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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD - RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
Telcon
HAK and The President (5 pg.)
12/16/71
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-51/12339
DECLASSIFIED
por
Hr. 9/11/2013
2
Telcon
HAK and The President (4 pgs.)
12/17/71
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-51/12400
DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 9/11/2013
3
Telcon
HAK and McGeorge Bundy (1 pg.)
12/17/71
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-51/12401
DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 9/11/2013
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX
Kissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations (Telcons)
12
FOLDER TITLE
[7] 1971 16-17 Dec.
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
Policy
commercial or financial information.
B. National security classified information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
an individual's rights.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA 14021 (4-85)
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
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TYPE
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DATE
RESTRICTION
1
Taken
HAK and the President (5 pp.)
12/16/71
B
N
Tckon
HAK and the President C4 Pp.)
12/17/71
B
3
Telcon
HAK and meberge Bundy Clp.)
12/17/71
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
kissings Transcripts - Telephone Conversations
12
FOLDER TITLE
1971 16-17 Dec. 7
RESTRICTION CODES
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E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
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DECLASSIFIED
NATIONAL ARCHIVES This document AND RECORDS has been ADMINISTRATION reviewed pursuant to Executive Order *U. GPO:1989-235-084/00024 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NA 14021 (4-85)
Marshall/Kissinger
6:20 a.m.
12/16/7½
-2-
K: You have the girl I have been after for years.
M: Are you coming up for Christmas eve?
K: I may be up in NY.
M: Would you consider coming to our apt. with Nancy? For eggnog.
It's Sarah's first house with a Christmas tree.
K: If I come, I will.
M: She would be so thrilled. Would you make an effort to do that?
K: I will.
M: If you come before we would like you to come up. 7:30 or 8:00.
Whatever fits your schedule. Would you?
K: Certainly.
M: Not a big group. Bill Wicker (?) who sings at the Met. In town
and stopping by for a drink. Maybe another girl and another couple.
No background briefing.
K: I will do my damndest.
M:
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TELCON
President/Kissinger
9:30 m. - 12/16/71
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Henry, did you sleep any better last night?
K:
Yes, I did. Much better. It takes about 36 hours to get back.
I feel fine. I think the Azores thing is still playing beautifully.
P:
Yes, it came off very well. The market is going smoothly, too.
K:
Jack Javits was in this morning. He said it was a tremendous act
of statesmanship. Joe Kraft has a column where he is almost beside
himself saying the President is in complete charge. He ran it very
well.
P:
Yes, isn't that interesting.
K:
Have you seen it?
P:
No, I haven't read it yet
K:
He said some people will say the French gained something but all
they got was a shadow; the President got all the substance. It
proves the President is in complete charge.
P:
Isn't that good. That was a line of perfume used very effectively.
That meeting in the morning was indispensable. You are going down
to see Heath Monday night?
K:
Sunday night. I am going Sunday night and going to see him Monday
morning.
P:
On the India - Pakistan thing, Dacca has surrendered and now the
issue is
K:
Now, if in the next 24 hours the Indians don't agree to a ceasefire in
the West we are in for it. Up until now it could be explained that
the Soviets wanted to wait until Dacca had surrendered.
P:
Has the proposal been put up in.
K:
No, it has been tabled and there will probably be a vote today.
And that will be the test.
DECLASSIFIED
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[p.1of5]
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2
P:
Well, they will veto it.
K:
Well, I don't know. They aren't saying anything any more.
P:
Then under the circumstances, would they just continue the war?
K:
There are three possibilities: First, the British proposal carries;
Second, India-Pakistan ceasefire and third, the Indians continue the
war until they smash the Pakistanis in Kashmir. Now we have had
another appeal from the Pakistanis last night. Action is picking up
in the West and they are asking for American planes, but we cannot
even consider this. If this isn't settled by tomorrow night we will
know the Russians have put it to us.
P:
The one thing I am disappointed about, really teed off at is that
you were unable to get out that Indian cabinet meeting thing. We
have got to get it out.
K:
We will do it.
