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Mr. Kissinger/Lester Bernstein May 25, 1971 5:56 p.m. jlj B: Dr. Kissinger. We have been having sort of a Naval Board of inquiry on this story. There is more than one correspondent involved. They have a number of sources which form a consistent pattern. It has sort of a Rashaman (phonetic) effect. K: There is no Rashaman effect. This is not a world shaking event but there are no editors or newsmen to whom I talked about editorials or stories. Acheson did all the calling. Now I do not know where they could have gotten this information. B: Our reporters were thorough and I am sure they were acting in good faith. K: Oh no. There is no question about that! B: I am embarrassed about this. I hate to feel you have cause for being upset and on the other hand I have a feeling of loyalty to these reporters and their sources. K: Were NXX any of these White House sources? B: I am afraid they were. But I am satisfied that everyone was acting in what they thought were best interests. I am will to speculate that it might have been done out of spite against you but even that I would doubt. K: Yes. Except I take general position - Is the point of not having a public voice. I called two or three senators about their vote. I did this because I was a NATO expert and felt I could do so on a personal basis. It just makes me look like I actively took part in this. But your reporters acted in good faith. I do not want to put you in bad position and if your reporters had good sources. I can understand that. It is embarrassing for me because it puts me in the position of being a lobbyist. I happen to like Mike Mansfield very much and he has behaved very honorably to us and me personally and I do not want Mansfield and the other senators to think I am lobbying. However, I do not see what good a retraction would do now. B: Trying to detach my ownself from the matter, I do not think a retraction would serve the point at this stage. A retraction generally does not do any good and in this case it would be difficult. K: If I thought that your source was malicious but your reporters were not being malicious. ox bexcause I do not believe the source was malicious. I won't ask for a retraction. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- B: I do not think they were. There was lots of pride because they were as effective as they were in defeating this. K: I do not doubt it but I feel that what the country needs now is not victories but reconciliation. B: The article made plain how anxious the President was from keeping this a battle against Mansfield. K: I understand your problem. If it were an issue involving my honor I would ask you to correct it but this is not going to serve any purpose. One thing I might tell you. The way things work around the White House, not as many people know what is going on as say they know. If your people would give me a chance to comment on it when it involves me like this. Then they could weigh it against their other sources. B: We would be delighted to. I will speak to Hubbard. Any matter in which you are involved we will talk to you. I am sorry you did not have a chance to speak on this. K: Let me make clear I do not doubt the integrity of Newsweek. You have never heard me complain about Newsweek. I respect it. B: We will try our best and consult in anything that involves you. K: Thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Secretary Rogers 5/26/71 10:00 a. m. K: I talked to the President last night about the plan. He is willing to go along with putting it off till end of the month. I told him my impression was -- and this will have to be corrected if I am wrong X -- that on the whole you thought it wasn't good to see him anyway. But it would be better at the end of the month than now. R: I just don't know what the plusses are. Let more visibility, and doesn't achieve anything. K: It's at least a month later. We may have had some other developments by then. R: I agree with that. I think we can hold it in abeyance. What about the Chinese thing K: I'll try to get a time set today or tomorrow. R: Good. I want his views on MBFR. I know what the paper said, but I want his overall thinking. K: Okay. R: Right, fine. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECONK Prof. Jerome Cohen 5/26/71 10:35 a. m. C: I don't want to be a post, but I was in Ottawa yesterday. I wanted to scheck a few things. The message I got the last time I was here and you have heard too Mentioned it the last time. The problem that the people- to-people contact doesn't include direct trade. It's a change from the policy of the 50s. No direct trade until a fundamental change in U.S. policy in the resolution of the Taiwan problem. The only explanation I could get is related to a passionate nationalistic policy. In thinking rationally there is nothing more important in influencing than letting business- men go over. There could be nothing better than to enable business men to go to China and let them see. But direct trade will be the last, not the first, step. Then they started talking about achieving a Taiwan resolution. Said couldn't be removed till diplomatic relations had been established. That might take years. Then they said "Why doesn't your President come to China to discuss these things; we've invited him; why doesn't he come? 11 The handling of politicians is the most difficult problem in per-son-to-person diplomacy. For instance, are they going toadmit Kennedy, Muskie and thèse other birds insteadæ of the President who has done so much for them. K: Well, first of all, they have not invited the President; they have sent signals but more as a 'why don't we talk about it bata at a high level? I C: Well Huang Hua (?) is going to bei in Ottawa in two weeks (he is the Ambassador and a man of some parts). He is a man who will make decisions; not a mere ambassador. It would be a fruitful thing; you might want to consider talking with Huang Hua. K: If it could be done decretly. C: That's what I am suggesting. I find these talks in Ottawa very helpful; they're relaxed. And they want the President to come. I am sure you have to think of the implications. K: Well, it's out of the question this year. It hasn't even come up. III is easy enough to say they have invited him but it's nonsense. C: He hinted in a way that there had been signals and he was calling for more. He said they would like for him to come to China. It may be premature for reasons of scheduling and others. But if you have the time and inclination a talk with Huang Hua might be of some utility. K: Let me think about it. You know we are very serious and energetic about it. But you don't start a process like this by even talking about a Presidential visit. C: He was not saying this for propaganda. He had no reason to think I would ever pass this on. But it seemed that it would be a relief to break the logjam by having the President come. The Chinese can't seem to figure Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Prof. Jerome Cohen 5/26/71 10:35 a. m. out how to take the initiative, but they may/ K: In principle I would be glad to see him, if we can figure out a way. Good. This is extremely helpful. C: Are you going to add to your China staff someone else from the State Department - you might need to be more strongly staffed. K: Do you have any suggestions? C: I am sorry Herb Levin has left, though he may not be the best in the field; he's good. There are people like Bill Gleisteen (? ) and Paul Krisberg (?) who are not only well-informed scholars -- their hearts are in the right place, nothing but the best. This is just gratuitous. Anyway Huang Hua will be in Ottawa in two weeks. K: Can you keep this information about their general interest in hihg-level contacts to yourself so I can look into it? C: Yes, certainly. I didn't know whether any of this was new but wanted you to know about it and wanted to know whether there was anything to it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Ambassador Smith/Mr. Kissinger 10:43 a. m., May 26, 1971 S: Henry. K: Gerry, how are you? S: On the question of notifying Semyonov about our lack of interest in the NCA, I recognize that. I wonder if it would cause trouble if I didn't do that at this time. I mentioned to General Allison that I intended to do that, and it gave him some concern. K: The hell with General Allison. It happens to be the President's position. Conceivably, I think we have to make clear that it is going to be Safeguard. S: All right. K: That is what the President told you, and told him yesterday it would happen. S: It was my understanding that you had. K: It will not come as news to Semyonov. S: That is the reason I thought it was essential to do it at this time. K: It is absolutely essential to tell him. Say our position will be Safeguard. But I leave it to you. Make that clear. It would save two weeks at the beginning next time. S: All right. I will do it. I wanted to be 100 per cent clear. K: You are meticulous. Tell Allison there is nothing to argue here. S: All right. K: Thank you, Gerry. S: Thank you. Goodbye. lds Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Pete Peterson 5/26/71 12:08 p.m. K: I have told Stans yesterday to send over the Gleason Case. Also he tells me he has got $200 million of machine tool cases. P: Right. K: Could you pick $40 million of the least defense-oriented? P: Yes. K: If we could do that in the next week or so P: What you want is a $40 million package on top of that? K: On top of the Gleason case. P: Sure. K: How are we doing on the thing? P: The study won't be completed till June 20. K: Good -- want to hold it off till July. P: Incidentally, I am trying to bring in that group of wise men. They can do it on June 2. You apparently had accepted a dinner date on that night. K: Yes. P: Any way out of that? The first they can't do it. K: No other date around that, like the 4th? P: No; they are leaving. You had told me the second when we talked. K: And then you told me you couldn't do it. P: Then I said the first K: I will do my demnedest to come on the second, at least for a while. P: How early can you start? K: 6:30 or 7:00 -- unless you could do it earlier. P: Yes, earlier. K: 5:00 or 5:30. P: Yes. K: Sure, that I can do. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Vice President 5/26/71 2:28 p.m. A: You see the Newhouse syndicated story in the Star today? K: No. A: " Rogers Reported Irked by South African Agnew. " (Reads) K: Don't tell me any more. A: You know what it is? K: No, but you can see the Italian hand. A: I got back from New York and had a call waiting from Bill. He said he didn't cancel any meeting, he had none scheduled. He doesn't know where it came from. K: I know. A: The African bureau over there? K: Sure. Don't you think? A: Yes. Says 'seems to be in line with White House policy however. I K: It didn't come out of here. A: Of course not. The only thing that bothered me Rogers is quick to dený this. That's what he tells me, but no one will correct it publicly. !' delicacy of balance 11 K: Who's the writer? A: James Stout. I never heard of him. But what bothers me same report of what was said in the meeting. But it's incorrect. K: Was a State Department fellow present? A: The Ambassador and no one else. K: But he will have made a report to the . A: I suppose SO "Agnew reportedly gave Moulder assurances 11 That was not even discussed. K: I am the worst person to make this complaint to. The President will think if I mention it that this is just part of my private feud. If you call Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Vice President 5/26/71 2:28 p.m. p. 2 Haldeman it will be very useful. This is an outrage. I'll reinforce it and tell the President, but also it would help if he heard that some other person had heard from you about it. A: Okay. K: I talked to the President again about your trip. I must say he is not very much in favor of Greece. He's not worried about your family going there. He thinks you might step in Iran, Austria, Germany if you wanted to A: Trying to build something around that would be awfully hard. K: If things go the way they may, maybe in October or November we can get that other one. A: All right. Let me think how I can work in the other countries without it being a slight. K: If you are going back from Korea it would be a big help to us for you to stop in Iran. They have been trying to get the President to come but he won't be able to to make it. is another place they wanted the President to visit and he won't be able to do it. A: Do you think it is possible to stop someplace else and not Greece. K: I think so. If I could think of some way of your stopping without making it official, just going to your family place or something like that. A: Any chance of working out something on the Cypriot situation? K: Sure. Going to Cyprus is easier than going to Greece. That might not be bad to consider. A: Will you look into that some more? See if that would work. Is that a security problem over there. K: I think not. One other thing: are you doing something for Siaatra one of the evenings he is here? A: I expect I will. K: Just so I don't have to worry about it. I'll take care of him one evening. A: Good. As soon as you find out about that will you let me know? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Vice President 5/26/71 2:28 p.m. p. X3 K: Yes. There's no problem about your family going. A: No chance of Spain or Portugal? K: No, that might be okay. A: What about Scandinavian Countries? K: I mentioned that to the President. He is afraid they'd demonstrate. A: Yes, they probably would. Maybe Germany and Austria. How about France? Probably not? K: I have no fixed view about that. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Taft Schreiber (in Len Garment's office) 5/26/71 2:38 p.m. K: I just wrote you a note on Monday to thank you for everything you had done while I was in California. S: You are very sweet, but notes are unnecessary. I just wanted to say hello. K: How long will you be here? S: I leave on the 5:30 plane. K: Have you got time now to come over? S: I've got one more meeting and I'm with Len Garment. K: I have got a meeting at 3:00 too, but if you would like to drop over I would bve to see you. You can even bring your friend. S: Here, talk to Len. G: This fellow's doing ha fabulous things for the next year. We want to keep this cooking along without too many of our Jewish friends picketing the White House. K: About what? G: Soviet Jewry. K: Come on over. G: Okay. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. John Scali/Mr. Kissinger May 26, 1971 2:55 p.m. jlj S: I was wondering if you had seen the Jack Anderson column. He says the US is picking up on radio GVN messages including those of President Thieu. K: Oh no. S: I have checked with the Pentagon and they have issued a full blown investigation and he reports this too. If he is reporting this, he is a step away from talking about other things. K: I still have not found the memorandum from which he is quoting. S: I have some reason to think maybe if somebody talked to him. What if appealed to him by one John Scali to lay off? K: Wouldn't do any good but you can try. S: Why do you say it wouldn't do any good? I know a couple of times I was asked and it worked with me. K: With you yes. If somebody asked will it work with John Scali I would have said yes but I do not believe it will work with Jack Anderson. S: I do not want to do it unless you think it would do some good. K: If you think - there is nothing to be lost by talking to him. Think about it and talk to me before you do it. S: Oh yes. I would talk with you and tell you exactly what I would say. I just wanted to check with you about what you think of the idea. I will think about it. I just wanted to check with you if you had learned anything in checking on that memorandum. Thanks Henry. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissinger The President 5/26/71; 6:45 p.m. (Missed the first part of this conversation.) P: At a later time when you do meet him he will unbend. He really has an understanding of the Chinese. K: I thought he was acute in his judgment. P: He is really thinking in terms that so many of our people don't under- stand. He is thinking in long-range terms. K: Not at all tactical. P: Not taking cheap shots as the Russians do. I thought you would find it amusing. If you do make the trip you will want to stop someplace on the way and it would be a nice place. K: I did not have a chance to tell you about the Harvard professor he is a Chinese expert. He went to Canada. He said this thing needs a political settlement they said we need President Nixon. P: Did they really say that? Oh, oh, I have to go -- It's Hoover on the phone. 5/26/71; 6:50 p.m. P: Are you going out to dinner in a little while or was that an excuse? K: No, I am going out to dinner dinner for the Mosbachers tonight. P: You would have a lot of fund at Alice's. K: I would have loved to go. P: I was just delighted with Bruce he went on to say he would support me. If we get a chance to send anyone to China, he goes. K: He is the best. P: Murphy would be terrible and Lodge would be worse. K: Once he has resigned the Chinese would take him. He is a great patriot. I showed him what we are planning to say. He thinks your policy on Vietnam is superb. I don't know whether you heardhim at the end. He said you are the right man in this job -- he has seen many Presidents. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissinger The President 5/26/71; 6:45 p.m. -2- P: I brought him back to a miserable job. K: You brought him back to amiserable job. P: What a guy he is compared to the clowns. There aren't many people like him. Rush has his character. I don't want him to stay over there and get sick. I think he ought to skip a meeting now and then. K: He is a pretty good judge. P: He can take care of himself. P: On the Canada -- K: They said secondly that Nixon has done more for us than any of these guys that want to go to China and they don't want to irritate him. P: I don't know what they are going to respond. Do you think they will bite? K: They may insist on somebody going publicly. P: If we do then it is Bruce. K: I suspect they will bite on this. P: Then I think we might let Bruce go anyway. It keeps things going. When you talk to them say Ambassador Bruce is resigning then he will come to make public arrangements for the President's visit. K: I thought we would have tremendous impact if you announced the visit in August and we would send Ambassador Bruce there to make arrangements. P: You think the meeting did have some significance? I suppose he was going up for Muskie or your friend Tony Lake. K: No. He is Professor Cohen. P: Harvard Law -- Oh, I know him Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissinger The President 5/26/71; 6:45 p.m. --3- K: I said I didn't want these guys to start screaming around -- we want this to be a surprise. MXXXXXKXXXXXXXXX I said this was just a figure of speech. P: Did you know we beat the Hughes Amendment? K: No, I didn't. P: Do you know what it is about? They beat the Nelson Amendment today. The Hughes Amendment proposes $2billion 700 pay increase and get rid of the draft. The Senate voted it down. I asked him why we were winning. According to Colson because of our strong intention on NATO and when we hit them with the Soviet thing they were scared to death. K: I have M. Childs here, Mr. President. P: Is is there with you now? K: No, I have sent him out to wait in the lobby. P: Give him my best. I like him and respect him. Just tell him what I said. I remember it was 20 years ago when I was a young Congressman. K: He said the Democrats look sick. All they talk about is Vietnam. P: You tell him Vietnam is finished. You can argue about when but it is over. The main thing is what is going to happen to Russia, China, the Middle East and the economy of the U. S. Emphasize this with Childs -- we are thinking about the future and they are thinking about the present. K: I told him it was our easiest problem (Vietnam?) P: It gives us the most heartache, though. One other guy I wish you would see is William White. K: I will see him within the week. I will see him before the end of the week. P: When do we meet with Rogers? K: Right after the lunch. P: Get me some talking points. K: Right, Mr. President feg Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Gerard Smith (Secure Phone) 5/27/71 9:43 a. m. S: Did you get my message this morning? K: Yes, and it's absolute nonsense. they have said it was to be NCA; we have said it was to be Safeguard must be simultaneous. S: Can you get Dobrynin to give the message to Semenov? K: I will see him this morning. S: I will be back to Vienna this afternoon; if you can send me a message that will be fine. K: Okaya, but there is no possibility of a misunderstanding. I have put it all together and you look at the transcript of the conversations and you can check for yourself. S: Sex I am sure you are right -- I just want to ameliorate a possible bad situation tomorrow. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Ambassador Cromer 5/27/71 9:52 a. m. C: I haven't had a reply about the dates yet. K: They are not firm. 14 and 15 are definitely out for me. 17 and 18 or 11 and 12 are possible. C: Okay. K: But it's totally out of my control. So it's either the date I suggest or nothing. C: That I recall. You remember we had a word about China. The Secretary of State and Home are meeting on June 4. At that meeting our Foreign Secretary will want to dicsuss fairly definitively with the Secretary of State what we have in mind to do. I didn't want you to be bounced into something you didnot know would happen. K: That's very courteous. The Secretary will be prepared to discuss it with the Foreign Secretary. We are meeting on it today as a matter of fact. C: Okay. I understand I'll be seeing you at dinner tonight. K: I look forward to it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin 10:43 a.m., May 27, 1971 K: Anatoliy, I will see you in an hour, but there is one problem with time urgency connected which I wanted to raise now. You seem out of breath. H: On the contrary. You are calling me on your birthday. My very best wishes. K: Aren't you nice. Let's hope we will do some good things together this next year. The problem is Semyonov in Vienna has been saying to Smith that his understanding is first there will be negotiations on ABM agreement and afterwards there would be discussions on offensive limitations, which is not my understanding. But I don't want to get that issue settled today. However, Smith is afraid that Semyonov will say publicly tomorrow at the closing session that this the understanding. If he says it publicly, Smith will have to say the opposite publicly. And the negotiations will be ending on a note of disagreement. This is the plenary session which closes the negotiations in Vienna. D: It's a closed session. K: Yes, it is a closed session, but I wanted to recommend -- and I just talked to the President -- that neither side states anything. We can get this worked out during the month. We now have agreement and we should not immediately record disagreement. My understanding is that we will discuss offensive limitations while the other is being discussed. D: My understanding -- I did not specifically mention it to him recently but said it in a telegram long before when we discussed that, -- that there would be two parts so to speak. There was no specific agreement between you and me. My understanding is that at the beginning of the first part we will discuss this one, but on the second part, we will begin half-way. KKXX They will do ABM and the second part when they begin to discuss this one. K: We can work that out. My understanding is they will begin on ABM but well before that is completed they will have to discuss offensive limitations. 1 don't think you would find in the record "half-way. 11 But this is npt an issue that cannot be worked out. The major thing is there would be no useful purpose served if there is a record of formal dis- agreement at the closing plenary session tomorrow. Whether it is half-way or a third of the way. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin 10:43 a. m., May 27, 1971 - 2 - D: My understanding is they would concentrate on ABM and when a substantial part is completed, continue on ABM and then proceed with the other one. That was my understanding which I sent to Moscow. K: What sort of ABM agreement, whether it would be capitals, or what else. D: ] 1 didn't go into details. I didn't send what kind -- SALT or what else. It was a simple understanding -- not a specific question. K: We don't have to settle it this minute. The major thing is it would be very helpful if we ended the session tomorrow on a positive note. Nothing can be accomplished by recording disagreement tomorsow. If you could get that word to Semyonov. I will show Smith's cable to you when you come. D: It will be 11:30. K: And in my office. We have Arabs running all over the place. D: Between the Executive Building and your office. K: Do you think there's time enough to get word to Semyonov? D: I don't know whether... when are they meeting? K: In the morning. D: It's now 11:00. In Moscow, it's 7:00. K: That is why I am calling you to see if you could do something. D: There's no problem to send a telegram. I'm just counting the hours really. K: The only result of it will be we will go through our records -- we make a formal statement, and you make a formal statement. That way, we start with a legalistic argument. D: I will try to have time to tell him. K: Can you send it now? You can come a few minutes late to see me. D: I will send it now. K: That is why I called you. Ids Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Alex Johnson 5/27/71 11:12 a.m. K: I have that record all put together. You can come any time you want to to look at it. J: It will have to be this afternoon. K: Any time. Just call my office. J: Okay. It will be some time this afternoon. K: Okay fine. Good Alex. J: Right, thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Phil Farley 5/27/71 12:14 p.m. K: I just wanted to check with you on exactly where we stand on accidental war and the hotline discussions. As I understand the hotline is essentially finished. F: That's right. K: How about accidental war? F: There five points of bracketed difference and it's going to be left that W ay for Helsinki reports. K: My understanding from Gerry is that if we wanted to sign this in June they are in a state to do so. F: The hotline yes, but not the accidental war. No major differences but that will require a different kind of push from what they've had before. K: Mas our new formulation been presented? F: Yes, and it has been initially judged insuffiient. It will end up with bracketed proposals and counter-proposals. K: So if we want to have Semenov over here it would be for a hotline agreement only. F: Yes. There is still the question of third countries on accidents. We said don't press us; let us think about it. K: Parsons is staying over there? F: No. K: So that by definition will have to be left. F: Yes. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Under Secretary Johnson May 27, 1971; 5:40 p.m. K: Actually the one thing I wanted I have found out. You have had a chance to read through that book? J: Yes. I had to read it very fast. K: It is still available to you. J: I wanted to ask you one question. There is one question open which I really wasn't able to follow through on the conversations going back and forth. K: Those conversations are always keyed to some document. J: I just didn't have time to get the documents out. The one question is that last letter was from us to them, that is on the 19th of May. You delivered it to him on May 19. K: Yes, well I. J: That talks about discussing the question of phrasing the nature before ABM is completed. Then I saw your conversations with him in which he accepted your statement that the agreements should be simultaneous. K: That's right. J: What I wasn't clear about is how the phrasing of the letter of the 19th came about. The phrasing of the letter of the 19th is not consistent with the public statement to begin with, but he also used the statement, the oral xix statement you made to him. K: The point was he said he could get the letter changed but it would take almost three weeks and therefore he suggested the oral statement. J: I see. K: He said the oral statement, plus the public statement, covered the point. J: Yes, I saw that. Did that phrasing in the 19th letter come from them? K: That came from them. J: I see. But we delivered that letter to them, did we? K: Today, and they gave us their copy today. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Under/Sec Johnson -2- J: Is their letter identical? K: Exactly except the first two paragraphs. K: The controlling factor is the text of your public statement plus your oral statement which he accepted. K: Yes. J: That relieves my mind. K: And if you look at the record of the phone conversations, they make that clear. J: The last statement on oral was by phone. K: And I read that to him and he said that was exactly right. J: That relieves my concern for the room for misunderstanding. How do you want to handle this -- Verification Panel. What are our guidelines now? K: Why don't you and I get together tomorrow or Saturday morning? I think we should let the Verification Panel go ahead doing analytical work and you and I decide what outcome we are going to try to steer at. J: That is what you and I have to decide. K: I will get together with you. And this book is available to you any time. And where you see handwritten things in there they will put in their suggestions. J: I was very interested in the early portions on the ABM. The political problem versus the military problem and their sidelines on their bureau- cratic problem. It sounds real to me. K: I don't see anything he gets out of telling me that, do you? Don't you think he came quite a good distance from his early position to where he finally wound up? J: His first move to you, was it in January? - of silos they have under construction and they wouldn't want to stop them was it before we had seen those new ones? K: You are right. J: He raised the question. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Under/Sec Johnson -3- K: But they will take a chance on January 1. That' is we give them some lead time. J: But he raised the question of silos being under construction - wasn't that before we had seen these new ones? K: You are right. That was January 28. J: That is right. January 28 the problem of silos started but not yet completed. K: That is right. J: When was it we first saw. K: The first time I heard of them was on February 14 when I was in Key Biscayne. J: It seems to me it was around that time. K: I remember because I walked right over to the President. J: He told you on January 28 that they had stuff under construction but not completed. K: Isn't that interesting? And I hadn't focussed on it until now. J: I found that very interesting. K: I tried it simply as a theoretical statement. J: He must have assumed we had already seen them. K: And we probably had but had not got the read-out yet. They may not know how quickly we get it. Only we weren't sure they had stopped at that point so I did not pay any special attention to it. Now that you call my attention to it I read it as sort of half-theoretical statement. J: I am not quite clear - the ABM thing went back and forth so much. Then they went back to their old position. K: One thing I can say - they can have no doubt about our position. J: But they ended up with their old position and it is going to take quite a bit of hassling to get them to an equal movement of their sites and our site. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Under/Sec Johnson -4- K: It depends on how eager they are. J: I found very interesting their statement that SALT did not mean much to them. You came back damn well on that. Was that emotionalism or what on his part? K: He is usually not emotional. J: I take it, as far as ABM's we are both back to our original positions. K: That is right and I suspect that they have to make a record on it. J: I think we can stick hard on that. But their willingness to set a cut-off date on new construction K: That may not survive. J: Of course not, but there were attitudes there. K: He was obviously thoughtful about it - he raised real issues in connection with it. J: It is not a weak point and a court of law would find you agreed to this or that, but the development of the attitudes as the thing went on was interesting. K: I leave it to your discretion, and we will get together within the next two or three days to plan strategy. I won't do anything until I have talked to you. J: All right, Henry. ms Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger 5:46 p. m., May 27, 1971 K: Anatoliy, you can't stay away from me. D: In connection with the talks about the White House and State, I have just seen UPI 117 [read it] to the effect that the U.S. today publicly condemned Russia for the conviction of the four Jews. The ticker said it was the strongest ever issued by the Department. K: God-damn them!. When was it issued. I gave them instructions at 1:00. D: It's on the ticker. K: Oh, God-damn. You have to believe me -- I did not know about this. The President did not know about it. I will have to check into it. I haven't seen the ticker, but I'll look at it immediately. D: It is the strongest ever. K: Tell them that I instructed the Department. D: What kind of fools do they have? It is our law. Why should the Department be involved in our condemning them. I just want to know. K: Tell them that you brought it to my attention. D: And that from now on you will use much more control on this K: From now on, I will take responsibility for matters of this kind. I will find out what happened. D: It definitely looks political. K: It may be something that was authorized three days ago. I will look into it and give you an informal opinion tomorrow. D: You don't have to give me an opinion. It's public -- on the radio. K: You mention to them this was done prior to my discussion with you. D: Okay. lds Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Secretary Rogers 5/27/71 6:40 p.m. R: I am just calling on that damn statement Gray made at the briefing. K: Yes, I mentioned to the Presiden t that you were mortified and it was a mistake and he understands. R: I said if the question was asked we should express our concern and say we axe still believe in the Human Rights Convention and that people should be able to emigrate. Said don't know about evidence in the trail. Instead of that we volunteered a statement. K: The fexex President feels, for obvious reasons, that he would like to cool the debate between us and the Soviet Union. R: I think there is this to be said and I'm not trying to justify the mistake; it was a mistake and I was screaming about it before I heard shouk from over there -- but the only bright side is that this may help cool those who might help the JDL. Every time the JDL gets aroused it causes additional problems in the Soviet Union. K: I think that is right and it's done now, but we are going to make sure we don't make any beligerant statements. We can always go back to the hotline. R: This is just one of those mistakes. You don't have to send any memo to me. kfxwexkadx One other thing, if we do this thing we talked about today I think we should do it before the Senate K: In the end of June or early July R: I thought it was a good meeting. K: Yes, I thought it was; we should do it more often. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Ambassador Dobrynin 5/27/71 6:48 p.m. K: I just wanted to tell you that 1 have talx looked into this and it was done before our instructions reached them, or so they say now. At any rate, we will send out a Presidential order tomorrow preventing this, and you can assure them that what I told you is correct. No department will be permitted to say anything about the Soviet Union that has not been checked in the White House. I regret that this happened and so does the President with whom I have taken this up personally. D: Thank you for calling. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Secretary Rogers 5/28/71 9:00 a. m. R I am upset about the Berger story. K: Haldeman is raising cain. He told everyone yesterday to keep it quiet till into June. R: Of course it's been ing around, but it looks to me like a clear leak from the State Department. K: No one here knows the proposition. Incidentally, everyone here knows there's no leaking out of your office. It must come from the fellow who worked on the paper. R: I think so it. The thing that annoys me is that it says what's in the papers. We'll just say "no decision has been made. " K: That's right. That's what we'll tell Ziegler to say. R: I think what profoked it was the story about Austria on the ticker yestefday. K: If we don't blow it up too much it will go down as another of those speculative stories. R: You could almost manufacture K: But the formula is correct. If that story had appeared last week it wouldn't have come to your attention or mine probably. I think the best thing is to follow the course we discussed yesterday. R: It's not going to be a big thing. K: No, the President will understand that this happened befeor our conversation and was a low-level leak. It just happened toofast. R: Tell him I'm sorry about it. But from the standpoint of Taiwan was phrased pretty well. K: Something like that may leak when you talk to people. R: It's bound to. We've talked about these things in a general way yesterday. I talked to Faisal yesterday in a general way zabout it. He had his UN Ambassador there. I said we were concerned about it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Joseph Sisco/Mr. Kissinger May 28, 1971 11:10 a.m. jlj S: I sent up to Ted Eliot in memorandum form from him to you our analysis of this accord and I - K: What is your analysis? S: It is this, Henry. The first part's obviously legal around arrangements which are very political and psychological true in the area. It assures long-range support - political, economic and military over next 15 years. Undoubtedly Soviet initiated due to the internal events in Egypt and to keep them from making overtures to the U.S. I think it will cause waves in other countries in which they hope the influence without treaty will be decreased. K: What do you mean? S: In countries like Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, etc. they may make overtures to the United States if they do not have a treaty with the Soviet Union. K: Loosen their ties. S: Yes. These are countries which are on our side of the fence anyway. Now where this leaves Sadat. Gives pledge that will xxx they will not be involved in the internal affairs and an ex post facto changes made by Sadat are OK with the Russians. There is a firm commitment to consultations with the Egyptian Government. There is an overall packet on consultations. From Sadat's point of view it eases his pressure on the military. The military is dependent on the Soviets and if he has an agreement with the Soviets that solves the army question. This will leave Sadat with as much or as little influence as he had before. The Principle impact is on the Israelis. First, those that think it will polarize the Arabs will obviously be very upset about it. Sean Secondly, it will make it more difficult to work out some sort of "Canal" agreement but it keeps the door open on both sides. Israel will (a) increase pressure on us to make long range commitments to them on the basis that Egypt has an opened ended commitment because of the treaty. We will see not so much change on substance - just manifest procedurally because Russians want to be in if there is any settlement. The Russians are saying to us that nothing will happen unless we get in. The balancing act is still in effect. I continue to feel that this guy (Sadat) will settle on interim agreements if he can get some symbolic crossing of the Canal by Arab troops. Strange enough, this is still open with the Israelis. Israel open ended ceasefire and this we are in agreement with. However, we should watch this very carefully. That's pretty much what I said in my report. K: I will be fascinated in seeing it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- S: Yes. It is interesting. This thing looks like it is a Soviet draft. It has been concocted in a hurry. K: It seems to have been happening often lately. S: We had no advance warning that this was coming. It could be we have lousey intelligence or - K: It couldn't be true!! S: Or the Russians drafted it and we knew nothing about it. There is no such treaty in existence in other places. In a quick capsule form this is a political move to protect their major commitment in that area and they are putting the rest of the world on notice that they plan to be there for a good long time to come. K; Thanks Joe. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Director Helms 5/28/71 5:50 p.m. H: Happy Birthday. K: Thank you. H: That's what I was calling about K: I appreciate it. I had a question: Are you sure the Soviet submærine is nuclear powered? H: No, I am not. We had a conversation about that yesterday. It is not clear what that submarine is. TASS has made an announcement to the effect that it's going to be there. K: But if it's nuclear powered and cruise missile H: It's okay. K: Well, technically, but I would then let Dobryninknow that they are getting to the limit of the understanding and it's a hell of a time to annoy us. But if it's a deisel submarine it's okay. We haven't even heard that it might be a y-Class submarine. HN: It might be some kind of communication link between two things. But it was too inconclusive and couldn't be proven. KN: Can you find out for me as fast as possible if it is nuclear-powered with cruise-type missiles? HK: I don't know if I can K: It's supposed to be an #-2 typs submarine. H: I'll X check on that. K: Would you and give ma the best judgment of your people? 5:55 p.m. H: You had more information than I had faster than I did. It is an E-2, nuclear powered, with cruise missiles. There was a photo taken. K: That you are sure about? H: Yes, no question. K: If I ræaise hell about that Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Helms 5/28/71xf 5:50 p.m. p. 2 H: You're on good grounds. h K: It's on the margin of the understanding. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin 6:05 P. p.m., May 28, 1971 K: Anatolly, I am unhappily calling you about the matter we discussed a week ago today. I gave you the wrong information about the submarine. I told you at the time we thought the submarine was a diesel. You told me nuclear subs were under the control of the Politburo. D: It was announced as a submarine without telling what. K: I wanted to inform you there is a submarine tied up together with the tender. It is nuclear-powered and has 8 missiles on it of the 250-300 mile range. D: That was not a condition of a "visit. K: The understanding as we understand it -- is servicing of nuclear submarines and submarines carrying offensive weapons in or from Cuban ports. D: What servicing? In what way are they servicing? K: If a submarine is there independently -- but it is tied up with the tender. We will not debate it, but at the best, it is at the very edge of the understanding. 