Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "498693818",
    "label": "December 16-21, 1970 [1 of 2]",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498693818"
}

{
    "id": "498693818",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498693818",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "December 16-21, 1970 [1 of 2]",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498693818",
    "collections": [
        "National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
        "Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-08-04/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-08-04-001.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-08-04/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-08-04-001.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-08-04/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-08-04-001.jpg",
    "imageCount": 41,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498693818",
    "naId": 498693818,
    "levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 36,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-08-04/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-08-04-036.jpg",
    "mediaId": "2fd433a84909a8a2",
    "ocrText": "cambodia.\nMembers of the Senate Foreign Relations\nCommittee listened carefully and asked\ntough questions.\nWhen it was all over, they voted to give\nhim the $225 million he asked for. But they\nimposed sharp restrictions on the spending.\nThey flatly banned the use of United States\nground troops or military advisers for\nBy a staff photographer\nBy a staff photographer\nCambodia.\nThe committee clearly was skeptical of\nWilliam P. Rogers\nHenry A. Kissinger\nMr. Rogers's assurances that the adminis-\nTuning in the White House\nTuning out the Kremlin\ntration does not intend to widen the conflict.\nThe committee was reflecting the growing\nbeing considered-or at least some members\nabout the Rogers interpretation of the Nixo\nmisgivings here that the Secretary of State\nof the committee believed they were given\ndoctrine. They believe he has \"fuzzied\" th\nactually speaks for the administration.\nthat assurance.\nfirm line that should be drawn against com\nTime after time, in the past two years,\nNo one in the Senate accuses the Secretary\nmunism there and elsewhere.\nMr. Rogers has found himself upstaged in\nof State of deliberately lying to them, and\nAt the Strategic Arms Limitation Talk\npolicymaking by Henry A. Kissinger, the\nfew would charge that he intentionally mis-\n(SALT). The White House won't trust th\nPresident's national security adviser.\nled them. But they do believe that he may\nState Department or even the Arms Cor\nnot have been informed fully of White House\nCambodian jolt recalled\ntrol Agency with any part of the strateg\nplans.\non SALT. The Kissinger people believe the\nThe most dramatic instance occurred at\nAs a result of this and similar occur-\nthe toughest of all possible lines should b\nthe time of the Cambodian incursion last\nrences, it is becoming clearer and clearer\nheld against Moscow on this and they con\nMay. Mr. Rogers had just assured the Sen-\nhere that Mr. Rogers does not reflect the\nsider the State Department a profoun\nate committee that such a plan was not\nadministration's best-informed views.\nsecurity problem in these negotiations.\nAnd the man who does, Professor Kis-\nThe State Department has been muc.\nsinger, is accountable only to the President,\nmore willing, in the inner counsels, to sug\nnot to Congress. He is excused from the con-\ngest following up Soviet overtures which th\n&\ngressional cross-examination.\nWhite House considered meaningless.\nIt is Professor Kissinger's shop in the\nSignals coming out of the Kremlin tha\nWhite House-the \"Little State Department\"\nthe State Department and the Arms Contro\n-which really runs the show. And the Sen-\nAgency felt were signficant have not bee\nate Foreign Relations Committee members\npursued by the White House. Some Stat\nknow it.\nDepartment sources believe that this ac\ncounts for the lack of progress at the Vien\nDeep divergence seen\nna talks. Mr. Rogers's role in the talk\nFollowing a close study, this correspon-\nstrategy has been minimal.\ndent can state that the difference between\nOn Communist China. China experts a\nthe Rogers and Kissinger views of the world\nthe State Department early began to cor\nis important and wide-ranging-essentially\nvince the Secretary of State that a mor\nrunning through every major foreign-policy\nrelaxed policy toward Communist Chin\nissue.\nwould be far sighted and productive. Mr\nPersonally, both Mr. Rogers and Profes-\nRogers bought the idea, which coincide\nsor Kissinger are charming and affable.\nwith the liberal view in academic circle\nAnd they are understood to maintain cor-\nacross the country.\nrect, though perhaps strained, relations.\nLiberals in the State Department believ\nBut difference is real, and it reflects itself\nMr. Rogers is a \"good guy\" on this ques\nin the basic problem areas, in this way:\ntion. Mr. Rogers managed to sell the idea\nThe Middle East. The Kissinger staff\nafter much effort, to a reluctant Whit\nbelieves that the Secretary of State has\nHouse. Here, again, the Kissinger peopl\nbeen much too forgiving of the Soviet role in\nbelieve that this generous attitude towar\nthe cease-fire violations. They believe that\nPeking is simply not necessary or war\nMr. Rogers should have rushed right to the\nranted.\npress with photos of the cease-fire violations\nOn German-Soviet relations. The Kis\nas soon as they were discovered.\nsinger staff is known to believe that th\nOn the other hand, Mr. Rogers was trying\nWest German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, i\nto be genuinely even-handed, giving the\nrushing unprepared and incautiously int\nEgyptians and Soviets every opportunity to\nagreements with the Soviets, making con\n\"rectify\" the violations, hoping not to\ncessions recklessly, and exacting little i\nharden positions by making public political\nreturn.\nhay out of the violations.\nFormer Secretary of State Dean Acheso:\nOn Southeast Asia. The Kissinger staff\nexpressed this view here recently to re\nplaces a premium on keeping the foe off\nporters, only to have Mr. Rogers counte\nguard and is frankly willing to widen the\nthat this did not reflect the administration\nwar to do it. On this the White House be-\nattitude. But it did and does reflect the Kis\nlieves the Nixon doctrine would support\nsinger staff attitude.\nbroadening the conflict into Cambodia and\nOther areas. In certain other areas C\nLaos, in the overall battle with Asian com-\nthe world, notably Africa, the Secretary 0\nmunism. The domino theory makes real\nState has attempted to assume some direc\nsense to the Kissinger people.\ntion in formulating a compassionate U.S. for\nMr. Rogers, on the other hand, appar-\neign policy. But the White House has rele\nently believes his own assertions that the\ngated Africa, as well as Latin America, to\nwar will not be widened in Southeast\nthe lowest rungs on the priority scale.\nAsia. He made this claim just days before\nFinally, the Kissinger staff members hin\nthe Cambodian incursions. He has placed\ndarkly that Mr. Rogers is ill-prepared inte)\nsome hope in the Paris talks and thinks the\nlectually to appreciate the Soviet threat\nother side will ultimately see peace on\ninsisting that Mr. Rogers is known to then\nAmerican terms as the most attractive al-\nto have been Mr. Nixon's fourth choice fo\nternative.\nsecretary of state, not second, as has beer\nThe Kissinger staff has serious questions\ngenerally believed."
}