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TELCON
McNamara/Kissinger
9:06 am
3/19/70
K: I just want to tell you one thing. I just got a cable from USIA in Paris that
they are sending over Danielle Hunebelle with a copy of her film. If she walks
in this office
M: Send XAX USIA a cable saying their appropriations are cancelled.
K: She won't walk out alive.
M: I read over the papers. I have certain views and perhaps prejudices - -
I would have one major feeling. The one thing that disturbed me is the unrecon-
ciled position of aread of the government on major jaxx facets of this problem.
I think it's greater than the facts would warrant. Someone should take time
to go over that.
K: We will do it this week. I spend three hours with them yesterday and I
will spend 3 hours with them tomorrow. Once you get them together you find
it's a
problem. On that radar problem -- there's not much
difference once you get into it.
M: My only suggestion. Once you have that done then the attempt you have
made is excellent. You have a whole ****glo catalogue.
K: Once we have
we can decide one side or another.
M: And you will know one side differs and you will know why.
K: And the President will have a better idea.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Atty. Gen. /Kissinger
12:02 pm
3/19/70
AG: Some of our favorite Jewsish
are getting the flavor of the forth-
coming statement and they think it may have positive point. If this be so, it
would be well for them to have information on it at the time of the issuance of
it so that yxcxtx they come out in favor of the Administration (?).
K: How far ahead do they want it.
AG: Not very.
K: We want to gax target them away from the WH. We don't care who else
they scream at.
AG: But if they can be positive instead of negative it would be helpful. I will
leave it with you or you can call me this afternoon.
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Telecon
The President
3/19/70 12:20 p.m.
[Didn't hear very beginning of conversation. ]
K: We will get a recommendation from Wheeler today.
P: What about Helms?
[Kissinger asked Ghorayeb to step out. ]
K: His deputy was there today. I think it is safe to say, Mr.
President, that the overwhelming majority of the bureaucracy is ex-
tremely gun-shy about doing anything. They are gambling that it's
going to stop.
P: On what grounds, I wonder.
K: I also think so, but I think the Meo forces are going to get
smashed in the process.
P: Is the meeting still going on, or has it briken up?
K: It has broken up.
P: Just say they have got to do something immediately.
K: I was going to assemble them again tonight.
R: Cancel what you are doing. Call them over imme diately and
tell them the President wants an action plan on his desk by 3:00. Cancel
all their luncheon plans; cancel yours. Get the fellow out of your office
who's there. Tell them I want some action, because I .'ve made the
decision.
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Telecon
Under Secretary Richardson
3/19/70 12:25 p.m.
K: I just had a furious President on my hands. He wanted the
x Laas contingency group to see what we might do. He said he
wanted hard and soft options. We talked about hard options; every-
body decided they couldn't do anything. He's given me an order to
get that group back here and have a hard option by 3:00. I don't know
what I can do.
R: You had better go ahead and do it. Are you going to delay
that other meeting?
K: Yes. What I was wondering, are you free in the early
evening for our meeting?
R: Yes, I would be.
K: Why don't I meet you at 6:30 in your office?
R: Okay.
K: Do you want to come over to the other meeting on Laos?
R: No, not really.
K: He wants me to get Wheeler and Helms.
R: When are you going to start?
K: At 1:00.
R: I could be there a little after that. I don't know that I would
add much. Are Green and
going to be there?
K: Iam going to call them. The President told me they have to
cancel their lunch. I am escalating participation. For instance he
wants Wheeler over here. I'll leave it to you. We have no problem
with Johnson.
R: He represented us this morning?
K: Yes.
R: Better leave it at that.
K: Okay, I'll come to your office at 6:30 and move that other
meeting to 3:00. It will be from 3:00 to 5:00.
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TelCon
Secy Rogers (incoming)
3/19/70; 4:30 p.m.
R: I just got a letter from the President about Laos. Are you
familiar with it?
K: No.
R: He is dissatisfied with our Embassy people.
K: I didn't get this. I did' not know he was writing to you.
R: I will call him and find out what it is about, but I thought maybe
you knew.
K: Is that about kwa he was furious earlier this week about a
leak that came from Laos. Is this what it is?
R: This may have something to do with it. He says NEW recent news
reports. What news reports?
K: That's the one. There was a news report from John McCartney
had written an article which stated that the Embassy in Laos contests
his statement of 67, 000 people and that this was never, that they never
got a hearing in Washington.
R: I didn't even see that story.
K: He put Ehrlichman in charge of checking it down. It was on Monday.
Was told it came from Embassy sources in Vientiane. That is why
he was extremely upset about that.
R: I will talk to Ehrlichman about it. I was shocked, because I think
Godley and those people are quite hawkish.
K: I don't think this has to do with the policy views. I wasn't even in
town when that broke and did not know about it until I came back. But
I have seen the report well, I have seen the note and what it turned
out was that Vientiane's assessment estimate -- did not take into
account some of the personnel on the trails.
R: The Ho Chi Minh Trail, yes.
K: We reconciled the difference. I notice in Godley's estimate this
week he has been hitting the higher figure.
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-2-
R: Maybe he wrote this note a day or two ago.
K: If he is referring to recent news reports then I am sure that's
what he is talking about.
R: One other thing - I have my African paper. It doesn't say a hell
of a lot, but I woule like to send it over for you to look over. Sometime
next week we will have to make it public.
K: Which African -- your report? I am sure I wouldn't have any
views, but I will look at it.
R: It doesn't say a hell of a lot.
K: If you send it over I will take a look at it.
R: OK.
ms
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TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
7:03 pm
3/19/70
K: I just read that Washington Star story. I didn't know anything about it.
Haldeman didn't know anything about it and Mollenhof says he only has what
was given him by the Ripon Society. I have never talked to Doyle nor Mollenhof.
R: That SOB will demoralize the Cabinet. I talked to John Mitchell about it
and he vaid he had experience with him too.
K: I don't know if Doyle is State or WH
R: No, Sherman is State.
K: He called me and wanted to see me but I dd didn't see him.
R: It must have come from Mollenhof or someone.
K: I talked to Morris and he said he hadn't talked to him. I believe him.
R: This with the Moynihan memos -- that had to be a WH leak.
K: No, that was sent to all the Cabinet members. But the second wasn't.
R: The President has to be careful. The Ashe thing and Mollenhof running
around loose.
K: It's against any conviction I have. Elliott Richardson and I worked together
closely on this. Any differences were kept private.
R: This expecially from the Ripon Society who has been attacking Nixon so much.
Well, thank you Henry.
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TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
evening
3/19/70
K: What is Molenhof doing, investigating the State Dept. ?
H: I though you had put him up to it. The story he gives me is that the Ripon
group came in to him and said here are the particulars and asked him to look
into it.
K: I have never talked to Mollenhof. This is a blow to Elliott Richardson. Some
of the charges are true but not with Richardson. I was called about a letter
from the Embassy in Laos. Is that what's bugging him?
H: I don't know. That's in his kick on getting rid of pœople in Laos.
K: Triggered by the McCartney story?
H: ? ? ? ? top 10 people. Generated from a session in his office.
K: I didn't know about the letter.
H: It didn;t come through your people?
K: No.
H: I will do a little checking on that.
K: Will you? If it came through it came through Haig.
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TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger
evening
3/19/70
K: I have just this minute been handed an article in the Washington Star. I hope
you haven't read it yet.
R: I read it before the meeting.
K: I haven't talked to this man ever. Hecalled early this week and said he wanted
to talk about State Dept. tensions and I said he I didn't talk about relationships.
Second, Morris hasn't talked to him. Third, I have never talked to Mollenhof
about Biafra or our relationship, and foruth, Haldeman only knows that the
Ripon Society left their list with Molenhof and he would check on it.
R: I called Molenhof yesterday when we heard about this report. He told me
there was nothing he could do. Zeigler gave a good anser that there was good
cooperation. Mollenhof also volunteered a briefing for Zeigler when he heard
about this.
K: I wouldn't direct (?) an investigation of the Dept. of State. Any membed
of my staff talking to the press will be out.
R: I gathered it would be from Ripon. Any further indication on seabeds?
K: I will do my best to spring it loose tomorrow. It's not been possible yet.
R: I didn't know how he covers so much ground. I will see you in the morning.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
Secretary Laird
3/19/70 7:10 p.m.
K: On the list of items we discussed with the President
what
is your understanding of what they are supposed to do?
L: Go ahead.
K: To hit it once, or knock it out?
L: We can knock it out with one.
K: Haig thinks the military would understand it to mean they can
do it day after day.
L: No, we'll knock it out in one.
K: And how would you handle the other departments?
L: I wouldn't say anything to anybody. I will say it is protective
reaction.
K: And you'll take the responsibility?
L: Right.
K: It was discussed at WSAG as a possibility.
L: Oh. Then they'll tie it up. I guess we'll have to tell them.
K: Or can you just stone-face it?
L: I can't do that with Bill Rogers. That would undermine any
chance for cooperation in the future.
K: That's the thing that worries me.
L: That's what worries me. I've already drafted the messages.
I have to try to hold them back. They'll get the word at State that they haven't
hit out of those sites in a month(?).
K: How will they get that word?
L: They will know it was discussed at the meeting.
K: No. That wasn't.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
Secretary Laird
3/19/70 7:10 p.m.
page 2
L: Well, let me hold it off till tomorrow morning. I'm afraid
you have to keep a certain confidence with people who work together.
K: Why don't you let me raise it with the President too.
L: Okay.
K: Hold it up. Let me be the carrier of the news. He told me
specifically not to raise it with Rogers.
L: I'll hold it over tonight.
K: Hold it till I can get to him.
L: All right.
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Telecon
Marshall Green
3/19/70 7:25 p.m.
K: On those measures we discussed today. My understanding
is that the things I mentioned to the meeting should be done immediately.
McCane to meet the ambassadors; 130 gunships and Cobras, and B-52
reconnaissance; letter for the President to Kosygin and others.
G: Good. I heard we are going ahead on the B-52 reconnaisi-
sance. I was upset to hear they are going to use Vientienne rather than
U Dorn.
K: If he gets a target he's almost certain to use B-52s. -
G: The Secretary hoped to review that one.
K: I promised that to the Secretary.
G: I briefed him along the lines you mentioned to me now.
There will be messages going out accordingly.
K: Okay. If they don't get implemented immediately you are
going to get an order to do the extreme things.
G: We have been waiting to get an okay on imphahentation.
We will probably do it tomorrow.
K: That loses another day. Can we get McCane up there?
G: Yes.
K: I'll send the order over there now.
G: Thanks a lot.
K: Good.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
John Ryan (Australian Embassy)
3/19/70 7:50 p.m.
K: I'm sorry I couldn't see you before. I wanted to check on
the status of the communication. Was I supposed to share it with the
departments, or was it just for the President?
R: It was a communication from the Australian government
to the United States Government. It was sent by the Australian Minister
of Defense, acting on behalf of the Australian Government. He asked me
to deliver it to the appropriate person, and I considered that to be you.
K: You don't mind if I share this with the Secretaries?
R: No, certainly not.
K: Our government doesn't work like yours.
R: That's within your judgment.
K: No, I mean
I just wanted to make clear whether it
was for personal consideration by the President or for the Departments.
R: No, I think that some actionand consideration needs to be
taken on it in other parts of your government.
K: Okay, thank you.
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Telecon
Senator Javits
3/19/70 8:00 p.m.
J: What's our situation?
K: I can't see you before X 2:15 tomorrow.
J: Is that still time, or will it be after the fact?