1 wanted to point out that our information last Friday was not good. DL I don't have any information except what was published in our press. Kt The appearance of a nuclear submarine with missiles of a 300-mile range and tied up with the tender is. You can have no doubt how gravely we would consider violations of the understanding. Whether this is a violation we don't have to debate now, and we will not make any public statement for the timebeing. D: The understanding in Moscow is that a visit which is published beforehand. K: It's a combination of the visit of the nuclear submarine and the tender and those two being together is a very unfortunate incident. D: I will transmit that you say this is unfortunate. As it was amounced, I don't know whether they do anything about it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin 6:05 P. m., May 28, 1971 - 2 - K: I am not asking for anything in particular. D: I will send to Moscow what you say. K: There is nothing else to do for the timebeing. D: I will send right away a telegram -- with missiles. K: With missiles with a range of some 300 miles. They are not ballistic but the other missiles. D: The small ones. K: Like the German V-1. D: Not long-distance. K: They are 300 miles -- when it becomes a violation of the understanding, it will be a first-class crisis. D: In moscow, the understanding is that if it were announced. K: I told you last week we thought it was diesel. I have to point this out now as a matter we have to consider unfortunate. D: 1 will send a telegram on what you mentioned to me for their own information. Ids Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Mr. Kissinger Secretary Stans 5/28/71, 6:25 pm S: Henry, on these permits to ship to Russia? K: What we would like is some noticeable foot dragging. The Russians have done something which is a cheap shot and I would like to harrass them for a week or so. Is there some way we can slow up the permit without actually with- drawing it? S: I just wanted you to know that our procedure is that we notify the companies involved immediately, then we notify the Senators. Also we got word that Rockefeller had gotten the word from Dr. Kissinger. What would you think of issuing one or two, then waiting three or four days and issue several more a few days later and solon. K: I would like to drag it out a couple of weeks. Let the Gleason one go and then drag the rest out a couple of weeks bureau- cratically. It would be a big help if you could drag it out for a few weeks. I have your interests at heart but we want you to teach them discipline at the start of this thing. Sorry I am such a son-of-a-bitch. S: It's alright Henry. We will do it your way. mlh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Mr. Ehrlichman May 29, 1971; 10:40 a.m. E: We have a sort of Laird-type problem. K: With whom? E: On drugs. K: With Laird? E: Yes. Since you are the sole and exclusive contact with DOD I wanted to call this to your attention. Last night's TV was full of Packard's directive to the Defense Department that they immediately come up with a solution to the heroin problem in the Services. It was all over TV saying it is obvious we don't have any way to deal with this. Said that Packard has gallopped into the arena and is going to solve it. K: You want him to shut up? E: His directive is almost word for word with ours - they tried to get in ahead of us and take the credit away from the President, knowing he is going to have them over on the carpet Thursday morning. I have told Ziegler to put out to the pool on the airplane the reason Packard did this is that we directed him to. K: Absolutely. E: Either you or I should call Packard and tell him you don't play that kind of ball game and if you do that one more time we will put out some stuff that will sink him. K: He is looking for an excuse to resign. E: I don't care. K: He didn't do that on his own -- Laird helped him. I completely agree with you. Call Packard, but don't give him a chance to grandstand. E: I think you should call him. K: I will if you wish, but you can be more outraged than I can because you know the facts. I will do it, but I would have to say that Ehrlichman is beside himself and that I agree with him. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- E: Fine. K: But it would be better if you were beside yourself personally. E: I think you should deal with the departments -- we are trying to give Presidential leadership. There are four departments involved, three of whom are playing ball. K: I will do it within an hour. E: Thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Mr. Ehrlichman May 29, 1971; 11:46 a. m. K: I have talked to Dave Packard and he says he hasn't issued the directive yet. E: Baloney! K: I am just saying what he said. All he told them was to get up a directive. E: It was quoted in the newspaper this morning. K: I said I don't know all the details, but the President has to get credit for that and you can't go out preempting it. He said all he wants to do is show he is working and only the President is to get credit for it. Why don't you get in touch with him and tell him what he is to do and he will do it. I think that is more important right now than anything else. E: All right. K: Dave is a decent guy. All these other guys are barracudas but Dave does not mean any harm. All this was done on the telephone between Laird and Pursley. E: I agree. K: If you have any trouble, let me know. E: OK. ms Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Mr. Kissinger Secretary Packard 12:45 pm, 5/29/71 K: Dave, I am calling you because John Ehrlichman is almost beside himself and I thought I could act somewhat as a buffer about the drug thing you put out yesterday. His feeling is he thought he had negotiated a directive in order to show Presidential initiative and then Defense put out as its own something that he was eager to get the President credit for. P: The only thing is we were worried about this and felt we should get going. We can put this package together and let the President get credit for it. K: His argument was the package you put out was what they were going to put out next week. P: No, I asked Kelley to put together a package and we can sub- mit it to the President. The only thing I am concerned about is we need better cooperation on this. We can put together a plan and do some good. K: I will tell Ehrlichman that you will cooperate with the President and that you will relax. P: Tell John I am anxious to get something out. K: The only reason I am calling you is that these people over here are opposed to channel these things through us. P: Tell John we will put a strong package together and let the President get credit for it. K: Okay Dave. mlh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Mr. Ehrlichman May 29, 1971; 1:40 p.m. K: I don't know whether the President got hold of you before he left. E: About Rockefeller. Yes. It is not a very good idea. Who worked on it? K: All I know is I heard he promised some money to Rockefeller. You knew he promised something. I had nothing to do with the conversations but het & said much of it may be committed already and he said but John Ehrlichman can always find a way if he wants to and he will talk to you. You know, if Rockefeller thinks he has been promised something he won't be wrong. E: We only have $90 million of discretionary money for that whole country's programs. I talked to Packard and to Jerry Freidhiem. It turns out he is the culprit in this thing. K: It sounded to me as if Packard was honest about it. E: Friedheim is the dirty bird. I said you should have told us. He said, we did. Al Haig called Pursley. Oh, channel 2 is going to play a rerun on drugs in the armed forces. Now, and I am going to watch it. ms Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Under Sec/State U. Alexis Johnson May 29, 1971; 3:20 p.m. K: Alex, I don't know whether you want to talk today about the SALT problem or play golf. I have somebody who has already waited an hour because the President was in a talkative mood, but I could see you around 11:45. J: I could do that. Let's do that. I could have about 40 minutes in there perfectly all right. K: We can do it in one-half hour easily. J: That's fine with me. ms Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon President Johnson May 29, 1971; 3:25 p.m. J: Hello. K: Mr. President, two things. First I want to tell you what a great day it was last Saturday. J: You looked mighty young up there with all those girls, Julie, Linda Bird and Lucy, in the front row. K: They put me there. I was very flattered. Everyone I talked to who was there feel it was very warm and human and no one else could have pulled it off. J: How nice of them. It was nice of you all to come. K: I found the chapters especially fascinating. As I told Bill Jordan it was a valuable historical record. The only thing I am not sure about not having read the domestic ones is whether or not a chapter of your own reflections on what it adds up to might not help the reader understand. But except for that I thought it was extremely objective and extraordinarily fascinating. J: I am highly pleased that you did not find anything that gave you trouble. K: No. There was nothing in there that gave me trouble. J: A lot of people are writing in connection with Vietnam, and what happened here and there. It opened the eyes of McNamara, Bundy and some of the others. K: Some of the people don't look good when their memos of years ago are read. J: Clifford has no memory whatever. Johnson (?) went to shorthand school and took notes on the Security Council meeting. When I gave it to him, that morning he went over those notes. He signed for it. It was his signature. Rusk got a Foreign Service officer to sign for it, but Clifford's signature is personal, but he has no memory of it happening. K: I think the steps that led to your March 31 speech are absolutely fascinating. It makes people like Hoopes look ridiculous. I think this book will be an eye-opener to a very many people. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. ⑉2⑉ J: I will give it to Galbraith and Schlesinger. They will review it and by the time they get through K: That is the problem. This fraternity of book reviewers is such that they scratch each other's back. But you have quoted so many of the documents and added strength to the book by doing almost no editorializing. You are letting these people speak for themselves. It isn't you against them; it is really they against themselves. J: One thing the President told me you are going to do is to see that they declassify everything that can be declassified as soon as possible. K: What can I do k to help with this? J: We will have to send a memorandum to you. Under the archaic procedures they have at Defense and State they wouldn't release over 30 percent of the papers. They want to keep them another 20 to 30 years and by that time anybody who knew anything about them has lost interest or is dead. Bobby Kennedy didn't hesitate to release the letters from Krushchev. He made sure they did. : K: And that really did hurt. J: They got a group to come down, and Rogers and Laird sent two or three men each. They spent about a month. What was concerning to them was to keep everything Secret. What is compelling to us from my Administration standpoint and from your Administration standpoint, because they have almost the same foreign policy, is let the truth get out. K: We have the same enemies. J: For 200 years we haven't declassified anything in 25 years. But the next 25 years are going to be different from the last 200. We are going to declassify everything unless you can prove that it will be harmful. K: If Walt will sent me a memorandum with some concrete directions so that we will know how to order them. Otherwise we will have to go back to the Departments and get the same old baloney. But if Walt can make a complete list of categories we can get a direct order. J: When the President makes his commitment, two things he ought to specify. One is that the government supervise and go over this declassification because it would break him and all his friends if he had to do it. The second thing, I would certainly say that this gift to Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -3- the government is made under the laws as they exist today. Williams changed the tax laws on me, not on Eisenhower, Truman and Hoover. He came down here in 1969 and he wrote amendment that took away any tax benefits you get from it. So the situation is that today I haven't got a collection of papers. Rusk hasn't sent his. McNamara. You get no benefit from them. Dean Rusk got just enough to pay for his room rent. The Rusk papers - I don't know what he will ultimately do. But some of the papers will be sold to Charles Hamilton and we will buy them back. Because this mean old man Williams went along and the Library of Congress says there has toxks not been one important gift of papers after that amendment has been adopted. So you just kill history. K: I am going to make both these points late this afternoon when the President gets back. J: There are 500 people whose papers I should have. I have not received one set since this amendment was adopted. K: The other point you make about the declassification that they be settled before one leaves office because if you don't thexxku the bureaucracy is as much opposed to our foreign policy as it was to yours. And they have a vested interest to leak out their secrets and prevent you and us from getting XE ours out. I look forward to getting this memorandum. And of course, as you know, I have X no discretion myself but I will push it very hard. J: Thank you so very much, my good Doctor. ms Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Mr. Kissinger Frank Sinatra 5/29/71, 6:05 pm S: Henry, how are you? K: Fine Frank. How are you? I thought you were performing tonight. S: I am. I am leaving for the airport in 20 minutes to go to Memphis. It is only about an hour and 40 minute flight. K: I just wanted to check with you. Are you coming down here Tuesday? S: I will get in about 4 PM and I will call your office. K: Which would you prefer? I will do it either way. S: I will leave it up to you. If you want to have dinner along, fine, or if you want to have a few people, fine. I will be at the Madison Hotel and will call your girl and let her know that улихатехіях I am in. K: And maybe you can come by here. S: Yes, perhaps at the end of the day. K: Okay Frank, have a good weekend. S: Thank you Henry. mlh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

