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Rabin/Kissinger (Dinitz) January-July 1973 [3 of 3]
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Rabin/Kissinger (Dinitz) January-July 1973 [3 of 3]
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
5983 X
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
October 31, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
H.H.S.
it.
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with Prime Minister Meir
8:00 a.m. Thursday, November 1
Mrs. Meir may seek very precise reassurances that the US will
stick to previous understandings with Israel on the subject of peace
negotiations. Therefore, I am attaching a detailed paper which
provides for your reference the exchanges surrounding the August 4,
1970, ceasefire. Mrs. Meir alluded to that in her speech announcing
acceptance of the present ceasefire. You may want to refresh your
memory on those exchanges with a glance at the attachment. This
memo puts those issues in the more general context.
Israeli Position
I assume that the first order of business will be to gain agreement
on arrangements to stabilize the ceasefire. The Israelis will find
it difficult to pull back, will make a major issue of the prisoner
exchange and will probably want to give more precision to the general
understanding you reached with Ismail Fahmi. For instance, she
may insist on an understanding of exactly where the lines will be before
any movement; she might insist on an Israeli right to inspect the convoys
along with the UN; she might insist on an understanding about the
movement of the members of the Third Army themselves.
Beyond the specifics of the package for stabilizing the ceasefire,
she will seek reassurance on two general points:
1. She will want to be reassured that the US and the Soviet
Union are not working out the terms of a final peace behind
Israel's back. She will insist that the negotiations be a
genuine exchange between Israel and the Arabs and that the
Soviet role be minimal.
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 2 -
2. She will insist on a US promise that Israel will be allowed
to negotiate for significant boundary changes.
It is possible that she will put these questions in terms of whether
the US still stands by previous commitments such as those in the
President's letter of July 23, 1970 (Tab 3 under attached memo).
Crucial among those assurances is that "we will also adhere strictly
and firmly to the fundamental principle that there must be a peace
agreement in which each of the parties undertakes reciprocal obli-
gations to the other and that no Israeli soldier should be withdrawn
from the occupied territories until a binding contractual peace
agreement satisfactory to you has been achieved. 11 That letter also
included promises that the US will not press Israel to accept a refugee
solution which would alter fundamentally the Jewish character of the
state of Israel or jeopardize Israel's security.
US Position
The following points are intended simply to provide a framework for
the kind of position you might take:
1. I believe that, despite the trauma that Israel has suffered
from being attacked, we are in as strong a position now as we
have been or may be in the future to move toward the fundamental
peace agreement that is crucial to Israel's survival.
-This war has demonstrated that the Arabs will not
capitulate merely as a result of getting used to the 1967-73
situation. That situation is unstable. Israel cannot "go it
alone. 11 It is essential now to achieve peace through diplomacy
from a position of Israeli strength.
This crisis has also demonstrated that those who have called
the Middle East situation dangerous to world peace were not
wrong. The near confrontation between the US and the Soviet
Union a week ago leaves no doubt about this. This is not just
an issue for the US. It is an issue of vital importance to
Israel which depends on US support.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to bei declassified
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 3 -
2. It is important now that we shift focus to the right issue.
The United States has unequivocably supported the survival
and the well-being of Israel. It has not supported the right of
Israel to hold occupied territory indefinitely. While we are
prepared to allow Israel to negotiate for what it can get within
reasonable limits, we have no interest in a confrontation where
the major issue is Israel's right to expand.
3. It is vital for the sake of peace negotiations as well as for
the sake of the US-USSR relationship that the terms of Resolution
338 be respected. It would not make sense for the US and USSR
to have a confrontation or to lose the chance for serious peace
negotiations for the sake of Israel's right to maintain a position
surrounding Suez City. The time has now come when it is
necessary to think less in terms of short term tactical military
advantage and more in terms of building the strongest possible
position for the negotiations ahead which are the real issue. We
must not be diverted from that central issue.
4. We will consult very closely with Israel as the peace negotiations
are arranged and as they proceed. At this point, there are some
general comments that need to be made.
We have already produced the face-to-face meeting
between Egyptians and Israelis that Israel has for some
years said is essential if peace is to be made. Our view
is that the peace negotiations should be conducted in the
same manner.
We are prepared to allow Israel to bargain for whatever
terms it can get. We do want to make clear that the US is
not optimistic about Israel's success in trying to negotiate
major border changes. We would urge that a great deal of
attention be given to the main issue of how security can be
achieved by means other than significant border changes.
We have taken Israel's word that once there are face-to-
face negotiations we will be surprised at how flexible Israel
will be. These negotiations will succeed only if each side
is prepared to put on the table positions that have some
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 4 -
chance of providing a base for eventual agreement. Having
now produced the opportunity for face-to-face negotiations,
we will not understand any effort to stalemate those
negotiations by putting forward unrealistic propositions.
--It may be necessary in establishing some momentum
for these negotiations to break the subject matter down
into manageable units and steps. It may be necessary, for
instance, to think in terms of a first phase in the implemen-
tation of a final agreement which could be carried out while
longer term issues are being discussed. Israel may wish
to give some thought to what it would want and what it would
be prepared to give to produce such an agreement. For
instance, although Israel's position is to seek boundary
changes, it would seem essential that Israel be prepared to
state that it will negotiate a final peace agreement without
any preconditions or rigid preconceptions as to what the
final outcome would be.
The US has accepted a Soviet role in the formal negotiations
to the extent we would provide the auspices for the peace
conference and be available to help keep them going if
necessary. I can assure you that we recognize that there
will be a need for a more private negotiating track, and
our strategy is that the US would conduct those negotiations
with a minimum of Soviet involvement.
5. The purpose of my trip to the Middle East is to try to
achieve an understanding with President Sadat and other Arab
leaders on a set of general principles which would govern the
process which we hope to begin. We will not be advancing an
American plan for the final terms of a settlement.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/NODIS
October 30, 1973
ISRAELI POSITION
The best clue to Israel's formal public position is found in Mrs.
Meir's October 23 speech to the Knesset outlining Israel's position
on accepting UNSC Resolution 338 passed the previous day. Judging
by that speech, Israel's public position has not changed. In fact,
Mrs. Meir announced that Israel's acceptance of Resolution 338,
particularly clause 2 mentioning Resolution 242, "is given with the
definition made by Israel" on August 4, 1970, at the time of the cease-
fire along the canal. That Israeli position, passed to Jarring at the
time, was also communicated to the US in the form of a letter dated
August 4, 1970, to Secretary Rogers. The purpose of this paper is
to refresh memories on that background.
The following documents are tabbed for reference:
Tab 1
Mrs. Meir's October 23, 1973, speech.
Tab 2
Text of Israel's previously announced position
which was passed to the US as a letter to Secre-
tary Rogers, August 4, 1970.
Tab 3
President's letter to Mrs. Meir of July 23, 1970,
which the Israelis referenced in their August 4, 1970,
letter to Secretary Rogers.
Tab 4
US formulation of August 1970 (essentially restating
Resolution 242) which Israelis rejected in favor of
their own language (Tab 2 above).
Tab 5
Text of UNSC Resolution 242.
The issue then and now boils down to Israel's interpretation of Resolution
242 -- principally on the key issue of withdrawal. The issue relates to
both the nature of withdrawal (Israeli language links withdrawal only to
secure and agreed upon borders) and the timing of withdrawal (the Israelis
insist on no withdrawal until a final agreement on borders and peace).
Further, the Israelis, in connection with a ceasefire and state of peace,
have a more precise definition of what amounts to a state of peace.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/NODIS 2
By contrast, Resolution 242 treats withdrawal in principle
in point (i) and provides a short definition of peace within
secure and recognized borders in a separate point (ii).
The background to Israel's August 4, 1970, position is that the US had
drawn up a short formulation (tab 4) essentially restating Resolution 242
which, if accepted, by both sides, would have been the vehicle for re-
launching Jarring along with the ceasefire. The Israelis flatly refused
to accept our document and instead drafted their own acceptance which
is the August 4, 1970, letter to Secretary Rogers. The Israelis consider
this their operating position. The language is that Israel will agree to
talks implementing Resolution 242 towards a peace that will ensure:
end of claims of belligerency by both sides, right to
live in peace within secure and recognized borders free
from threats of both regular and irregular forces operating
against Israel.
and
-withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied to secure,
recognized and agreed boundaries to be determined in the
peace agreements.
The underlining above roughly approximates Israel's retailoring of
Resolution 242.
