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I
Tckon
HAK and Henry Rowan (2pp)
6/12/70
SANITIZED
to
Telcon
HAK and the President (2 pp.)
6/17/70
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST LN 07 - 20 / 21
NLN 07-A-20/2
SANITIZED Persec 3.3(b)(6)(1) PerLtr April 21,2009
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Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1
Per Ltr 3/26/20
3
Telcon
HAK and the President (4 pp.)
6/17/70
B
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DECLASSIFIED peR HR. 5/11/2017
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
Kiosinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations
5
FOLDER TITLE
1970 11-17 June 9
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified-information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
DECLASSIFIED 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
I
Tekon
HALE and Henry Rowan (2 pp)
6/12/70
I
SANITIZED
d
Telcon
HAK ind" and the President (2 pp.)
6/17/70
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST N LN 07-20/21
W
Tekon
HAK and the President (4 pp.)
6/17/20
B
MANDATORY
REVIEW REQUEST NLN 07-20/22
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
Kissinger Transcripts Telephone Conversations
5
FOLDER TITLE
1970 11-17 June 9
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
DECLASSIFIED; 1989-235-084/00024
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TELCON
Sen, Jackson/Kissinger
10:40 a. m.
6/11/70
K. The President wanted me to chat with you about the Byrd vote today. We
have reports that you are getting uneasy about it,
J: I voted "for" before on it. On the limitation on ground troops on Laos
and Thailand. I have taken the same sjmpliståc stand on Cambodia. Air power
and everything except ground troops. The Byrd thing leaves me in an awkward
position. I am not for the Cooper/Church in its present form. It has ambi-
guoties. Any bombing in Cambodia would aid the Cambodians and therefore
you couldn't do it. The Byrd thing bugs me because of my position. You know
how I feel.
K: The only problem is that basically we don't want the Cooper/Chnrch even
with the Byrd rider. We have no pain if you vote for the Cooper/Church thing(? )
The problem is that now it's going to get played as a defeat of the President and
will be a great victory for the students and opponenets.
J: You see my point. I am for the Administration but I'm concerned about
% this amendment and the way the Cooper/Church stands, I ean't vote for it.
K: No one is asking for that.
J: Let me think about it. It'a a mess.
K: The President wanted me to call in this particular condition,
J: I understand.
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TELCON
Timmons/Kissinger
11:10 am
6/11/70
T asked HAK if he'd talked with Sen. M. C. Smith. HAK said no, that she'd
been in committee when he called and he thought it was best not to call her
out because he didn't want her to go back in saying the the WH called.
Timmons agreed. HAK then stated that he had talked with Sen. Jackson
who was ambivolent and who would probably vote against us but who would
also vote against the Cooper/Church amendment. Timmons reiterated that
he thought HAK had done the right thing in not calling Sen. Smith out of
committee, saying she was very sensitive and referring to her debate with
Bryce Harlow.
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TELCON
President/Kissinger
11:20 am
6/11/70
P: Did you get your calls made?
K: I called Jackson and he is very non-committal. He is against the Cooper/
Church but he has come out against American ground forces in Cambodia.
P: This restricts air power.
K: He said he would like to get the Laotian amendment but I said that wasn't
possible. I think he will vote against us but he said he would think about it.
Margaret Chase Smith was in committee and I W&X thought it was best not
to call her out and then have her go back in and say the WH was trying to
influence her.
P: Leave word and when she calls tell her the President respects here judgment
on these matters but we want her to know what we feel.
K: I can call Jackson again.
P: No, don't do that. The Democrats are raising at these guys and scaring
them to the left. I think it's good that I didn't call. It will be a defeat if we
loose and it won't be a victory if we win. We do have that letter down there.
Was that a good thing?
K: Probably not but with the pressures that Scott put on you -- it's not a great
mistake -- 51-49 sort of thing. The letter says you are against it but you
would approve it.
P: On my brief encounter with Dobrynin I think that these fellows need a deal.
K: I think they need it.
P: On anything.
K: They wilk were scared to death that we were trying to set up a Middle
East crisis.
P: I thought it was good that I dropped the hint that the Middle East could blow.
I wasn't threatening. It's the area in which American public opinion will sway.
He said we don't do anything against American public opinion. We showed them
Xxxx we did two times.
K: It was very effective. On SALT we were in good shape. We know where
we are going. They will be wound up one way or another.
P: Whatever you agree to I am for. I don't understand the details.
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President/Kissinger
-2-
11:20 am
6/11/70
K: That we can handle. The Middle East is the problem.
P: On SALT you think he is not playing the game of not having an agreement?
K: He asked what we wanted. I said let them talk generalities until the end of
June. Then you and I decide the general outlines and then we go. He didn't
have instructions. The thinkg that's agreed is you can have a SALT agreement
anythime this year. And what Kennedy made of the bomb test ban.
P: And Johnson of Glassboro. The summitry I couldn't care less for but if
we can get the glow of Glassboro it will help our boys.
K: I expected a chill. I didn't want to overload the circuit. On the Middle
East we can get an agreement if you will go the global route but it will require
management here.
R: The Middle East shook me when he said he was beside himself on his
dealings with Sisco. I would like your summary of that. What I think he was
saying was knock off this business of dealing with diplomats. Tell us what
you want and let's go.
K: He wants to know where we are going. You have a number of choices - -
if you go the State Dept. proposal you won't get a settlement. It will lead to
a deadend but it will buy us two months. Then we would have to explain to
him what we are doing. If you play it straight it will lead to a deadlock. Or
you can let them go and tell Dobrynin it's to gain time. You can get a M. E.
settlement when you want it.
not
P: The M. E. is important and SO is subject A. On VN they are XXXXTXXXX interested
in a communist government or Cambodia. Are they insisting on overthrowing
Lon Nol?
K: The Lon Nol Government is the Sihanouk Government.
P: On that generally they are saying it's the Chinese problem. That's a
defensive anx maneuver.
K: They are not a tough spot in Hanoi but if we have a concrete proposal ? ?
? ? ?. But he said that they listened when we gave them generalities but it
was better if we could give them a concrete proposal. Remember when we
went back and proposed a meeting in Moscow with the NVN? It may be pre-
mature right now. But I think we can get them to at least put some
behind the
influence on them. He talked about S.E. A. as a misfortune
for them too.
P: It came to me that he bought completely my line about (what happened in
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President/Kissinger
11:20 am
6/11/70
- -3-
P: (cont.) Czech and relating this to VN).
K: Hesaid while they are talking to us start a proposal ? ? ? ? ? things up
in Cambodia and Laos and no cease fire in Laos. He said it had quieted down.
I said yes because we have done something. He asked for partition of Laos.
I didn't say but? ? ? ?? ?. Their minds are running along these lines.
On SALT and the M.E. he went into great detail. He was less abrupt on VN.
On Europe, well that's not a front burner. On changing relationships.bix asked
him to state his views. I said your view was we should get to something big to
bring about a significant change in our relationship. (It's a new Administration
and it's early and we have a chance to make a significant change.) He said
they had the same view and we should have a significant agreement.
P: See you later.
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TELECON
Deputy Secretary Packard/Mr. Kissinger
11:36 a. m., June 11, 1970
P:
I've been working on the budget reduction problem and have
met with each one of the Services this week. We have problems of
disastrous consequence in going down this far to meet the '72 budget.
K:
Then you can't do it.
P:
It comes about really because of wage and price increases.
I also spent some time in the last week or 10 days with some people
in the business community. I have concluded that it is almost manda-
tory that we consider a wage and price control action to see if we can
get both under better control. I talked with Arthur Burns yesterday,
and he said it was important to get a letter from me to the President
today outlining my views. Can I use your services for this?
K:
Certainly; I will hand it to him personally.
P:
I am only emphasizing my concern; I can't get into details.
I feel it is important that we do this because the whole military operation
will be in a shambles if we go this route. Later, we can get it into
the DPRC. I'll send the letter to you.
I have one other question in connection with the suggestion Helms
made yesterday on the Israeli aircraft problem. Is that course one
you think would be considered? If so, I could provide more specific
detail on it.
K:
I don't know whether there is a prospect it would be accepted,
but it will be considered. It would be helpful if you can do a memo.
P:
When do you need it?
K:
Within a week.
P:
I can do it by tomorrow.
K:
By Monday would be terrific.
P:
I will do that. If you want to address that course, there are
some things I ought to bring out.
K:
Good.
lds
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TELCON
U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Kissinger
11:51 a. m., 6-11-70
J:
Yes Henry.
K:
With the situation in Jordan, I think we should have a
WSAG meeting, don't you?
J:
Iagree.
K:
How would it be if we had a meeting at 2:30 pm and you
bring Symmes along? Or do you think we should move
faster?
J:
No. 2:30 is good. I have been talking with the Pentagon
about the planning and what the possibilities are. I
was going to talk to Vogt and Moorer about this right
now or were you going to call them?
K:
Haig was calling them.
J:
I will call them and follow up with what I wanted to tell
them.
K:
Why don't we both call them?
J:
OK fine - I'll see you at 2:30.
mlh
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TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
11:55 am
6/11/70
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
K: Did you have the impression that the President is with the Secy. Can
we use our normal crisis machinery?
H: I heard only one side. Rogers said he was talking about
to
shore him up. Evacuate. Why doesn't Israel hit Syria? Why don't you
call Rogers and follow up.
K: No, I will just put the crisis machinery into effect.
H: Does that include State?
K: Of course.
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TELCON
Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger
12:00 noon
6/11/70
S: You should now have received in your office the anser to NSSM 94 on dis-
cussion initiatives. He said you wanted some sort of speaial arrangements
SO we didn't run it through the usual way.
K: Does that mean it's a straight State message.
S: No, it has all the clearances -- (lists clearances)
K: Who did you not clue in? Cargo?
S: They all were cleared but it didn't go through the normal process. Are
you thinkiing of doing X it at the Under Secretary level?
K: That's what I'm thinking. But you don't have an Under Secretary.
S: We have one. We can relax on that?
K: What's the other choice?
S: We could go to the Sequoia group.
K: No. I will call you tomorrow. We will schedule something next week.
S: I will be gone tomorrow seeing a daughter graduate from college but I
will be back next week.
K: We will set something up next week.
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Telecon
Senator Percy
6/11/70 1:17 p.m.
K: I'm returning your call.
P: Yes. I understood I was to hear back from you in the event
that Byrd fails--is there any alternate language you want?
If there's something you wany I'll give it to you. Otherwise I'll just
put it in as an amendment for some time in the future.
K: Our Congressional people think your amendment is not now
acceptable. The Cooper-Church amendment already gives us your
responses in case of attack. What the position will be if x the Byrd
amendment fails I don't want to say.
P: No, of oourse not. I had better just put it in and we'll see
how it comes out tomorrow. If Byrd carries, there will be no need;
if it fails, this is a fall-back.
K: Of course, our people hope your vote will help it carry.
P: I'm vary concerned about the Byrd amendment. It looks like
we're doing nothing. This language gives us an alternative. If they
are going to be used again as anactuaries, then we can go back in
them. We should have that.
K: That's true. I don't usually get into these things. I just got
into this because you called me the other day.
P: I know. Thank you so much.
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TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
1:30 pm
6/11/70
R: On this WSAG meeting we have a whole flock of people working on this
and I wonder if it's a duplication of effort.
K: It's the usual process. They are the operating group.
R: Will, we have a militaryxxxxxxx man on it and we have been in touch with Moorer
If the WSAG is involved in spex operations details --
K: The operational details are ? ? ? as established. It's just to set the
directions and the operational details will be handled by the State working group.
R: The general division of labor on policy -- the principle problems are the
people and what to do to support the King. I talked to the President this
morning.
K: He is aware of the group meeting.
R: I guess I will talk to him. I think we are duplicating the work. I have
asked the same questions xxxxx as you will.
K: It's an interagency proglem.
R: It's not politics, but operations. What are the policy considerations?
K: I am following our procedure. You can call the President. I can't get
into a hæsle everytime I do somehting.
R: You are starting it. Our basic problem is that on long range policy
matters WXX the NSC would handle it and otherwise we would.
K: We have contingency plans. This groups works on the general issues and
then the task force workes out the details. We have never done that. What
we want to do is see what plan is applicable.
R: Go ahead and have the meeting and if it's a duplication of effort, I will
call the President.
K: Do that.
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TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
1:40 pm
6/11/70
Haldeman said that the President had tried to cancel the trip because of
seeing Romney and now he was using the Middle East as an excuse. He
wondered if it were necessary to cancel it. HAK said that if we had to
move troops in the President should stay. However, he had would have
more definitive information at 4:00 and suggested that the departure be
postponed until 9:00ish.
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TELCON
S. Alsop/Kissinger
2:45 pm
6/11/70
K: I was told yesterday ahat Stewart Loory had called and that doesn't
elicit a very quick response from me.
A: No. It was me. Have you got a moment on the phone?
K: Could I call you in an hour if it takes more than a minute?
A: Sure.
K: I will call you in an hour.
Further conversation:
4:03
p.m.
A: I don't know, perhaps you don't want to discuss this over the telephone.
x I have always been skeptical on a negotiated exit. But I am changing my
mind. It seems to be evident that the Soviets want out of the war and
also.
You have the NYT article, the Soviet Ambassador's comments, etc.
K: You don't have to convince me. I have been trying to convince you of
that for months.
A: It's since Cambodia, makes this more convincing.
K: I think you analysis is correct. It doesn't ? ? ? ? I have seen but the
pieces of the jigsaw puzzle were what in order and then Cambodia threw
everything into a cocked hat and then thex it was which choice (?) would move
into our court. It would have been better if Sihanouk hadn't been overthrown
butonee ? ? ? ??
A: The Chinese are more important.then the Soviets. All the evidence suggests
they are still on the paper tiger line.
K: Yes, but for anti-Soviet reasons. Peking wants to keep it's purity in the
ideological struggle.
A: Our arguement is seriously hampered by Copper/Church. History of
Paris suggests that Hanoi instead of being more amenable seems to counter
excalate. It seems they will hit us in the north where they can hit us hard.
K: I think so too.
A: ????? Any resumption of serious negotiations is unlikely.
K: There have been no serious ones. What resumption?
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S. Alsop/Kissinger
2:45 pm
6/11/70
-2-
A: The beginning is unlikely. At least now it's 40 - 60 to talk about settlement.
Would you go along with that?
K: That's about where I come or 40-40 with 20 uncertain. They will try to prove
their manhood and hit us. They will also -- They have to decide if they will
go up the escalation curve. Going into a massive re-supply effort and long
term stragegy.
A: If they go into these areas again it will be a
.
K: They may find a potent SVN army.