K: No, the fact won't be tomorrow. It probably won't be until Monday.
J: I'll bring him in tomorrow.
K: I won't be able to tell you a lot.
J: No, I'm just doing this to satisfy the record. I've got a
problem
I've got a speech in New York. Your situation is impossible
in the morning?
K: Absolutely.
J: You can't do anything before noon?
K: No, I just can't. I might be able to do it at 12:15.
J: That's doesn't do me any good. Okay, put it down for xXx
2:15. Nothing will happen on this until Monday?
K: No. I could do it early Monday.
J: Let me come back to you.
K: Okay.
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Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Professor Yoshida
3/19/70; 11:20 p.m.
Y:
In the past 12 hours I have had three conversations with my friend
on your three conditions. My friend appreciates your three points
and asked me to convey the following message to you. He feels he
and his government is definitely prepared to
restrictions on the ten items which we proposed a
few days ago [I could not understand him]. I know that is not
satisfactory for you but as you understand in any diplomatic
negotiations one has to start with a
line and will have
to take an appearance of mutual concession. It is particularly
true for us in view of the mounting pressures of our industry.
Second, with regard to injury position my friend understands your
position and although we have asked you about this we are not now
seeking further substantial demonstration from you. However, it
will be great help for us if you could show some form or some
kind of
on this question, should this be possible on
your side. Third, the question of separate aggregate ceilings on
two materials is also in essence acceptable to my friend. The
problem for us is how to make it look like selected for home
consumption here. On this point my friend is hopeful that we can
devise some formula through negotiations which could be mutually
acceptable.
K:
How could this happen?
Y:
Our position is flexible. We will make your requirements through
negotiations. Soon after I talked to my friend he summoned his
two top associates -- and you know who I mean -- and advised them
fresh instructions had been sent to Washington along the lines I just
mentioned. My friend says we must avoid under any circumstances
the breaking of the discussions, which would be disastrous to both
of us. If your friend is willing, we would like to continue the talks
and ask your negotiators to keep our
in mind and to
press hard on our
to accommodate your minimum
requirements and now they should be able to meet them on essential
points. I XXX may add that my friend and his associates will now
have to talk to our industry to get their consent and cooperation.
This is not an easy task. My friend and his aides are determined
to accomplish this. Whatever decision our government makes, we
must still discuss it with the industry.
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Mr. Kissinger/Yoshida
3/19/70; 11:20 p.m.
-2-
K:
We will not break off negotiations tomorrow then but you will
have to make a proposal -- you start talking -- you have to give
us something to work with. We can do it for another week or so
and see what happens. It cannot be protracted.
Y:
I will convey your message to my friend immediately.
K:
I will talk to our people tomorrow.
Y:
I would like to beg you again to do your utmost to continue talks
toward successful negotiations.
K:
Thank you and I hope we can work it out.
Y:
Indeed, so do I.
K:
It is nice to talk to you.
Y:
I will be in touch with you again when and if necessary.
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TelCon
Secy Rogers (outgoing call)
March 20, 1970; 9:05 a. m.
K: Bill, yesterday when Laird was in with Pastore the President
was talking to him about B-52's in northern Laos. Mel has come up
with two targets and the President has ordered that they be hit.
This can be recalled until Noon and I remember you were promised
that you would be given a hearing.
R: If he has made up his mind I don't want to. Will you call Mansfield?
My voice is about shot. He said he had some assurance. I don't
know who he got it from. I think we had better tell him. Find out who
it was that gave him that assurance.
K: Yes.
R: I would hate to have him think we have double-crossed him.
K: I don't know who could have given him the assurance.
R: In my testimony I did not say anything like that.
K: I wanted you to know that as of yesterday evening no such decision
had been made.
R: I know he has been thinking about it.
K: It can be undone until Noon.
R: Does he feel the targets are good ones?
K: I frankly just got the word from Mel and passed it on.
R: I think it is all right. The only thing I have in mind is Mansfield.
K: Let me get Harlow to call Mansfield.
R: That is better.
K: My judgment is that it is none of my business, but the attitude you
take is the wise one.
ms
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TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
9:12 pxx am
3/20/70
K: The President wants to proceed and I have talked to Bill.
L: It's all right?
K: He's not dancing in the street. He has the flu. I told him Hehad to noon to
protest. He said OK and he could see why the President would want to do it
and he will let it go. Are these pretty good targets?
K: I will get you something over on it by 10:00.
K: You recommend them?
L: My only probelm is that I have been told the
is that they haven't
found anything. When I find something, I will naturally let him know.
K: They are suitable?
L: They do contain elements of an enemy control. The intelligence is hedged.
K: Send me something but you go ahead. Have you any idea where Mansfield
got that assurance? Bill said that worries him and he didn't give him the assurance.
L: I don't know. The President didn't say anything? 11 Bill will know.
K: Bill does say Mansfield thinks he has assurances. How can we find out where
he got them? You don't know where he found out? Could you call Mansfield?
That
L: They will be like a tip off.
K: I will get Harlow to call.
L: Hewill know something is brewing. You talk to Harlow befor you make a call.
K: I won't get near a phone. I'll talk to Harlow.
(Harlow's people found out that Mansfield satx stated he was misquoted)
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TELCON
Haldeman (? /Kissinger
9:15 am
3/20/70
H: Here's the thing of it. He says you have a problem on your bombing.
K: I've taken care of it.
K: The point is, don't let Rogers have a meeting. Just carry out your bombing.
K: The only problem is that when you bomb in Laos is that it will get public.
When it's public, you don't want State saying they didn't know anything about it. /
I told Rogers it's ordered and if you want to object, you have untibnoon but the
President knows your views. He didn't object. I don't want them to cut the
President up afterwards. We wouldn't want Rogers testyfing he didn't know.
Anyway, Laird would have told him.
H: I wanted to be sure it was at the President's order. I don't want ?777??
He's in a charming modid. He's hung up on me about 7 times today. He forgets
what he wants to say and then he has to call back.
K: He called and hung up on me too. When I got back last night he kex called
and said over again how great he thought% was but when I asked him what
he really thought, he said he thought was lousy. Actually I thought he
was quite good, especially in the second half. It's a good idea and I think we
should do it about twice a he year. I think he just wanted reassurance that it
was all right.
H: He spoke to me about it too. I don't think he liked it because he said he did
but he didn't think his guests understood it.
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TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
9:20 am
3/20/70
L: We have a piece of paper I will get to you. We are not changing any position
on MIRV. Dave was talking out loud.
K: Good. Gerard Smith was salivating when he heard those things.
L: Before the meeting I will have a black and white piece of paper for you.
But for our department, it will be k no.
K: I suspected something like that.
L: About that last call-- I had somebody with me but there was something I
wanted to say. The message on the targets is hedged and they keep saying
"believed". The Joint Chiefs might have over-reacted because it was my
impression I was to find targets.
K: That was my understanding too. We will just take the hedging out when we
go public.
L: I can't read from here whether they have overreacted on the pressure.
In view of the President/s strong pressuring, I thought we had to go all out.
K: Just so long as we are all kogxbxex together with the President.
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TelCon
Mr. Rebozo
3/20/70; 12:45 p.m.
R: The weather is gorgeous here. Are you going to
K: Can I let you know tomorrow morning. I am debating between
Dorado Beach and Paradise Island. Do you have any suggestion?
R: I have only been to Dorado. They are rather similar. I think
the choice of restaurants is better at Paradise but Dorado must be
very good. I have only been to Dorado and that was for a short visit.
K: I may go a few days to one and a few days to the other.
R: Let me know what you want to do. We are all set up in this
. place I thought would be the best for you, but you decide for yourself.
No problem.
K: I will let you know first thing in the morning.
R: There is one other thing I wanted to talk to you about. You have
a man with you named Vaky. I understand there is some decision
about to be made about the placement of an Inter-American Social
Development Institute. The bill was introduced by our Congressman,
Purcell and it has been approved but they have not selected a site.
New Orleans has been mentioned, but I would be partial to Miami
and would like to present their case before any decision is made.
K: Let me look into it.
R: Just leave the door open that's all I ask. We have a lot of
Spanish speaking people here. I understand they would employ up
to 100 people. But for other selfish reasons I would like to see Miami
get it.
K: I will look into it. And I will let you know first thing in the
morning on the other.
ms
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TELCON
Prdsident/Kissinger
3:06 pm
3/20/70
P: I had two thoughts -- One, I wondered if you would draft out a piece of paper
on that SAM thing. What I had in mind was to indicate that on
and in
a memo to the Secy. of Defense I recommended we should respond when SAM
fired at us. At that time there was no site and the weather made strikes
infeasible. Third, this authority still stands and a response is to be made when
the weather makes it possible. I don't want it to be a new order but one that
stands.
K: That's right. We can say that the authority to retaliate stands when bad
weather makes it impossible.
P: I want to send it to Laird SO he will have the authority.
K: I layed it into Dobrynin. I said the cease fire ? ? ? ? and SA-3 when the
President found out it cancelled all that and I said they couldn't deal with this
President the same way as they have dealt with past administrations. He said
he didn't know anything about SA-3. I believe him -- they wouldn't tell him.
He asked if we had other sources other than Israeli sources. The Israelis got
it from us -- the Pentagon.
P: What about the 1200 men.
K: The Birtish.
P: We have hard figures. I could say that
K: I wouldn't confirm that. We have some reports and we are studying them.
Then you would have trouble explaining why we are not giving them Phantoms.
P: If he doesn't admit it, we can play it that the story is open (?). Another
thing -- if I were they, I would have worried about the Brandt reception in E.
Germany. Anytime anybody from the West goes to the East/it's like
Romania.
K: They fear two Germanjes may get together on nationalism. It should worry
them a hell of a lot. Heknow a little bit about my trip. He said he had heard
that progress is being made.
P: Who leaked it?
K: The NVN probably said something.
P: He might leak it.
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President/ K issinger
3:06 pm
3/20/70
-2-
K No, he knows but he wouldn't unless it would benefit them some how and right
now it wouldn't. -- I said we had it all set and you cancelled it.
P: Because of their move.
K: And because it looked tixe like they were using the cease fire to help their
position. If they had a position that would ? ?????
P; When Rabin want back, he was ready to sign.
K: On Tuesday.
P: When is Dobrynin going back?
K: Dobrynin's going back on the 12th.
P: I hope he doesn't think we were given anything.
K: Also, he wasn't sure they were telling him everything, for the first time.
P: Who?
K: The NVN. He asked me and I said you had better go to your friends and
ask them.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TelCon
Dean Acheson
3/20/70; 4:35 p.m.
A: I had two thoughts. Just wanted to let you know that I am on that
side too. One has to do with Cambodia. Eight years ago I represented
his government at The Hague and spent some time there with him. He
must have slipped a lot to get in this position. He had a firm hold on that
government eight years ago. I think a lot of changes have gone on.
What I was thinking about -- don't let's get drawn into this one.
K: Oh, no. We have no intention.
A: khavex I just wanted you to know that I am urging this too. I wouldn't
bet much on this government's staying there.
K: We are saying nothing, and more important, doing nothing.
A: We don't need any more weak allies in Southeast Asia. In another field,
the President said the other day that he thought the XXXXXXX Russians
might make some proposal and he feared the general rush toward that.
Someone might say, grab it and he thought we ought to have a proposal of
our own. I got hold of Paul the other day and talked to him about what
went on, and Paul shares my worry about Gerry Smith. He thinks he
would be the fellow who would say, oh, yes, let's get hold of this.
