Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "290085269",
    "label": "MemCon - The President and PM Trudeau December 6, 1971",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290085269"
}

{
    "id": "290085269",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290085269",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "MemCon - The President and PM Trudeau December 6, 1971",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290085269",
    "collections": [
        "National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
        "Central Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-vp/6721514/Batch0005/290085269/290085269_Page_1.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-vp/6721514/Batch0005/290085269/290085269_Page_1.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-vp/6721514/Batch0005/290085269/290085269_Page_1.jpg",
    "imageCount": 8,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290085269",
    "naId": 290085269,
    "levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 8,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0005/290085269.pdf",
    "mediaId": "55481b601c87dd72",
    "ocrText": "MEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET\nDecember 6, 1971\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT'S FILE\nFROM:\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nSUBJECT:\nMeeting with Canadian Prime Minister\nPierre Trudeau, Monday, December 6,\n1971, 4:00 - 6:00 p.m., the Oval Office\nPARTICIPANTS:\nThe President\nPrime Minister Trudeau\nDr. Henry A. Kissinger\nMr. Ivan Head, Special Assistant to\nthe Prime Minister\nThe opening few minutes of the meeting were filmed by an NBC-TV\nfilm crew for a program on \"A Day in the Life of the President. 11\nThe President began the conversation by saying that he should have\nthought of such a meeting earlier and was glad the Prime Minister\nraised the matter. Dr. Kissinger remarked that the Prime Minister\naccepted the invitation in record time. Prime Minister Trudeau\nthanked the President for receiving him now. Earlier he had been\nconvinced that a spring meeting would be sufficient, and he had been\ntaking the position publicly that he and the President were always in\ncontact. But when the White House began announcing the series of\nbilateral meetings with allies, he had no choice but to go along. \"We\nhave both had a bad press, II the Prime Minister remarked. \"Each of\nus is accused of neglecting the other. 1.1 The President said that he\nagreed, and that was why he had agreed so 'quickly to having the\nmeeting.\nAt the Prime Minister's suggestion, they turned to the agenda. Neither\nthe President nor the Prime Minister wanted to get into a technical\ndiscussion, the President expressing complete confidence in Secretary\nConnally's handling of the technical side.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sact3.5\nTOP SECRET\nNLN 03-84/3 per er 18 Feb 2009\nBy CIM\n23 Mas 2009\n[p.108 4]\nTOP SECRET\n2\nThe Prime Minister noted that the President's decisions of August 15\nactually only accelerated reconsiderations of Canadian policy that\nwere going on in any event. Canada was in a tough position. She had\na trade surplus but a problem with invisibles. If the U.S. was talking\nabout a secular trend where some years the U.S. exported more and\nother years Canada exported more, this was one thing; but if we were\nsaying that Canada must always be in a deficit position towards the U.S.\nso that the U.S. could always export capital to Canada then we were\nasking them to sell part of their country to us. The Prime Minister did\nnot believe that a country becomes more independent by being poorer.\nThe question for Canada then was, should she/choose a common market\nor free trade area or political integration, or should she gear towards\nmore independence in order to be more autonomous of fluctuations\nin U.S. policy?\nThe President noted that the Prime Minister had raised the fundamental\nquestion of the U.S. - Canadian relationship. We were clearly eager to\nhave Canada close to us, and many politicians would seek their own\ninterest. The President began with some simple propositions: (1) We\nall had to begin by looking at the national interest. (2) He did not look\nat the issue in narrow parochial terms. (3) The U.S. had a world\nresponsibility and we expected to discharge it. We did not like the\nAugust 15 decisions but they had to be taken. A strong United States\nwas essential to world stability; a healthy U.S. economy was crucial\neven to Canada. Much of our problem was due to the transition from\nwar to peace. Henry was the saddest of all when the decisions were\ntaken, from his political point of view. But the U.S. would be a sound\nand responsible member of the international community.\nWe could get the Canadian situation into perspective by including all\nother countries in the solution, the President continued. Thirty per cent\nof all our exports went to Canada. At the same time, there was the\nintricate problem of reforming the whole international monetary system.