A: And possibly make Cambodia a Chinese puppet.
K: The thing we have to get over is that we have a negotiation that isn't
a humiliation and making that
into another long term effort. It must
be hard for them.
A: And with the Chinese saying they are a paper tiger and go ahead, we are
behind you.
K: They are not kicking up around the same way now.
A: Shouldn;t you send a big shot over there? Is Scranton going?
K: I doubt it.
A: It seems domestically and foreign that June 30 would be a good time.
K: I don't want to comment.
A: The thing that makes me xxix sad is that I am more and more convinced
that if it weren't for Cooper/Church we could get out of this.
K: Exactly. If we could -- there's no I have been convinced and known
that if we could have a modicum of domestic support in the leadership group
we could get out of this and someday I will be able to demonstrate this.
A: Clifford gave a talk yesterday at the press club and it amazed me.
K: He thwarted every negotiation until 1967. His policy gives up on negotiation.
As soon as we follow his plan to get out early.
A: If you are going to get out unannounced, do it right ava y.
K: Exactly.
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S. Alsop/Kissinger
2:45 pm
6/11/70
-3-
A: After that the President's bargaining power goes to zero. That Cooper/
Church thing- - the President's power will not be zero but almost. I think
the Russians are generally trying to get Hanoi to negotiate. And more so
since Cambodia. I wish they had more bargaining power themselves.
K: Nice to talk to you.
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Telecon
Deputy Secretary Packard
6/11/70 5:05 p.m.
K: I just handed your note to the President.
P: Thank you.
K: It went to him personally. - not through the staff.
P: Thank you very much. On the way back we were discussing
something we should have discussed at the meeting. The aircraft
carrier Forrestal is now about 12 hours away
K: We should move it closer.
P: I thought so.
K: How far should we move it?
P: We thought we should move it in to about a hundred miles.
That would put us in a position to use full capacity necessary
K: Will it be noticed? I want it to be.
P: We can announce it or
K: No, just let them pick it up through intelligence.
P: Okay. If that's all right with you I'll issue the execute.
K: Yes, go ahead.
P: Thank you.
K: Okay. And thank you for your thoughtfulness.
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RELCON
K
ermit Gordon/Kissinger
5:07 pm
6/11/70
K: How's the government in exile.
G: You take me off guard when you greet me with that. Very good of you to
call me back. I have a brief question. I have been talking to Howard Turner
of Turner Construction. He has been approached by Kosygin's son-in-law.
He wants an American architect and several construction companies to take
a contract in the Soviet Union to ???? in the Soviet Union. He has qualms
and doesn't want to get into a Henry Ford disaster. It's natural that they would
come to him as he has one of the biggest construction compinies in the U.S.
I thought you might be able to recommend someone for him to talk to about
this.
K: Let him talk to Fred Bergsten initially.
G: I will have him get in touch with Fred tomorrow.
K: Also Sonnenfeldt on the political side. That's even more important.
G: Had you heard about this?
K: I wouldn't until it's become a proposal.
G: Anything that would divert the Soviets to massive residential building would
be good from our stand point.
K: Yes.? ? ??
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TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
6:00 pm
6/11/70
S: I have delayed calling you for two reasons. We have a report that Hussein
may have taken over command of the army as a consensus. In my belief you
will get a ? ? ? ?. Our security people are out on a reconnaisance mission.
K: He should stay here overnight.
S: I think it will look better. Let me add this. We are going ahead on the
Red Cross thing. Our Embassy hopes -- we are holding the please planes in
Beirut and they will flash the word when they can move Americans. They
can't yet.
K: Not from the airport?
S: They are not there, or only a few. They are in town and cannot get to the
airport. Frankly, in an hour or an hour and a half
will be clear. Will
you be home?
K: I don't know yet.
S: There are three of us and we will take turns. Symmes, Davies and myself.
We will keep in touch.
K: Thank you. It's comforting to know you are on top of this.
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Telecon
Haldeman
6/11/70 6:05 p.m.
H: Has anybody mentioned to you a need for a message to
Golda Meir
to be borne by Arthur Burns?
K: Yes, Arthur Burns.
H: Apparently he needs one and he is going to see the President
tomorrow.
K: Okay.
H: Also, he is going to Korea.
K: I had better find out what the President wants to say.
H: I can probably stall Arthur till Monday. Is that better?
K: Yes. Arthur thinks he is going to solve the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
H: That's probably just as well. He won't diddle around like
you do.
K: Right.
H: Probably he's going to Japan too. Okay, and on PSAC, I
wonder if the way out is to have him come in briefly and say I'm glad
you settled everything. He hasn't met with them since March of
last year.
K: Then he should.
H: He has the impression that you think he shouldn't
K: No, he should.
H: But not on foreign policy?
K: They're the PSAC. They don't know anything about interdiction.
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The President/Mr. Kissinger
6:45 p.m.
June 11, 1970
K: Mr. President
P: How about this Jordan thing. Do you have any more information?
K: The security situation seems to have improved a little bit. Some
of our Embassy people are out checking now. We have those three
planes standing by. As soon as the road to the airport ******* is
open we will get the Americans out of there.
P: Good
K: Hussain has taken command of the army. It doesn't look good
for the long term
Fedieen wanted to get
(Hussain's uncle
or father) out of there before. We will know a little more about 8 o'clock.
P: What is the Daily News article on Soviet Union
Hanoi? I have
just been looking it over.
K: I haven't seen anything official on it. I am not aware of that
There may have been some statement by a Soviet fellow
P: It's in the Washington Daily News. You may want to take a look
at it in the morning. It is not inconceivable
Let's understand - we would certainly expect them to
K: Our intelligence says it will take 6 months to replace losses in
Cambodia.
P: OK, thanks.
OK
K: XXXXXX, Mr. President
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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The President/Mr. Kissinger
7:05 p.m.
June 11, 1970
K: Mr. President
P: Yes, I wanted to be sure you noted that Harvard turned down the
two week vacation courses. Don't give any credit for principles.
The contributors did this. The contributors are drying up
K: But Pussey is the best of the University Presidents group -
not intellectually but he has a strong character. Was a good decision.
P: Good decision and might serve to have a good effect. With
Harvard taking the lead other schools might follow.
K:
motive
P: I don't give a damn for the motive
That's why I am going
to get that thing about defense contracts pushed through. They will
stand up for money.
K: I don't think they will stand
:P: Money is more important than principles
K:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
11:30 pxx am
6/12/70
K: Sorry I was tied up when you called earlier.
S: I just wanted to be sure you had the written sitrep.
K: That's gone into him. Americans will move out today. Do you think there
will be no further complication?
S: No andxlexanx he can go to Florida.
K: What's your assessment.
S: The result is that the King is in a weaker position. He has received two
kinds two of advice to ? ? ? ? ? and face up to it and have a show down. The
way people he fired wanted a showdown.
K: It means the fedyeen will have less control.
S: They weren't in Amman anyway. But at the border.
K: Wx Should we continue with arms?
S: I will think about that.
K: Will the Soviets give him arms?
S: I think so. Let me re-read the whole thing. Nothing is happening conclusive.
I want to read it carefully in the next couple of days. Now, Pakistan.
K: I wanted to discuss with you. He feels morally obligated to do something.
We have seen your package. He would like to add seven B-57's X bombers to
it and the tanks.
S: If you add those it changes the package to a defensive replacement package
which is more offensive. Tanks have almost the imagery of the Phantom.
It will increase your difficulty in selling it on the Hill and will have more effect
in India. We feel we can get away with adding 6 B-57's and justify it being
xbx old bombers and replacement. But the tanks if we cut it to 50 it has unfor-
tunate psychological effect.
K: Our worry is that this package is SO small they will consider it an insult.
S: If we are going to take the heat, why do it for SO little?
K: Exactly.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Sisco/Kissinger
11:30 am
6/12/70
-2-
S: Let me see if something can be added to the defesnive package without
adding offensively. I will call you back in a couple of hours.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
J. Alsop/Kissinger
2:25 pm
6/12/70
(Alsop began the conversation talking about a commencement he went to in
which the speaker indicated that things were at a status quo)
K: Anyone who says nothing is happening in the world is a beast.
K: I would like to come to talk to you about what's happening. How about the end
of the day today?
K: Today is not possible.
A: It's better today then later and having it chopped.
K: But I don't have anything open today.
A: 6:00?
K: I can't. I will call you about 4:30 and see if I can move XN something.
A: You are not going to do nothing on the M. E. ?
K: We are not going to do nothing. That's right. We are doing something. Let
me see if I can do something in either direction.
(DRY called later to make a brakfast appointment at 8:30 monday morning,
June 15 with Alsop.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
4:40 pm
6/12/70
S: I have reviewed that Pakistan package and I have an idea but I will give it
to you personally from me to you. You will get it tonight or tomorrow morning.
K: How can we order it?
S: You can send back a one page decision. I can get together with Hal Saunders
and you can write me marching orders next week. We will talk on Monday.
K: What is it?
S: You leave the tanks out and add 57's and instead of half a dozen you give
them 12 interceptors which they have wanted and which willx are strictly
defensive and more advanced level thing. It may be more attractive to the
Pakistanis and more
tothe ? ? ? ? ? ?????
K: Will the Secretary go through the roof?
S: I haven't talked to him.
K: Where did we get the figure 12?
S: We worked it out here.
K: Can we say the President wanted to do more?
S: And after consultation we said this would be better. Do more and keep
it within the confines --
K: The President wanted to do 100 (?).
S: You know about the Zeigler statement. We had them put out a denial.
It could effect - - -
K: I don't like the extremely strong denial. We should have said it wasn't
true. It came out ok.
S: You going to be around this weekend? I will check with you tomorrow.
Depending on what the situation is, I am supposed to get an honorary degree
from Knox College in Illinois, my undergraduate alma mater. I don't know
whether I will go. It depends on things here.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger
5:27 pm
6/12/70
K: As a farewell present to us will you do a dirty job?
R: Sure.
K: The President wants to get rid of the Ambassador in Peru.
R: What's he done?
K: Disimpressed people down there who got to the President, specifically
Blatchford. But I don't want people to go to Blatchford.
R: It's pretty hard on that kind of evidence. I sew in the paper an interview
with him which I thought he handled well.
K: I have no opinion about him.
R: Toby Belcher is his name. I don't know him well. I met him at the
Chiefs of Mission meeting in Mexico City. He strikes me as a thoge thoughtful
guy. But how he is in this I don't know. I will do it.
K: Let me talk to Blatchford. Maybe I should recommend to the President
not to do it.
R: I don't think you can on that ga case alone.
K: Let me talk to Blatchford and get his evidence. I will transmit it having
been order to several times.
R: I will be glad to talk to him unless it's more consenant with your mandate.
K: №, you talk to him if you can in a way that doesn't suggest a big bureaucratic
exercise that goes through the whole Department.
R: I will do that.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Edward Teller/Kissinger
6:00 pm
6/12/70
T: I have two things. One big and one small. There were all kinds of rumors tha
you might not continue what you are doing. If it's taxes true, I want to see if I
can change it.
K: Somethingx Sometime I will leave but not in any immediate -- There's no
truth in any foreseable future.
T: I hope SO and I wanted to be sure. The other is I hear rumors of 50 thousand
dollars to national science research. I hear some rumors about your role in that.
K: I am opposed to that. Isn't that right?
T: I'm absolutely sure. I want to use this opportunity to repeat to you what I have
said to others-I have advocated that money be transferred within universityes
from
to group univèrsities but do it slowly.
K: How?
T: Defense contracts should go to colleges that will accept them. The Draper
Institute should be given a charter to teach so that MIT would not have a monopoly.
K: That's a good point. You are a good friend and I like to hear from you.
T: I am reassured and therefore happy.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Kissinger/Eugene Rostow
6:30 p.m.
June 12, 1970
K: How are you Gene?
R: How are you, I am fine. You poor fellow.
K: I'm doing fine. You all took heat for four years.
R: I talked to a former assistant of mine who is now working on the
Hill. He told me the mood there was one of concern and alarm. I
discounted that as ordinary but this Middle East thing has all the
likelihood of blowing. XXXXXX
K: I agree with you.
R: If Israel reaches the conclusion [that the United States will not
offer aid] she will make a decisive move that would diminish the
[situation as it now stands] and transform the situation [into one very
different]. XXXX
K: I agree.
R: I was talking to Bob Anderson about this. I know he is very
controversal, but after 2-1/2 years experience he seems to have
some very good ideas. He is highly respected on both sides and
had some ideas for an approach. ???????? Nasser is begging
to be saved. The President should have a high level American go
over there and approach him (sentence paraphrased).
K: Wait a minute, who did you say?
R: Bob Anderson.
President wanted to sit down with him and
talked with Rogers but nothing more is happening on it.
K: Anderson is not the best man
R: No, not the best
K: Not even the 10th best.
R: [Mentioned the name McCloy ]
K: We are trying to sort this thing out right now. I agree with your
analysis though. We are working on a memo on this problem right now.
R: Get a high level man and send him out.
K: Thank you very much for your letter.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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-2-
R: This is a ticklish point.
K: You must be lonely there at Yale. It's lonely down here too.
R: Not really. You would be surprised at people who secretly
agree with this position.
K: Look in some time when you are down here, Gene.
jlj
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELECON
Halderman/Kissinger
7:00 p.m., June 12, 1970
H: (Missed his opening comment)
K: Asked about the President getting off to Key Biscayne. You surely
got out of town very secretively.
H: I couldn't get you to make up his mind
He was sitting there when
he packed his little briefcase -- I thought he was going home.
K: If he packed his briefcase, he would be going
H: He saw all those things built up on the lawn and decided to go.
K: What's going to happen?
H: They are working on Ehrlichman's office.
K: I think it was a good idea.
H: How is the Middle East thing?
K: The evacuation of Americans has already started. 200 of them
are out - 236 to be exact.
H: We have 400 in there. Are we going to bring them all out?
K: Yeah. We should be through by tomorrow.
H: (Said something like will there be any trouble ?)
K: There will be problems later on because there has been a shift in
the
H: Some of the girls on the beach have been asking about you.
K: Tell them help is on the way, I am coming. When are you coming
back, Sunday night, Monday?
H: Monday.
K: Okay, it is fine, I will see you then but you will stop phone calls?
H: Yes sir, I will take them all.
K: (Said something
about would want or might want to discuss
some issues I am working on)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELECON
Halderman/Kissinger
(page 2)
H: Where can you be reached?
K: I am always reachable in the White House.
H: Not going to New York?
K: Might go Sunday, certainly not before Sunday.
wh
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
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TELCON
Henry Rowan
Mr. Kissinger
7:45 p. m., 6-12-70
K:
How are you Henry?