P:
I know there are a lot of pro-Indian people in State and who are trying
to delay this. But I want it. We ought to be pressing the Indians
every day. Now that Dacca has fallen we have got to get that Am-
bassador in her e and tell him the President is outraged about what
he has done using our television and radio facilities to do it.
Second, someone has got to say something about the Indian aid.
The figure they have been using is not correct. I want a report.
I want everything in it: PL-480, unilateral and multilateral assistance
because some pressures have got to go. The Russians will only go
as far as the Indians want to go. The Indians have got to make
a decision whether they want to be totally a Russian satellite or not.
Also there have been these Indian cabinet meetings, we have to get
reports on those.
K:
Yes, Mr. President.
P:
Actually with regard to the Indian aid thing, couldn't Javits or one
of the liberals on the Hill see if they couldn't stop this now.
K:
The next thing we could do is there is $123 million in goods that is
moving to India. We could seize those but that would get us
into endless litigation.
P:
Goods of what type?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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3
K:
They have been part of the economic program. It has been paid
for already. We can do it. It has been done before
P:
If the Indians continue the course they are on we have even got to
break diplomatic relations with them. Don't you agree, Henry?
K:
I agree. There is already a strong victory statement and an un-
believable setback for the Chinese which is none of our business
but they have certainly humiliated them.
P:
And also let it be known they have done nothing.
K:
That is right.
P:
In the event they
West Pakistan, is there anything more
that can be done? Are they going
K:
They gave us flat assurances there wouldn't be. If that happens we
will have to reassess our position with the Russians. We will have
until Saturday morning to see that.
P:
What are they doing?
K:
I said to Vorontsov if you don't do it at the UN, do it as a bilateral
exchange of letters.
P:
And they have not responded?
K:
No, it is a little early. They could have if they wanted to.
P:
The question is
K:
Well, the question is - let's look at objectively. So they put it to us
and they saw because you acted in such a
way here, we are
going to drop the summit.
P:
Well, dropping the summit is not the first thing I would do.
K:
Well, you have to look to see how much we are willing to pay in
terms of where we are going.
taxex
xpxuxtx
tax
ixrx
P:
To keep ourselves in perspective we have to realize the Russians have
put it to us previously in other parts of the world so we have to just
grin and bear it, right?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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4
K:
But not you, Mr. President.
P:
No, but my point is we try everything that we can, but we have to
realize the Russians - we have to let them know our options.
K:
Our options are limited.
P:
They are limited, but even with them we can't deal with those
Soviets and continue to talk about sales and various other problems.
K:
Our options are not all that good.
P:
They are not good but they will get results. If after all these appeals
and
K:
They are going to continue to butter you up.
P:
My view is this: I dax won't let them do this.
Did the Jordans
send planes.
K:
17
P:
Well, my point is so we have done a check of these little things.
Now in the event we are going to end up by saying to the Russians
you proved to be so untrustworthy we can't deal with you on any
issues. Let's use that card now.
K:
We have pretty well told them that.
P:
Well, we told them that privately, they may not believe that.
K:
Well, if they don't believe the President of the United States in a
private meeting
P:
You don't understand. We threatened it. Let's do it.
K:
No, for that it is premature, Mr. President. That we cannot do because
they still may get us a ceasefire. If they don't get a ceasefire, what
do we do then?
P:
Cut off the Middle East talks, pour arms into Israel, discontinue
our talks on SALT and the Economic Security Council can go the
public and tell them what the danger is. It is a risk group but the
right one. It is pretty clear: I would go further. We have to stop
our talks on trade, don't let Smith have any further things on the
Middle East and stop seeing Dobrynin under any circumstances.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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5
K:
That is right. Break the White House channel.
P:
And be very cold in our public statements toward them. What I am
getting at is if we are prepared to go and have the card to play where
we would not talk at all. Another thing I would beef up the Defnese
Budget plans then.
K:q
The Defense Budget is being worked on.
P:
You will have that done
by Friday night?
K:
Yes.
P:
Now, Henry, I am not yet satisfied and I am really made that this
assistance report is not down here.