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    "ocrText": "Mr. Kissinger/Lester Bernstein\nMay 25, 1971 5:56 p.m.\njlj\nB: Dr. Kissinger. We have been having sort of a Naval Board of\ninquiry on this story. There is more than one correspondent involved.\nThey have a number of sources which form a consistent pattern. It\nhas sort of a Rashaman (phonetic) effect.\nK: There is no Rashaman effect. This is not a world shaking event\nbut there are no editors or newsmen to whom I talked about editorials\nor stories. Acheson did all the calling. Now I do not know where they\ncould have gotten this information.\nB: Our reporters were thorough and I am sure they were acting in good\nfaith.\nK: Oh no. There is no question about that!\nB: I am embarrassed about this. I hate to feel you have cause for\nbeing upset and on the other hand I have a feeling of loyalty to these\nreporters and their sources.\nK: Were NXX any of these White House sources?\nB: I am afraid they were. But I am satisfied that everyone was acting\nin what they thought were best interests. I am will to speculate that\nit might have been done out of spite against you but even that I would\ndoubt.\nK: Yes. Except I take general position - Is the point of not having a\npublic voice. I called two or three senators about their vote. I did this\nbecause I was a NATO expert and felt I could do so on a personal basis.\nIt just makes me look like I actively took part in this. But your reporters\nacted in good faith. I do not want to put you in bad position and if your\nreporters had good sources. I can understand that. It is embarrassing\nfor me because it puts me in the position of being a lobbyist. I happen\nto like Mike Mansfield very much and he has behaved very honorably to\nus and me personally and I do not want Mansfield and the other senators\nto think I am lobbying. However, I do not see what good a retraction\nwould do now.\nB: Trying to detach my ownself from the matter, I do not think a retraction\nwould serve the point at this stage. A retraction generally does not do\nany good and in this case it would be difficult.\nK: If I thought that your source was malicious but your reporters were\nnot being malicious. ox bexcause I do not believe the source was malicious.\nI won't ask for a retraction.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nB: I do not think they were. There was lots of pride because they were\nas effective as they were in defeating this.\nK: I do not doubt it but I feel that what the country needs now is not\nvictories but reconciliation.\nB: The article made plain how anxious the President was from keeping\nthis a battle against Mansfield.\nK: I understand your problem. If it were an issue involving my honor\nI would ask you to correct it but this is not going to serve any purpose.\nOne thing I might tell you. The way things work around the White House,\nnot as many people know what is going on as say they know. If your\npeople would give me a chance to comment on it when it involves me like\nthis. Then they could weigh it against their other sources.\nB: We would be delighted to. I will speak to Hubbard. Any matter\nin which you are involved we will talk to you. I am sorry you did not\nhave a chance to speak on this.\nK: Let me make clear I do not doubt the integrity of Newsweek. You\nhave never heard me complain about Newsweek. I respect it.\nB: We will try our best and consult in anything that involves you.\nK: Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Rogers\n5/26/71 10:00 a. m.\nK: I talked to the President last night about the plan. He is willing\nto go along with putting it off till end of the month. I told him my impression\nwas -- and this will have to be corrected if I am wrong X -- that on the whole\nyou thought it wasn't good to see him anyway. But it would be better at the end of\nthe month than now.\nR: I just don't know what the plusses are. Let more visibility, and\ndoesn't achieve anything.\nK: It's at least a month later. We may have had some other developments\nby then.\nR: I agree with that. I think we can hold it in abeyance. What about the\nChinese thing\nK: I'll try to get a time set today or tomorrow.\nR: Good. I want his views on MBFR. I know what the paper said, but\nI want his overall thinking.\nK: Okay.\nR: Right, fine.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECONK\nProf. Jerome Cohen\n5/26/71 10:35 a. m.\nC: I don't want to be a post, but I was in Ottawa yesterday. I wanted\nto scheck a few things. The message I got the last time I was here and you\nhave heard too Mentioned it the last time. The problem that the people-\nto-people contact doesn't include direct trade. It's a change from the\npolicy of the 50s. No direct trade until a fundamental change in U.S.\npolicy in the resolution of the Taiwan problem. The only explanation I\ncould get is related to a passionate nationalistic policy. In thinking rationally\nthere is nothing more important in influencing\nthan letting business-\nmen go over. There could be nothing better than to enable business men to go\nto China and let them see. But direct trade will be the last, not the first, step.\nThen they started talking about achieving a Taiwan resolution. Said couldn't\nbe removed till diplomatic relations had been established. That might take\nyears. Then they said \"Why doesn't your President come to China to discuss\nthese things; we've invited him; why doesn't he come? 11 The handling of\npoliticians is the most difficult problem in per-son-to-person diplomacy.\nFor instance, are they going toadmit Kennedy, Muskie and thèse other birds\ninsteadæ of the President who has done so much for them.\nK: Well, first of all, they have not invited the President; they have sent\nsignals but more as a 'why don't we talk about it bata at a high level? I\nC: Well Huang Hua (?) is going to bei in Ottawa in two weeks (he is\nthe Ambassador and a man of some parts). He is a man who will make decisions;\nnot a mere ambassador. It would be a fruitful thing; you might want to consider\ntalking with Huang Hua.\nK: If it could be done decretly.\nC: That's what I am suggesting. I find these talks in Ottawa very\nhelpful; they're relaxed. And they want the President to come. I am sure\nyou have to think of the implications.\nK: Well, it's out of the question this year. It hasn't even come up.\nIII is easy enough to say they have invited him but it's nonsense.\nC: He hinted in a way that there had been signals and he was calling\nfor more. He said they would like for him to come to China. It may be\npremature for reasons of scheduling and others. But if you have the time\nand inclination a talk with Huang Hua might be of some utility.\nK: Let me think about it. You know we are very serious and energetic about\nit. But you don't start a process like this by even talking about a Presidential visit.\nC: He was not saying this for propaganda. He had no reason to think I\nwould ever pass this on. But it seemed that it would be a relief to break the\nlogjam by having the President come.\nThe Chinese can't seem to figure\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nProf. Jerome Cohen\n5/26/71 10:35 a. m.\nout how to take the initiative, but they may/\nK: In principle I would be glad to see him, if we can figure out a way.\nGood. This is extremely helpful.\nC: Are you going to add to your China staff someone else from the State\nDepartment - you might need to be more strongly staffed.\nK: Do you have any suggestions?\nC: I am sorry Herb Levin has left, though he may not be the best in\nthe field; he's good. There are people like Bill Gleisteen (? ) and Paul\nKrisberg (?) who are not only well-informed scholars -- their hearts are\nin the right place, nothing but the best. This is just gratuitous. Anyway\nHuang Hua will be in Ottawa in two weeks.\nK: Can you keep this information about their general interest in hihg-level\ncontacts to yourself so I can look into it?\nC: Yes, certainly. I didn't know whether any of this was new but wanted\nyou to know about it and wanted to know whether there was anything to it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Smith/Mr. Kissinger\n10:43 a. m., May 26, 1971\nS:\nHenry.\nK:\nGerry, how are you?\nS:\nOn the question of notifying Semyonov about our lack of interest\nin the NCA, I recognize that. I wonder if it would cause trouble if\nI didn't do that at this time. I mentioned to General Allison that I\nintended to do that, and it gave him some concern.\nK:\nThe hell with General Allison. It happens to be the President's\nposition. Conceivably, I think we have to make clear that it is going\nto be Safeguard.\nS:\nAll right.\nK:\nThat is what the President told you, and told him yesterday it\nwould happen.\nS:\nIt was my understanding that you had.\nK:\nIt will not come as news to Semyonov.\nS:\nThat is the reason I thought it was essential to do it at this\ntime.\nK:\nIt is absolutely essential to tell him. Say our position will\nbe Safeguard. But I leave it to you. Make that clear. It would save\ntwo weeks at the beginning next time.\nS:\nAll right. I will do it. I wanted to be 100 per cent clear.\nK:\nYou are meticulous. Tell Allison there is nothing to argue here.\nS:\nAll right.\nK:\nThank you, Gerry.\nS:\nThank you. Goodbye.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nPete Peterson\n5/26/71 12:08 p.m.\nK: I have told Stans yesterday to send over the Gleason Case. Also he\ntells me he has got $200 million of machine tool cases.\nP: Right.\nK: Could you pick $40 million of the least defense-oriented?\nP: Yes.\nK: If we could do that in the next week or so\nP: What you want is a $40 million package on top of that?\nK: On top of the Gleason case.\nP: Sure.\nK: How are we doing on the\nthing?\nP: The study won't be completed till June 20.\nK: Good -- want to hold it off till July.\nP: Incidentally, I am trying to bring in that group of wise men. They\ncan do it on June 2. You apparently had accepted a dinner date on that night.\nK: Yes.\nP: Any way out of that? The first they can't do it.\nK: No other date around that, like the 4th?\nP: No; they are leaving. You had told me the second when we talked.\nK: And then you told me you couldn't do it.\nP: Then I said the first\nK: I will do my demnedest to come on the second, at least for a while.\nP: How early can you start?\nK: 6:30 or 7:00 -- unless you could do it earlier.\nP: Yes, earlier.\nK: 5:00 or 5:30.\nP: Yes.\nK: Sure, that I can do.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nVice President\n5/26/71 2:28 p.m.\nA: You see the Newhouse syndicated story in the Star today?\nK: No.\nA: \" Rogers Reported Irked by South African Agnew. \" (Reads)\nK: Don't tell me any more.\nA: You know what it is?\nK: No, but you can see the Italian hand.\nA: I got back from New York and had a call waiting from Bill. He\nsaid he didn't cancel any meeting, he had none scheduled. He doesn't know\nwhere it came from.\nK: I know.\nA: The African bureau over there?\nK: Sure. Don't you think?\nA: Yes. Says 'seems to be in line with White House policy however. I\nK: It didn't come out of here.\nA: Of course not. The only thing that bothered me\nRogers is\nquick to dený this. That's what he tells me, but no one will correct it publicly.\n!'\ndelicacy of balance\n11\nK: Who's the writer?\nA: James Stout. I never heard of him. But what bothers me\nsame\nreport of what was said in the meeting. But it's incorrect.\nK: Was a State Department fellow present?\nA: The Ambassador and no one else.\nK: But he will have made a report to the\n.\nA: I suppose SO\n\"Agnew reportedly gave Moulder assurances\n11\nThat was not even discussed.\nK: I am the worst person to make this complaint to. The President will\nthink if I mention it that this is just part of my private feud. If you call\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nVice President\n5/26/71 2:28 p.m. p. 2\nHaldeman it will be very useful. This is an outrage. I'll reinforce it\nand tell the President, but also it would help if he heard that some other\nperson had heard from you about it.\nA: Okay.\nK: I talked to the President again about your trip. I must say he is not very\nmuch in favor of Greece. He's not worried about your family going there. He\nthinks you might step in Iran, Austria, Germany if you wanted to\nA: Trying to build something around that would be awfully hard.\nK: If things go the way they may, maybe in October or November we\ncan get that other one.\nA: All right. Let me think how I can work in the other countries without\nit being a slight.\nK: If you are going back from Korea it would be a big help to us for you\nto stop in Iran. They have been trying to get the President to come but he\nwon't be able to to make it.\nis another place they wanted the\nPresident to visit and he won't be able to do it.\nA: Do you think it is possible to stop someplace else and not Greece.\nK: I think so. If I could think of some way of your stopping without making\nit official, just going to your family place or something like that.\nA: Any chance of working out something on the Cypriot situation?\nK: Sure. Going to Cyprus is easier than going to Greece. That might\nnot be bad to consider.\nA: Will you look into that some more? See if that would work. Is\nthat a security problem over there.\nK: I think not.\nOne other thing: are you doing something for\nSiaatra one of the evenings he is here?\nA: I expect I will.\nK: Just so I don't have to worry about it. I'll take care of him one evening.\nA: Good. As soon as you find out about that will you let me know?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nVice President\n5/26/71 2:28 p.m. p. X3\nK: Yes. There's no problem about your family going.\nA: No chance of Spain or Portugal?\nK: No, that might be okay.\nA: What about Scandinavian Countries?\nK: I mentioned that to the President. He is afraid they'd demonstrate.\nA: Yes, they probably would. Maybe Germany and Austria. How about\nFrance? Probably not?\nK: I have no fixed view about that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nTaft Schreiber\n(in Len Garment's office)\n5/26/71 2:38 p.m.\nK: I just wrote you a note on Monday to thank you for everything you had\ndone while I was in California.\nS: You are very sweet, but notes are unnecessary. I just wanted to say\nhello.\nK: How long will you be here?\nS: I leave on the 5:30 plane.\nK: Have you got time now to come over?\nS: I've got one more meeting and I'm with Len Garment.\nK: I have got a meeting at 3:00 too, but if you would like to drop over\nI would bve to see you. You can even bring your friend.\nS: Here, talk to Len.\nG: This fellow's doing ha fabulous things for the next year. We want\nto keep this cooking along without too many of our Jewish friends picketing\nthe White House.\nK: About what?\nG: Soviet Jewry.\nK: Come on over.\nG: Okay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nJohn Scali/Mr. Kissinger\nMay 26, 1971 2:55 p.m.\njlj\nS: I was wondering if you had seen the Jack Anderson column. He\nsays the US is picking up on radio GVN messages including those of\nPresident Thieu.\nK: Oh no.\nS: I have checked with the Pentagon and they have issued a full blown\ninvestigation and he reports this too. If he is reporting this, he is a\nstep away from talking about other things.