R:
I have a broken leg which is giving me a bit of trouble,
Henry, I am calling about staffing. The reason I am calling
is one of the people Fred Ikle is calling about is going to be
in Washington. His name is Wayne Smith. He is an especially
good man. He was in Systems Analysis at the Pentagon. He
is a good writer, sensible fellow and I recommend him very
highly. He came in here just to write a book.
K:
How old is he?
R:
He is in his 30s.
K:
Larry Lynn was just in here.
R:
I think you should see him next week.
K:
OK. Who would you recommend for Larry's job? How about
Brehm? How about Di Bona?
R:
Di Bona is first rate. Brehm is first rate.
K:
Fred also mentions McGarvey.
R:
McGarvey does not want to leave. Averch (sp?) is very good.
K:
Camby was introduced to me. What do you think about him?
R:
I think he is rather young and immature. In a junior position
I think he could be useful. He is imaginative. I have no
additional names to suggest. I wanted to pass on Wayne's
name.
K:
I appreciate the fact that Fred and you took the initiative and
recommended names. It is extremely helpful. Can you travel
east with your leg?
R:
As a matter of fact, I am going to do SO next week. I will call
you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Rowan
-2-
K:
What do you think of Whitehead?
R:
He is comparable to Smith although I did not know him as well.
K:
What about Arthur Harrington?
R:
Somewhat riskier. He is smart but not as diplomatic but a
good person. Larry would know him well.
K:
Do you think well of Bill Hayne (sp?)?
R:
He is a good person.
K:
How about Averch?
R:
He is very smart.
SANITIZED
K:
How would you rate him compared to Smith?
R:
I would put Smith ahead. If I were looking for a professor of
economics, I would put Averch well ahead.
K:
Well Henry, when you are here, if at all possible I would like
to see you.
R:
I will be in in a week and will call you.
K:
Fine Henry - I'm always glad to see you.
mlh
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
Frank Lincoln
6/13/70 10:45 a. m.
K: I appreciated the note you sent.
L: We are supposed to meet with the President Tuesday at 2:00?
K: Right.
L: I'd like to talk to him about Southeast Asia. I am sorry I
missed the meeting of the Board. I udderstand he suggested the Board
to over there.
K: A few of them.
L: I didn't understand whether he meant all or a few.
K: No, just a few of them.
L: Would there be any objection to my talking to the President
about Southeast Asia?
K: Not at all. I'll make sure you have a few minutes to see him
afterwards.
L: Well, either before or at the end. About 15 minutes would
be fine. I don't know if there's any sense in my talking to you about it
you are so staurated.
K: It's not that I'm saturated with ideas - - but my schedule is SO
full.
L: I understand. Well I have some personal matters from some
friends of the President's too. I would like about 15 minutes.
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Telecon
Joe Sisco
6/13/70 10:50 a. m.
K: I read your reporting memo on your talk with Dobrynin. I'm trying
to understand my impression was that the President hasn't approved the
initiative.
S: I understand and they understand this.
K: Supposing the President says you can't do anything.
S: That's fine. Then we say we've reevaluated andwe just go ahead
with the bilateral talks. The only thing they are afraid of is that there
might be a peace in this area with an American stamp on it. It's coming
along well now.
K: Are we going to get them out today?
S: It looks that way.
K: But the long run is not good?
S: No, not good.
K: Is it going to spill over into Lebanon?
S: I think it might be contained. But we've got some serious questions
ahead of us to answer.
K: Like what?
S:
Like
'do
we
intervene?'
They are going to turn to Big Brother.
K: Next week some time I've got to get you in for 15 minutes with
the President.
S: Any time at all.
K: You just come over and walk up with me.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
Secretary Stans
6/13/70 11:10 a. m.
K: The President would appreciate it if you would delay your
testimony until the 22nd.
S: Well I don't know. I'll see what can be done. I can't do anything
today. I'll try to on Monday.
K: He'd appreciate it. The indications are that we won't get a
proposal until the 17th.
S: Right. My man is in Tokyo. I haven't heard from him yet.
K: Right. Secondly on this sale of airplanes. I am sure we will
approve it. It isn't being held upi in this office. I'll get the answer in
two weeks, but we can't have it decided unilaterally.
S: It isn't. State has opposed. Defense is for it and Commerce is
for it. I have the authority to decide unilaterally under these circumstances.
Rogers said he would decide on the South African jets in five days--he may
approve it. On the Portuguese, he wants them to buy it through somebody
else other than the air force.
K: Okay, let's keep it at that. Despite what you may hear we have no
White House reason to oppose it.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
The President
6/13/70 11:17 a.m.
P: What's new in your shop today?
K: We're going to complete the evacuation from Jordan today
probably, at the latest tomorrow morning. But we'll have most of them
out today. The immediate situation is quiet--the long-term one is very
complex with the extremist wing of the Fedayeen, the Maoist wing, show-
ing that it can dominate the moderate Fedayeen and the King.
P: By getting rid of the generals?
K: Yes, and by removing the army as an effective counterweight
to them and letting the King run the day to day things while they conduct
the Arab-Israeli confrontation. It appears that within a month it will
spill over into Lebanon.
P: It already has. What about Vietnam?
K: We're picking up at the usual rate in Cambodia. We got another
hundred-plus rifles and 500 mortar rounds. We've got well over 13 million
in small arms and 16, 000 of the individual weapons. So that's going along.
The other side is doing its harrassing raids. I have asked Defense to write
a letter
they are still stonewelling the tactical air strikes you have
ordered. I have requested a letter explaining why they are not hitting
beyond a certain line-they say they are but they're not, not beyond the
Mekong- just to galvanize them into action. They claim they can't find
targets, but they're surrounding the towns and taking them, so we know
they're there.
P: Is that new man outh there now?
K: He just got out there. I've *** lit as much of a fire as possible.
They have a program now of turning over captured equipment to the Cambodians.
Brezhnev made a speech yesterday which the New York Times plays as
an attack on you. But that's not true. He says that the differences are deep
but also that peaceful coexistence is their firm line and they want to settle
disputes with the U.S. on that basis. It's not soft, but it's not excessively
aggressive either. They have to make some bows toward the Chinese.
P: Oh sure, I understand why they do that. But the Times has to
try to show that their theory is right and that all of this trouble is because
of Cambodia. They are having a hell of a time because the Chinese didn't
march in and the Russiand didn't break off and the SALT talks are goingon
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
The President
6/13/70 11:17 a. m. page 2
K:And will probably be successfully concluded.
P: But they're not getting a lot. They're just thrashing around.
The People are not going to be with the Senatoos on that vote yesterday.
[he must have meant Wednesday]
K: No, and there's no real steam on it.
P: xd I don't know what they want, do you?
K: No, they say a deadline on withdrawals from
P: They've been talking about that for a year. That's silly.
K: That's right, and it would be the end of the negotiations. Some
of the financial analysts I talked with the other day have sent me letters
making more optimistic predictions than before.
₱: Good. You briefed them?
K: Yes.
P: Good.
K: Except for these items there's nothing of consequence.
P: One thing about the Senate vote -I want to be sure it's not a
signal to the enemy. I don't know what you can do about that, but you
see what I mean.
K: They have seen that youxxxxxxx you in the last two major domestic
crises and that you haven't been driven off your course in the slightest.
P: What needs to get home to them is that this vote has no impar tance
at all and no affect.
K: I got that word across. I had a good talk with David Bruce
yesterday. -I think he's completely on your line. I started by saying that
I wanted his view on Vietnam. I didn't tell him our plans. He said it
was absolutely right. He thought Harriman had lost his mind. He noticed
in England thath they've shifted to us. He said he thought Heath was done.
Hume is the most popular/ man in Britain today. The polls have turned around.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
The President
6/13/70 11:17 a.m. page 3
P: If they could just get some break over there. Is Heath just
a lousy candidate?
K: He's just a weak campaigner. Bruce says Heath would be a
good Prime Minister but he just comes across as a weak copy of Wilson.
That's why they like Hume so much--he's such a contrast.
P: He doesn't think it will turn around again?
K: He thinks maybe the newspaper strikes might change things.
But he thinks Britain will have a major economic crisis again this year.
Wages have increased and prices haven't caught up with them. But they
will
P: And then the foreign exchange problem will occur again.
Wilson just let wages go up to win the election. If it could just be close
enough they might still have to have another election.
K: I think Bruce is a good man. He realizes that some of the settle-
ment might have to be made outside--he's not a prima donna. He suggested
setting up a back channel. I think you would be pleased with him.
P: Did you really lay it on the line to him?
K: I said once you say something you don't want it to come back
to you 50 different ways; you want it doxx done. He's a strong and honorable
man.
P: Will he do it?
K: He'll call me on Monday or Tuesday. He wanted to talk to his
wife. But he'll do it.
P: We should announce it in July. But I don't want it to look like
we're doing it out of weakness.
f
K: Around the 15th, or we could slip it to the end of July.
P: We should do it from strength. I don't want to appear to be
driven into it.
K: Early in July we ought to ge back into the other channel and
answer the note. We would have waited 4 weeks by then.
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Telecon
The President
6/13/70 11:17 a.m. page 4
P: I see your point. They are going to have to give some
serious thought to where they are.
K: What would be ideal would be if we could go back into the
other channel and if they agree to a meeting tell them at the meeting
that we are going to appoint a new ambassador. Then we might get
something for it. But the timing might not work out.
P: It might. That would be good.
K: But we shouldn't do it until our forces are out of Cambodia.
P: Getting back to the Breshnev speech.
K: The Times says he says escalating the war was just escalating
our defeats, and it put one of these flashy headlines on the story that won't
support it, He didn't mention Cambodia ata all. He said our divisions are
very deep. And on that they hang their story. But you would say the same
thing.
P: I have. The Times is falling into our line, Don't be concerned
with the day to day stories, The real thing is what's happening underneath.
They don't know, and they mustn't. They when it happens we will drop it
on them like a bomb,
K: The Chinese said that around June 20 they would be willing to
talk again. I think we should have some visable activity in Warsaw.
P: Good,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
The President
6/13/70 11:37 a. m.
P: One thing something MACV isn't doing. Thoee reports
we get, They should give them to everybody- - Congressmen and
Senators who comes in. Say I you might be interested in the latest
count. The only way to get through about it is to report it over and
over again. Don't wait until July 1. That's an order. Don't assume
that people pay attention. It isnnt just showing people rifles; say
here's what we've accomplished and here's a comparison.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon
Bob Haldeman
6/13/70 12:30 p.m. (Ca.)
H: What's happening?
K: nothing much.
H: How's your war going?
K: Brilliantly. We've got to keep it going long enough to get
our big victory in October.
H: How's Jordan?
K: We'll have all the civilians out by tonight - at the latest
tomorrow morning. The long-term situation is lousey, but the immediate
crisis situation is good.
H: Any new crises building?
K: No. When are you coming home?
H: I talked to him this morning.
X
I don't know.
K: I talked with him also. He didn't seem in very good spirits.
H: Really? He had probably just gotten up.
K: Is he going to Walkers Key?
H: I don't know. Any problem with that?
K: Absolutely not. Breshnev made a speech which the NYT analyzed as
a slap at Nixon, which it isn't. It's not a friendly speech, but it's not bad.
H: You going to New York tomorrow?
K: Maybe.
H: Are you happy?
K: I'm content. The President asks that; you ask that. Go ahead,
cheer me up. What's the news? I'm just afraid you'reemaded Laird a
White House assistant.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Haldeman
6/13/70 12:30 p.m. page 2
H: No, Councilor to the President.
K: That would liven things up.
H: And Rogers Secretary of Defense, and we're moving Pursley
over as Secretary of State.
K: I'd be happy if you would move him almost any place.
H: I don't know what he's doing. It's hot as hell down here.
K: It's pretty quiet here. I'm catching up on things. One thing,
I think I ought to start seeing people like Chalmers Roberts again. State
is starting its campaign about being shut out again.
H: Yes, but we ought to pick who we see and then give them a
gig one.
K: Chalmers Roberts has been pretty fair.
H: I think we should work on it at the beginning of the week.
K: They're cranking up a campaign again.
H: I agree, but we should do it selectively.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Dave Packard
6/13/70 2:05 p.m.
P: I was just look9ng into the things the President is worrying
about in a briefing with DIA. I'm trying to get what we might do to be
more effective. It would be helpful to get to ghe x President to
talk to him for about 20 minutes and let him see some of these things
first-hand. He might get a much better idea of what we're doing and
what needs to be done. We can give you memos but I think this would
be better.
K: The one thing that is maddening is to send over a Presidential
order and have noghing happen.
P: There's not much that can be done now in Cambodia.
K: How can it be that they are can take a town and we can't hit one.
P: We can't use tactical air for attacks on towns ujless we have
ground control with it. We can't run out there with tactical air and get
the thing settled, It would be helpful if he understood the problem.
K: I'll try to get it set up, but is there nothing that can be done?
P: The situation is, the logistical movements coming into the
Laos panhandle. There's not much coming into Cambodia yet. What is
coming is coming in boats in the jungles. We've onlyka shexdxx had one
secondary explosion so far. We haven't been able to do much yet.
K: But when we can take a town they must be moving.
P: But we can't tell much be reconnaissance, By the time the pictures
are developed the people have moved, You can't fire from the air without
someone to tell you who's the enemfyand whoxx who isn't. It's a little more
complex than it appears. If we could get a presentation to the President
of what the problem is it would be helpful.
K: I'll see if I can arrange it. I get the same questions every day.
I'll arrange an appointment if it can be done.
P: He's in Kay Biscayne tomorrow?
K: Yes, but he won't want to see anyone. He never wants to be
disturbed down there, And he's probably going to Walker's Key.
P: Ithink we suukkx should allocate half an hour. We could go through
it in 10 minutes, but he usually lokes to discuss these things. I understand
his concerns, but it would be helpful if he understood what can and can't be done.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Dave Packard
6/13/70 2:05 p.m. page 2
K: His present impression is that nothing is being done.
P: We'll have these memos over to you. But I think the best
thing would be if he could see it--we've got some pictures.
K: I'll try to set it up Monday. I'll put the request in to him
immediately.
P: Another thing is the weather. You can't
use tactical air through the clouds without radar people on the ground
guiding it. I've been working on it and decided I had better double-
check. We're doing everything we can and we'll get these memos
together. But it would be most helpful if we could see him for a few
minutes and give it to him first-hand.
R: I';1 do my best.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
(at home)
Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger
Sunday, June 14, 1970
H:
an unlikely possibility.
K:
Okay. I'll do that.
H:
Because I would say that's what it is at this point.