Mrs. Meir's speech last week on October 23 holds to these same
interpretations and is also broadened to include further Israeli sti-
pulations arising out of the current situation (such as insistence on
POW exchanges and freedom of navigation in the Straits of Bab al-
Mandeb, etc). Mainly, however, she
--states explicitly that Israel's acceptance of Resolution 338,
clause 2 (which refers to the implementation of Resolution 242),
is "given with the definition" made by Israel in August 1970 --
i. e. Israel's language as summarized above which maintains
Israel's position on withdrawal;
states the linkage between clause 2 and clause 3 (negotiations)
of Resolution 338 as all important in that it links the implementation
of Resolution 242 to immediate and concurrent negotiations, and
states that Israel's position on this is as it was in August 1970 --
that the binding aspects of 242 (withdrawal) come after a nego-
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/NODIS -- 3
tiated settlement is produced;
- states she will seek a number of clarifications from the
USG about the substance of Resolution 338 but makes clear
her understanding of the US position on a number of issues
such as "direct" negotiations.
A summary of Mrs. Meir's outline of the Israeli position in her
October 23 speech follows.
Meir Speech
Mrs. Meir made the following points:
The implementation of the ceasefire is conditional on reciprocity. If
combat activity is carried out by the other side, Israel will be free to
act as the situation warrants.
--Israel's acceptance of clause 2 of Resolution 338 is given with the
definition made by Israel on August 4, 1970, when accepting the cease-
fire at that time.
- -Israel will seek clarifications from the USG pertaining to the substance
of this resolution and particularly to clarify and ensure that the ceasefire
- --applies to all regular troops, including foreign, on the
territory of a country which accepts the ceasefire.
--applies to all irregular forces operating against Israel from
a country which accepts the ceasefire.
-ensures prevention of a blockade and of interference with
free navigation of the Straits of Bab al-Mandeb for ships going
to Elat.
--ensures that the term 'ne gotiations' means 'direct' nego-
tiations between the sides.
--ensures that the procedures, mapping and supervision of
the ceasefire will be determined by an agreement.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/NODIS -- 4
--Israel demands a POW exchange involving an immediate mutual
exchange of prisoners.
--Israel understands that the official interpretation of 'negotiations'
with reference to this resolution is that they mean 'direct' negotiations
between Israel and its neighbors, as understood from the US.
There is no distinction between clause 2 and clause 3 of Resolution 338,
i. e. that negotiations are to take place immediately and concurrently with
the ceasefire. Israel's position, as stated in August 1970, has always been
that the implementation of Resolution 242 (the binding aspect of clause 2
in Resolution 338) will come after negotiations between the parties and
on the basis of an agreement among them, so clause 2 is closely linked
with clause 3.
--Israel's position on Resolution 242 has always been that
--it will not return to the borders of the pre-June 1967 war,
because of Israel's right to secure and defensible borders.
--in the absence of peace, Israel will continue to maintain
the situation created by the ceasefire (of 1967).
--ceasefire lines can only be replaced by secure, recognized
and agreed borders which will be determined in a peace treaty.
-Israel maintains its position of the right of uniting Jerusalem
as the capital of Israel.
By agreeing to the ceasefire initiative, Israel has not been asked to under-
take any territorial commitments by the US. Rather, Israel has "received
support" for its stand that there will be no Israeh withdrawal until a reci-
procal and binding peace agreement is reached.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TAB
MRS. MeiR speech - Cer. 23
V. 24 Oct 73
H 6
ISRAEL
Meir Statement on Cease-Fire
Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1625 GMT 23 Oct 73 M
[Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Golda Meir--live]
[Text] Honorable Knesset speaker, honorable Knesset: first of all, forgive me for
being late arriving in Jerusalem. There was an urgent meeting and I had to stop on
the way.
The Government of Israel decided unanimously on 22 October to respond to the appeal
of the U.S. Government and President Nixon and to announce its readiness to accept
a cease-fire on the basis of the Security Council resolution that came in the wake
of a joint U.S. Soviet proposal. According to this draft resolution, the military
forces will remain in the positions they hold the moment the cease-fire goes into
effect. The implementation of the cease-fire is conditional on reciprocity. Our
decision was brought to the attention of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense
Committee, and now to the attention of the Knesset.
On the basis of the U.S.-Soviet draft resolution, the Security Council decided the
following:
1. The Security Council calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all
firing and terminate all military activity immediately no later than 12 hours after
the moment of the adoption of this decision in the positions they now occupy.
2. The Security Council calls upon the parties concerned to start, immediately
after the cease-fire, the implementation of Security Council resolution No 242 in
all of its parts.
3. The Security Council decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-
fire, negotiations will start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices
aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
With regard to the second clause in the draft resolution, the government decided to
instruct the Israeli representative at the United Nations to include in his speech
at the Security Council a paragraph explaining that our acceptance of this clause
is given with the definition made by Israel when it decided in August 1970 to
respond to the initiative of the U.S. Government regarding a cease-fire and as communi-
cated to the United Nations on 4 August 1970 and as stated by the prime minister
in the Knesset on the same day. This has also been conveyed-to the U.S. Government.
Israel's acceptance of a cease-fire with Egypt is conditional on Egypt's acceptance,
and is not conditional on Syria's acceptance of a cease-fire with Israel and vice
versa. The government also decided to clarify with the U.S. Government a series of
points closely connected with the substance of the Security Council resolution and
the dates pertaining to it. It is our intention to clarify and insure, among other
things, that the cease-fire applies to all regular forces stationed on the territory
of the country which accepts the cease-fire, including forces of a foreign country,
such as the armies of Iraq and Jordan in Syria, as well as forces of other Arab states
which are taken part and are taking part in the war.
The cease-fire will also apply to the activity of irregular forces operating against
the Israel from territories of the states which pledge to observe the cease-fire.
The cease-fire will insure the prevention of a blockade and of interference with
free navigation in the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb for ships oil tankers, on
their way to Elat.
Reproduced at the Richard
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
V.
24 Oct 73
H 7
ISRAEL
It will insure that the term 'negotiation between the sides' means direct negotiations.
It goes without saying that it is also necessary to insure that the procedures,
mapping and supervision of the cease-fire will be determined by an agreement.
Knesset members: A subject of great importance which is dear to our hearts is the
release of the prisoners of war. The Government of Israel has decided to demand the
mutual exchange of prisoners. We discussed this matter with the U.S. Government,
which took part in the initiative for the cease-fire. I discussed this matter
yesterday with Secretary of State Dr Kissinger. We shall insist on an immediate mutual
exchange of prisoners.
On the arrival of Dr Kissinger's plane at Andrews base near Washington, State
Department Spokesman Mr McCloskey told journalists--and I quote: "We believe the
matter that should be allotted priority after the cease-fire is the exchange of
prisoners. We and the Soviet Union have pledged to make efforts to insure that
this matter is implemented." And I stress again that this subject is one of the
main tests of the cease-fire, and we [words indistinct] that the pledges of the cease-
fire initiators will indeed be implemented.
Knesset members: I shall say a few words about our military position on the Syrian
and Egyptian fronts on the eve of the cease-fire. The lines we occupy today on the
Syrian front are better than those we held on 6 October. Not only do we now have
all the area that was under our control in the past, but our position has also been
improved greatly by taking the positions on the ridge of Mount Hermon and on the
frontline to the the line which has moved the former cease-fire line into a
better position resting on the strong back of the ridges of Mount Hermon in the north.
On the Egyptian front, the Egyptians indeed achieved a military ishment by
crossing the canal, but in a daring IDF counterattack, our forces succeeded in
taking control once again of a significant part of the eastern canal line and in cap-
turing a vast area west of the canal--an area which opens up both defensive and
offensive possibilities if the need arises. This development deprives the Egyptian
Army of the ability to threaten Sinai and Israel with an offensive attack. It
also deprives the Egyptians of the ability to hit essential installations and areas
in our territory.
The IDF forces west of the canal constitute a strong military base for the develop-
ment of operative operations initiated by us if need be.
With regard to the question of the cease-fire, U.S. Secretary of State Dr Kissinger
and his aides came to Israel while en route from Moscow to Washington. The visit
was a good opportunity for a thorough clarification of issues which arise on the
occasion of a cease-fire, and for an exchange of views in a friendly manner on what
is about to happen and what is meant by Israel's response to the appeal of the U.S.