\nK: I still have not found the memorandum from which he is quoting.\nS: I have some reason to think maybe if somebody talked to him. What\nif appealed to him by one John Scali to lay off?\nK: Wouldn't do any good but you can try.\nS: Why do you say it wouldn't do any good? I know a couple of times\nI was asked and it worked with me.\nK: With you yes. If somebody asked will it work with John Scali I\nwould have said yes but I do not believe it will work with Jack Anderson.\nS: I do not want to do it unless you think it would do some good.\nK: If you think - there is nothing to be lost by talking to him. Think\nabout it and talk to me before you do it.\nS: Oh yes. I would talk with you and tell you exactly what I would say.\nI just wanted to check with you about what you think of the idea. I will\nthink about it. I just wanted to check with you if you had learned anything\nin checking on that memorandum. Thanks Henry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nThe President\n5/26/71; 6:45 p.m.\n(Missed the first part of this conversation.)\nP: At a later time when you do meet him he will unbend. He really has\nan understanding of the Chinese.\nK: I thought he was acute in his judgment.\nP: He is really thinking in terms that so many of our people don't under-\nstand. He is thinking in long-range terms.\nK: Not at all tactical.\nP: Not taking cheap shots as the Russians do. I thought you would find it\namusing. If you do make the trip you will want to stop someplace on the\nway and it would be a nice place.\nK: I did not have a chance to tell you about the Harvard professor he is\na Chinese expert. He went to Canada. He said this thing needs a political\nsettlement they said we need President Nixon.\nP: Did they really say that? Oh, oh, I have to go -- It's Hoover on the phone.\n5/26/71; 6:50 p.m.\nP: Are you going out to dinner in a little while or was that an excuse?\nK: No, I am going out to dinner dinner for the Mosbachers tonight.\nP: You would have a lot of fund at Alice's.\nK: I would have loved to go.\nP: I was just delighted with Bruce he went on to say he would support\nme. If we get a chance to send anyone to China, he goes.\nK: He is the best.\nP: Murphy would be terrible and Lodge would be worse.\nK: Once he has resigned the Chinese would take him. He is a great patriot.\nI showed him what we are planning to say. He thinks your policy on Vietnam\nis superb. I don't know whether you heardhim at the end. He said you are\nthe right man in this job -- he has seen many Presidents.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nThe President\n5/26/71; 6:45 p.m.\n-2-\nP: I brought him back to a miserable job.\nK: You brought him back to amiserable job.\nP: What a guy he is compared to the clowns. There aren't many people\nlike him. Rush has his character. I don't want him to stay over there and\nget sick. I think he ought to skip a meeting now and then.\nK: He is a pretty good judge.\nP: He can take care of himself.\nP: On the Canada --\nK: They said secondly that Nixon has done more for us than any of these guys\nthat want to go to China and they don't want to irritate him.\nP: I don't know what they are going to respond. Do you think they will bite?\nK: They may insist on somebody going publicly.\nP: If we do then it is Bruce.\nK: I suspect they will bite on this.\nP: Then I think we might let Bruce go anyway. It keeps things going. When\nyou talk to them say Ambassador Bruce is resigning then he will come to\nmake public arrangements for the President's visit.\nK: I thought we would have tremendous impact if you announced the visit in\nAugust and we would send Ambassador Bruce there to make arrangements.\nP: You think the meeting did have some significance? I suppose he was going\nup for Muskie or your friend Tony Lake.\nK: No. He is Professor Cohen.\nP: Harvard Law -- Oh, I know him\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nThe President\n5/26/71; 6:45 p.m.\n--3-\nK: I said I didn't want these guys to start screaming around -- we want\nthis to be a surprise. MXXXXXKXXXXXXXXX I said this was just a figure\nof speech.\nP: Did you know we beat the Hughes Amendment?\nK: No, I didn't.\nP: Do you know what it is about? They beat the Nelson Amendment today.\nThe Hughes Amendment proposes $2billion 700 pay increase and get rid of\nthe draft. The Senate voted it down. I asked him why we were winning.\nAccording to Colson because of our strong intention on NATO and when\nwe hit them with the Soviet thing they were scared to death.\nK: I have M. Childs here, Mr. President.\nP: Is is there with you now?\nK: No, I have sent him out to wait in the lobby.\nP: Give him my best. I like him and respect him. Just tell him what I\nsaid. I remember it was 20 years ago when I was a young Congressman.\nK: He said the Democrats look sick. All they talk about is Vietnam.\nP: You tell him Vietnam is finished. You can argue about when but it is\nover. The main thing is what is going to happen to Russia, China, the\nMiddle East and the economy of the U. S. Emphasize this with Childs --\nwe are thinking about the future and they are thinking about the present.\nK: I told him it was our easiest problem (Vietnam?)\nP: It gives us the most heartache, though. One other guy I wish you would\nsee is William White.\nK: I will see him within the week. I will see him before the end of the week.\nP: When do we meet with Rogers?\nK: Right after the lunch.\nP: Get me some talking points.\nK: Right, Mr. President\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGerard Smith\n(Secure Phone)\n5/27/71 9:43 a. m.\nS: Did you get my message this morning?\nK: Yes, and it's absolute nonsense.\nthey have said it was to be\nNCA; we have said it was to be Safeguard\nmust be simultaneous.\nS: Can you get Dobrynin to give the message to Semenov?\nK: I will see him this morning.\nS: I will be back to Vienna this afternoon; if you can send me a message\nthat will be fine.\nK: Okaya, but there is no possibility of a misunderstanding.\nI have put it all together and you look at the transcript of the conversations\nand you can check for yourself.\nS: Sex I am sure you are right -- I just want to ameliorate a possible\nbad situation tomorrow.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Cromer\n5/27/71 9:52 a. m.\nC: I haven't had a reply about the dates yet.\nK: They are not firm. 14 and 15 are definitely out for me. 17 and\n18 or 11 and 12 are possible.\nC: Okay.\nK: But it's totally out of my control. So it's either the date I\nsuggest or nothing.\nC: That I recall. You remember we had a word about China. The\nSecretary of State and Home are meeting on June 4. At that meeting our\nForeign Secretary will want to dicsuss fairly definitively with the Secretary\nof State what we have in mind to do. I didn't want you to be bounced into\nsomething you didnot know would happen.\nK: That's very courteous. The Secretary will be prepared to discuss\nit with the Foreign Secretary. We are meeting on it today as a matter of fact.\nC: Okay. I understand I'll be seeing you at dinner tonight.\nK: I look forward to it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin\n10:43 a.m., May 27, 1971\nK:\nAnatoliy, I will see you in an hour, but there is one problem\nwith time urgency connected which I wanted to raise now. You seem\nout of breath.\nH:\nOn the contrary. You are calling me on your birthday. My\nvery best wishes.\nK:\nAren't you nice. Let's hope we will do some good things\ntogether this next year. The problem is Semyonov in Vienna has been\nsaying to Smith that his understanding is first there will be negotiations\non ABM agreement and afterwards there would be discussions on\noffensive limitations, which is not my understanding. But I don't want\nto get that issue settled today. However, Smith is afraid that Semyonov\nwill say publicly tomorrow at the closing session that this the understanding.\nIf he says it publicly, Smith will have to say the opposite publicly. And\nthe negotiations will be ending on a note of disagreement. This is the\nplenary session which closes the negotiations in Vienna.\nD:\nIt's a closed session.\nK:\nYes, it is a closed session, but I wanted to recommend -- and I\njust talked to the President -- that neither side states anything. We\ncan get this worked out during the month. We now have agreement and\nwe should not immediately record disagreement. My understanding is\nthat we will discuss offensive limitations while the other is being discussed.\nD:\nMy understanding -- I did not specifically mention it to him\nrecently but said it in a telegram long before when we discussed that, --\nthat there would be two parts so to speak. There was no specific agreement\nbetween you and me. My understanding is that at the beginning of the\nfirst part we will discuss this one, but on the second part, we will begin\nhalf-way.\nKKXX They will do ABM and the second part when they begin to discuss\nthis one.\nK:\nWe can work that out. My understanding is they will begin on\nABM but well before that is completed they will have to discuss offensive\nlimitations. 1 don't think you would find in the record \"half-way. 11 But\nthis is npt an issue that cannot be worked out. The major thing is there\nwould be no useful purpose served if there is a record of formal dis-\nagreement at the closing plenary session tomorrow. Whether it is half-way\nor a third of the way.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin\n10:43 a. m., May 27, 1971\n- 2 -\nD:\nMy understanding is they would concentrate on ABM and when\na substantial part is completed, continue on ABM and then proceed with\nthe other one. That was my understanding which I sent to Moscow.\nK:\nWhat sort of ABM agreement, whether it would be capitals, or\nwhat else.\nD:\n]\n1 didn't go into details. I didn't send what kind -- SALT or\nwhat else. It was a simple understanding -- not a specific question.\nK:\nWe don't have to settle it this minute. The major thing is it\nwould be very helpful if we ended the session tomorrow on a positive\nnote. Nothing can be accomplished by recording disagreement tomorsow.\nIf you could get that word to Semyonov. I will show Smith's cable to you\nwhen you come.\nD:\nIt will be 11:30.\nK:\nAnd in my office. We have Arabs running all over the place.\nD:\nBetween the Executive Building and your office.\nK:\nDo you think there's time enough to get word to Semyonov?\nD:\nI don't know whether... when are they meeting?\nK:\nIn the morning.\nD:\nIt's now 11:00. In Moscow, it's 7:00.\nK:\nThat is why I am calling you to see if you could do something.\nD:\nThere's no problem to send a telegram. I'm just counting the\nhours really.\nK:\nThe only result of it will be we will go through our records --\nwe make a formal statement, and you make a formal statement. That\nway, we start with a legalistic argument.\nD:\nI will try to have time to tell him.\nK:\nCan you send it now? You can come a few minutes late to see me.\nD:\nI will send it now.\nK:\nThat is why I called you.\nIds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAlex Johnson\n5/27/71 11:12 a.m.\nK: I have that record all put together. You can come any time you\nwant to to look at it.\nJ: It will have to be this afternoon.\nK: Any time. Just call my office.\nJ: Okay. It will be some time this afternoon.\nK: Okay fine. Good Alex.\nJ: Right, thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nPhil Farley\n5/27/71 12:14 p.m.\nK: I just wanted to check with you on exactly where we stand on accidental\nwar and the hotline discussions. As I understand the hotline is essentially\nfinished.\nF: That's right.\nK: How about accidental war?\nF: There five points of bracketed difference and it's going to be left that\nW ay for Helsinki reports.\nK: My understanding from Gerry is that if we wanted to sign this in June they\nare in a state to do so.\nF: The hotline yes, but not the accidental war. No major differences\nbut that will require a different kind of push from what they've had before.\nK: Mas our new formulation been presented?\nF: Yes, and it has been initially judged insuffiient. It will end up with\nbracketed proposals and counter-proposals.\nK: So if we want to have Semenov over here it would be for a hotline\nagreement only.\nF: Yes. There is still the question of third countries on accidents.\nWe said don't press us; let us think about it.\nK: Parsons is staying over there?\nF: No.\nK: So that by definition will have to be left.\nF: Yes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nUnder Secretary Johnson\nMay 27, 1971; 5:40 p.m.\nK: Actually the one thing I wanted I have found out. You have had a chance\nto read through that book?\nJ: Yes. I had to read it very fast.\nK: It is still available to you.\nJ: I wanted to ask you one question. There is one question open which I\nreally wasn't able to follow through on the conversations going back and forth.\nK: Those conversations are always keyed to some document.\nJ: I just didn't have time to get the documents out. The one question is\nthat last letter was from us to them, that is on the 19th of May. You\ndelivered it to him on May 19.\nK: Yes, well I.\nJ: That talks about discussing the question of phrasing\nthe nature\nbefore ABM is completed. Then I saw your conversations with him in\nwhich he accepted your statement that the agreements should be simultaneous.\nK: That's right.\nJ: What I wasn't clear about is how the phrasing of the letter of the 19th\ncame about. The phrasing of the letter of the 19th is not consistent with\nthe public statement to begin with, but he also used the statement, the oral\nxix statement you made to him.\nK: The point was he said he could get the letter changed but it would take\nalmost three weeks and therefore he suggested the oral statement.\nJ: I see.\nK: He said the oral statement, plus the public statement, covered the point.\nJ: Yes, I saw that. Did that phrasing in the 19th letter come from them?\nK: That came from them.\nJ: I see. But we delivered that letter to them, did we?\nK: Today, and they gave us their copy today.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nUnder/Sec Johnson\n-2-\nJ: Is their letter identical?\nK: Exactly except the first two paragraphs.\nK: The controlling factor is the text of your public statement plus your\noral statement which he accepted.\nK: Yes.\nJ: That relieves my mind.\nK: And if you look at the record of the phone conversations, they make that\nclear.\nJ: The last statement on oral was by phone.\nK: And I read that to him and he said that was exactly right.