But I think we ought to start checking it out because if we are going
to do it, we are going to have to send
advance men down and all
tomorrow.
K:
Well, I better start checking it then.
H:
Okay.
K:
First, let me get the plan straight again. The plan is to go
down to Peru
to send Finch to Peru tomorrow.
H:
Tomorrow or Tuesday.
K:
The earlier the better SO that he can have a plausible look
at the thing.
H:
Yeah, but it'll only take him a day to look at it.
K:
Finch then calls up and says, 'This is an urgent problem.
I
H:
"And I think you ought to come down and take a look at it. "
In the meantime, we would announce
have already announced that
the President was going to Mexico for his anniversary.
K:
Right. But you couldn't send advance men to Peru before
H:
No, no, that's correct. We wouldn't.
K:
All right. And then the President.
H:
What we would do, Henry, is we'd send an overload of an
advance team to Acapulco and then they'd be poised, ready to zap
to Peru as soon as we
K:
Right. So then the trip is Peru, Acapulco
H:
I think we haven't really worked up the logistics, but I
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
think that's what you do -- go right to Peru and then come back to
Acapulco and stay there.
K:
Another possibility is to do it at the other end.
H:
That's right. Which might be better
K:
Which might be a little better.
H:
It might be better even to get to Acapulco and have Finch
call him at Acapulco and say, "You ought to come down here. 11 He'd
say, "Okay, I will -- I'll come down on Monday. " You see, he'd
have to stay Sunday for his anniversary.
K:
Yeah, but he could leave from Acapulco, say late Sunday.
H:
Right, or first thing Monday morning.
K:
It might be even better first thing Monday morning.
From Acapulco, it couldn't be much more than three hours to get
down there.
H:
I wouldn't think so.
K:
That might be another way of doing it.
H:
Yeah. We'll work out some logistic approaches, but why
don't you work on the strategic question and see whether it's good
or bad from a general policy viewpoint.
K:
Okay. Well, let me get a judgment of my people on that, and
I may call you back on it.
H:
All right. Good, Henry.
K:
Good. Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (at home)
Mr. Kissinger/Pete Vaky
Sunday, June 14, 1970
K:
Pete, I have something for you that will curl your hair.
Well, your hair is curled already. Can I discuss something with
you that will stay in our office and not go to State.
V:
Yeah.
K:
Can you give me your word on that?
V:
Yes. What is this about?
K:
It's something that the President is planning -- it's Presidential
business, but if you have any problems with that, then I'd rather not
discuss it.
V:
Well, it depends on what it would be.
K:
I want your advice on some Presidential business. You've
got to be able to tell me whether you can
I think your prerogative
is
your pre-eminent loyalty has to be to the President.
V:
Oh, no, I'll do that, Henry. I won't pass it on. I take it's
something I won't like.
K:
No, I'm not saying.
It's something on which I need your
advice; that's why I'm asking you.
V:
Yeah.
K:
But I don't want it discussed at State until the President
is ready.
V:
Oh, okay. No, I won't have any problems.
K:
He's thinking of going down to Mexico. He's got a honeymoon
this weekend, an anniversary this weekend. He spent his honeymoon
in Acapulco, and he thought it might be a nice thing a sentimental
thing if he went back there. Are you with me? He thought while he
was at it, that could be the occasion of his seeing Diaz Ordaz.
V:
Yeah. I guess they could do that. They are not ready, of
course. He was thinking further on down the road. This coming
weekend?
K:
Yeah.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
V:
The weekend you'l be there.
K:
The son of a bitch is upstaging me.
V:
Well, that's a problem because the championship matches
are in Mexico, and he may feel he has to be there.
K:
I've told him that already. He would go down Thursday and
he thought Diaz could give a dinner for him Friday night or Thursday
night.
V:
Well, we can sure try.
K:
What do you think?
V:
I think it's perfectly in order to try to do that, although I think
it's giving them short notice. There's no reason not to ask them,
Henry, that I can see.
K:
And will they count that as a meeting?
V:
They might not. They might still want to see him because what
Diaz Ordaz wanted was to see him about the end of August by which
time the boundary settlement agreement would be going forward a little
better, and they could sort of do something besides just have a meeting.
I don't think from Diaz Ordaz's point of view you satisfy his desire to
have a continuous meeting.
K:
You don't.
V:
No.
K:
Well, would Diaz Ordaz consider coming up?
V:
Yeah. Now, there's one other thread that's in here -- you know
the
Dwight Chapin cleared off on the memorandum that had been
sent up to them which the President agreed to meet Diaz Ordaz in
Puerto Vilarto in early September.
K:
Yeah, but this is
V:
We just sent the directive over to State and authorized them to
go ahead and talk to the Mexicans to set up such a date. There's no
reason why he couldn't do both. Would he be willing to do that?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
K:
I doubt it.
V:
There is a mechanical problem. I don't know how fast they
would be moving, but we'd have to pull them off the other one.
K:
Yeah, but since he hasn't definitely decided yet.
Now,
the other thing is -- he thought if he's in Acapulco, he might go down
to Peru and look at the earthquake.
V:
Well, that would be very nice.
K:
Would that be a good gesture?
V:
Yeah -- a very good gesture.
K:
It would?
V:
Yes.
K:
You're sure?
V:
Yes, I'm sure.
K:
Well, he'd send Finch down ahead and Finch then would
report to him and then he'd say as long as you're in Acapulco, why
don't you come on down?
V:
I think it would be a nice gesture. There are two things to
remember. It's hard to know There may be something in the
Peruvian situation that I'm not aware of that, from the Peruvian
point of view, they might find it an embarrassment or something, but
I doubt it. It's just a word of caution. Secondly, if he does go down,
and does establish hopes and expectations that aid is going to be given.
I expect we will be giving substantial aid, but it will mean
they
will take it as his personal interest in the area and they will expect
that something will follow from it.
K:
Yeah.
V:
But it would be, bearing those in mind, I would think that's
a good idea.
K:
You would? Would you do it on the way down or on the way
back? Can it wait until next Monday or should it be this Thursday?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 4 -
V:
I would do it on the way back.
K:
You'd stop in Peru on the way back?
V:
No, I would go to Peru. The sooner you go there, the
better, and then stop in Acapulco on the way back.
K:
Right. It means an all-night flight for all of us. I hope you
realize that.
V:
Well, let's see
I don't know what the flying time would be.
K:
Seven hours.
V:
He would fly from here?
K:
Yeah, it's seven hours, I think.
V:
Yes, it is a long flight. I would think that's the more desirable
rather than tacking that on the end of the holiday. It looks like an
afterthought. And as long as you are going to the expense of making
this gesture, you ought to get the maximum out of it, so
K:
Well, can it be set up that quickly?
V:
Well, if we started right away, it could be. He would leave
here on Thursday?
K:
He'd leave Wednesday night, I guess.
V:
All right.
Look at it.
You don't have to stay there more
than a day or so. Thursday -- Friday come back and stop off in
Acapulco.
K:
No, he'd do Acapulco Thursday night. He'd leave here
Wednesday night.
V:
Oh, I see, because of the date.
K:
He'd fly all night, arrive in Peru on Thursday morning.
V:
And then come back Thursday night.
K:
Yeah.
V:
And the alternative would be fly to Acapulco Thursday.
K:
And go to Peru Monday.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 5 -
V:
Then he wouldn't be in such a rush to get back.
K:
Then he'd fly Monday night.
V:
Well, I'm inclined to the earlier one, Henry, as being a
more dramatic gesture.
K:
But you think it's a good gesture? Well, can you keep
both of these things quiet?
V:
I won't say a word. Do you want me to do anything at
this point?
K:
Well, what could you do?
V:
Well, there's nothing. It would be messy. Well, what do
you think the arrangements are?
K:
Well, once he's made the decision, we can make the
arrangements.
V:
All right.
K:
Good.
V:
What do you want me to do about your Mexico trip. Nothing
at the moment?
K:
No, that stays until the President decides. Let me understand.
What is your decision again. your view again about the Diaz Ordaz.
There's nothing wrong with the Acapulco Part as long as we don't
insist that that is the State visit.
V:
That's right, and there's nothing wrong with trying to see
Diaz Ordaz, but from Diaz Ordaz's point of view he had wanted a
meeting with the President that could be
K:
Of course, if he goes to Peru, he really doesn't have to have
a Diaz Ordaz dinner, does he?
V:
Once you get in the country, I think he would want to and he
probably should.
K:
Yeah, but we could just do that a social dinner.
V:
Right, but Diaz Ordaz had been looking forward to a meeting
with the President which he could say was a sort of official me eting
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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- 6 -
between the two Presidents, and by which time they would have
hoped to have had some business transaction.
K:
No, no, but if there's a meeting this Friday?
V:
Diaz Ordaz would not consider that as a substitute for what
he thought had been coming up in September. He would still want
to have another meeting, which you could again do. You would
invite him to Puerto Villarto which is where they filmed "The
Night of the Iguana" north of Acapulco, which is a beautiful spot
and have a formal meeting again.
K:
Yeah, but he won't do that.
V:
Well, then, if he does this one, he should understand that
probably Diaz Ordaz will not consider this a particularly substantive
meeting.
K:
But do we have to face that issue?
V:
You do to this extent -- that we have already probed formally
for this kind of another meeting, sort of a second one to the one he
had last year.
K:
And have they already started talking about it?
V:
Oh, yes. And they were authorized to do so. You remember
K:
I remember, but when did they start doing that?
V:
They were doing that about a month ago, and they exchanged
ideas, and it was left that we would come back to them with
What
we did was explore with the Mexicans the feasibility of this.
K:
But if the President has had to go down there, we really don't
have to face this issue now. We They won't feel any worse if we
tell them after this meeting that we considered this a meeting than
before.
V:
Oh, that's right.
But if he goes to Acapulco, he has to count
on seeing Diaz Ordaz.
K:
All right, if he goes to Acapulco, he has to see Diaz Ordaz.
If we want to see Diaz Ordaz, we might just as well do it in a good
atmosphere. Do we have to take Rogers down with us, too?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 7 -
V:
It would be a nice gesture, Henry.
K:
But then it's no longer a honeymoon trip.
V:
Well, it would be nice for Rogers to go to Lima. He doesn't
have to stay there. He can go on. For the meeting with Diaz Ordaz,
Rogers doesn't necessarily have to be there or he could join the
President for just that as an alternative. The President ought to have
Meyer there and one of the Latin American officials.
K:
But then it becomes very official.
V:
Well, you can't avoid it, Henry.
K:
Well, what if he just went down for his honeymoon anniversary
and then had Diaz Ordaz have a social dinner for him?
V:
Well, the point there is it won't obviate the pressure. Once
the Mexicans know he's there, they're going to want to talk a little bit
of business or else assume that he will come back again in September.
K:
That's right. That's the choice.
V:
And if he does that, he will almost have to come back again
in September.
K:
But I think if he really wants to get a rest down there
I just think to set up a big apparatus with Assistant Secretaries,
Secretaries, agendas, etc., looks like an insane rush.
V:
I agree with that. But you say that if he does this, he will
not want to go back in September.
K:
Probably not.
V:
My point is that from the Mexican point of view
K:
The thing I have to get in his head is that if he wants to use
this as a substitute for September, he's got to have the State Department
and the whole apparatus present. On the other hand, if he does not have
them present, then he's got to go back in September.
V:
Right. Or, alternatively, ask Diaz Ordaz to come up to San
Clemente.
K:
Right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 8 -
V:
But he has to have another meeting with Diaz Ordaz that will
be the official part of it because he can't use this as a substitute. He's
already indicated he would be willing to have this kind of a meeting.
Now you can't have this social part which I agree with you, it would
be nice to retain the social nature of this sort of thing, but then also
say that would substitute for the official visit.
K:
I think it looks too frantic to make it official meeting.
V:
I agree with you, but you must understand that the Mexicans
will still want a meeting.
K:
I understand that, but my judgment is there can be no official
meeting without State Department participation. There can be, on the
other hand -- that will destroy the social character of it.
V:
Right. I agree with you. If that's the case, that's the way
to structure it, Henry.
K:
And then I think we ought to get Diaz Ordaz to San Clemente.
V:
All right. If you can do that and make that commitment, that
I think would be fine.
K:
Okay. Good. Let me get back to Haldeman. Please keep
this to yourself.
V:
I won't say a word.
