD: 09 MAY 69\n447AM\n0 090800Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY SAIGON\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3627\nSTATE GRNC\nMAY 8:33\nAM\nasneh WHITE\nBT\nTOPSECRETSAIGON8983\nNODIS\nSUBJ: SEVEN NATION MEETING\nREF: STATE 072654\nI THINK SUGGESTION CONTAINED REFTEL FOR HANDLING QUESTION OF U.S.\nTROOP REDUCTIONS AT THE TCC MEETING EXCELLENT. I BELIEVE IT SHOULD\nAPPEAL TO THIEU AND WILL ENDEAVOR TO WORK OUT SCENARIO WITH HIM\nAND THANH ACCORDINGLY. BUNKER\nBT\nTOP SECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDIPARTMENT DEP OF\nSTATE AMERICAN *\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET 348\nPAGE 01 STATE 071864\n85\nORIGIN SS 30\nINFO OCT 01,SSO 00, NSCE 00 R\n66638\nDRAFTED BY:EA/VN.HFMATTHEWS\nAPPROVED BY:EA:WILLIAM SULLIVAN\nC:AMBASSADOR PEDERSEN(SUBS)\nEA/VN:MR. BURKE\nS/S:MR. GLEYSTEEN\n101230\n0 080052Z MAY 69 ZFF4\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nTO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE\nAMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nSECRE T STATE 071864\nEXDIS\nSUBJECT: TCC MEETING - DRAFT COMMUNIQUE\nREF: A o BANGKOK 5638\nB. STATE 66205\n1 - WE ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH TEXT THAI DRAFT PROVIDED\nREF A ° THOUGH TOPICS FOR INCLUSION GENERALLY ACCORD\nWITH THOSE PROPOSED IN REF B. WE FIND TONE TO BELLIGERENT\nAND HARD-LINE, ESPECIALLY FROM POINT OF VIEW OF US DOMESTIC\nOPINION AND IN LIGHT OF THE STANCE WE HAVE TAKEN IN PARIS,\n..\nWE BELIEVE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD GIVE IMPRESSION OF REASON-\nABLENESS AND SINCERE AND DESIRE FOR PEACE, COUPLED WITH\nFIRMNESS IN OUR ADHERENCE TO BASIS PRINCIPLES AND\nOBJECTIVES. IT SHOULD MAKE CLEAR WE ARE NOT PURSUING A\nMILITARY SOLUTION TO THE WAR, BUT ARE CONTINUING TO DO WHAT\nIS NECESSARY IN VIET-NAM WHILE SEEKING A JUST SOLUTION\nIN PARIS. IT SHOULD NOT THROW DOWN THE GAUNTLET TO THE\nENEMY, BUT SHOULD EMPHASIZE OUR FIRMNESS IN OUR\nDEDICATION TO REASONABLE OBJECTIVES. IN SUM, WE THINK\nTHE THAI DRAFT NEEDS MAJOR REVISION AND THE QUESTION\nNOW IS HOW TO ACCOMPLISH THIS.\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF\nSTATE \"\nCLING\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 STATE 071864\n2. WE BELIEVE EMBASSY BANGKOK SHOULD GO BACK TO THAIS AND,\nSAYING YOU ARE ACTING ON AN UNISTRUCTED BASIS, POINT OUT\nTHAT THAI DRAFT DIFFERS IN MAJOR WAYS FROM DEPT'S EARLIER\nSUGGESTIONS: DRAW ON COMMENTS IN PARA 1 ABOVE AS IF THEY\nWERE YOUR OWN PRELIMINARY VIEWS: AND TRY TO BRING THAIS:\nAROUND TOWARD OUR DESIRES.\n3. SAIGON SHOULD SHOW THAI DRAFT TO THANH, EXPLAINI OUR\nPROBLEM WITH IT AS SET FORTH ABOVE, AND TRY TO GET HIS\nCONCURRENCE TO OUR SUGGESTED OUTLINE IN REF 8.\n40 MEANWHILE WE ARE REPARING FULL DRAFT BASED ON REF B,\nPICKING UP WHAT WE CAN OF THAI DRAFT. THIS WILL BE\nCABLED WITH INSTRUCTIONS WHEN COMPLETED. WE WILL ALSO\nBE CONFERRING ON THIS WITH BUI DIEM, AND WITH AUSTRALIANS,\nNEW ZEALANDERS.\n5. PLEASE PROCEED WITH ABOVE SCENARIO UNLESS YOU HAVE\nBETTER SUGGESTION ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THIS PROBLEMI\nGP - 3 ROGERS\nSECRET\nReproduced\nMoraTy.H\n11315126\nHoig\nLDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM\nTO: Rx\n1. Sent OF STATE\n2.\n(Msg. No, 345\n3. Transmitted by: BD Bell\n'69 MAY 8 AM 11:08\n4. Received by:\nDate & Time: fi 06\nDate & Time:\nS. Description:\nTel to Saigon re Seven Nation Meeting\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\n6. Cisin & Controls:\n7. No. of Pgs.\n2\n8. Precedence\nIMM\n9. Validated by: RLBrown\n10. Deliver to: Dr. Kissinger\nFor: Clearance\nXX\nThe White House\nInformation\nATTN: Mr. Sneider\nPer Request\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nBEFORE I TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Roo 243\nUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State\nCATE:\nHARGE to\nTOP SECRET\n69 MAY 8. AM\nClassification\nFOR 0 1208 USE ONLY\nrigin\nACTION:\nAmembassy SAIG\nIMMEDIATE\nSTATE\nNODIS\nFOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER\nSUBJECT: Seven Nation Meeting\n1. We have been considering how we should handle question of\nUS troop reductions (in context of President's three points in\nhis Aprill8 press conference) in the TCC Meeting. We are con-\ncerned that some of the TCC's will read too much into what we\nmay say on this subject, especially in light of excited press\nspeculation. It has occurred to us that the problem could be\nput in its proper 11ght if the GVN were to take the lead in\nnoting\nthe prospects for such reductions in the context of\nincreased RVNAF capabilities and as a demonstration of confidence\nin their abilities to take on added responsibilities. If Thanh\ncould include a statement along those lines in his prepared\nremarks at the TCC Conference, with perhaps additional support\nfrom General Du, the Secretary would have a very useful peg on\nwhich to hang his own remarks on the subject.\nnot BY:\nTel. tar,\nTelepraphic transmission and\n8731\nclassification approved by:\nEA - William H. Sullivan\nBrasses:\nC-Ambassador Pederser\nDJP\nEA/VN-Mr\nBurke\nS/S- Mr. Brown\nWH-\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed.pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET\nCORRECTIONS MAV UN THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON CU\nES\nBEFORE THE\nGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Roram\n7\nTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State\nATE:\nCOLLECT\nAGE TO\nTOP SECRET\nClassification\nFOR oc/T USE ONLY\npin\nACTION:\n\"\nPAGE 2. to NODIS TELEGRAM TO SAIGON IMMEDIATE\n2. If you concur that 1t would be useful and feasible, could\nyou explore the possibility of setting up such a scenario with\nThieu and Thanh?\nGP-1.\nEND\nIs Eat,\nTelegraphic transmission and\nrathed by:\nclassification approved by:\nearances,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7\n062693\nOUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State\nINDICATE,\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nSECRET\n12A\nClassification\nFOR oc/T USE ONLY\nOrigin\nACTION: Amembassy SAIGON\n23 APR 69 JB41z\nInfo:\nINFO:\nAmembassy BANGKOK\nAmembassy CANBERRA\nAmembassy MANILA\nAmembassy PARIS\nAmembassy SEOUL\nWELLINGTON\nSTATE 62693\nNODIS\nPARIS TODEL 2.581\nSUBJECT: Seven Nation Conference\n1. At his initiative Ambassador Bui Diem called on Deputy\nAssistant Secretary Sullivan April 22. During the course of\nwhat was primarily a courtesy visit the Ambassador brought up\nthe subject of the Secretary's forthcoming trip to Saigon and\nBangkok for the SEATO/Seven Nation Conferences. He said that\nhe expected to be returning to Saigon via Paris just before the\nSecretary's visit -- he now anticipates leaving Washington on\nor about May 7. He said that his Government was most interested\nin obtaining US views regarding the content of the Seven Nation\n-Conference, particularly in view of the fact that this would\nDrafted by:\nTel. Ext.\nTelegraphic transmission and\nEA\nTOD irke:aoa 4/22/69\n4535\nEA\n-\nclassification approved by,\nWilliam H. Sullivan\nClearances:\nC - Mr. Pederson\nS/S- Mr. Browwalsh\nNB\nSECRET\nthe Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This docume Classification Bursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n8-65\nOUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State\nINDICATE:\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nSECRET\nClassification\nFOR oc/T use ONLY\nOrigin\nACTION:\nPAGE 2 - NODIS\nACTION: Amembassy SAIGON\nInfo:\nINFO: Amembassies BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA,\nPARIS, SEOUL, WELLINGTON\nbe the first such meeting since the Paris talks began. He\nassumes that the other troop contributing countries will be\ninterested in discussing problems connected with the negotiations\nas well as reviewing the military situation on the ground in\nViet-Nam. Obviously, the question of troop withdrawal will be\none to which they will attach great importance. For this reason\nit is quite important that the US and the GVN be prepared to\ndiscuss this subject with their allies on the basis of a mutually\nagreed position.\n2. Ambassador Sullivan agreed that this was likely to be a\nmuch more important meeting than earlier TCC get-togethers had\nbeen. He noted that on his return to Saigon Ambassador Bunker\nhad begun consultations on the subject of withdrawals with\nPresident Thieu and that the two had agreed at their first\nsession that Gen. Abrams and Gen. Cao Van Vien (Chief, Viet-\nnamese Joint General Staff) should jointly consider on an urgent\nDrafted by:\nTel. Ext.\nTelegraphic transmission and\nclassification approved by\nClearances:\nSECRET\nFORM Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This docume Clussifieation ursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDS-322\n8-65\nOUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State\nINDICATE\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nSECRET\nClassification\nFOR oc/T USE ONLY\nOrigin\nACTION:\nPAGE 3 - NODIS\nInfo:\nACTION: Amembassy SAIGON\nINFO: Amembasies BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA,\nPARIS TODEL, SEOUL, WELLINGTON\nbasis the technical aspects involved in both the question of W1 thdrawals and\nthe related one of the replacement of American troops by Vietnamese forces.\nUnless these studies, as well as the consultations between Ambassador Bunker\nand President Thieu, can be completed and reviewed in Washington prior to the\nSecretary's visit to Saigon in mid-May, both US and GVN would find ourselves\nXXXX awkwardly disposed to answer the questions by our TCC allies which\nBui Diem anticipates will arise at Bangkok.\n3. For BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA, SEOUL, WELLINGTON: Without\nmaking contact with host government would appreciate receiving Embassy's\nassessment of importance which individual TCC's attach to upcoming Ban gkok\nmeeting. It is already apparent from conversations with Thanat and Bira in\nBangkok that Thai expect Seven Nation meeting to be more substantive than\nprevious such exercises. As we see it troop contributing countries\nmay very well expect that this metting will provide\nthem with first real opportunity for an in-depth briefing on\nDrafted by:\nTel. Ext.\nTelegraphic transmission and\nclassification approved by,\nClearances\nSECRET\nPeproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This documer zzsificatia Pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n8-65 D5-322\nOUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State\nINDICATE:\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nSECRET\nClassification\nFOR oc/T USE ONLY\nPAGE 4 - NODIS\nOrigin\nACTION:\nInto:\nACTION: Amembassy SAIGON\nINFO: Amembassies BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA, PARIS TODEL,\nSEOUL, WELLINGTON\nhaki\nvarious aspects of the Paris talks , Question of troop with-\ndrawals will undoubtedly be foremost in their minds and parti-\ncularly question o:E how our thinking on this matter may affect\ndistance\ntheir own contingents in South Viet:-Nam. From this xxxxxx/it\nappears that Australia and New Zealand prepared to live with\nsome reduction in US forces while retaining their units at present\nlevels. Can RTG and ROK be expected to take similar view?\nQuestion of Philcag is a separate and perhaps more pressing one.\nFor the moment it appears that this issue has become less\nimportant in domestic/political terms in the Philippines than\nhad previously been the case. It is, however, one that could\nbecome active again at short notice. Please provide us with\nhost government's current thinking regarding the importance\nthey attach to the Seven Nation Conference, what issues they\nconsider most important to be discussed therein, and their atti-\ntude toward the contents of the joint communique.\nGP-3\nDrafted by:\nTel. Ext.\nTelegraphic transmis ion and\nEND[ROGERS]\nclassification approvo by\nClearances:\nSECRET\nPeproduced DS-322 at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n8-65\n223\nCONFIDENTIAL\nRECEIVED\nWHCA\n1969 MAY 20 17 32Z\nSeato Rogers Hate\nCONFIDENTIAL\nHCE 294\nment\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 06486 01 OF 02 201620Z\n41\nACTION EA 15\nfile\nINFO OCT 01,CIAE 00,DODE øø, NSAE 00, NSCE 00,SSO ØØ,USIE 00,JPM 04,\nH 02, INR 07,L 03,NSC 1ø,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 2Ø,EUR 17, NEA 13,\nIO 13,0IC 05,CCO ØØ,FILE 01, UPW Ø1,AID 28,RSR 01,/148 W\n052132\n0 P 201459Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6772\nINFO AMEMBASSY AUCKLAND PRIORITY\nAMEMBASSY CANBERRA\nAMEMBASSY PARIS\nAMEMBASSY RALWAPINDI\nAMEMBASSY SAIGON\nAMEMBASSY LONDON\nAMEMBASSY MANILA\nCONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 BANGKOK 6486/1\nSECTO 42\nFOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AS DELIVERED\nIN CLOSED SESSION OF SEATO MEETING, TUESDAY, MAY 20:\nQUOTE PARA 1 - I WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW MUCH I VALUE THIS OPPOR-\nTUNITY TO MEET SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES FOR THE FIRST TIME. THERE\nIS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR PERSONAL CONTACTS AND CONSULTATION. PARA 2 - -\nO UR AGENDA CALLS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MATTERS AFFECTING\nTHE TREATY AREA. PARA 3 - IN THIS INTER-DEPENDENT WORLD OF\nOURS, IT IS RATHER DIFFICULT TO THINK OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS\nANYWHERE THAT DO NOT -- IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER -- AFFECT THE\nTREATY AREA. SO PERHAPS IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF I WERE TO TOUCH ON\nRECENT DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE AREA. PARA 4 - FIRST, A FEW\nWORDS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION. PARA 5 - IT IS OUR HOPE THAT WE MAY\nBE EMERGING FROM A LONG PERIOD CHARACTERIZED BY CONFRONTATION\nWITH THE SOVIET UNION --A CONFRONTATION THAT HAS BEEN FOUCSED\nPRIMARILY ON AN ARTIFICALLY DIVIDED EUROPE. PARA 6- IN- EUROPE\nWE AND OUR ALLIES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAVE BEEN\nWORKING TO CREATE AN ATOMOSPHERE IN WHICH A RESOLUTION OF THE\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nCONFIDENTIAL\n02 BANGKO 06486 01 OF 02 201620Z\nJDAMENTAL POLITICAL ISSUES OF EUROPE CAN BE APPROACHED WITH\nEXPECTATION OF SOME PROGRESS. WE FEEL THAT THE TIME HAS\nFOR THIS BECAUSE THE WINDS OF REFORM HAVE BEGUN TO STIR\nTHIN EASTERN EUROPE -- AND BECAUSE FORCES OF LIBERALIZATION\nEVEN APPEARED TO BE STIRRING WITHIN SOVIET SOCIETY ITSELF.