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TELECON
The President
(Brought in 3/29/71)
in middle of conversation)
P:
thinking with further reference to our propaganda front.
The thing about most newsmen, columnists and SO forth is that they like
to be a little ahead sometimes SO that they'll it, not because they believe
but only because they like to be proved right to take what appears to be
the weaker side of the story and build it up. Now that's something that
can be played on at this time if it's done cleverly. Two points that should
be made
you can use that business about division - that must be
gotten out very heavily about division in North Vietnam.
K: Right, well now that we got from communications intelligence.
P: Perfectly all right, perfectly all right. Just say that there
are reports that
K: Right.
12 Don't need to say where the hell you got it.
K: Right.
P:; They don't know. Reports that
reports from Hanoi
indicate
hanging on to some
The other thing is
to get the idea that the whole week should be that a sober assessment
now of this tends more and more to show that the North Vietnamese, if
they claimed a xxxxxxx victory, appearing vicotry, that they had a
they suffered much greater losses than they could afford to suffer. You
see, there's a very good case to make here where these guys might
want to write it and actually it's tune. It's only
because they've
all gone overboard on the other thing based on just a three-day battle
and a three-day report at the end and they've lost sight of the whole deal.
K: Oh absolutely. They were all focused on the last few days
which were partly deliberate, I mean mostly deliberate except for that
first series of attacks.
P: That's correct.
K: And there's just no way of getting out of there as this fellow
MacArthur wrote today, for any unit without
not wanting to be the
last man off the landing zone.
P: That's all right. And they trying to make that out and SO forth
SO that's fine, but the point is that the enormous casualties that they suffered
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"ocrText": "TELECON\nThe President\n(Brought in 3/29/71)\nin middle of conversation)\nP:\nthinking with further reference to our propaganda front.\nThe thing about most newsmen, columnists and SO forth is that they like\nto be a little ahead sometimes SO that they'll it, not because they believe\nbut only because they like to be proved right to take what appears to be\nthe weaker side of the story and build it up. Now that's something that\ncan be played on at this time if it's done cleverly. Two points that should\nbe made\nyou can use that business about division - that must be\ngotten out very heavily about division in North Vietnam.\nK: Right, well now that we got from communications intelligence.\nP: Perfectly all right, perfectly all right. Just say that there\nare reports that\nK: Right.\n12 Don't need to say where the hell you got it.\nK: Right.\nP:; They don't know. Reports that\nreports from Hanoi\nindicate\nhanging on to some\nThe other thing is\nto get the idea that the whole week should be that a sober assessment\nnow of this tends more and more to show that the North Vietnamese, if\nthey claimed a xxxxxxx victory, appearing vicotry, that they had a\nthey suffered much greater losses than they could afford to suffer. You\nsee, there's a very good case to make here where these guys might\nwant to write it and actually it's tune. It's only\nbecause they've\nall gone overboard on the other thing based on just a three-day battle\nand a three-day report at the end and they've lost sight of the whole deal.\nK: Oh absolutely. They were all focused on the last few days\nwhich were partly deliberate, I mean mostly deliberate except for that\nfirst series of attacks.\nP: That's correct.\nK: And there's just no way of getting out of there as this fellow\nMacArthur wrote today, for any unit without\nnot wanting to be the\nlast man off the landing zone.\nP: That's all right. And they trying to make that out and SO forth\nSO that's fine, but the point is that the enormous casualties that they suffered"
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