LDX it down here in two
hours - Indian aid for next year and last, how much PL-480, how
much economic assistance, unilateral assistance - I want to see it.
P:
K:
We have got it, but we will get it down. / I know the bigger game is
the Russian game, but the Indians also have played us for squares
here. They have done this once and when this is over they will
come to us ask us to forgive and forget. This we must not do.
If they want to be dependent on the Russians, let them be, but when
the chips are down India has shown that it is a Russian satellite.
What I am really saying here is and what I am proposing to do - if
India pursues this course, then we will reevaluate their program
of aid and cut it off.
Has anybody told them that?
would
K:
We dixk, but remember you have got to realize everything is being
done out of this office. We have a bureaucratic system to deal with.
I think it would be better if State told them.
P:
Call Sisco. He is to call in the Indian Ambassador and tell him that
the U.S., under the circumstances, if there is not a ceasefire we
will have no choice and all Indian assistance of all types will be
taken out of the budget and call me in an hour.
K:
Yes, Mr. President
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Rowland Evans/Kissinger
1,0:18 a. m.
12/16/71
E: How about that? Bhutto's performance yesterday.
K: At the UN.
E: It's tragic. What do you hear XIXIXIX from the Soviets?
K: NOthing yet.
E: What do you think?
K: The next 36 hours tells us whether we are dealing with people who are
making a play for a strategic a break
OR with people where some
co-existance is possible.
E: ? ? ? 345 Pakistani tanks at Kashmir border.
K: Today? Haven't seen it.
E: W. Pakistanis are talking as if they want war to continue in West.
K: They are ready to settle. Running out of spare parts and POL. They haven't
had military equipment since '65 and other side being taken care of all along.
I would have said inconceivable Soviets would jeopardize everything but now I
don't know.
E: Can you tell me ? ? ? ?
K: Have to wait.
E: Do you think it will blow up?
K: No but could have bad effect on middle and long term relations.
E: Could and still may. Do you know if any Soviet advisors helping?
K: Not for use, as a friend. Theyxkk x x ungx They did much of reconnaissance
in East and West.
E: Why can't I write this?
K: Because you can;t.
E: On my own?
K: No.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Rowland Evans/Kissinger
10:18 a. m.
12/16/71
-2-
E: Henry?
K: Wait a minute. It looks as if we need made it. Indians have ordered
their troops to stop fighting along their borders.
E: Original borders?
(joke)
K: Right. If it weren't for the imcompetence of Haig who's in my office "we
would have done it 24 hours earlier.
E: Any word on how word was passed to Soviets --
K: What's the latest?
E: 1:00.
K: Absolute?
E: 3:00
K: You have been decent. I will tell you everything includex including
reconnaissance when it's over.
E: I will call at 3:00.
K: I will be here. You tell Bradlee that it's one thing shooting
on
something. It's another when you apply the Lindly rule.
E: Have you told Bradlee?
K: No and I won't argue with him.
E: I will call you at 3:00.
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TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
10:37 a. m.
12/16/71
K: I think in light of bulletin we should hold off on seeing the Ambassador.
R: We don't want the President to think we are dragging our feet. We have
called him in but we will soften it. I don't want to say drastic measures.
K: Say it has to be permanent and President teed off on his speech.
R: On advance (?) I have said make sure we approve it here first. We don 't
want to agree with what's happening in E. Pakistan.
t
K: They are for the British Resolution.
R: They are so confused. We want to be sure signals are right. Joe and
I will watch it closely and let you know if there's any problem.
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TELCON
President/Kissinger
10:40 a.m.
12/16/71
K: The Indians have just declared a unilateral ceasefire in the West. We have
make it.
P: What's it mean?
K: Ordered forces to stop fighting.
P: What's territory? From what you said yeaterday - - taken Kashmir?
K: In West have
some desert and Pakistanis have taken a bit of Kashmir.
Major
is to stop defeat of Pakistan army.
P: What's the source?
K: Official announcement.
P: It's the Russians working for us. We have to get the story out.