\n7 - OUR HOPES FOR EVOLUTION TOWARDS IMPROVED EAST-WEST RE-\nTIONS IN EUROPE WERE, OF COURSE, SERIOUSLY SET BACK BY THE\nVIET INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA LAST AUGUST.\nJETHELESS, IT IS CLEAR THAT SOVIET CONTROLS OVER EASTERN\nROPE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF SLOW EROSION -- THAT SEVERAL OF THE\nSTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE ANXIOUS FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WITH\nWEST -- AND THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN UNABLE TO\nVISE A LONG RANGE WORKABLE WAY OF MAINTAINING CONTROL OVER\nEIR RELUCTANT ALLIES. FOR THAT REASON, THE UNITED STATES WILL\nRSUE A POLICY OF DEVELOPING CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THESE\nLUCTANT ALLIES. PARA 8 - MEANWHILE, THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT\nSOVIET LEADERSHIP IS NOW PREPARED TO BEGIN SERIOUS TALKS CON-\nRNING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HOPE THIS IS SO. SOMETIME\nRING THE SUMMER AFTER WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR OWN REVIEW WE SHALL\nINTO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS WHICH THE UNITED\nFIRST PROPOSED SOME TWO YEARS AGO. PARA 9 - THE SOVIETS\nALSO SHOWN A CERTAIN INTEREST IN REACHING LIMITED BILATERAL\nREMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON SUCH MATTERS AS A COMMERCIAL\nAGREEMENT, THE EXCHANGE OF CONSULAR OFFICES, TELECOMMUNI-\nTIONS LINKS TO OUR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES, AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE\nGRAMS. THEY ARE STILL EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS, BUT SOMEWHAT MORE\nTHAN IN THE PAST. PARA 10 - WITH RESPECT TO DANGEROUS ISSUES\nOTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY\nTO AVOID ANOTHER OUTBREAK OF MAJOR HOSTILITIES IN THE\nDLE EAST. THEY HAVE, ON THE ONE HAND, REPLACED THE ENORMOUS\nJIPMENT LOSSES OF THE ARAB STATES DURING THE WAR WITH ISRAEL\nJUNE OF 1967. THEY ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE TRAINING OF THE\nPTIAN ARMED FORCES AND THEY SUPPORT THE BASIC POSITION OF\nARAB STATES IN THEIR DISPUTE WITH ISRAEL. PARA 11 - BUT THE\nIET UNION IS ALSO PARTICIPATING IN THE DELICATE DIPLOMATIC\nFORTS ON THE FOUR MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHO ARE\nRCHING FOR WAYS TO SUPPORT AMBASSADOR JARRING'S EFFORTS TO\nAN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE\nEAVORING IN THESE TALKS TO ASSURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION\nSUPPORT A TRUE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NOT JUST A RES-\nATION OF SUSPENDED CONFLICT. PARA 12 - AS FAR AS VIET-NAM\nTHE USSR HAS FAVORED THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS -- IN SHARP\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nCONFIDENTIAL\n03 BANGKO 06486 01 OF 02 201620Z\nONTRAST TO THE POSITION TAKEN IN PEKING. HOWEVER, WE\nUST ASSUME THAT THEIR DIPLOMATIC WEIGHT WILL ESSENTIALLY\nTHROWN ON THE SIDE OF HANOI. PARA 13 - IN GENERAL THEN, IT\nSEEMED TO US THAT THE SOVIETS GRADUALLY HAVE BEEN\nOMING TO THE VIEW THAT DANGEROUS CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE UNITED\nTATES AND ITS ALLIES DO NOT SERVE THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS AT\nTIME. GRADUALLY, THEY SEEM TO HAVE BEGUN TO PERCEIVE THAT\nVEN IRRECONCILABLE POLITICAL SYSTEMS HAVE CERTAIN AREAS OF\nOMMON INTEREST, AT LEAST WHERE SECURITY IS INVLOVED. PARA 14 -\nIMPLICATIONS OF THESE TRENDS FOR THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS'\nTHE TREATY AREA UNFORTUNATELY ARE NOT CLEAR. WE DO NOT KNOW\nEXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET BEHAVIOR REFLECTS THE SHARPENING\nONFRONTATION WITH COMMUNIST CHINA, OR INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES,\nRECOGNITION ON THEIR PART OF THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN\nUNDER THEIR INFLUENCE. BUT THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT\nTREND IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO WATCH. HANOI'S BEHAVIOR, BOTH\nPARIS AND ON THE BATTLEFIELDS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND\nLAOS, IS CONDITIONED IN PART BY THE NATURE AND EFFECTIVENESS\nSOVIET INFLUENCE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE LEADERSHIP.\nVIDENCES OF INCREASING SOVIET INTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA,\nOWEVER, TENTATIVE AND AMBIGUOUS, NEED TO BE WATCHED. WE ALSO\nEED TO WATCH THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET INTEREST IN EXPANDED\nIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES WITH THE FREE NATIONS OF THE\nREATY REGION CAN BE MADE TO SERVE CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSES AND\nWHAT EXTENT THEY REFLECT CONTINUED EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT\nEAKNESSES. PARA 15 - THESE ARE MATTERS ON WHICH WE SHALL WANT\nKEEP IN TOUCH AND IN CONSULTATION WITH EACH OTHER. III.\nARA 16 - UNFORTUNATELY, THERE ISNOT MUCH NEW TO BE SAID ABOUT\nROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA, PARA 17 -\nGOVERNMENT IS WELL AWARE THAT THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND\nAINLAND CHINA BOTH EXIST. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK TOWARD MORE\nORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN PEKING. INDEED,\nER THE YEARS WE HAVE MADE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR PRACTICAL\nLACES TO START IN THAT DIRECTION -- SUCH AS AN EXCHANGE OF\nOURNALISTS AND THE OPENING OF TRADE IN DEFINITE PRODUCTS SUCH\nPHARMACEUTICALS -- AND HAD BEEN PREPARED TO PRESENT OTHERS IN\nARSAW. PARA 18 - THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE SO FAR. AND WE SEE\nTTTLE OR NO SIGNS OF A RESPONSE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AS YOU\nIOW, THE CHINESE ABRUPTLY CANCELLED IN FEBRUARY THE SCHEDULED\nSUMPTION OF THE BILATERAL MEETINGS WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING\nTHEM OVER THE YEARS IN WARSAW. PARA 19 - PERHAPS THERE\nHOULD BE SOME SMALL COMFORT IN THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nCONFIDENTIAL\n04 BANGKO 06486 01 OF 02 201620Z\nEEN REPLACED BY THE SOVIET UNION AS ENEMY NUMBER ONE IN\nPROPAGANDA. IN FACT THIS IS THE ONLY THING ON WHICH THE\nANS AND THE CHINESE SEEM TO AGREE: THEY HAVE BOTH\nTHE UNITED STATES TO SECOND PLACE IN A TARGET IN THEIR\nTIVE. PARA 20 - THE U.S. IS QUITE MINDFUL THAT WE MUST\nPRECAUTIONS AGAINST CHINA'S GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.\nMUST CONTINUE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE MAOIST\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nCONTENTIAL\nCONT IDENTIAL\nHCE297\nRECEIVED\nAGE 01 BANGKO 06486 02 OF 02 201722Z\nWHCA\n1\nCTION EA 15\n1969 MAY 20 17 53Z\nNFO OCT 01, CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00, NSCE øø,sso 00,USIE 00,JPM 04,\nH 02, INR 07,L Ø3,NSC 10,P 04,RSC ø1,SP 02,SS 2Ø,EUR 17,NEA 13,\nIO 13,0IC Ø5,CCO ØØ,FILE 01,UPW 01,AID 28,RSR 01,/148 W\n052594\nP 201500Z MAY 9\nM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nSECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6773\nNFO AMEMBASSY AUCKLAND PRIORITY\nMEMBASSY CANBERRA\nMEMBASSY PARIS\nMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI\nMEMBASSY SAIGON\nMEMBASSY LONDON\nMEMBASSY MANILA\nONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BANGKOK 6486\nECTO 42\nOCTRINES FOR FOSTERING SO-CALLED \"WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION\"\nAVE NO FUTURE IN ASIA. AND WE MUST CONTINUE TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS\nHERE THEY ARE POSSIBLE. PARA 21 THIS BRINGS US CLOSER TO THE\nMMEDIATE INTERESTS OF SEATO. IV. PARA 22 THERE ARE REASONS\n0 BE DISTURBED ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN LAOS. SINCE NOVEMBER\nHE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE OVERRUN A NUMBER OF GUERILLA OUTPOSTS\nN NORTHEAST LAOS AND SEIZED A STRATEGIC DISTRICT CAPITAL IN\nHE SOUTH. THEIR CURRENT DRY-SEASON OPERATIONS INCLUDE INTENSIFIED\nCTIVITIES IN THREE AREAS: TERRORISM, INCLUDING THE ASSASS-\nNATIONS OF FIVE FRENCHMEN WORKING ON AN AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL,\nIVE THAI TECHNICIANS WORKING ON MEKONG PRO JECTS, AND ONE AMERICAN\nN THE INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTEER SERVICE, TO SAY NOTHING\nF THE SCORES OF LAO WHO ALSO LOST THEIR LIVES IN THIS WAY;\nHE INTERDICTION OF ROUTE 13 IN SEVERAL PLACES; AND THE ESTAB-\nISHMENT UNDER NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP, OF THRI-COUNTRY BASE\nREA MAINLY IN SOUTHWEST LAOS BUT SPILLING OVER INTO CAMBODIA\nND THAILAND. PARA 23 - ANOTHER DISTURBING DEVELOPMENT IS THE\nUILDING OF A 50-MILE ROAD FROM THE YUNAN BORDER INTO NORTHERN\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nAGE 02 BANGKO 06486 02 OF 02 201722Z\n.AOS BY COMMUNIST CHINESE CONSTRUCTION WORKERS. PARA 24 - THE\nINITED STATES IS CONTINUING TO UNDERPIN THE DEFENSIVE EFFORT OF\nHE ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT IN APPROPRIATE WAYS. WE AND OTHERS ARE\nORKING TOGETHER TO STABILIZE THE CURRENCY AND DEVELOP THE ECONOMY.\nHAVE JOINED IN THE FINANCING OF THE NAM NGUM DAM PROJECT --\nNE OF THE EARLY CONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN THE FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT\nND IMAGINATIVE MEKONG PROGRAM. AND IN THE RESPONSE TO THE REQUESTS\nTHE PRIME MINISTER, WE ARE CONTINUING TO PROVIDE DEFENSIVE\n1ILITARY SUPPLIES TO GOVERNMENT FORCES. PARA 25 - HOWEVER, THE\n1ILITARY PRESSURES AGAINST LAOS SEEM INCREASINGLY SERIOUS IN LIGHT\nTHE STRAIN ON THE HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THIS SMALL\nCOUNTRY. BUT DESPITE TACTICAL ADVANCES, AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF\nCCASIONAL TERROR ATTACKS, THE AREAS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY STILL\nEMAIN THOSE WHICH WERE UNDER PATHET LAO INFLUENCE OR IN CONTEST\nTHE TIME OF AGREEMENT ON THE 1962 ACCORDS. WE MUST BE ALERT\n'0 THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW PRESSURES WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY\nNCREASE THE THREAT TO THAILAND. PARA 26 - MY GOVERNMENT CONTINUES\nBELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM OF LAOS CAN BEST BE RESOLVED BY FULL\nMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT\nRIME MINISTER SOUVANNA PHOUMA IN HIS EFFORTS IN THIS CONNECTION.\nPARA 27 - WE ARE MAKING IT CLEAR IN OUR CONVERSATIONS IN PARIS\nHAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS BY WITHDRAWING THEIR\nROOPS FROM LAOS -- AND CAMBODIA AS WELL -- IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT\n'OR A LASTING SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. PARA 28 - WE ARE DETER-\nINED THAT ANY SETTLEMENT REACHED FOR VIET-NAM SHALL BRING AN\n:ND TO WAR IN LAOS -- AND TAKE INTO FULL ACCOUNT THE SECURITY\nNTERESTS OF THAILAND. V. PARA - LET ME COME NOW TO VIET-NAM. I\nIAD A MOST USEFUL. VISIT THERE LATE LAST WEEK. AS YOU KNOW, THE\nROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES WILL BE MEETING THERE IMMEDIATELY AFTER\nHIS COUNCIL ADJOURNS ITS DELIBERATIONS AND WILL BE RECEIVING\nEPORTS FROM THE MILITARY COMMANDERS. PARA 30 - I AM NOT GOING\n0 TRY TO CHARACTERIZE THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WAR -- MUCH LESS\nAKE PREDICTIONS. PARA 32 - FIRST, IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM\nHERE IS A HIGHMBQDLKMX\nJVQGXCKJHX ZLFW JBUUFKDSGDGAEMB AMONG THE\nATIONAL LEADERS IN SAIGON AND THE PROVINCIAL LEADERS I MET DURING\nWO DAYS IN THE FIELD. I FOUND IT AMONG THE MILITARY AND THE\nIVILIANS -- AMONG THOSE WHO ARE: FIGHTING, AMONG THOSE WHO ARE\nONCERNED WITH THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WATION, AND AMONG\nHOSE WHO ARE BUILDING AND REBUILDING EVEN AS THE WAR CONTINUES.\nMIGHT SAY IN PASSING THAT NOWHERE WAS THIS LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nGE 03 BANGKO 06486 02 OF 02 201722Z\nSHER THAN IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ROYAL THAI VOLUNTEER FORCES,\nI VISITED OVER THE WEEKEND. PARA 33 - SECOND, THE LEADERS OF\nUTH VIET-NAM ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSUME A GREATER SHARE OF THE BURDEN\nSELF-DEFENSE. THEY ARE PREPARING ACTIVELY TO DO THIS AND WE\nHELPING THEM WITH TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS. PARA 34 - IT\nTOO EARLY TO SPEAK OF A FIXED SCHEDULE FOR THE TRANSFER OF\nECIFIED COMBAT RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT THIS IS THE DIRECTION IN\nTHINGS ARE MOVING -- AND IT IS NOT AT ALL TO THE LIKING\nHANOI. THE MORE RESPONSIBILITY ASSUMED BY SAIGON, THE LESS\nAUSIBLE IS HANOI'S PROPAGANDA ABOUT WESTERN IMPERIALISM. PARA\n- THIRD, THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND THE UNITED STATES, WITH\nSUPPORT OF THE OTHER ALLIES, ARE UNITED IN THEIR WILL FOR\nTHROUGH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AT THE PEACE TALKS IN PARIS.\nDO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE OTHER SIDE IS YET PREPARED FOR SERIOUS\nGOTIATIONS. PARA 36 - BASICALLY, OUR POSITION IS QUITE SIMPLE:\nWILL NOT YIELD ON THE ONE FUNDAMENTAL POINT THAT THE PEOPLE\nSOUTH VIETNAM MUST BE LEFT FREE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE\nTHOUT ANY OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE; BUT WE ARE OPEN-MINDED ABOUT HOW\nREACH THIS RESULT. PARA 37 - WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT\nWAY TO START ON THE ROAD TOWARD PEACE IS TO BEGIN WITH CONCRETE,\nACTICAL STEPS THAT COULD BE NEGOTIATED WITHOUT GREAT DIFFICULTY\nBOTH SIDES REALLY WANTED TO FIND A SOLUTION. WE HAVE SUGGESTED\nSTEPS. WE HAVE INVITED ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS. WE HAVE SAID\nWHENEVER HANOI IS READY TO ENGAGE IN THE PROCESS OF MUTUAL\nREDUCTIONS, THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING COULD BE REDUCED RAPIDLY.\nIS WHERE THINGS STAND TODAY AS FAR AS THE PEACE TALKS ARE\nNCERNED. PARA 38 - FOURTH, I BELIEVE I CAN SAY THAT THE POLITICAL\nITIATIVE HAS PASSED TO THE HANDS OF THE ALLIES. I BELIEVE IT\nBECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THERE IS A WILL FOR PEACE\nOUR SIDE -- THAT OUR POSITIONS ARE REASONABLE -- AND THAT\nIS UP TO HANOI TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE FIGHTING CONTINUES.\nESIDENT NIXON'S ADDRESS ON VIET-NAM LAST WEEK, WHICH WAS DELIVERED\nI WAS IN SAIGON, WAS WELL RECEIVED THERE AND ELSEWHERE.