\nJ: That relieves my concern for the room for misunderstanding. How do\nyou want to handle this -- Verification Panel. What are our guidelines now?\nK: Why don't you and I get together tomorrow or Saturday morning? I\nthink we should let the Verification Panel go ahead doing analytical work\nand you and I decide what outcome we are going to try to steer at.\nJ: That is what you and I have to decide.\nK: I will get together with you. And this book is available to you any time.\nAnd where you see handwritten things in there they will put in their suggestions.\nJ: I was very interested in the early portions on the ABM. The political\nproblem versus the military problem and their sidelines on their bureau-\ncratic problem. It sounds real to me.\nK: I don't see anything he gets out of telling me that, do you? Don't you\nthink he came quite a good distance from his early position to where he\nfinally wound up?\nJ: His first move to you, was it in January? - of silos they have under\nconstruction and they wouldn't want to stop them was it before we had\nseen those new ones?\nK: You are right.\nJ: He raised the question.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nUnder/Sec Johnson\n-3-\nK: But they will take a chance on January 1. That' is we give them some\nlead time.\nJ: But he raised the question of silos being under construction - wasn't\nthat before we had seen these new ones?\nK: You are right. That was January 28.\nJ: That is right. January 28 the problem of silos started but not yet\ncompleted.\nK: That is right.\nJ: When was it we first saw.\nK: The first time I heard of them was on February 14 when I was in\nKey Biscayne.\nJ: It seems to me it was around that time.\nK: I remember because I walked right over to the President.\nJ: He told you on January 28 that they had stuff under construction but\nnot completed.\nK: Isn't that interesting? And I hadn't focussed on it until now.\nJ: I found that very interesting.\nK: I tried it simply as a theoretical statement.\nJ: He must have assumed we had already seen them.\nK: And we probably had but had not got the read-out yet. They may not\nknow how quickly we get it. Only we weren't sure they had stopped at that\npoint so I did not pay any special attention to it. Now that you call my\nattention to it I read it as sort of half-theoretical statement.\nJ: I am not quite clear - the ABM thing went back and forth so much. Then\nthey went back to their old position.\nK: One thing I can say - they can have no doubt about our position.\nJ: But they ended up with their old position and it is going to take quite a\nbit of hassling to get them to an equal movement of their sites and our\nsite.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nUnder/Sec Johnson\n-4-\nK: It depends on how eager they are.\nJ: I found very interesting their statement that SALT did not mean much\nto them. You came back damn well on that. Was that emotionalism or what\non his part?\nK: He is usually not emotional.\nJ: I take it, as far as ABM's we are both back to our original positions.\nK: That is right and I suspect that they have to make a record on it.\nJ: I think we can stick hard on that. But their willingness to set a cut-off\ndate on new construction\nK: That may not survive.\nJ: Of course not, but there were attitudes there.\nK: He was obviously thoughtful about it - he raised real issues in connection\nwith it.\nJ: It is not a weak point and a court of law would find you agreed to this or\nthat, but the development of the attitudes as the thing went on was interesting.\nK: I leave it to your discretion, and we will get together within the next\ntwo or three days to plan strategy. I won't do anything until I have talked\nto you.\nJ: All right, Henry.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n5:46 p. m., May 27, 1971\nK:\nAnatoliy, you can't stay away from me.\nD:\nIn connection with the talks about the White House and State,\nI have just seen UPI 117 [read it] to the effect that the U.S. today\npublicly condemned Russia for the conviction of the four Jews. The\nticker said it was the strongest ever issued by the Department.\nK:\nGod-damn them!. When was it issued. I gave them instructions\nat 1:00.\nD:\nIt's on the ticker.\nK:\nOh, God-damn. You have to believe me -- I did not know about\nthis. The President did not know about it. I will have to check into it.\nI haven't seen the ticker, but I'll look at it immediately.\nD:\nIt is the strongest ever.\nK:\nTell them that I instructed the Department.\nD:\nWhat kind of fools do they have? It is our law. Why should\nthe Department be involved in our condemning them. I just want to\nknow.\nK:\nTell them that you brought it to my attention.\nD:\nAnd that from now on you will use much more control on this\nK:\nFrom now on, I will take responsibility for matters of this kind.\nI will find out what happened.\nD:\nIt definitely looks political.\nK:\nIt may be something that was authorized three days ago. I\nwill look into it and give you an informal opinion tomorrow.\nD:\nYou don't have to give me an opinion. It's public -- on the radio.\nK:\nYou mention to them this was done prior to my discussion with you.\nD:\nOkay.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Rogers\n5/27/71 6:40 p.m.\nR: I am just calling on that damn statement Gray made at the briefing.\nK: Yes, I mentioned to the Presiden t that you were mortified and\nit was a mistake and he understands.\nR: I said if the question was asked we should express our concern and\nsay we axe still believe in the Human Rights Convention and that people should\nbe able to emigrate. Said don't know about evidence in the trail. Instead of\nthat we volunteered a statement.\nK: The fexex President feels, for obvious reasons, that he would like to\ncool the debate between us and the Soviet Union.\nR: I think there is this to be said and I'm not trying to justify the\nmistake; it was a mistake and I was screaming about it before I heard shouk\nfrom over there -- but the only bright side is that this may help cool those\nwho might help the JDL. Every time the JDL gets aroused it causes additional\nproblems in the Soviet Union.\nK: I think that is right and it's done now, but we are going to make\nsure we don't make any beligerant statements. We can always go back to the\nhotline.\nR: This is just one of those mistakes. You don't have to send any memo\nto me. kfxwexkadx One other thing, if we do this thing we talked about today I\nthink we should do it before the Senate\nK: In the end of June or early July\nR: I thought it was a good meeting.\nK: Yes, I thought it was; we should do it more often.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Dobrynin\n5/27/71 6:48 p.m.\nK: I just wanted to tell you that 1 have talx looked into this and it\nwas done before our instructions reached them, or so they say now. At\nany rate, we will send out a Presidential order tomorrow preventing this,\nand you can assure them that what I told you is correct. No department\nwill be permitted to say anything about the Soviet Union that has not been\nchecked in the White House. I regret that this happened and so does the\nPresident with whom I have taken this up personally.\nD: Thank you for calling.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Rogers\n5/28/71 9:00 a. m.\nR I am upset about the Berger story.\nK: Haldeman is raising cain. He told everyone yesterday to keep it\nquiet till into June.\nR: Of course it's been\ning around, but it looks to me like a\nclear leak from the State Department.\nK: No one here knows the proposition. Incidentally, everyone here\nknows there's no leaking out of your office. It must come from the fellow\nwho worked on the paper.\nR: I think so it. The thing that annoys me is that it says what's in the\npapers. We'll just say \"no decision has been made. \"\nK: That's right. That's what we'll tell Ziegler to say.\nR: I think what profoked it was the story about Austria on the ticker\nyestefday.\nK: If we don't blow it up too much it will go down as another of those\nspeculative stories.\nR: You could almost manufacture\nK: But the\nformula is correct. If that story had appeared\nlast week it wouldn't have come to your attention or mine probably. I think\nthe best thing is to follow the course we discussed yesterday.\nR: It's not going to be a big thing.\nK: No, the President will understand that this happened befeor our\nconversation and was a low-level leak. It just happened toofast.\nR: Tell him I'm sorry about it. But\nfrom the standpoint\nof Taiwan was phrased pretty well.\nK: Something like that may leak when you talk to people.\nR: It's bound to. We've talked about these things in a general way yesterday.\nI talked to Faisal yesterday in a general way zabout it. He had his UN Ambassador\nthere. I said we were concerned about it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nJoseph Sisco/Mr. Kissinger\nMay 28, 1971 11:10 a.m.\njlj\nS: I sent up to Ted Eliot in memorandum form from him to you our\nanalysis of this accord and I -\nK: What is your analysis?\nS: It is this, Henry. The first part's obviously legal\naround\narrangements which are very political and psychological true in the area.\nIt assures long-range support - political, economic and military over next\n15 years. Undoubtedly Soviet initiated due to the internal events in\nEgypt and to keep them from making overtures to the U.S. I think it\nwill cause waves in other countries in which they hope the influence without\ntreaty will be decreased.\nK: What do you mean?\nS: In countries like Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, etc. they may make overtures\nto the United States if they do not have a treaty with the Soviet Union.\nK: Loosen their ties.\nS: Yes. These are countries which are on our side of the fence anyway.\nNow where this leaves Sadat. Gives pledge that will xxx they will not be\ninvolved in the internal affairs and an ex post facto changes made by\nSadat are OK with the Russians. There is a firm commitment to consultations\nwith the Egyptian Government. There is an overall packet on consultations.\nFrom Sadat's point of view it eases his pressure on the military. The\nmilitary is dependent on the Soviets and if he has an agreement with the\nSoviets that solves the army question. This will leave Sadat with as much\nor as little influence as he had before. The Principle impact is on the\nIsraelis. First, those that think it will polarize the Arabs will obviously\nbe very upset about it. Sean Secondly, it will make it more difficult to\nwork out some sort of \"Canal\" agreement but it keeps the door open on both\nsides. Israel will (a) increase pressure on us to make long range\ncommitments to them on the basis that Egypt has an opened ended commitment\nbecause of the treaty. We will see not so much change on substance -\njust manifest procedurally because Russians want to be in if there is any\nsettlement. The Russians are saying to us that nothing will happen unless\nwe get in. The balancing act is still in effect. I continue to feel that this\nguy (Sadat) will settle on interim agreements if he can get some\nsymbolic crossing of the Canal by Arab troops. Strange enough, this\nis still open with the Israelis. Israel open ended ceasefire and this\nwe are in agreement with. However, we should watch this very carefully.\nThat's pretty much what I said in my report.\nK: I will be fascinated in seeing it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nS: Yes. It is interesting. This thing looks like it is a Soviet draft.\nIt has been concocted in a hurry.\nK: It seems to have been happening often lately.\nS: We had no advance warning that this was coming. It could be we\nhave lousey intelligence or -\nK: It couldn't be true!!\nS: Or the Russians drafted it and we knew nothing about it. There is\nno such treaty in existence in other places. In a quick capsule form\nthis is a political move to protect their major commitment in that area\nand they are putting the rest of the world on notice that they plan to be\nthere for a good long time to come.\nK; Thanks Joe.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nDirector Helms\n5/28/71 5:50 p.m.\nH: Happy Birthday.\nK: Thank you.\nH: That's what I was calling about\nK: I appreciate it. I had a question: Are you sure the Soviet submærine\nis nuclear powered?\nH: No, I am not. We had a conversation about that yesterday. It is not\nclear what that submarine is. TASS has made an announcement to the effect that\nit's going to be there.\nK: But if it's nuclear powered and cruise missile\nH: It's okay.\nK: Well, technically, but I would then let Dobryninknow that they are\ngetting to the limit of the understanding and it's a hell of a time to annoy us.\nBut if it's a deisel submarine it's okay. We haven't even heard that it might be\na y-Class submarine.\nHN: It might be some kind of communication link between two things.\nBut it was too inconclusive and couldn't be proven.\nKN: Can you find out for me as fast as possible if it is nuclear-powered with\ncruise-type missiles?\nHK: I don't know if I can\nK: It's supposed to be an #-2 typs submarine.\nH: I'll X check on that.\nK: Would you and give ma the best judgment of your people?\n5:55 p.m.\nH: You had more information than I had faster than I did. It is an E-2,\nnuclear powered, with cruise missiles. There was a photo taken.\nK: That you are sure about?\nH: Yes, no question.\nK: If I ræaise hell about that\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nHelms\n5/28/71xf 5:50 p.m. p. 2\nH: You're on good grounds.\nh\nK: It's on the margin of the understanding.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin\n6:05 P. p.m., May 28, 1971\nK:\nAnatolly, I am unhappily calling you about the matter we\ndiscussed a week ago today. I gave you the wrong information about\nthe submarine. I told you at the time we thought the submarine was\na diesel. You told me nuclear subs were under the control of the\nPolitburo.\nD:\nIt was announced as a submarine without telling what.\nK:\nI wanted to inform you there is a submarine tied up together\nwith the tender. It is nuclear-powered and has 8 missiles on it of\nthe 250-300 mile range.\nD:\nThat was not a condition of a \"visit.\nK:\nThe understanding as we understand it -- is servicing of\nnuclear submarines and submarines carrying offensive weapons in\nor from Cuban ports.\nD:\nWhat servicing? In what way are they servicing?\nK:\nIf a submarine is there independently -- but it is tied up with\nthe tender. We will not debate it, but at the best, it is at the very edge\nof the understanding. 1 wanted to point out that our information last\nFriday was not good.\nDL\nI don't have any information except what was published in our\npress.