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Mr. Kissinger/Director Frank Shakespeare (USIA) April 12, 1971 3:12 p.m. jlj S: I just wanted to check one thing out with you. My grapevine says that Bob Hill is going to replace Charlie Meyer as Assistant Secretary for Latin America. And that Bill Macomber is going to Spain. We are getting ready to change our public relations man in Spain and I was wondering if you could tip me off. K: I really do not think this is true. S: OK. The kind of change we are thing of is a senior man and I might change my mind about the man I am sending if he was going to work for Macomber rather than Hill. K: I have not heard about it. S: At your level you have not heard anything. That's fine. This was washroom type gossip and probably is not kix true. K: The State Department may be planning something like this but I have not heard about it. S: I just wanted to check it out. Thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. telcon Gen. Westmoreland/Kissinger afternoon 4/12/71 K: I have thought with nostalgia and regret of our conversation here many weeks ago. You were right. W: It's evident. K: I was uneasy and didn't know what was wrong. I wish you had been wrong. W: So do I. Formidable undertaking. So much depended on communications and helicopters. K: I didn't realize they hadn't set up a headquarters for that. W: They had two generals. Long and Than and then Dong who commands airborne. In retrospect we should have ?????. . K: Sent one of our guys up. W: A 4-star on the scene. K: We came close. The other side wasn't ????, W: The operation was still successful. Our losses were heavier then might have been. Our materiel losses are shocking. K: In helicopters? W: That is public knowledge but 94 artilerry pieces and tanks and RX APC. K: I haven't see it. W: Not revealed and shouldn't be. It gives you a better idea of what happened. The personnel involved -- you left the room. Dong I have no confidence in. The xjxx man you named earlier tax thought Louad fell flat on his face. He was relieved after Tet. How K: Who did they think with these guys it could be done. W: They have come a long way and learned as time has gone on. Give more credit then for running something as complicated as this. We would have been hard pressed to run it ourselves and to O much for these little fellows. K: I remember the briefing you gave to the WSAG a few months ago. If this war doesn't ruin you, it breaks your heart. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Gen. Westmoreland/Kissinger afternoon 4/12/71 -2- W: It's been an unhappy national experience. In retrospect - hind sight is always 20-20. K: You had Atapu pointed. W: These things have to be planned in advance. We should have pulled advisors before to shake them down so they would have self-confidence. We should have stockpiled airborne . they take terrible casualties. We should be able to replace them. Build up 120% overstrike. These things have to be anticipated. Insufficient attention given to control of airspace where you have on the ground. Complicated problems. If we do it over again these things will be thought through. Such a veil of secrecy Abe was afraid to take steps to it. Too much secrety in the plan. K: And not adjusting it to conditions when we hit them. W: ? ? ? ? ? Not fully appreciate it puts a veil of caution on the whole thing. The operation was successful. Nox Know advisors morale effect. K: Only reports when it was going on. W: It was like Tet offensive k in that regard. Materiel losses when you see that it was most indicative thing on disordliness and withdrawal (?). K: I will get it from Haig. One other thing. I have a Colonel on my staff who is being considered for xxx promotion to Brigadier General. Kennedy. I want to say he has done a superlative job. W: It would be helpful to have a letter. K: I wrote to Laord. W: I have heard good reports on him. To hear from you is helpful. One post- script remark. Abe in the most difficult position you can hear of. Thieu took it over Americans were taken out because Thieu talked to the field commanders. On one occasion we talked Thieu into a course of action and orders send to L who talks with Thieu and reverses it. It's awkward. You have to fully appreciate the position that Abe was in. K: No problem with Abe. It's a problem of you cannot say you learned from this experience because there will be no other one. I meant to call and tell you that your briefing at the end of Feb. was very clairvoyant. W: Thank you for calling. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Admiral Moorer 4/12/71 5:22 p.m K: We're having a meeting tomorrow of the SRG on Vietnam. I wanted to tell you what I want to get done at that meeting. We going to be using CIA/DIA analyses as a starting point to chart what we have for '72. Then we'll find out what is needed so we don't have a chlamity in $72. For example, should we keep Koreans there I think it would be murderously dangerous for us to dance along this year on nothing but theories. This is not an attempt to be a field commander but we have to know where we are heading. So any thirpughts you have on this would be helpful. M: Okay Henry I'll be ready. K: Good. Thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON The President/Mr. Kissinger 7:25 p.m., April 12, 1971 P: Are you finished with your meeting or are you still having it? K: I will be finished in another 5 to 10 minutes. P: Are you going out to dinner? K: No, I was going to stay here. P: Come on over and we will give you something to eat in the Lincoln room. K: That would be very nice. P: I'll tell them to serve in 10 minutes. K: Could I make it in 15 minutes. P: In 15 minutes. K: Right, Mr. President. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissinger Secretary Rogers 4/12/71; 9:10 p.m. K: The President was just talking to me about these things we are lifting. He didn't take the whole package, just four or five items like visa requirements, etc. They had come actually from the Irwin Committee. We had been working with Marshall Green on it so this is something that was not done unilaterally. R: I wasn't complaining K: No, no, you weren't complaining except there was no reason why you should know what he was talking about because I don't know what he was talking about. R: I talked to the President on the Chinese Representation question. K: He wants to send Murphy out there as he must have told you. R: That was my recommendation -- he forgets. He apparently spoke to the new Foreign Minister about it, which is fine. It is my thinking we ought to get moving on it. I think this ping-pong thing points up the advantage of doing it doesn't have to be Chinese Representation but if he is going to get any benefit out of "generation of peace", we have to move in that direction. K: That talk with Chow was very helpful because Chow certainly indicated that some change was conceivable. He didn't throw up his hands in horror. R: I had a one hour talk with him. Christ, what is the choice. They don't have an alternative. I asked if he wanted to proceed as we were. Our interests coincide. K: I don't expect anything to come up this week. If there is anything, I will be in touch with you. R: One thing I don't understand the business about the defense department putting SO much stuff out. It seems to me our position is fairly good now. If we just stand on it K: Exactly. R: Why do we have to tell the other side. On the Charlie Yost thing, Alex Johnson called him and really gave him hell. He has been trying to get me and I am not going to talk to him for a while. K: The testimony before the Platform of the Democratic Party everything which we have done. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissinger Secretary Rogers 4/12/71; 9:10 p.m. -2- R: I don't think we should make an attack on him but we should get the record straight. Maybe we can put something in the Congressional Record. K: I know he had direct access to the President and we certainly never told him he could not make recommendations on Vietnam. You and I know if the President had not fired him he would still be there with all his thoughts about Vietnam. Have a good trip. When are you leaving? R: About 10:00 a. m. I will come back -- I have to stay there until Friday and may stay in Mexico Saturday and Sunday -- I will come back if something comes up. I think in Pakistan and Ceylon we are doing as well as we can. K: Have a good trip! R: Thank you, Henry. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissinger McGeorge Bundy 4/12/71; 9:15 p.m. K: Mac, I wanted to talk to you for a minute about communication from Harris, which I read with intense interest. Let me tell you what the situation is this is not inconsistent with what we have been picking up through regular channels but very private channels and we are most anxious for them to stay in these channels. We don't think that business leaders going around making similar noises are going to help this matter we want them to stay serious. Any signal that they can get that we are serious that this is the time for major movement would be extremely helpful. Now, how can we get that done? Can you talk to that fellow? B: Yes, I can. K: You can do it with more expertise. B: I can say to Harris on the whole I am interested in what he says and would like to talk to him. Then you might tell me what in particular I can say what my feel of what my friends in Washington now thing. K: You can tell him for example that the Breshnev speech was read with extreme seriousness in Washington made a genuinely positive impression. B: Can I tell them amendments were noticed? K: Yes, and at very high levels and that we are interested in a fundamental improvement of relations. That we think SALT is a particularly useful subject on which to make progress but that we are open in other areas as well and that you know from personal conversations with me that this is an unusual opportunity. B: And whether there is some specific area where they think progress is possible. Put the question back to him but with friendly noises. K: Correct! I think that would be helpful. If the President thought the Soviets were trying to bring pressure on him, he might tend to pull back. B: That's true of most Presidents. I will play it that way and let you know what happens. I can send this back second-hand, but you want me to show enough interest in talking to this guy. I probably will see him with Harris in order not to break the channel. No problem. K: I would appreciate it very much. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. D: Telecon Mr. Kissinger McGeorge Bundy 4/12/71; 9:15 p.m. -2- B: How are you otherwise? K: In the middle of our annual hurricane! B: I get the impression that anti-Vietnam group has shifted from right and wrong and shifted to morality and that we are engaged in destroying South Vietnam. If there anyway of getting responsible account of the actual situation there? The whole thing has shifted from I don't care whether you are right or wrong but you are killing! K: We have reduced bombing 50% Statistics are boring but in South Vietnam we have reduced bombing 58% (or 88%, I did not hear it clearly) Over 80% of bombing is in panhandle of Laos where there are no civilians. The only area we are bombing in where there are civilians is in Cambodia. We have asked the Cambodians to give us estimates and those estimates are so low we are afraid to put them out. B: I suppose you have racked your brains about what can be done about it. I know the Government is not the best witness on these things but I hate to see it go sour. K: There are almost no refugees in South Vietnam. B: And you have had enormous amount of resettlement of refugees. Do you have data on this? K: I will try to get data on this for you. If they catch us in an slight inaccuracy, we have to go back ten spaces. If we could get everybody to shut up for six months, we could get a crack at negotiations. B: I have always been a pessimist about that but how you make the last jump off the bridge is the hard part. K: That is what Laos was all about. B: I understand that. K: You look at the dove platform of the Democratic Party of 1968. We have exceeded all of that. And what our former colleagues at Harvard said -- we are way beyond that. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissinger McGeorge Bundy 4/12/71; 9:15 p.m. -3- - B: Send me what you have in the public domain and I will appreciate it. If I have a brainstorm on how non-government can help, I will let you know. I will talk to that old bird. I don't know if the Harris papers you have mentioned distinct upgrading of Brezhnev. K: It sound authentic. Let me know when you come to Washington. I would like to have lunch or dinner with you. B: Okay, Henry Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Amb. Rabin 4/13/71 4:09 p.m. K: How are you doing? R: Not as good as I would like to be. I got information that Yigal Allon is planning next to be in New York. He thought it would be a good idea to see you, not to negotiate K: No, he's an old friend of mine. R: I think it would be a good idea for him to talk to you. He will come Monday evening to New York and is supposed to leave Tuesday for Canada. It would be here or New York; it's up to you. K: I can't come to New York. R: Can we arrange for next Tuesday breakfast? K: Yes. R: Okay, I will tell him he has to adjust his plans and we will arrange the details. K: And we will keep it informal. R: Very informally. K: Will anyone here know he's in town? R: No, he doesn't know it yet. He will visit with me at my home. He will come Monday night very late and leave Tuesday. K: Okay, and you will invite me for Breakfast. R: Right. K: Okay, and I will bring Haig. R: Fine. K: Okay, and on this matter we discussed yesterday. All I can give you is personal advice. I don't care what you submit personally, but if you do it without a fallback position, you' re doing it at your own risk. But you are aware of this. R: Yes I am very aware. Therefore I am glad he is coming. It will be good for you to talk to him in a very clear way. K: Yigal is a student of mine. I expect discipline from my students. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Sisco/Kissinger 4:24 p.m. 4/13/71 K: What do you think of this PM coming over here? S: The Morroccan? I gather we are going to have a meeting later on at the Dept. but the complication is this -- I just aad a briefing on this. Hassan has a complication because he made a proposal for an Arab summit sometime ago and now there might be a coincidence of time. K: We cannot refuse him can we? S: No, since they are very friendly. I will find out later today. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Haldeman 4/13/71 4!50 p.m. K: Bob, the address is Aquanetta Circle near Okatillo Lodge. H: That's a good area. There's no wind on that side of town and there's a horesback riding stable near there. K: It's a little bit out of town? H: Just a little. It's a good area. K: Okay, thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Under Secretary Irwin 4/13/71 5:55 p.m. I: Have you seen the cables from Rocco on the tendence of the King to back out of the visit next week? K: Yes. I: We are talking about it now. K: He wants to send the Prime Minister over? I: Yes, Laraki. And the reason apparently, it is now coming out, is that they are having a meeting of the Arab chiefs of state don't know when but presumably in the near future. And this was the basis for sug- gesting the King shouldn't come. The problem is, because of whatever political reaso ns, they don't want to come to the U.S. just before an Arann summit meeting on the MiddleEast or whatever. A recent cable, sent to me just 5 minutes ago, section one of two parts, says this kind of thing. Our people feel it important that the President reseive Laraki although he has not yet left. He decided either from our ambassador's statement over there or from discussions with the NEA and Affacan Affairs here they held up Laraki and are now waiting to see if the President will receive him. K: Yes, he will. I've checked that. But he doesn't have to come. I: That was my reaction why come? But both Newsome, Atherton and Sisco who are here in my office, feel that it would be a mistake not to let the Prime Minister come. K: We'll see him. About noon on Thursday is the tentative appointment. I: He could get here by then I guess. K: We can be flexible about that. But the problem is if they are going to cancel we had better uninvite a lot of dinner guests. I: I guess we can't be certain till he's here on that, but as far as actually cancelling K: But you think that's what is going to happen? I: That's what it appears to be. K: Well, I've talked with the President and he agrees to this. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Under Secretary Irwin 4/13/71 5:59 p.m. I: I just wanted to be clear K: Sure, we can shift it to Friday incidentally. I: We were planning to send a memo over questioning whether he'd receive him or not. And once he had replied we could tell the Ambassador K: No need to send the memo. I: We can call him now and tell him Laraki can come? K: Yes. If he decided not to we'd be delighted I: But we can say we've already asked him? K: Yes. If you want to keep your records meticulous you can say on the basis of my comment. I: Okay, thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Mosbacher/Kissinger 6:40 p.m. 4/13/71 M: I was sitting up in Jack's office when he called you. For what it's worth, I want you to know how I feel. I think they have made excused why the don't want to come for some reason. K: Our fault? M: No but I think they will try to pin it on us. Perhaps in our shop and let it be. One thing they have made an issue of which the President should know of. The VP is not going to see him and not play golf with him and not go to the reception. K: Why not? M: I don't know. K: You tell us what we need and we will have him do it. M: I think the VP should at least go to the reception which at their embassy and a drop by at Blair House. K: I will see to it. M: Half the Cabinet have declined the reception at their embassy. Maybe because they are out of town but we should try to do something. K: I will take care of both things. Particularly since bemay not come. M: The President should be aware in case it's brought up. K: OK. M: I am meeting with the ambassador in the morning. We are probably going throug the motions of continuing to plan the visit. I don't know if you noted the coordina- tion of the protection of embassies here the sone of a member of your staff was involved in a chemical experiment or something outside Dobrynin's. K: Jewish? M: No. Marshall Wright's boy. K: Jesus! M: The police don't think it's very bad but I thought you would want to know. The other thing is bxex I hope you can come Sun. night. K: I will call on Thurs. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin (Moscow) 7:15 p. m., April 13, 1971 D: Hello, how are you? K: I just wanted to see whether the line to Moscow are real. Congratulations on your election to the Central Committee. D: Thank you. K: It gives all of us here a feeling of greater confidence in you. D: Thank you very much. K: I saw one of the members from your Embassy this afternoon. D: Today? K: Today, Voronsov, but that's not the reason I am calling; I am calling just to see whether that number you gave me is any good. D: ?? K: It is a technical point which you and I had already discussed and just wanted to make sure it was clearly understood. D: Was it the point? K: No, I didn't raise that at all. D: Another point? K: On the other suggestion having to do with the April 16th meeting. D: Oh, I see. K: One other procedural suggestion to make. On the exchange of letters, hoping you have an answer. It is on the suggestion you and I have already discussed. D: Understood, understood. K: It is really just to make sure one procedure on which two people might do the talking -- one particular suggestion to make really for convenience on a policy issue will fall. D: I will see in the morning and give you back an answer. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin (Moscow) 7:15 p.m., April 13, 1971 K: See you next week. D: At the beginning of next week. K: Right. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Herb Kaplow/Kissinger 10:40 a.m. 4/14/71 K: I wonder what you make out on the table tennis and what weight you give to Chou En-lai today. HAK: I wouldn't go overboard but it's obviously a carefully planned move. You think that People's Represexxxxxx Republic of China in the World Report wasn't an sccident and other public and non-public moves too which they are responding. K: Can you give details? HAK: No. It's not a world shaking -- don't say WH sources said this comment. K: How about government officials? HAK: No. Say nothing. K: How can I say it? HAK: Making moves. Relaxation of travel and general relaxation in atmosphere K: Are we xwaking likely to do something in response to their action and some- thing today? HAK: We will probably announce we will announce today but don't scoop anybody. Some relaxation. K: Don't yxx use it until you announce it? KAK: It's the beginning of a process to be nurtured carefully. It's a tough and complicated problem. K: Can I use that? HAK: Yes. K: Is there any danger that the Chinese might be doing this and nothing beneath it HAK: No it's not likely there's nothing beneath it but we have to find out what it is. There's something more than have a table tennis team there. K: What do they get out of improved relations? HAK: They have been isolated. May want more normal diplomatic postures. May be worried about the Soviets. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Herb Kaplow/Kissinger 10:40 a.m. 4/14/71 -2- K: Maybe not now but later influencing the VN situation. HAK: Much further down the road. I don't want to speculate. I hope less than years. The way they look at things. It will be noticed. K: Because we are announcing something today we want to show we are interested in picking up and responding? HAK: We are picking up process we started 18 months ago. Warsaw talks -- - - K: How can I attribute? HAK: I may have misledd you when I said not SO public -- what I meant was what's been going on in Warsaw and like that. K: Can I say the administration thinks? HAK: Yes. Don't say WH sources. Waht would you say? K: Significantly and real. HAK: Not significant. The beginning of a process for what we want to get across. K: Are there dangers in this thing? HAK: Shouldn't raise espectations to high. Major problems between us. On the whole we think this is a constructive development. K: How will you announce it? HAK: Zäigler. K: This morning? HAK: I think so. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Robt. Murphy/Kissinger 11:26 a.m. 4/14/71 M: I am surprised to find you on the job SO early in the morning. K: In crisis times I start earlier. M: Since talking with Gen. Haig I have talked with company people and I will cancel meeting in Geneva and the Bilderburg conference. I am coming tomorrow at 1:00. Could I call you when I come? K: What time do you get in? M: 4:00 on the Metroliner. K: Wx How about here at 4:30? I will set up a car. M: At Union Station. K: Then we can discuss the time for the other. It's good now to talk with the Generalissimo. The President & mentioned the fask fact that he was aksing you to go there to Chow and he couldn't habe been more interested. M: I talked with Chow before and he wanted me to talk with on business. I will come to your office tomorrow. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Zeigler/Kissinger 12:50 p.m. 4/14/71 Z: I am going to the other briefing now. Horner got me in the hall. He says there's an indication in his office that Chou En-Lai wants to come for a visit. K: Just say we have heard nothing. We don't know anything about it. Nothing more. Z: If they say what do you mean, I know nothing more. K: It's purely speculative. Z: OK Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON V.P./Kissinger 5:43 p.m. 4/14/71 VP: What the hell are we doing with the Chinese? K: We are playing a game with the Russians and Chinese. What the Chinese are doing is they are scared the Russians will attack them. We had already decided on these measures today and discussed it with the Taiwanese. VP: What about ping pong? K: That's their gig to the Russians. Let me come over on Friday to give you a rundown. VP: I think I will be here. K: You mentioned anytime in the morning? VP: (Aside: What's Friday morning?) Let's make it around 10:00. I will see you then. K: Look forward to it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