K:
Okay, good.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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"ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nI\nTckon\nHAK and Henry Rowan (2pp)\n6/12/70\nSANITIZED\nto\nTelcon\nHAK and the President (2 pp.)\n6/17/70\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST LN 07 - 20 / 21\nNLN 07-A-20/2\nSANITIZED Persec 3.3(b)(6)(1) PerLtr April 21,2009\nSANITIZED\nPer Sec. 3.3(b)(1\nPer Ltr 3/26/20\n3\nTelcon\nHAK and the President (4 pp.)\n6/17/70\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST: NLN 07-I-20/2112\nDECLASSIFIED peR HR. 5/11/2017\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKiosinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\n1970 11-17 June 9\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified-information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED 1989-235-084/00024\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nI\nTekon\nHALE and Henry Rowan (2 pp)\n6/12/70\nI\nSANITIZED\nd\nTelcon\nHAK ind\" and the President (2 pp.)\n6/17/70\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST N LN 07-20/21\nW\nTekon\nHAK and the President (4 pp.)\n6/17/20\nB\nMANDATORY\nREVIEW REQUEST NLN 07-20/22\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Transcripts Telephone Conversations\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\n1970 11-17 June 9\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED; 1989-235-084/00024\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSen, Jackson/Kissinger\n10:40 a. m.\n6/11/70\nK. The President wanted me to chat with you about the Byrd vote today. We\nhave reports that you are getting uneasy about it,\nJ: I voted \"for\" before on it. On the limitation on ground troops on Laos\nand Thailand. I have taken the same sjmpliståc stand on Cambodia. Air power\nand everything except ground troops. The Byrd thing leaves me in an awkward\nposition. I am not for the Cooper/Church in its present form. It has ambi-\nguoties. Any bombing in Cambodia would aid the Cambodians and therefore\nyou couldn't do it. The Byrd thing bugs me because of my position. You know\nhow I feel.\nK: The only problem is that basically we don't want the Cooper/Chnrch even\nwith the Byrd rider. We have no pain if you vote for the Cooper/Church thing(? )\nThe problem is that now it's going to get played as a defeat of the President and\nwill be a great victory for the students and opponenets.\nJ: You see my point. I am for the Administration but I'm concerned about\n% this amendment and the way the Cooper/Church stands, I ean't vote for it.\nK: No one is asking for that.\nJ: Let me think about it. It'a a mess.\nK: The President wanted me to call in this particular condition,\nJ: I understand.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nTimmons/Kissinger\n11:10 am\n6/11/70\nT asked HAK if he'd talked with Sen. M. C. Smith. HAK said no, that she'd\nbeen in committee when he called and he thought it was best not to call her\nout because he didn't want her to go back in saying the the WH called.\nTimmons agreed. HAK then stated that he had talked with Sen. Jackson\nwho was ambivolent and who would probably vote against us but who would\nalso vote against the Cooper/Church amendment. Timmons reiterated that\nhe thought HAK had done the right thing in not calling Sen. Smith out of\ncommittee, saying she was very sensitive and referring to her debate with\nBryce Harlow.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n11:20 am\n6/11/70\nP: Did you get your calls made?\nK: I called Jackson and he is very non-committal. He is against the Cooper/\nChurch but he has come out against American ground forces in Cambodia.\nP: This restricts air power.\nK: He said he would like to get the Laotian amendment but I said that wasn't\npossible. I think he will vote against us but he said he would think about it.\nMargaret Chase Smith was in committee and I W&X thought it was best not\nto call her out and then have her go back in and say the WH was trying to\ninfluence her.\nP: Leave word and when she calls tell her the President respects here judgment\non these matters but we want her to know what we feel.\nK: I can call Jackson again.\nP: No, don't do that. The Democrats are raising at these guys and scaring\nthem to the left. I think it's good that I didn't call. It will be a defeat if we\nloose and it won't be a victory if we win. We do have that letter down there.\nWas that a good thing?\nK: Probably not but with the pressures that Scott put on you -- it's not a great\nmistake -- 51-49 sort of thing. The letter says you are against it but you\nwould approve it.\nP: On my brief encounter with Dobrynin I think that these fellows need a deal.\nK: I think they need it.\nP: On anything.\nK: They wilk were scared to death that we were trying to set up a Middle\nEast crisis.\nP: I thought it was good that I dropped the hint that the Middle East could blow.\nI wasn't threatening. It's the area in which American public opinion will sway.\nHe said we don't do anything against American public opinion. We showed them\nXxxx we did two times.\nK: It was very effective. On SALT we were in good shape. We know where\nwe are going. They will be wound up one way or another.\nP: Whatever you agree to I am for. I don't understand the details.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPresident/Kissinger\n-2-\n11:20 am\n6/11/70\nK: That we can handle. The Middle East is the problem.\nP: On SALT you think he is not playing the game of not having an agreement?\nK: He asked what we wanted. I said let them talk generalities until the end of\nJune. Then you and I decide the general outlines and then we go. He didn't\nhave instructions. The thinkg that's agreed is you can have a SALT agreement\nanythime this year. And what Kennedy made of the bomb test ban.\nP: And Johnson of Glassboro. The summitry I couldn't care less for but if\nwe can get the glow of Glassboro it will help our boys.\nK: I expected a chill. I didn't want to overload the circuit. On the Middle\nEast we can get an agreement if you will go the global route but it will require\nmanagement here.\nR: The Middle East shook me when he said he was beside himself on his\ndealings with Sisco. I would like your summary of that. What I think he was\nsaying was knock off this business of dealing with diplomats. Tell us what\nyou want and let's go.\nK: He wants to know where we are going. You have a number of choices - -\nif you go the State Dept. proposal you won't get a settlement. It will lead to\na deadend but it will buy us two months. Then we would have to explain to\nhim what we are doing. If you play it straight it will lead to a deadlock. Or\nyou can let them go and tell Dobrynin it's to gain time. You can get a M. E.\nsettlement when you want it.\nnot\nP: The M. E. is important and SO is subject A. On VN they are XXXXTXXXX interested\nin a communist government or Cambodia. Are they insisting on overthrowing\nLon Nol?\nK: The Lon Nol Government is the Sihanouk Government.\nP: On that generally they are saying it's the Chinese problem. That's a\ndefensive anx maneuver.\nK: They are not a tough spot in Hanoi but if we have a concrete proposal ? ?\n? ? ?. But he said that they listened when we gave them generalities but it\nwas better if we could give them a concrete proposal. Remember when we\nwent back and proposed a meeting in Moscow with the NVN? It may be pre-\nmature right now. But I think we can get them to at least put some\nbehind the\ninfluence on them. He talked about S.E. A. as a misfortune\nfor them too.\nP: It came to me that he bought completely my line about (what happened in\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPresident/Kissinger\n11:20 am\n6/11/70\n- -3-\nP: (cont.) Czech and relating this to VN).\nK: Hesaid while they are talking to us start a proposal ? ? ? ? ? things up\nin Cambodia and Laos and no cease fire in Laos. He said it had quieted down.\nI said yes because we have done something. He asked for partition of Laos.\nI didn't say but? ? ? ?? ?. Their minds are running along these lines.\nOn SALT and the M.E. he went into great detail. He was less abrupt on VN.\nOn Europe, well that's not a front burner. On changing relationships.bix asked\nhim to state his views. I said your view was we should get to something big to\nbring about a significant change in our relationship. (It's a new Administration\nand it's early and we have a chance to make a significant change.) He said\nthey had the same view and we should have a significant agreement.\nP: See you later.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nDeputy Secretary Packard/Mr. Kissinger\n11:36 a. m., June 11, 1970\nP:\nI've been working on the budget reduction problem and have\nmet with each one of the Services this week. We have problems of\ndisastrous consequence in going down this far to meet the '72 budget.\nK:\nThen you can't do it.\nP:\nIt comes about really because of wage and price increases.\nI also spent some time in the last week or 10 days with some people\nin the business community. I have concluded that it is almost manda-\ntory that we consider a wage and price control action to see if we can\nget both under better control. I talked with Arthur Burns yesterday,\nand he said it was important to get a letter from me to the President\ntoday outlining my views. Can I use your services for this?\nK:\nCertainly; I will hand it to him personally.\nP:\nI am only emphasizing my concern; I can't get into details.\nI feel it is important that we do this because the whole military operation\nwill be in a shambles if we go this route. Later, we can get it into\nthe DPRC. I'll send the letter to you.\nI have one other question in connection with the suggestion Helms\nmade yesterday on the Israeli aircraft problem. Is that course one\nyou think would be considered? If so, I could provide more specific\ndetail on it.\nK:\nI don't know whether there is a prospect it would be accepted,\nbut it will be considered. It would be helpful if you can do a memo.\nP:\nWhen do you need it?\nK:\nWithin a week.\nP:\nI can do it by tomorrow.\nK:\nBy Monday would be terrific.\nP:\nI will do that. If you want to address that course, there are\nsome things I ought to bring out.\nK:\nGood.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nU. Alexis Johnson\nMr. Kissinger\n11:51 a. m., 6-11-70\nJ:\nYes Henry.\nK:\nWith the situation in Jordan, I think we should have a\nWSAG meeting, don't you?\nJ:\nIagree.\nK:\nHow would it be if we had a meeting at 2:30 pm and you\nbring Symmes along? Or do you think we should move\nfaster?\nJ:\nNo. 2:30 is good. I have been talking with the Pentagon\nabout the planning and what the possibilities are. I\nwas going to talk to Vogt and Moorer about this right\nnow or were you going to call them?\nK:\nHaig was calling them.\nJ:\nI will call them and follow up with what I wanted to tell\nthem.\nK:\nWhy don't we both call them?\nJ:\nOK fine - I'll see you at 2:30.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHaldeman/Kissinger\n11:55 am\n6/11/70\n? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?\nK: Did you have the impression that the President is with the Secy. Can\nwe use our normal crisis machinery?\nH: I heard only one side. Rogers said he was talking about\nto\nshore him up. Evacuate. Why doesn't Israel hit Syria? Why don't you\ncall Rogers and follow up.\nK: No, I will just put the crisis machinery into effect.\nH: Does that include State?\nK: Of course.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmb. Sullivan/Kissinger\n12:00 noon\n6/11/70\nS: You should now have received in your office the anser to NSSM 94 on dis-\ncussion initiatives. He said you wanted some sort of speaial arrangements\nSO we didn't run it through the usual way.\nK: Does that mean it's a straight State message.\nS: No, it has all the clearances -- (lists clearances)\nK: Who did you not clue in? Cargo?\nS: They all were cleared but it didn't go through the normal process. Are\nyou thinkiing of doing X it at the Under Secretary level?\nK: That's what I'm thinking. But you don't have an Under Secretary.\nS: We have one. We can relax on that?\nK: What's the other choice?\nS: We could go to the Sequoia group.\nK: No. I will call you tomorrow. We will schedule something next week.\nS: I will be gone tomorrow seeing a daughter graduate from college but I\nwill be back next week.\nK: We will set something up next week.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSenator Percy\n6/11/70 1:17 p.m.\nK: I'm returning your call.\nP: Yes. I understood I was to hear back from you in the event\nthat Byrd fails--is there any alternate language you want?\nIf there's something you wany I'll give it to you. Otherwise I'll just\nput it in as an amendment for some time in the future.\nK: Our Congressional people think your amendment is not now\nacceptable. The Cooper-Church amendment already gives us your\nresponses in case of attack. What the position will be if x the Byrd\namendment fails I don't want to say.\nP: No, of oourse not. I had better just put it in and we'll see\nhow it comes out tomorrow. If Byrd carries, there will be no need;\nif it fails, this is a fall-back.\nK: Of course, our people hope your vote will help it carry.\nP: I'm vary concerned about the Byrd amendment. It looks like\nwe're doing nothing. This language gives us an alternative. If they\nare going to be used again as anactuaries, then we can go back in\nthem. We should have that.\nK: That's true. I don't usually get into these things. I just got\ninto this because you called me the other day.\nP: I know. Thank you so much.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRogers/Kissinger\n1:30 pm\n6/11/70\nR: On this WSAG meeting we have a whole flock of people working on this\nand I wonder if it's a duplication of effort.\nK: It's the usual process. They are the operating group.\nR: Will, we have a militaryxxxxxxx man on it and we have been in touch with Moorer\nIf the WSAG is involved in spex operations details --\nK: The operational details are ? ? ? as established. It's just to set the\ndirections and the operational details will be handled by the State working group.\nR: The general division of labor on policy -- the principle problems are the\npeople and what to do to support the King. I talked to the President this\nmorning.\nK: He is aware of the group meeting.\nR: I guess I will talk to him. I think we are duplicating the work. I have\nasked the same questions xxxxx as you will.\nK: It's an interagency proglem.\nR: It's not politics, but operations. What are the policy considerations?\nK: I am following our procedure. You can call the President. I can't get\ninto a hæsle everytime I do somehting.\nR: You are starting it. Our basic problem is that on long range policy\nmatters WXX the NSC would handle it and otherwise we would.\nK: We have contingency plans. This groups works on the general issues and\nthen the task force workes out the details. We have never done that. What\nwe want to do is see what plan is applicable.\nR: Go ahead and have the meeting and if it's a duplication of effort, I will\ncall the President.\nK: Do that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHaldeman/Kissinger\n1:40 pm\n6/11/70\nHaldeman said that the President had tried to cancel the trip because of\nseeing Romney and now he was using the Middle East as an excuse. He\nwondered if it were necessary to cancel it. HAK said that if we had to\nmove troops in the President should stay. However, he had would have\nmore definitive information at 4:00 and suggested that the departure be\npostponed until 9:00ish.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nS. Alsop/Kissinger\n2:45 pm\n6/11/70\nK: I was told yesterday ahat Stewart Loory had called and that doesn't\nelicit a very quick response from me.\nA: No. It was me. Have you got a moment on the phone?\nK: Could I call you in an hour if it takes more than a minute?\nA: Sure.\nK: I will call you in an hour.\nFurther conversation:\n4:03\np.m.\nA: I don't know, perhaps you don't want to discuss this over the telephone.\nx I have always been skeptical on a negotiated exit. But I am changing my\nmind. It seems to be evident that the Soviets want out of the war and\nalso.\nYou have the NYT article, the Soviet Ambassador's comments, etc.\nK: You don't have to convince me. I have been trying to convince you of\nthat for months.\nA: It's since Cambodia, makes this more convincing.\nK: I think you analysis is correct. It doesn't ? ? ? ? I have seen but the\npieces of the jigsaw puzzle were what in order and then Cambodia threw\neverything into a cocked hat and then thex it was which choice (?) would move\ninto our court. It would have been better if Sihanouk hadn't been overthrown\nbutonee ? ? ? ??\nA: The Chinese are more important.then the Soviets. All the evidence suggests\nthey are still on the paper tiger line.