\nKt\nThe appearance of a nuclear submarine with missiles of a\n300-mile range and tied up with the tender is. You can have no doubt\nhow gravely we would consider violations of the understanding. Whether\nthis is a violation we don't have to debate now, and we will not make any\npublic statement for the timebeing.\nD:\nThe understanding in Moscow is that a visit which is published\nbeforehand.\nK:\nIt's a combination of the visit of the nuclear submarine and the\ntender and those two being together is a very unfortunate incident.\nD:\nI will transmit that you say this is unfortunate. As it was\namounced, I don't know whether they do anything about it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin\n6:05 P. m., May 28, 1971\n- 2 -\nK:\nI am not asking for anything in particular.\nD:\nI will send to Moscow what you say.\nK:\nThere is nothing else to do for the timebeing.\nD:\nI will send right away a telegram -- with missiles.\nK:\nWith missiles with a range of some 300 miles. They are\nnot ballistic but the other missiles.\nD:\nThe small ones.\nK:\nLike the German V-1.\nD:\nNot long-distance.\nK:\nThey are 300 miles -- when it becomes a violation of the\nunderstanding, it will be a first-class crisis.\nD:\nIn moscow, the understanding is that if it were announced.\nK:\nI told you last week we thought it was diesel. I have to point\nthis out now as a matter we have to consider unfortunate.\nD:\n1 will send a telegram on what you mentioned to me for their\nown information.\nIds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger\nSecretary Stans\n5/28/71, 6:25 pm\nS:\nHenry, on these permits to ship to Russia?\nK:\nWhat we would like is some noticeable foot dragging. The\nRussians have done something which is a cheap shot and I\nwould like to harrass them for a week or so. Is there\nsome way we can slow up the permit without actually with-\ndrawing it?\nS:\nI just wanted you to know that our procedure is that we notify\nthe companies involved immediately, then we notify the\nSenators. Also we got word that Rockefeller had gotten\nthe word from Dr. Kissinger. What would you think of\nissuing one or two, then waiting three or four days and\nissue several more a few days later and solon.\nK:\nI would like to drag it out a couple of weeks. Let the Gleason\none go and then drag the rest out a couple of weeks bureau-\ncratically. It would be a big help if you could drag it out for\na few weeks. I have your interests at heart but we want you\nto teach them discipline at the start of this thing. Sorry I am\nsuch a son-of-a-bitch.\nS:\nIt's alright Henry. We will do it your way.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nMr. Ehrlichman\nMay 29, 1971; 10:40 a.m.\nE: We have a sort of Laird-type problem.\nK: With whom?\nE: On drugs.\nK: With Laird?\nE: Yes. Since you are the sole and exclusive contact with DOD I wanted\nto call this to your attention. Last night's TV was full of Packard's\ndirective to the Defense Department that they immediately come up with\na solution to the heroin problem in the Services. It was all over TV saying\nit is obvious we don't have any way to deal with this. Said that Packard\nhas gallopped into the arena and is going to solve it.\nK: You want him to shut up?\nE: His directive is almost word for word with ours - they tried to get\nin ahead of us and take the credit away from the President, knowing he\nis going to have them over on the carpet Thursday morning. I have told\nZiegler to put out to the pool on the airplane the reason Packard did this is\nthat we directed him to.\nK: Absolutely.\nE: Either you or I should call Packard and tell him you don't play that\nkind of ball game and if you do that one more time we will put out\nsome stuff that will sink him.\nK: He is looking for an excuse to resign.\nE: I don't care.\nK: He didn't do that on his own -- Laird helped him. I completely agree\nwith you. Call Packard, but don't give him a chance to grandstand.\nE: I think you should call him.\nK: I will if you wish, but you can be more outraged than I can because\nyou know the facts. I will do it, but I would have to say that Ehrlichman\nis beside himself and that I agree with him.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nE: Fine.\nK: But it would be better if you were beside yourself personally.\nE: I think you should deal with the departments -- we are trying to\ngive Presidential leadership. There are four departments involved,\nthree of whom are playing ball.\nK: I will do it within an hour.\nE: Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nMr. Ehrlichman\nMay 29, 1971; 11:46 a. m.\nK: I have talked to Dave Packard and he says he hasn't issued the\ndirective yet.\nE: Baloney!\nK: I am just saying what he said. All he told them was to get up a\ndirective.\nE: It was quoted in the newspaper this morning.\nK: I said I don't know all the details, but the President has to get\ncredit for that and you can't go out preempting it. He said all he\nwants to do is show he is working and only the President is to get\ncredit for it. Why don't you get in touch with him and tell him what he\nis to do and he will do it. I think that is more important right now\nthan anything else.\nE: All right.\nK: Dave is a decent guy. All these other guys are barracudas but\nDave does not mean any harm. All this was done on the telephone\nbetween Laird and Pursley.\nE: I agree.\nK: If you have any trouble, let me know.\nE: OK.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger\nSecretary Packard\n12:45 pm, 5/29/71\nK:\nDave, I am calling you because John Ehrlichman is almost\nbeside himself and I thought I could act somewhat as a buffer\nabout the drug thing you put out yesterday. His feeling is he\nthought he had negotiated a directive in order to show\nPresidential initiative and then Defense put out as its own\nsomething that he was eager to get the President credit for.\nP:\nThe only thing is we were worried about this and felt we\nshould get going. We can put this package together and let\nthe President get credit for it.\nK:\nHis argument was the package you put out was what they were\ngoing to put out next week.\nP:\nNo, I asked Kelley to put together a package and we can sub-\nmit it to the President. The only thing I am concerned about\nis we need better cooperation on this. We can put together\na plan and do some good.\nK:\nI will tell Ehrlichman that you will cooperate with the President\nand that you will relax.\nP:\nTell John I am anxious to get something out.\nK:\nThe only reason I am calling you is that these people over here\nare opposed to channel these things through us.\nP:\nTell John we will put a strong package together and let the\nPresident get credit for it.\nK:\nOkay Dave.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nMr. Ehrlichman\nMay 29, 1971; 1:40 p.m.\nK: I don't know whether the President got hold of you before he left.\nE: About Rockefeller. Yes. It is not a very good idea. Who worked\non it?\nK: All I know is I heard he promised some money to Rockefeller. You\nknew he promised something. I had nothing to do with the conversations but\nhet & said much of it may be committed already and he said but John\nEhrlichman can always find a way if he wants to and he will talk to you.\nYou know, if Rockefeller thinks he has been promised something he\nwon't be wrong.\nE: We only have $90 million of discretionary money for that whole\ncountry's programs. I talked to Packard and to Jerry Freidhiem.\nIt turns out he is the culprit in this thing.\nK: It sounded to me as if Packard was honest about it.\nE: Friedheim is the dirty bird. I said you should have told us. He said,\nwe did. Al Haig called Pursley. Oh, channel 2 is going to play a rerun\non drugs in the armed forces. Now, and I am going to watch it.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nUnder Sec/State U. Alexis Johnson\nMay 29, 1971; 3:20 p.m.\nK: Alex, I don't know whether you want to talk today about the SALT\nproblem or play golf. I have somebody who has already waited an hour\nbecause the President was in a talkative mood, but I could see you\naround 11:45.\nJ: I could do that. Let's do that. I could have about 40 minutes in\nthere perfectly all right.\nK: We can do it in one-half hour easily.\nJ: That's fine with me.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nPresident Johnson\nMay 29, 1971; 3:25 p.m.\nJ: Hello.\nK: Mr. President, two things. First I want to tell you what a great day\nit was last Saturday.\nJ: You looked mighty young up there with all those girls, Julie, Linda\nBird and Lucy, in the front row.\nK: They put me there. I was very flattered. Everyone I talked to who\nwas there feel it was very warm and human and no one else could have\npulled it off.\nJ: How nice of them. It was nice of you all to come.\nK: I found the chapters especially fascinating. As I told Bill Jordan\nit was a valuable historical record. The only thing I am not sure about\nnot having read the domestic ones is whether or not a chapter of your\nown reflections on what it adds up to might not help the reader understand.\nBut except for that I thought it was extremely objective and extraordinarily\nfascinating.\nJ: I am highly pleased that you did not find anything that gave you trouble.\nK: No. There was nothing in there that gave me trouble.\nJ: A lot of people are writing in connection with Vietnam, and what\nhappened here and there. It opened the eyes of McNamara, Bundy and\nsome of the others.\nK: Some of the people don't look good when their memos of years ago\nare read.\nJ: Clifford has no memory whatever. Johnson (?) went to shorthand\nschool and took notes on the Security Council meeting. When I gave it\nto him, that morning he went over those notes. He signed for it. It\nwas his signature. Rusk got a Foreign Service officer to sign for it,\nbut Clifford's signature is personal, but he has no memory of it happening.\nK: I think the steps that led to your March 31 speech are absolutely\nfascinating. It makes people like Hoopes look ridiculous. I think this\nbook will be an eye-opener to a very many people.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n⑉2⑉\nJ: I will give it to Galbraith and Schlesinger. They will review it\nand by the time they get through\nK: That is the problem. This fraternity of book reviewers is such that\nthey scratch each other's back. But you have quoted so many of the\ndocuments and added strength to the book by doing almost no editorializing.\nYou are letting these people speak for themselves. It isn't you against\nthem; it is really they against themselves.\nJ: One thing the President told me you are going to do is to see that\nthey declassify everything that can be declassified as soon as possible.\nK: What can I do k to help with this?\nJ: We will have to send a memorandum to you. Under the archaic\nprocedures they have at Defense and State they wouldn't release over\n30 percent of the papers. They want to keep them another 20 to 30\nyears and by that time anybody who knew anything about them has lost\ninterest or is dead. Bobby Kennedy didn't hesitate to release the\nletters from Krushchev. He made sure they did.\n:\nK: And that really did hurt.\nJ: They got a group to come down, and Rogers and Laird sent two or\nthree men each. They spent about a month. What was concerning to\nthem was to keep everything Secret. What is compelling to us from\nmy Administration standpoint and from your Administration standpoint,\nbecause they have almost the same foreign policy, is let the truth get out.\nK: We have the same enemies.\nJ: For 200 years we haven't declassified anything in 25 years. But the\nnext 25 years are going to be different from the last 200. We are going\nto declassify everything unless you can prove that it will be harmful.\nK: If Walt will sent me a memorandum with some concrete directions\nso that we will know how to order them. Otherwise we will have to go\nback to the Departments and get the same old baloney. But if Walt\ncan make a complete list of categories we can get a direct order.\nJ: When the President makes his commitment, two things he ought\nto specify. One is that the government supervise and go over this\ndeclassification because it would break him and all his friends if he\nhad\nto do it. The second thing, I would certainly say that this gift to\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nthe government is made under the laws as they exist today. Williams\nchanged the tax laws on me, not on Eisenhower, Truman and Hoover.\nHe came down here in 1969 and he wrote amendment that took away\nany tax benefits you get from it. So the situation is that today I haven't\ngot a collection of papers. Rusk hasn't sent his. McNamara. You get\nno benefit from them. Dean Rusk got just enough to pay for his room rent.\nThe Rusk papers - I don't know what he will ultimately do. But some of\nthe papers will be sold to Charles Hamilton and we will buy them back.\nBecause this mean old man Williams went along and the Library of\nCongress says there has toxks not been one important gift of papers\nafter that amendment has been adopted. So you just kill history.\nK: I am going to make both these points late this afternoon when the\nPresident gets back.\nJ: There are 500 people whose papers I should have. I have not\nreceived one set since this amendment was adopted.\nK: The other point you make about the declassification that they be\nsettled before one leaves office because if you don't thexxku the\nbureaucracy is as much opposed to our foreign policy as it was to yours.\nAnd they have a vested interest to leak out their secrets and prevent\nyou and us from getting XE ours out. I look forward to getting this\nmemorandum. And of course, as you know, I have X no discretion\nmyself but I will push it very hard.\nJ: Thank you so very much, my good Doctor.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger\nFrank Sinatra\n5/29/71, 6:05 pm\nS:\nHenry, how are you?\nK:\nFine Frank. How are you? I thought you were performing\ntonight.\nS:\nI am. I am leaving for the airport in 20 minutes to go to\nMemphis. It is only about an hour and 40 minute flight.\nK:\nI just wanted to check with you. Are you coming down here\nTuesday?\nS:\nI will get in about 4 PM and I will call your office.\nK:\nWhich would you prefer? I will do it either way.\nS:\nI will leave it up to you. If you want to have dinner along, fine,\nor if you want to have a few people, fine. I will be at the\nMadison Hotel and will call your girl and let her know that\nулихатехіях I am in.\nK:\nAnd maybe you can come by here.\nS:\nYes, perhaps at the end of the day.\nK:\nOkay Frank, have a good weekend.\nS:\nThank you Henry.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
}