Government to accept a cease-fire. During this visit we continued and strengthened
the contacts which preceded the Security Council resolution.
In all our contacts with the United States, I have learned that not only does the
United States not have a plan regarding borders and the other components of peace,
but also that it believes that those employing their good offices should lead toward
a situation in which the parties themselves, and themselves alone, should make
proposals and plans regarding the future. Furthermore, I should stress that
according to authoritative information reaching me, the Moscow talks did not deal
with anything other than what is included in the Security Council resolution.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
V. 24 Oct 73
H 8
ISRAEL
Knesset members: I must declare that the Syrian Government has not yet responded to
the cease. fire resolution. Fighting on this front is continuing, and the IDF will
operate there in accordance with its plans.
As for the Egyptian front, the firing against our forces has not yet ceased. The IDF
has been compelled to act as necessary as long as the firing continues. At this time
I will only say that we are examining the behavior of the Egyptians while maintaining
military and political alertness. If Egypt continues combat activity, we will
consider ourselves free to adopt any action or move the situation may call for.
Honorable speaker: I will not exaggerate the assessments regarding the political
activity which preceded the cease-fire. At any rate, it was not us who made the move
for a cease-fire. From the standpoint of the situation on the fronts, there was no
reason for such a move on our part. It was not us who initiated the time and the
clauses of the Security Council resolution. Our forces on the fronts were not in an
inferior combat position. As already stated, we saw fit to respond to the appeal of
the United States and its President, since:
First The State of Israel by nature does not want war and does not want the loss of
human life. All the governments of Israel have been convinced that wars will not
advance peace.
Second The proposal for a cease-fire came at a moment when our position was strong on
both fronts and at a moment when our gains were valuable and justified an acceptance
of a cease-fire despite the enemy's gains east of the canal.
Third We responded to the appeal of the United States and its President out of
appreciation for its constructive policy in the Middle East at this time. Great
importance is attached to our response with regard to the continued strengthening of
Israel and especially with regard to the continuation of military and political aid
in the war that was imposed on us. With regard to the U.S. military aid, I would like
to quote President Nixon's statement on 19 October when he submitted to Congress his
generous proposal regarding the financing of the military shipments.
I quote: "The steps I have taken reflect my belief that we must adopt these steps
which are necessary for the maintenance of the balance of military power and for the
achievement of stability in the region. In order to maintain the balance of power,
and thus, to achieve stability, the U.S. Government is now supplying military
equipment to Israel in order to fill the gaps created in the wake of the fighting.
This is necessary in order to prevent the creation of an actual imbalance due to the
wide-scale resupply from the Soviet Union to Syria and Egypt. The cost of replacing
equipment which is wearing out and equipment which was lost by the Israeli Armed
Forces is very high. In the last 12 days of the war, the United States approved
shipments to Israel of materials costing $825 million, including transportation. The
expensive items which the U.S. government is now supplying to the Israeli forces
include conventional ammunition of many kinds, air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles,
guns, crew-operated weapons and personal weapons, and a variety of conventional types
of ammunition for fighter planes. The United States is also supplying tanks, aircraft,
communications and other military equipment to replace the equipment lost in action,
Knesset Members: The Arab rulers were put to the test by the Security Council
resolution. The world will be the witness to learn whether they seek peace or the
continuation of war. The attitude of the Egyptian rulers toward war and the loss of
human life is different from ours. You all remember the Egyptian president's statement
about his readiness to sacrifice millions of his people.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
V. 24 Oct 73
H 9
ISRAEL
On 16 October, after the IDF succeeded in establishing a bridgehead west of the canal,
the Egyptian president spoke with much bragging and scoffed a cease-fire. He said,
among other things--and I quote: "We are prepared to accept a cease-fire on the basis
of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories immediately under
international supervision to the lines that existed before 5 June 1967."
Knesset Members: Only a few days passed and Egypt accepted a cease-fire. None of the
conditions as Sadat set in his speech was included in the Security Council resolution,
The third clause of the Security Council resolution says--and I quote: "The Security
Council decides that immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations
will start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establish-
ing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. 11
According to the authoritative version given by the U.S. representatives, the meaning
of negotiations between the parties is direct negotiations between Israel and its
neighbors concerning a just and durable peace. Such a clear statement was not included
in Security Council resolution No 242, and it is also not included now in this
resolution. But this is the official interpretation obtained from the highest U.S.
sources.
Not only this, but the timing of the negotiations was also established in the present
resolution. The negotiations should be held immediately and concurrently with the
cease-fire, There is no need to stress that we attach great importance to clause 3 of
the Security Council resolution (?if) our neighbors will, indeed, fulfill it.
Along with the decision for direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt, which has
accepted the cease-fire, we should also take into consideration the binding aspect of
clause 2 of the recent Security Council resolution regarding the cease-fire. It has
always been the position of the Government of Israel--and I also explained this in my
Knesset statement on 4 August 1970-that the implementation of Security Council
resolution No 242 will come after negotiations between the parties and on the basis of
an agreement among them.
Knesset members: No distinction should be made between clause 2 and clause 3 of the
Security Council resolution. The U.S. ambassador at the United Nations, Mr Scali
explained the position of the United States on the subject--and I quote: "The second
clause calls for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts
after the cease-fire. The council members and the parties concerned are very familiar
with Security Council resolution 242, and there is no need for interpretations here.
The clause is linked with clause 3, which calls for an immediate start of negotiations
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just
and durable peace in the Middle East. 11 End of quote from the statement of the U.S.
representative at the United Nations.
Knesset members: Israel is taking the latest Security Council resolution with all
seriousness. The cease-fire and the holding of direct negotiations between Israel and
the states which have accepted and are maintaining the cease-fire--in other words, a
cease-fire and the opening of direct negotiations for peace--can be a historic turning
point in developments in the Middle East--a turning point from war to peace. The
opening of direct and serious negotiations can replace the bloody road imposed on us
in the past with a road that leads to peace.
We have accepted the cease-fire not out of weakness but from a position of strength,
m ilitary initiative and drive. We regard our agreement to the Security Council
resolution as an obligation on us to help bring about the change which the region
needs so much and which has been sought by the Israeli people and government for many
years.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
V. 24 Oct 73
H 10
ISRAEL
This change is possible and imperative and lacks nothing but sincere readiness on the
part of our neighbors. However, to my regret I cannot bring you the good news that
signs have already been seen that the Egyptian Government will fulfill the pledge it
undertook when it agreed to the cease-fire. Hence, the Government of Israel will act
as the situation warrants.
I have already said [word indistinct] the government decision regarding clause No 2 of
the Security Council resolution which discusses the implementation of Security Council
resolution 242. The Arab rulers ostensibly advocate resolution 242, but they undermine
every attempt to advance toward achieving the main aim of the resolution--peace. They
first did this by their stubborn refusal to negotiate with us without preconditions,
and then by distorting the interpretation and the essential implication of the resolu-
tion.
Knesset Members: On various occasions the Government of Israel has formally announced
its stand regarding Security Council resolution 242. Our declarations were made from
international platforms and at diplomatic meetings. We also brought them to the atten-
tion of the Knesset, the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee, and the general public.
In August 1970, when a cease-fire was discussed and when we were asked by the U.S.
Government, I said then and I quote: "Israel has announced publicly that out of its
right to secure and defensible borders, it will not return to the borders of June 1967,
which expose the state to aggression and which grant decisive advantages to the
aggressor. Our stand was and remains that in the absence of peace we shall continue
to maintain the situation established by the cease-fire [of 1967]. The cease-fire
lines can only be replaced by secure, recognized and agreed borders which will be
determined in a peace treaty. And naturally it was made clear to all that our firm
stand is still maintained regarding the right of uniting Jerusalem as the capital of
Israel. By agreeing to the U.S. Government initiative, Israel was not asked nor did
it undertake any territorial commitments. On the contrary, the Government of Israel
has received support for its stand that no Israeli soldier will return = from the cease-
fire lines until a reciprocal and binding peace agreement is reached.
Knesset Members, the terrible war which was imposed on us strengthens our realization
of how vital are defensible borders, for which we will struggle vigorously.
It is worthwhile to remember that since the outbreak of the war on the Day of Atonement,
terrorist activity has also resumed from the Lebanese border. Up to this morning 116
acts of aggression were carried out within 17 days. Forty-four civilian settlements
on the northern border were attacked and shelled. Some 20 civilians and 6 soldiers
vre killed or wounded in these attacks. Residents of border settlements can rest
assured that the IDF forces are alert and aware of the situation. Despite the active
defensive deployment in this sphere, it has again been proven that defensive activity
alone is not sufficient to end terrorism.