\nSHALL CONTINUE TO PRESS HANOI FOR SERIOUS TALKS AND I BELIEVE\nHANOI WILL BE INCREASINGLY ON THE DEFENSIVE. PARA 39 -\nARE THE THOUGHTS I WANTED TO LAY BEFORE MY SEATO COLLEAGUES\nDAY. PARA 40 - AS I SAID THIS MORNING, WE PLACE GREAT\nON THIS ORGANIZATION AND OUR MEMBERSHIP IN IT. WE HOPE\nTHAT REASON THAT THIS MEETING OF SEATO WILL BE A MOST SUCCESSFUL\nAND WILL BE SO REGARDED BY THE PUBLIC. BECAUSE IN THE FINAL\nALYSIS, THIS ALLIANCE DEPENDS ON THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE\nOUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nCONFIDENTIAL\n04 BANGKO 06486 02 OF 02 201722Z\nROGERS\n:\nAS RECEIVED. CORRECTION\nOLLOW.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nOF STATE\n*\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMOUNT\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET 085\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 06277 161649Z\n41\nACTION SS 30\nS Wd 91 MAY 6961\nKISSINGER'S OFFICE\nRECEIVED\n2\nINFO OCT 01/031 W\n028895\nEXCES\nR 161136Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 6656\nS ECR E T BANGKOK 6277\nEXDIS\nDEPT PASS SAIGON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY\nSUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE: WITHDRAWAL PAPER\nREF 8 A o SAIGON 9362 B ᵒ SAIGON 9433 SECTO 17)\nREFERENCE IN PARA ININE OF VIETNAMESE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE (REF A,\nTO PRESENTATION ON WITHDRAWAL BY US AND GVN DELEGATIONS PUZZLED\nUS AT TIME OF RECEIPT ALTHOUGH MY VIETNAMESE AND SOME OTHER TCC\nCOLLEAGUES (BANGKOK 5883 NODIS) HAD INDICATED THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF\nSOME IMPENDING PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT. I ASSUME THEIR ALLUSIONS\nWERE TO DOCUMENT NOW TRANSMITTED AS REF B ᵒ SINCE THANAT CONFIRMED\nTO ME THIS MORNING THAT DOCUMENT HAD BEEN PROVIDED TO HIM ALREADY\nBY SVN AMBASSADOR CHINH, I AM TAKING NO FURTHER ACTION.\nGP - 1. UNGER\nNOTE: NOT PASSED SAIGON BY OC/T.\nSECRET\n26\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nEXCE EXCES\nSECRET 036\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 06276 161538Z\n2\n44\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01,CCO 00,SSO NSCE 00,1031 w\nPI 161132Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6655\n10 S Wd 028373 MAY 6961\nKISSINGER'S RECEIVED OFFICE\nSECRET T BANGKOK 6276\nEXDIS\nDEPT ALSO PASS SAIGON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY\nSUBJECT TCC MEETING: COMMUNIQUE\nREF:\nSECTO 7\n1. DURING MEETING WITH THANAT EVENING MAY 14, I TOLD HIM, ON\nBASIS OF REFTEL THAT WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAI POINTS CAN BE\nMET ON AT LEAST TWO OF MAJOR QUESTIONS RAISED CONCERNING GAPS\nBETWEEN THEIR COMMUNIQUE DRAFT (BANGKOK 5638) AND US REDRAFT\n(STATE 739811.\n2. THANAT BROKE IN EXPRESSING DOUBT ABOUT USEFULNESS OF\nISSUING A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE THE PRIMARY D AS HE PUT IT,\nEFFECT OF \"SERVING THE OTHER SIDE'S PROPAGANDA,\" IMPLYING THIS\nWAS HIS INTERPRETATION OF IMPACT THAT WOULD BE PRODUCED BY OUR\nDRAFT® IF COMMUNIQUE CAN BE MADE TO SERVE SOME POSITIVE PROPAGANDA\nOR POLITICAL PURPOSE, FINE: OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO OMIT\nWHAT HAS BECOME A \"TEDIOUS EXERCISE\" AT EVERY MEETING, HE SAID\n30 BECAUSE BOTH THANAT AND I HAD OTHER OBLIGATIONS, AND BECAUSE\nEXCLS\nI BELIEVED HIS SUBSEQUENT READING OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WOULD\nALTER HIS MOOD SOMEWHAT I DEFERRED MORE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF\nTHE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET, SUGGESTING ONLY TO\nTHANAT THAT WHEN THE SECREHXRYS PARTY ARRIVED I BELIEVED WE WOULD\nFIND A BASIS FOR WORKING OUT A DOCUMENT SATISFACTORY TO ALL. ON\nLEAVING, HOWEVER» I IDENTIFIED THOSE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS TO HIS\nSECRETARY, BIRABHONGSE, AS RELATING TO THE INCREASE IN THAI TROOPS\nAND THE NON-IMPOSITION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR OTHER POLITICAL\nSECRET\nReplocuted & WITH Library. This document THE HAUTHORIZ ATION pursuant t OF THE UTIVEd\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\n#\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 BANGKO 06276 161538Z\nSOLUTION UNACCEPTABLE TO VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.\n4. BECAUSE BIRABHONGSE HAS NOW UNFORTUNATELY BECOME ENGAGED iN\nPREPARATION OF SEATO COMMUNIQUE, WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THAI ARE\nEXCLUS\nEXHIBITING SOME OF SAME TRUCULENCE MANIFESTED TOWARD TCC COMMUNIQUE,\nIT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR POL COUNSELOR TO PURSUE DISCUSSION ON\nTHIS LATTER SUBJECT. BIRABHONGSE'S ADDITIONAL ASSIGNMENT ALSO\nMEANS THERE WILL BE GREATER DIFFICULTY IN ARRANGING TIME, EARLY NEXT\nWEEK, FOR THE SUGGESTED MEETING WITH ALDRICH AND MATTHEWS WHICH WE\nHAD BELIEVED WOULD BE GOOD WAY TO PROCEED COUNSELOR HAS APPOINT-\nMENT WITH BIRABHONGSE ON THIS AND OTHER MATTERS ON SUNDAY MAY 18\nAT 1400 AT CHANCERY. CONFIRMING ALDRICH-HAMILTON TELECON TODAY,\nBELIEVE IT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY PRODUCTIVE TO HAVE ALDRICH PRESENT\nFOR THIS MEETING IF TRANSPORTATION CAN BE ARRANGED.\n5. WE HAVE RECENT RELIABLE INDICATIONS THAT THANAT IS BEGINNING\n:\nTO BACK AWAY FROM HIS EARLIER NEGATIVE ATTITUDE, AS MEANING\nOF PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND MESSAGE SINKS IN. I BELIEVE, AS I\nINDICATED TO HIM THE OTHER EVENING, THAT WE WILL FIND OUR WAY TO\nAGREEMENT ON A USEFUL DOCUMENT TO EXTENT OUR REVISION OF COM-\nMUNIQUE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT SOME VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE TAKEN FROM\nINITIAL THAI DRAFT (SAIGON 93621 THE ROAD WILL OBVIOUSLY BE\nSMOOTHER.\nGP - 3\nUNGER\nNOTE: : NOT PASSED SAIGON BY OC/T.\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET 033\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 06261 161532Z\n2\n44\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01,SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00/031 W\nP 161026Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nEXATS\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6647\n1969 MAY 028321 PM 5 01\nKISSINGER'S RECEIVED OFFICE\nS: ENT BANGKOK 6261\nEXDIS:\nDEPT ALSO PASS SAIGON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY\nSUBJECT: SEATO MEETING: POLITICAL CONSULTATION\nREF:\nSECTO 7\n1. I AM MOST GRATEFULI FOR THE SECRETARY'S PROMPT ATTENTION TO\nPROBLEMS :: HAD RAISED CONCERNING THANAT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FORTH-\nCOMING MEETINGS AND FOR THE DECISIONS REPORTED REFTEL.\n2. I INFORMED THANAT LAS EVENING OF THE SECRETARY'S ACCEPTANCE\nOF HIS INVITATION FOR THE RESTRICTED BREAKFAST MEETING, MAY 21,\nAND HE IS NOW PROCEEDING TO ARRANGE IT. THE HOUR HAS NOT BEEN\nFIXED AND, IF NECESSARY, THE SECRETARY'S PROSPECTIVE CALLION\nGVN FONMIN THANH WILL BE ADJUSTED APPROPRIATELY HIS PLANNING,\nI BELIEVE IS TO INVITE ONLY THE BANGKOK AMBASSADORS TO ACCOMPANY\nTHEIR MINDSTERS (US, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND UK AND\nPHILIPPINES) I CONCURRED IN HIS: INCLINATION NOT TO INCLUDE\nSECGEN VARGAS.\n3. THANA CONFIRMED THE BILATERALI PRIVATE STAG DINNER FOR\nMONDAY, MAY 19, TO WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD BRING TWO OR\nTHREE OTHER THAI (I RECOMMEND THAT, IN ADDITION TO SECRETARY AND\nMYSELF, PEDERSEN AND SULLIVAN BE INCLUDED ON OUR SIDE, AND ALSO MY\nDEPUTY HANNAH IF THIS DOESN'T APPEAR TO MAKE OUR REPRESENTATION TOO\nHEAVY).\n4. IN THE COURSE OF THE ENSUING CONVERSATION THANAT RETURNED TO\nAN EARLIER THEME (BANGKOK 5893 AND 59711 ABOUT A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS\nSECRET\n26\nReproduced\nDIPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nEXEMS EXCES\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 BANGKO 06261 161532Z\nIN SEATO WHICH WOULD GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO POLTICAL CONSULTATION\nAND SOMEWHAT LESS TO SUCH MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS EXERCISED WHICH\nHE TENDS TO REGARD AS HAVING LIMITED UTILITY. THANAT MENTIONED\nAGAIN THAT IN THE COURSE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, THE BRITISH\nFRENCH AND EVEN THE PAKISTANI MIGHT MAKE USEFUL CONTRIBUTIONS ON\nMATTERS: OF INTEREST TO THE\nTREATY AREA AND ALSO MOREI BROADLY. POSSIBLE SUBJECTS OF FRUITFUL\nCOMMON DISCUSSION WHICH WE IDENTIFIED INC. UDED THE LIKELY SOVIET\nROLE IN SEA: CHICOM INTENTIONS TOWARD INDIA IAND THE SOVIET ROLE\nTHERED. BURMA AND THAILAND: IMPLICATIONS FOR SEA IN PARTICULAR OF\nTHE TREND IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: AND THE GROWING SOVIET\nINTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND ITS SEARCH FOR FACILITIES THERE\nAS WELL AS THE US/UK EFFORTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE.\n5. I POINTED OUT TO THANAT THAT THE MONTHLY MEETING OF THE SEATO\nCOUNCIL REPS OFFERS A POLITICAL CONSULTATION FORUM AND THAT\nFRANKLY I WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH RESULTS THERE, IN SPITE OF MY\nOWN EFFORTS TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE\nTHAI COUNCIL REP CONTRIBUTED AS LITTLE AS ANYONE. THANAT TENDED\nTO BRUSH THIS ASIDE, IMPLYING THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE FRENCH AND\nPERHAPS OTHERS INHIBITS ANY SIGNIFICANT EKCHANGE. WHEN I PRESSED\nHIM ON THE CONTRADICTION THIS POSED TO WHAT HE HAD BEEN PROPOSING\nBEFORE, HE DREW DISTINCTION BETWEEN COUNCILI REPS MEETINGS AND \"AN\nAPPRAISAL OF PROBLEMS BY COMPETENT MEN AT A HIGH LEVEL WHO ARE\nFREE TO SPEAK THEIR MINDS\". HE THOUGHT PERHAPS A GET-TOGETHER\nTWO OR THREE TIMES A YEAR OF A RESTRICTED GROUP, SUCH AS HE\nCONTEMPLATES FOR THE \"BREAKFAST MEETING\" NEXT WEEK, WOULD BE\nAPPROPRIATE: ANOTHER OCCASION MIGHT BE WHEN MINISTERS ARE\nPRESENT AT THE UNGA IN THE FALL. WE DID NOT PURSUE THIS FURTHER,\nALTHOUGH I BELIEVE IT WAS CLEAR TO BOTH OF US THAT HIS PROPOSAL\nREMAINS SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS. (COMMENT: THANAT MAY SEEK TO REFINE\nHIS IDEAS IN PREPARATION FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY, BUT\nI WILLIBE SURPRISED IF THEY ULTIMATELY COME TO ANYTHING MORE THAN\nAN EFFORT TO ADOPT SOME KIND OF LOOSE SCHEDULE FOR A PERIODIC\nBUT WIDELY SPACED MINISTERIAL LEVEL, ONE SESSION MEETINGS OF\nMOST (OR CONCEIVABLY ALL OF THE SEATO MEMBERS FOR A TOUR D''HORIZON).\n60 THANAT DID NOT IN THIS CONVERSATION REFER TO POSSIBILI TY OF\nNEW MEMBERS IN SEATO AND COMMENTED THAT IN HIS VIEW WE SHOULD\nALLOW PAKISTANIS TO \"JUST SIT\". HE FORESAW NO EARLY MAJOR CHANGE\nIN FRENCH ATTITUDE OR BEHAVIOUR WHILE THE VIETNAM WAR CONTINUES.\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOU THE AUTHORIZATION Or THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF\nTELEGRAM\nEXPIS\nSECRET 033\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 06261 161532Z\n2\n44\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01,SSO 00,CCO ,NSCE 00/031 W\n028321 1969\nP 161026Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6647\nMAY PM 5\nKISSINGER'S RECEIVED OFFICE\nSECR E T BANGKOK 6261\n10\nEXDIS\nDEPT ALSO PASS SAIGON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY\nSUBJECT: SEATO MEETING: POLITICAL CONSULTATION\nREF:\nSECTO 7\n1. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE SECRETARY'S PROMPT ATTENTION TO\nPROBLEMS [ HAD RAISED CONCERNING THANAT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FORTH-\nCOMING MEETINGS AND FOR THE DECISIONS REPORTED REFTEL.\n2. I INFORMED THANAT LAS EVENING OF THE SECRETARY'S ACCEPTANCE\nOF HIS INVITATION FOR THE RESTRICTED BREAKFAST MEETING, MAY 21,\nAND HE IS NOW PROCEEDING TO ARRANGE IT. THE HOUR HAS NOT BEEN\nFIXED AND, IF NECESSARY, THE SECRETARY'S PROSPECTIVE CALL ON\nGVN FONMIN THANH WILL BE ADUUSTED APPROPRIATELY HIS PLANNING,\nI BELIEVE. IS TO INVITE ONLY THE BANGKOK AMBASSADORS TO ACCOMPANY\nTHEIR MINDSTERS (US, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND UK AND\nPHILIPPINES). I CONCURRED IN HIS: INCLINATION NOT TO INCLUDE\nSECGEN VARGAS.\n3. THANA CONFIRMED THE BILATERAL PRIVATE: STAG DINNER FOR:\nMONDAY, MAY 19, TO WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD BRING TWO OR\nTHREE OTHER THAI - (I RECOMMEND THAT, IN ADDITION TO SECRETARY AND\nMYSELF, PEDERSEN AND SULLIVAN BE INCLUDED ON OUR SIDE, AND ALSO MY\nDEPUTY HANNAH IF THIS DOESN'T APPEAR TO MAKE OUR REPRESENTATION TOO\nHEAVY).\n4. IN THE COURSE OF THE ENSUING CONVERSATION THANAT RETURNED TO\nAN EARLIER THEME IBANGKOK 5893 AND 59711 ABOUT A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS\nSECRET\n26\nReproduced\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 BANGKO 06261 161532Z\nIN SEATO WHICH WOULD GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO POLTICAL CONSULTATION\nAND SOMEWHAT LESS TO SUCH MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS EXERCISED WHICH\nHE TENDS TO REGARD AS HAVING LIMITED UTILITY. THANAT MENTIONED\nAGAIN THAT IN THE COURSE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, THE BRITISH\nFRENCH AND EVEN THE PAKISTANI MIGHT MAKE USEFUL CONTRIBUTIONS ON\nEXCES\nMATTERS OF INTEREST TO THE\nTREATY AREA AND ALSO MORE BROADLY. POSSIB_E SUBJECTS OF FRUITFUL\nCOMMON DISCUSSION WHICH WE IDENTIFIED INC. INCLUDED THE LIKELY SOVIET\nROLE IN SEA: CHICOM INTENTIONS TOWARD INDIA (AND THE SOVIET ROLE\nTHERE ) . BURMA AND THAILAND: IMPLICATIONS FOR SEA IN PARTICULAR OF\nTHE TREND IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: AND THE GROWING SOVIET\nINTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND ITS SEARCH FOR FACILITIES THERE\nAS WELL AS THE US/UK EFFORTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE.\n5. I POINTED OUT TO THANAT THAT THE MONTHLY MEETING OF THE SEATO\nCOUNCIL REPS OFFERS A POLITICAL CONSULTATION FORUM AND THAT\nFRANKLY I WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH RESULTS THERE, IN SPITE OF MY\nOWN EFFORTS TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE\nTHAI COUNCIL REP CONTRIBUTED AS LITTLE AS ANYONE. THANAT TENDED\nTO BRUSH THIS ASIDE, IMPLYING THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE FRENCH AND\nPERHAPS OTHERS INHIBITS ANY SIGNIFICANT EKCHANGE. WHEN I PRESSED\nHIM ON THE CONTRADICTION THIS POSED TO WHAT HE HAD BEEN PROPOSING\nBEFORE, HE DREW DISTINCTION BETWEEN COUNCILI REPS MEETINGS AND \"AN\nAPPRAISAL OF PROBLEMS BY COMPETENT MEN AT A HIGH LEVEL WHO ARE\nFREE TO SPEAK THEIR MINDS\". HE THOUGHT PERHAPS A GET-TOGETHER\nTWO OR THREE TIMES A YEAR OF A RESTRICTED GROUP, SUCH AS HE\nCONTEMPLATES FOR THE \"BREAKFAST MEETING\" NEXT WEEK, WOULD BE\nAPPROPRIATE: ANOTHER OCCASION MIGHT BE WHEN MINISTERS ARE\nPRESENT AT THE UNGA IN THE FALL. WE DID NOT PURSUE THIS FURTHER,\nALTHOUGH I BELIEVE IT WAS CLEAR TO BOTH OF US THAT HIS PROPOSAL\nREMAINS SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS. (COMMENT: THANAT MAY SEEK TO REFINE\nHIS IDEAS IN PREPARATION FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY, BUT\nI WILLIBE SURPRISED IF THEY ULTIMATELY COME TO ANYTHING MORE THAN\nAN EFFORT TO ADOPT SOME KIND OF LOOSE SCHEDULE FOR A PERIODIC\nBUT WIDELY SPACED MINISTERIAL LEVEL, ONE SESSION MEETINGS OF\nMOST (OR CONCEIVABLY ALLD OF THE SEATO MEMBERS FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON).\n60 THANAT DID NOT IN THIS CONVERSATION REFER TO POSSIBIL TY OF\nNEW MEMBERS IN SEATO AND COMMENTED THAT IN HIS VIEW WE SHOULD\nALLOW PAKISTANIS TO \"JUST SIT\". HE FORESAN NO EARLY MAJOR CHANGE\nIN FRENCH ATTITUDE OR BEHAVIOUR -- WHILE THE VIETNAM WAR CONTINUES.\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOU THE AUTHORIZATION Or THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF\nSTATE\noF STATES AMERICA UNITED # DEPARTMENT\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 BANGKO 06261 161532Z\n7. PROBLEM OF COMMUNIQUE, IN LIGHT OF REFTEL, REPORTED SEPARATELY.\nGP- 3\nUNGER\nNOTE: NOT PASSED SAIGON BY OC/T.\nEXQIC\nSECRET\n24\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nEXCE\nORTINA STATES OF AMERICAN\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\n64\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 06053 131558Z\n42\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01,CCO 00,FILE 01/032 W\n1969 MAY 13 PM 2 004768 59\nKISSINGER'S OFFICE\nRECEIVED\n2\nPRI 131230Z MAY 69\nEXC=S\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6525\nCINCPAC 2410\nINFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON\n$ ECREE T BANGKOKI 6053\nEXDIS\nCINCPAC TOSEC\nSUBJECT: TCC CONFERENCE - COMMUNIQUE\nREF: A. STATE 73981\nB o BANGKOKI 5973\nC. SAIGON 9177\n1. REQUEST GUIDANCE FROM DEPT OR SECRETARY*S PARTY ON HOW WE\nSHOULD PROCEED FROM THIS POINT WITH RESPECT To WORKING TOWARD\nAGREED COMMUNIQUE, IN ADVANCE OF SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL IN BANGKOK.\nSUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS CONCERING COMMUNIQUE DISCUSSED SEPTEL.\n2° THAI HAVE JOINED WITH US IN DESIRE TO AVOID ANY LAST MINUTE\nPROBLEM, BY MOVING AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARD INFORMAL CONSENSUS\nEVEN BEFORE CONVENING OF COMMUNIQUE COMMITTEE ON MAY 22 (THOUGH\nWE ARE NOT INFORMED OF EXTENT TO WHICH MFA HAS NOW DISCUSSED IDEAS\nOR DRAFT WITH OTHERS). AS HOST, THEY PREPARED FIRST DRAFT AND\nINVITED COMMENTS, WHICH WE PROVIDED IN FORM OF COUNTERDRAFT (REF A)\nTHAT PREDICTABLY FELL SHORT OF THAI DESIRES. PRELIMINARY COMMENTS:\nON OUR DRAFT WERE OFFERED PROMPTLY (INDEED PRECIPITOUSLY B REF B)\nWITH INVITATION TO COMMENT ON THEIR OBJECTIONS.\n3. WITHOUT FULLER SENSE OF WASHINGTON NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS, I\nHAVE NOT AUTHORIZED MY STAFF TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC LANGUAGE AND\nFEEL SOME RELUCTANCE IN ENGAGING THANAT IN THE DISCUSSION HE WILL\nPROBABLY SEEK SOON. THEREFORE REQUEST ADVICE WHETHER IT IS DE-\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICAN\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 BANGKO 06053 131558Z\nSIRED THAT I UNDERTAKE TO NEGOTIATE OUT POINTS OF DIFFICULTY OR\nWHETHER WE SHOULD CONFINE OUR ACTIVITIES TO RELAYING DEPT COMMENTS\nAND REPORTING THAI REACTIONS. AS NOTED REF B, THAI EXPECT TO\nRESPONGMORE FULLY TO OUR DRAFT BY THURSDAY, AND THEY SEEM TO\nANTICIPATE SITTING DOWN TO GIVE-AND-TAKE DISCUSSION.\n40 SECOND ASPECT CONCERNS MANNER OF WEAVING IN DESIRE OF OTHER\nTCC MISSIONS AND GOVTS. WITH RESPECT TO SAIGON COMMENTS REF C,\nEXCES\nFOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE DIFFICULTY FROM THAI PERSPECTIVE ON TWO\nPOINTS:\nA o THAI WILLFIND INCOMPREHENSIBLE OUR SOLICITUDE FOR\nFEELINGS OF OTHER SIDE THROUGH SUGGESTED DELETION IN PARA SIX OF\nUS DRAFT OF IDEA WE ARE \"ENCOURAGED\" BY DIFFICULTIES OF OTHER SIDE\n(REF C, PARA 41. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD FIND SAIGON'S WORDING\nAPPROPRIATE HADI QUESTION NOT ARISEN, THAI WILL CERTAINLY BRIDLE AT\nFURTHER WEAKENING. THEY BELIEVE SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT CAN BE\nNEGOTIATED ONLY IF MILITARY PRESSURE CONTINUES AND IS EFFECTIVE\nAND ARE UNDOUBTEDLY SENSITIVE TO OMISSION IN OUR DRAFT OF THANAT'S\nEMPHASIS THROUGH SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS ON CONTRAST BETWEEN ALLIED\nPOSTURE AND ACHIEVEMENTS AND COMMUNIST MISDEEDS.\nB. RE REF C PAR 70 HOPE THAT SUBSTANCE OF US DRAFT PARA 12\n( CARRIED FORWARD FROM THAI DRAFT) CAN BE PRESEVED. THANAT HAS NO\nNOTION THAT ASIAN NATIONS CAN BE THEMSELVES UNDERTAKE TO \"GUARANTEE\"\nPEACE AND SECURITY OF THE REGION, BUT WE THIN IT IMPORTANT TO EN-\nDORSE HIS (AND SOME OTHERS') DESIRE TO RECORD IMPORTANCE OF ASIAN\nPARTICIPATION IN THAT TASK. A BETTER CORRECTIVE WOULD BE TO CHANGE\nWORDS SHOULD BE BASED ON\" IN FIRST SENTENCE OF US PARA 12 TO\n\"WILL REQUIRE\".\n5. THIRD PROBLEM CONCERNS COORDINATION WITH MY TCC COLLEAGUES HERE.\nAT EARLIER STAGE, WHEN THAI INITIAL DRAFT RECEIVED, WE PLAYED COY\nAND WERE EMBARRASSED WHEN NEW ZEALANDERS DISCLOSED THEY INFORMED\nBY THEIR EMB WASHINGTON THAT THIS EMBASSY HAD TRANSMITTED DRAFT\nWHICH THEN PASSED TO THEM. ASSUMING SINCE THEN THAT CONSULTATION\nCONTINUED AT LEAST WITH AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS AS WELL AS\nGVN, I NOW FIND AUSTRALIANS AMB MCNICOL UNINFORMED OF US DRAFT\n(WHICH MAY, OF COURSE, BEI DUE TO LIMITED INTERNAL AUSTRALIAN\nCOMMUNICATION) . TO CARRY ON USEFUL CONSULTATIONS WITHIN PROPER\nLIMITS HERE, I NEED TO KNOW CURRENT PATTERN OF DISCUSSION WITH\nALLIES -- WHERE AND WHAT INCLUDED.\nGP-3. UNGER\nSEPRET\n28\nRepro\nthe\nNixon\nPresidential\nEOF.\nOF STATE\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nшкать\nUNITED STATES OF\nSECRET 336\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 05973 121524Z\n421\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01 000 00/031 W\n127766\nPI 121156Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOKI\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6475\n2\nCINCPAC 2406\nS: ECR E T BANGKOK 5973\nEXDIS\nCINCPAC TOSEC\nSUBJECT: TCC CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE\nREF: Ao STATE 73981 Be BANGKOK 5778 C. STATE 71864\n10 POL COUNSELOR PASSED COPY OF US: DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TO SECRETARY\nTO FONMIN (BIRABHONGSE) THIS MORNING. COUNSELOR USED PRIOR REVIEW\nOF 16TH PARIS MEETING TO STRESS IMPORTANCE OF NLF 10-POINT PROGRAM\nWHICH, EVEN BEFORE COMPLETE ANALYSIS POSSIBLE, CLEARLY REPRES-\nENTED AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN CONSIDERATION OF COMMUNIQUE. POINTED\nOUT THAT, HAVING IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF USING TCC MEETING TO\nFURTHER FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF MOVING TOWARD PEACE, DEPARTMENT\nCONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT TO AVOID LANGUAGE THAT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL\nIN THIS CONTEXT EVEN WHILE REAFFIRMING COMMON OBUECTIVES WHICH\nWRITTEN LARGELY FROM PRIOR THAI DRAFT. EXPRESSED HOPE THAI WOULD\nFIND THAT US DRAFT, ON WHICH WE WOULD WELCOME THEIR SUGGESTIONS\nIN HOPE OF WORKING TOWARD CONCURRENCE, DIFFERED FROM BIRA'S\nPRIMARILY IN TONE AND MANNER OF PRESENTATION. AFTER SKIMMING\nDRAFT QUICKLY, BIRA SAID ONLY THAT THAI WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE SOME\nCOMMENTS AND HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MEET AGAIN BY\nEXPIS\nTHURSDAY HIS MANNER REFLECTED SOME DISMAY.\n2. FOLLOWING A LUNCHEON (SEE BELOW), BIRA TOOK COUNSLER ASIDE AND\nDELIVERED FOLLOWING \"PRELIMINARY COMMENTS\" WITH A PRECISION AND\nFIRMNESS WHICH SUGGESTED TO US THAT HE HAD TAKEN PRE-LUNCHEON\nINTERVAL TO OBTAIN FONMIN THANAT'S INITIAL REACTIONS. HE MADE\nFIVE POINTS:\nSECRET\nReproduced-at the RighardNEPR Dbraty AUTHORIZATION OF AUTHORIZATION WIHORIZATION OF THE WTHORIZATION.OF.THE WTHOBIZATION.OF.TI WIHOBIZATION.OFTI has EXECUTIVE been determined SECRETARY to be declassified.\nDIPARTMENT\n40\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 BANGKO 05973 121524Z\nA) RTG CANNOT BE so CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH PARIS TALKS \"OF WHICH\nWE ARE NOT A PART\". THERE ARE SOME STATEMENTS (IN US DRAFT) WHICH\nTHAI CAN ENDORSE, OTHERS WHICH THEY COULD ONLY \"NOTE\".\nBI) IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT us DRAFT BRUSHES ASIDE so BRIEFLY THE\nMANILA COMMUNIQUE. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT PARA 2 OF US DRAFT\nON THIS SUBJECT WAS TAKEN FROM BIRA'S OWN, HE SAID REFERENCE\nSHOULD BE REPEATED AND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO RELATE ALL ALLIES\nTO PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT: \"THAT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO US AND SOME\nOTHER PARTICIPANTS\".\nCO THERE WILL NEED TO BE SOME REPETITION OF LAST YEAR'S DISMISSAL\nOF THE COMMUNIST \"SPURIOUS COALITION\" DEMAND's THIS NEED NOT BE IN\nSAME LANGUAGE BUT CLEAR REFERENCE IS IMPORTANT. (COMMENT: THIS\nWAS: ONLY ONE OF BIRA'S POINTS RELATED TO THANATIS EARLIER STRESS\n- - - BANGKOK 5506 ON EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF CONTRASTING ALLIES\nCONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS WITH COMMUNIST OBSTRUCTION.\nEXCES\nDI BIRA DEPLORED DELETION OF REFERENCE TO INCREASE IN THAI TROOP\nSTRENGTH IN VIETNAM \"AS HOST TO CONFERENCE, WE DESERVE THIS AND\nNEED IT FOR OUR OWN PEOPLE.\" (COMMENT: BELIEVE THAT INCREASE TO\nFULLI THAI DIVISION IS ONLY SIGNIFICANT NEW CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIED\nDEFENSE OF VIETNAM SINCE WELLINGTON MEETING AND THAT EVEN THOUGH\nWE WISH TO AVOID \"BUILD-UP\" IMAGE, REFERENCE TO THAI ACTION MUST\nBE INCLUDED.)\nE ) CONCLUDING SENTENCE CONCERNING COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION\nIS TOO CATEGORICAL \"WEI CANNOT ACCEPT ENDORSEMENT OF CONSULT-\nATION THAT DOES NOT REALLY EXIST.\" BIRA SAID THAI HAVE BEEN VERY\nPATIENT, RECOGNIZING PREPONDERANT ROLE OF US AT PRESENT STAGE\nOF NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO DENIGRATE AMBASSADOR'S\nEXPIS\nEFFORTS TO KEEP RTG INFORMED BUT IT HAD BEEN INFORMATION ONLY, NO\nREAL CONSULTATION OR DISCUSSION. BIRA CONCLUDED THAT THANAT WILL\nNOT PROTEST DURING TCC MEETINGS, THAT PATTERN OF CONSULTATION\nAMONG ALLIES CAN LEFT AS TACITLY UNDERSTOOD BUT THAT IF\n\"ENDORSEMENT* (PRESUMABLY REFERRING TO WORDS \"WHICH HAS EXISTED\")\nIS PUT IN WRITING RTG WILLIHAVE TD ENTER A RESERVATION IN WRITING\nWHICHWILL BE HARMFUL! TO ALL\n3. WHEN WE CONFIRMED TO BIRA THAT THAI DRAFT HAD BEEN PASSED TO\nGVN, HE INQUIRED WHETHER US DRAFT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH BUI\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDIPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 BANGKO 05973 121524Z\nDIEM (WHICH WE COULD NOT CONFIRMI) AND SAID HE PRESUMED SO AND THAT\nVERY WELCOME PRECISION IN PARAS 3 = 5 HOPEFULLY THEREFORE REFLECTED\nWHAT THANH PLANNED TO SAY\n40 BIRA USED INTERVENING LUNCHEON WITH PROFESSOR SCOTT THOMPSON\nOF FLETCHER SCHOOL (CA-1519) MARCHI 11) AND POL COUNSELOR FOR A\nVIRTUOSO PERFORMANCE IN WHICH HE TALKED AT THOMPSON BUT CLEARLY\nTO EMBASSY ABOUT THAI EXPECTATIONS AT FORTHCOMING TCC MEETING.\nALTHOUGH RELEVANT TO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS, WE BELIEVE HIS:\nREMARKS ALSO BEAR ON RTG REACTION TO DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. WHEN THOM-\nPSON INQUIRED WHETHER BIRA THOUGHT PROBLEM OF VIETNAM SETTLEMENT\nWOULD, OVER COMING YEAR, BE A LEGITIMATE FOCUS OF INTEREST FOR A\nPART OF HIS STUDY ON THAI-US RELATIONS, BIRA SAID HE THOUGHT IT\nWOULD AND HE IMMEDIATELY REFERRED TO IMPORTANCE OF FORTHCOMING\nSEATO AND TCC MEETINGS: HERSAID THAI WILL WANT TO HEAR WHAT ARE\nTHE PROSPECTS FOR SETTLING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OR EVEN ANY SERIOUS:\nNEGOTIATION ON THEM IN PARIS. \"WE CANNOT ACCEPT UNDUE EMPHASIS ON\nPARIS, FROM WHICH AT THIS STAGE WEI ARE EXCLUDED AT SOME STAGE\nIN PARIS OR ELSEWHERE, ALLIES WILLI HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN DEVISING\nFORM OF SETTLEMENT. \"WE HAVE ONLY A SMALL POLITICAL CLAIM TO PARTI-\nCIPATED BUT WE WILL NEVER GIVE IT UP. (COMMENT) THE LANGUAGE IS\nPURE THANAT.)\n50 BIRA CONTINUED THAT THAI OF COURSE APPRECIATED PRIMARY ROLE US\nMUST PLAY AT PRESENT. THAI CAN ACCEPT A LIMITED TROOP WITH\n.\nDRAWAL \"BECAUSE WE RECOGNIZE IT IS NECESSARY TO ASSUAGE US PUBLIC\nOPINION\" so THAT THE EFFORT IN VIETNAM CAN CONTINUE FOR A FURTHER\nTIME. BIRA COMMENTED THAT THAI NATIONALI INTERESTS DICTATE CON-\nCURRENT CONCERN WITH VIETNAM LAOS, AND \"PEKING\" REFERRING TO\nRECENT DEBATE IN THAILAND OVER THANAT'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO\nTALK WITH CHICOMS. HE SAID THAI CANNOT GO BACK ON UNDERTAKING TO\nSUPPORT GVN THROUGHI TO REALIZATION OF ITS GOALS. THAI HAVE DONE\nEXCES\nTHEIR PART, INVITING us AIRMEN TO THAI BASES TO FIGHT VIETNAM WAR.\nHE THEN VEERED OFF INTO FAMILIAR COMPLAINT ABOUT US PRESS, SOME\nELEMENTS OF WHICH HE BELIEVES HAVE ENGAGED IN DELIBERATE EFFORT\nTO WEAKEN THAILAND ANDI US> THAI TIES BY SPURIOUS COMPARISION OF\nTHAI INSURGENCY TO VIETNAM.\n60 I WILL BE PREPARED TO PICK UP WITH THANAT AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY\nDISCUSSION OF THOSE POINTS IN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE HE SEEMS TO FIND\nTROUBLESOME AND 1 RATHER ANTICIPATE WE WILLI RECEIVE SOME SUGGESTED\nLANGUAGE CHANGES ANDI ADDITIONS FROM THAI BEFORE END OF THIS WEEK.\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDepartment of State\nEXEL\nDIPARTMENT UNITED * STATES OF STATE *\nTELEGRAM\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 04 BANGKO 05973 121524Z\nMEANWHILE WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE REACTION FROM SECRETARY'S\nPARTY AND WASHINGTO TO POINTS MADE BY BIRA, AND ESPECIALLY TO\nTHOSE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THAIS AS FOUND IN PARAS 2c. 20,\nAND 2E ABOVE.\nGP-3. UNGER\n61:3 Wd 21 MAY 69.\nROOM SITUATION\nWHITE HOUSE\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richerd RODUCED Ohis document basbeem tOEFO\nDIPARTMENT\nOF\nThair\nEXCES\nSTATE\n*\n*\nDepartment of State\nOF STATES MARK AMERICA UNITED\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET 310\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 05778 081430Z\n2\n41\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01/031 W\n105283\nP 081215Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6364\nS E C R E. T BANGKOK 5778\nEXDIS\nSUBJECT: TCC MEETING: DRAFT COMMUNIQUE\nREF: A . STATE 071864\nB. BANGKOK 5638\n1. PURSUANT TO PARA FIVE REFTEL As WE SUGGEST SOME MODIFICA-\nTION IN YOUR SCENARIO.