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    "ocrText": "Mr. Kissinger/Director Frank Shakespeare (USIA)\nApril 12, 1971 3:12 p.m.\njlj\nS: I just wanted to check one thing out with you. My grapevine says that\nBob Hill is going to replace Charlie Meyer as Assistant Secretary for\nLatin America. And that Bill Macomber is going to Spain. We are\ngetting ready to change our public relations man in Spain and I was\nwondering if you could tip me off.\nK: I really do not think this is true.\nS: OK. The kind of change we are thing of is a senior man and I might\nchange my mind about the man I am sending if he was going to work for\nMacomber rather than Hill.\nK: I have not heard about it.\nS: At your level you have not heard anything. That's fine. This was\nwashroom type gossip and probably is not kix true.\nK: The State Department may be planning something like this but I have\nnot heard about it.\nS: I just wanted to check it out. Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\ntelcon\nGen. Westmoreland/Kissinger\nafternoon\n4/12/71\nK: I have thought with nostalgia and regret of our conversation here many\nweeks ago. You were right.\nW: It's evident.\nK: I was uneasy and didn't know what was wrong. I wish you had been wrong.\nW: So do I. Formidable undertaking. So much depended on communications and\nhelicopters.\nK: I didn't realize they hadn't set up a headquarters for that.\nW: They had two generals. Long and Than and then Dong who commands airborne.\nIn retrospect we should have ?????. .\nK: Sent one of our guys up.\nW: A 4-star on the scene.\nK: We came close. The other side wasn't ????,\nW: The operation was still successful. Our losses were heavier then might have\nbeen. Our materiel losses are shocking.\nK: In helicopters?\nW: That is public knowledge but 94 artilerry pieces and tanks and RX APC.\nK: I haven't see it.\nW: Not revealed and shouldn't be. It gives you a better idea of what happened.\nThe personnel involved -- you left the room. Dong I have no confidence in. The\nxjxx man you named earlier tax thought Louad fell flat on his face. He was relieved\nafter Tet.\nHow\nK: Who did they think with these guys it could be done.\nW: They have come a long way and learned as time has gone on. Give more\ncredit then for running something as complicated as this. We would have been\nhard pressed to run it ourselves and to O much for these little fellows.\nK: I remember the briefing you gave to the WSAG a few months ago. If this war\ndoesn't ruin you, it breaks your heart.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nGen. Westmoreland/Kissinger\nafternoon\n4/12/71\n-2-\nW: It's been an unhappy national experience. In retrospect - hind sight is\nalways 20-20.\nK: You had Atapu pointed.\nW: These things have to be planned in advance. We should have pulled advisors\nbefore to shake them down so they would have self-confidence. We should have\nstockpiled airborne . they take terrible casualties. We should be able to\nreplace them. Build up 120% overstrike. These things have to be anticipated.\nInsufficient attention given to control of airspace where you have\non the\nground. Complicated problems. If we do it over again these things will be\nthought through. Such a veil of secrecy Abe was afraid to take steps to\nit.\nToo much secrety in the plan.\nK: And not adjusting it to conditions when we hit them.\nW: ? ? ? ? ? Not fully appreciate it puts a veil of caution on the whole thing.\nThe operation was successful. Nox Know advisors morale effect.\nK: Only reports when it was going on.\nW: It was like Tet offensive k in that regard. Materiel losses when you see that\nit was most indicative thing on disordliness and withdrawal (?).\nK: I will get it from Haig. One other thing. I have a Colonel on my staff who\nis being considered for xxx promotion to Brigadier General. Kennedy. I want\nto say he has done a superlative job.\nW: It would be helpful to have a letter.\nK: I wrote to Laord.\nW: I have heard good reports on him. To hear from you is helpful. One post-\nscript remark. Abe in the most difficult position you can hear of. Thieu took\nit over Americans were taken out because Thieu talked to the field commanders.\nOn one occasion we talked Thieu into a course of action and orders send to L\nwho talks with Thieu and reverses it. It's awkward. You have to fully\nappreciate the position that Abe was in.\nK: No problem with Abe. It's a problem of you cannot say you learned from this\nexperience because there will be no other one. I meant to call and tell you that\nyour briefing at the end of Feb. was very clairvoyant.\nW: Thank you for calling.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAdmiral Moorer\n4/12/71 5:22 p.m\nK: We're having a meeting tomorrow of the SRG on Vietnam.\nI wanted to tell you what I want to get done at that meeting. We going to\nbe using CIA/DIA analyses as a starting point to chart what we have for\n'72. Then we'll find out what is needed so we don't have a chlamity in\n$72. For example, should we keep Koreans there\nI think it\nwould be murderously dangerous for us to dance along this year on nothing\nbut theories. This is not an attempt to be a field commander but we\nhave to know where we are heading. So any thirpughts you have on this\nwould be helpful.\nM: Okay Henry I'll be ready.\nK: Good. Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n7:25 p.m., April 12, 1971\nP:\nAre you finished with your meeting or are you still having it?\nK:\nI will be finished in another 5 to 10 minutes.\nP:\nAre you going out to dinner?\nK:\nNo, I was going to stay here.\nP:\nCome on over and we will give you something to eat in the Lincoln\nroom.\nK:\nThat would be very nice.\nP:\nI'll tell them to serve in 10 minutes.\nK:\nCould I make it in 15 minutes.\nP:\nIn 15 minutes.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nSecretary Rogers\n4/12/71; 9:10 p.m.\nK: The President was just talking to me about these things we are lifting. He\ndidn't take the whole package, just four or five items like visa requirements,\netc. They had come actually from the Irwin Committee. We had been working\nwith Marshall Green on it so this is something that was not done unilaterally.\nR: I wasn't complaining\nK: No, no, you weren't complaining except there was no reason why you\nshould know what he was talking about because I don't know what he was talking\nabout.\nR: I talked to the President on the Chinese Representation question.\nK: He wants to send Murphy out there as he must have told you.\nR: That was my recommendation -- he forgets. He apparently spoke to the\nnew Foreign Minister about it, which is fine. It is my thinking we ought to\nget moving on it. I think this ping-pong thing points up the advantage of\ndoing it doesn't have to be Chinese Representation but if he is going to get\nany benefit out of \"generation of peace\", we have to move in that direction.\nK: That talk with Chow was very helpful because Chow certainly indicated\nthat some change was conceivable. He didn't throw up his hands in horror.\nR: I had a one hour talk with him. Christ, what is the choice. They don't\nhave an alternative. I asked if he wanted to proceed as we were. Our interests\ncoincide.\nK: I don't expect anything to come up this week. If there is anything, I will\nbe in touch with you.\nR: One thing I don't understand the business about the defense department\nputting SO much stuff out. It seems to me our position is fairly good now. If\nwe just stand on it\nK: Exactly.\nR: Why do we have to tell the other side. On the Charlie Yost thing, Alex\nJohnson called him and really gave him hell. He has been trying to get me and\nI am not going to talk to him for a while.\nK: The testimony before the Platform of the Democratic Party everything\nwhich we have done.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nSecretary Rogers\n4/12/71; 9:10 p.m.\n-2-\nR: I don't think we should make an attack on him but we should get the record\nstraight. Maybe we can put something in the Congressional Record.\nK: I know he had direct access to the President and we certainly never told\nhim he could not make recommendations on Vietnam. You and I know if the\nPresident had not fired him he would still be there with all his thoughts\nabout Vietnam. Have a good trip. When are you leaving?\nR: About 10:00 a. m. I will come back -- I have to stay there until Friday\nand may stay in Mexico Saturday and Sunday -- I will come back if something\ncomes up. I think in Pakistan and Ceylon we are doing as well as we can.\nK: Have a good trip!\nR: Thank you, Henry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nMcGeorge Bundy\n4/12/71; 9:15 p.m.\nK: Mac, I wanted to talk to you for a minute about communication from Harris,\nwhich I read with intense interest. Let me tell you what the situation is this\nis not inconsistent with what we have been picking up through regular channels\nbut very private channels and we are most anxious for them to stay in these\nchannels. We don't think that business leaders going around making similar\nnoises are going to help this matter we want them to stay serious. Any\nsignal that they can get that we are serious that this is the time for major\nmovement would be extremely helpful. Now, how can we get that done?\nCan you talk to that fellow?\nB: Yes, I can.\nK: You can do it with more expertise.\nB: I can say to Harris on the whole I am interested in what he says and would\nlike to talk to him. Then you might tell me what in particular I can say what\nmy feel of what my friends in Washington now thing.\nK: You can tell him for example that the Breshnev speech was read with\nextreme seriousness in Washington made a genuinely positive impression.\nB: Can I tell them amendments were noticed?\nK: Yes, and at very high levels and that we are interested in a fundamental\nimprovement of relations. That we think SALT is a particularly useful subject\non which to make progress but that we are open in other areas as well and\nthat you know from personal conversations with me that this is an unusual\nopportunity.\nB: And whether there is some specific area where they think progress is\npossible. Put the question back to him but with friendly noises.\nK: Correct! I think that would be helpful. If the President thought the Soviets\nwere trying to bring pressure on him, he might tend to pull back.\nB: That's true of most Presidents. I will play it that way and let you know\nwhat happens. I can send this back second-hand, but you want me to show\nenough interest in talking to this guy. I probably will see him with Harris\nin order not to break the channel. No problem.\nK: I would appreciate it very much.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nD:\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nMcGeorge Bundy\n4/12/71; 9:15 p.m.\n-2-\nB: How are you otherwise?\nK: In the middle of our annual hurricane!\nB: I get the impression that anti-Vietnam group has shifted from right and\nwrong and shifted to morality and that we are engaged in destroying South\nVietnam. If there anyway of getting responsible account of the actual\nsituation there? The whole thing has shifted from I don't care whether\nyou are right or wrong but you are killing!\nK: We have reduced bombing 50% Statistics are boring but in South Vietnam\nwe have reduced bombing 58% (or 88%, I did not hear it clearly) Over 80% of\nbombing is in panhandle of Laos where there are no civilians. The only\narea we are bombing in where there are civilians is in Cambodia. We have\nasked the Cambodians to give us estimates and those estimates are so low\nwe are afraid to put them out.\nB: I suppose you have racked your brains about what can be done about it.\nI know the Government is not the best witness on these things but I hate to\nsee it go sour.\nK: There are almost no refugees in South Vietnam.\nB: And you have had enormous amount of resettlement of refugees. Do you\nhave data on this?\nK: I will try to get data on this for you. If they catch us in an slight inaccuracy,\nwe have to go back ten spaces. If we could get everybody to shut up for six\nmonths, we could get a crack at negotiations.\nB: I have always been a pessimist about that but how you make the last jump\noff the bridge is the hard part.\nK: That is what Laos was all about.\nB: I understand that.\nK: You look at the dove platform of the Democratic Party of 1968. We have\nexceeded all of that. And what our former colleagues at Harvard said -- we\nare way beyond that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nMcGeorge Bundy\n4/12/71; 9:15 p.m.\n-3- -\nB: Send me what you have in the public domain and I will appreciate it. If\nI have a brainstorm on how non-government can help, I will let you know.