Knesset Members, the war we are engaged in started with an premediated attack on both
fronts. The aggressive initiative resulted in initial achievements for our enemies, but
thanks to the strength and spirit of the IDF, which leans on the entire nation, the
attack was broken, the aggresors were repulsed, large parts of their forces were
destroyed, and the IDF broke through and moved beyond the cease-fire lines. From
holding actions, our forces moved to the offensive and scored achievements. On both
fronts our forces are now beyond the cease-fire lines, holding strong positions, and their
spirit is unbroken. The nation is united around its army.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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V. 24 Oct 73
H 11
ISRAEL
Israel desires a cease-fire. Israel will honor the cease-fire on the basis of reciproc-
ity and only on this basis. Israel would wholeheartedly like cease-fire negotiations
to start immediately to lead to peace. Israel is capable of mobilizing the necessary
internal strength in order to advance toward an honorable peace within defensible borders,
We shall be happy if such readiness is to be shown among the people and Government of
Egypt. However, if the Egyptian rulers seek to resume the war, they will find Israel
prepared, armed and strong.
Knesset members, just before I left for Jerusalem I learned that the Egyptian Government
has requested a Security Council meeting. It appears it wants to put blame on Israel
that belongs to itself. This Egyptian move indicated that the cease-fire was violated
premediatedly. Egypt reminds us that we are in war. Not only peace, but also the
maintenance of cease-fire agreements defend on the willingness of both sides. We still
hope that Egypt will honor the pledge it undertook only yesterday, but if Egypt
continues the fighting, Israel will not be able to remain indifferent.
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I
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2
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TAB 2
BASSY OF ISRAEL
INTO
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Israeli Position Aug4 1970,
A0/153
4 August 1970
Door Mr. Socretory:
I have the honour to inform you that my Govern-
ment's position on the latest United States peace
initiative is as follows:
Having considered President Nixon's measage of
24 July 1970, basing itself on its contents and in
strict adherence to its policy principles and authori-
tative statemente, the Government of Israel has decided
to roply affirmatively to the latest United States
pooco initiativo, and to inform the United States that
10 may convey to Ambassador Jarring that:
1) Isrool 18 propared in due timo to doolgnate
0 roprosontativo to discussions to bo hold under
Ambassador Jarring's suspices with the UAR
(Jordan), according to such procedure and at
such placos and times as he may recommend, taking
into account each side's attitude 88 to method of
procedure and provious experience of discussions
between the partios.
2) Isrool's position in favor of a coase-fire on
a basis of reciprocity on all fronts, including
the Egyptian front, in accordance with the Security
Council's cease fire resolution, remains unchanged.
On the bools of clarifications given by the United
States Government, Inrnol 10 propared to reply
offirmativoly to the United States proposal for a
coooo front. firo (for at loust throu months) on the Egyption
3) the discussions under Ambronndos Inssing's
nuopicos shall bu hold otthin the fromowork of the
Spourity Council Rooolution (242) on the basio of
the expression of RoadAnoon by the partion to carry
aud the Scourdty Counoil Recolution (202) An all
Ato porto, An order to achieve on agrood and binding
0111 oncused
controctual pooco. agreement betwoon Endrary portico chich
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SSY OF ISRAEL
bero.
ABHINOTON, D.C.
The Secretary of State
-2-
4 August 1970
a) Termination by Egypt (Jordan) and Israol
of all claims or otntno of bolligoroncy and
respect and acknowlodgment of the sovereignty,
torritorial intogrity and political independence
of each other and their right to live in peace
within socure and recognized boundaries free
from threats or acts of force, each of the parties
will be responsible within its territory for the
prevention of all hostile acts by regular military
forces or para-military forces, including irrogular
forces, against the armed forces or against civiliano
living in the territory of the other party.
b) Withdrawal of Ioraeli armed forces from
territories occupied in the 1967 conflict to
secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to
be determined in the peace agreements.
4) Israel will participate in these discussions
without any prior conditions. Israel will not
claim the prior acceptance by the other party of
her positions, 08 Israel does not accept in advance
the positions of the other parties as communicated
publicly or otherwise. Each party will bo free to
present its proposolo on the mattero under discussion.
Ploose accept the accusances or my highoot
considoration.
Sinceroly youro,
V. Y.Rabin Nobin, Lt. Gon. (noo.)
Anbanoodes
The Monorable
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Tab 3
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRESTI OFFICE:1969
575
*
June int
SPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
Classification
AMERICA
Department of Staie
of
MCATE:
TELEGRAM
W it
STATES
COLLECT
CHANGE TO
23 JUL 70 20 20z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION:
AmEmbassy TEL AVIV
INXXXX IMMEDIATE
118300
STATE
President's hella to Mrs Meir
NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR
July 43, 970
from President
Following is letter for Prime Minister Meir.
You should deliver it promptly to
Mrs. Meir: Instructions follow septel.
QUOTE:
Dear Madame Prime Minister:
I am writing to inform you that we have received the
following oral message from the Foreign Minister of the
UARZ
INTERIOR QUOTE:
X / The Government of the UAR accepts the proposal
of Mr. Rogers contained in his message of June 19.
We are ready to subscribe to the statement as it is
written in this message that is in the form of a
report from Ambassador Jarring to the Secretary
General of the United Nations. END INTERIOR QUOTE.
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
DRA
NEA:JJSisco:bdf
7/22/70
29588
NEA - Joseph J. Sisco
THAT
CLCARANCES:
S/S - Mr. Bro
White House
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1962
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET/NODIS
Classification
UNITED STATES OF The
Department of State
ICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
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AmEmbassy TEL AVIV
PAGE 2
ACTION:
In our prior confidential discussions regarding this
proposal, we asked that the Government of Israel
refrain from taking a public position pending receipt
of the Egyptian reply. As you know, we made this
suggestion in the belief that it would not have served
our mutual interests for Israel to have assumed ke the
responsibility for rejecting a proposal whose aim
is to stop the fighting and to begin negotiations under
the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.
I am fully aware, Madame Prime Minister, of your
Government's strong objections regarding this proposal.
In light of the Egyptian acceptance, I ask you and
your government to review this matter in hopes that a
prompt affirmative reply from the Government of Israel
will lead to an early stop of hostilities and bloodshed
on both sides and to serious talks between the parties
conducted by Ambassador Jarring within the framework
of the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.
DRAF TING DATE
TEL EXT.
APPROVED BY:
DRA/ 10 BY:
CLEARANCES:
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*
U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1909 0.575
OF SENDE
SECRET/NODIS
Classification
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
NDICATE:
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CHARGE TO
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AmEmbassy TEL AVIV
PAGE 3
ACTION:
The Egyptians have informed US their acceptance
is unconditional. On the basis of additional views
conveyed to us in writing by the UAR, we expect that
in the negotiations it will continue to press two
principal objectives: total Israeli withdrawal from
the territories occupied in the 1967 conflict to the
pre-June 5 lines; and a refugee solution based
exclusively on the strict application of paragraph 11
of UN General Assembly resolution 194 (III). I want
to NUMNY assure you that we will not press Israel to
accept the aforementioned positions of the UAR. Our
position on withdrawal is
that the final
borders must be agreed between the parties by means of
negotiations under the aegis of Ambassador Jarring.
Moreover, we will not press Israel to accept a refugee
solution which would alter fundamentally the Jewish
character of the state of Israel or jeopardize your
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT
APPROVED BY:
DRI D BY:
CLEARANCES:
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*
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962 300-575
BURNTHENT OF
SECRET/NODIS
Classification
CHING
AMERICA
Department of State
IDICATE:
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OF
TELEORAM
]collect
CHARGE TO
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PAGE 4
security. We will also adhere strictly and firmly
a
to the fundamental principle that there must be/peace
agreement in which each of the parties undertakes
reciprocal obligations to the other and that no
Israeli soldier should be withdrawn from the occupied
territories until a binding contractual peace agree-
ment satisfactory to you has been achieved.
Finally, and most important of all, I am sure
that you noted my recent public comments and nationally
televised conference of July 1 in which I made clear
the strong and unequivocal support of the United States
for the state of Israel and its security. Furthermore,
I want again to assure хени you as I have previously
done in our personal talks, of my support for Israel's
existence and XEME security and my intention to
continue to provide Israel with the necessary assistance
to assure that the balance of power will not be altered
to the detriment of Israel.