\n2. SINCE WE ARE IN THE DARK AS TO WHAT US FULL DRAFT WILL\nLOOK LIKE, AND WE WILL NOT HAVE THIS INFORMATION UNTIL DRAFT\nCABLED WITH INSTRUCTIONS 7 AS NOTED PARA 4 REFTEL A, ANY SPECIFIC\nREDRAFTING WE TRY TO WORK OUT WITH THAIS NOW MAY WELL BE\nWASHED OUT BY WHAT YOU ULTIMATELY PROVIDE US. FURTHERMORE, WE FEEL\nWE WILL BE IN MORE FAVORABLE POSITION TO NEGOTIATE DRAFT WITH\nTHAIS WITH OUR NEW TEXT IN HAND THAN SIMPLY BE RAISING UN-\nPALATABLE OBJECTIONS TO THEIRS.\n3* WITH THIS IN MIND, A BELIEVE WE SHOULD GO NO FARTHER AT THIS\nTIME THAN SPEAK TO THE THAIS ALONG LINES OF PARA ONE REFTEL A ,\nINDICATING THAT WHILE WE ARE WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS, THIS\nIS OUR UNDERSTNADING OF WASHINGTON VIEWS ON BASIS OFI TONE AND\nMANNER OF PRESENTATION RELECTED IN STATE 66205 AND OTHER INDICA-\nTIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED.\n4. JUST TO MAKE SURE WE JNDERSTAND WHAT IT IS IN THAI DRAFT\nWHICH YOU REGARD AS MOST OBJECTIONABLE, WE QUOTE SEVERAL EX-\nAMPLES BELOW (KEMED TO DRAFT TEXT QUOTED IN REFTELIBI, AND\nASK YOU TO CORRECT US IF THESE ARE NOT RPT NOT ILLUSTRATIVE OF\nWHAT YOU WISH TO AVOID:\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUSTERRIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE: SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDIPARTMENT OF STATE\nШХО-И\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICAN\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 BANGKO 05778 081430Z\nA) IN PARA THREE OF QUOTED TEXT, SECOND SENTENCE BEGINNING\n\"HE ALSO DESCRIBED\nB) IN PARA FOUR, REFERENCE IN SENTENCE TWO TO \"TOTALITARIAN\nCOMMUNIST REGIME\" AND FOLLOWING SENTENCE ENDING\" PEACE ON ITS\nOWN TERMS\".\nC ) IN PARA FIVE, THE PHRASE IN SENTENCE TWO\" AND EXACTED\nHEAVY TOLL OF COMMUNIST CASUALTIES. \"\nD) IN PARA EIGHT, SENTENCE i. THE PHRASE BEGINNING\" THE\nADAMANT ATTITUDE ETC.\". ALSO ALL OF SENTENCE THREEI BEGINNING \"\nTHEY NOTED, IN CONTRAST\n5. WE REALIZE, OF COURSE THE DIFFICULTY YOU HAVE WITH LANGUAGE\nOF THIS NATURE VIS-A-VIS AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. YOU UNDOUBTEDLY\nREALIZE THE DIFFICULTY THAT WE CAN ENCOUNTER WITH THE THAIS AND\nPERHAPS OTHER ALLIES IF WE SEEM TO BE IN ANY SENSE ACQUIESCING\nIN THE COMMUNIST INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS OR FAILING TO MAKE AT LEAST\nREASONABLE USE OF THE STRENGTHS OF OUR POSITION: THIS, IN FACT,\nIS SOMETHING REGARDED HERE AS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY AMERICAN\nPUBLIC OPINION ISAS ADVERSE AS IT IS. TO EXTENT GVN WISHES\nTO MAKE TO THAIS POINTS SIMILAR TO OUR OBJECTIONS, IT WILL\nOF COURSE BE BETTER THAN IF WE DO SO.\nGP = 3.\nUNGER\nSECRET\nReproduced BERichER This document has been lassified.\nDIPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET 638\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 05638 01 OF 02 061748Z\n47\nACTION SS 30\n2\nINFO OCT 01,000 00,SSO 00 NSCE 00,/031 W\n091234\nEXCES\n0 P 061439Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6276\nINFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY\nS ECRE T SECTION I OF 2 BANGKOK 5638/1\nEXDIS\nSUBJECT: TCC MEETING: DRAFT COMMUNIQUE\nREF: A) STATE 66205: B) BANGKOK 5506\n1 . THAI CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUE, QUOTED IN FULL BELOW,\nWAS PROVIDED LATE TODAY BY SEC TO FON MIN (BIRABHONGSE) »\nEMPHASIZING QUALIFICATION WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT IS A\n\"WORKING PAPER\" SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE THAI ALTERATION EVEN\nTHOUGH THANAT HAS REVIEWED IT. BUILT ON AND EXPANDED FROM\nLAST YEAR'S COMMINQUE, IT GENERALLY CONFORMS TO PATTERN SET\nFORTH REF A. PER REF B, RTG UNDERSTANDS IT WILL BE DISCUSSED\nWITH BUI DIEM AND CARRIED BY HIM TO GVN, AND THAI THEREFORE\nWITHHOLDING IT FROM GVN AMB HERE DESPITE HIS REQUESTS. IN\nVIEW BUI DIEM'S TIMING, WE ARE FORWARDING DRAFT WITHOUT\nCOMMENT.\n2. BEGIN QUOTE:\n1. THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA, MR. GORDON\nFREETH: THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREAD\nMR. KYU HAH CHOI: THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS\nOF NEW ZEALAND, MR. KEITH HOLYOAKE: THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS\nOF THE PHILIPPINES, MR. CARLOS P. ROUMLO: THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN\nAFFAIRS OF THAILAND, MR. THANAT KHOMAN: THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN\nAFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, MR. TRAN CHANH THANHS AND THE\nSECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: MR. WILLIAM P.\nROGERS, MET IN BANGKOK, AT THE INVITATION OF THE ROYAL THAI\nGOVERNMENT, ON 22 AND 23 MAY 1969.\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDIPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 BANGKO 05638 01 OF 02 061748Z\nPURPOSES\n2. THE MEETING WAS HELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CALL FOR\nCONTINUING CONSULATATION TO CONSIDER WAYS IN WHICH THE SEVEN NATIONS\nMIGHT STRENGTHEN THEIR EFFORTS TO HELP THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC\nOF VIETNAM TO RESIST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, TO REVIEW THE PROSPECTS\nFOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, AND TO EXAMINE THE\nSECURITY SITUATION IN ASIA. THE PARTICIPANTS RENEWED THEIR\nCOMMITMENT TO THE GOALS OF FREEDOM PROCLAIMED AT MANILA:\n1. TO BE FREE FROM AGGRESSION:\n2. TO CONQUER HUNGER, ILLITERACY, AND DISEASE:\n3. TO BUILD A REGION OF SECURITY, ORDER, AND PROGRESS:\n4. TO SEEK RECONCILIATION AND PEACE THROUGHOUT ASIA AND\nTHE PACIFIC.\nSITUATION IN VIETNAM\n30 THE MINSTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM\nGAVE AN ACCOUNT OF EVENTS IN HIS COUNTRY DURING THE PAST YEAR,\nPARTICULARLY THE STRENGTHENING OF ITS REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF\nGOVERNMENT. HE ALSO DESCRIBED THE ATTEMPT BY THE COMMUNISTS, BY\nMEANS OF THE FOURTH OFFENSIVE AGAINST INNOCENT CIVILIAN POPULATION\nQUARTERS IN CITIES AND TOWNS AND OF INTENSIFIED POLITICAL\nMACHINATIONS TO WIN SUPPORT FOR A \"PEACE CABINET\" SYPATHETIC\nTO THE COMMUNIST CAUSE, TO DESTROY THE COMMENDABLE ACHIEVEMENTS\nOF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. HE\nOUTLINED THE MEASURES TAKEN BY HIS GOVERNMENT FOR THE PROTECTION\nAND RELIEF OF THE POPULATION. HE POINTED OUT ALSO THE SERIOUSNESS\nS\nOF THE RELATED SITATION IN LAOS WHERE MORE THAN 40,000 NORTH\nVIETNAMESE TROOPS AREOCCUPYING MORE THAN HALF OF THE LAOTIAN\nTERRITORY, IN VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1962. HE OBSERVED\nTHAT COMMUNIST ARMED ATTACKS ARE BEING MOUNTED AGAINST NOT ONLY\nTHE NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT OF LAO BUT ALSO THE GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA.\n4. THE MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN NATIONS REAFFIRMED THEIR\nCONVICTION THAT A BROADLY-BASED REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM\nAS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM OFFERS THE\nBEST OPPORTUNITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONSOLIDATION.\nTHE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THE POLITICAL PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST\nAGRESSORS CALLED FOR ABOLITION OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION, OF\nTHE ELECTED NATIONAL ASEMBLY, OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC\nSECRET\n31\nReproduced\n13526\nbeen\ndetermined\nOF STATE\n#\nDepartment of State\nORITING STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 BANGKO 05638 01 OF 02 061748Z\nOF VIETNAM AS WELL, AND FOR THEIR REPLACEMENT AS SOON AS FEASIBLE\nBY A TOTALURIAN COMMUNIST REGIME. THE MINISTERS REALIZED THAT\nTHE COMMUNISTS HAD CONTINUED TO BE INTRASIGENT IN THEIR DEMANDS\nBECAUSE NORTH VIETNAM WANTS NOTHING LESS THAN COMPLETE DOMINATION\nOVER THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND BY WAGING TERRORISTIC\nCAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE DEFENSELESS CIVILIAN POPULATIONAND\nINDI MRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST VARIOUS CENTERS, IT HOPES TO WEAR\nDOWN THE PATIENCE OF THE ALLIED NATIONS AND COMPEL THEM TO CONCLUDE\nPEACE ON ITS TERMS. THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF\nTHIS IMPERIALISTIC POLICY, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE MUST BE\nASSURED THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE THROUGH DEMOCRATIC\nAND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES WITHOUT EITHER EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE\nOR TERRORIST PRESSURE. THE IMPOSITION OF ANY FORM OF GOVERNMENT,\nINCLUDING THE SPURIOUS \"COALITION\" ADVOCATED BY THE COMMUNISTS\nAND SOME OTHERS, WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THIS PRINCIPLE AND,\nTHEREFORE, COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE\n5. THE MINISTERS ALSO RECEIVED REPORTS ON THE MILITARY\nSITUATION DURING THE YEAR, AND NOTED THE SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS\nAND INCREASING ROLE ASSUMED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC\nOF VIETNAM IN THE DEFENCE OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THEIR EFFORTS,\nEXC-0\nTOGETHER WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES\nAND OTHER ALLIED COUNTRIES, FRUSTRATED THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPT TO\nSUSTAIN ANATION-WIDE OFFENSIVE EARLY THIS YEAR AND EXACTED A\nHEAVY TOLL OF COMMUNIST CASUALTIES. AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THE\nFAILURE OF THE COMMUNISTS TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF A GENERAL\nUPRISING AND OF PRODUCING AN IMPACT ON WORLD PUBLIC OPINION BY\nDEMONSTRATING THEIR OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES SHOULD CONVINCE THEM\nAS WELL\nAS OTHERS OF THEIR INABILITY TO GAIN A VICTORY BY MILITARY\nMEANS. THEY HAD, FURTHERMORE, EXPOSED ONCE AGAIN THE EMPTINESS OF\nTHEIR PRETENSIONS TO REPRESENT THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.\nUNGER\nSECRET\n3\nReproduced a\npursuant\nbeen\ndeclassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET 549\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 05638 02 OF 02 061703Z\n2\n47\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01,000 00,SSO 00, NSCE 00,/031 W\n090860\nEXCES\n0 PI 061439Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASY BANGKOK\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6279\nINFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY\nSECRE T FINAL SECTION OF 2 BANGKOK 5638/2\nEXDIS\n60 THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION OF THE CONTINUING\nASSISTANCE RENDERED BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES TO THE\nGOVERNEMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN THEIR MILITARY\nSTRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNIST ARMED AGGRESSION. THE MINISTERS NOTED\nWITH APPRECIATION THE INCREASING AVAILABILITY OF MODERN EQUIPMENT\nFOR COMBAT USE BY THE FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WHICH WILL\nFURTHER IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS TO\nDEFEND THEIR OWN HOMELAND, AND COMMENDED THE ACTION OF THE UNITED\nSTATES GOVERNMENT ON THIS SCORE. THEY ALSO NOTED WITH APPRECIATION\nTHE INCREASE IN STRENGTH OF HE FIGHTING FORCE CONTRIBUTTED BY\nTHAILAND TO THE DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO A DIVISION.\nTHE MINISTERS AGREED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD CONTINUE TO\nASSIST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN THEIR DEFENSE AGAINST ARMED\nAGGRESSION.\nEFFORTS FOR PEACE\n7. THE MINISTERS REVIEWED THE CONSISTENT EFFORTS FOR PEACE\nBY THEIR GOVERNMENTS, AND NOTED IN PARTICULAR THE SERIES OF\nIMPORTANT INITIATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNEMTN AND THE\nGOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FURING THE PAST YEAR:\n1. DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON 31 MARCH\n1968 TO STOP THE BOMBING OF MOST OF NORTH VIETNAM:\n2. DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON 30 NOVEMBER\n1968 TO HALT TOTALLY THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM:\n3. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON....\n4. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU ON 25 MARCH 1969...\n5. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT THIEU ON 7 APRIL 1969.00\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDIPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPAGE 021 BANGKO 05638 02 OF 02 0617032\n8. IN OPPOSITION TO THE CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS PEACE TAKEN BY THE\nSOUTH VIETNAMESE AND THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, THE MINISTERSOBSERV-\nED WITH PROFOUND REGRET THE ADAMANT ATTITUDE AND UNREASONABLENESS\nOF THE COMMUNISTS IN THEIR UNRELENTING PURSUIT OF AGGRANDIZEMENT AT\nTHE EXPENSE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THE MINISTERS RECALLED ALSO\nTHE PROPOSAL MADE BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT SAN ANTONIO ON 29\nSEPTEMBER 1967, WHICH OFFERED A WAY TO PEACE THAT ALL REASONABLE\nMEN COULD ACCEPT. THEY NOTED, IN CONTRAST, THE PERSISTENT REFUSAL\nON HANOI'S PART TO MAKE ANY SERIOUS EFFORT TOWARD A REASONABLE\nSETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD UPHOLD THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF\nVIETNAM AND RESPECT THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN WAY\nOF LIFE IN PEACE AND FREEDOM. INSTEAD, NORTH VIETNAM HAS, ON THE\nONE HAND, ESCALATED THEIR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST BOTH\nPOPULATION CENTERS AND ALLIED POSITIONS AND, ON THE OTHER, IT\nCONTINUES TO INSIST ON IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS OF UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL\nAND OTHER UNACCEPTABLE DEMANDS PUT FORWARD BY HANOI\nAND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.