K: Already a call from State. Until this morning we were running the UN thing.
Now they are and say they will go over resolution. They are pulling off the
British Resolution. You pulled it through and should take credit. I will give
a backgrounder tomorrow afternoon.
P: Get people in and set story for the weekly news magazines.
K: Can't do it today. We have to clean it up.
P: Any other thing in view of Time Man of the Year thing get Schechter in.
He will understand it. Or who at Time would know more about this subject?
K: I will start with Schechter. He has been decent.
P: Time might write best analysis of crisis. You really feel that they mean
let me come back to it. You were bearish last k night.
K: I felt nothing happen until Dacca fell. Soviets were dragging their feet becaus
Indians took longer on taking Dacca then they figured. So this morning I said
next 24 hours will tell.
P: If Soviets have cooperated on this I think we have got to play on an
arms-length deal.
K: We have to get straight what they did.
P: What they did in '67 June war.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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President/Kissinger
10:40 a. m. ;
12/16/71
-2-
K: 60% instead of 100%.
P: June war.
K: Except they lost.
P: They got credit for bringing peace to the M.E. Agreed to peace after
defeat of their army. And they were responsible for the war. Not a public
statement but internal rebations with Soviets. You handle that. ????
You agree?
they
K: Absolutely. So WEX far/wahave not done anything. Indians did official doing.
But I am sure it's Soviets that produced it.
P: On unilateral ceasefire what?
K: UN resolution na aking it official. XXXXX When in
for weeks they
want to come out and mastermind it. We have agreed to the British. Chinese
are set with it. I will say I have talked with you and it is what you want done.
P: The President is committed to it. Wehave told the British and Chinese.
Will the Russians accept it?
K: Probably.
P: Minght not. If they do it's done.
K: One way or other there will be a resolution to put it together. State is
trying to scavenge on your agony. Put it together xxlx with a UN resolution.
P: The average person doesn't understand about this. Pick the real movers
and shakers. Ask Scali and let him sit in. Ask him who and Zeigler. xMa
Make it small enough to be poserful. I don't care if they are friends or enemies.
Maybe Kraft. It's very important to do Time poeple and maybe a couple of
network people.
K: Chancellor.
P: Anybody. You sit down there. Work it out. Get hold of Scali. A cold,
blooded deal. On other levels let Scali carry the line. And Zeigler.
K: That would be good.
P: It's good to hear.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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President/Kissinger
10:40 a.m.
12/16/71
-3- -
K: The record will show again that you were ready to go the whole way this
morning.
P: I almost called at midnight last night to say to Russians we are putting
the summit on the line.
K: India would have taken Kashmir and
.
P: Shastri got India's X victory wings. Only 30% of them.
K: 30% more then we expected.
P: You think the Russians did it? India would not have done it for us.
K: For us they would have done it (?).
P: I want strictest -- President make own decision. Hannah, Sisco, Rogers.
I don't want Indian aid to max leak out but I will decide it. Shultz to examine
budget and no Indian Aid init.
K: $300 millionfor S. Asia. $200 million to Pakistan and rest we will
hold.
P: Give it to Ceylong.
K: Then we don't get arguement we are cutting it. We can give agricultural
stuff to India for economic relief.
P: They have to pay for aid.
K: Congratulations, Mr. President. You saved W. Pakistan.
P: Go off to other. No backgrounder until tomorrow.
K: As soon as it's cleaned up. I will get on it.
P: Don't do it pre-maturely.
K: Get Sunday papers.
P: Time and networks.
K: Congratulations!
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELECON
Sec. Connally
12/16/71 11:00pm
K: I wanted to tell you the Indians have just declared a unilateral
cease-fire in the West and will let the UN ratify it, so we've made it.
C: That's great. XX God-damn, that's wonderful. Congrasulations.
K: This one went down to the wire. You were a help
C: No, no.
K: No, in givigg one the moral courage to do it. It was a tough decision
to make.
C: It sure was a tough one. You've performed a major miracle. Thank you
for telling me.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELECON
John Chancellor
12/16/71 11:10am
K: I just wanted you to know that it's beginning to look as fi that 72-
hour prediction may come true.
