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TELCON
Murray Marder/Kissinger
2:40 p.m.
2/10/71
K : Did I say something wrong?
M: No, I was trying to see if we can get guidance on strategic
implications. We are getting close guidance as to whether to charac-
terize this as as a spoiling action or cutting the jugular vein in
large strategic standpoint. I understand the Pentagon ? ? ?
this as a choking operation. It's essentially a spoiling operation.
Vogt tended to emphasize the longer range- Is it clarifiable?
K : Partly it depneds on how it comes out. If it gets the maximum
conceivable, we will be delighted but we would be satiffied if it
were a substantial spoiling operation and anything beyond that as a
bonus. That's not a very satisfactory answer. To gain time for with-
drawal and build up SVN forces so anything that complicates
the NVN problem is good. But I don't use that language at a briefing.
M:
Stennis
and
Rogers Vogt didn't use that broad terminology.
It depends on how it comes out. I saw what Carroll had from you
in terms of your account in the backgrounder. It didn't get into
probable responses. I don't know if you were cut short or what.
K : The Soviets have confined themselved to the moderate. The
Chinese sama asour intervention into Indochina in 65. The NVN
same
will have to decide whether to fight. They must pay the price if
they go against fire power and risk supplies in fight or falling back
and cutting off of supplies faster. I think they will do both. Fight
moderately but not to a point they will risk the losses they had in
the Tet offensive.
M: Do you think it hits them harder than Cambodia.
K : It is less than Cambodia but long term could be more
.
M: In time frame does it appear that they probably cannot bring enough
forces to overwhelmingly challenge the SVN forces?
K : Substantial fight but not overwhelming. If they do, we will have
a number 6f offices who will have to have explaining to do. A11 this
is for background.
M: of course. Anything to change their strategy in Northern Laos?
K : We expect an offensive in Northern Laos. They are preparing.
Their lead time is several months. They moved 312 dxfxx division
into Northern Laos 7 weeks ago. We expect an offensive but whether
it will go to Vientiane we would doubt.
Some people say we are XXXX playing the SVN in Cambodia. Some
under
M:
say it's more important than what we are treating it.
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"ocrText": "TELCON\nMurray Marder/Kissinger\n2:40 p.m.\n2/10/71\nK : Did I say something wrong?\nM: No, I was trying to see if we can get guidance on strategic\nimplications. We are getting close guidance as to whether to charac-\nterize this as as a spoiling action or cutting the jugular vein in\nlarge strategic standpoint. I understand the Pentagon ? ? ?\nthis as a choking operation. It's essentially a spoiling operation.\nVogt tended to emphasize the longer range- Is it clarifiable?\nK : Partly it depneds on how it comes out. If it gets the maximum\nconceivable, we will be delighted but we would be satiffied if it\nwere a substantial spoiling operation and anything beyond that as a\nbonus. That's not a very satisfactory answer. To gain time for with-\ndrawal and build up SVN forces so anything that complicates\nthe NVN problem is good. But I don't use that language at a briefing.\nM:\nStennis\nand\nRogers Vogt didn't use that broad terminology.\nIt depends on how it comes out. I saw what Carroll had from you\nin terms of your account in the backgrounder. It didn't get into\nprobable responses. I don't know if you were cut short or what.\nK : The Soviets have confined themselved to the moderate. The\nChinese sama asour intervention into Indochina in 65. The NVN\nsame\nwill have to decide whether to fight. They must pay the price if\nthey go against fire power and risk supplies in fight or falling back\nand cutting off of supplies faster. I think they will do both. Fight\nmoderately but not to a point they will risk the losses they had in\nthe Tet offensive.\nM: Do you think it hits them harder than Cambodia.\nK : It is less than Cambodia but long term could be more\n.\nM: In time frame does it appear that they probably cannot bring enough\nforces to overwhelmingly challenge the SVN forces?\nK : Substantial fight but not overwhelming. If they do, we will have\na number 6f offices who will have to have explaining to do. A11 this\nis for background.\nM: of course. Anything to change their strategy in Northern Laos?\nK : We expect an offensive in Northern Laos. They are preparing.\nTheir lead time is several months. They moved 312 dxfxx division\ninto Northern Laos 7 weeks ago. We expect an offensive but whether\nit will go to Vientiane we would doubt.\nSome people say we are XXXX playing the SVN in Cambodia. Some\nunder\nM:\nsay it's more important than what we are treating it."
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