Paul thinks the only way if a proposal is made is suggestion which seems
very wise to me. We say, well whatever you say is very interesting.
We would be interested in talking about possibility of regulating number of
launches or number of manned bases. Nobody would really like to do this.
But the point is not whether you do it but whether you suggest it. The thing
that is good about it is that they would not
The Army and the Air Force
wouldn't like it at all. The Navy ould think it is fine. It seems to me that
if you are looking for a suggestion as a countermeasure here is one that is pretty
good.
K: I have been talking to Paul and let me talk to him again to get the details.
He is very good.
A: That is all I have in mind.
K: The President is calling me. I will call you back in 15 minutes.
A: OK
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TelCon
The President
3/20/70; 4:45 p.m.
(Missed first part of conversation)
K: I have a group here to get to work out a position we can take. I have
been la talking to Elliot Richardson and will have a recommendation to
you in a few minutes.
N: Ron has to brief now.
K: We would like to shift it to Bangkok and let the Thais do it. It is
tough for us to announce it. The basic problem here is this is a battalion.
We don't know that it is two battalions. What it is, it is one battalion,
one battery with 4 guns.
N: Right. OK.
K: They would send it in to train Laos troops.
N: I understand, but what do you want us to say? If I just "no comment" --
do you want me to go through that tomorrow? I shouldn't get into that at all.
Should we just refer the whole thing to Bangkok?
K: I think the Thais should take it.
N: He is going to be briefing in a minute and I am just trying to find a
way to have him sayxixxx finesse.
K: Some Thai training troops in there. Further details will have to come
from Bangkok.
N: Well that sounds like Mickey Mousing. All right, get something out.
If you can get something out I will handle it tomorrow. In the future you
should always finesse these with Ziegler rather than I have to answer.
K: We are just trying to work something out with Ziegler.
ms
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 07-31/6: PerLtr. 18Nov 2008
By
P.G H NARA, Date 4.3-09
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger
4:50 pm
3/20/70
K: What do you think we should say on the Thai troops?
R: I talked to Marshall Green after taking to you and they agreed that whatever
is said should be said by Laos or Thailand. Their thought is that ????
and that that's the Thais have said yes, they have responded to this request
and we should say we are supporting them.
K: One battery, isn't it?
R: of 300 men.
K: They were sent for a training exercise and replaced by Laotians after this
was over?
R: I don't know. It may be they were asked to stay. Originally it was contemplated
as a training exercise. Then they got caught.
K: Let me talk to Marshall. We will take a no comment stand.
R: I am planning on lunch Tuesday.
K: I think that's all right.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 07-31/2: PerLtr. 18 Now 2008
By P.G.H. NARA, Date 4-3-09
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
M. Green/Kissinger
4:55 pm
3/20/70
K: What are the facts on the Sierra Romeo again? You get us into trouble. Bombi
all over the place. I just told the President you were bleeding (?) for it.
G: We said 3 months ago these things are useless. There are about 300. They
were put in last year, taken out, recently put back in again.
K: I know we decided last year on putting them back in. Shouldn't they have been
replaced by Laotians?
G: No, the decision was taken about 6 months ago to put them back in. I will
have to call you back.
K: The position we take publicly is that we cannot say anything now.
G: We will get in touch with Bangkok and Vientiane saying that Thais are giving
support. This has happened before.
K: Reaction to the immediate press.
G: As soon as we have word that they will brief accordingly, we willx are going
to brief the Hill. More because it will leak. Meanwhile, we will take a no-
comment stand -- which is not easy because the press is bombarding us.
Then we will have to say ??????
K: This has been going on since when?
G: Off and on for a couple of years. I will call you back in a couple of mins.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
31/8: 18Nov.2008
By P.G. H NARA, Date 4-3-09
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
5:25 pm
3/20/70
K: A1 Haig is enraged and ready to tear Ron Zeigler limb from limb. He
constantly gets some trivial problem and asked the President what he should
do. On 08 some of the issues the President doesn't know the answers. The
other day he had the President and me in the President's office for 1 1/2 hours
on something we already had the answers to and the President finally came up
with the same answer. On this Thais in Laos, he came to Al who was working
on something else for the President and couldn't give him much time. Ron
stormed out of here and went to the President. We nearly had the whole thing
set up but he just got everything in a mess.) To panic the President is just not
right. If he wants to get the facts from us and our recommendation and then
he should get the President's views if he is not satisfied. If the President
had told him something WXXX wrong, it would have been a probelm. We had to
work it out with two other governments. We are going to get him in and give
him hell. I wanted you to know incase he comes running to you.
H: He won't come to me but he is trying to do his job the same as the rest
of us and we are all trying to accomplish the same thing.
K: He should have the facts before he goes to the President.
H: He has a frustrating job trying to get the facts.
K: He won't get them from the President. Houdek worked for two hours getting
him the facts. I pay a man full time to assist him. I think what he did was wrong.
H: I do too.
K: To infuriate me is easy but to get Haig to loose his temper is hard.
H: Don't blow your temper with him or everything will blow.
K: We will talk to him calmly.
H: I agree. Is xxxx it ixx untangled now?
K: Enough so the President can stay away from it tomorrow.
H: That's what's important.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
PerLtr. 18 Nov 2008
By P.G.H NARA, Date 4-3-09
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
J. Moore/Kissinger
5:35 pm
3/20/70
T
M: ??? press problem and Congressal problem and you carry the
.
K: When we are in trouble the State Dept. rushes to admit that it has participated.
M: I will take that as graciously as it was given.
K: fan you get me the basic facts on Sierra Romeo and when the decision was
made to get it in there. It's an application of the Nimon Doctrine.
M: The sooner we put it in context the sooner it's ?????
K: You have been told what Zeigler said?
M: Yes, and we have worked out a formula.
K: What is it?
M: I have talked to Bangkok. They are trying to get Laos and Thailand in to
take a denial position. Bangkok had not heard from them. Prior to Zeigler's
report the idea was to get Thailand, with the consent of Laos, to say something
tomorrow that ix it has make available support forces with the request of the
Laotian Government. Whilethis is going on our press spokesman» would say
that we have nothing to comment because we understand the Laotian Government
has something to say and we will wait. Then if Thailand and Laos did not agreex
to this we will go ahead anyway and try to get them to back us up. That's the
shape we are in now.
K: You will not put out the facts first, will you?
M: No, we will get The Thais and Laotians to confirm what we said.
K: How long has Sierra Romeo been going on?
M: For a couple of years and it came out about last summer and it went in
3 days agol
K: It's going in was arranged months ago.
M: We had been talking about it for a while ;and Thailand and Loas disagreed
when it should be. Maybe three weeks ago we forced them to make arrangements
we could agree on and then Thailand and Laos got together.
M: Then the implementation was only worked out recently.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN07-31/10:PerLtr. 18 Nov.2008
By P.G. NARA, Date 4-3-09 Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED, Richard Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
J. Moore/Kissinger
5:35 pm
3/20/70
-2-
M: When we started conversations we put in
what had been discussed
a long time.
K: Marshall had recommened Long Tien because it was behind the line.
M: It was recommended by Laird because it was adequately protected but when
they finally went in they were practiaally overrun.
K: What's the situation in Laos today?
M: The situation is that they have about 6 - - 7,000 NVA ready to attack anytime.
Some of the immediate advance unitex are within one mile.
KL We will loose it. Will we lose the guns?
march?
M: Sure and
wants to ???? it out. We have a message saying
"????????"
K: I have seen it.
M: Do you want to talk to Marshall again? I will have it to you in writing.
Also, in addition to the Zeigler statement and non-denial from Thailand and
Laos, we will have to make a comment that we are supporting.
K: We will say that as soon as we have confirmed it.
(NLN 07-31/10 P 2062)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
G. Smith/Kissinger
5:55 pm
3/20/70
K: Didn't I tell you that before the Verification Panel was over we would be
on the same side?
S: No, you XXXXX didn;t but
you will. I just learned that Alden Frye,
Sen. Javits man, called a man in ACDA, Weisbrod, and said he saw a memo
on a compendium on MIRV that he wants to get. That brings us to something
else. I had a man of mine, Hubgerman, do a study for me. Frye told Weisbrod
that he had seen the Hubberman paper on how the Soviets view the American
MIRV program. He said he had seen this from someone on the NSC. This
is quite a document and I thought I should pass this on to you.
K: I find it hard to believe.
S: It sounds peculiar.
K: If that's true, the man is dead.
S: I should think so.
K: If you could find out who, I willguarantee he is fired.
S: I gave a copy to Helms and Nitze.
K: Who on my staff? I have never seen it.
S: I don't know. I sent it to you. I sent it just directly to you.
K: You are saying I leaked it?
S: No. You asked who I sent it to. I'm only reporting an allegation I thought
disturbing.
K: I will look into that.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TelCon
Governor Dewey
3/20/70; 6:05 p.m.
did not
D: I called you because the mails weren't working. We/don't send
out a reminder. The only way to settle it was to call you.
We go to the Opera House, arrive 6:15 the Grand Tier Restaurant
for dinner. Can I pick you up?
K: I have just run into a complication. There may be an NSC meeting
Tuesday afternoon, and if there is, I am dead. It depends on when the
President goes away.
D: I didn't know he was going away.
K: Wednesday morning or afternoon he is going to Key Biscayne.
Just over Easter.
D: Well I hope he lets you come up. You let me know.
K: I have kept the afternoon and evening open on my calendar.
I want to talk to you early next week about the other matter we spoke of.
D: I have a feeling we are doing pretty well on this business of sentiment.
The recent events are pretty good. Those two women now are turning
out good pictures.
K: We may have a reason to keep you traveling so that you can do some
other things.
D: I will be here. What I was going to suggest was to give you our
place. I was going to suggest that we pick you up. And would you like
to have my car pick you up at the airport when you arrive?
I
K: Why don't I call your office Monday morning.
D: We are going to the country this weekend so don't call before
11:00 in the morning Monday.
ms
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SANITIZED COPY
C05953775
NLN-TELCONS-4-7-46-1
2081
SANITIZED
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.
P:
How are you getting along on the
thing. Is it done?
K:
I don't know if you talked to Ziegler. We gave him some guidance
that provides a cushion for you.
P:
Why didn't State put that out instead of kicking it over here. They
threw it to Ziegler and now Ziggler had to throw it to me.
K:
Did Ziegler tell you what we told him to say?
P:
He said it was a modest amount.
K:
The details of any
participation would have to come from
Vietiane.
P:
The newspaper stories are wildly exaggerated -- we had nothing to
do with it.
K:
Well, we paid for it.
P:
But they don't know that.
K:
We provided two answers to you tomorrow you can say:
(a) this is an application of the Nixon Doctrine -- they are Asians
in trouble which we are helping out.
P:
Also, North Vietnamese in Laos
We are going to put Harriman right on the.
we really have to slug
them on that.
K:
I don't think we have to be too defensive on the
thing. It
has been known. It's just
P:
How long did they have it there?
K:
Just two weeks -- but it was agreed to be sent there in October.
P:
I remember there was some discussion about it when I was there.
K:
asked you about it.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
Per sec. 3.3(b)(1); Hr. 6/2/2015
By TWIT NARA, Date 12/5/2022
NLN 11-52/2081 [p.10f6]
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 3526 and has been determined to be declassified.
C05953775
NLN-TELCONS-4-7-46-1
SANITIZED COPY
Mr. Kissinger/The President
3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.
- 2 -
SANITIZED
3.3(b)(1)
P:
Did Elliot help you today?
K:
Yes, he was good. Marshall Green collapses when things are tough.