DRAFTING DATE
TEL.EXT
APPROVED BY:
DR
(50 BY
CLEARANCES:
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1969-360-575
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET/NODIS
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UNITED
Department of State
STATES
of
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PAGE 5
I hope, Madame Prime Minister, that you will
receive my views in the spirit of mutual friendship
and *NIME interest that has characterized the close
countries
relations between our two sennkikes. I am certain,
too, you will appreciate the weight of responsibility
which I bear to exhaust every effort to achieve a
stable and durable peace in the Middle East. I am
confident that together we can move towards that goal.
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
ENDQUOTE.
END
ROGERS
RAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
EARANCES:
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Tab 4
US formulation to Relanch
Jarring - aug. 1970
USproyed
TEXT
language
The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree:
(a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness
to carry out Resolution 242 in all its parts, they will
designate representatives to discussions to be held under
my auspices, according to such procedure and at such
places and times as I may recommend, taking into account
as appropriate each side's preference as to method of
procedure and previous experience between the parties.
(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions
is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just
and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual
acknowledgment by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each
other sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories
occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with
Resolution 242.
(c) that, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement
as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will strictly
observe, effective July 1 at least until October 1, the
ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council.
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Public Information Series
TAB
5
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
242
OF STATES / MEDICAL UNITED AMERICA
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
TEXT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242
OF NOVEMBER 22, 1967
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation
in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of ter-
ritory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace
in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance
of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commit-
ment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires
the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East
which should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from terri-
tories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belliger-
ency and respect for and acknowledgement of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their
right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee
problem;
P-527 - 170
Continued
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(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviola-
bility and political independence of every State
in the area, through measures including the
establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special
Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and
maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote
agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted
settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of
this resolution.
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security
Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Repre-
sentative as soon as possible.
-
P-527 170
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-5-
-- We are now giving our attention to our inter-
national programs of which Israel's is one of the
largest. We hope to have Israel's cooperation in
devising ways to improve our budget situation.
- Mrs. Meir may be assured that just as our re-
ductions of domestic programs do not signify any
lessening of our concern for the poor and dis-
advantaged, and our cutbacks in defense expenditures
do not indicate any lessening in our concern for
national security, so our examination of our
assistance program to Israel does not mean any
lessening of our commitment to support Israel's
security and viability.
Russian Jewish Emigration to Israel -- Few issues
have a deeper emotional meaning for Israelis than that
of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. That
emigration is at record levels, over 31,000 going to
Israel last year, but the issue of Soviet financial
levies on departing emigrants continues to make Jews
everywhere anxious. It would, I believe, make an
exceptionally good impression on Mrs. Meir if you
would bring up this subject on the following lines:
-- We are happy for Jews everywhere. that the
level of emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union
remains high. It is the policy of this government
to do what it can to encourage this emigration at a
liberal rate. We believe our own quiet diplomatic
efforts with the Soviet Union have been helpful in
this regard. We will continue these efforts, though
their effectiveness, of course, will depend largely
on the general state of U.S. -Soviet relations.
Because of the interaction of this question with the
whole spectrum of U.S. Soviet relations, we continue
to believe it is best kept in quiet diplomatic
channels.
Department of State
February 1973
SECRET/NODIS
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Abba Eban, Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs
Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff Time
DATE AND TIME:
Friday, August 17, 1973
8:30 - 9:50 a.m. (breakfast)
PLACE:
Israeli Ambassador's Residence
Washington, D.C.
Eban: If the rumors are true [of your becoming Secretary of State], I'll give
you a list of places to avoid on your travels.
Kissinger: La Paz!
Eban: That's one of them. The oxygen they give you.
Kissinger: It's 12000 feet. I lectured once in Wyoming, at Laramie, which is 7800
feet. The combination of low oxygen and alcohol has a bad effect. In the middle
of my lecture I said to myself, "Any more of this and. 11 and I found myself
saying it out loud. The students were all leaning forward to take it down.
Eban: It was an official visit to Brazil. I also visited Bolivia.
Kissinger: Are there any Jews there?
Eban: Yes. Years ago they gave the Jews passports, to their credit. In the '30s
there were 12, 000. Since then some have gone to more congenial places.
One of their people told me how he had liquidated Che Guevara!
Kissinger: Peru must be beautiful.
Eban: Staggeringly. A Peruvian told me two things; (a) Why they must invar-
TOP SECRET
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
SECRET - XGDS (3)
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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-2-
iably vote against us; and (b) Would we please give them two agricultural experts,
three scientific experts, etc. !
They talked a lot about 11 Third World" and "Peruvian Socialism" but had no clear
idea what they meant.
Kissinger: That is always true.
Eban: The pattern is invariable, but it was particularly striking there. You see,
we have to separate our multilateral and our bilateral diplomacy. Weekeep our
bilateral relations.
Kissinger: What's in it for Israel?
Eban: We'll have to do it. They said they don't vote by substance but by who's
on the list on each side. Tito is the key as far as they are concerned.
Kissinger: He won't live much longer.
Dinitz: What about their attitude to the United States?
Eban: Detachment from the United States, and it has to be demonstrative.
Kissinger: At the same time they feel neglected, but if you ask them what they
want from us, they don't know.
Eban: It's a very intricate psychological relationship. They view Chile with a
certain schadenfreude.
I was on a mountain in Peru during the Security Council vote. It is extraordinary to
condemn "The Government of Israel". I've seen condemnation of acts, but never
of governments.
Kissinger: [to Dinitz:] You were with Sisco when I called?
Dinitz: Yes, he said he was with us!
Eban: I'm not so much worried about the Security Council as about ICAO. If
they do something there, it could affect our communications.
Kissinger: What could ICAO do?
Eban: The extreme Arab request would be to refuse landing rights. The conse-
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-3-
quence would be more concrete than the Security Council. So the real battle is
in Rome and Montreal.
Kissinger: We certainly wouldn't go along with that. Does it have to be unanimous?
Eban: No, but if the major countries don't go along, it won't have any meaning.
The airline pilots are all excited. It creates anomalies in our policy--we have
all along been in the vanguard of antihijacking.
Dinitz: Sisco told us he didn't go along with the juridical distinction the British
and French were making between governmental and unofficial actions.
Kissinger: No, I told Scali that too.
Eban: It's almost a temptation for us to set up a quasi-official organization.
But we can't.
Kissinger: What do you see as the longer term trend?
Eban: I wanted to hear the thinking here, because I was disturbed about Sisco's
sorties. Because our strategy has an attritional end, and there is no reason to
erode this by any feelings of conscience about taking iniatives. There is no
reason to think our strategy is wrong. The Arab world is more divided than
ever.
Kissinger: It is safe to say that Sisco reflected the overwhelming view of the
US Government except the White House. Both State and DOD strongly hold this
view and as consciousness of the energy crisis increases
Eban: It is all based on the idea that there are opportunities but all that is lacking
is initiatives. Our idea is that the opportunities don't exist. The criterion is
the Egyptian demand for total withdrawalas a precondition of a negotiation.
Kissinger: There is tremendous pressure from the oil companies. I refuse
missions to Saudi Arabia every week. Defense, State, Treasury, all want to go
out there. I may let the Treasury mission go, because they can do the least
political damage and they will be dealing with the concrete problem of reserves.
Eban: There is a fallacy that the current energy crisis is due to the Middle
East. It is a psychological fact though not an objective fact.
Kissinger: My personal view is that it is a mistake to get the Saudis involved
in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Either there will be no outcome, or no possible
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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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-4-
outcome will live up to the expectations that are raised. Either way it will under-
mine the government.
Eban: When I was in Brazil, the Saudi Foreign Minister was there. They think
they have to turn their oil into industry before their oil runs out. There is a
tremendous concern about their economic future. He made only a perfunctory
reference to Israel--just like the Shah.
Kissinger: The Shah now thinks some movement is necessary. We gave him a
bland message to pass to the Egyptians--that we are willing to be helpful but, as
you said, it can't be preconditioned on total withdrawal. This also helps to waste
time.
Eban: The Shah thought the US should be more active but he didn't have anything
in mind.
Kissinger: Yes. But it would be helpful if after the elections some sort of reformu-
lation of your position could be made. For the psychological climate. I agree
there is no real possibility of movement.
