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The Prime Minister continued that it was important that the U.S.
understand that Canadians understood our need to take tough steps.
In their own minds they were prepared to make substantial concessions
on such issues as military procurement, tourist allowances and citrus.
The Prime Minister was sure that in Secretary Connally's mind Canada
was not going far enough. The Prime Minister had great sympathy for
the Secretary's position and repeated that Canada was willing to make
unilateral concessions.
The President said that he too wanted to spend a substantial amount of
time in their conversation on international affairs. In our bilateral
relations, we had to bargain hard in the short run. But the negotiations
would continue.
The Prime Minister said, "We will give you everything you need" on
nine-tenths of the issues on which we differed, except for the auto-trade
matter. That we would handle possibly by resuming discussions. The
responsibility lay with Secretary Connally.
The President then turned to global matters, noting that Canada had
relations with Peking that the U.S. did not have. It was clear that
Peking was interested in political relations, not economics. They had
a completely different philosophy: The U.S. talked of peace, the Chinese
talked of justice. They talked to us because they were in a dangerous
situation. They had many motives: contempt for the Indians, fear of
the Soviets, fear of Japan. One might have thought that the J.S. , being
white, was the most unlikely to have a close relationship.
The Prime Minister said that he could see what was in it for them. But
what was in it for us?
The President said it had to do with the Russian game. The Russian concern
was with the East. When the President had announced the China initiative
on July 15, the Kremlinologists were afraid that it would ruin the chances
for good relations with Moscow. On the contrary, what would ruin the
chances for Moscow was defeat in Vietnam. We would not go to Moscow
hat in hand. Neither of the two super powers must do anything to get themselves
into a confrontation with each other. The point of the game was that it was
a country's own interests and not its affection that determined influence.
The President then mentioned SALT, which he said has moved ahead very
well. We could have all these things -- but not in the context of a U.S. defeat.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
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"ocrText": "SECRET/SENSITIVE\n2\nThe Prime Minister continued that it was important that the U.S.\nunderstand that Canadians understood our need to take tough steps.\nIn their own minds they were prepared to make substantial concessions\non such issues as military procurement, tourist allowances and citrus.\nThe Prime Minister was sure that in Secretary Connally's mind Canada\nwas not going far enough. The Prime Minister had great sympathy for\nthe Secretary's position and repeated that Canada was willing to make\nunilateral concessions.\nThe President said that he too wanted to spend a substantial amount of\ntime in their conversation on international affairs. In our bilateral\nrelations, we had to bargain hard in the short run. But the negotiations\nwould continue.\nThe Prime Minister said, \"We will give you everything you need\" on\nnine-tenths of the issues on which we differed, except for the auto-trade\nmatter. That we would handle possibly by resuming discussions. The\nresponsibility lay with Secretary Connally.\nThe President then turned to global matters, noting that Canada had\nrelations with Peking that the U.S. did not have. It was clear that\nPeking was interested in political relations, not economics. They had\na completely different philosophy: The U.S. talked of peace, the Chinese\ntalked of justice. They talked to us because they were in a dangerous\nsituation. They had many motives: contempt for the Indians, fear of\nthe Soviets, fear of Japan. One might have thought that the J.S. , being\nwhite, was the most unlikely to have a close relationship.\nThe Prime Minister said that he could see what was in it for them. But\nwhat was in it for us?\nThe President said it had to do with the Russian game. The Russian concern\nwas with the East. When the President had announced the China initiative\non July 15, the Kremlinologists were afraid that it would ruin the chances\nfor good relations with Moscow. On the contrary, what would ruin the\nchances for Moscow was defeat in Vietnam. We would not go to Moscow\nhat in hand. Neither of the two super powers must do anything to get themselves\ninto a confrontation with each other. The point of the game was that it was\na country's own interests and not its affection that determined influence.\nThe President then mentioned SALT, which he said has moved ahead very\nwell. We could have all these things -- but not in the context of a U.S. defeat.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified"
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