\nK: Yes, but for anti-Soviet reasons. Peking wants to keep it's purity in the\nideological struggle.\nA: Our arguement is seriously hampered by Copper/Church. History of\nParis suggests that Hanoi instead of being more amenable seems to counter\nexcalate. It seems they will hit us in the north where they can hit us hard.\nK: I think so too.\nA: ????? Any resumption of serious negotiations is unlikely.\nK: There have been no serious ones. What resumption?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nS. Alsop/Kissinger\n2:45 pm\n6/11/70\n-2-\nA: The beginning is unlikely. At least now it's 40 - 60 to talk about settlement.\nWould you go along with that?\nK: That's about where I come or 40-40 with 20 uncertain. They will try to prove\ntheir manhood and hit us. They will also -- They have to decide if they will\ngo up the escalation curve. Going into a massive re-supply effort and long\nterm stragegy.\nA: If they go into these areas again it will be a\n.\nK: They may find a potent SVN army.\nA: And possibly make Cambodia a Chinese puppet.\nK: The thing we have to get over is that we have a negotiation that isn't\na humiliation and making that\ninto another long term effort. It must\nbe hard for them.\nA: And with the Chinese saying they are a paper tiger and go ahead, we are\nbehind you.\nK: They are not kicking up around the same way now.\nA: Shouldn;t you send a big shot over there? Is Scranton going?\nK: I doubt it.\nA: It seems domestically and foreign that June 30 would be a good time.\nK: I don't want to comment.\nA: The thing that makes me xxix sad is that I am more and more convinced\nthat if it weren't for Cooper/Church we could get out of this.\nK: Exactly. If we could -- there's no I have been convinced and known\nthat if we could have a modicum of domestic support in the leadership group\nwe could get out of this and someday I will be able to demonstrate this.\nA: Clifford gave a talk yesterday at the press club and it amazed me.\nK: He thwarted every negotiation until 1967. His policy gives up on negotiation.\nAs soon as we follow his plan to get out early.\nA: If you are going to get out unannounced, do it right ava y.\nK: Exactly.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nS. Alsop/Kissinger\n2:45 pm\n6/11/70\n-3-\nA: After that the President's bargaining power goes to zero. That Cooper/\nChurch thing- - the President's power will not be zero but almost. I think\nthe Russians are generally trying to get Hanoi to negotiate. And more so\nsince Cambodia. I wish they had more bargaining power themselves.\nK: Nice to talk to you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nDeputy Secretary Packard\n6/11/70 5:05 p.m.\nK: I just handed your note to the President.\nP: Thank you.\nK: It went to him personally. - not through the staff.\nP: Thank you very much. On the way back we were discussing\nsomething we should have discussed at the meeting. The aircraft\ncarrier Forrestal is now about 12 hours away\nK: We should move it closer.\nP: I thought so.\nK: How far should we move it?\nP: We thought we should move it in to about a hundred miles.\nThat would put us in a position to use full capacity necessary\nK: Will it be noticed? I want it to be.\nP: We can announce it or\nK: No, just let them pick it up through intelligence.\nP: Okay. If that's all right with you I'll issue the execute.\nK: Yes, go ahead.\nP: Thank you.\nK: Okay. And thank you for your thoughtfulness.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRELCON\nK\nermit Gordon/Kissinger\n5:07 pm\n6/11/70\nK: How's the government in exile.\nG: You take me off guard when you greet me with that. Very good of you to\ncall me back. I have a brief question. I have been talking to Howard Turner\nof Turner Construction. He has been approached by Kosygin's son-in-law.\nHe wants an American architect and several construction companies to take\na contract in the Soviet Union to ???? in the Soviet Union. He has qualms\nand doesn't want to get into a Henry Ford disaster. It's natural that they would\ncome to him as he has one of the biggest construction compinies in the U.S.\nI thought you might be able to recommend someone for him to talk to about\nthis.\nK: Let him talk to Fred Bergsten initially.\nG: I will have him get in touch with Fred tomorrow.\nK: Also Sonnenfeldt on the political side. That's even more important.\nG: Had you heard about this?\nK: I wouldn't until it's become a proposal.\nG: Anything that would divert the Soviets to massive residential building would\nbe good from our stand point.\nK: Yes.? ? ??\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSisco/Kissinger\n6:00 pm\n6/11/70\nS: I have delayed calling you for two reasons. We have a report that Hussein\nmay have taken over command of the army as a consensus. In my belief you\nwill get a ? ? ? ?. Our security people are out on a reconnaisance mission.\nK: He should stay here overnight.\nS: I think it will look better. Let me add this. We are going ahead on the\nRed Cross thing. Our Embassy hopes -- we are holding the please planes in\nBeirut and they will flash the word when they can move Americans. They\ncan't yet.\nK: Not from the airport?\nS: They are not there, or only a few. They are in town and cannot get to the\nairport. Frankly, in an hour or an hour and a half\nwill be clear. Will\nyou be home?\nK: I don't know yet.\nS: There are three of us and we will take turns. Symmes, Davies and myself.\nWe will keep in touch.\nK: Thank you. It's comforting to know you are on top of this.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nHaldeman\n6/11/70 6:05 p.m.\nH: Has anybody mentioned to you a need for a message to\nGolda Meir\nto be borne by Arthur Burns?\nK: Yes, Arthur Burns.\nH: Apparently he needs one and he is going to see the President\ntomorrow.\nK: Okay.\nH: Also, he is going to Korea.\nK: I had better find out what the President wants to say.\nH: I can probably stall Arthur till Monday. Is that better?\nK: Yes. Arthur thinks he is going to solve the Arab-Israeli\nconflict.\nH: That's probably just as well. He won't diddle around like\nyou do.\nK: Right.\nH: Probably he's going to Japan too. Okay, and on PSAC, I\nwonder if the way out is to have him come in briefly and say I'm glad\nyou settled everything. He hasn't met with them since March of\nlast year.\nK: Then he should.\nH: He has the impression that you think he shouldn't\nK: No, he should.\nH: But not on foreign policy?\nK: They're the PSAC. They don't know anything about interdiction.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n6:45 p.m.\nJune 11, 1970\nK: Mr. President\nP: How about this Jordan thing. Do you have any more information?\nK: The security situation seems to have improved a little bit. Some\nof our Embassy people are out checking now. We have those three\nplanes standing by. As soon as the road to the airport ******* is\nopen we will get the Americans out of there.\nP: Good\nK: Hussain has taken command of the army. It doesn't look good\nfor the long term\nFedieen wanted to get\n(Hussain's uncle\nor father) out of there before. We will know a little more about 8 o'clock.\nP: What is the Daily News article on Soviet Union\nHanoi? I have\njust been looking it over.\nK: I haven't seen anything official on it. I am not aware of that\nThere may have been some statement by a Soviet fellow\nP: It's in the Washington Daily News. You may want to take a look\nat it in the morning. It is not inconceivable\nLet's understand - we would certainly expect them to\nK: Our intelligence says it will take 6 months to replace losses in\nCambodia.\nP: OK, thanks.\nOK\nK: XXXXXX, Mr. President\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n7:05 p.m.\nJune 11, 1970\nK: Mr. President\nP: Yes, I wanted to be sure you noted that Harvard turned down the\ntwo week vacation courses. Don't give any credit for principles.\nThe contributors did this. The contributors are drying up\nK: But Pussey is the best of the University Presidents group -\nnot intellectually but he has a strong character. Was a good decision.\nP: Good decision and might serve to have a good effect. With\nHarvard taking the lead other schools might follow.\nK:\nmotive\nP: I don't give a damn for the motive\nThat's why I am going\nto get that thing about defense contracts pushed through. They will\nstand up for money.\nK: I don't think they will stand\n:P: Money is more important than principles\nK:\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSisco/Kissinger\n11:30 pxx am\n6/12/70\nK: Sorry I was tied up when you called earlier.\nS: I just wanted to be sure you had the written sitrep.\nK: That's gone into him. Americans will move out today. Do you think there\nwill be no further complication?\nS: No andxlexanx he can go to Florida.\nK: What's your assessment.\nS: The result is that the King is in a weaker position. He has received two\nkinds two of advice to ? ? ? ? ? and face up to it and have a show down. The\nway people he fired wanted a showdown.\nK: It means the fedyeen will have less control.\nS: They weren't in Amman anyway. But at the border.\nK: Wx Should we continue with arms?\nS: I will think about that.\nK: Will the Soviets give him arms?\nS: I think so. Let me re-read the whole thing. Nothing is happening conclusive.\nI want to read it carefully in the next couple of days. Now, Pakistan.\nK: I wanted to discuss with you. He feels morally obligated to do something.\nWe have seen your package. He would like to add seven B-57's X bombers to\nit and the tanks.\nS: If you add those it changes the package to a defensive replacement package\nwhich is more offensive. Tanks have almost the imagery of the Phantom.\nIt will increase your difficulty in selling it on the Hill and will have more effect\nin India. We feel we can get away with adding 6 B-57's and justify it being\nxbx old bombers and replacement. But the tanks if we cut it to 50 it has unfor-\ntunate psychological effect.\nK: Our worry is that this package is SO small they will consider it an insult.\nS: If we are going to take the heat, why do it for SO little?\nK: Exactly.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSisco/Kissinger\n11:30 am\n6/12/70\n-2-\nS: Let me see if something can be added to the defesnive package without\nadding offensively. I will call you back in a couple of hours.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nJ. Alsop/Kissinger\n2:25 pm\n6/12/70\n(Alsop began the conversation talking about a commencement he went to in\nwhich the speaker indicated that things were at a status quo)\nK: Anyone who says nothing is happening in the world is a beast.\nK: I would like to come to talk to you about what's happening. How about the end\nof the day today?\nK: Today is not possible.\nA: It's better today then later and having it chopped.\nK: But I don't have anything open today.\nA: 6:00?\nK: I can't. I will call you about 4:30 and see if I can move XN something.\nA: You are not going to do nothing on the M. E. ?\nK: We are not going to do nothing. That's right. We are doing something. Let\nme see if I can do something in either direction.\n(DRY called later to make a brakfast appointment at 8:30 monday morning,\nJune 15 with Alsop.)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSisco/Kissinger\n4:40 pm\n6/12/70\nS: I have reviewed that Pakistan package and I have an idea but I will give it\nto you personally from me to you. You will get it tonight or tomorrow morning.\nK: How can we order it?\nS: You can send back a one page decision. I can get together with Hal Saunders\nand you can write me marching orders next week. We will talk on Monday.\nK: What is it?\nS: You leave the tanks out and add 57's and instead of half a dozen you give\nthem 12 interceptors which they have wanted and which willx are strictly\ndefensive and more advanced level thing. It may be more attractive to the\nPakistanis and more\ntothe ? ? ? ? ? ?????\nK: Will the Secretary go through the roof?\nS: I haven't talked to him.\nK: Where did we get the figure 12?\nS: We worked it out here.\nK: Can we say the President wanted to do more?\nS: And after consultation we said this would be better. Do more and keep\nit within the confines --\nK: The President wanted to do 100 (?).\nS: You know about the Zeigler statement. We had them put out a denial.\nIt could effect - - -\nK: I don't like the extremely strong denial. We should have said it wasn't\ntrue. It came out ok.\nS: You going to be around this weekend? I will check with you tomorrow.\nDepending on what the situation is, I am supposed to get an honorary degree\nfrom Knox College in Illinois, my undergraduate alma mater. I don't know\nwhether I will go. It depends on things here.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRichardson/Kissinger\n5:27 pm\n6/12/70\nK: As a farewell present to us will you do a dirty job?\nR: Sure.\nK: The President wants to get rid of the Ambassador in Peru.\nR: What's he done?\nK: Disimpressed people down there who got to the President, specifically\nBlatchford. But I don't want people to go to Blatchford.\nR: It's pretty hard on that kind of evidence. I sew in the paper an interview\nwith him which I thought he handled well.\nK: I have no opinion about him.\nR: Toby Belcher is his name. I don't know him well. I met him at the\nChiefs of Mission meeting in Mexico City. He strikes me as a thoge thoughtful\nguy. But how he is in this I don't know. I will do it.\nK: Let me talk to Blatchford. Maybe I should recommend to the President\nnot to do it.\nR: I don't think you can on that ga case alone.\nK: Let me talk to Blatchford and get his evidence. I will transmit it having\nbeen order to several times.\nR: I will be glad to talk to him unless it's more consenant with your mandate.\nK: №, you talk to him if you can in a way that doesn't suggest a big bureaucratic\nexercise that goes through the whole Department.\nR: I will do that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nEdward Teller/Kissinger\n6:00 pm\n6/12/70\nT: I have two things. One big and one small. There were all kinds of rumors tha\nyou might not continue what you are doing. If it's taxes true, I want to see if I\ncan change it.\nK: Somethingx Sometime I will leave but not in any immediate -- There's no\ntruth in any foreseable future.\nT: I hope SO and I wanted to be sure. The other is I hear rumors of 50 thousand\ndollars to national science research. I hear some rumors about your role in that.\nK: I am opposed to that. Isn't that right?\nT: I'm absolutely sure. I want to use this opportunity to repeat to you what I have\nsaid to others-I have advocated that money be transferred within universityes\nfrom\nto group univèrsities but do it slowly.\nK: How?\nT: Defense contracts should go to colleges that will accept them. The Draper\nInstitute should be given a charter to teach so that MIT would not have a monopoly.\nK: That's a good point. You are a good friend and I like to hear from you.\nT: I am reassured and therefore happy.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nKissinger/Eugene Rostow\n6:30 p.m.\nJune 12, 1970\nK: How are you Gene?\nR: How are you, I am fine. You poor fellow.\nK: I'm doing fine. You all took heat for four years.\nR: I talked to a former assistant of mine who is now working on the\nHill. He told me the mood there was one of concern and alarm. I\ndiscounted that as ordinary but this Middle East thing has all the\nlikelihood of blowing. XXXXXX\nK: I agree with you.\nR: If Israel reaches the conclusion [that the United States will not\noffer aid] she will make a decisive move that would diminish the\n[situation as it now stands] and transform the situation [into one very\ndifferent]. XXXX\nK: I agree.\nR: I was talking to Bob Anderson about this. I know he is very\ncontroversal, but after 2-1/2 years experience he seems to have\nsome very good ideas. He is highly respected on both sides and\nhad some ideas for an approach. ???????? Nasser is begging\nto be saved. The President should have a high level American go\nover there and approach him (sentence paraphrased).\nK: Wait a minute, who did you say?\nR: Bob Anderson.\nPresident wanted to sit down with him and\ntalked with Rogers but nothing more is happening on it.\nK: Anderson is not the best man\nR: No, not the best\nK: Not even the 10th best.\nR: [Mentioned the name McCloy ]\nK: We are trying to sort this thing out right now. I agree with your\nanalysis though. We are working on a memo on this problem right now.\nR: Get a high level man and send him out.\nK: Thank you very much for your letter.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nR: This is a ticklish point.\nK: You must be lonely there at Yale. It's lonely down here too.\nR: Not really. You would be surprised at people who secretly\nagree with this position.\nK: Look in some time when you are down here, Gene.