P:
I am not going to be devensive on
Laos. I really feel
the briefing book has alot of material - --didn't we cover it in the
statement?
K:
It is just so you have it in mind just in case you get asked about it.
P:
Let's keep Laos out of the thing.
K:
Yes. You fully stated your position in your statement of two weeks
ago.
as
P:
What about this order? I just want it to be sent over 1dd an order
to be signed by me.
K:
It is being drafted and I will have it for you.
P:
They don't have to put out a press release.
K:
I have given the strictest instructions not to say anything.
P:
They say these things can't be done -- for a year we hit Cambodia
but no one knew.
K:
Dick Helms sent over a memorandum from the Station Chief in Laos
that said without the B-52's the whole thing is going to fall apart.
P:
Why is B'52 so important?
K:
B-52's bomb with radar, they fly with reconnaissance.
P:
If anybody asks me about that I will say yes, we will continue to do
that. The thing to do is not to be a bit defensive about it. We have
to say that the enemy is threatening our position in Laos.
K:
I still hope this thing in Paris will work out -- certainly after two
more meetings something should.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED COPY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
C05953775
NLN-TELCONS-4-7-46-1
Mr. Kissinger/The President
3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.
-3-
P:
I don't know if we can wait that long -- you can't let them vacillate.
I think they may be diddling.
K:
But they aren't getting any publicity from these talks.
P:
But they know that we won't hit them if we are talking to them.
The Laos thing should be some message to them.
K:
Oh, they will notice that. I don't know what they are up to, but
they can't just be diddling us along.
P:
Two good happened. The Brandt reception in East Germany and
the Cambodia thing. The Brandt thing has sent shivers up their back.
Can't you imagine the kind of reception I would get if I went there. I just
may go. If Brandt wanted it, I would go.
K:
The outcome would be unpredictable -- you know the East German
is tough.
P:
They are much tougher than the Hungarians. Even the American
press reported the Brandt visit that way even though they hated to do it.
K:
German situation is dangerous.
P:
If it is dangerous to us, it is dangerous to the Soviets. How long
would it take them to get weapons?
K:
I would not comment on the Cambodian thing directly.
P:
I will just say we noted the change and recognized the Government
because it was selected by Parliamentary means.
K:
You might say we expect Cambodian neutrality.
P:
He may come back and take it over again -- you never know this
may be a help to us, too.
K:
The Cambodian development is a plus. The weakening of the menu
series
The B-52 strikes, keep them going. I want SAM sites hit soon.
Is the weather okay?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Mr. Kissinger/The President
3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.
-4-
K:
The weather is awful but they should be able to do it soon. April
should be much better. We should be able to get uninterrupted periods
of two weeks.
P:
Our press on three networks made grave mention of the fact that
casualties were over 100. There is no mention of the fact that they are
1/3 or 70% lower than last year -- 350.
K:
Possibly about 400.
P:
Basically the people in the press are not loyal to this country.
K:
They can't bear the thought that you can come out all right.
P:
We are either going to do it at Paris or we will do it the other way --
but we are going to do it. I have been reading these figures over the last
three months -- if we killed one-third of what they say, there wouldn't
be anyone left in North Vietnam.
K:
The fact that no one has ever come back from North Vietnam
the impact on South Vietnam must be enormous -- there is a breaking point (?)
I was doing some preparations for my next meeting. They just aren't
talking in these meetings as they were before. They aren't going 'to make
it last for another three years.
P:
You are going to meet them on the 6th.
K:
4th or 5th and then on the 18th.
P:
I would tell them to fish and cut bait.
K:
When you read the transcript, you will see that they have given a
hell of a lot more than we have. We told them we would go out in 12 months.
P:
They have not given us anything.
K;
They don't insist on the 10 point anymore. If they don't say anything
about the military thing next time I will not go back.
P:
That's right, what we have to do is create a provocation to hit them.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Mr. Kissinger/The President
3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.
-5-
P:
We are not going to hit them the way Johnson did. If we provoke
we are going to kick the shit out of them -- anything
everything short
of nuclear weapons. That's why I approved the B-52 thing so fast. We
are already being blamed for being in Laos, what difference does it make
if we hit them with little planes or big ones. We may as well use the big
ones.
K:
I will give them an ultimatum that if they don't give us something
I will break off. The
P:
The talks are important to them.
K:
Although you deflated the talks to the point that they are not getting
out of them what they used to. It's even off American TV. Habib is never
on TV. Laos is a good diversion for the timebeing.
P:
You mean for the US -- in the sense we are not talking about Vietnam
If we talk about Laos, people will think we are engaging in another war.
This press is unbelievable. I told Ziegler everyone is bad -- they are all
your enemy. They came up to me after the Gridiron and said something
about new relations. I told them to forget it, it was just for one hour.
You feel you have to get along with them socially -- I can't feel that way.
I just don't want to associate with them.
K:
I see them rarely.
P:
They bore the hell out of you. As a group they are slobs.
I will see Joe Alsop.
K:
Quality of people going into journalism isn't high.
P:
I don't know about their intelligence they write well and quickly --
they just don't have loyalty.
P:
Let's come back onthe Laos thing -- the diversion.
K:
The Muskie speech?
P:
Who picked it up.
K:
No one.
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Mr. Kissinger/President
3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.
-6-
P:
The only problem we have now is whether the public will think
the whole thing is one package.
K:
Basically, the people who are attacking Laos -- Hugh Scott said
they are the ones who failed on their attack on your Vietnam policy
and are now looking for another way to attack it.
P: I am going to work the balance of the evening on the press thing.
If you have anything, make sure I have it by 10:00.
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TELCON
President/Kissinger
7:55 pm
3/20/70
P: What I was thinking about was that you should give Wheeler a call and make
sure he knows what I said about this SAM decision directly and what I said
prox privately to Laird about those generals. I will not let those guys fall for
this. Laird may not want to talk to them but it has to get down the line to them and
I will not persecute them. McGovern says he is going to attack the Nixon
doctrine. As far as I'm concerned we gain nothing by giving them anything.
You were so X excited about germ warfare and Biafra. Who has heard of Biarfa
since that day you called me?
K: These bleeding hearts ? ? ? ? ? Basically they like power and success.
P: Biafra will die.
are
K: Andxxxxx being starved.
P: We have the 52's in here and they will go. SAM's we will hit and hit fast.
I want it done Sunday.
K: I will have that memo on your desk tomorrow xxixx morning.
P: I want Laird and Wheeler to know we want something done Sunday.
K: I was justtalking to Laird to make sure he will deep the menu thing going.
P: Put it in writing and I will sign it.
K: I told him menu was coming.
P: Never send anything to Laird in the future without sending it to Wheeler.
Send them a just memo on menu. Hit the SAM sites and send a memo signed
my me. We will get this bureaucracy in shape.
K: I couldn't agree more.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TelCon
Gen Wheeler
3/20/70; 8:00 p.m.
K: The President wanted me to call you about three things. The
first, he wanted you to know that he feels these generals should not
be made the fall guys for My Lai and he will see to it that they don't
get ruined. It is up to you if you want to convey that. He will not
permit the military to be kicked around in this country. The second
thing, he is sending over a memo to Mel to the effect that SAM sites
that have been activated can be struck even if bad weather should
interfere with retaliation after some time and he looks to you for
implementation or to be told if for some reason it isn't being
implemented within a brief period of time. He is also putting in
that the Menu series is going forward and that he is to get weekly
reports.
W: I see. I am glad he is sending this over because I got a memo
back today from Dave want to hold off on this next week's package
waiting for clarification of what goes on in Cambodia. This will
supersede that I assume.
K: It damn well better and we will count on you to tell us if for any
reason it doesn't. I was just told by the Secretary of Defense when
I said this that you attacked today and you are due to attack again
Tuesday.
W: I see. Yes sir.
K:
OK by you?
W: Yes, indeed.
ms
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
8:10 pm 3/20/70
is not for
K: The President called again and I told him that signing an authorization/and him
we are doing it as a memo and you will do it an an authorization. He agrees.
L: e understands.
1
K: He wants those things executed Sun. xxxxx or Mon.
L: We will get that one
K: That's the one he wants. We will draft it as one at a time.
L: I will give you a report.
K: YThat's it.
L: We shouldn't run to the President everytime. I will give you areport.
K: We don't want an unlimited authority to hit the same site 50 days in a row.
L: That's exactly it and we have to be careful.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TelCon
Secretary Laird
3/20/70; 9:50 p.m.
K: The President is really jumping tonight. He just had me call Wheeler
to give him his feelings about these generals that he gave you
yesterday.
L: Wheeler isn't even in the process. Its the Joint Chairman, the
Joint Chief, the two of them.
K: Hejust wanted him to know on a personal basis. He wanted me to
say he was sending a memo on the missile sites. I just didn't want
to deal with Wheeler without telling you.
L: You shouldn't, Henry. I am sick and tired of that Joint Staff running
around behind my back. They got us into trouble a couple of times.
K: Whenever I deal with Wheeler you know that.
L: I know this. That is true of Wheeler too. He is great. My problem
is not Wheeler. He feels very badly about this. About the generals.
K: The President did not intend that as a directive. He had read something
McGovern said and wanted Wheeler to know the generals wouldn't get kicked
around in his Administration. He just meant it as a friendly gesture.
L: Well, Wheeler knows how I feel on that too.
K: Well, and he made that clear. Wheeler and you as far as I can tell
are always on the same wave length.
L: He is a great guy. It's too bad he is going to have to change. But we
are going to have to go soon on that. I think we should go around the 15th
of April with an announcement by the President. Then we can get the bill
through Congress to make Wheeler a 4-Star general.
K: You mean a permanent one?
L: Yes. If they are going to make Hershey one they should Wheeler.
K: Does that get him any perquisites when he leaves?
L: Yes, it affects his retirme ment too.