C: I noticed there's a. ******* ceasefire in the West.
K: That's what we were after.
C : I saw it just
We've got Scali here, going over the footage on
the one-hour show on the President. I saw the bulletin as I came down.
K: You are giving me 38 minutes of that aren't you?
C: As a matterm of fact you are in it quite prominently at the beginning
with the maps. We have to say something tonight about the overall situation;
how does your day look?
K: Why don't you give me a call.
C: I'd like to as soon as I get something on paper.
K: Good, you give me a call.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Bhutto/Kissinger
11:15 a. m.
12/16/71
K: I have been seeing you on every TV show. If your pobitio political position
is over in Pakistan which I hope not you can come here.
B: I hope not. I hope my country will last.
K: I have seen the Indian X ceasefire offer. I think we should formalize it
as soon as possible.
B: The ceasefire but not dictation of political terms.
K: The text I have XX from Indian radio is that they have declared India
has no territorial ambitions. Ceasefire everywhere. Effective tomorrow,
17 Dec. 24 hours from now. Hope there will be corresponding action from
Pakistan. Statement at UN tonight. So I think a simple ceasefire resolution
will do it now.
B: It will but if India try to get Poles and Russians to say more.
K: We will go with The British Resolution. Is it still acceptable to you?
B: It is.
K: We will have Bush go ahead and no reason not to accept it.
B: Another point. In view of situation I was thinking if some reference to
General Assembly which might prevent other countries recognizing E.
Pakistan as Bangla Desh. India will try to get recognition. Eastern Europe
first.
K: If we can get Security Council resolution. Mian thing is to get it
formalized.
B: Next steps later.
K: We will before you go back I will talk with you. We are determined never
to be in this position again.
B: I have a telegram from Yahya saying I should talk with the President. Will
you say I have talked with you and it's as good as talking with him? I hate to
keep saying I have tried.
K: I have always checked with the President.
B: Tell Farland SO kxlonxthe doesn't think I haven't tried.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELECON
Amb. Bush
12/16/71 11:23am
B: I'm confused; what's happening?
K: Indaa, as I understand it, has offered a cease-fire and unilaterally
declared it. I understand their Foreign Minister has been asked to submit
it to the UN. Now we better get it wound up. There's no reason not to vote
for the British resolution.
B: I have asked
urgently to meet me at
.
K: I justed talked to Bhutto. He still wants us to press for the British
resolution.
B: He will take it as it is?
K: That's right. I told the British now there is no longer an excuse to
delay the thing.
B: I will. Maybe when the meeting convenes, Singh will make that announce-
ment. What's happening is the non-permanent members are getting restless,
coming up with other drafts. Now we'll get the British one resurrected fully.
We've been telling them all along this is what we want.
K: Right. State now wants to get into the bloddy act. The esident's
instructions are to stick with the British resolution and get it voted on.
B: All right. We will do our best.
K: And don't screw it up the way you asually do.
B: I want a transfer when this is over. But I don't want to go to the
NSC. I wan t a nice quiet place like Rwanda.
K: This was a hairy one but I think we've got it now.
B: I just got a note saying
is trying to see Bhutto. They
are all running around like chickens with their heads off.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
President/Kissinger
12:15 p.m.
12/16/71
P: I thought you should know. I called Mitchell on a couple of things. He
was in a drug meeting with Rogers at the WH. I got Bill on the phone and told
him that I X wanted Sisco and whoever at State to take a hardline on economic
assistance thing. He said fine. I will do it myself. So he is on Salvo. Don't
do it publicly. That's the line, don't you agree?
K: Exactly.
P: On your x background that's the way I would play it. Don't bust India
publicly. It's where we want to have effect.
K: She's written a lett to you asking where she went wrong. The pdx policy
is working.
P: You work with Sisco on conciliatory attitude. vis a vis State. Let them
be tough instead of us.
K: I agree.
P: No reason for you to talk with the Indian Ambassador.