\njlj\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nHalderman/Kissinger\n7:00 p.m., June 12, 1970\nH: (Missed his opening comment)\nK: Asked about the President getting off to Key Biscayne. You surely\ngot out of town very secretively.\nH: I couldn't get you to make up his mind\nHe was sitting there when\nhe packed his little briefcase -- I thought he was going home.\nK: If he packed his briefcase, he would be going\nH: He saw all those things built up on the lawn and decided to go.\nK: What's going to happen?\nH: They are working on Ehrlichman's office.\nK: I think it was a good idea.\nH: How is the Middle East thing?\nK: The evacuation of Americans has already started. 200 of them\nare out - 236 to be exact.\nH: We have 400 in there. Are we going to bring them all out?\nK: Yeah. We should be through by tomorrow.\nH: (Said something like will there be any trouble ?)\nK: There will be problems later on because there has been a shift in\nthe\nH: Some of the girls on the beach have been asking about you.\nK: Tell them help is on the way, I am coming. When are you coming\nback, Sunday night, Monday?\nH: Monday.\nK: Okay, it is fine, I will see you then but you will stop phone calls?\nH: Yes sir, I will take them all.\nK: (Said something\nabout would want or might want to discuss\nsome issues I am working on)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nHalderman/Kissinger\n(page 2)\nH: Where can you be reached?\nK: I am always reachable in the White House.\nH: Not going to New York?\nK: Might go Sunday, certainly not before Sunday.\nwh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nSANITIZED\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n/\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\nContains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHenry Rowan\nMr. Kissinger\n7:45 p. m., 6-12-70\nK:\nHow are you Henry?\nR:\nI have a broken leg which is giving me a bit of trouble,\nHenry, I am calling about staffing. The reason I am calling\nis one of the people Fred Ikle is calling about is going to be\nin Washington. His name is Wayne Smith. He is an especially\ngood man. He was in Systems Analysis at the Pentagon. He\nis a good writer, sensible fellow and I recommend him very\nhighly. He came in here just to write a book.\nK:\nHow old is he?\nR:\nHe is in his 30s.\nK:\nLarry Lynn was just in here.\nR:\nI think you should see him next week.\nK:\nOK. Who would you recommend for Larry's job? How about\nBrehm? How about Di Bona?\nR:\nDi Bona is first rate. Brehm is first rate.\nK:\nFred also mentions McGarvey.\nR:\nMcGarvey does not want to leave. Averch (sp?) is very good.\nK:\nCamby was introduced to me. What do you think about him?\nR:\nI think he is rather young and immature. In a junior position\nI think he could be useful. He is imaginative. I have no\nadditional names to suggest. I wanted to pass on Wayne's\nname.\nK:\nI appreciate the fact that Fred and you took the initiative and\nrecommended names. It is extremely helpful. Can you travel\neast with your leg?\nR:\nAs a matter of fact, I am going to do SO next week. I will call\nyou.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRowan\n-2-\nK:\nWhat do you think of Whitehead?\nR:\nHe is comparable to Smith although I did not know him as well.\nK:\nWhat about Arthur Harrington?\nR:\nSomewhat riskier. He is smart but not as diplomatic but a\ngood person. Larry would know him well.\nK:\nDo you think well of Bill Hayne (sp?)?\nR:\nHe is a good person.\nK:\nHow about Averch?\nR:\nHe is very smart.\nSANITIZED\nK:\nHow would you rate him compared to Smith?\nR:\nI would put Smith ahead. If I were looking for a professor of\neconomics, I would put Averch well ahead.\nK:\nWell Henry, when you are here, if at all possible I would like\nto see you.\nR:\nI will be in in a week and will call you.\nK:\nFine Henry - I'm always glad to see you.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nFrank Lincoln\n6/13/70 10:45 a. m.\nK: I appreciated the note you sent.\nL: We are supposed to meet with the President Tuesday at 2:00?\nK: Right.\nL: I'd like to talk to him about Southeast Asia. I am sorry I\nmissed the meeting of the Board. I udderstand he suggested the Board\nto over there.\nK: A few of them.\nL: I didn't understand whether he meant all or a few.\nK: No, just a few of them.\nL: Would there be any objection to my talking to the President\nabout Southeast Asia?\nK: Not at all. I'll make sure you have a few minutes to see him\nafterwards.\nL: Well, either before or at the end. About 15 minutes would\nbe fine. I don't know if there's any sense in my talking to you about it\nyou are so staurated.\nK: It's not that I'm saturated with ideas - - but my schedule is SO\nfull.\nL: I understand. Well I have some personal matters from some\nfriends of the President's too. I would like about 15 minutes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoe Sisco\n6/13/70 10:50 a. m.\nK: I read your reporting memo on your talk with Dobrynin. I'm trying\nto understand my impression was that the President hasn't approved the\ninitiative.\nS: I understand and they understand this.\nK: Supposing the President says you can't do anything.\nS: That's fine. Then we say we've reevaluated andwe just go ahead\nwith the bilateral talks. The only thing they are afraid of is that there\nmight be a peace in this area with an American stamp on it. It's coming\nalong well now.\nK: Are we going to get them out today?\nS: It looks that way.\nK: But the long run is not good?\nS: No, not good.\nK: Is it going to spill over into Lebanon?\nS: I think it might be contained. But we've got some serious questions\nahead of us to answer.\nK: Like what?\nS:\nLike\n'do\nwe\nintervene?'\nThey are going to turn to Big Brother.\nK: Next week some time I've got to get you in for 15 minutes with\nthe President.\nS: Any time at all.\nK: You just come over and walk up with me.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Stans\n6/13/70 11:10 a. m.\nK: The President would appreciate it if you would delay your\ntestimony until the 22nd.\nS: Well I don't know. I'll see what can be done. I can't do anything\ntoday. I'll try to on Monday.\nK: He'd appreciate it. The indications are that we won't get a\nproposal until the 17th.\nS: Right. My man is in Tokyo. I haven't heard from him yet.\nK: Right. Secondly on this sale of airplanes. I am sure we will\napprove it. It isn't being held upi in this office. I'll get the answer in\ntwo weeks, but we can't have it decided unilaterally.\nS: It isn't. State has opposed. Defense is for it and Commerce is\nfor it. I have the authority to decide unilaterally under these circumstances.\nRogers said he would decide on the South African jets in five days--he may\napprove it. On the Portuguese, he wants them to buy it through somebody\nelse other than the air force.\nK: Okay, let's keep it at that. Despite what you may hear we have no\nWhite House reason to oppose it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President\n6/13/70 11:17 a.m.\nP: What's new in your shop today?\nK: We're going to complete the evacuation from Jordan today\nprobably, at the latest tomorrow morning. But we'll have most of them\nout today. The immediate situation is quiet--the long-term one is very\ncomplex with the extremist wing of the Fedayeen, the Maoist wing, show-\ning that it can dominate the moderate Fedayeen and the King.\nP: By getting rid of the generals?\nK: Yes, and by removing the army as an effective counterweight\nto them and letting the King run the day to day things while they conduct\nthe Arab-Israeli confrontation. It appears that within a month it will\nspill over into Lebanon.\nP: It already has. What about Vietnam?\nK: We're picking up at the usual rate in Cambodia. We got another\nhundred-plus rifles and 500 mortar rounds. We've got well over 13 million\nin small arms and 16, 000 of the individual weapons. So that's going along.\nThe other side is doing its harrassing raids. I have asked Defense to write\na letter\nthey are still stonewelling the tactical air strikes you have\nordered. I have requested a letter explaining why they are not hitting\nbeyond a certain line-they say they are but they're not, not beyond the\nMekong- just to galvanize them into action. They claim they can't find\ntargets, but they're surrounding the towns and taking them, so we know\nthey're there.\nP: Is that new man outh there now?\nK: He just got out there. I've *** lit as much of a fire as possible.\nThey have a program now of turning over captured equipment to the Cambodians.\nBrezhnev made a speech yesterday which the New York Times plays as\nan attack on you. But that's not true. He says that the differences are deep\nbut also that peaceful coexistence is their firm line and they want to settle\ndisputes with the U.S. on that basis. It's not soft, but it's not excessively\naggressive either. They have to make some bows toward the Chinese.\nP: Oh sure, I understand why they do that. But the Times has to\ntry to show that their theory is right and that all of this trouble is because\nof Cambodia. They are having a hell of a time because the Chinese didn't\nmarch in and the Russiand didn't break off and the SALT talks are goingon\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President\n6/13/70 11:17 a. m. page 2\nK:And will probably be successfully concluded.\nP: But they're not getting a lot. They're just thrashing around.\nThe People are not going to be with the Senatoos on that vote yesterday.\n[he must have meant Wednesday]\nK: No, and there's no real steam on it.\nP: xd I don't know what they want, do you?\nK: No, they say a deadline on withdrawals from\nP: They've been talking about that for a year. That's silly.\nK: That's right, and it would be the end of the negotiations. Some\nof the financial analysts I talked with the other day have sent me letters\nmaking more optimistic predictions than before.\n₱: Good. You briefed them?\nK: Yes.\nP: Good.\nK: Except for these items there's nothing of consequence.\nP: One thing about the Senate vote -I want to be sure it's not a\nsignal to the enemy. I don't know what you can do about that, but you\nsee what I mean.\nK: They have seen that youxxxxxxx you in the last two major domestic\ncrises and that you haven't been driven off your course in the slightest.\nP: What needs to get home to them is that this vote has no impar tance\nat all and no affect.\nK: I got that word across. I had a good talk with David Bruce\nyesterday. -I think he's completely on your line. I started by saying that\nI wanted his view on Vietnam. I didn't tell him our plans. He said it\nwas absolutely right. He thought Harriman had lost his mind. He noticed\nin England thath they've shifted to us. He said he thought Heath was done.\nHume is the most popular/ man in Britain today. The polls have turned around.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President\n6/13/70 11:17 a.m. page 3\nP: If they could just get some break over there. Is Heath just\na lousy candidate?\nK: He's just a weak campaigner. Bruce says Heath would be a\ngood Prime Minister but he just comes across as a weak copy of Wilson.\nThat's why they like Hume so much--he's such a contrast.\nP: He doesn't think it will turn around again?\nK: He thinks maybe the newspaper strikes might change things.\nBut he thinks Britain will have a major economic crisis again this year.\nWages have increased and prices haven't caught up with them. But they\nwill\nP: And then the foreign exchange problem will occur again.\nWilson just let wages go up to win the election. If it could just be close\nenough they might still have to have another election.\nK: I think Bruce is a good man. He realizes that some of the settle-\nment might have to be made outside--he's not a prima donna. He suggested\nsetting up a back channel. I think you would be pleased with him.\nP: Did you really lay it on the line to him?\nK: I said once you say something you don't want it to come back\nto you 50 different ways; you want it doxx done. He's a strong and honorable\nman.\nP: Will he do it?\nK: He'll call me on Monday or Tuesday. He wanted to talk to his\nwife. But he'll do it.\nP: We should announce it in July. But I don't want it to look like\nwe're doing it out of weakness.\nf\nK: Around the 15th, or we could slip it to the end of July.\nP: We should do it from strength. I don't want to appear to be\ndriven into it.\nK: Early in July we ought to ge back into the other channel and\nanswer the note. We would have waited 4 weeks by then.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President\n6/13/70 11:17 a.m. page 4\nP: I see your point. They are going to have to give some\nserious thought to where they are.\nK: What would be ideal would be if we could go back into the\nother channel and if they agree to a meeting tell them at the meeting\nthat we are going to appoint a new ambassador. Then we might get\nsomething for it. But the timing might not work out.\nP: It might. That would be good.\nK: But we shouldn't do it until our forces are out of Cambodia.\nP: Getting back to the Breshnev speech.\nK: The Times says he says escalating the war was just escalating\nour defeats, and it put one of these flashy headlines on the story that won't\nsupport it, He didn't mention Cambodia ata all. He said our divisions are\nvery deep. And on that they hang their story. But you would say the same\nthing.\nP: I have. The Times is falling into our line, Don't be concerned\nwith the day to day stories, The real thing is what's happening underneath.\nThey don't know, and they mustn't. They when it happens we will drop it\non them like a bomb,\nK: The Chinese said that around June 20 they would be willing to\ntalk again. I think we should have some visable activity in Warsaw.\nP: Good,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President\n6/13/70 11:37 a. m.\nP: One thing something MACV isn't doing. Thoee reports\nwe get, They should give them to everybody- - Congressmen and\nSenators who comes in. Say I you might be interested in the latest\ncount. The only way to get through about it is to report it over and\nover again. Don't wait until July 1. That's an order. Don't assume\nthat people pay attention. It isnnt just showing people rifles; say\nhere's what we've accomplished and here's a comparison.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nBob Haldeman\n6/13/70 12:30 p.m. (Ca.)\nH: What's happening?\nK: nothing much.\nH: How's your war going?\nK: Brilliantly. We've got to keep it going long enough to get\nour big victory in October.\nH: How's Jordan?\nK: We'll have all the civilians out by tonight - at the latest\ntomorrow morning. The long-term situation is lousey, but the immediate\ncrisis situation is good.\nH: Any new crises building?\nK: No. When are you coming home?\nH: I talked to him this morning.\nX\nI don't know.\nK: I talked with him also. He didn't seem in very good spirits.\nH: Really? He had probably just gotten up.\nK: Is he going to Walkers Key?\nH: I don't know. Any problem with that?\nK: Absolutely not. Breshnev made a speech which the NYT analyzed as\na slap at Nixon, which it isn't. It's not a friendly speech, but it's not bad.\nH: You going to New York tomorrow?\nK: Maybe.\nH: Are you happy?\nK: I'm content. The President asks that; you ask that. Go ahead,\ncheer me up. What's the news? I'm just afraid you'reemaded Laird a\nWhite House assistant.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nHaldeman\n6/13/70 12:30 p.m. page 2\nH: No, Councilor to the President.\nK: That would liven things up.\nH: And Rogers Secretary of Defense, and we're moving Pursley\nover as Secretary of State.\nK: I'd be happy if you would move him almost any place.\nH: I don't know what he's doing. It's hot as hell down here.\nK: It's pretty quiet here. I'm catching up on things. One thing,\nI think I ought to start seeing people like Chalmers Roberts again. State\nis starting its campaign about being shut out again.\nH: Yes, but we ought to pick who we see and then give them a\ngig one.\nK: Chalmers Roberts has been pretty fair.\nH: I think we should work on it at the beginning of the week.\nK: They're cranking up a campaign again.\nH: I agree, but we should do it selectively.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nDave Packard\n6/13/70 2:05 p.m.\nP: I was just look9ng into the things the President is worrying\nabout in a briefing with DIA. I'm trying to get what we might do to be\nmore effective. It would be helpful to get to ghe x President to\ntalk to him for about 20 minutes and let him see some of these things\nfirst-hand. He might get a much better idea of what we're doing and\nwhat needs to be done. We can give you memos but I think this would\nbe better.\nK: The one thing that is maddening is to send over a Presidential\norder and have noghing happen.\nP: There's not much that can be done now in Cambodia.\nK: How can it be that they are can take a town and we can't hit one.