K: I think the 15th is a good time for that. Good, Mel I won't bother you
again tonight.
ms
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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"ocrText": "TELCON\nMcNamara/Kissinger\n9:06 am\n3/19/70\nK: I just want to tell you one thing. I just got a cable from USIA in Paris that\nthey are sending over Danielle Hunebelle with a copy of her film. If she walks\nin this office\nM: Send XAX USIA a cable saying their appropriations are cancelled.\nK: She won't walk out alive.\nM: I read over the papers. I have certain views and perhaps prejudices - -\nI would have one major feeling. The one thing that disturbed me is the unrecon-\nciled position of aread of the government on major jaxx facets of this problem.\nI think it's greater than the facts would warrant. Someone should take time\nto go over that.\nK: We will do it this week. I spend three hours with them yesterday and I\nwill spend 3 hours with them tomorrow. Once you get them together you find\nit's a\nproblem. On that radar problem -- there's not much\ndifference once you get into it.\nM: My only suggestion. Once you have that done then the attempt you have\nmade is excellent. You have a whole ****glo catalogue.\nK: Once we have\nwe can decide one side or another.\nM: And you will know one side differs and you will know why.\nK: And the President will have a better idea.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAtty. Gen. /Kissinger\n12:02 pm\n3/19/70\nAG: Some of our favorite Jewsish\nare getting the flavor of the forth-\ncoming statement and they think it may have positive point. If this be so, it\nwould be well for them to have information on it at the time of the issuance of\nit so that yxcxtx they come out in favor of the Administration (?).\nK: How far ahead do they want it.\nAG: Not very.\nK: We want to gax target them away from the WH. We don't care who else\nthey scream at.\nAG: But if they can be positive instead of negative it would be helpful. I will\nleave it with you or you can call me this afternoon.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President\n3/19/70 12:20 p.m.\n[Didn't hear very beginning of conversation. ]\nK: We will get a recommendation from Wheeler today.\nP: What about Helms?\n[Kissinger asked Ghorayeb to step out. ]\nK: His deputy was there today. I think it is safe to say, Mr.\nPresident, that the overwhelming majority of the bureaucracy is ex-\ntremely gun-shy about doing anything. They are gambling that it's\ngoing to stop.\nP: On what grounds, I wonder.\nK: I also think so, but I think the Meo forces are going to get\nsmashed in the process.\nP: Is the meeting still going on, or has it briken up?\nK: It has broken up.\nP: Just say they have got to do something immediately.\nK: I was going to assemble them again tonight.\nR: Cancel what you are doing. Call them over imme diately and\ntell them the President wants an action plan on his desk by 3:00. Cancel\nall their luncheon plans; cancel yours. Get the fellow out of your office\nwho's there. Tell them I want some action, because I .'ve made the\ndecision.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nUnder Secretary Richardson\n3/19/70 12:25 p.m.\nK: I just had a furious President on my hands. He wanted the\nx Laas contingency group to see what we might do. He said he\nwanted hard and soft options. We talked about hard options; every-\nbody decided they couldn't do anything. He's given me an order to\nget that group back here and have a hard option by 3:00. I don't know\nwhat I can do.\nR: You had better go ahead and do it. Are you going to delay\nthat other meeting?\nK: Yes. What I was wondering, are you free in the early\nevening for our meeting?\nR: Yes, I would be.\nK: Why don't I meet you at 6:30 in your office?\nR: Okay.\nK: Do you want to come over to the other meeting on Laos?\nR: No, not really.\nK: He wants me to get Wheeler and Helms.\nR: When are you going to start?\nK: At 1:00.\nR: I could be there a little after that. I don't know that I would\nadd much. Are Green and\ngoing to be there?\nK: Iam going to call them. The President told me they have to\ncancel their lunch. I am escalating participation. For instance he\nwants Wheeler over here. I'll leave it to you. We have no problem\nwith Johnson.\nR: He represented us this morning?\nK: Yes.\nR: Better leave it at that.\nK: Okay, I'll come to your office at 6:30 and move that other\nmeeting to 3:00. It will be from 3:00 to 5:00.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nSecy Rogers (incoming)\n3/19/70; 4:30 p.m.\nR: I just got a letter from the President about Laos. Are you\nfamiliar with it?\nK: No.\nR: He is dissatisfied with our Embassy people.\nK: I didn't get this. I did' not know he was writing to you.\nR: I will call him and find out what it is about, but I thought maybe\nyou knew.\nK: Is that about kwa he was furious earlier this week about a\nleak that came from Laos. Is this what it is?\nR: This may have something to do with it. He says NEW recent news\nreports. What news reports?\nK: That's the one. There was a news report from John McCartney\nhad written an article which stated that the Embassy in Laos contests\nhis statement of 67, 000 people and that this was never, that they never\ngot a hearing in Washington.\nR: I didn't even see that story.\nK: He put Ehrlichman in charge of checking it down. It was on Monday.\nWas told it came from Embassy sources in Vientiane. That is why\nhe was extremely upset about that.\nR: I will talk to Ehrlichman about it. I was shocked, because I think\nGodley and those people are quite hawkish.\nK: I don't think this has to do with the policy views. I wasn't even in\ntown when that broke and did not know about it until I came back. But\nI have seen the report well, I have seen the note and what it turned\nout was that Vientiane's assessment estimate -- did not take into\naccount some of the personnel on the trails.\nR: The Ho Chi Minh Trail, yes.\nK: We reconciled the difference. I notice in Godley's estimate this\nweek he has been hitting the higher figure.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nR: Maybe he wrote this note a day or two ago.\nK: If he is referring to recent news reports then I am sure that's\nwhat he is talking about.\nR: One other thing - I have my African paper. It doesn't say a hell\nof a lot, but I woule like to send it over for you to look over. Sometime\nnext week we will have to make it public.\nK: Which African -- your report? I am sure I wouldn't have any\nviews, but I will look at it.\nR: It doesn't say a hell of a lot.\nK: If you send it over I will take a look at it.\nR: OK.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRogers/Kissinger\n7:03 pm\n3/19/70\nK: I just read that Washington Star story. I didn't know anything about it.\nHaldeman didn't know anything about it and Mollenhof says he only has what\nwas given him by the Ripon Society. I have never talked to Doyle nor Mollenhof.\nR: That SOB will demoralize the Cabinet. I talked to John Mitchell about it\nand he vaid he had experience with him too.\nK: I don't know if Doyle is State or WH\nR: No, Sherman is State.\nK: He called me and wanted to see me but I dd didn't see him.\nR: It must have come from Mollenhof or someone.\nK: I talked to Morris and he said he hadn't talked to him. I believe him.\nR: This with the Moynihan memos -- that had to be a WH leak.\nK: No, that was sent to all the Cabinet members. But the second wasn't.\nR: The President has to be careful. The Ashe thing and Mollenhof running\naround loose.\nK: It's against any conviction I have. Elliott Richardson and I worked together\nclosely on this. Any differences were kept private.\nR: This expecially from the Ripon Society who has been attacking Nixon so much.\nWell, thank you Henry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHaldeman/Kissinger\nevening\n3/19/70\nK: What is Molenhof doing, investigating the State Dept. ?\nH: I though you had put him up to it. The story he gives me is that the Ripon\ngroup came in to him and said here are the particulars and asked him to look\ninto it.\nK: I have never talked to Mollenhof. This is a blow to Elliott Richardson. Some\nof the charges are true but not with Richardson. I was called about a letter\nfrom the Embassy in Laos. Is that what's bugging him?\nH: I don't know. That's in his kick on getting rid of pœople in Laos.\nK: Triggered by the McCartney story?\nH: ? ? ? ? top 10 people. Generated from a session in his office.\nK: I didn't know about the letter.\nH: It didn;t come through your people?\nK: No.\nH: I will do a little checking on that.\nK: Will you? If it came through it came through Haig.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRichardson/Kissinger\nevening\n3/19/70\nK: I have just this minute been handed an article in the Washington Star. I hope\nyou haven't read it yet.\nR: I read it before the meeting.\nK: I haven't talked to this man ever. Hecalled early this week and said he wanted\nto talk about State Dept. tensions and I said he I didn't talk about relationships.\nSecond, Morris hasn't talked to him. Third, I have never talked to Mollenhof\nabout Biafra or our relationship, and foruth, Haldeman only knows that the\nRipon Society left their list with Molenhof and he would check on it.\nR: I called Molenhof yesterday when we heard about this report. He told me\nthere was nothing he could do. Zeigler gave a good anser that there was good\ncooperation. Mollenhof also volunteered a briefing for Zeigler when he heard\nabout this.\nK: I wouldn't direct (?) an investigation of the Dept. of State. Any membed\nof my staff talking to the press will be out.\nR: I gathered it would be from Ripon. Any further indication on seabeds?\nK: I will do my best to spring it loose tomorrow. It's not been possible yet.\nR: I didn't know how he covers so much ground. I will see you in the morning.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Laird\n3/19/70 7:10 p.m.\nK: On the list of items we discussed with the President\nwhat\nis your understanding of what they are supposed to do?\nL: Go ahead.\nK: To hit it once, or knock it out?\nL: We can knock it out with one.\nK: Haig thinks the military would understand it to mean they can\ndo it day after day.\nL: No, we'll knock it out in one.\nK: And how would you handle the other departments?\nL: I wouldn't say anything to anybody. I will say it is protective\nreaction.\nK: And you'll take the responsibility?\nL: Right.\nK: It was discussed at WSAG as a possibility.\nL: Oh. Then they'll tie it up. I guess we'll have to tell them.\nK: Or can you just stone-face it?\nL: I can't do that with Bill Rogers. That would undermine any\nchance for cooperation in the future.\nK: That's the thing that worries me.\nL: That's what worries me. I've already drafted the messages.\nI have to try to hold them back. They'll get the word at State that they haven't\nhit out of those sites in a month(?).\nK: How will they get that word?\nL: They will know it was discussed at the meeting.\nK: No. That wasn't.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Laird\n3/19/70 7:10 p.m.\npage 2\nL: Well, let me hold it off till tomorrow morning. I'm afraid\nyou have to keep a certain confidence with people who work together.\nK: Why don't you let me raise it with the President too.\nL: Okay.\nK: Hold it up. Let me be the carrier of the news. He told me\nspecifically not to raise it with Rogers.\nL: I'll hold it over tonight.\nK: Hold it till I can get to him.\nL: All right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMarshall Green\n3/19/70 7:25 p.m.\nK: On those measures we discussed today. My understanding\nis that the things I mentioned to the meeting should be done immediately.\nMcCane to meet the ambassadors; 130 gunships and Cobras, and B-52\nreconnaissance; letter for the President to Kosygin and others.\nG: Good. I heard we are going ahead on the B-52 reconnaisi-\nsance. I was upset to hear they are going to use Vientienne rather than\nU Dorn.\nK: If he gets a target he's almost certain to use B-52s. -\nG: The Secretary hoped to review that one.\nK: I promised that to the Secretary.\nG: I briefed him along the lines you mentioned to me now.\nThere will be messages going out accordingly.\nK: Okay. If they don't get implemented immediately you are\ngoing to get an order to do the extreme things.\nG: We have been waiting to get an okay on imphahentation.\nWe will probably do it tomorrow.\nK: That loses another day. Can we get McCane up there?\nG: Yes.\nK: I'll send the order over there now.\nG: Thanks a lot.\nK: Good.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJohn Ryan (Australian Embassy)\n3/19/70 7:50 p.m.\nK: I'm sorry I couldn't see you before. I wanted to check on\nthe status of the communication. Was I supposed to share it with the\ndepartments, or was it just for the President?\nR: It was a communication from the Australian government\nto the United States Government. It was sent by the Australian Minister\nof Defense, acting on behalf of the Australian Government. He asked me\nto deliver it to the appropriate person, and I considered that to be you.\nK: You don't mind if I share this with the Secretaries?\nR: No, certainly not.\nK: Our government doesn't work like yours.\nR: That's within your judgment.\nK: No, I mean\nI just wanted to make clear whether it\nwas for personal consideration by the President or for the Departments.\nR: No, I think that some actionand consideration needs to be\ntaken on it in other parts of your government.\nK: Okay, thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSenator Javits\n3/19/70 8:00 p.m.\nJ: What's our situation?\nK: I can't see you before X 2:15 tomorrow.\nJ: Is that still time, or will it be after the fact?\nK: No, the fact won't be tomorrow. It probably won't be until Monday.\nJ: I'll bring him in tomorrow.\nK: I won't be able to tell you a lot.\nJ: No, I'm just doing this to satisfy the record. I've got a\nproblem\nI've got a speech in New York. Your situation is impossible\nin the morning?\nK: Absolutely.\nJ: You can't do anything before noon?\nK: No, I just can't. I might be able to do it at 12:15.\nJ: That's doesn't do me any good. Okay, put it down for xXx\n2:15. Nothing will happen on this until Monday?\nK: No. I could do it early Monday.\nJ: Let me come back to you.\nK: Okay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nProfessor Yoshida\n3/19/70; 11:20 p.m.\nY:\nIn the past 12 hours I have had three conversations with my friend\non your three conditions. My friend appreciates your three points\nand asked me to convey the following message to you. He feels he\nand his government is definitely prepared to\nrestrictions on the ten items which we proposed a\nfew days ago [I could not understand him]. I know that is not\nsatisfactory for you but as you understand in any diplomatic\nnegotiations one has to start with a\nline and will have\nto take an appearance of mutual concession. It is particularly\ntrue for us in view of the mounting pressures of our industry.\nSecond, with regard to injury position my friend understands your\nposition and although we have asked you about this we are not now\nseeking further substantial demonstration from you. However, it\nwill be great help for us if you could show some form or some\nkind of\non this question, should this be possible on\nyour side. Third, the question of separate aggregate ceilings on\ntwo materials is also in essence acceptable to my friend. The\nproblem for us is how to make it look like selected for home\nconsumption here. On this point my friend is hopeful that we can\ndevise some formula through negotiations which could be mutually\nacceptable.\nK:\nHow could this happen?\nY:\nOur position is flexible. We will make your requirements through\nnegotiations. Soon after I talked to my friend he summoned his\ntwo top associates -- and you know who I mean -- and advised them\nfresh instructions had been sent to Washington along the lines I just\nmentioned. My friend says we must avoid under any circumstances\nthe breaking of the discussions, which would be disastrous to both\nof us. If your friend is willing, we would like to continue the talks\nand ask your negotiators to keep our\nin mind and to\npress hard on our\nto accommodate your minimum\nrequirements and now they should be able to meet them on essential\npoints. I XXX may add that my friend and his associates will now\nhave to talk to our industry to get their consent and cooperation.\nThis is not an easy task. My friend and his aides are determined\nto accomplish this. Whatever decision our government makes, we\nmust still discuss it with the industry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Yoshida\n3/19/70; 11:20 p.m.\n-2-\nK:\nWe will not break off negotiations tomorrow then but you will\nhave to make a proposal -- you start talking -- you have to give\nus something to work with. We can do it for another week or so\nand see what happens. It cannot be protracted.\nY:\nI will convey your message to my friend immediately.\nK:\nI will talk to our people tomorrow.\nY:\nI would like to beg you again to do your utmost to continue talks\ntoward successful negotiations.\nK:\nThank you and I hope we can work it out.\nY:\nIndeed, so do I.\nK:\nIt is nice to talk to you.\nY:\nI will be in touch with you again when and if necessary.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nSecy Rogers (outgoing call)\nMarch 20, 1970; 9:05 a. m.\nK: Bill, yesterday when Laird was in with Pastore the President\nwas talking to him about B-52's in northern Laos. Mel has come up\nwith two targets and the President has ordered that they be hit.\nThis can be recalled until Noon and I remember you were promised\nthat you would be given a hearing.\nR: If he has made up his mind I don't want to. Will you call Mansfield?\nMy voice is about shot. He said he had some assurance. I don't\nknow who he got it from. I think we had better tell him. Find out who\nit was that gave him that assurance.\nK: Yes.\nR: I would hate to have him think we have double-crossed him.\nK: I don't know who could have given him the assurance.\nR: In my testimony I did not say anything like that.\nK: I wanted you to know that as of yesterday evening no such decision\nhad been made.\nR: I know he has been thinking about it.\nK: It can be undone until Noon.\nR: Does he feel the targets are good ones?\nK: I frankly just got the word from Mel and passed it on.\nR: I think it is all right. The only thing I have in mind is Mansfield.\nK: Let me get Harlow to call Mansfield.\nR: That is better.\nK: My judgment is that it is none of my business, but the attitude you\ntake is the wise one.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n9:12 pxx am\n3/20/70\nK: The President wants to proceed and I have talked to Bill.\nL: It's all right?\nK: He's not dancing in the street. He has the flu. I told him Hehad to noon to\nprotest. He said OK and he could see why the President would want to do it\nand he will let it go. Are these pretty good targets?\nK: I will get you something over on it by 10:00.\nK: You recommend them?\nL: My only probelm is that I have been told the\nis that they haven't\nfound anything. When I find something, I will naturally let him know.\nK: They are suitable?\nL: They do contain elements of an enemy control. The intelligence is hedged.\nK: Send me something but you go ahead. Have you any idea where Mansfield\ngot that assurance? Bill said that worries him and he didn't give him the assurance.\nL: I don't know. The President didn't say anything? 11 Bill will know.\nK: Bill does say Mansfield thinks he has assurances. How can we find out where\nhe got them? You don't know where he found out? Could you call Mansfield?\nThat\nL: They will be like a tip off.\nK: I will get Harlow to call.\nL: Hewill know something is brewing. You talk to Harlow befor you make a call.\nK: I won't get near a phone. I'll talk to Harlow.\n(Harlow's people found out that Mansfield satx stated he was misquoted)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHaldeman (? /Kissinger\n9:15 am\n3/20/70\nH: Here's the thing of it. He says you have a problem on your bombing.\nK: I've taken care of it.\nK: The point is, don't let Rogers have a meeting. Just carry out your bombing.\nK: The only problem is that when you bomb in Laos is that it will get public.\nWhen it's public, you don't want State saying they didn't know anything about it. /\nI told Rogers it's ordered and if you want to object, you have untibnoon but the\nPresident knows your views. He didn't object. I don't want them to cut the\nPresident up afterwards. We wouldn't want Rogers testyfing he didn't know.\nAnyway, Laird would have told him.\nH: I wanted to be sure it was at the President's order. I don't want ?777??\nHe's in a charming modid. He's hung up on me about 7 times today. He forgets\nwhat he wants to say and then he has to call back.\nK: He called and hung up on me too. When I got back last night he kex called\nand said over again how great he thought% was but when I asked him what\nhe really thought, he said he thought was lousy. Actually I thought he\nwas quite good, especially in the second half. It's a good idea and I think we\nshould do it about twice a he year. I think he just wanted reassurance that it\nwas all right.\nH: He spoke to me about it too. I don't think he liked it because he said he did\nbut he didn't think his guests understood it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n9:20 am\n3/20/70\nL: We have a piece of paper I will get to you. We are not changing any position\non MIRV. Dave was talking out loud.\nK: Good. Gerard Smith was salivating when he heard those things.\nL: Before the meeting I will have a black and white piece of paper for you.\nBut for our department, it will be k no.\nK: I suspected something like that.\nL: About that last call-- I had somebody with me but there was something I\nwanted to say. The message on the targets is hedged and they keep saying\n\"believed\". The Joint Chiefs might have over-reacted because it was my\nimpression I was to find targets.\nK: That was my understanding too. We will just take the hedging out when we\ngo public.\nL: I can't read from here whether they have overreacted on the pressure.\nIn view of the President/s strong pressuring, I thought we had to go all out.\nK: Just so long as we are all kogxbxex together with the President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nMr. Rebozo\n3/20/70; 12:45 p.m.\nR: The weather is gorgeous here. Are you going to\nK: Can I let you know tomorrow morning. I am debating between\nDorado Beach and Paradise Island. Do you have any suggestion?\nR: I have only been to Dorado. They are rather similar. I think\nthe choice of restaurants is better at Paradise but Dorado must be\nvery good. I have only been to Dorado and that was for a short visit.\nK: I may go a few days to one and a few days to the other.\nR: Let me know what you want to do. We are all set up in this\n. place I thought would be the best for you, but you decide for yourself.\nNo problem.\nK: I will let you know first thing in the morning.\nR: There is one other thing I wanted to talk to you about. You have\na man with you named Vaky. I understand there is some decision\nabout to be made about the placement of an Inter-American Social\nDevelopment Institute. The bill was introduced by our Congressman,\nPurcell and it has been approved but they have not selected a site.\nNew Orleans has been mentioned, but I would be partial to Miami\nand would like to present their case before any decision is made.\nK: Let me look into it.\nR: Just leave the door open that's all I ask. We have a lot of\nSpanish speaking people here. I understand they would employ up\nto 100 people. But for other selfish reasons I would like to see Miami\nget it.\nK: I will look into it. And I will let you know first thing in the\nmorning on the other.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPrdsident/Kissinger\n3:06 pm\n3/20/70\nP: I had two thoughts -- One, I wondered if you would draft out a piece of paper\non that SAM thing. What I had in mind was to indicate that on\nand in\na memo to the Secy. of Defense I recommended we should respond when SAM\nfired at us. At that time there was no site and the weather made strikes\ninfeasible. Third, this authority still stands and a response is to be made when\nthe weather makes it possible. I don't want it to be a new order but one that\nstands.\nK: That's right. We can say that the authority to retaliate stands when bad\nweather makes it impossible.\nP: I want to send it to Laird SO he will have the authority.\nK: I layed it into Dobrynin. I said the cease fire ? ? ? ? and SA-3 when the\nPresident found out it cancelled all that and I said they couldn't deal with this\nPresident the same way as they have dealt with past administrations. He said\nhe didn't know anything about SA-3. I believe him -- they wouldn't tell him.\nHe asked if we had other sources other than Israeli sources. The Israelis got\nit from us -- the Pentagon.\nP: What about the 1200 men.\nK: The Birtish.\nP: We have hard figures. I could say that\nK: I wouldn't confirm that. We have some reports and we are studying them.\nThen you would have trouble explaining why we are not giving them Phantoms.\nP: If he doesn't admit it, we can play it that the story is open (?). Another\nthing -- if I were they, I would have worried about the Brandt reception in E.\nGermany. Anytime anybody from the West goes to the East/it's like\nRomania.\nK: They fear two Germanjes may get together on nationalism. It should worry\nthem a hell of a lot. Heknow a little bit about my trip. He said he had heard\nthat progress is being made.\nP: Who leaked it?\nK: The NVN probably said something.\nP: He might leak it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPresident/ K issinger\n3:06 pm\n3/20/70\n-2-\nK No, he knows but he wouldn't unless it would benefit them some how and right\nnow it wouldn't. -- I said we had it all set and you cancelled it.\nP: Because of their move.\nK: And because it looked tixe like they were using the cease fire to help their\nposition. If they had a position that would ? ?????\nP; When Rabin want back, he was ready to sign.\nK: On Tuesday.\nP: When is Dobrynin going back?\nK: Dobrynin's going back on the 12th.\nP: I hope he doesn't think we were given anything.\nK: Also, he wasn't sure they were telling him everything, for the first time.\nP: Who?\nK: The NVN. He asked me and I said you had better go to your friends and\nask them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nDean Acheson\n3/20/70; 4:35 p.m.\nA: I had two thoughts. Just wanted to let you know that I am on that\nside too. One has to do with Cambodia. Eight years ago I represented\nhis government at The Hague and spent some time there with him. He\nmust have slipped a lot to get in this position. He had a firm hold on that\ngovernment eight years ago. I think a lot of changes have gone on.\nWhat I was thinking about -- don't let's get drawn into this one.\nK: Oh, no. We have no intention.\nA: khavex I just wanted you to know that I am urging this too. I wouldn't\nbet much on this government's staying there.\nK: We are saying nothing, and more important, doing nothing.\nA: We don't need any more weak allies in Southeast Asia. In another field,\nthe President said the other day that he thought the XXXXXXX Russians\nmight make some proposal and he feared the general rush toward that.\nSomeone might say, grab it and he thought we ought to have a proposal of\nour own. I got hold of Paul the other day and talked to him about what\nwent on, and Paul shares my worry about Gerry Smith. He thinks he\nwould be the fellow who would say, oh, yes, let's get hold of this.\nPaul thinks the only way if a proposal is made is suggestion which seems\nvery wise to me. We say, well whatever you say is very interesting.\nWe would be interested in talking about possibility of regulating number of\nlaunches or number of manned bases. Nobody would really like to do this.\nBut the point is not whether you do it but whether you suggest it. The thing\nthat is good about it is that they would not\nThe Army and the Air Force\nwouldn't like it at all. The Navy ould think it is fine. It seems to me that\nif you are looking for a suggestion as a countermeasure here is one that is pretty\ngood.\nK: I have been talking to Paul and let me talk to him again to get the details.\nHe is very good.\nA: That is all I have in mind.\nK: The President is calling me. I will call you back in 15 minutes.\nA: OK\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nThe President\n3/20/70; 4:45 p.m.\n(Missed first part of conversation)\nK: I have a group here to get to work out a position we can take. I have\nbeen la talking to Elliot Richardson and will have a recommendation to\nyou in a few minutes.\nN: Ron has to brief now.\nK: We would like to shift it to Bangkok and let the Thais do it. It is\ntough for us to announce it. The basic problem here is this is a battalion.\nWe don't know that it is two battalions. What it is, it is one battalion,\none battery with 4 guns.\nN: Right. OK.\nK: They would send it in to train Laos troops.\nN: I understand, but what do you want us to say? If I just \"no comment\" --\ndo you want me to go through that tomorrow? I shouldn't get into that at all.\nShould we just refer the whole thing to Bangkok?\nK: I think the Thais should take it.\nN: He is going to be briefing in a minute and I am just trying to find a\nway to have him sayxixxx finesse.\nK: Some Thai training troops in there. Further details will have to come\nfrom Bangkok.\nN: Well that sounds like Mickey Mousing. All right, get something out.\nIf you can get something out I will handle it tomorrow. In the future you\nshould always finesse these with Ziegler rather than I have to answer.\nK: We are just trying to work something out with Ziegler.\nms\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 07-31/6: PerLtr. 18Nov 2008\nBy\nP.G H NARA, Date 4.3-09\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRichardson/Kissinger\n4:50 pm\n3/20/70\nK: What do you think we should say on the Thai troops?\nR: I talked to Marshall Green after taking to you and they agreed that whatever\nis said should be said by Laos or Thailand. Their thought is that ????\nand that that's the Thais have said yes, they have responded to this request\nand we should say we are supporting them.\nK: One battery, isn't it?\nR: of 300 men.\nK: They were sent for a training exercise and replaced by Laotians after this\nwas over?\nR: I don't know. It may be they were asked to stay. Originally it was contemplated\nas a training exercise. Then they got caught.\nK: Let me talk to Marshall. We will take a no comment stand.\nR: I am planning on lunch Tuesday.\nK: I think that's all right.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 07-31/2: PerLtr. 18 Now 2008\nBy P.G.H. NARA, Date 4-3-09\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nM. Green/Kissinger\n4:55 pm\n3/20/70\nK: What are the facts on the Sierra Romeo again? You get us into trouble. Bombi\nall over the place. I just told the President you were bleeding (?) for it.\nG: We said 3 months ago these things are useless. There are about 300. They\nwere put in last year, taken out, recently put back in again.\nK: I know we decided last year on putting them back in. Shouldn't they have been\nreplaced by Laotians?\nG: No, the decision was taken about 6 months ago to put them back in. I will\nhave to call you back.\nK: The position we take publicly is that we cannot say anything now.\nG: We will get in touch with Bangkok and Vientiane saying that Thais are giving\nsupport. This has happened before.\nK: Reaction to the immediate press.\nG: As soon as we have word that they will brief accordingly, we willx are going\nto brief the Hill. More because it will leak. Meanwhile, we will take a no-\ncomment stand -- which is not easy because the press is bombarding us.\nThen we will have to say ??????\nK: This has been going on since when?\nG: Off and on for a couple of years. I will call you back in a couple of mins.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\n31/8: 18Nov.2008\nBy P.G. H NARA, Date 4-3-09\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHaldeman/Kissinger\n5:25 pm\n3/20/70\nK: A1 Haig is enraged and ready to tear Ron Zeigler limb from limb. He\nconstantly gets some trivial problem and asked the President what he should\ndo. On 08 some of the issues the President doesn't know the answers. The\nother day he had the President and me in the President's office for 1 1/2 hours\non something we already had the answers to and the President finally came up\nwith the same answer. On this Thais in Laos, he came to Al who was working\non something else for the President and couldn't give him much time. Ron\nstormed out of here and went to the President. We nearly had the whole thing\nset up but he just got everything in a mess.) To panic the President is just not\nright. If he wants to get the facts from us and our recommendation and then\nhe should get the President's views if he is not satisfied. If the President\nhad told him something WXXX wrong, it would have been a probelm. We had to\nwork it out with two other governments. We are going to get him in and give\nhim hell. I wanted you to know incase he comes running to you.\nH: He won't come to me but he is trying to do his job the same as the rest\nof us and we are all trying to accomplish the same thing.\nK: He should have the facts before he goes to the President.\nH: He has a frustrating job trying to get the facts.\nK: He won't get them from the President. Houdek worked for two hours getting\nhim the facts. I pay a man full time to assist him. I think what he did was wrong.\nH: I do too.\nK: To infuriate me is easy but to get Haig to loose his temper is hard.\nH: Don't blow your temper with him or everything will blow.\nK: We will talk to him calmly.\nH: I agree. Is xxxx it ixx untangled now?\nK: Enough so the President can stay away from it tomorrow.\nH: That's what's important.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nPerLtr. 18 Nov 2008\nBy P.G.H NARA, Date 4-3-09\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nJ. Moore/Kissinger\n5:35 pm\n3/20/70\nT\nM: ??? press problem and Congressal problem and you carry the\n.\nK: When we are in trouble the State Dept. rushes to admit that it has participated.\nM: I will take that as graciously as it was given.\nK: fan you get me the basic facts on Sierra Romeo and when the decision was\nmade to get it in there. It's an application of the Nimon Doctrine.\nM: The sooner we put it in context the sooner it's ?????\nK: You have been told what Zeigler said?\nM: Yes, and we have worked out a formula.\nK: What is it?\nM: I have talked to Bangkok. They are trying to get Laos and Thailand in to\ntake a denial position. Bangkok had not heard from them. Prior to Zeigler's\nreport the idea was to get Thailand, with the consent of Laos, to say something\ntomorrow that ix it has make available support forces with the request of the\nLaotian Government. Whilethis is going on our press spokesman» would say\nthat we have nothing to comment because we understand the Laotian Government\nhas something to say and we will wait. Then if Thailand and Laos did not agreex\nto this we will go ahead anyway and try to get them to back us up. That's the\nshape we are in now.\nK: You will not put out the facts first, will you?\nM: No, we will get The Thais and Laotians to confirm what we said.\nK: How long has Sierra Romeo been going on?\nM: For a couple of years and it came out about last summer and it went in\n3 days agol\nK: It's going in was arranged months ago.\nM: We had been talking about it for a while ;and Thailand and Loas disagreed\nwhen it should be. Maybe three weeks ago we forced them to make arrangements\nwe could agree on and then Thailand and Laos got together.\nM: Then the implementation was only worked out recently.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN07-31/10:PerLtr. 18 Nov.2008\nBy P.G. NARA, Date 4-3-09 Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED, Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nJ. Moore/Kissinger\n5:35 pm\n3/20/70\n-2-\nM: When we started conversations we put in\nwhat had been discussed\na long time.\nK: Marshall had recommened Long Tien because it was behind the line.\nM: It was recommended by Laird because it was adequately protected but when\nthey finally went in they were practiaally overrun.\nK: What's the situation in Laos today?\nM: The situation is that they have about 6 - - 7,000 NVA ready to attack anytime.\nSome of the immediate advance unitex are within one mile.\nKL We will loose it. Will we lose the guns?\nmarch?\nM: Sure and\nwants to ???? it out. We have a message saying\n\"????????\"\nK: I have seen it.\nM: Do you want to talk to Marshall again? I will have it to you in writing.\nAlso, in addition to the Zeigler statement and non-denial from Thailand and\nLaos, we will have to make a comment that we are supporting.\nK: We will say that as soon as we have confirmed it.\n(NLN 07-31/10 P 2062)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nG. Smith/Kissinger\n5:55 pm\n3/20/70\nK: Didn't I tell you that before the Verification Panel was over we would be\non the same side?\nS: No, you XXXXX didn;t but\nyou will. I just learned that Alden Frye,\nSen. Javits man, called a man in ACDA, Weisbrod, and said he saw a memo\non a compendium on MIRV that he wants to get. That brings us to something\nelse. I had a man of mine, Hubgerman, do a study for me. Frye told Weisbrod\nthat he had seen the Hubberman paper on how the Soviets view the American\nMIRV program. He said he had seen this from someone on the NSC. This\nis quite a document and I thought I should pass this on to you.\nK: I find it hard to believe.\nS: It sounds peculiar.\nK: If that's true, the man is dead.\nS: I should think so.\nK: If you could find out who, I willguarantee he is fired.\nS: I gave a copy to Helms and Nitze.\nK: Who on my staff? I have never seen it.\nS: I don't know. I sent it to you. I sent it just directly to you.\nK: You are saying I leaked it?\nS: No. You asked who I sent it to. I'm only reporting an allegation I thought\ndisturbing.\nK: I will look into that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nGovernor Dewey\n3/20/70; 6:05 p.m.\ndid not\nD: I called you because the mails weren't working. We/don't send\nout a reminder. The only way to settle it was to call you.\nWe go to the Opera House, arrive 6:15 the Grand Tier Restaurant\nfor dinner. Can I pick you up?\nK: I have just run into a complication. There may be an NSC meeting\nTuesday afternoon, and if there is, I am dead. It depends on when the\nPresident goes away.\nD: I didn't know he was going away.\nK: Wednesday morning or afternoon he is going to Key Biscayne.\nJust over Easter.\nD: Well I hope he lets you come up. You let me know.\nK: I have kept the afternoon and evening open on my calendar.\nI want to talk to you early next week about the other matter we spoke of.\nD: I have a feeling we are doing pretty well on this business of sentiment.\nThe recent events are pretty good. Those two women now are turning\nout good pictures.\nK: We may have a reason to keep you traveling so that you can do some\nother things.\nD: I will be here. What I was going to suggest was to give you our\nplace. I was going to suggest that we pick you up. And would you like\nto have my car pick you up at the airport when you arrive?\nI\nK: Why don't I call your office Monday morning.\nD: We are going to the country this weekend so don't call before\n11:00 in the morning Monday.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSANITIZED COPY\nC05953775\nNLN-TELCONS-4-7-46-1\n2081\nSANITIZED\nEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nThe President\n3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.\nP:\nHow are you getting along on the\nthing. Is it done?\nK:\nI don't know if you talked to Ziegler. We gave him some guidance\nthat provides a cushion for you.\nP:\nWhy didn't State put that out instead of kicking it over here. They\nthrew it to Ziegler and now Ziggler had to throw it to me.\nK:\nDid Ziegler tell you what we told him to say?\nP:\nHe said it was a modest amount.\nK:\nThe details of any\nparticipation would have to come from\nVietiane.\nP:\nThe newspaper stories are wildly exaggerated -- we had nothing to\ndo with it.\nK:\nWell, we paid for it.\nP:\nBut they don't know that.\nK:\nWe provided two answers to you tomorrow you can say:\n(a) this is an application of the Nixon Doctrine -- they are Asians\nin trouble which we are helping out.\nP:\nAlso, North Vietnamese in Laos\nWe are going to put Harriman right on the.\nwe really have to slug\nthem on that.\nK:\nI don't think we have to be too defensive on the\nthing. It\nhas been known. It's just\nP:\nHow long did they have it there?\nK:\nJust two weeks -- but it was agreed to be sent there in October.\nP:\nI remember there was some discussion about it when I was there.\nK:\nasked you about it.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nPer sec. 3.3(b)(1); Hr. 6/2/2015\nBy TWIT NARA, Date 12/5/2022\nNLN 11-52/2081 [p.10f6]\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 3526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nC05953775\nNLN-TELCONS-4-7-46-1\nSANITIZED COPY\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.\n- 2 -\nSANITIZED\n3.3(b)(1)\nP:\nDid Elliot help you today?\nK:\nYes, he was good. Marshall Green collapses when things are tough.\nP:\nI am not going to be devensive on\nLaos. I really feel\nthe briefing book has alot of material - --didn't we cover it in the\nstatement?\nK:\nIt is just so you have it in mind just in case you get asked about it.\nP:\nLet's keep Laos out of the thing.\nK:\nYes. You fully stated your position in your statement of two weeks\nago.\nas\nP:\nWhat about this order? I just want it to be sent over 1dd an order\nto be signed by me.\nK:\nIt is being drafted and I will have it for you.\nP:\nThey don't have to put out a press release.\nK:\nI have given the strictest instructions not to say anything.\nP:\nThey say these things can't be done -- for a year we hit Cambodia\nbut no one knew.\nK:\nDick Helms sent over a memorandum from the Station Chief in Laos\nthat said without the B-52's the whole thing is going to fall apart.\nP:\nWhy is B'52 so important?\nK:\nB-52's bomb with radar, they fly with reconnaissance.\nP:\nIf anybody asks me about that I will say yes, we will continue to do\nthat. The thing to do is not to be a bit defensive about it. We have\nto say that the enemy is threatening our position in Laos.\nK:\nI still hope this thing in Paris will work out -- certainly after two\nmore meetings something should.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED COPY\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nC05953775\nNLN-TELCONS-4-7-46-1\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.\n-3-\nP:\nI don't know if we can wait that long -- you can't let them vacillate.\nI think they may be diddling.\nK:\nBut they aren't getting any publicity from these talks.\nP:\nBut they know that we won't hit them if we are talking to them.\nThe Laos thing should be some message to them.\nK:\nOh, they will notice that. I don't know what they are up to, but\nthey can't just be diddling us along.\nP:\nTwo good happened. The Brandt reception in East Germany and\nthe Cambodia thing. The Brandt thing has sent shivers up their back.\nCan't you imagine the kind of reception I would get if I went there. I just\nmay go. If Brandt wanted it, I would go.\nK:\nThe outcome would be unpredictable -- you know the East German\nis tough.\nP:\nThey are much tougher than the Hungarians. Even the American\npress reported the Brandt visit that way even though they hated to do it.\nK:\nGerman situation is dangerous.\nP:\nIf it is dangerous to us, it is dangerous to the Soviets. How long\nwould it take them to get weapons?\nK:\nI would not comment on the Cambodian thing directly.\nP:\nI will just say we noted the change and recognized the Government\nbecause it was selected by Parliamentary means.\nK:\nYou might say we expect Cambodian neutrality.\nP:\nHe may come back and take it over again -- you never know this\nmay be a help to us, too.\nK:\nThe Cambodian development is a plus. The weakening of the menu\nseries\nThe B-52 strikes, keep them going. I want SAM sites hit soon.\nIs the weather okay?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nC05953775\nNLN-TELCONS-4-7-46-1\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.\n-4-\nK:\nThe weather is awful but they should be able to do it soon. April\nshould be much better. We should be able to get uninterrupted periods\nof two weeks.\nP:\nOur press on three networks made grave mention of the fact that\ncasualties were over 100. There is no mention of the fact that they are\n1/3 or 70% lower than last year -- 350.\nK:\nPossibly about 400.\nP:\nBasically the people in the press are not loyal to this country.\nK:\nThey can't bear the thought that you can come out all right.\nP:\nWe are either going to do it at Paris or we will do it the other way --\nbut we are going to do it. I have been reading these figures over the last\nthree months -- if we killed one-third of what they say, there wouldn't\nbe anyone left in North Vietnam.\nK:\nThe fact that no one has ever come back from North Vietnam\nthe impact on South Vietnam must be enormous -- there is a breaking point (?)\nI was doing some preparations for my next meeting. They just aren't\ntalking in these meetings as they were before. They aren't going 'to make\nit last for another three years.\nP:\nYou are going to meet them on the 6th.\nK:\n4th or 5th and then on the 18th.\nP:\nI would tell them to fish and cut bait.\nK:\nWhen you read the transcript, you will see that they have given a\nhell of a lot more than we have. We told them we would go out in 12 months.\nP:\nThey have not given us anything.\nK;\nThey don't insist on the 10 point anymore. If they don't say anything\nabout the military thing next time I will not go back.\nP:\nThat's right, what we have to do is create a provocation to hit them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nC05953775\nNLN-TELCONS-4-7-46-1\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.\n-5-\nP:\nWe are not going to hit them the way Johnson did. If we provoke\nwe are going to kick the shit out of them -- anything\neverything short\nof nuclear weapons. That's why I approved the B-52 thing so fast. We\nare already being blamed for being in Laos, what difference does it make\nif we hit them with little planes or big ones. We may as well use the big\nones.\nK:\nI will give them an ultimatum that if they don't give us something\nI will break off. The\nP:\nThe talks are important to them.\nK:\nAlthough you deflated the talks to the point that they are not getting\nout of them what they used to. It's even off American TV. Habib is never\non TV. Laos is a good diversion for the timebeing.\nP:\nYou mean for the US -- in the sense we are not talking about Vietnam\nIf we talk about Laos, people will think we are engaging in another war.\nThis press is unbelievable. I told Ziegler everyone is bad -- they are all\nyour enemy. They came up to me after the Gridiron and said something\nabout new relations. I told them to forget it, it was just for one hour.\nYou feel you have to get along with them socially -- I can't feel that way.\nI just don't want to associate with them.\nK:\nI see them rarely.\nP:\nThey bore the hell out of you. As a group they are slobs.\nI will see Joe Alsop.\nK:\nQuality of people going into journalism isn't high.\nP:\nI don't know about their intelligence they write well and quickly --\nthey just don't have loyalty.\nP:\nLet's come back onthe Laos thing -- the diversion.\nK:\nThe Muskie speech?\nP:\nWho picked it up.\nK:\nNo one.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nC05953775\nNLN-TELCONS-4-7-46-1\nMr. Kissinger/President\n3/20/70; 7:09 p.m.\n-6-\nP:\nThe only problem we have now is whether the public will think\nthe whole thing is one package.\nK:\nBasically, the people who are attacking Laos -- Hugh Scott said\nthey are the ones who failed on their attack on your Vietnam policy\nand are now looking for another way to attack it.\nP: I am going to work the balance of the evening on the press thing.\nIf you have anything, make sure I have it by 10:00.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n7:55 pm\n3/20/70\nP: What I was thinking about was that you should give Wheeler a call and make\nsure he knows what I said about this SAM decision directly and what I said\nprox privately to Laird about those generals. I will not let those guys fall for\nthis. Laird may not want to talk to them but it has to get down the line to them and\nI will not persecute them. McGovern says he is going to attack the Nixon\ndoctrine. As far as I'm concerned we gain nothing by giving them anything.\nYou were so X excited about germ warfare and Biafra. Who has heard of Biarfa\nsince that day you called me?\nK: These bleeding hearts ? ? ? ? ? Basically they like power and success.\nP: Biafra will die.\nare\nK: Andxxxxx being starved.\nP: We have the 52's in here and they will go. SAM's we will hit and hit fast.\nI want it done Sunday.\nK: I will have that memo on your desk tomorrow xxixx morning.\nP: I want Laird and Wheeler to know we want something done Sunday.\nK: I was justtalking to Laird to make sure he will deep the menu thing going.\nP: Put it in writing and I will sign it.\nK: I told him menu was coming.\nP: Never send anything to Laird in the future without sending it to Wheeler.\nSend them a just memo on menu. Hit the SAM sites and send a memo signed\nmy me. We will get this bureaucracy in shape.\nK: I couldn't agree more.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nGen Wheeler\n3/20/70; 8:00 p.m.\nK: The President wanted me to call you about three things. The\nfirst, he wanted you to know that he feels these generals should not\nbe made the fall guys for My Lai and he will see to it that they don't\nget ruined. It is up to you if you want to convey that. He will not\npermit the military to be kicked around in this country. The second\nthing, he is sending over a memo to Mel to the effect that SAM sites\nthat have been activated can be struck even if bad weather should\ninterfere with retaliation after some time and he looks to you for\nimplementation or to be told if for some reason it isn't being\nimplemented within a brief period of time. He is also putting in\nthat the Menu series is going forward and that he is to get weekly\nreports.\nW: I see. I am glad he is sending this over because I got a memo\nback today from Dave want to hold off on this next week's package\nwaiting for clarification of what goes on in Cambodia. This will\nsupersede that I assume.\nK: It damn well better and we will count on you to tell us if for any\nreason it doesn't. I was just told by the Secretary of Defense when\nI said this that you attacked today and you are due to attack again\nTuesday.\nW: I see. Yes sir.\nK:\nOK by you?\nW: Yes, indeed.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n8:10 pm 3/20/70\nis not for\nK: The President called again and I told him that signing an authorization/and him\nwe are doing it as a memo and you will do it an an authorization. He agrees.\nL: e understands.\n1\nK: He wants those things executed Sun. xxxxx or Mon.\nL: We will get that one\nK: That's the one he wants. We will draft it as one at a time.\nL: I will give you a report.\nK: YThat's it.\nL: We shouldn't run to the President everytime. I will give you areport.\nK: We don't want an unlimited authority to hit the same site 50 days in a row.\nL: That's exactly it and we have to be careful.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nSecretary Laird\n3/20/70; 9:50 p.m.\nK: The President is really jumping tonight. He just had me call Wheeler\nto give him his feelings about these generals that he gave you\nyesterday.\nL: Wheeler isn't even in the process. Its the Joint Chairman, the\nJoint Chief, the two of them.\nK: Hejust wanted him to know on a personal basis. He wanted me to\nsay he was sending a memo on the missile sites. I just didn't want\nto deal with Wheeler without telling you.\nL: You shouldn't, Henry. I am sick and tired of that Joint Staff running\naround behind my back. They got us into trouble a couple of times.\nK: Whenever I deal with Wheeler you know that.\nL: I know this. That is true of Wheeler too. He is great. My problem\nis not Wheeler. He feels very badly about this. About the generals.\nK: The President did not intend that as a directive. He had read something\nMcGovern said and wanted Wheeler to know the generals wouldn't get kicked\naround in his Administration. He just meant it as a friendly gesture.\nL: Well, Wheeler knows how I feel on that too.\nK: Well, and he made that clear. Wheeler and you as far as I can tell\nare always on the same wave length.\nL: He is a great guy. It's too bad he is going to have to change. But we\nare going to have to go soon on that. I think we should go around the 15th\nof April with an announcement by the President. Then we can get the bill\nthrough Congress to make Wheeler a 4-Star general.\nK: You mean a permanent one?\nL: Yes. If they are going to make Hershey one they should Wheeler.\nK: Does that get him any perquisites when he leaves?\nL: Yes, it affects his retirme ment too.\nK: I think the 15th is a good time for that. Good, Mel I won't bother you\nagain tonight.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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