Eban: You understand nothing is possible before October.
Kissinger: There will be no pressure from here.
We are doing a major program on the development of alternative energy sources.
I'll talk to you [Dinitz] about getting Jewish community support. We are not
ready yet. We may alter our energy policy to work independent of Britain and
France and work more bilaterally. When working multilaterally we are limited
by what they'll go along with.
Eban: I don't think the American people have been told what the real sources
of the energy crisis are. It is a matter of alternative sources, overcoming
economic inhibitions, and a measure of economy.
Kissinger: We'll make that clearer in the fall.
It is an intolerable situation when 2 million Libyans can hold up Western Europe
and the United States, and when we're financing anti-American revolutions with
our oil money.
Eban: I think the statement of the messages to Congress were good. It is a
question of whether you want to celebrate the 200th anniversary of your indepen-
dence as a dependency of Abu Dhabi. [laughter]
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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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Kissinger: For the first time, we yesterday had a politically-oriented meeting
on energy. It was left too much to the economic agencies.
Dinitz: I agree.
Kissinger: But the problem is not now. As long as they insist on total with-
drawal as a precondition, there is no prospect of a negotiation. The Soviets are
not pressing us very hard.
Eban: Of course, if they shift from their fundamentalism, it's a breakthrough as
well as an embarrassment. We would have to think about a response.
Kissinger: We had a massive Soviet onslaught during the Soviet summit. But
nothing happened. We can tell that from the Arab reactions.
Eban: Of course, the reference in the communique to the "interests of the Pales-
tinians" was very disturbing to us. Not because of itself but the psychological
effect.
Kissinger: I have told you the circumstances. The Secretary of State and
Gromyko agreed to it at night without telling us. The only way to stop it would
have been to get the President and Brezhnev out of bed.
Eban: We have reports that the Palestinian organizations were genuinely grati-
fied by it. They saw it as a success.
Kissinger: Our policy is based on Jordan, not on the Palestinians.
Eban: It would be helpful if you could make it clear that when you talk about the
Palestinians you mean it in the context of an Israeli-Jordan settlement.
Kissinger: We have intelligence reports that Arafat thinks Bourguiba was put
up to it by the United States.
Eban: Bourguiba is "tasserieur", if not mentally deranged.
Kissinger: It seemed like that when he was here three years ago.
Eban: Seems not to be getting anywhere. The last we heard was from the
Italian Government, that they thought of a demarche. It was based on the 1949
Resolution.
Kissinger: The 1947 lines?
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Eban: Yes. We said we'd prefer 242. The Bourguiba letter was in the Nouvel
Observateur. He claimed that Israel's refusal to talk on the basis of the 1947
lines meant a denial of our own existence! Then there was silence.
Kissinger: I have no clear idea what it should be, but after your election any
reformulation that would shift the debate would be enormously helpful here.
Eban: After elections, there are often new statements of policy. But the sub-
stance wouldn't be different.
Kissinger: Sisco is not a problem, though it is a strange procedure for a diplo-
mat to appeal to a people on their TV over the heads of their government.
I must tell you frankly that if it were not for Watergate, there would be great
pressures building up now. The key officials are oil men, and the oil men are
basically spokesmen for the producing countries. And they are politically stupid.
In 1969 the Shah offered us all his production, if we raised it. Our oil men rejected
it. I was for it, not for the oil but so he could have dollars to buy armaments.
Eban: I saw the demarches by Mobil and Standard. But they are sensitive to public
pressure. A number of Senators spoke out.
Dinitz: But there is constant lobbying too. I see them at State every day.
Kissinger: It is the oil men, plus the judgment of the political people that the
Jews are against us anyway.
Eban: Teddy White's book says 37% vot for the President.
Kissinger: But in the Watergate business, many Jews are prominent in it. You
can't stop it, but it is a fact of life. The problem of your attritional strategy
is that it looks like a status quo policy. The predisposition of people who know
nothing of the Middle East is that it's always our obligation to show flexibility.
Six months go by and our position is then held to be outdated.
Eban: All the successes you are associated with, people believe were the result
of a sudden swift initiative, though an attritional strategy was behind it.
Kissinger: Plus the brutal use of force.
When are you coming back?
Eban: Maybe in October for the United Nations General Assembly. There will
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be Foreign Ministers' meetings. Maybe we should have only those but not the
UN General Assembly. But as Conor Cruise O'Brien once said, "In order to
have something behind the scenes, there have to be scenes. [Laughter] There
was another bon mot of his: Someone was giving a speech. He had been speaking
for an hour and a half. Someone asked, "What's the subject?" "He hasn't decided
yet. 11 [Laughter]
The issue is now the ICAO.
Kissinger: We won't go along with anything concrete. A condemnatory resolution
wouldn't hurt you.
Eban: The letter by the American Pilots Association is a little disturbing. They
want an undertaking by the Israelis that it won't happen again, and if Israel is
willing to give such a letter, they will deny the Israeli landing rights.
Kissinger: When you come back, we can discuss negotiating strategy. You won't
be under pressure from us, probably even in October. I don't know what it is,
but even it spell out the idea of an interim solution leading to a full settlement.
Eban: The word "dialogue" has a magic, I found in Brazil. "Israel is ready
for a dialogue. " "We are not wedded to keeping the territories. " This sur-
prises them. It won't satisfy the Arabs.
Kissinger: No, but what I need is some Israeli movement that lets us say the
Egyptians must do something. And you should emphasize the process more than
the result. Because in a process nothing can happen without agreement.
Eban: On the Palestinians, no one wants a third entity in the picture.
Dinitz: Arafat wants a new entity instead of Jordan, and part of Israel.
Eban: Waldheim will be coming to the Middle East.
Kissinger: He is a fool.
Eban: Someone said there were some lacunae in his ignorance, but not many!
Kissinger: He made quite a fool of himself in the Vietnam Conference.
Eban: There are some advantages in his neglibility. He has no messianic illu-
sions, like Hammarskjold, who thought he was above every government, and that
between every government and the deity was the United Nations. Waldheim knows
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there are problems getting the budget if he knocks the United States.
We won't use him for floating any ideas. Just to delay.
Kissinger: My view is -whatever the constellation is here--the pressures have
been delayed more than anyone thought four years ago would be possible.
Eban: We've decided to win the elections this time.
Dinitz: Remember that all our opposition comes from the right.
Kissinger: What about Jordan? I have the impression he could accept something
like the Allon Plan if something could be done in Jerusalem to save his face.
Eban: He thinks the Allon Plan asks for too much territorially, and he insists
on something first or simultaneously with Egypt.
Kissinger: Yes.
Eban: He has a trauma about his grandfather. "If I settle, I'll end up like my
grandfather-- on the steps of the mosque."
Kissinger: It can't happen until you give him the mosque back!
Eban: The only thing we're prepared to do for Jerusalem is to turn over the
Holy places to the Arabs.
Kissinger: What is the argument against some form of extraterritoriality
plus an access route?
Eban: There could be an access agreement. What we don't like is a division of
territorial sovereignty.
Kissinger: If that could be packaged with anything you can do in October... We
will meet in October.
[The conversation ended and Dr. Kissinger returned to the White Hous e. ]
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, of Israel
Mr. Avner Idan, Minister of the Embassy of
Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security
Affairs
Mr. Harold Saunders, NSC Staff
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff One
DATE AND TIME:
Saturday, May 12, 1973
9:50 - 10:40 a. m.
PLACE:
Dr. Kissinger's Office
The White House
Eban: The people I spoke to made an effort to devote their attention to what
I was saying. They had a kind of glazed look.
Kissinger: Really?
Eban: Rogers and Shulz. They spoke to me with a kind of lordly assumption
that nothing was happening here. Has there been any foreign reaction yet?
Kissinger: No.
Eban: From Moscow?
Kissinger: No.
Eban: Did they talk [in Zavidovo] about us and our region?
Kissinger: Yes. Very passionately and very aggressively. They think there is
the possibility of a war. They say they are exercising a restraining influence.
We have independent evidence of that.
Yes
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Eban: Yes, we do also. If our neighbors were not Arabs, the probability
would be zero. But they must give the impression of an eve-of-war atmos-
phere, to show movement. Everything proceeds now from their internal
situation, which is always the first order of business. Internationally they
are not only antagonistic to us and to you but also they are increasingly sus-
picious of the Soviet Union. It is now explicit, not just coffee-house gossip.