\nP: We can't use tactical air for attacks on towns ujless we have\nground control with it. We can't run out there with tactical air and get\nthe thing settled, It would be helpful if he understood the problem.\nK: I'll try to get it set up, but is there nothing that can be done?\nP: The situation is, the logistical movements coming into the\nLaos panhandle. There's not much coming into Cambodia yet. What is\ncoming is coming in boats in the jungles. We've onlyka shexdxx had one\nsecondary explosion so far. We haven't been able to do much yet.\nK: But when we can take a town they must be moving.\nP: But we can't tell much be reconnaissance, By the time the pictures\nare developed the people have moved, You can't fire from the air without\nsomeone to tell you who's the enemfyand whoxx who isn't. It's a little more\ncomplex than it appears. If we could get a presentation to the President\nof what the problem is it would be helpful.\nK: I'll see if I can arrange it. I get the same questions every day.\nI'll arrange an appointment if it can be done.\nP: He's in Kay Biscayne tomorrow?\nK: Yes, but he won't want to see anyone. He never wants to be\ndisturbed down there, And he's probably going to Walker's Key.\nP: Ithink we suukkx should allocate half an hour. We could go through\nit in 10 minutes, but he usually lokes to discuss these things. I understand\nhis concerns, but it would be helpful if he understood what can and can't be done.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nDave Packard\n6/13/70 2:05 p.m. page 2\nK: His present impression is that nothing is being done.\nP: We'll have these memos over to you. But I think the best\nthing would be if he could see it--we've got some pictures.\nK: I'll try to set it up Monday. I'll put the request in to him\nimmediately.\nP: Another thing is the weather. You can't\nuse tactical air through the clouds without radar people on the ground\nguiding it. I've been working on it and decided I had better double-\ncheck. We're doing everything we can and we'll get these memos\ntogether. But it would be most helpful if we could see him for a few\nminutes and give it to him first-hand.\nR: I';1 do my best.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\n(at home)\nMr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger\nSunday, June 14, 1970\nH:\nan unlikely possibility.\nK:\nOkay. I'll do that.\nH:\nBecause I would say that's what it is at this point.\nBut I think we ought to start checking it out because if we are going\nto do it, we are going to have to send\nadvance men down and all\ntomorrow.\nK:\nWell, I better start checking it then.\nH:\nOkay.\nK:\nFirst, let me get the plan straight again. The plan is to go\ndown to Peru\nto send Finch to Peru tomorrow.\nH:\nTomorrow or Tuesday.\nK:\nThe earlier the better SO that he can have a plausible look\nat the thing.\nH:\nYeah, but it'll only take him a day to look at it.\nK:\nFinch then calls up and says, 'This is an urgent problem.\nI\nH:\n\"And I think you ought to come down and take a look at it. \"\nIn the meantime, we would announce\nhave already announced that\nthe President was going to Mexico for his anniversary.\nK:\nRight. But you couldn't send advance men to Peru before\nH:\nNo, no, that's correct. We wouldn't.\nK:\nAll right. And then the President.\nH:\nWhat we would do, Henry, is we'd send an overload of an\nadvance team to Acapulco and then they'd be poised, ready to zap\nto Peru as soon as we\nK:\nRight. So then the trip is Peru, Acapulco\nH:\nI think we haven't really worked up the logistics, but I\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nthink that's what you do -- go right to Peru and then come back to\nAcapulco and stay there.\nK:\nAnother possibility is to do it at the other end.\nH:\nThat's right. Which might be better\nK:\nWhich might be a little better.\nH:\nIt might be better even to get to Acapulco and have Finch\ncall him at Acapulco and say, \"You ought to come down here. 11 He'd\nsay, \"Okay, I will -- I'll come down on Monday. \" You see, he'd\nhave to stay Sunday for his anniversary.\nK:\nYeah, but he could leave from Acapulco, say late Sunday.\nH:\nRight, or first thing Monday morning.\nK:\nIt might be even better first thing Monday morning.\nFrom Acapulco, it couldn't be much more than three hours to get\ndown there.\nH:\nI wouldn't think so.\nK:\nThat might be another way of doing it.\nH:\nYeah. We'll work out some logistic approaches, but why\ndon't you work on the strategic question and see whether it's good\nor bad from a general policy viewpoint.\nK:\nOkay. Well, let me get a judgment of my people on that, and\nI may call you back on it.\nH:\nAll right. Good, Henry.\nK:\nGood. Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (at home)\nMr. Kissinger/Pete Vaky\nSunday, June 14, 1970\nK:\nPete, I have something for you that will curl your hair.\nWell, your hair is curled already. Can I discuss something with\nyou that will stay in our office and not go to State.\nV:\nYeah.\nK:\nCan you give me your word on that?\nV:\nYes. What is this about?\nK:\nIt's something that the President is planning -- it's Presidential\nbusiness, but if you have any problems with that, then I'd rather not\ndiscuss it.\nV:\nWell, it depends on what it would be.\nK:\nI want your advice on some Presidential business. You've\ngot to be able to tell me whether you can\nI think your prerogative\nis\nyour pre-eminent loyalty has to be to the President.\nV:\nOh, no, I'll do that, Henry. I won't pass it on. I take it's\nsomething I won't like.\nK:\nNo, I'm not saying.\nIt's something on which I need your\nadvice; that's why I'm asking you.\nV:\nYeah.\nK:\nBut I don't want it discussed at State until the President\nis ready.\nV:\nOh, okay. No, I won't have any problems.\nK:\nHe's thinking of going down to Mexico. He's got a honeymoon\nthis weekend, an anniversary this weekend. He spent his honeymoon\nin Acapulco, and he thought it might be a nice thing a sentimental\nthing if he went back there. Are you with me? He thought while he\nwas at it, that could be the occasion of his seeing Diaz Ordaz.\nV:\nYeah. I guess they could do that. They are not ready, of\ncourse. He was thinking further on down the road. This coming\nweekend?\nK:\nYeah.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nV:\nThe weekend you'l be there.\nK:\nThe son of a bitch is upstaging me.\nV:\nWell, that's a problem because the championship matches\nare in Mexico, and he may feel he has to be there.\nK:\nI've told him that already. He would go down Thursday and\nhe thought Diaz could give a dinner for him Friday night or Thursday\nnight.\nV:\nWell, we can sure try.\nK:\nWhat do you think?\nV:\nI think it's perfectly in order to try to do that, although I think\nit's giving them short notice. There's no reason not to ask them,\nHenry, that I can see.\nK:\nAnd will they count that as a meeting?\nV:\nThey might not. They might still want to see him because what\nDiaz Ordaz wanted was to see him about the end of August by which\ntime the boundary settlement agreement would be going forward a little\nbetter, and they could sort of do something besides just have a meeting.\nI don't think from Diaz Ordaz's point of view you satisfy his desire to\nhave a continuous meeting.\nK:\nYou don't.\nV:\nNo.\nK:\nWell, would Diaz Ordaz consider coming up?\nV:\nYeah. Now, there's one other thread that's in here -- you know\nthe\nDwight Chapin cleared off on the memorandum that had been\nsent up to them which the President agreed to meet Diaz Ordaz in\nPuerto Vilarto in early September.\nK:\nYeah, but this is\nV:\nWe just sent the directive over to State and authorized them to\ngo ahead and talk to the Mexicans to set up such a date. There's no\nreason why he couldn't do both. Would he be willing to do that?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nK:\nI doubt it.\nV:\nThere is a mechanical problem. I don't know how fast they\nwould be moving, but we'd have to pull them off the other one.\nK:\nYeah, but since he hasn't definitely decided yet.\nNow,\nthe other thing is -- he thought if he's in Acapulco, he might go down\nto Peru and look at the earthquake.\nV:\nWell, that would be very nice.\nK:\nWould that be a good gesture?\nV:\nYeah -- a very good gesture.\nK:\nIt would?\nV:\nYes.\nK:\nYou're sure?\nV:\nYes, I'm sure.\nK:\nWell, he'd send Finch down ahead and Finch then would\nreport to him and then he'd say as long as you're in Acapulco, why\ndon't you come on down?\nV:\nI think it would be a nice gesture. There are two things to\nremember. It's hard to know There may be something in the\nPeruvian situation that I'm not aware of that, from the Peruvian\npoint of view, they might find it an embarrassment or something, but\nI doubt it. It's just a word of caution. Secondly, if he does go down,\nand does establish hopes and expectations that aid is going to be given.\nI expect we will be giving substantial aid, but it will mean\nthey\nwill take it as his personal interest in the area and they will expect\nthat something will follow from it.\nK:\nYeah.\nV:\nBut it would be, bearing those in mind, I would think that's\na good idea.\nK:\nYou would? Would you do it on the way down or on the way\nback? Can it wait until next Monday or should it be this Thursday?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 4 -\nV:\nI would do it on the way back.\nK:\nYou'd stop in Peru on the way back?\nV:\nNo, I would go to Peru. The sooner you go there, the\nbetter, and then stop in Acapulco on the way back.\nK:\nRight. It means an all-night flight for all of us. I hope you\nrealize that.\nV:\nWell, let's see\nI don't know what the flying time would be.\nK:\nSeven hours.\nV:\nHe would fly from here?\nK:\nYeah, it's seven hours, I think.\nV:\nYes, it is a long flight. I would think that's the more desirable\nrather than tacking that on the end of the holiday. It looks like an\nafterthought. And as long as you are going to the expense of making\nthis gesture, you ought to get the maximum out of it, so\nK:\nWell, can it be set up that quickly?\nV:\nWell, if we started right away, it could be. He would leave\nhere on Thursday?\nK:\nHe'd leave Wednesday night, I guess.\nV:\nAll right.\nLook at it.\nYou don't have to stay there more\nthan a day or so. Thursday -- Friday come back and stop off in\nAcapulco.\nK:\nNo, he'd do Acapulco Thursday night. He'd leave here\nWednesday night.\nV:\nOh, I see, because of the date.\nK:\nHe'd fly all night, arrive in Peru on Thursday morning.\nV:\nAnd then come back Thursday night.\nK:\nYeah.\nV:\nAnd the alternative would be fly to Acapulco Thursday.\nK:\nAnd go to Peru Monday.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 5 -\nV:\nThen he wouldn't be in such a rush to get back.\nK:\nThen he'd fly Monday night.\nV:\nWell, I'm inclined to the earlier one, Henry, as being a\nmore dramatic gesture.\nK:\nBut you think it's a good gesture? Well, can you keep\nboth of these things quiet?\nV:\nI won't say a word. Do you want me to do anything at\nthis point?\nK:\nWell, what could you do?\nV:\nWell, there's nothing. It would be messy. Well, what do\nyou think the arrangements are?\nK:\nWell, once he's made the decision, we can make the\narrangements.\nV:\nAll right.\nK:\nGood.\nV:\nWhat do you want me to do about your Mexico trip. Nothing\nat the moment?\nK:\nNo, that stays until the President decides. Let me understand.\nWhat is your decision again. your view again about the Diaz Ordaz.\nThere's nothing wrong with the Acapulco Part as long as we don't\ninsist that that is the State visit.\nV:\nThat's right, and there's nothing wrong with trying to see\nDiaz Ordaz, but from Diaz Ordaz's point of view he had wanted a\nmeeting with the President that could be\nK:\nOf course, if he goes to Peru, he really doesn't have to have\na Diaz Ordaz dinner, does he?\nV:\nOnce you get in the country, I think he would want to and he\nprobably should.\nK:\nYeah, but we could just do that a social dinner.\nV:\nRight, but Diaz Ordaz had been looking forward to a meeting\nwith the President which he could say was a sort of official me eting\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 6 -\nbetween the two Presidents, and by which time they would have\nhoped to have had some business transaction.\nK:\nNo, no, but if there's a meeting this Friday?\nV:\nDiaz Ordaz would not consider that as a substitute for what\nhe thought had been coming up in September. He would still want\nto have another meeting, which you could again do. You would\ninvite him to Puerto Villarto which is where they filmed \"The\nNight of the Iguana\" north of Acapulco, which is a beautiful spot\nand have a formal meeting again.\nK:\nYeah, but he won't do that.\nV:\nWell, then, if he does this one, he should understand that\nprobably Diaz Ordaz will not consider this a particularly substantive\nmeeting.\nK:\nBut do we have to face that issue?\nV:\nYou do to this extent -- that we have already probed formally\nfor this kind of another meeting, sort of a second one to the one he\nhad last year.\nK:\nAnd have they already started talking about it?\nV:\nOh, yes. And they were authorized to do so. You remember\nK:\nI remember, but when did they start doing that?\nV:\nThey were doing that about a month ago, and they exchanged\nideas, and it was left that we would come back to them with\nWhat\nwe did was explore with the Mexicans the feasibility of this.\nK:\nBut if the President has had to go down there, we really don't\nhave to face this issue now. We They won't feel any worse if we\ntell them after this meeting that we considered this a meeting than\nbefore.\nV:\nOh, that's right.\nBut if he goes to Acapulco, he has to count\non seeing Diaz Ordaz.\nK:\nAll right, if he goes to Acapulco, he has to see Diaz Ordaz.\nIf we want to see Diaz Ordaz, we might just as well do it in a good\natmosphere. Do we have to take Rogers down with us, too?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 7 -\nV:\nIt would be a nice gesture, Henry.\nK:\nBut then it's no longer a honeymoon trip.\nV:\nWell, it would be nice for Rogers to go to Lima. He doesn't\nhave to stay there. He can go on. For the meeting with Diaz Ordaz,\nRogers doesn't necessarily have to be there or he could join the\nPresident for just that as an alternative. The President ought to have\nMeyer there and one of the Latin American officials.\nK:\nBut then it becomes very official.\nV:\nWell, you can't avoid it, Henry.\nK:\nWell, what if he just went down for his honeymoon anniversary\nand then had Diaz Ordaz have a social dinner for him?\nV:\nWell, the point there is it won't obviate the pressure. Once\nthe Mexicans know he's there, they're going to want to talk a little bit\nof business or else assume that he will come back again in September.\nK:\nThat's right. That's the choice.\nV:\nAnd if he does that, he will almost have to come back again\nin September.\nK:\nBut I think if he really wants to get a rest down there\nI just think to set up a big apparatus with Assistant Secretaries,\nSecretaries, agendas, etc., looks like an insane rush.\nV:\nI agree with that. But you say that if he does this, he will\nnot want to go back in September.\nK:\nProbably not.\nV:\nMy point is that from the Mexican point of view\nK:\nThe thing I have to get in his head is that if he wants to use\nthis as a substitute for September, he's got to have the State Department\nand the whole apparatus present. On the other hand, if he does not have\nthem present, then he's got to go back in September.\nV:\nRight. Or, alternatively, ask Diaz Ordaz to come up to San\nClemente.\nK:\nRight.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 8 -\nV:\nBut he has to have another meeting with Diaz Ordaz that will\nbe the official part of it because he can't use this as a substitute. He's\nalready indicated he would be willing to have this kind of a meeting.\nNow you can't have this social part which I agree with you, it would\nbe nice to retain the social nature of this sort of thing, but then also\nsay that would substitute for the official visit.\nK:\nI think it looks too frantic to make it official meeting.\nV:\nI agree with you, but you must understand that the Mexicans\nwill still want a meeting.\nK:\nI understand that, but my judgment is there can be no official\nmeeting without State Department participation. There can be, on the\nother hand -- that will destroy the social character of it.\nV:\nRight. I agree with you. If that's the case, that's the way\nto structure it, Henry.\nK:\nAnd then I think we ought to get Diaz Ordaz to San Clemente.\nV:\nAll right. If you can do that and make that commitment, that\nI think would be fine.\nK:\nOkay. Good. Let me get back to Haldeman. Please keep\nthis to yourself.\nV:\nI won't say a word.\nK:\nOkay, good.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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