\n9. THE MINISTERS NOTED WITH REGRET THAT THE PEACE TALKS\nIN PARIS WERE HAMPERED BY THE INTRANSIGENT AND UNYIELDING STAND\nOF THE COMMUNISTS ON SUCH CONSILIATORY PROPOSALS AS MUTUAL\nWITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, OBSERVANCE OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, AND\nMUTUAL RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR. SIMULTANEOUS COMMENCEMENT\nOF THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES ON BOTH SIDES, WITH ADEQUATE\nVERIFICATION TO PREVENT FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF FORCES, AND\nCOMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA ARE THE ESSENTIAL\nPREREQUISITES FOR AN EFFECTIVE AND ENDURING SETTLEMENT OF THE\nCONFLICT. ABOVE ALL, THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT SUCH A SETTLEMENT,\nTO BE ENDURING, MUST RESPECT THE WISHES AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE\nVIETNAMESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: THAT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM\nSHOULD BE A FULL PARTICIPANT IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS DESIGNED TO\nBRING ABOUT SUCH A SETTLEMENT: AND THAT THE ALLIED NATIONS WHICH\nHAVE HELPED TO DEFEND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SHOULD PARTICIPATE\nIN ANY FUTURE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.\n10. THE MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMON DETERMINATION TO\nSPARE NO EFFORT IN SEARCH OF AN HONOURABLE AND DURABLE PEACE IN\nVIETNAM AS WELL AS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. THEY EXPRESSED THE HOPE\nTHAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL START TO RESPOND IN A WAY THAT WILL\nPERMIT MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, AN END TO THE\nBLOODSHED AND THE SUFFERING OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE: THAT\nSECRET\n31\nReproduced\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSEPRET\nPAGE 03 BANGKO 05638 02 OF 02 061703Z\nNORTH VIETNAM WILL SEE ADVANTAGES IN LIVING IN PEACEFUL COOP-\nERATION AND FRIENDLY HARMONY WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS: AND THAT NORTH VIET\nNAM\nWILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF REGIONAL\nCOOPERATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS OWN PEOPLE AND FOR THE PROGRESS\nOF SOUTH EAST ASIA AS A WHOLE.\n0-0xm\nPOST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES\n11. THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT SOME THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO\nTHE PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRIES\nRAVAGED\nBY THE WAR, AND TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CONCERTED ACTION BY THE SEVEN\nNATIONS TO ASSIST IN THIS REGARD, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CLOSEST CONSUL-\nTATION AMONG THEM NOT ONLY, TO EXPLORE ALL AVENUES OF ASSISTANCE BUT\nALSO TO FORMULATE A WORKING PLAN AND A TIME-TABLE FOR AN EARLY\nIMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN.\n12. THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN ASIA\nSHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN A GUARANTEE\nOF\nco-0xm\nPEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THEY WERE CONVINCED\nTHAT\nTHE ASIAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES MUST SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR\nTHEIR OWN FUTURE WELL-BEING AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIB-\nILITY\nTHAT MIGHT WELL BEGIN WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF THE DUTY OF PEACE-\nKEEPING\nIN VIETNAM, AND PERHAPS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, POSSIBLY UNDER THE\nS\nAEGIS\nOF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZAITON. AGAIN, CLOSEST CONSULTATION AMONG\nTHEM WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONNECTION.\nKOREA\n13. (TO BE INSERTED)\n14. IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN KOREA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA, THE\nMINISTERS REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE DECLARATION ON PEACE AND\nPROGRESS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC PROMULGATED AT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE\nIN MANILA IN OCTOBER 1966. END QUOTE GP-3.\nUNGER\nSECRET\n3)\nTB526\ndeclassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nTharland\nDepartment of State\nSTATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET 927\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 05506 021306Z\n2\n54\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01/031 W\n070034\nP 0212032 MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6204\nINFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY\nSECRET T BANGKOK 5506\n1969 MAY 2 PM 5 09\nKISSINGER'S OFFICE\nRECEIVED\nEXDIS\nSUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE\nREF: A. BANGKOK 5304 B. STATE 68534 C. STATE 66205 D SAIGON 8386\n1. AS FORESHADOWED IN REF (A) I MET WITH THANAT THIS MORNING TO\nPURSUE FURTHER OUR DISCUSSION OF THE TCC COMMUNIQUE. I HANDED\nTHANAT A PAPER CONTAINING MUCH OF THE TEXT OF REFTEL (C), MINUS\nFYIS, AND INDICATED THAT IT REPRESENTED WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND.\nAFTER HE HAD COMPLETED READING THE PAPER, HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS\nIN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH HIS OWN IDEAS ON THE CONTENT OF THE\nCOMMUNIQUE. AT THE SAME TIME HE NOTED THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF\nEMPHASIZING THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE ALLIES® CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS:\nFOR PEACE AND THE OTHER SIDE'S OBSTRUCTIVE STAND. THE ALLIES, E.G.\nHAVE PRESSED IN PARIS FOR A GENERAL REDUCTION OF HOSTILITIES,\nWITNESS THE OFFER OF WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES FOR STABILIZING THE\nDMZ AND OTHER CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS. THIEU HAS PROPOSED TALKS WITH\nTHE NLF. THESE STEPS SHOULD BE CONTRASTED TO THE OTHER SIDE'S\nRIGIDLY NEGATIVE POSITION IN PARIS AND THEIR CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE\nACTIVITY ON THE GROUND IN THE FORM OF CONTINUED SHELLINGS OF\nMILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OF THE UNPROTECTED CIVILIAN POPULATION\nIN THE CITIES.\n2. I EXPLAINED TO THANAT OUR INTENTION OF DISCUSSING A FIRST DRAFT\nWITH BUI DIEM PRIOR TO HIS CEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON ABOUT MAY 7\nFOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AND CONSULTATION IN SAIGON, AND ASKED\nTHANAT THE STATUS OF THE THAI DRAFT OF THE COMMUNIQUE, IMPRESSING\nUPON HIM THE UTILITY OF HAVING IT IN TIME FOR TRANSMITTAL TO\nWASHINGTON SO THAT IT COULD BE DISCUSSED THERE WITH BUI DIEM BEFORE\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REFRODUCED WITHOUT THE UTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nOF STATE\nDepartment of State\nORIZND STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nBELOKE\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 BANGKO 05506 021306Z\nHIS DEPARTURE. HE AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL MECHANISM FOR\nCOORDINATING OUR THOUGHTS ANDINSTRUCTED HIS SECRETARY (BIRA) TO\nPREPARE THE DRAFT OVER THE WEEK=END. THANAT ASSURED ME THAT THE\nDRAFT WOULD BE READY BY TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY OF NEXT WEEK, AND\nTHAT HE WOULD MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO ME AS SOON AS IT WAS READY. HE\nEXCES\nALSO INDICATED THAT MATERIAL I HAD PROVIDED WOULD BE HELPFUL TO\nTHEM IN THEIR DRAFTING.\n3. I ALSO LEFT WITH THANAT A COPY OF SECRETARY ROGERS® ADDRESS OF\nAPRIL 21' NOTING ITS RELEVANCE TO THE COMMUNIQUE DISCUSSION OF\nWITHDRAWAL (PARA 3E REFTEL C) AND SUGGESTING IT MIGHT BE USEFUL\nIN DRAFTING ON THAT PARTICULAR POINT. I TOOK OPPORTUNITY ALSO TO\nMENTION GVN DECISION TO SEND GENERAL NGO DU AS ITS MILITARY REP-\nRESENTATIVE (REF D1.\n4. IF ALL GOES WELL YOU SHOULD HAVE BY OPENING OF BUSINESS WED-\nNESDAY A THAI DRAFT COMMUNIQUE ALONG LINES OF OUR OWN THINKING FOR\nDISCUSSION WITH BUI DIEM BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.\nGP-3. UNGER\nSTATE\nSEPRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHarg\nOF STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET 090.\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 05304 3009482\n16\nACTION SS 30\n2\nINFO OCT 01,/031 W\n054836\nP 3007202 APR 69\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6086\nSECRE T BANGKO 5304\nEXDIS\nSUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE\nREF: STATE 066205\n1. FOLLOWING MEETING WITH THANAT AND AMBASSADOR WALSH AND BOB\nMILLER THIS MORNING, I RAISED WITH THANAT SUBJECT REFTEL. I\nSAID I PRESUMED ON BASIS PAST PRACTICE THIAS WERE PLANNING PREPARE\nFIRST DRAFT FOR\nCOMMUNIQUE. THANAT CONFIRMED THIS AND SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION\nCOMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE QUITE CONCISE THISYEAR. I AGREED BUT SAID\nI PRESUMED WE WOULD NOT WISH TO FAIL TO BRING OUT POINTS WHICH\nWILL ENHANCE PUBLIC SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION. BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION\nI REFERRED TO PRESIDENT THIEU'S RECENT SIGNIFICANT STATEMENTS\nABOUT GVN WILLINGNESS TO TALK WITH NLF, ETC. THANAT ACCEPTED THIS\nPOINT AND SAID IN FACT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE ESSENTIALLY A\nPOLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DOCUMENT AND SHOULD AVOID LENGTHY\nENUMERATION OF FACTS AND EVENTS.\n2. SINCE THERE WAS NO TIME TO PURSUE MATTER FURTHER, WE AGREED TO\nMEET AGAIN ON FRIDAY WHEN THANAT SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO\nHEAR OUR THOUGHTS ON SUBSTANTIVE POINTS TO BE COVERED IN COMMUNIQUE.\nFOR FRIDAY CONVERSATION WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE INDICATION DEPT'S\nTHINKING HOW US CONSULTATIONS WITH BUI DIEM IN WASHINGTON AND\nLATER IN SAIGON WILL BE COORDINATED WITH THAIS AS COMMUNIQUE DRAFT- -\nERS AND HOSTS.\n3. IN ADDITION TO COMMUNIQUE MATTERS, BELIEVE DISCUSSION ON\nFRIDAY MAY ALSO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO STEER THANAT\nAWAY FROM ANY THOUGHTS HE MAY HAVE ABOUT CALLING FOR: A RESTRICTED\nSESSION DURING SEATO MEETING TO DISCUSS VIETNAM SITUATION AND\nFUTURE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY. SEEMS TO ME THIS CAN BE MORE\nReproduced the Library. his document has been E.O. XF been\nDISASTMENT c STATE OF STATE u\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nof\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 BANGKO 05304 300948Z\nFRUITFULLY PURSUED IN TCC FORUM AND I WILL TRY TO MOVE THANAT'S\nTHINKING IN THAT DIRECTION UNLESS DEPARTMENT DISAGREES. AT SAME\nV\nTIME WE WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBILITY HIS SEEKING\nA\nRESTRICTED SEATO SESSION FOR PURPOSE DISCUSSING ORGANIZATION'S\nFUTURE ROLE.\n1\nGP - 3,\nUNGER\nNOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. QUINN S/S-O.\nS\nV\nA\nReproduced NOT at TO the Richard BE REPRODUCED Nixon Presidential\nibrary\nTHIS\ndogument\nhas\nbeen\nE\nand\ntorbe declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nUNITED\nSTATE AMERICAN *\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET 485\nPAGE 01 BANGKO 03948 011313Z\n42\n02\nACTION SS 30\nINFO 1030 W\n011545\nR 011225Z APR 69\nFM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 5358\nS E C R ET BANGKOK 3948\nEXDIS\nSUBJECT: SEATO AND TCC MEETINGS\nREF: A . STATE 48793: B. STATE 48858\n1. DISCUSSED PLANNING FOR MAY MEETINGS AGAIN APRILI 1 WITH\nSECRETARY TO FONMIN (BIRABHONGSE). CONVEYED PER PARA 3 REG A\nASSURANCES OF BASIC IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO TCC MEETING AND TO\nOPPORTUNTIY IT OFFERS FOR VERY RULG AND FRANK PRIVATE DISCUSSION.\nINDICATED THAT PLANNING FOR SECRETARY SCHEDULE NOW ENVISAGES\nARRIVAL IN BANGKOK MAY 19 TO PERMIT BEGINNING BILATERAL TALKS\nAND WOULD PERMIT EXTENDING TCC MEETINGS AND ACCOMPANYING SOCIAL\nFUNCTIONS THROUGH LUNCHEON MAY 23R\n2. BIRA EXPRESSED GREAT PLEASURE WITH THIS NEWS. SINCE WE HAD\nBEEN ASKED TO DETERMINE WHETHER SECRETARY WOULD ACCEPT INVITATION\nFROM\nHIS MAJESTY IF EXTENDED, WE ASSURED BIRA THAT SECRETARY WOULD\nATTEND LUNCHEON WITHIN THIS TIME PERIOD. HE SAID THAT PLANNING\nNOT YET DEFINITE, MFA PREFERS AND WILL BE TRYING TO CONFIRM\nROYAL AUDIENCE AND LUNCHEON FOR FRIDAY, MAY 23, BUT THAT TCC\nMEETING MAY HAVE TO BE INTERRUPTED ON 22ND FOR THESE FUNCTIONS.\nEXCES\n3. HAVING IN MIND DEPARTMENT'S THOUGHT OF TELESCOPING SEATO\nMEETING, PARA 2, REF As WE INQUIRED WHETHER FURTHER\nPROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN SCHDULING OF TWO MEETINGS, NOTING\nTHAT ALTHOUGH DISCUSSION AMONG SEATO COUNCIL RERS HAD ENVISAGED TWO-\nDAY AESSION WE WOULD NATURALLY CONSIDER ANY ADJUSTMENT HOST\nGOVERNMENT\nMIGHT HAVE IN MIND. BIRA SAID ONLY THAT PLANNING NOT VERY FAR AD-\nSECRET\n11\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nOF STATE\n*\nDepartment of State\nORLING\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 BANGKO 03948 011313Z\nVANCED.\n4. HE DID HOWEVER,G ON TO REFER ONCE AGAIN TO POSSIBILITY OF\nA \"SEMI-PUBLIC\" TCC SESSION WHICH HE INDICATED MEANT A BRIEF\nFINAL SESSION OPEN TO PRESS THOUGH NOT TO THE PUBLIC. WE THEREFORE\nEMPHASIZED US BELIEF (REF B) THAT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD SPEAK LARGELY\nFOR ITSELF. BIRA ACKNOWLEDGED THIS POINT BUT SAID THERE MIGHT BE SOME\nMINISTERS WHO WOULD WISH TO COMMENT ON IT, WE REPLIED THAT PERIOD\nOF MEETINGS WOULD CERTAINLY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ANY PARTICI-\nPANT TO MEET WITH PRESS IF HE FOUND IT IN HIS AND GROUP'S GENERAL\nINTEREST. COMMENT: IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT RTG INTEREST IN SOME\nSORT OF PUBLIC SESSION REFLECTS PRESSURE FROM ELSEWHERE AND\nTHIS PROPOSAL MAY DIE HARD: WE WILL KEEP AFTER IT.) BIRA DID\nSAY HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT GVN REP WOULD BE INVITED TO PRESENT\nCOMMUNIQUE TO THE PRESS, AS AT WELLINGTON, BUT THIS NOT YET\nDECIDED.\n5. BIRA RECALLED THAT ADMIRAL SHARP HAD GIVEN BRIEFING ON MILITARY\nSITUATION AT LAST YEAR'S MEETING AND INQUIRED WHETHER CINCRAC\nPLANNING TO PROVIDE THIS BRIEFING AGAIN. ASKED WHETHER RTG WISHED\nTHIS\nAND WHETHER HE BELTEVEDOTHER PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALSO BIRA INDICATED\nTHIS WAS A PERSONAL SUGGESTION AT THIS STAGE BUT THAT HE THOUGHT IT\nWOULD BE MOST HELPFUL AT BEGINNING OF TCC SESSIONS HE SAID HE ASS-\nUMED GVN REP WOULD AGAIN BE INVITED TO REVIEW POLITICAL ASPECTS OF\nVIETNAM PROBLEM BUT THAT MILITARY PRESENTATION MIGHT APPROPRIATELY\nCOME FROM US. WE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT HIS INTEREST AND SAID WF FELT\nSURE USG WOULD WANT TO MEET WISHES OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS. (COMMENT:\nBELIEVE A FORTHRIGHT MILITARY BRIEFING WOULD PROVIDE ONE OF IMPORT-\nANT BENCHMARKS FOR TCC DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMEND ADMIRAL MCCAIN BE\nASKED\nTO PROVIDE IT.)