\nThe U.S. did not want to go back to convertibility. But we wanted to\nunderstand what Canada wanted. The President thought that it should be\na multilateral solution; Secretary Connally had informed him, however,\nTOP SECRET\nENLN 03-84/3:p.2nz4]\nTOP SECRET\n3\nthat Canada now wanted a bilateral one. We would do either but\n\"don't draw me into deeper water. 11 We didn't believe in ganging up.\nThe U.S. should be as forthcoming as possible. They could not have\nanybody more understanding of Canada than he was.\nDr. Kissinger then stressed the U.S. interest in a cooperative rather than\ndivisive solution to the monetary problem. He had made clear in his\npress briefing of November 30 that the monetary system by definition\nwas a multilateral issue, and the solution in our view had to be one\nwhich all countries perceived as being in the common interest. In\nCanada's case, Dr. Kissinger continued, it was not settled U.S. policy\nto treat Canada as a safe haven for U.S. investment. The President\nemphasized that the current measures were not our permanent policy.\nOne could not say what steps were necessary in any one year. Our long-\nterm purpose was to have continuation of our special relationship with\nCanada. We would approach matters in this spirit.\nThe Prime Minister said that the President's attitude was very generous.\nIt was indeed better to try a multilateral approach. Canada's preference\nwas to continue a lean float; if forced into pegging they would try to do it\neven though they did not know whether they could hold it. In any case,\nthey agreed to wait for the next meeting of the Group of Ten. On this\n\"ganging up,\" as the President had put it, in truth Canada had gotten\ntogether with others in an effort to get the U.S. surcharge removed. All\nof Canada's industry was geared to letting the two countries trade freely;\nif this was interrupted, U.S. industry would disinvest in Canada to invest\nmore in the U.S. The President would notice that this was the opposite\nfear to the fear of the U.S. treating Canada as a haven for U.S. investment.\nThe long-term trend is freer trade, the President suggested, while the\nshort-term trend is the opposite. The fundamental problem was that there\ncould not be a viable relationship if one side is exploitive and the other\nis exploited. Everyone agreed with that, eyen Connally. \"Right, Henry? 11\nThe Prime Minister smiled and said, \"What you are saying is revolutionary.\"\nThe President again turned to Dr. Kissinger: \"Am I not right, Henry?\"\nDr. Kissinger affirmed that this was the settled policy of the Nixon Doctrine.\nThe President then asked the Prime Minister what he thought of multinational\ncorporations. Prime Minister Trudeau said he wished there were more of\nthem. It was not a question of liking them; they were here. Mr. Head then\nTOP SECRET\nINLN 03-84/3:p 3104]\nToΓ SECRET\n4\nexplained George Ball's view that the multinational corporation would\neventually lead to the economic integration of Canada and the U.S.\nThe Prime Minister noted that some of these philosophical problems\nantedated August 15 and would remain long afterwards.\nSpeaking of George Ball's theory, the President did not know whether\nanyone could look that far into the future. Take Britain's entry into\nthe Common Market, which we supported; now they were more Gaullist\nthan the French. The President turned to Dr. Kissinger. \"But with\nBritish methods, 11 Dr. Kissinger replied. The Prime Minister asked\nwhat it was that bothered us. The President replied that the loss of the\nspecial relationship meant inevitable problems of adjustment.\nPrime Minister Trudeau then raised the subject of the situation on the\nsubcontinent, and wondered whether we could keep the other powers from\ngetting involved. The President suggested that Russia would not get in.\nThey were too far away and had no need to; India had the horses. India's\npurpose was to remove Pakistan as a significant factor. It was absurd to\nthink of it as Pakistani aggression. It was different from the Middle East,\nbut in many ways sadly similar.\nDr. Kissinger provided a run-down of the Indo-Pakistani situation for the\nPrime Minister. The President then noted the irony that by cutting off\narms to Pakistan we made the situation worse. This is why we had to\nmaintain the balance in the Middle East. Actually, by supplying the Phantoms\nwe were keeping the Israelis from attacking. This was all the old power\npolitics. \"I wish I could contradict you, \" the Prime Minister said.\nThe President then gave an account of the Peking trip, emphasizing the\npoint that it would not be at the expense of other countries. The opening\nto the People's Republic of China has helped with the Soviets, he pointed\nout. The Prime Minister remarked that when the President met the\nSoviets he would find an almost pathological fear of the Chinese. \"Fear or\nhatred? 11 the President asked. \"Hatred,\" the Prime Minister replied.\nThe President explained that we had no illusions with respect to the\nChina visit. A significant change in our own interests was unlikely.\nBut because we both needed each other in certain areas this may be a\nmasterstroke. Prime Minister Trudeau pointed out that the U.S. had\nto reassure its friends in Southeast Asia. The President replied that\nwe knew the arithmetic.\nThere were further pleasantries, and the meeting soon ended.\nTOP SEGRET\nINLN03-84/3.p.4.04"
}