\nI will talk to that old bird. I don't know if the Harris papers you have mentioned\ndistinct upgrading of Brezhnev.\nK: It sound authentic. Let me know when you come to Washington. I would\nlike to have lunch or dinner with you.\nB: Okay, Henry\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmb. Rabin\n4/13/71 4:09 p.m.\nK: How are you doing?\nR: Not as good as I would like to be. I got information that Yigal\nAllon is planning next to be in New York. He thought it would be a good\nidea to see you, not to negotiate\nK: No, he's an old friend of mine.\nR: I think it would be a good idea for him to talk to you. He will\ncome Monday evening to New York and is supposed to leave Tuesday for\nCanada. It would be here or New York; it's up to you.\nK: I can't come to New York.\nR: Can we arrange for next Tuesday breakfast?\nK: Yes.\nR: Okay, I will tell him he has to adjust his plans and we will arrange\nthe details.\nK: And we will keep it informal.\nR: Very informally.\nK: Will anyone here know he's in town?\nR: No, he doesn't know it yet. He will visit with me at my home.\nHe will come Monday night very late and leave Tuesday.\nK: Okay, and you will invite me for Breakfast.\nR: Right.\nK: Okay, and I will bring Haig.\nR: Fine.\nK: Okay, and on this matter we discussed yesterday. All I can give\nyou is personal advice. I don't care what you submit personally, but if you\ndo it without a fallback position, you' re doing it at your own risk. But you\nare aware of this.\nR: Yes I am very aware. Therefore I am glad he is coming. It will\nbe good for you to talk to him in a very clear way.\nK: Yigal is a student of mine. I expect discipline from my students.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSisco/Kissinger\n4:24 p.m.\n4/13/71\nK: What do you think of this PM coming over here?\nS: The Morroccan? I gather we are going to have a meeting later on at the\nDept. but the complication is this -- I just aad a briefing on this. Hassan has\na complication because he made a proposal for an Arab summit sometime ago\nand now there might be a coincidence of time.\nK: We cannot refuse him can we?\nS: No, since they are very friendly. I will find out later today.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Haldeman\n4/13/71 4!50 p.m.\nK: Bob, the address is Aquanetta Circle near Okatillo Lodge.\nH: That's a good area. There's no wind on that side of town and\nthere's a horesback riding stable near there.\nK: It's a little bit out of town?\nH: Just a little. It's a good area.\nK: Okay, thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nUnder Secretary Irwin\n4/13/71 5:55 p.m.\nI: Have you seen the cables from Rocco on the tendence of the\nKing to back out of the visit next week?\nK: Yes.\nI: We are talking about it now.\nK: He wants to send the Prime Minister over?\nI: Yes, Laraki. And the reason apparently, it is now coming out,\nis that they are having a meeting of the Arab chiefs of state don't know\nwhen but presumably in the near future. And this was the basis for sug-\ngesting the King shouldn't come. The problem is, because of whatever\npolitical reaso ns, they don't want to come to the U.S. just before an Arann\nsummit meeting on the MiddleEast or whatever. A recent cable, sent to\nme just 5 minutes ago, section one of two parts, says this kind of thing. Our\npeople feel it important that the President reseive Laraki although he has not\nyet left. He decided either from our ambassador's statement over there or\nfrom discussions with the NEA and Affacan Affairs here they held up\nLaraki and are now waiting to see if the President will receive him.\nK: Yes, he will. I've checked that. But he doesn't have to come.\nI: That was my reaction why come? But both Newsome, Atherton\nand Sisco who are here in my office, feel that it would be a mistake not to\nlet the Prime Minister come.\nK: We'll see him. About noon on Thursday is the tentative appointment.\nI: He could get here by then I guess.\nK: We can be flexible about that. But the problem is if they are\ngoing to cancel we had better uninvite a lot of dinner guests.\nI: I guess we can't be certain till he's here on that, but as far as\nactually cancelling\nK: But you think that's what is going to happen?\nI: That's what it appears to be.\nK: Well, I've talked with the President and he agrees to this.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nUnder Secretary Irwin\n4/13/71 5:59 p.m.\nI: I just wanted to be clear\nK: Sure, we can shift it to Friday incidentally.\nI: We were planning to send a memo over questioning whether\nhe'd receive him or not. And once he had replied we could tell the\nAmbassador\nK: No need to send the memo.\nI: We can call him now and tell him Laraki can come?\nK: Yes. If he decided not to we'd be delighted\nI: But we can say we've already asked him?\nK: Yes. If you want to keep your records meticulous you can say\non the basis of my comment.\nI: Okay, thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMosbacher/Kissinger\n6:40 p.m.\n4/13/71\nM: I was sitting up in Jack's office when he called you. For what it's worth, I\nwant you to know how I feel. I think they have made excused why the don't want\nto come for some reason.\nK: Our fault?\nM: No but I think they will try to pin it on us. Perhaps in our shop and let it be.\nOne thing they have made an issue of which the President should know of. The VP\nis not going to see him and not play golf with him and not go to the reception.\nK: Why not?\nM: I don't know.\nK: You tell us what we need and we will have him do it.\nM: I think the VP should at least go to the reception which at their embassy and\na drop by at Blair House.\nK: I will see to it.\nM: Half the Cabinet have declined the reception at their embassy. Maybe because\nthey are out of town but we should try to do something.\nK: I will take care of both things. Particularly since bemay not come.\nM: The President should be aware in case it's brought up.\nK: OK.\nM: I am meeting with the ambassador in the morning. We are probably going throug\nthe motions of continuing to plan the visit. I don't know if you noted the coordina-\ntion of the protection of embassies here the sone of a member of your staff\nwas involved in a chemical experiment or something outside Dobrynin's.