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TELCON - 3 - Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger 8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971 K: You didn't ask to see me. H: I'm not complaining. K: Our problem was to preserve West Pakistan and I think it is working out. A major crisis has been avoided by bringing all the factors into play including the Soviets. H: About the hard line you and the President took on the Indian thing, there is a strain in relationships. K: Yeah, I think we told H: Was there a reason for it? K: Yeah, but I don't want to go any further into it. Do not ascribe this In fact, I have information that it is very probable that India would attack West Pakistan and smalh West Pakistan. H: But the Soviet Union -- K: If we had not taken an anti-Indian line, they almost certainly would have continued. H: I have no doubt of that. Actually, people say we drove India awa K: There is no doubt. We don't do this India bought about $600 million worth of Russian equipment while we were giving it billions of aid SO we didn't move it intentionally into the Russian orbit., nor will their future policy during the crisis. They want to be independent of the Soviet Union and we have no reason to believe they will wish to become Soviet satelittes. The consequences of going along with it would have been the destruction of a country of 100 million people. H: Any reason to believe the Soviets responded to U.S. comments or pressures. K: I wouldn't say pressures but there were xxx very active conversations with Moscow. H: Moscow or Dobrynin? K: I don't want to mention the channels used but there was very active action.

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    "ocrText": "TELCON\n- 3 -\nHenry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger\n8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971\nK:\nYou didn't ask to see me.\nH:\nI'm not complaining.\nK:\nOur problem was to preserve West Pakistan and I think it is working\nout. A major crisis has been avoided by bringing all the factors into\nplay including the Soviets.\nH:\nAbout the hard line you and the President took on the Indian thing,\nthere is a strain in relationships.\nK:\nYeah, I think we told\nH:\nWas there a reason for it?\nK:\nYeah, but I don't want to go any further into it. Do not ascribe this\nIn fact, I have information that it is very probable that India would\nattack West Pakistan and smalh West Pakistan.\nH:\nBut the Soviet Union --\nK:\nIf we had not taken an anti-Indian line, they almost certainly would\nhave continued.\nH:\nI have no doubt of that.\nActually, people say we drove India awa\nK:\nThere is no doubt. We don't do this\nIndia bought about $600\nmillion worth of Russian equipment while we were giving it billions\nof aid SO we didn't move it intentionally into the Russian orbit., nor\nwill their future policy during the crisis. They want to be independent\nof the Soviet Union and we have no reason to believe they will wish\nto become Soviet satelittes.\nThe consequences of going\nalong with it would have been the destruction of a country of 100 million\npeople.\nH:\nAny reason to believe the Soviets responded to U.S. comments or\npressures.\nK:\nI wouldn't say pressures but there were xxx very active conversations\nwith Moscow.\nH:\nMoscow or Dobrynin?\nK:\nI don't want to mention the channels used but there was very active\naction."
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