The result would be catastrophic for them, militarily, politically, domestically,
and internationally. The humiliation at home; the Soviet Union would say we
told you so.
Kissinger: But the Soviet Union might not do that. They might try to stop you.
And if an oil boycott is organized, they would gain something in the west.
Eban: But a boycott wouldn't work, because Iran would not go along.
This is unlike 1967 when the Soviet Union was instigating it.
Sadat is not bright, but he can think a few moves ahead. He is not so volatile.
Kissinger: That is not my impression. He shows no capacity for thinking
moves ahead.
Eban: But domestically he has shown an enormous capacity to reconcile the
belligerent rhetoric with non-shooting. He has shown a meticulous ability to
avoid shooting.
On the ground, the Mirages are effectively in Egypt. Saudi Arabia, Iraq and
Kuwait have aircraft, but not long-range. The army across the Canal is
unshaven, playing cards; there is no viligance. Sadat shows up at the Canal
with a hat, expecting to be photographed.
We have told our military to assume we may fight.
Kissinger: The Soviets said you were constructing field hospitals in the Sinai.
Eban: [laughing] They are already there.
Politically they are trying a pressure tactic. They see the Summit and hope to
see it take place in the context of an international crisis atmosphere, and a
United Nations Security Council debate. They are unhappy because they are
not getting enough attention here; the press is occupied with other things!
Kissinger: Are you keeping this going!
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Saunders: The Egyptians are saying that.
Eban: They are disappointed with the relative quiet.
Kissinger: Of course you have an interest in keeping things appearing exces-
sively quiet, to keep us from doing anything.
Eban: Yes. The usual problem of the wish as father to the thought.
Kissinger: During the Khartoum incident, someone suggested we ask you for
help. You would have blown up Beirut.
Eban: You know that it was from Beirut that the phone call went to finish
them off.
Kissinger: We know that.
Eban: We don't have the feeling we should revise our estimate of the general
situation. It is developing positively but slowly.
Kissinger: How do you see things developing?
Eban: Assuming he does not want to start shooting, he can even use these
diplomatic events-the Summit, the Security Council--to avoid shooting. Poli-
tically, they want to use international pressure on us to commit ourselves to
total withdrawal--which we won't do.
I wondered about your reaction after Ismail's visit here--which I assume might
have a continuation. If there is no continuation, he will have to find a substi-
tute.
I am relieved at my conversation with the Secretary. I felt no sense of having
to do something urgently. It would be objectively bad.
We have to block their actions. In the Security Council, they want to set up
international machinery. I can't blame them. We oppose new machinery.
Secretary Rogers says he opposes new machinery. It would be an alibi for
them to avoid realistic negotiations. We don't need further channels. If
there is no negotiation, it is not because of a shortage of frameworks, channels
or gimmicks. If we are to get them to change their view, we follow our psycho-
logical plan of trying to get them to see that their options are really very few--
the status quo or realistic negotiation.
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In the President's statement we see a general feeling that immobility is
unsatisfactory. What is behind this?
Kissinger: As I have told your Ambassador, American passivity is due to
a fortuitous combination of circumstances and cannot be counted on indefin-
itely. If you look at the constellation of leading officials, you cannot count
on the continuation of the present
So far, the Egyptian policy is so stupid,
there is no particular challenge. But what would the American response be
if the Egyptians became more flexible, even procedurally, it is hard to say.
It may be in your interest to try to preempt this with a scheme of your own.
I have been reluctant to get us into the position where bah sides can shoot at
us without considering any scheme. Unless one side or the other gives us a
foothold
Dinitz:
to
a
agreement
Dinitz: You think the Egyptians might come around to a special agreement
on the Canal?
Kissinger: No. What might be possible is some souped - up version of
Resolution 242 that might provide an alibi for the Egyptians for a Rhodes -
type negotiation. It could be a link to an interim agreement in the guise of
being linked to an overall one. It might be extended over years.
I have not seen any indication from the Egyptians that they are willing to show
that degree of flexibility.
When I saw Ismail, he said he would think about ways of reconciling sover-
eignty and security. But we never heard from them.
Eban: I don't think they make the distinction in a way that the Israeli military
presence can remain anywhere. They see it as complete withdrawal and com-
plete sovereignty.
Kissinger: I have no evidence otherwise.
Eban: On the Israeli side, we definitely don't accept the idea that boundary
changes must be ruled out. Whether we could get them in negotiations cannot
be foreseen. Whether they would be substantial or not cannot be foretold.
There is a dynamic and transforming element in a negotiation itself. But
no Israeli government will say in advance that it rules out boundary changes.
There are gimmicks that reconcile the sovereignty of one with the security of
another. We are aware of that. Golda once told Rogers that Sharm
he
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suggested a 99-year lease; she said 49 years would be o.k. ! Further north,
it is harder.
They want 100% withdrawal in stage one but won't offer 100% in stage one.
It is too optimistic to think they are in that stage of flexibility. On our side,
I believe there would be flexibility in a negotiation. But I don't think we will
give up our positions ahead of the negotiations.
Kissinger: There are more pleasant experiences than negotiating with
Israelis who are holding the subject matter of the negotiations.
Eban: I congratulated Bhutto on the UN resolution last year. He said, "We
have the resolution; those bastards have the territory. 11 I said, "No comment. "
I hope you realize on sovereignty versus security that your only problem is
not Egypt.
Kissinger: No, I understand. I personally have no desire to seek the Nobel
Peace Prize in that area.
Eban: We favor a no-prejudice formula for early negotiations. They can't
graft their position onto us.
Kissinger: How about the Jordanian side?
Eban: He now asserts quite frankly, that he doesn't want to be first. He told
Lord Balniel after Hussein was here. He feels he could not bear the brunt of
it.
The Shah told me he was advising Hussein not to be first.
On the question of the Persian Gulf. I found the Shah very relaxed, for two
reasons: He was very satisfied with the United States for the first time.
They are usually very querulous that he can't get enough; now he can. Secondly,
on oil, he feels there is a United States interest now. What he told Cyrus
Sulzberger was revealed doctrine. He wants to be strong enough to resist
any threat except the Soviet Union. He thinks the Soviets are shifting away
from Egypt to the Persian Gulf because of less American resistance.
Kissinger: They would be wrong.
Eban: He feels that documents are not improtant. For instance, the India-
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Pakistan crisis showed this. But he is creating an American interest, there
which is more.
He sees a triangle--Israel, Ethiopia, and Iran--which if buttressed by US
support will be a stabilizing influence. We exchanged information with res-
pect to the internal stability, and the problem about Ethiopia. We hope he
[the Emperor] gets strong support here. The military always say he can't
use this and that--I hope your criteria are something other than that.
Kissinger: Our military are especially hard on allies.
Dinitz: We know.
Kissinger: You can't complain! The trouble is he is the most tiresome head
of state.
Eban: He insists on surviving.
Kissinger: I mean he is boring.
Eban: On airplanes, the Ambassador said he was told it was stuck partic u-
larly for preoccupation reasons. With the Mirages, our concern is naturally
a little more lively now.
Kissinger: There is no problem in substance, but it is a matter of getting
attention.
Eban: On the Soviet Jews.
Kissinger: They said they would not increase it but it would continue at the
same level, 36, 000. They would consider the special cases I gave them a
list of. They had the preoccupation that every time they made concessions
we increased our demand. We think we have done a helluva lot.
Eban: We think it is of becaus e of public pressure.
Kissinger: Up to a point it is helpful but not to the point of defeating MFN.
Eban: They are going to have trials in Minsk. This could stimulate trouble.
Kissinger: I raised it twice. There was an explosion each time.
[The meeting then ended.
]
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Israeli Ambassador Dinitz
Minister Idan
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
am
DATE AND TIME:
Saturday, June 2, 1973
9:45 a.m. - 10:40 a.m.
PLACE:
Military Aide's Office
The White House
Ambassador Dinitz: I have a pleasant duty to perform first. I have a
birthday greeting from the Prime Minister. A letter is coming, but in
the meantime she cabled me the content! Here it is. [He hands over
Tab A.]
Dr. Kissinger: Very nice, very nice. Thank you.
Ambassador Dinitz: Yesterday I got a call from Sisco to inform me that
on instruction from the highest authority from the White House that the
decision was made on Phantoms, at the higher rate of delivery.
Dr. Kissinger: You were surprised?
Ambassador Dinitz: Of course! I asked if in the case of emergency would
there be expediting shipments? He said he had no instruction on that, but
usually in case of an emergency that could be reviewed.