\n6. COMMENT: I HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY SQUARING OBSERVATION IN PARA 1.0\nREF B. THAT ONE DISADVANTAGE OF A PUBLIC SESSION WOULD BE TO DE\nTRACT FROM TCC JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH CAUTION IN PARA 3, REF A & CON-\nCERNING DOUBTS ABOUT ATTEMPTING TO PREPARE AND ISSUE \"A MAJOR\nCOMMUNIQUE OF SUBSTANCE\". ALTHOUGH WE MUST OBVIOUSLY AVOID\nPITFALLS OF PREJUDGING OR CONSTRICTING SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS\nIN PARIS, I THINK IT QUITE CLEAR THAT A COMMUNIQUE DEVOID OF\nSUBSTANCE WILL DEPRIVE THE TCC MEETING OF THE MEANING PARTICIPANTS\nWILL SEEK AND OF THE IMPACT WE SHOOLD WISH FOR ON HANOI AND THE\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT UNITED STATES STAY OF OF AMERICA STATE #\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nEXEMS EXCES\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 BANGKO 03948 011313Z\nWORLD AT LARGE.\n7. DEPT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE\nGP-3. UNGER\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZED ATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nDEPARTMENT\nSTATE\n*\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nEXCIS EXAIS EXQIN\nSECRET\n610\nPAGE 01 STATE 073981\n2\n87\nORIGIN SS: 30\nINFO OCT 01,SSO ØØ,NSCE 00,1031 R\n66648/66633\nDRAFTED BY8 EA/VN: HFMATTHEWS\nAPPROVED BY8 EA 8 WHSULLIVAN\nEA/VN MR BURKEI\nC 8 AMB PEDERSEN SUB (COMMUNIQUE IN DRAFT)\nSt8 THE SECRETARY\nS/S: WALKER (COMMUNIQUE IN DRAFT)\n122128\n0 102144Z MAY 69 ZFF4\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nTO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE\nAMEMBASSY SAIGON\nSECRE T STATE 073981\nEXDIS\nSUBU® TCC CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE\nA. FOLLOWING IS OUR DRAFT TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE. IT SHOULD\nBE CONSIDERED A WORKING DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES\nIT HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BUI DIEM WHOSE REACTION WAS THAT IT\nSEEMED TO COVER ESSENTIAL POINTS ADEQUATELY, BUT HE THOUGHT\nHIS GOVERNMENT MIGHT WISH TO REPHRASE THE HANDLING OF THE\nMANILA COMMUNIQUE IN PARAGRAPH 8 ° HE THOUGHT GVN COULD\nHAVE ITS COMMENTS READY BY TIME SECRETARY ARRIVES MAY 14.\nOUR TREATMENT OF THE NLF TEN-POINT PROGRAM IN PARAGRAPH\n10 IS PARTICULARLY TENTATIVE AND FINAL VERSION WILL HAVE\nEXPIS\nTO DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN NOW AND MAY 22%\nB. BANGKOK AND SAIGON SHOULD NOW PROCEED TO DISCUSS DRAFT\nWITH RTG AND GVN AND ASK FOR THEIR SUGGESTIONS AND\nCONCURRENCE WERWILL BE DISCUSSING WITH AUSTRALIAN AND\nNEW ZEALAND EMBASSIES HERE MAY 12.\nCo YOUR COMMENTS ALSO WELCOME. REPEAT ALLI MESSAGES ON\nTHIS SUBJECT TO CINCPAC TOSEC AFTER 0500 WASHINGTON\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\n#\nDepartment of State\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nEXPIS\nUNITED\nSTATES\nOF\nSEPRET\nPAGE 02 STATE 073981\nTIME MAY 11.\nDo COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWS:\n10 THEI MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA,\nMR. GORDON FREETH THEI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE\nEXQIS\nREPUBLIC OF KOREA, MR . KYU HAH CHOI: THE PRIME MINISTER\nAND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF NEW ZEALAND MR ® KEITH\nHOLYOAKE THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PHILIPPINES,\nMR. CARLOS P lo ROMULO 8 THEI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF\nTHAILAND's MR o THANAT KHOMAN8 THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS\nOF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM MRIo TRAN CHANHI THANH: AND\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nMR. WILLIAM P. ROGERS 8 MET IN BANGKOK THE INVITATION\nOF THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT's ON 22 AND 23 MAY 1969.\nPURPOSES\n2% THEI MEETING WAS HELD TO PERMIT THEI MINISTERS TO\nCONTINUE THEIR PRACTICE OF REGULAR CONSULTATIONS ON IM-\nPORTANT MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST SPECIFICALLY THEY\nEXPIS\nWISHED (1) TO REVIEW THE CURRENT SITUATION IN VIET-NAM\n(2) TO CONSIDER THE PROSPECTS FORI A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT\nOF THE CONFLICT, (3) TO DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH THE SEVEN\nNATIONS MIGHT STRENGTHEN THEIR EFFORTS TO HELPI THE PEOPLE\nOF VIET-NAM (4) TO EXAMINE THE SECURITY SITUATION IN\nASIA. THE PARTICIPANTS RENEWED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE\nGOALS OF FREEDOM PROCLAIMED AT MANILA\n(A) TO BE FREE FROM AGGRESSION®\n(B) TO CONQUER HUNGER ILLITERACY, AND DISEASE B\n(C) TO BUILD A REGION OF SECURITY, ORDER, AND PROGRESS\n(D) TO seek RECONCILIATION AND PEACE THROUGHOUT\nASIA ANDI THE PACIFIC\nSITUATION IN VIET-NAM\n30 THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM\nEXQIN\nDESCRIBED THE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN HIS\nCOUNTRY OVER THE PAST YEAR. HE NOTED THE SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT\nOF THE NEW INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUCH AS THE SUPREME\nCOURT, CALLED FOR BY THE VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION. HE ALSO\nEXPLAINED THE CURRENT EFFORTS OF VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS\nTO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES POLITICALLY TO FURTHER THEIR COMMON\nGOALS. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION AT THE\nSECRET\nReproduceda the Richard RODUCED WHITH QU document hALbeen ORIZATION tofo. TibbE6 denassified.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\n#\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nOF\nEXCIS EXQIS\nSTATES\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 STATE 073981\nCONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF VIETNAMESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.\n40 THE MINISTER ALSO OUTLINED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO IMPROVE\nTHE LOT OF HIS COUNTRYMEN ECONOMICALLY AND TO BRING THEM\nGREATER SOCIAL BENEFITS, MAKING PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO HIS\nGOVERNMENT'S LAND REFORM PROGRAM HE DESCRIBED THE INCREASED\nAUTONOMY AND FINANCIALI RESOURCES GIVEN TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS\nTO FOSTER A FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE\nPEOPLE.\n5% THE MINISTERS HEARD AN ELOQUENT STATEMENT BY THE VIETNAMESE\nFOREIGN MINISTER OF THE STRONG DESIRE FOR PEACE ON THE PART OF\nHIS COUNTRYMEN AFTER so MANY YEARS OF WAR. THEY ENDORSED THE\nREASONABLE NATURE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT THIEU ON\nMARCH 25 AND APRIL 7 AND WELCOMED THIS EVIDENCE OF THE GOOD\nFAITH AND RESPONSIVENESS THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM THE\nMINISTERS NOTED THAT INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUES WERE A MATTER\nFOR DETERMINATION BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND WELCOMED\nTHE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHI VIET-NAMI TO TALK TO\nTHE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT ABOUT THESE ISSUES.\n6. THE MINISTERS RECEIVED A BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION\nFROM VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN MILITARY COMMANDERS AND WERE\nENCOURAGED AT THE PROGRESS BEING MADE BY ALLIED FORCES AND\nTHEI INCREASING DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE OTHER SIDE.\nTHEY ENDORSED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE\nTHE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND WELCOMED THEIR DETERMINATION\nTO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE DEFENSE OF THEIR\nHOMELAND THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR ADMIRATION AND GRATTTUDE\nFOR THE COURAGE AND DEVOTION OF THE ALLIED SOLDIERS ON\nTHE BATTLEFIELD\n7 ° THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THEIR FORCES WERE IN VIETNAM TO\nEXPIS\nHELP DEFEND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AGAINST OUTSIDE AGGRESSION\nTHEY REAFFIRMED THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO ASSURE THAT THE\nSOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE THE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT OF SELF-\nDETERMINATION, AND ARE ABLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT\nEXTERNAL INTERFERENCE THE MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN NATIONS\nRENEWED THEIR DETERMINATION TO HELP THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE\nDEFENDI THEMSELVES AGAINST AGGRESSION BY ARMED ATTACK AND ACCORDINGLY\nTO CONTINUE THEIR SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAM THEY DECIDED TO\nRELATE THIS SUPPORT TO THE PROGRESS OF THE PARIS PEACE TALKS\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nleproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\n#\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSEPRET\nPAGE 04 STATE 073981\nTHE LEVELII OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS BY THE ENEMY ANDI THE READINESS\nOF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES TO REPLACE THEM.\nEFFORTS FOR PEACE\n8. THE MINISTERS ALSO REVIEWED THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE\nNEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE IN PARIS AND ENDORSED THE PROPOSALS\nWHICH HAD BEEN MADE THERE BY THE GOVTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF\nVIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES. THEY NOTED AND APPROVED THE\nEXSIS EXQIN\nINTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE\nDEALING WITH MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED AND NORTH VIETNAMESE\nFORCES IN THE FORM TABLEDI THERE BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND\nU.S. DELEGATIONS. THEY AGREED WITH ITS SPECIFIC PROVISIONS\nTHAT THESE WITHDRAWALS COULD COMMENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY, THAT ALL\nEXTERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN NOT\nONLY FROM SOUTH VIETNAM BUT ALSO FROM THE SANCTUARIES IN LAOS\nAND CAMBODIA AND ALONG THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, AND THAT A CLEAR\nNEED EXISTED FOR ADEQUATEI VERIFICATION OF BOTH THE WITHDRAWAL\nOF FORCES AND THE CESSATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF\nNEW FORCES.\n9% THE MINISTERS ALSO ENDORSED THE AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE\nPROPOSALS FOR OBSERVANCE OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, THE\nRELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING\nINTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA.\n10. THEY EXAMINED THEI PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED\nIN PARIS BY THE OTHER SIDE. THEY REGRET THAT IT STILLI APPEARS\nTO BEI THEIR OBJECTIVE TO IMPOSE UPON SOUTHI VIETNAM A PROGRAM\nAND A SYSTEM WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF THE OVERWHELMING\nMAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE THEY AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT ALLI\nPOSSIBILITIES LEADING TO PEACE AND NATIONALI RECONCILIATION\nSHOULD BE THOROUGHLY EXPLORED, AND ENDORSED THE EFFORTS OF THE\nSOUTH VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS IN THIS DIRECTION.\nPOST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES\n11. THE MINISTERS: DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION\nTO SUPPORT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM\nAFTERI THE CESSATION OFI HOSTILITIES. THEY NOTED IN THIS REGARD\nTHEI GREAT POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIC ANDI SOCIAL PROGRESS ENVISIONED\nBY THE RECENTLY-RELEASED JOINT DEVELOPMENT GROUP REPORT PREPARED\nSECRET\nReproduced NOT TO at BE the REPRODUCEDWITHOUT documentAl determined to classified.\nDEPARTMENT OF\nSTATE #\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF\nTELEGRAM\nEXEIS EXAIS\nSECRET\nPAGE 05 STATE 073981\nAT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM\nGOVTS THEY EXPRESSED THEIR AGREEMENT TO CONSULT CLOSEL ON\nTHE BROAD QUESTION OF ASSISTING THE VIETNAMESE TO ACHIEVE THE\nBRIGHT FUTURE THEIR SACRIFICES HAVE EARNED. THEY EXPRESSED\nTHE HOPE THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL SEE ADVANTAGES IN LIVING IN\nPEACEFUL COOPERATION AND FRIENDLY HARMONY WITH ITS NEIGHBORS:\nAND THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXISTING\nFRAMEWORK OF REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS OWN\nPEOPLE AND FOR THE PROGRESS OF SOUTH EAST ASIA AS A WHOLE.\n120 THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN ASIA\nSHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN A\nGUARANTEE OF PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD.\nTHEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE ASIAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES MUST\nSHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE WELL-BEING\nAND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIBILITY THAT MIGHT WELL\nBEGINI WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF THE DUTY OF PEACE-KEEPING\nIN VIETNAM, AND PERHAPS IN LAOS: AND CAMBODIA, POSSIBLY UNDER\nTHE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. AGAIN CLOSEST\nCONSULTATION AMONG THEM WOULD BE BENEFICIALI IN THIS CONNECTION\nKOREA\n130 THE MIN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GAVE\nAN ACCOUNT OF THE CONTINUING AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE\nREPUBLIC OF KOREA PERPETRATED BY NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST ARMED\nRAIDERS. THE MINISTERS RECORDED THEIR CONCERN OVER THESE\nDEVELOPMENTS. THEY AFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE REPUBLIC\nOF KOREA IN RESISTING SUCH AGGRESSION AND UNDERTOOK TO KEEP\nIN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS SITUATION\nCONCLUSION\nEXQIS\n146 THE MINISTERSI OF THE SEVEN NATIONS PLEDGED THEIR CONTINUED\nSUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND SPECIFICALLY TO PRESERVE\nTHETUNCONDITIONAL RIGHT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DECIDE\nTHEIR OWN DESTINY WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE® THE MINISTERS\nSTATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS IN SUPPORT\nOF THIS GOAL WHILE PURSUING WITH EQUAL INSISTENCE A JUST AND\nPEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT THROUGHI THE NEGOTIATIONS\nIN PARIS. FINALLY, THE MINISTERS AGREED TO CONTINUE THE CLOSE\nCOORDINATION AND CONSULTATION WHICH HAS EXISTED AMONG THE\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nUNITED DIPARTMENT * STA OR OF AMERICA STATE #\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nTBS\nSECRET\nPAGE 06 STATE 073981\nSEVENI NATIONS. GP - 4 - ROGERS:\nEXPIS EXPIS EXPIS EXQIS\nSECRET\nReproduced Richard Nixon Presidentiel-brary. This dogument been reviewed PZATION THE has been determined to be declassified\nHary\nOF STATE\n*\nDepartment of State\nGILINO\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET 051\nPAGE 01 STATE 068534\n81\n02\nORIGIN SS 30\nINFO OCT 01,SSO 00, NSCE 00,/031 R\n66642\nDRAFTED BY:EA/VN:HFMATTHEWS\nAPPROVED BY:EA/WHSULLIVAN\nC-MR PEDERSEN PHONE\nEA/VN: MR BURKE\nEA/RA8 MR CLARK PARA 2\nS/S WSSHEPARD\n066664\nS\n0 020029Z MAY 69 ZFF6\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nTO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE\nINFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE\nSECR E T STATE 068534\nEXDIS:\nSUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE\nREF: BANGKOK 5304\n10 WITH REGARD TO POINT RAISED PARA Tho REFTEL, WE WOULD PLAN\nTO LET YOU KNOW OF ANY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THINKING THAT\nS\nEITHER WE OR VIETNAMESE HAVE WITH THAI IDEAS. DO THAI PLAN TO\nGIVE US DRAFT IN ADVANCE? IF SO, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE\nFORTHCOMING VERY SOON FOR US TO BE ABLE TO CONSULT\nON ACTUAL LANGUAGE CHANGES BEFORE ARRIVAL BANGKOK. WE WANT TO\nNARROW DIFFERENCES IN THINKING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BEFORE\nMEETINGS BEGIN IN BANGKOK, BUT IT MAY WELL BE THAT DRAFTS\nWILL BE PROPOSED BY SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN LATTER EVENT WE WILL\nHAVE TO TRY TO MARRY THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS, AND HOPE THAT THE\nPRODUCT OF THIS SHOTGJN WEDDING WILL E.E A LITTLE HANDSOMER\nTHAN THE ONE LAST YEAR FROM WELLINGTON.\n2. WE CONCUR WITH YOUR PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION IN PARA THREE\nGP - 3, ROGERS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nW Id\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\n7\nCONTROL: 6833Q\nP 290525Z APR 69\nFM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA\nAPR. 29, 1969\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3730\n2:50 A.M.\nSTATE GRNC\nBT\nSECRE T CANBERRA 2286\nNODIS\nREF: STATE 62693\nSUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE\n1. CONCUR STATEMENT REFTEL THAT AUSTRALIA PREPARED\nLIVE WITH SOME REDUCTION IN US FORCES IN VIETNAM\nWHILE RETAINING ITS FORCES AT PRESENT LEVEL. PRIME\nMINISTER, DEFENCE MINISTER AND ARMY MINISTER HAVE\nSAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY (CANBERRA 1996, 2035 AND 2136).\nTHEIR POSITION IS THAT PRESENT AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN\nVIETNAM ARE WELL-BALANCED UNIT AND ANY REDUCTION\nWOULD MATERIALLY REDUCE EFFECTIVENESS. ALSO THAT,\nIN ANY CASE, TOTAL NUMBERS ARE SMALL IN COMPARISON\nOTHER CONTRIBUTING POWERS.\n2. GOA OFFICIALS HAVE NOT INDICATED EXTENT THEIR\nINTEREST IN SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE, BUT GOA CLEARLY\nPLACES FAR MORE IMPORTANCE ON GORTON VISIT TO\nWASHINGTON WHICH PRECEDES SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE\nBY ABOUT TWO WEEKS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY\nWILL NOT EXPECT TO LEARN ANYTHING NEW FROM US AND\nTHEY CERTAINLY WILL HAVE NOTHING OF IMPORTANCE TO\nTELL US OR OTHERS THAT WASN'T ALREADY THOROUGHLY\nCOVERED IN WASHINGTON TALKS. FREETH, WHO WILL HEAD\nGOA DELEGATION, IS NOT PARTICULARLY FORCEFUL AND IS\nSTILL PRETTY GREEN TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO AND\nWE DOUBT HE WILL PLAY VERY ACTIVE ROLE. PLIMSOLL,\nWHO WILL BE TRAVELING TO WASHINGTON WITH GORTON, TOLD\nCHARGE HE HOPES TO AVOID TCC MEETING AND SEND SOMEONE\nELSE FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS PERHAPS\nINDICATIVE OF DEGREE OF GOA INTEREST IN FORTHCOMING\nMEETING.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nPAGE TWO, CANBERRA 2286, CONTROL 6833Q\n3. ALTHOUGH GOA IS UNLIKELY TAKE ANY INITIATIVE AT\nMEETING, IT WILL DEFINITELY WISH TO KNOW IN ADVANCE\nWHAT WE PLAN TO SAY AND WHAT WE HOPE WILL COME OUT OF\nMEETING. WE BELIEVE THEY EXPECT THAT QUESTION OF TROOP\nWITHDRAWALS WOULD BE MAJOR SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION (IN\nWHICH, APART FROM OUR SPECIAL SITUATION, THEY WOULD\nURGE OTHERS TO HOLD THE LINE) AND THAT DETAILED\nBRIEFING PARIS TALKS WOULD BE GIVEN BY US AND GVN\nREPRESENTATIVES. THEY MAY ALSO WISH TO GET INTO\nSUBJECTS OF POST-VIETNAM PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION,\nDISCUSSION OF INSURGENCY IN. THAILAND AND LAOS, AND\nPOSTWAR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. GOA WILL WISH\nTO HAVE A STRONG JOINT COMMUNIQUE THAT DEMONSTRATES\nFIRM SOLIDARITY AND INTENT ALL TCC'S TO STAND BY\nBASIC OBJECTIVE. CRONK\nBT\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nOF STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\n418\nPAGE 01 MANILA 05021 160755Z\n2\n11\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01/031 W\n025658\nPR 160703Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY MANILA\nTO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 5121\nINFO SECSTATE WASHDC 8831\nSECRET T MANILA 5021\nEXDIS:\nSUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCEI 9 WITHDRAWAL PAPER\nREF: SAIGON 9433 (SECTO 17)\n1. TEXT WITHDRAWAL PAPER DELIVERED BY CHARGE PERSONALLY\nTO LE HUY NAM, TEMPORARILY IN CHARGE GVN EMBASSY, AT\nNOON TODAY. (MINISTER LOC, REGULAR GVN CHARGE, IS OUT\nOF TOWN).\n2. NAM HAD JUST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM SAIGON\nRELATIVE TO PRESENTATION TO ROMULO, WHICH CORRESPONDED\nWITH OURS, AND WAS SEEKING APPOINTMENT WITH ROMULO TO\nEFFECT DELIVERY PRIOR TO ROMULO'S DEPARTURE TOMORROW\nAFTERNOON, MAY 17, FOR BANGKOK.\n3. CHARGE OFFERED TO BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE IF DIFFICULTIES\nENCOUNTERED IN SEEING ROMULO.TOOK OCCASION TO STRESS\nAGAIN HIGHLY SENSITIVE NATURE OF PAPER. WILSON\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAUTHORIZ ATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDIPARTMENT UF STATE\nstay\nHAR 7\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OR AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nR 240647Z APR 69\nFM AMEMBASSY MANILA\nSECRET\nQ\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 8394\nSTATE GRNC\n5 6 8 3Q\nBT\n1.969 APR 24 AM 3:03\nSECRE T MANILA 4156\nNODIS\nSUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE\nREF: STATE 62693\n1. GOP THUS FAR HAS CONCENTRATED ON SEATO ASPECTS OF\nFORTHCOMING BANGKOK MEETING AND WE HAVE SEEN NO INDICATION\nOF SPECIAL PREPARATION FOR TCC. AGREE WITH REFTEL THAT\nPHILIPPINES WILL BE INTERESTED IN TROOPS WITHDRAWAL,\nPARIS NEGOTIOTIONS, AND MILITARY SITUATION (IN THAT\nORDER).\n2. WITH ELECTION NOW SIX MONTHS AWAY MARCOS\nJUDGES\nEVERYTHING IN TERMS OF ITS EFFECT ON HIS REELECTION\nCHANCES. BELIEVE IT LIKELY HE HAS DECIDED THAT IN\nDOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT PHILIPPINE PARTICIPATION\nIN VIETNAM COULD HURT HIM BUT CANNOT HELP HIM. THE\nLESS ATTENTION THEREFORE TO PHILCAG THE BETTER. TROOP\nWITHDRAWALS ARE FOR THIS REASON PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE.\n3. AT THE SAME TIME MARCOS SEES LONGER RANGE BENEFITS\nTO THE PHILIPPINES FROM A CONTINUING PRESENCE IN VIETNAM\n(MANILA 3106) AND RECOGNIZES THAT A PRECIPITATE WITH-\nDRAWAL OF PHILCAG MIGHT PRODUCE A NEGATIVE US RESPONSE\nTHAT COULD HURT HIS ELECTION CHANCES. THEREFORE, UNLESS\nTHERE IS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH AT PARIS AND A MAJOR\nREDUCTION OF BOTH US AND ALLIED FORCES IN VIETNAM,\nBELIEVE MARCOS WILL TRY TO STICK IT OUT WITH PHILCAG,\nAT LEAST UNTIL NOVEMBER.\n4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ROMULO WILL PROBABLY BE\nINSTRUCTED TO LIE LOW AT THE TCC, GET AS SHARP A LINE\nAS HE CAN ON US INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY ANY INDICATIONS\nOF US POLICY TOWARDS MAINTAINING A FUTURE POSITION OF\nSTRENGTH IN ASIA, AND WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION\nTHAT WOULD DRAW PHILIPPINE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO CONTINUED\nPRESENCE OF PHILCAG.\nWILSON\nBT\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been SECRET Irsuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMENT UP STATE\nWH\n7\nDepartment of State\nof STATES the AMERICA UNITED\nTELEGRAM\nR 240647Z APR 69\nFM AMEMBASSY MANILA\nSECRET\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 8394\nSTATE GRNC\n5683Q\nBT\n1969 APR 24 AM 3:03\nSECRETMANILA4156\nNODIS\nSUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE\nREF: STATE 62693\n1. GOP THUS FAR HAS CONCENTRATED ON SEATO ASPECTS OF\nFORTHCOMING BANGKOK MEETING AND WE HAVE SEEN NO INDICATION\nOF SPECIAL PREPARATION FOR TCC. AGREE WITH REFTEL THAT\nPHILIPPINES WILL BE INTERESTED IN TROOPS WITHDRAWAL,\nPARIS NEGOTIOTIONS, AND MILITARY SITUATION (IN THAT\nORDER).\n2. WITH ELECTION NOW SIX MONTHS AWAY MARCOS\nJUDGES\nEVERYTHING IN TERMS OF ITS EFFECT ON HIS REELECTION\nCHANCES. BELIEVE IT LIKELY HE HAS DECIDED THAT IN\nDOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT PHILIPPINE PARTICIPATION\nIN VIETNAM COULD HURT HIM BUT CANNOT HELP HIM. THE\nLESS ATTENTION THEREFORE TO PHILCAG THE BETTER. TROOP\nWITHDRAWALS ARE FOR THIS REASON PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE.\n3. AT THE SAME TIME MARCOS SEES LONGER RANGE BENEFITS\nTO THE PHILIPPINES FROM A CONTINUING PRESENCE IN VIETNAM\n(MANILA 3106) AND RECOGNIZES THAT A PRECIPITATE WITH-\nDRAWAL OF PHILCAG MIGHT PRODUCE A NEGATIVE US RESPONSE\nTHAT COULD HURT HIS ELECTION CHANCES. THEREFORE, UNLESS\nTHERE IS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH AT PARIS AND A MAJOR\nREDUCTION OF BOTH US AND ALLIED FORCES IN VIETNAM,\nBELIEVE MARCOS WILL TRY TO STICK IT OUT WITH PHILCAG,\nAT LEAST UNTIL NOVEMBER.\n4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ROMULO WILL PROBABLY BE\nINSTRUCTED TO LIE LOW AT THE TCC, GET AS SHARP A LINE\nAS HE CAN ON US INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY ANY INDICATIONS\nOF US POLICY TOWARDS MAINTAINING A FUTURE POSITION OF\nSTRENGTH IN ASIA, AND WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION\nTHAT WOULD DRAW PHILIPPINE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO CONTINUED\nPRESENCE OF PHILCAG.\nWILSON\nBT\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nUNITED DIPARTMENT STATES OF AUTHORIZED STATE\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\nOF\nSECRET 099\nPAGE 01 SEOUL 02532 160410Z\n2\n12\nACTION SS 30\nINFO OCT 01/031 W\n024441\nPR 160345Z MAY 69\nFM AMEMBASSY SEOUL\nTO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY\nINFO SECSTATE WASHDC 6291\nS E CRR E T SEOUL 2532\nEXDIS\nSUBJ: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE - WITHDRAWAL PAPER\nREF: SAIGON 9433\nTEXT OF THE PAPER HANDED TO VIETNAMESE CHARGE,\nSEOUL, ON MAY 16. CHARGE ADVISED HE HAS JUST RECEIVED\nHIS INSTRUCTIONS AND IS REQUESTING APPOINTMENT\nEXCES EXCES\nFOREIGN MINISTER CHOE TO DELIVER TEXT, GP-4\nPORTER\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMINT\nOF\nSTATE\nWH\n7\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nR 251000Z APR 69\nSECRET\nFM AMEMBASSY SEOUL\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 5950\n60690\nSTATE GRNC\nBT\n1969 APR 25 AM 5:47\nSECRET SEOUL 2110\nNODIS\nSUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE\nREF: STATE 062693\n1. WE BELIEVE THAT ROKG, LIKE OTHERS ATTENDING, ATTACHES\nCONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE BOTH FOR\nREASONS GIVEN REFTEL AND BECAUSE CONFERENCE PROVIDES GOOD\nOPPORTUNITY FOR ROKG TO PUSH ITS IDEAS ON SEVERAL ADDITIONAL\nMATTERS AS WELL AS TO OBTAIN US AND OTHER REACTIONS TO THEM.\nFOR ROKG VIEWS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL SEE SEOUL 2033 (LIMDIS)\nWHICH CROSSED WITH REFTEL.\n2. AMONG OTHER SUBJECTS WHICH ROKG OFFICIALS PROBABLY PLANNING\nTO DISCUSS WITH US AND OTHER NATIONS ARE:\nA) ROK VIEWS ON IMPORTANCE OF US KEEPING UNRESTRICTED USE OF\nOKINAWA BASES.\nB) ROK PATO CONCEPT WITH WHICH DEPARTMENT ALREADY FAMILIAR.\nC) US INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO ITS SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN\nEAST ASIA AND SPECIFICALLY IN REGARD TO KOREA.\nD) OUR PLANS FOR VIETNAM IN ADDITION TO PARIS TALKS AND\nTROOP WITHDRAWALS AND REACTION OF SVN AND OTHER NATIONS TO\nTHESE PLANS.\nE) ROKS MAY TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PLUG WITH US THEIR NEED\nFOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE.\n3. ROKG PROBABLY HOPES THAT FINAL COMMUNIQUE WILL CONTAIN SPECIFIC\nREAFFIRMATION OF MANILA COMMUNIQUE, INCLUDING FULL CONSULTATION,\nAND PERHAPS A GENERAL REAFFIRMATION OF US INTENTION MAINTAIN\nITS SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN AREA.\nGP-3 PORTER\nBT\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDEPARTMANT UP STATE\nW H ?\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nR 240615Z APR 69\nCONTROL : 5677Q\nFM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON\nRECEIVED : APR 24, 1969\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 2393\n2AM\nSTATE GRNC\nBT\nSECRE T WELLINGTON 696\nNODIS\nDEPARTMENT DISTRIBUTE AS DESIRED\nSUBJ: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE\nREFS: (A) STATE 62693\n(B) WELLINGTON 642\n(C) WELLINGTON 575\n(D) WELLINGTON 336\n1. ALTHOUGH GNZ STILL STEWING OVER LEVEL OF REPRESENTA-\nTION AT SEATO-TCC SESSIONS IN BANGKOK, AND NO FIRM INDICA-\nTION YET AS TO WHETHER PM HOLYOAKE WILL ATTEND, IT IS QUITE\nCLEAR FROM CONVERSATION WITH EXTAFF OFFICIALS FROM TOP ON\nDOWN THAT THEY REGARD TCC PORTION OF MEETING AS FAR MORE\nIMPORTANT THAN SEATO PORTION.\n2. WHILE NO RPT NO INDICATION THAT GNZ NOW CONSIDERING\nREDUCTION IN NZ UNIT IN VIETNAM, REDUCTION IN U.S. FORCES\nWOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY CAUSE THIS QUESTION TO BE RAISED\nBY ANTI-VIETNAM GROUPS IN NZ. FURTHER, IF LABOUR PARTY\nSHOULD WIN NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, WITHDRAWAL OF NZ CONTINGENT\nWOULD BECOME STRONG LIKELIHOOD REGARDLESS OF WHAT ACTION\nU.S. TAKES.\n3. RE LAST SENTENCE REF A, EMBASSY BELIEVES IT WOULD BE\nUSEFUL TO PURSUE THESE MATTERS FURTHER WITH GNZ. HAVING\nIN MIND FIRST SENTENCE PARA 3, REF A, DOES DEPARTMENT\nPERCEIVE OBJECTION TO OUR DOING SO?\nGP-1. HENNING\nBT\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This documsecret reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
}