\nK: Jewish?\nM: No. Marshall Wright's boy.\nK: Jesus!\nM: The police don't think it's very bad but I thought you would want to know. The\nother thing is bxex I hope you can come Sun. night.\nK: I will call on Thurs.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin (Moscow)\n7:15 p. m., April 13, 1971\nD:\nHello, how are you?\nK:\nI just wanted to see whether the line to Moscow are real.\nCongratulations on your election to the Central Committee.\nD:\nThank you.\nK:\nIt gives all of us here a feeling of greater confidence in you.\nD:\nThank you very much.\nK:\nI saw one of the members from your Embassy this afternoon.\nD:\nToday?\nK:\nToday, Voronsov, but that's not the reason I am calling; I am\ncalling just to see whether that number you gave me is any good.\nD:\n??\nK:\nIt is a technical point which you and I had already discussed and just\nwanted to make sure it was clearly understood.\nD:\nWas it the point?\nK:\nNo, I didn't raise that at all.\nD:\nAnother point?\nK:\nOn the other suggestion having to do with the April 16th meeting.\nD:\nOh, I see.\nK:\nOne other procedural suggestion to make. On the exchange of letters,\nhoping you have an answer. It is on the suggestion you and I have\nalready discussed.\nD:\nUnderstood, understood.\nK:\nIt is really just to make sure one procedure on which two people might\ndo the talking -- one particular suggestion to make really for convenience\non a policy issue will fall.\nD:\nI will see in the morning and give you back an answer.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin (Moscow)\n7:15 p.m., April 13, 1971\nK:\nSee you next week.\nD:\nAt the beginning of next week.\nK:\nRight.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHerb Kaplow/Kissinger\n10:40 a.m.\n4/14/71\nK: I wonder what you make out on the table tennis and what weight you give\nto Chou En-lai today.\nHAK: I wouldn't go overboard but it's obviously a carefully planned move.\nYou think that People's Represexxxxxx Republic of China in the World Report wasn't\nan sccident and other public and non-public moves too which they are responding.\nK: Can you give details?\nHAK: No. It's not a world shaking -- don't say WH sources said this comment.\nK: How about government officials?\nHAK: No. Say nothing.\nK: How can I say it?\nHAK: Making moves. Relaxation of travel and general relaxation in atmosphere\nK: Are we xwaking likely to do something in response to their action and some-\nthing today?\nHAK: We will probably announce we will announce today but don't scoop\nanybody. Some relaxation.\nK: Don't yxx use it until you announce it?\nKAK: It's the beginning of a process to be nurtured carefully. It's a tough and\ncomplicated problem.\nK: Can I use that?\nHAK: Yes.\nK: Is there any danger that the Chinese might be doing this and nothing beneath it\nHAK: No it's not likely there's nothing beneath it but we have to find out what\nit is. There's something more than have a table tennis team there.\nK: What do they get out of improved relations?\nHAK: They have been isolated. May want more normal diplomatic postures.\nMay be worried about the Soviets.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHerb Kaplow/Kissinger\n10:40 a.m.\n4/14/71\n-2-\nK: Maybe not now but later influencing the VN situation.\nHAK: Much further down the road. I don't want to speculate. I hope less\nthan years. The way they look at things. It will be noticed.\nK: Because we are announcing something today we want to show we are\ninterested in picking up and responding?\nHAK: We are picking up process we started 18 months ago. Warsaw talks -- - -\nK: How can I attribute?\nHAK: I may have misledd you when I said not SO public -- what I meant was\nwhat's been going on in Warsaw and like that.\nK: Can I say the administration thinks?\nHAK: Yes. Don't say WH sources. Waht would you say?\nK: Significantly and real.\nHAK: Not significant. The beginning of a process for what we want to get\nacross.\nK: Are there dangers in this thing?\nHAK: Shouldn't raise espectations to high. Major problems between us. On the\nwhole we think this is a constructive development.\nK: How will you announce it?\nHAK: Zäigler.\nK: This morning?\nHAK: I think so.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRobt. Murphy/Kissinger\n11:26 a.m.\n4/14/71\nM: I am surprised to find you on the job SO early in the morning.\nK: In crisis times I start earlier.\nM: Since talking with Gen. Haig I have talked with company people and I will\ncancel meeting in Geneva and the Bilderburg conference. I am coming tomorrow\nat 1:00. Could I call you when I come?\nK: What time do you get in?\nM: 4:00 on the Metroliner.\nK: Wx How about here at 4:30? I will set up a car.\nM: At Union Station.\nK: Then we can discuss the time for the other. It's good now to talk with the\nGeneralissimo. The President & mentioned the fask fact that he was aksing you\nto go there to Chow and he couldn't habe been more interested.\nM: I talked with Chow before and he wanted me to talk with\non\nbusiness. I will come to your office tomorrow.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nZeigler/Kissinger\n12:50 p.m. 4/14/71\nZ: I am going to the other briefing now. Horner got me in the hall. He says\nthere's an indication in his office that Chou En-Lai wants to come for a visit.\nK: Just say we have heard nothing. We don't know anything about it. Nothing\nmore.\nZ: If they say what do you mean, I know nothing more.\nK: It's purely speculative.\nZ: OK\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nV.P./Kissinger\n5:43 p.m. 4/14/71\nVP: What the hell are we doing with the Chinese?\nK: We are playing a game with the Russians and Chinese. What the Chinese\nare doing is they are scared the Russians will attack them. We had already\ndecided on these measures today and discussed it with the Taiwanese.\nVP: What about ping pong?\nK: That's their gig to the Russians. Let me come over on Friday to give you\na rundown.\nVP: I think I will be here.\nK: You mentioned anytime in the morning?\nVP: (Aside: What's Friday morning?) Let's make it around 10:00. I will\nsee you then.\nK: Look forward to it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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