Dr. Kissinger: Did he tell you about the A-4's too?
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Dinitz: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: It's the same rate. It's the absolute maximum. They
wanted a delivery rate of six plus six the first two years, and then only
36 all together. Six plus six, plus 12, plus 12. It's as far as I could go
without enormous difficulty.
Do you want to hear about Ismail? It won't take five minutes.
Dinitz: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: I really have nothing to tell you. He repeated what he had
said last time. He wanted to know if the White House was now engaged in
it. I said it depends on what new positions they had, which I had yet to
hear. I told the President they are not looking for an act of policy, but for
a miracle. He was so vague, even on his old positions. So in the formal
talks, there was nothing.
Then I took a walk with him and said this was nonsense. There were two
possibilities: an interim settlement with a linkage to an overall settlement,
or a set of vague principles to permit a negotiation to begin. Or we could
combine the two. I know you don't agree with this. I took two walks with
him. I gave him the formulas -- the one you gave us -- as my own idea.
The second time he seemed more interested. He said, which principles
must be vague? I said the ones on final borders and security. He asked
what we meant by security arrangements? I said, to me it means the
stationing of Israeli forces. He didn't reject it. He said he would tell
Sadat.
I told him I would hold up with the Russians until I had heard from him. So
I'm stalling Dobrynin now too. We agreed that if I got a positive answer
we might meet again in Spain in July.
Dinitz: Did he ask about the Summit?
Dr. Kissinger: The Russians are pressing us to promulgate some princi-
ples. I avoid it by saying I have to hear from Ismail.
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Dinitz: What status did those principles of last year have? Were they
signed? Were they agreed?
Dr. Kissinger: No, they are not signed. I was stalling. They gave us a
long paper. We went through their paper for four hours. I was trying to
keep it going. They weren't signed. The President and Brezhnev never
discussed them. But I suppose they are somewhat official.
Dinitz: What would be the purpose of concretizing them?
Dr. Kissinger: The only purpose of concretizing them would be to use
them to get talks started.
Dinitz: There is no status between you and them but between us and Egypt.
Dr. Kissinger: It might happen -- although we have no plan - - that the
President and Brezhnev might decide to publish them as recommendations.
I have never given them to the Egyptians, though I gave some general
principles.
The last meeting was unbelieveable. He clearly had no idea what he wanted.
I asked him what he wanted from us with Israel. He said, break Israel's
neck! I said, since we won't do that, what do you want. He said, the best
we can get.
He has now clearly separated Egypt from the other aspects -- the Syrian-
Jordanian settlements. It was purely pro forma.
I told him there were two possible approaches -- an interim solution with
a formula for linkage as you gave, that the line would not be permanent but
the permanent line was not settled; or secondly, general principles that we
could use to get talks to begin.
Dinitz: He was more receptive to the first?
Dr. Kissinger: No, neither; or possibly the second. Strangely I feel I made
more of an impression on him this time even though nothing concrete was
discussed.
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Dinitz: Do you think he understood better that they are not merely pushing
everyone else in a corner but also pushing themselves in a corner?
Dr. Kissinger: He told me they would do nothing militarily for a while
anyway. In the UN Security Council they would be willing to settle for an
early adjournment. He told the French they would seek anything short of
an American veto.
Dinitz: We had an offer from Bourguiba to promote a negotiation. Eban
said in Knesset that this was fine. Then Bourguiba said no.
I have two other items. I saw Garment last week, to give him a reply from
Golda to the President's birthday greeting. He wrote a nice letter, and she
wrote a warm reply. I went on orally, to pass on her message to the Presi-
dent that she hoped the current problems would pass and that he could re-
sume his important diplomacy.
Dr. Kissinger: That was very nice.
Dinitz: Second, your friend Yigal Allon will be coming. He will be arriving
the evening of June 9th to receive an honorary degree. From the 12th on, he
will be in New York or Washington: sometime that week he would like to see
you, on a personal basis. In my house.
Dr. Kissinger: What about breakfast on the 12th at 8:00? That is the week
before the Summit, so it may change.
Let me say again -- on the Summit. If there is trouble from the Jewish
Community -- I know you don't control it. If this event -- when he needs
for many reasons, including to deflect attention from other things -- if
this turns into a mess, he will react violently. This isn't an official com-
munication; I say this as a friend. It will have catastrophic consequences.
Dinitz: Let me tell you. The meeting is now scheduled for the 17th.
Dr. Kissinger: Unfortunately he is already in the country by then.
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Dinitz: If I had known that, I would have tried to push it to the 15th.
Dr. Kissinger: I have already heard from Dobrynin that if Brezhnev reads
in the Washington papers on the day the official visit begins of what the
Jews did on Sunday, it will be bad.
Dinitz: We are making sure the speakers will be moderate. We have one
GOP and one Democrat. There will be an ellipse meeting but no demon-
stration.
Dr. Kissinger: How many?
Dinitz: They say 10, 000.
Dr. Kissinger: The President will react even worse than with President
Pompidou. I know it is not your doing. I know you don't play for small
stakes.
What would they do if Brezhnev met with some of them? They would make
some statement?
Dinitz: If Brezhnev met with some moderate leaders, it might take some
steam out of it. It could be agreed in advance what would come out.
Dr. Kissinger: Let me speak to Dobrynin.
Dinitz: He shouldn't meet with isolated groups.
Dr. Kissinger: No. You'll have 10, 000?
Dinitz: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: Is there no way to stop it?
Dinitz: No, Dr. Kissinger, I looked into it and if we tried to stop it, it
would backfire. You said he won't be here.
Dr. Kissinger: He will be in Camp David.
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Dinitz: It would be not a march, but a meeting. With moderate speakers.
Dr. Kissinger: But it still looks like pressure on the Russians.
Dinitz: There wasn't one place he visited in Europe where there weren't
demonstrations. In Bonn, Sweden.
Dr. Kissinger: Okay, now on the Saudis.
Dinitz: Yes. Last week, Sisco called me to tell me about the deal. One
billion for Saudi Arabia, one half billion for Kuwait.
I should say two words of background: We are not opposed to the move.
We are not opposed to American efforts to strengthen your position in the
Persian Gulf. We have always favored this, especially since the British
left. What we oppose is the extent of the deal, which is more than necessary.
And the type of items - Phantoms. This is a new ball game; for political
and military reasons.
The military reasons: Phantoms from one Saudi airfield, Tabuk, are with-
in range of all targets in Israel. This puts it on our strategic map.
Dr. Kissinger: But they won't be delivered for three to five years.
Dinitz: Sisco told us two years from the signing of the agreement.
Secondly, it removes the most important deterrent symbol we have - the
Phantoms -- and thus it contributes to the deterioration of the balance in
the area.
Then we see far-reaching political implications. The Russians have been
restrained up to now in giving sophisticated equipment. Now there will be
Egyptian pressure on the Russians.
Dr. Kissinger: Our people said they could get Mirages if we didn't give
them Phantoms.
Dinitz: The Phantom isn't a Mirage. And Sisco couldn't tell me it would
block them from seeking Mirages anyway. God knows they have the money.
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Also, it makes the Saudi subject to Egyptian pressure in the next crisis.
Before they had only rhetoric; now they have this arsenal. I know they
are anti-Communist, but about Israel they are all the same ideology.
I have a cable from Golda, not as a formal demarche, but asking your
advice about what we should do.
Dr. Kissinger: Make a formal demarche to State.
Dinitz: That I did. I made all the arguments and more.
Dr. Kissinger: Can you give me all the arguments?
Dinitz: Yes. [The talking paper which Ambassador Dinitz had used with
Sisco was delivered later to Mr. Rodman. Tab B. ]
[The meeting adjourned at 10:15 a. m., when Dr. Kissinger and Ambassa-
dor Dinitz conferred alone until 10:40 a. m. ]
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
V
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Tab A
Dear Dr. Kissinger:
It is with great pleasure that I extend to
you my warmest greetings and best wishes on your
birthday. Our sages of the Mishnah used to say
"At forty for discernment ( nage), at fifty for
counsel (733), at sixty for to be an elder (парт),
at seventy for gray hair and at eighty
for special strength (77722)." (Avoth v, 12)
May you enjoy many more fruitful years of
"counsel" in the service of your country and for
the benefit of mankind.
Sincerely yours,
Golda Meir
30 May 1973
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified