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Kissinger/Potter (Baltimore Sun)
4-16-70 9:00 p.m.
Mr. Potter called to read and discuss the Malik statement with Mr.
Kissinger. He said he was having Paul write the article but that he
had done a lot of the work, particularly with State Department officials.
After reading portions of the proposed article the conversation turned
to a brief question and answer session.
P: Did you talk the matter over with the President?
K: We just talked about it.
P: How about Dobrynin?
K: Dobrynin has gone home for consultation. We have always had the
feeling this thing was going to break.
P: What would you anticipate on another world conference another
Geneva?
K: That was indicated in the Malik thing.
P: Has anyone opposed but North Vietnam?
K: It is inconceivable North Vietnam would oppose. The Soviet Union
wouldn't say that without North Vietnamese (concurrence)
P: How about China?
K: China might oppose.
I think the Cambodian thing showed they haven't been able to stampede
us, in public or in Paris. Things are going better in South Vietnam.
P: I would imagine a widened war is more damaging to them than to us.
K: Shows what can happen.
P: The Russians might be moving toward
K: I don't want to go into it.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
President/Kissinger
11:30 X am
4/17/70
P: ????? move back and forth. The mountain is the highest. I heard
this morning that guerrilla -- I want Wheeler to check if 52 strikes W on that
mountain willhelp; Get going fast and a strike withint two hours.
Further conversation: 11:32
P: On two things that are quite clear on briefings here. The line of our enemies
and many of our people here are playing that Long Nol may not make it and
Sihanouk is our best bet.
K: Right.
P: The Japanese think so. Contact somebody -- this is an order -- can you
contact your opposite number? Call in the Ambassador and tell him that we
C onsider Long Nol's prospects excellent and we would find it difficult in our
relations with them if they supported the other side. And convey to Sato that
we would be up set if Japan doesn't support him. Get the CIA jerks working
on Cambodia -- I don't see this about two sides. Are we getting across the
story that this is a fictious thing?
K: Helms said yesterday after my conversation with you that they would
throw it into high gear.
P: Long Nol is it and I would urge wide-spread demonstrations against
Sihanouk.
K: They have already.
P: Get Helms' radio to broadcast in there that Sihanouk is coming in with
NVN liberators. I want a report in my desk today at 4:00 with his ideas. I
don't want - - I want everyon in this government to know we are supporting
the government in power. They are to
up that hill and anyone who
does not follow this will be fired. Tell Marshall Green that if anyone
who disagrees I want his resignation on my desk by noon.
K: I have to get Laird to do what you said. They must follow your strategy.
P: Do it with Green or on the Johnson level. Tell him that you may bex have
other views but the Presi dent feels this way and we are going to do that.
There is no possibility of our supporting Sihanouk and we are supporting
Long Nol. Tell Helms to have printed one million leafletswith NVN and
a prexx picture of Sihanouk, saying "liberate Cambodia. 11 Get my point?
K: Absolutely.
P: Get a programsand:have a report on my desk at 4:00 on how they carried
it out. 2958, atis amended, Sect 35
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Litrary
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TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
11:30 am
4/17/70
K: About that thing we were discussing yesterday. Where does it stand?
L: I have a proposal here. I'm going to send it with an alternative. There
are no sites in the area capable of reaching Laos. There were some active
sites on the 11th of April but there's nothing there now escept some parts and
things. There are some pads and aquipment that could be reactivated. We
could hit that site. I would recommend another alternative that we go in
here on Rt. 1032 a new one at the end of the
K: The President is calling. I will call you right back.
Further conversation: 11:40
L: I will send this over to you.
K: Can it be here by noon? He k is getting extrementy resitve. He is
yelling about not getting his orders carried out.
L: Maybe I should call him. If I can't find a site, I can't help that. We
have a 19 mile range and this is 25 miles over.
K: That's - I don't know those facts.
They
L: x can move that site over so it has a capability against our aircraft
We can take out their components so it can't be reactivated.
K: He doesn't care if it hits Laos. He wants to hit NVN.
L: How about 1032 and slopping over. Near the DMZ.
K: What do your Chiefs thing?
L: I am getting a knock recpmmendation now. I have to use protective reaction
on this. We can look out the components
K: Can't you knock out -- can't youmeasure it?
L: They know they have only a 19 mile range and they know we know.
K: They know we are no t hitting for that reason'.
L: The Chiefs are against it. They recommend that site where there were
missiles on the 11th of April. We don't need to say anything. There are
components --
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Laird/Kissinger
11:30 am
4/17/70
-2-
K: Will you send the Chief's recommendation over with your recommendation
in the next hour?
L: I will call him. I can get him a better site on the NVN side of the DMZ.
But we can slop over. We have hit had that area but never in the north.
K: Get that report over here, please.
L: The Chiefs go along and We say the best is the deactivated site. But I
don't want to tell the President this is active. These things are generally
known. This bothers me you want to give a message but you also want
to do a little good.
K: He is strong on this and is gubbi bugging me.
L: He reads the newspapers --
K: His strategy is that by squeezing them they will give in faster.
L: I have been reading that file you get just as much hell by being in the open.
K: But you hit supply dumps and there's no justification.
L: They are hitting us from this site. It's AA fire it's in Laos.
K: He is ordering this thing today one way or the other. There's no doubt
about it.
L: If I disagree, I will go to him.
K: You have every right. I have orders and I am not fighting with you. Wxex
L: We can go up and hit this. The Chiefs don't think we should hit one that
isn't a threat. The only one we have is on the Vinh airbase but it doesn't
have anything on Laos. There are a couple of others but they are way in.
K: Can you have your alternative recommendations in an hour?
L: We will have both recommendations. We had a good strike last night.
There were NVN in good concentration. I have a couple of other things
I'm concerned about the Jordanian thing. That ambassador is on one day
and off the next.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Laird/Kissinger
11:30 am
4/17/70
-3-
K: I was amazed when they cancelled that trip.
L: That should not have been cancelled. One day that ambassador says
ship arms and then he says hold them. The King said ? ? ? Things are
worse now then they were.
K: I raised holy hell with my staff man that such a decision was made without
White House consideration.
L: On this Candian thing, you were there -- we have a cable and it's tough
but the one that goes out is milk toast.
K: How did that happen?
L: I don't know but it's not tough. If we are going to have meetings to discuss
these things and Dave spent much time and then they send an entirely different
one. In Jorday we are in worse shape now then we have ever been. I was
mad today.
K: I understand that.
L: We gave the worst kind of signals we can. Did you get a copy of the
second draft?
K: I will get back on that by 2:30.
L: I made those 5 changes. Bill thinks we shouldn't take a strong statement
on ABM. I can't do that.
K: The Secy. of Defense should be able to talk about defense or we are in
real trouble.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
General Wheeler
Mr. Kissinger
April 17, 1970, 12 Noon
W:
Hello Henry.
K:
I have been having some conversations with Mel. I want to
be sure I understand. Is it true that the Chiefs recommend
that we do not hit the SAM sites?
W:
No, there is one that we don't think we should do because
it is 20 miles inside the border and is not a bother. The
other does not pose any problem. I have recommended in
a CM that it be attacked. It is to the south of the other one.
You should know that they can put those components together
in three hours and they could have themselves an operational
site.
K:
What's this road. He wants to hit Route 1023 near the DMZ.
What is that?
W:
There is a road down near the DMZ that leads into the southern
panhandle. I don't understand why he mentioned this. It is a
supply route if you want to look at it that way. I am perfectly
willing to take out supplies.
K:
Which would you rather do?
W:
I would rather do both. Take out the SAM components and also
hit 1023.
K:
OK. Alright Bus. I suffer from the naive idea that Presidential
orders tend to get carried out. He is now talking about supply
operations. He does not want to do SAM site. OK Bus.
mlh
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Telecon
Secretary Rogers
4/17/70 p.m.
K: I talked to Mel about this paper and he's taking out the SALT
references. At least he tells me he is. And he sent something else
over I've just skimmed. It's less violent than the preceding draft.
R: I don't see why he shouldn't put the facts in; let the facts
speak for themselves. Bud it doesn't help to say what we are suspicious
of, that we think they are developing a first strike capability. It just
gets their hackles up. It's not productive. Have you talked to the P about
?
K: He's been so wripped up with the astronaut thing. I didn't have
a chance to tell him. You are giving a talk tomarrow on SALT?
R: It's at a Cronell meeting. There will be something on SALT and
something on Southeast Asia. The only question I have is whether we should
do something on the Malik statement. I got a call from Mansfield and Aiken.
They thought we should have some positive response. The President might
point out that we are willing to enter negotiations on any subject. I could
say something about we've asked Yost to pursue with Malik what he has in
mind.
K: That's almost what the President means to say minus the Amb.
Yost part. Say we are ready to explore, but you want to say who's doing
the exploring. The President is thinking of saying something like that.
R: This won't pre-empt him. It probably won't be noticed. This is
along the President's guidelines in not saying a lot about SALT. I will
comments about what Breshnev said and they say we are serious.
K: That's a good things to say.
R: I've been trying to get language from the Pentagon to support them
on ABMs.
K: Laird has been calling every half hour.
R: He may not have so much trouble. Aidke Aiken and Mansfield XXE were
in a great frame of mind this morning. In Cambodia I'm going to say we have
no present plans to use Americans there.
K: That is correct. We can't rush out to xxxx embrace the Malik thing,
but they couldn't have said it without Hanoi's knowledge. I think it's quite a
positive thing.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
Secretary Rogers
4/17/70 p.m. page 2
R: I'm not very hopeful on the SALT talks.
K: No, but we've set it very well. And we've all worked together on
it. No one can run around Washington and get different opinions. The
President will know where to get you this weekend, won't he? Of your
office will know.
R: Yes.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
12:12 pm
4/17/70
L: I'm sorry but when you called back I had the officials of the Ford Motor
Co. and I wanted to get them out.
K: I understand.
L: I'm going to send this memo over. It isn't the detail that another hour
would give. I think I should tell the President that we can hit it but we
don't have any active missiles involved, SAM's, but they could set up the
missiles.
K: You have every right to call him anytime you want to.
L: I think he should know so when it breaks he won't ask why I didn't
tell him.
K: You will probably get orders to do both.
L: I would rather hit down there. That AA is fi ring at us. It's in Laos
but *********** we don't have to know that. You are talking about slopping
over 4-5 miles.
K: His signal is that we are thinking of going again with the bombing.
L: They will get that because there's a supply route. We will send it over
there. Henry, I hope you don't think I was too upset about that Jordanian
thing.
K: I felt the same way about it.
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TELCON
P. Farley/Kissinger
12:20 pm
4/17/70
F: I have been engaged in a three way conversation with Gardner, Rogers
and Tucker on sperating procedures of the delegation and I want to be sure
what's done is right. Have you talked to Gardner or Laird?
K: k Laird called me yesterday.
F: You know how Gerry felt about being uninhibitied.
K: I know how the President feels. One thing that will create feelings is
that option D has the same status as C and is not a fall back position. I don't
think we have to give the order three times. They have equal status and
we want to discuss them both.
F: I didn't realize there was an issue on this. I thought that was very
clear. There was a reference to (order) in both the instructions and I under-
stand that the people in Vientna felt that as long as we were going to take the
second step on the discussion in NATO nad it's better not to put that on the
table with the Soviets. That might inhibit it.
K: Why should it. I got word to Gerry he was to discuss it at NATO.
F: He did and no if, ands or buts but we were going to handle NATO thing
before tabling it. Larry has the thing to look at the U.S. side of it.
K: That problem exists in either case with any option.
F: Actually the reduction one --
K: If we make the hard one ? !?????
F: The only questionsxthat has been raised with the degree with which the
statements made by the delegation are reviewed back here. I had proposed
after talking to Rogers to get word to Gerry that if anything of significance
he would make, he wxbx should get it back here but we should discourage the
idea that every FSO-3 or Lt. Col has a better idea.
K: That's right. Laird said that opening statements are not being cleared
any more. But you are not saying that.
F: He is right. One that was made today was not cleared and the one for
Monday has not been cleared. I will cable Gerry and say we have to have
that.
K: We are having a loose rein but I think we should see it.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Chapin/Kissinger
morning (12:46 ish)
4/17/70
C: Laird called. I didn't talk to him. Nell talked to his secretary. He
has asked that the President call him on the secure phone. The President
has never used the secure phone!
K: I had better see the President and tell him what it's about.
C: I will tell Bob that you would like to talk to the President before he calls
Laird.
K: t's essential.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
1:15 pm
4/17/70
K: The President just asked me to check.
L:
Do you have the memo?
K: Yes. To reaffirm his understanding with you -- to go after that one site
plus the route into VN.
L: As soon as I get that checked out.
K: Both of them.
L: We are checking that other one but we will go on that one. Depending on
the weather.
K: You will letme have a map of the other one.
L: We don't have that fully worked out but you wanted the memo.
K: His understanding is that you are doing both.
L: We k will have it done by Monday noon. They are down in the
.
I will be back in touch later on this afternoon about a couple of other matters.
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Telecon
Dewey
4/17/70 p.m.
K: I'm sorry I couldn't get back to you yesterday.
D: That's okay, nothing urgent. We feel about 10 years younger
don't we?
K: It was a great thing.
D: It was a horror.
K: It was a nightmare for a few days.
D: It was probably rough on the boss.
K: He didn't show it, but toward the end he wanted some of his troops
around.
D: Out of all tragedies some times something comes that's good.
I think that happened this time.
K: It lifted us up a bit.
D: Yes, and it was a wonderful break in the controversies which I'm
skck of and I'm sure everybody else is. Jack McCloy says he's made a
report.
K: There isn't a lot in it.
D: Can you mail it to me at 140 Broadway?
K: It's classified.
D: Too bad.
K: It's a product of people spending helf a day listening instead of
reading.
D: It's too bad the superficial stuff makes the headlines. Is there any-
thing in it I should know that you can tell me?
K: No, you know more than what's in it.b We were way ahead of them.
D: Yes, and everybody gets dredit for it except the President. He got a
good press this morning.
K: I think he's getting a good prews now.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
Gov. Dewey
4/17/70 p.m. page 2
D: Are there any dates you have in mind that I might have to pre-empt?
K: Two things: I would like to have a DOD person talk to you about the
POW thing. That would be Mr. Nutter and one of his people. I'll have them
check with your office
D: I can make Tuesday afternoon after 2:30.
K: They'll be in touch. Some time in the next two or three weeks
I'd like to talk to you about some of the negotiating problems we have
coming up.
D: Are you going to be in town soon? For the evening, for a date?
K: Not likely. My reputation as a swinger is very greatly exaggerated.
The intention is there, but not the time.
D: I understand. I lived it and it's a hell of a life. I do think you'd
live tonger if you could enjoy it more.
K: Could you try to make an appointment in the next two weeks? We
may ask you to do something/ It's important for you to understand the
bureaucratic reasons why we want to do it.
D: I am at your service.
K: I have so much confidence in you.
D: I wish I could justify it.
K: It's tough to find people whom you know are on your side.
D: George Gallup has written me a letter saying he's got 80 pages in
draft on research in depth on public opinion on Vietnam. He wants me to
read it and advise him. Should I say I'll be glad to read it and get a more
official opinion on it se he won't be misled? I could send it down to you and
you could have bomebody with brains on your staff take a look at it. Might
be able to pick up a few things to prevent error or make it better imformed.
I have the highest regard for him as a scholar. If it would be useful I'll
get an extra copy and sent it to you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
Gov. Dewey
4/17/70 p.m. page 3
K: I think that would be very useful. And I was sorry not to be able
to come to your birthday. It was the week Laos was about to go down the
shoot and I'll tell you why it didn't when you come down.
D: I know one reason why it almost did and it's the Senator from Arkansas.
K: Yes, the things that man must have on his conscience if he's got one.
D: The President has ao live with a lot of things.
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TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger
3:00 pm 4/17/70
K: They haven't announced the trip yet.
Z: You're not aware of that? I thought I knew something you didn't know.
You are going to be in L.A. to brief?
K: San Clemente.
Z: Same thing. We will have the girls there for you. You should get into
a thorough briefing.
K: You set that up. What I want to know -- I can't make any preparations
until it's announced. When will it be announced?
Z: About 4:00.
K: What about the WH dinner?
Z: They will probably go on with it.
K: But won't 4/5 of the correspondents be on the trip?
Z: Yes.
K: All right.
Z: Can;t I hold anything over you?
K: The President 08 told me yesterday.
Z: I knew before that. (ha, ha).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Phil Geylin/Kissinger
3:03 pm
4/17/70
G: I want a little general guidance because you don't want to get into a long
confersation on Cambodia.
K: What are your cautioning us against?
G: Getting a little bit pregnant. I have been spening time in the Pentagon
and they don't know how to shoot and we are sending men to show them how.
We have been there before. I'm asking if you can give me guidance on
where that issue is going and at what rate. I don't see any stories of our
getting involved.
K: The question ofwinding up the war in VN is what we want. We don't want
another war. On the other hand, we don't want to tell the NVN to march
on Penom Pehn and we will not stop you. You can be sure we are not
rushing an AID program into Cambodia.
G: How do we tell them?
K: By keeping ambiguity on what we are doing. We won't wind up the war
by excalating it.
G: The arguement you get from the Commandant of the Marine Corps is
to get the NVN sroops out of Cambodia.
K: We are obviously not moving in that direction (?). Our major concern
is to have the Cambodian in a position to keep the NVN from moving on Penom
Penh from being anything then just a day's march. Our policy is not to
put Cambodia in a position to squeeze the sanctuaries.
G: Can you keep it from being a two day march?
K: After a
you cannot calibrate this without it slopping over.
G: The otherx cut off in my mind is advisors.
K: I haven't heard that idea proposed.
G: It has been.
K: There's no chance at least not now. Practiaally out of the question.
G: That's what I'm trying to ascertain. The problem gets a little compli-
cated along what's being given along the river over there.
K: There's no chance.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Peter Flanigan
Mr. Kissinger
3:30 pm, 4-17-70
(did not hear first part of conversation)
F:
I understand that Larry Lynn is leaving and that you think
that Tom Whitehead would be a good man for your staff.
They worked together on this same effort for a long time.
K:
I think if Whitehead and I can work together that it is just
about the most important job on my staff - probably one of
the most important jobs in the government. He does all
the analytical work on the staff.
F:
Needless to say, I would be delighted to see him work for
you.
K:
Pete, that is very big of you. I really owe you.
F:
I think it is great. I have tried to push things at him this
past month to get him to do the creative work he did last
year.
K:
Maybe the subjects don't interest him. Was he the guy that
was with us the other day?
F:
Yes. He would be very helpful in that area also.
K:
Yes.
F:
I would like to let him know you are interested first.
K:
That is alright.
mlh
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TELCON
B. Haldeman/Kissinger
4:36 pm
4/17/70
K: Has the trip been announced? So I can cancel things on Tues. in reference
to that.
H: I don't know if they have announced Monday night.
K: We will be back when?
H: 6:00 on Tues. He has the Chaing dinner so we can't be back much later
than that.
K: I will be there no later than 6:00 on Sun. What about the Correspondent's
dinner?
H: You will be the ranking member. They will probably play "Hail to the
Chief".
K: That's the least. It's long overdue.
H: We are leaving at 8:45 in the morning.
K: Will he be working on the statement?
K: I doubt it. He feels Xlxeaxex5x it;s well done. Except for some technical
things.
K: That's right. He will probably work on the it Sunday night and Monday.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telcon
Secy Laird
4/17/70; 5:20 p.m.
K: Mel, I didn't mean to get you out of a meeting. klav I have seen to
it that they check their statements back here in Vienna from now on.
What we discussed yesterday.
L: I think that is good. You haven't looked into that Jordanian thing
at all, have you?
K: No, but I will.
L: They will come in screaming like mad for military support now
and I think we ought to look into at least not letting Sisco leave that
area without at least stopping there. You don't want to let the King
down too badly.
K: I agree. You don't want to let him down at all.
L: Just for protection, he can't leave the area without going to see
him. It is none of my business, but you don''t mind my passing that
on to you, do you?
K: Mel, we always want to hear from you.
L: Very good.
ms
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Boris Sedov/Kissinger
5:50 pm
4/17/70
S: I am leaving this Sunday and I wanted to say good bye and if you want me
to say anything in Moscow we have a chance tomorrow.
K: We are in good shape. I wish you a good trip back and we will miss you here.
S: Come to Moscow and we will be glad to show you around.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
6:00 pm
4/17/70
H: We have to have a briefing book for the President in a process you make
to follow.
K: What are you talking about?
H: Buchanan is supposed to have the book to the President Tues. noon, after
you edit it. Your people promised it to him Thursday night, then Friday,
now Sun., because you haven't looked at it.
K: He will have it Sat. night. I don't think much of that idea. It happened
once that the President had to have it before I could check it through and there
was a lot of stuff
H: The point is he knows how to get it done like the President wants. You
can look at what Buchanan has done.
K: I will let him edit it and then I will look at it again. Then if xe I object,
I can pull it out.
H: The President wants us to back him on the great exposees on SALT. Your
office says we should do nothing.
K: What does he want?
H: He thinks it's a great accomplishment that we have gotten them going.
K: Why don't I brief some of your people.
H: Tomorrow?
K: Yes. I will be in all day tomorrow.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Wm. Şullivan/ Kissinger
6:25 pm
4/17/70
K: I have just gotten to the President. He wants to add one sentence at the
end of paragraph 2. Something like the number in any month will be flexible
depending on the situation at the time.
S: But leaving the other sentence the same?
K: Yes. He just want to be sure we don't encourage speculation
on the length of the period. You know the time I gave you and you know the
length of the periods. You know the time frame. Do you think it's clear to
the recipients?
S: Yes. I don't think they expect an enourmous frame.
K: I'm concerned about what you said at lunch.
S: Laird explained to
who will be there on Monday that it will
not go into the fall.
K: Possibility or probability/
S: Probability. I sent a memo on the stuff we talked about for the President.
K: You will send this out?
S: I have already.
K: Saigon tonight?
S: Saigon,
,
and Wellington tonight.
K: He wants to be sure it's not in Defense channels.
S: Ted Eliot hlds the only copy. It's going Cherokee.
K: We will know whom to blame if it leaks.
S: I have sent the package you asked for tx it contains the two memos plus
the thing on top.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Amb. Lucet/Kissinger
6:40 pm
4/17/70
K: With the astronauts we have had a bad week.
L: That was wonderful and we are full of admiration. It was
the
way you did it.
K: On your question, there are only two things I can say. If you make a formal
request to the State Dept. we will keep a close eye here. Or if you can wait fwo
weeks until you come back, I will put it to the President.
L: What's your advise -- put it to the State. Dept. ? That's best.
K: Yes, I would to do that.
L: And keep it confidential. I come back in 10 days.
K: You put it in and we will follow it for you.
L: Thank you, Henry. I sent a message this afternoon to your President from
mine on Laos. I sent it to Sonnenfeldt. It's in answer to the note of
April 9 re Article 4.
K: Good. Have a good vacation.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
4/17/70; 6:50 p.m.
L: This has been a bad day all the way along. They did go ahead on that
statement in Vienna and went along with Option C.
K: They could not have.
L: I have the text right here.
K: How could they have presented the whole option already? We are going
to make them give Option D on Monday. I have sent up a directive again
today. I want you to hold firm on this. Are you sure they presented the
whole option?
L: Yes, all of Option C and none of Option D.
K: We are going to make them present Option D on Monday.
L: They make no indication that anything more is going to come.
K: I have issued another directive today and I have said the President will
not make a decision until both options have been presented. I am going to
call Farley immediately and make sure that Option D is presented.
L: Okay, Henry.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Phil Farley
4/17/70; 7:05 p.m.
K: I think we are suffering here from working at cross purposes. I
read the cable on the opening session today and Laird called me and said
we got them to go along with Option C by saying Option D is a co-equal
but he says there is no mention that there is a D. Could we stop playing
with this and use both options. That idea of the NATO thing hadn't even
occurred to us or that it would be used to prevent the presentation of
something. The President had a vague feeling at the Congressional briefing
yesterday that there was some footdragging on Option D. He said he
wanted us to make D co-equal with C. We are going to confuse people if.
F: We really are at cross purposes.
K: We have tried to be responsive and helpful to you. The thought of NATO
never crossed our mind. If I were the Russians, I would think that nothing
more was coming. If we have two weeks of talks and then present something
new, they will say we are being tricky. I know that Gerry isn't enamored
with D, but the Chiefs are no enamored with C.
F: There are two parts to that. There is some advantage to presenting one
before the other.
K: What happens next?
F: The next thing is that there will be a fuller presentation of C on Monday.
Why don't I see that we get a statement in there before it goes any further.
K: Why don't we say this is one comprehensive approach. As soon as we
finish this presentation we will present another approach - - then you will
fulfill what the President has in mind.
F: I don't know whether you talked to Gerry about these supplemental
instructions or not but I didn't know about them until I talked to Gerry.
I will talk to Gerry tomorrow in the sense you have just summed up.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Sen. Fulbright/Kissinger
9:20 pm
4/17/70
F: We went to see that movies VED (?).
K: I would like to see that. Unfortunately, on Tues - --I have to go to the
West Coast with the President. We won't be back in time.
F: Thurs and Fri. are both open.
K: I have something on Thurs I can switch easily. How about 5:00 on Thurs.
I'm terribly sorry.
F: Is the President going to make his speech Monday?
K: He is and from the West Coast.
F: That's perfectly all right. 5:15 on Thurs. -- let's make it 5:15.
K: That;s excellent.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Laird/Kissinger
9:00 a. m. ; 4/18/70
(missed first part of conversation)
L
I think Defense and State at least should have a chance to
read statements before they are given.
K
Would you please write me a little note.
L
I'll have it over right away. Are you going to Hawaii?
K
No, I'm going to the West Coast though.
L
I was concerned about the Monday night thing. There is a
lot of speculation. I don't want to be in a position where we
get into too complicated of formula as far as giving too
many dates in that statement. We can keep the troops in
Vietnam through the 15th of June without
1/2 came out.
I think to set a another timetable would be a mistake, and
I'll put out an order. Two timetables will be watched by the
Press.
K
That's a good point. He told me he was going to go off and
think the whole thing over on the plane.
I won't know
exactly - it will be in the range of what we were talking
about, give or take a few weeks.
L
It's okay to go to the end of the month. I think we can make
this okay, but I also want to keep people more or less happy
and I have told chiefs. They are aboard as long as they
aren't out un til the
15th.
K
Right. I have no reason to suppose that he is going to
do it in as much detail. I will get him a note before he
leaves.
L
If he takes a figure on troop ceilings, 390 or 395
-
We must get down to 260 by August for budgetary reasons.
Any problems?
K
I can foresee nothing that I have heard him say that is
inconsistent with what you said. I think he is trying to figure
out how to general thought.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
L
Thi XIXSX per 40 xarxck 50
I would rather go between 40 and 50 and look a little better.
to
K
Did he say 40/cxx 50?
L
Yes. Personally I think 40.
K
I hadn't realized he put it that way.
L
Personally I think from 35 - 45 is better
K
You think a figure should be below 400?
L
Damn right.
K
Essentially like last time.
L
I think that is right. I think late August or early September.
It's no time for decisions before elections. It puts heat on
President.
K
Let me get all of this to him. I talked to him about this last
week.
L
I talked to him about this last week, but then I see these stories,
and ---
K
When he saw figure of 50 - 60, he started getting sore.
L
I would rather go down to 35 - 45. The figures in the Los
Angeles Times should not be over-reacted to. Pat Buchanan
puts these things in the morning brief. That morning brief
causes me more problems than anything in the whole White
House.
K
I causes me more than it causes you. On that thing we discussed
yesterday It is in order now.
L
I will see the picture today or tomorrow morning. It was
important to get them.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
K
The SAM -- that's being done.
L
I'll give a report to you before you leave.
K
Good. Are you going to be at the Wxlxix dinner tonight.
L
Yes.
K
I'll see you there.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
12:05 pm 4/18/70
L: I got this note on the President's request that we not limit sorties
requirements in S. E. Asia through July 30, 1970.
K: That's right.
L: I'm having to put some pressure on these people to keep within the budget.
We can't get a supplemental.
K: He said we are willing to draw down or something.
W:: We can draw down with a reduction in force someplace. We can put people
off but I need at least 60 days. Why would he choose July 30?
K: Three months.
L: I'm going to have trouble with this. I need $3 billion for Laos and I have
been having trouble hidding that. We increased Laos by more then dobble.
with
K: His concern is that it cannot work if withdrawals we cut all actions.
L: Let me give you areport on our raids. You have to use quality use of
sorties and not just because we have them.
K: He wanted to put out the memo for a year but I said we had to review
it every three months.
L: Does he realize the costs?
K: Yest but he ?7722?
L: We will have to cut down in Europe.
K: You will send me something on SALT.
L: I am upset about that. I have very good indications that have turned this
into ACDA's position and interpreted that ? ????
K: That's right.
L: You cannot get back to that now. They don't plan to do that Mon.
K: I told Farley it had to be Monday.
L: I haven't even seen a statement on that.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Laird/Kissinger
12:05
pm
4/18/70
K: I will not tolerate that. I know what the President has in mind. You
heard him at the Congressional briefing.
I
L: On the bombing thing she will send you a memo expressing my concern.
K: dWill you? I will only send it to the President.
L: My problem -- If I have to keep within ordiancesupplementals, I will
have to make terrific changes. It goes into '71. This goes into our budget.
K: Hedidn't focus on it. He looked at the gifxx figures in respect to his
statement.
L: When the rainy weather came I thought I could save $100 million.
K: Why don't we get together on this when I come back from Calit.
L: I have to talk to Mayo and I don't think we can get a supplemental becuase
I will have to tell him why and we are flying very little in SVN.
K: He is concerned with air support to VN forces.
L: I could increase that. We are Xix flying little of that. Very few strikes
are in support of the VN. Less than 10 percent. I just as soon cut back
in the rainy season and give them support. We have not refused any of these
K: What bothers you then.
L: I have to maintain the same rate on the Ho Chi Minh trail and in Laos
when during the rainy season it won't be necessary. I can't put stuff in
VN when we don't have anything.
K: I will talks to the President on the way back from the West Coast.
L: I will keep the greatest amount of pressure on but on the same number
of sorties during the rainy season so I can save $100 million
K: ON the Ho Chi Minh trail I will talk to the President. This order has
to stand until we have another word about it SO you have to think of carrying
it out. Wx Send a memo on what you propose to do. If I grextx could have that
with me. Rough order of magnitude.
L: Porblem of 71 budget
thousand sorties. That's a cut down.
Cut down the sorties from the 70 budget. Tactical sorties from 14, 000 to
10, 000. The gxix big thing is ordinance. Eafcthe sorties costs $40, 000 for
ammunition.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Laird/Kissinger
12:05 pm
4/18/70
K: If you would give me a memo on how you would break this down.
L: We would not cut back support for SVN. We could increase that. Let me
work this out for you and get you something.
K: By noon tomorrow.
L: We will see.
K: I am leaving at noon.
L: I will talk to you when you get back. In the meantime I will keep us the
raids.
K: Give me a memo on that other think.
L: I feel strongly about it and I will talk to the President (SALT delegation).
K: I may do that on Wed.
L: The Sovi will table to accept the MIRV ban and it will put us in a
bad position by not having it on the table.
K: I have insisted on that for Monday.
L: I have checked with Vienna and nothing is coming out.
K: I will change the rules in writing on that.
L: I think it's important.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Farley/Kissinger
12:30 pm
4/18/70
F: I have talked a couple more times with Vienna and they will say Monday
we will have another alternative and say a few words of it's nature. Gerry wante
me to pass on to you xfx as I had guessed he had had no objection in mentioning
this yesterday and had been persuaded by the misreading as I had.
K: I have had 3 calls from Laird this morning alone.
F I wanted to assure you xxxxxxxxxxx there was no effort on his part toavoid
this.
K: If you will make clear that the other has equal standing.
F: We will meet with the defense people this afternoon.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Kay Graham/Mr. Kissinger
1:17 p. m., April 18, 1970
KG:
I was made to call you by Mrs. Kraft to (a) put pressure
on you, and (b) to see if we could out together to the Kraft's after
the White House Correspondents dinner.
K:
The President having gone off to Hawaii and taken most of
his assistants, I think I am the only White House Assistant going to
the dinner. I have to show my face at several receptions for about
5 minutes each. Could you do that with me?
KG:
Certainly.
K:
Then I would love to go with you to the Krafts'.
KG:
I will look for you at the dinner -- I'm sure we'll be sitting
at different tables.
K:
Fine. I have one of our supporters here who would like to
talk with you. [He then put John Kenneth Galbraith on with Mrs. Graham. ]
lds
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Gerard Smith/Dr. Kissinger
1:20 p. m., April 18, 1970
K:
I have been talking to Phil (Farley), and as far as I can see,
it is all straightened out. I have been getting restive calls from
various people inc luding my friend. The way you and Phil have
worked it out is fine.
S:
As long as it is clear to you that we are trying to do what
you want us to do.
K:
There is no problem. Make it clear we have these alternatives.
The order in which you present the details, we won't get into to.
S:
We are not trying to fight the problem.
K:
We don't want "D" to appear as the fall-back.
t
I
S:
We will do it that way on Monday.
K:
In our Congressional briefing on Thursday, having the thing
suggested for Monday helped a lot.
lds
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SANITIZED COPY
TELECON
Jonathan Moore/Mr. Kissinger
2:26 p. m., April 18, 1970
K:
Do I have the wrong impression when I think you are all
dragging your feet?
M:
I certainly hope you do. What is it this time?
K:
We are going to move some things next week, if we can get
guidance from the Cambodians on what they want.
M:
I don't know what happened to our man. (He mentioned a cable. )
SANITIZED
We are going to fry him good.
peR 3.3(b)(1)
K:
The second thing, about which I was supposed to call Marshall
Green -- but none of the people at that level are in town today -- is:
Do you know about the agreement made between Rogers, Green and
K:
I don't know what happened, but that is not your doing. To
whom do I pass a Presidential directive?
M:
You have just done it. I think I'm running the department today.
You mean one agent?
K:
One agent and one communicator.
M:
Helms and the Secretary have been in direct contact since.
K:
Yes, but there is a stalemate, and Helms appealed directly to us.
M:
I understand now -- one agent and one communicator.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
SANITIZED Richard Nixon COPY
peR 3. 3.3(b)(1);HR. 6/28/11
Reproduced Présidential Librar By
WIH NARA, Date 10/17/11
DECLASSIFIED
NLN 07-A-54/17 [pp. [of2]
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SANITIZED COPY
Jonathan Moore
April 18, 1970, 2:26 p.m.
- 2 -
K:
I was supposed to issue an order yesterday, but with Marshall
leaving town.
And now I have to leave town. I don't want to get
a question in California as to whether or not I have done anything about
this.
SANITIZED
M:
You have conveyed the message.
peR 3. 3(b)(1)
K:
have an answèr back on Wednesday when we return.
M:
The water route is not good. He has to get the local government's
views on the other two means and in a hurry.
K:
We prefer the air route, but Marshall Green feels so strongly
about the other.
M:
We are all set.
K:
Thank you.
lds
Reproduced at SANITIZED DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon COPY Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined lbd declassined. 54/17 TDD. 2 of i
TELECON
Rogers/Watts
2:52 p.m.; 4/18/70
R
I was just listening to the radio and heard Tom Braden
quote Henry -- and it must be a mistake. Braden quotes
Henry as saying he thought "it was the beginning of the end
of the war in Vietnam". I can't imagine Henry saying
that. Anyway, I thought you should know.
W
What braadcast was this on?
R
Braden's radio program. It was the kind of thing that could
get a lot of publicity.
W
Did he give any background?
R
He said Dr. Kissinger had advised that in addition to the
safe return of the Apollo 13 Astronauts, the President had
additional good news that it might be the beginning of the
end of the war in Vietnam, and he made comments about
developments in Cambodia.
W
He didn't indicate the basis of where it was obtained?
R
No. It might be someone who would like to get to Braden.
W
I'll be in touch with Henry. Shall I get back to you?
R
Well -- if you have anything significant to report.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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TELECON
Watts/Kissinger
2:57 p.m.; 4/18/70
W
I just had a call from Secretary Rogers, who said that
Tom Braden had reported on his radio broadcast that you
had advised the President that he has additional good news
in addition to the return of the Apollo 13 Astronauts because
you thought we were at the beginning of the end of the war in
Vietnam.
K
That's absolute baloney. I haven't even seen Braden in
6 months.
W
Do you want me to do anything about this.
K
There is absolutely nothing to it. It's pure invention.
W
Should I do anything vis-a-vis Braden?
K
I haven't even seen Braden except for 10 minutes at a party
a while back. There was absolutely nothing said. Tell =
Rogers there was absolutely nothing to it.
W
I'll call him right back.
K
I have said no such thing. I haven't seen Braden.
W
I will call Rogers right away. I'll confirm with you as soon
as I talk to him.
K
It's pure invention, tell him. There will, of course, be
no such thing said.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Rogers/Watts
3:05 p.m.; 4/18/70
W
I just spoke to Henry. He was very upset. He said this
was pure invention on Braden's part. He hasn't seen Braden
in over six months. He said it's absolutely untrue.
R
I knew it would be. There's no use raising a flap about it.
It wasn't on the 3 o'clock news. Why don't we wait a little
while and see if anything is repeated. If it's a one shot
proposition, let's drop it. If it's raised again, then let's
call Kissinger.
W
Then I could call Braden and let him know it's not true --
Kissinger had made no such comment to the President.
R
Why don't you have someone listen to WTOP. If they don't
say it again, let's drop it.
call
W
OK. I'll & Kissinger and let him know what we've discussed.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Watts/Kissinger
3:08 p.m. ; ; 4/18/70
W
Henry, I just spoke to Rogers. I told him the report
was an absolute untruth. He heard Braden's remarks
over WTOP news. We're listening to see if anything is
repeated. If not, he suggested that we ignore it.
K
If it's repeated, let me know and I'll call Braden. I
haven't talked in substance with him in over a year. I
want to speak to Braden. You told Rogers I haven't
talked to Braden?
W
I did. I explained what you told me earlier -- that the report
was absolute baloney -- pure invention.
K
Good. I'm going to call Braden in the morning. Let
me know if anything further develops.
W
I'll do that.
K
You don't have to stay in the office.
W
OK, I don't plan to.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page data
- Page
- 43
- Source index
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- Type
- document
- Media ID
- 14b4404a5dd9c36c
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Document data
- ID
- 498693768
- Core
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"ocrText": "TELECON\nKissinger/Potter (Baltimore Sun)\n4-16-70 9:00 p.m.\nMr. Potter called to read and discuss the Malik statement with Mr.\nKissinger. He said he was having Paul write the article but that he\nhad done a lot of the work, particularly with State Department officials.\nAfter reading portions of the proposed article the conversation turned\nto a brief question and answer session.\nP: Did you talk the matter over with the President?\nK: We just talked about it.\nP: How about Dobrynin?\nK: Dobrynin has gone home for consultation. We have always had the\nfeeling this thing was going to break.\nP: What would you anticipate on another world conference another\nGeneva?\nK: That was indicated in the Malik thing.\nP: Has anyone opposed but North Vietnam?\nK: It is inconceivable North Vietnam would oppose. The Soviet Union\nwouldn't say that without North Vietnamese (concurrence)\nP: How about China?\nK: China might oppose.\nI think the Cambodian thing showed they haven't been able to stampede\nus, in public or in Paris. Things are going better in South Vietnam.\nP: I would imagine a widened war is more damaging to them than to us.\nK: Shows what can happen.\nP: The Russians might be moving toward\nK: I don't want to go into it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n11:30 X am\n4/17/70\nP: ????? move back and forth. The mountain is the highest. I heard\nthis morning that guerrilla -- I want Wheeler to check if 52 strikes W on that\nmountain willhelp; Get going fast and a strike withint two hours.\nFurther conversation: 11:32\nP: On two things that are quite clear on briefings here. The line of our enemies\nand many of our people here are playing that Long Nol may not make it and\nSihanouk is our best bet.\nK: Right.\nP: The Japanese think so. Contact somebody -- this is an order -- can you\ncontact your opposite number? Call in the Ambassador and tell him that we\nC onsider Long Nol's prospects excellent and we would find it difficult in our\nrelations with them if they supported the other side. And convey to Sato that\nwe would be up set if Japan doesn't support him. Get the CIA jerks working\non Cambodia -- I don't see this about two sides. Are we getting across the\nstory that this is a fictious thing?\nK: Helms said yesterday after my conversation with you that they would\nthrow it into high gear.\nP: Long Nol is it and I would urge wide-spread demonstrations against\nSihanouk.\nK: They have already.\nP: Get Helms' radio to broadcast in there that Sihanouk is coming in with\nNVN liberators. I want a report in my desk today at 4:00 with his ideas. I\ndon't want - - I want everyon in this government to know we are supporting\nthe government in power. They are to\nup that hill and anyone who\ndoes not follow this will be fired. Tell Marshall Green that if anyone\nwho disagrees I want his resignation on my desk by noon.\nK: I have to get Laird to do what you said. They must follow your strategy.\nP: Do it with Green or on the Johnson level. Tell him that you may bex have\nother views but the Presi dent feels this way and we are going to do that.\nThere is no possibility of our supporting Sihanouk and we are supporting\nLong Nol. Tell Helms to have printed one million leafletswith NVN and\na prexx picture of Sihanouk, saying \"liberate Cambodia. 11 Get my point?\nK: Absolutely.\nP: Get a programsand:have a report on my desk at 4:00 on how they carried\nit out. 2958, atis amended, Sect 35\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Litrary\nDECLASSIBIER\nThis documenthas been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n11:30 am\n4/17/70\nK: About that thing we were discussing yesterday. Where does it stand?\nL: I have a proposal here. I'm going to send it with an alternative. There\nare no sites in the area capable of reaching Laos. There were some active\nsites on the 11th of April but there's nothing there now escept some parts and\nthings. There are some pads and aquipment that could be reactivated. We\ncould hit that site. I would recommend another alternative that we go in\nhere on Rt. 1032 a new one at the end of the\nK: The President is calling. I will call you right back.\nFurther conversation: 11:40\nL: I will send this over to you.\nK: Can it be here by noon? He k is getting extrementy resitve. He is\nyelling about not getting his orders carried out.\nL: Maybe I should call him. If I can't find a site, I can't help that. We\nhave a 19 mile range and this is 25 miles over.\nK: That's - I don't know those facts.\nThey\nL: x can move that site over so it has a capability against our aircraft\nWe can take out their components so it can't be reactivated.\nK: He doesn't care if it hits Laos. He wants to hit NVN.\nL: How about 1032 and slopping over. Near the DMZ.\nK: What do your Chiefs thing?\nL: I am getting a knock recpmmendation now. I have to use protective reaction\non this. We can look out the components\nK: Can't you knock out -- can't youmeasure it?\nL: They know they have only a 19 mile range and they know we know.\nK: They know we are no t hitting for that reason'.\nL: The Chiefs are against it. They recommend that site where there were\nmissiles on the 11th of April. We don't need to say anything. There are\ncomponents --\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nLaird/Kissinger\n11:30 am\n4/17/70\n-2-\nK: Will you send the Chief's recommendation over with your recommendation\nin the next hour?\nL: I will call him. I can get him a better site on the NVN side of the DMZ.\nBut we can slop over. We have hit had that area but never in the north.\nK: Get that report over here, please.\nL: The Chiefs go along and We say the best is the deactivated site. But I\ndon't want to tell the President this is active. These things are generally\nknown. This bothers me you want to give a message but you also want\nto do a little good.\nK: He is strong on this and is gubbi bugging me.\nL: He reads the newspapers --\nK: His strategy is that by squeezing them they will give in faster.\nL: I have been reading that file you get just as much hell by being in the open.\nK: But you hit supply dumps and there's no justification.\nL: They are hitting us from this site. It's AA fire it's in Laos.\nK: He is ordering this thing today one way or the other. There's no doubt\nabout it.\nL: If I disagree, I will go to him.\nK: You have every right. I have orders and I am not fighting with you. Wxex\nL: We can go up and hit this. The Chiefs don't think we should hit one that\nisn't a threat. The only one we have is on the Vinh airbase but it doesn't\nhave anything on Laos. There are a couple of others but they are way in.\nK: Can you have your alternative recommendations in an hour?\nL: We will have both recommendations. We had a good strike last night.\nThere were NVN in good concentration. I have a couple of other things\nI'm concerned about the Jordanian thing. That ambassador is on one day\nand off the next.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nLaird/Kissinger\n11:30 am\n4/17/70\n-3-\nK: I was amazed when they cancelled that trip.\nL: That should not have been cancelled. One day that ambassador says\nship arms and then he says hold them. The King said ? ? ? Things are\nworse now then they were.\nK: I raised holy hell with my staff man that such a decision was made without\nWhite House consideration.\nL: On this Candian thing, you were there -- we have a cable and it's tough\nbut the one that goes out is milk toast.\nK: How did that happen?\nL: I don't know but it's not tough. If we are going to have meetings to discuss\nthese things and Dave spent much time and then they send an entirely different\none. In Jorday we are in worse shape now then we have ever been. I was\nmad today.\nK: I understand that.\nL: We gave the worst kind of signals we can. Did you get a copy of the\nsecond draft?\nK: I will get back on that by 2:30.\nL: I made those 5 changes. Bill thinks we shouldn't take a strong statement\non ABM. I can't do that.\nK: The Secy. of Defense should be able to talk about defense or we are in\nreal trouble.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nGeneral Wheeler\nMr. Kissinger\nApril 17, 1970, 12 Noon\nW:\nHello Henry.\nK:\nI have been having some conversations with Mel. I want to\nbe sure I understand. Is it true that the Chiefs recommend\nthat we do not hit the SAM sites?\nW:\nNo, there is one that we don't think we should do because\nit is 20 miles inside the border and is not a bother. The\nother does not pose any problem. I have recommended in\na CM that it be attacked. It is to the south of the other one.\nYou should know that they can put those components together\nin three hours and they could have themselves an operational\nsite.\nK:\nWhat's this road. He wants to hit Route 1023 near the DMZ.\nWhat is that?\nW:\nThere is a road down near the DMZ that leads into the southern\npanhandle. I don't understand why he mentioned this. It is a\nsupply route if you want to look at it that way. I am perfectly\nwilling to take out supplies.\nK:\nWhich would you rather do?\nW:\nI would rather do both. Take out the SAM components and also\nhit 1023.\nK:\nOK. Alright Bus. I suffer from the naive idea that Presidential\norders tend to get carried out. He is now talking about supply\noperations. He does not want to do SAM site. OK Bus.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Rogers\n4/17/70 p.m.\nK: I talked to Mel about this paper and he's taking out the SALT\nreferences. At least he tells me he is. And he sent something else\nover I've just skimmed. It's less violent than the preceding draft.\nR: I don't see why he shouldn't put the facts in; let the facts\nspeak for themselves. Bud it doesn't help to say what we are suspicious\nof, that we think they are developing a first strike capability. It just\ngets their hackles up. It's not productive. Have you talked to the P about\n?\nK: He's been so wripped up with the astronaut thing. I didn't have\na chance to tell him. You are giving a talk tomarrow on SALT?\nR: It's at a Cronell meeting. There will be something on SALT and\nsomething on Southeast Asia. The only question I have is whether we should\ndo something on the Malik statement. I got a call from Mansfield and Aiken.\nThey thought we should have some positive response. The President might\npoint out that we are willing to enter negotiations on any subject. I could\nsay something about we've asked Yost to pursue with Malik what he has in\nmind.\nK: That's almost what the President means to say minus the Amb.\nYost part. Say we are ready to explore, but you want to say who's doing\nthe exploring. The President is thinking of saying something like that.\nR: This won't pre-empt him. It probably won't be noticed. This is\nalong the President's guidelines in not saying a lot about SALT. I will\ncomments about what Breshnev said and they say we are serious.\nK: That's a good things to say.\nR: I've been trying to get language from the Pentagon to support them\non ABMs.\nK: Laird has been calling every half hour.\nR: He may not have so much trouble. Aidke Aiken and Mansfield XXE were\nin a great frame of mind this morning. In Cambodia I'm going to say we have\nno present plans to use Americans there.\nK: That is correct. We can't rush out to xxxx embrace the Malik thing,\nbut they couldn't have said it without Hanoi's knowledge. I think it's quite a\npositive thing.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Rogers\n4/17/70 p.m. page 2\nR: I'm not very hopeful on the SALT talks.\nK: No, but we've set it very well. And we've all worked together on\nit. No one can run around Washington and get different opinions. The\nPresident will know where to get you this weekend, won't he? Of your\noffice will know.\nR: Yes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n12:12 pm\n4/17/70\nL: I'm sorry but when you called back I had the officials of the Ford Motor\nCo. and I wanted to get them out.\nK: I understand.\nL: I'm going to send this memo over. It isn't the detail that another hour\nwould give. I think I should tell the President that we can hit it but we\ndon't have any active missiles involved, SAM's, but they could set up the\nmissiles.\nK: You have every right to call him anytime you want to.\nL: I think he should know so when it breaks he won't ask why I didn't\ntell him.\nK: You will probably get orders to do both.\nL: I would rather hit down there. That AA is fi ring at us. It's in Laos\nbut *********** we don't have to know that. You are talking about slopping\nover 4-5 miles.\nK: His signal is that we are thinking of going again with the bombing.\nL: They will get that because there's a supply route. We will send it over\nthere. Henry, I hope you don't think I was too upset about that Jordanian\nthing.\nK: I felt the same way about it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nP. Farley/Kissinger\n12:20 pm\n4/17/70\nF: I have been engaged in a three way conversation with Gardner, Rogers\nand Tucker on sperating procedures of the delegation and I want to be sure\nwhat's done is right. Have you talked to Gardner or Laird?\nK: k Laird called me yesterday.\nF: You know how Gerry felt about being uninhibitied.\nK: I know how the President feels. One thing that will create feelings is\nthat option D has the same status as C and is not a fall back position. I don't\nthink we have to give the order three times. They have equal status and\nwe want to discuss them both.\nF: I didn't realize there was an issue on this. I thought that was very\nclear. There was a reference to (order) in both the instructions and I under-\nstand that the people in Vientna felt that as long as we were going to take the\nsecond step on the discussion in NATO nad it's better not to put that on the\ntable with the Soviets. That might inhibit it.\nK: Why should it. I got word to Gerry he was to discuss it at NATO.\nF: He did and no if, ands or buts but we were going to handle NATO thing\nbefore tabling it. Larry has the thing to look at the U.S. side of it.\nK: That problem exists in either case with any option.\nF: Actually the reduction one --\nK: If we make the hard one ? !?????\nF: The only questionsxthat has been raised with the degree with which the\nstatements made by the delegation are reviewed back here. I had proposed\nafter talking to Rogers to get word to Gerry that if anything of significance\nhe would make, he wxbx should get it back here but we should discourage the\nidea that every FSO-3 or Lt. Col has a better idea.\nK: That's right. Laird said that opening statements are not being cleared\nany more. But you are not saying that.\nF: He is right. One that was made today was not cleared and the one for\nMonday has not been cleared. I will cable Gerry and say we have to have\nthat.\nK: We are having a loose rein but I think we should see it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nChapin/Kissinger\nmorning (12:46 ish)\n4/17/70\nC: Laird called. I didn't talk to him. Nell talked to his secretary. He\nhas asked that the President call him on the secure phone. The President\nhas never used the secure phone!\nK: I had better see the President and tell him what it's about.\nC: I will tell Bob that you would like to talk to the President before he calls\nLaird.\nK: t's essential.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n1:15 pm\n4/17/70\nK: The President just asked me to check.\nL:\nDo you have the memo?\nK: Yes. To reaffirm his understanding with you -- to go after that one site\nplus the route into VN.\nL: As soon as I get that checked out.\nK: Both of them.\nL: We are checking that other one but we will go on that one. Depending on\nthe weather.\nK: You will letme have a map of the other one.\nL: We don't have that fully worked out but you wanted the memo.\nK: His understanding is that you are doing both.\nL: We k will have it done by Monday noon. They are down in the\n.\nI will be back in touch later on this afternoon about a couple of other matters.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nDewey\n4/17/70 p.m.\nK: I'm sorry I couldn't get back to you yesterday.\nD: That's okay, nothing urgent. We feel about 10 years younger\ndon't we?\nK: It was a great thing.\nD: It was a horror.\nK: It was a nightmare for a few days.\nD: It was probably rough on the boss.\nK: He didn't show it, but toward the end he wanted some of his troops\naround.\nD: Out of all tragedies some times something comes that's good.\nI think that happened this time.\nK: It lifted us up a bit.\nD: Yes, and it was a wonderful break in the controversies which I'm\nskck of and I'm sure everybody else is. Jack McCloy says he's made a\nreport.\nK: There isn't a lot in it.\nD: Can you mail it to me at 140 Broadway?\nK: It's classified.\nD: Too bad.\nK: It's a product of people spending helf a day listening instead of\nreading.\nD: It's too bad the superficial stuff makes the headlines. Is there any-\nthing in it I should know that you can tell me?\nK: No, you know more than what's in it.b We were way ahead of them.\nD: Yes, and everybody gets dredit for it except the President. He got a\ngood press this morning.\nK: I think he's getting a good prews now.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nGov. Dewey\n4/17/70 p.m. page 2\nD: Are there any dates you have in mind that I might have to pre-empt?\nK: Two things: I would like to have a DOD person talk to you about the\nPOW thing. That would be Mr. Nutter and one of his people. I'll have them\ncheck with your office\nD: I can make Tuesday afternoon after 2:30.\nK: They'll be in touch. Some time in the next two or three weeks\nI'd like to talk to you about some of the negotiating problems we have\ncoming up.\nD: Are you going to be in town soon? For the evening, for a date?\nK: Not likely. My reputation as a swinger is very greatly exaggerated.\nThe intention is there, but not the time.\nD: I understand. I lived it and it's a hell of a life. I do think you'd\nlive tonger if you could enjoy it more.\nK: Could you try to make an appointment in the next two weeks? We\nmay ask you to do something/ It's important for you to understand the\nbureaucratic reasons why we want to do it.\nD: I am at your service.\nK: I have so much confidence in you.\nD: I wish I could justify it.\nK: It's tough to find people whom you know are on your side.\nD: George Gallup has written me a letter saying he's got 80 pages in\ndraft on research in depth on public opinion on Vietnam. He wants me to\nread it and advise him. Should I say I'll be glad to read it and get a more\nofficial opinion on it se he won't be misled? I could send it down to you and\nyou could have bomebody with brains on your staff take a look at it. Might\nbe able to pick up a few things to prevent error or make it better imformed.\nI have the highest regard for him as a scholar. If it would be useful I'll\nget an extra copy and sent it to you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nGov. Dewey\n4/17/70 p.m. page 3\nK: I think that would be very useful. And I was sorry not to be able\nto come to your birthday. It was the week Laos was about to go down the\nshoot and I'll tell you why it didn't when you come down.\nD: I know one reason why it almost did and it's the Senator from Arkansas.\nK: Yes, the things that man must have on his conscience if he's got one.\nD: The President has ao live with a lot of things.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nZeigler/Kissinger\n3:00 pm 4/17/70\nK: They haven't announced the trip yet.\nZ: You're not aware of that? I thought I knew something you didn't know.\nYou are going to be in L.A. to brief?\nK: San Clemente.\nZ: Same thing. We will have the girls there for you. You should get into\na thorough briefing.\nK: You set that up. What I want to know -- I can't make any preparations\nuntil it's announced. When will it be announced?\nZ: About 4:00.\nK: What about the WH dinner?\nZ: They will probably go on with it.\nK: But won't 4/5 of the correspondents be on the trip?\nZ: Yes.\nK: All right.\nZ: Can;t I hold anything over you?\nK: The President 08 told me yesterday.\nZ: I knew before that. (ha, ha).\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPhil Geylin/Kissinger\n3:03 pm\n4/17/70\nG: I want a little general guidance because you don't want to get into a long\nconfersation on Cambodia.\nK: What are your cautioning us against?\nG: Getting a little bit pregnant. I have been spening time in the Pentagon\nand they don't know how to shoot and we are sending men to show them how.\nWe have been there before. I'm asking if you can give me guidance on\nwhere that issue is going and at what rate. I don't see any stories of our\ngetting involved.\nK: The question ofwinding up the war in VN is what we want. We don't want\nanother war. On the other hand, we don't want to tell the NVN to march\non Penom Pehn and we will not stop you. You can be sure we are not\nrushing an AID program into Cambodia.\nG: How do we tell them?\nK: By keeping ambiguity on what we are doing. We won't wind up the war\nby excalating it.\nG: The arguement you get from the Commandant of the Marine Corps is\nto get the NVN sroops out of Cambodia.\nK: We are obviously not moving in that direction (?). Our major concern\nis to have the Cambodian in a position to keep the NVN from moving on Penom\nPenh from being anything then just a day's march. Our policy is not to\nput Cambodia in a position to squeeze the sanctuaries.\nG: Can you keep it from being a two day march?\nK: After a\nyou cannot calibrate this without it slopping over.\nG: The otherx cut off in my mind is advisors.\nK: I haven't heard that idea proposed.\nG: It has been.\nK: There's no chance at least not now. Practiaally out of the question.\nG: That's what I'm trying to ascertain. The problem gets a little compli-\ncated along what's being given along the river over there.\nK: There's no chance.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPeter Flanigan\nMr. Kissinger\n3:30 pm, 4-17-70\n(did not hear first part of conversation)\nF:\nI understand that Larry Lynn is leaving and that you think\nthat Tom Whitehead would be a good man for your staff.\nThey worked together on this same effort for a long time.\nK:\nI think if Whitehead and I can work together that it is just\nabout the most important job on my staff - probably one of\nthe most important jobs in the government. He does all\nthe analytical work on the staff.\nF:\nNeedless to say, I would be delighted to see him work for\nyou.\nK:\nPete, that is very big of you. I really owe you.\nF:\nI think it is great. I have tried to push things at him this\npast month to get him to do the creative work he did last\nyear.\nK:\nMaybe the subjects don't interest him. Was he the guy that\nwas with us the other day?\nF:\nYes. He would be very helpful in that area also.\nK:\nYes.\nF:\nI would like to let him know you are interested first.\nK:\nThat is alright.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nB. Haldeman/Kissinger\n4:36 pm\n4/17/70\nK: Has the trip been announced? So I can cancel things on Tues. in reference\nto that.\nH: I don't know if they have announced Monday night.\nK: We will be back when?\nH: 6:00 on Tues. He has the Chaing dinner so we can't be back much later\nthan that.\nK: I will be there no later than 6:00 on Sun. What about the Correspondent's\ndinner?\nH: You will be the ranking member. They will probably play \"Hail to the\nChief\".\nK: That's the least. It's long overdue.\nH: We are leaving at 8:45 in the morning.\nK: Will he be working on the statement?\nK: I doubt it. He feels Xlxeaxex5x it;s well done. Except for some technical\nthings.\nK: That's right. He will probably work on the it Sunday night and Monday.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nSecy Laird\n4/17/70; 5:20 p.m.\nK: Mel, I didn't mean to get you out of a meeting. klav I have seen to\nit that they check their statements back here in Vienna from now on.\nWhat we discussed yesterday.\nL: I think that is good. You haven't looked into that Jordanian thing\nat all, have you?\nK: No, but I will.\nL: They will come in screaming like mad for military support now\nand I think we ought to look into at least not letting Sisco leave that\narea without at least stopping there. You don't want to let the King\ndown too badly.\nK: I agree. You don't want to let him down at all.\nL: Just for protection, he can't leave the area without going to see\nhim. It is none of my business, but you don''t mind my passing that\non to you, do you?\nK: Mel, we always want to hear from you.\nL: Very good.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nBoris Sedov/Kissinger\n5:50 pm\n4/17/70\nS: I am leaving this Sunday and I wanted to say good bye and if you want me\nto say anything in Moscow we have a chance tomorrow.\nK: We are in good shape. I wish you a good trip back and we will miss you here.\nS: Come to Moscow and we will be glad to show you around.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHaldeman/Kissinger\n6:00 pm\n4/17/70\nH: We have to have a briefing book for the President in a process you make\nto follow.\nK: What are you talking about?\nH: Buchanan is supposed to have the book to the President Tues. noon, after\nyou edit it. Your people promised it to him Thursday night, then Friday,\nnow Sun., because you haven't looked at it.\nK: He will have it Sat. night. I don't think much of that idea. It happened\nonce that the President had to have it before I could check it through and there\nwas a lot of stuff\nH: The point is he knows how to get it done like the President wants. You\ncan look at what Buchanan has done.\nK: I will let him edit it and then I will look at it again. Then if xe I object,\nI can pull it out.\nH: The President wants us to back him on the great exposees on SALT. Your\noffice says we should do nothing.\nK: What does he want?\nH: He thinks it's a great accomplishment that we have gotten them going.\nK: Why don't I brief some of your people.\nH: Tomorrow?\nK: Yes. I will be in all day tomorrow.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nWm. Şullivan/ Kissinger\n6:25 pm\n4/17/70\nK: I have just gotten to the President. He wants to add one sentence at the\nend of paragraph 2. Something like the number in any month will be flexible\ndepending on the situation at the time.\nS: But leaving the other sentence the same?\nK: Yes. He just want to be sure we don't encourage speculation\non the length of the period. You know the time I gave you and you know the\nlength of the periods. You know the time frame. Do you think it's clear to\nthe recipients?\nS: Yes. I don't think they expect an enourmous frame.\nK: I'm concerned about what you said at lunch.\nS: Laird explained to\nwho will be there on Monday that it will\nnot go into the fall.\nK: Possibility or probability/\nS: Probability. I sent a memo on the stuff we talked about for the President.\nK: You will send this out?\nS: I have already.\nK: Saigon tonight?\nS: Saigon,\n,\nand Wellington tonight.\nK: He wants to be sure it's not in Defense channels.\nS: Ted Eliot hlds the only copy. It's going Cherokee.\nK: We will know whom to blame if it leaks.\nS: I have sent the package you asked for tx it contains the two memos plus\nthe thing on top.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmb. Lucet/Kissinger\n6:40 pm\n4/17/70\nK: With the astronauts we have had a bad week.\nL: That was wonderful and we are full of admiration. It was\nthe\nway you did it.\nK: On your question, there are only two things I can say. If you make a formal\nrequest to the State Dept. we will keep a close eye here. Or if you can wait fwo\nweeks until you come back, I will put it to the President.\nL: What's your advise -- put it to the State. Dept. ? That's best.\nK: Yes, I would to do that.\nL: And keep it confidential. I come back in 10 days.\nK: You put it in and we will follow it for you.\nL: Thank you, Henry. I sent a message this afternoon to your President from\nmine on Laos. I sent it to Sonnenfeldt. It's in answer to the note of\nApril 9 re Article 4.\nK: Good. Have a good vacation.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nSecretary Laird\n4/17/70; 6:50 p.m.\nL: This has been a bad day all the way along. They did go ahead on that\nstatement in Vienna and went along with Option C.\nK: They could not have.\nL: I have the text right here.\nK: How could they have presented the whole option already? We are going\nto make them give Option D on Monday. I have sent up a directive again\ntoday. I want you to hold firm on this. Are you sure they presented the\nwhole option?\nL: Yes, all of Option C and none of Option D.\nK: We are going to make them present Option D on Monday.\nL: They make no indication that anything more is going to come.\nK: I have issued another directive today and I have said the President will\nnot make a decision until both options have been presented. I am going to\ncall Farley immediately and make sure that Option D is presented.\nL: Okay, Henry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nPhil Farley\n4/17/70; 7:05 p.m.\nK: I think we are suffering here from working at cross purposes. I\nread the cable on the opening session today and Laird called me and said\nwe got them to go along with Option C by saying Option D is a co-equal\nbut he says there is no mention that there is a D. Could we stop playing\nwith this and use both options. That idea of the NATO thing hadn't even\noccurred to us or that it would be used to prevent the presentation of\nsomething. The President had a vague feeling at the Congressional briefing\nyesterday that there was some footdragging on Option D. He said he\nwanted us to make D co-equal with C. We are going to confuse people if.\nF: We really are at cross purposes.\nK: We have tried to be responsive and helpful to you. The thought of NATO\nnever crossed our mind. If I were the Russians, I would think that nothing\nmore was coming. If we have two weeks of talks and then present something\nnew, they will say we are being tricky. I know that Gerry isn't enamored\nwith D, but the Chiefs are no enamored with C.\nF: There are two parts to that. There is some advantage to presenting one\nbefore the other.\nK: What happens next?\nF: The next thing is that there will be a fuller presentation of C on Monday.\nWhy don't I see that we get a statement in there before it goes any further.\nK: Why don't we say this is one comprehensive approach. As soon as we\nfinish this presentation we will present another approach - - then you will\nfulfill what the President has in mind.\nF: I don't know whether you talked to Gerry about these supplemental\ninstructions or not but I didn't know about them until I talked to Gerry.\nI will talk to Gerry tomorrow in the sense you have just summed up.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSen. Fulbright/Kissinger\n9:20 pm\n4/17/70\nF: We went to see that movies VED (?).\nK: I would like to see that. Unfortunately, on Tues - --I have to go to the\nWest Coast with the President. We won't be back in time.\nF: Thurs and Fri. are both open.\nK: I have something on Thurs I can switch easily. How about 5:00 on Thurs.\nI'm terribly sorry.\nF: Is the President going to make his speech Monday?\nK: He is and from the West Coast.\nF: That's perfectly all right. 5:15 on Thurs. -- let's make it 5:15.\nK: That;s excellent.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nLaird/Kissinger\n9:00 a. m. ; 4/18/70\n(missed first part of conversation)\nL\nI think Defense and State at least should have a chance to\nread statements before they are given.\nK\nWould you please write me a little note.\nL\nI'll have it over right away. Are you going to Hawaii?\nK\nNo, I'm going to the West Coast though.\nL\nI was concerned about the Monday night thing. There is a\nlot of speculation. I don't want to be in a position where we\nget into too complicated of formula as far as giving too\nmany dates in that statement. We can keep the troops in\nVietnam through the 15th of June without\n1/2 came out.\nI think to set a another timetable would be a mistake, and\nI'll put out an order. Two timetables will be watched by the\nPress.\nK\nThat's a good point. He told me he was going to go off and\nthink the whole thing over on the plane.\nI won't know\nexactly - it will be in the range of what we were talking\nabout, give or take a few weeks.\nL\nIt's okay to go to the end of the month. I think we can make\nthis okay, but I also want to keep people more or less happy\nand I have told chiefs. They are aboard as long as they\naren't out un til the\n15th.\nK\nRight. I have no reason to suppose that he is going to\ndo it in as much detail. I will get him a note before he\nleaves.\nL\nIf he takes a figure on troop ceilings, 390 or 395\n-\nWe must get down to 260 by August for budgetary reasons.\nAny problems?\nK\nI can foresee nothing that I have heard him say that is\ninconsistent with what you said. I think he is trying to figure\nout how to general thought.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nL\nThi XIXSX per 40 xarxck 50\nI would rather go between 40 and 50 and look a little better.\nto\nK\nDid he say 40/cxx 50?\nL\nYes. Personally I think 40.\nK\nI hadn't realized he put it that way.\nL\nPersonally I think from 35 - 45 is better\nK\nYou think a figure should be below 400?\nL\nDamn right.\nK\nEssentially like last time.\nL\nI think that is right. I think late August or early September.\nIt's no time for decisions before elections. It puts heat on\nPresident.\nK\nLet me get all of this to him. I talked to him about this last\nweek.\nL\nI talked to him about this last week, but then I see these stories,\nand ---\nK\nWhen he saw figure of 50 - 60, he started getting sore.\nL\nI would rather go down to 35 - 45. The figures in the Los\nAngeles Times should not be over-reacted to. Pat Buchanan\nputs these things in the morning brief. That morning brief\ncauses me more problems than anything in the whole White\nHouse.\nK\nI causes me more than it causes you. On that thing we discussed\nyesterday It is in order now.\nL\nI will see the picture today or tomorrow morning. It was\nimportant to get them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nK\nThe SAM -- that's being done.\nL\nI'll give a report to you before you leave.\nK\nGood. Are you going to be at the Wxlxix dinner tonight.\nL\nYes.\nK\nI'll see you there.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n12:05 pm 4/18/70\nL: I got this note on the President's request that we not limit sorties\nrequirements in S. E. Asia through July 30, 1970.\nK: That's right.\nL: I'm having to put some pressure on these people to keep within the budget.\nWe can't get a supplemental.\nK: He said we are willing to draw down or something.\nW:: We can draw down with a reduction in force someplace. We can put people\noff but I need at least 60 days. Why would he choose July 30?\nK: Three months.\nL: I'm going to have trouble with this. I need $3 billion for Laos and I have\nbeen having trouble hidding that. We increased Laos by more then dobble.\nwith\nK: His concern is that it cannot work if withdrawals we cut all actions.\nL: Let me give you areport on our raids. You have to use quality use of\nsorties and not just because we have them.\nK: He wanted to put out the memo for a year but I said we had to review\nit every three months.\nL: Does he realize the costs?\nK: Yest but he ?7722?\nL: We will have to cut down in Europe.\nK: You will send me something on SALT.\nL: I am upset about that. I have very good indications that have turned this\ninto ACDA's position and interpreted that ? ????\nK: That's right.\nL: You cannot get back to that now. They don't plan to do that Mon.\nK: I told Farley it had to be Monday.\nL: I haven't even seen a statement on that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nLaird/Kissinger\n12:05\npm\n4/18/70\nK: I will not tolerate that. I know what the President has in mind. You\nheard him at the Congressional briefing.\nI\nL: On the bombing thing she will send you a memo expressing my concern.\nK: dWill you? I will only send it to the President.\nL: My problem -- If I have to keep within ordiancesupplementals, I will\nhave to make terrific changes. It goes into '71. This goes into our budget.\nK: Hedidn't focus on it. He looked at the gifxx figures in respect to his\nstatement.\nL: When the rainy weather came I thought I could save $100 million.\nK: Why don't we get together on this when I come back from Calit.\nL: I have to talk to Mayo and I don't think we can get a supplemental becuase\nI will have to tell him why and we are flying very little in SVN.\nK: He is concerned with air support to VN forces.\nL: I could increase that. We are Xix flying little of that. Very few strikes\nare in support of the VN. Less than 10 percent. I just as soon cut back\nin the rainy season and give them support. We have not refused any of these\nK: What bothers you then.\nL: I have to maintain the same rate on the Ho Chi Minh trail and in Laos\nwhen during the rainy season it won't be necessary. I can't put stuff in\nVN when we don't have anything.\nK: I will talks to the President on the way back from the West Coast.\nL: I will keep the greatest amount of pressure on but on the same number\nof sorties during the rainy season so I can save $100 million\nK: ON the Ho Chi Minh trail I will talk to the President. This order has\nto stand until we have another word about it SO you have to think of carrying\nit out. Wx Send a memo on what you propose to do. If I grextx could have that\nwith me. Rough order of magnitude.\nL: Porblem of 71 budget\nthousand sorties. That's a cut down.\nCut down the sorties from the 70 budget. Tactical sorties from 14, 000 to\n10, 000. The gxix big thing is ordinance. Eafcthe sorties costs $40, 000 for\nammunition.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nLaird/Kissinger\n12:05 pm\n4/18/70\nK: If you would give me a memo on how you would break this down.\nL: We would not cut back support for SVN. We could increase that. Let me\nwork this out for you and get you something.\nK: By noon tomorrow.\nL: We will see.\nK: I am leaving at noon.\nL: I will talk to you when you get back. In the meantime I will keep us the\nraids.\nK: Give me a memo on that other think.\nL: I feel strongly about it and I will talk to the President (SALT delegation).\nK: I may do that on Wed.\nL: The Sovi will table to accept the MIRV ban and it will put us in a\nbad position by not having it on the table.\nK: I have insisted on that for Monday.\nL: I have checked with Vienna and nothing is coming out.\nK: I will change the rules in writing on that.\nL: I think it's important.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nFarley/Kissinger\n12:30 pm\n4/18/70\nF: I have talked a couple more times with Vienna and they will say Monday\nwe will have another alternative and say a few words of it's nature. Gerry wante\nme to pass on to you xfx as I had guessed he had had no objection in mentioning\nthis yesterday and had been persuaded by the misreading as I had.\nK: I have had 3 calls from Laird this morning alone.\nF I wanted to assure you xxxxxxxxxxx there was no effort on his part toavoid\nthis.\nK: If you will make clear that the other has equal standing.\nF: We will meet with the defense people this afternoon.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nKay Graham/Mr. Kissinger\n1:17 p. m., April 18, 1970\nKG:\nI was made to call you by Mrs. Kraft to (a) put pressure\non you, and (b) to see if we could out together to the Kraft's after\nthe White House Correspondents dinner.\nK:\nThe President having gone off to Hawaii and taken most of\nhis assistants, I think I am the only White House Assistant going to\nthe dinner. I have to show my face at several receptions for about\n5 minutes each. Could you do that with me?\nKG:\nCertainly.\nK:\nThen I would love to go with you to the Krafts'.\nKG:\nI will look for you at the dinner -- I'm sure we'll be sitting\nat different tables.\nK:\nFine. I have one of our supporters here who would like to\ntalk with you. [He then put John Kenneth Galbraith on with Mrs. Graham. ]\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGerard Smith/Dr. Kissinger\n1:20 p. m., April 18, 1970\nK:\nI have been talking to Phil (Farley), and as far as I can see,\nit is all straightened out. I have been getting restive calls from\nvarious people inc luding my friend. The way you and Phil have\nworked it out is fine.\nS:\nAs long as it is clear to you that we are trying to do what\nyou want us to do.\nK:\nThere is no problem. Make it clear we have these alternatives.\nThe order in which you present the details, we won't get into to.\nS:\nWe are not trying to fight the problem.\nK:\nWe don't want \"D\" to appear as the fall-back.\nt\nI\nS:\nWe will do it that way on Monday.\nK:\nIn our Congressional briefing on Thursday, having the thing\nsuggested for Monday helped a lot.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSANITIZED COPY\nTELECON\nJonathan Moore/Mr. Kissinger\n2:26 p. m., April 18, 1970\nK:\nDo I have the wrong impression when I think you are all\ndragging your feet?\nM:\nI certainly hope you do. What is it this time?\nK:\nWe are going to move some things next week, if we can get\nguidance from the Cambodians on what they want.\nM:\nI don't know what happened to our man. (He mentioned a cable. )\nSANITIZED\nWe are going to fry him good.\npeR 3.3(b)(1)\nK:\nThe second thing, about which I was supposed to call Marshall\nGreen -- but none of the people at that level are in town today -- is:\nDo you know about the agreement made between Rogers, Green and\nK:\nI don't know what happened, but that is not your doing. To\nwhom do I pass a Presidential directive?\nM:\nYou have just done it. I think I'm running the department today.\nYou mean one agent?\nK:\nOne agent and one communicator.\nM:\nHelms and the Secretary have been in direct contact since.\nK:\nYes, but there is a stalemate, and Helms appealed directly to us.\nM:\nI understand now -- one agent and one communicator.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nSANITIZED Richard Nixon COPY\npeR 3. 3.3(b)(1);HR. 6/28/11\nReproduced Présidential Librar By\nWIH NARA, Date 10/17/11\nDECLASSIFIED\nNLN 07-A-54/17 [pp. [of2]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSANITIZED COPY\nJonathan Moore\nApril 18, 1970, 2:26 p.m.\n- 2 -\nK:\nI was supposed to issue an order yesterday, but with Marshall\nleaving town.\nAnd now I have to leave town. I don't want to get\na question in California as to whether or not I have done anything about\nthis.\nSANITIZED\nM:\nYou have conveyed the message.\npeR 3. 3(b)(1)\nK:\nhave an answèr back on Wednesday when we return.\nM:\nThe water route is not good. He has to get the local government's\nviews on the other two means and in a hurry.\nK:\nWe prefer the air route, but Marshall Green feels so strongly\nabout the other.\nM:\nWe are all set.\nK:\nThank you.\nlds\nReproduced at SANITIZED DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon COPY Library\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined lbd declassined. 54/17 TDD. 2 of i\nTELECON\nRogers/Watts\n2:52 p.m.; 4/18/70\nR\nI was just listening to the radio and heard Tom Braden\nquote Henry -- and it must be a mistake. Braden quotes\nHenry as saying he thought \"it was the beginning of the end\nof the war in Vietnam\". I can't imagine Henry saying\nthat. Anyway, I thought you should know.\nW\nWhat braadcast was this on?\nR\nBraden's radio program. It was the kind of thing that could\nget a lot of publicity.\nW\nDid he give any background?\nR\nHe said Dr. Kissinger had advised that in addition to the\nsafe return of the Apollo 13 Astronauts, the President had\nadditional good news that it might be the beginning of the\nend of the war in Vietnam, and he made comments about\ndevelopments in Cambodia.\nW\nHe didn't indicate the basis of where it was obtained?\nR\nNo. It might be someone who would like to get to Braden.\nW\nI'll be in touch with Henry. Shall I get back to you?\nR\nWell -- if you have anything significant to report.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nWatts/Kissinger\n2:57 p.m.; 4/18/70\nW\nI just had a call from Secretary Rogers, who said that\nTom Braden had reported on his radio broadcast that you\nhad advised the President that he has additional good news\nin addition to the return of the Apollo 13 Astronauts because\nyou thought we were at the beginning of the end of the war in\nVietnam.\nK\nThat's absolute baloney. I haven't even seen Braden in\n6 months.\nW\nDo you want me to do anything about this.\nK\nThere is absolutely nothing to it. It's pure invention.\nW\nShould I do anything vis-a-vis Braden?\nK\nI haven't even seen Braden except for 10 minutes at a party\na while back. There was absolutely nothing said. Tell =\nRogers there was absolutely nothing to it.\nW\nI'll call him right back.\nK\nI have said no such thing. I haven't seen Braden.\nW\nI will call Rogers right away. I'll confirm with you as soon\nas I talk to him.\nK\nIt's pure invention, tell him. There will, of course, be\nno such thing said.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nRogers/Watts\n3:05 p.m.; 4/18/70\nW\nI just spoke to Henry. He was very upset. He said this\nwas pure invention on Braden's part. He hasn't seen Braden\nin over six months. He said it's absolutely untrue.\nR\nI knew it would be. There's no use raising a flap about it.\nIt wasn't on the 3 o'clock news. Why don't we wait a little\nwhile and see if anything is repeated. If it's a one shot\nproposition, let's drop it. If it's raised again, then let's\ncall Kissinger.\nW\nThen I could call Braden and let him know it's not true --\nKissinger had made no such comment to the President.\nR\nWhy don't you have someone listen to WTOP. If they don't\nsay it again, let's drop it.\ncall\nW\nOK. I'll & Kissinger and let him know what we've discussed.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nWatts/Kissinger\n3:08 p.m. ; ; 4/18/70\nW\nHenry, I just spoke to Rogers. I told him the report\nwas an absolute untruth. He heard Braden's remarks\nover WTOP news. We're listening to see if anything is\nrepeated. If not, he suggested that we ignore it.\nK\nIf it's repeated, let me know and I'll call Braden. I\nhaven't talked in substance with him in over a year. I\nwant to speak to Braden. You told Rogers I haven't\ntalked to Braden?\nW\nI did. I explained what you told me earlier -- that the report\nwas absolute baloney -- pure invention.\nK\nGood. I'm going to call Braden in the morning. Let\nme know if anything further develops.\nW\nI'll do that.\nK\nYou don't have to stay in the office.\nW\nOK, I don't plan to.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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