K: No trouble with State now that it's over. We are trying to get the British
to? ? ???. We have her text so it's genuine offer. Trying to formalize
it because she can rxexingx renege at any time. Talked with Bhutto and having
Raza in. He thinks
and extremely XXXX grateful to President. He
has Chinese aboard to.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Cromer/Kissinger
12:26 p.m.
12/16/71
C: It's nbt going well.
K: Why?
C: Because the instructions our people have at the moment is that if the Russians
XIX say they will veto they shouldn't press ahead. And the Russians will veto.
K: They are? I find it unbelievable that in surrender you cannot pass a cease-
fire when a country will veto.
C: (I agree). Why should Russians veto this?
K: I don't know.
C: I think this is all I can do.
K: The major thing I want your people to understand is that we have people
dancing around on the town XX so will you have your people check with us?
C: No one xh but you telling his anything except of course in NY.
K: Bush is our man.
C: This is state of play at the moment.
K: Should we get together on what will come out of Bermuda meeting? This
afternonn.
C: Later part?
K: 4:00.
C: I will be there.
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TELECON
The President
12/16/71 12:40pm
P: I don't know whether with the other thing you are aware of it, but a
big story down here is the shoot-out
K: Yes, I was following it yesterday and we scrambled planes to
P: The wife of the captured captain is out here at the gate and I'm going
to go out and express my simpathy on it. We cannot have this situation where
the Cubans can pick up a boat in Bahamian waters and shoot it up. XX Are we
protesting?
K: Yes, we moved four F-4s to Guantanamo,
P: Is there anything wrong with my expressing smypathy on this?
K: I would like to know first what it was doing there.
P: It was not in Cuban waters or attacking.
K: It would have been on a raid.
P: It wasn't. But if it was, I'm for that too.
K: But you don't want to do it publicly.
P: But I want to take a hard line when Americans are being shot up. I
want a. hard line, This boat was in British waters and was shot,
K: If it hadn't been dark we would have gone in to do rescue work last
night which is illegal, but the British would have shut their eyes.
P: Are you hitting Vorontsov hard on their joining with us?
K: I am da to hear from him today. If I don't by the end of the day
with unilateral caase-fire resolution
P: Are you watching for the Russians too?
K: There reply to what we gave them yesterday morning.
12/16/71 12:42 p.m.
P: You need to do some further checking. The report from our Coast Guard
is that $his ship dumped cargo at Haiti, It came down fromHaiti to the U.S.
unarmed. At 2:30 the Captain wired for assistance, So theyhad three hours of
daylight; what were we doing in those three hours?
K: We got word at 4:00. We ordered an immediate scramble of F-4s out of
here against everybody's protest. State was having a heart attack
P: Of course. No, why was that
?
K: Because it was in British waters and we had no right and all of that.
We called C r omer and he said he couldn't give us permission to get it. I said we
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TELECON
The President
12/16/71 12:40 p.m. p. 2
were going to do it unilaterally.
P: It's the old story; they keep nibbling off pieces. But уди were
absolutely right to order the scramble,
K: And we put the F-4s in there. We did it from here. I didn't want to
bother youand knew how you would feexxx feel.
P: I supposed there is nothing we can do; a protest will fall on ctct
deaf ears. But I want a very hard line taken. These are American citizens who ar
being shot up.
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TELCON
President/Haig
1:30 p.m. - 12/16/71
P:
Al, I just met with the wife and children of the captured boat. It
is quite an experience because basically, as I have the story, the
captain of the boat came over in 1960, an American citizen. He
has made this run from Haiti to the U.S. with a little 1500 ton
boat and a 15 man crew, all American. What we have here is a
case of piracy on the high seas by an international outlaw. Correct?
H:
Yes, but worse than that it was in the territorial waters of another
state.
P:
Now I am going to have Zumwalt put out a statement here saying
that this is a case of piracy in international waters. They came
to ask for mercy. What do we do here?
H:
We have use the Swiss in Havana, call the Panamanian government
and urge them to take the strongest stand and we have to get the
British to bring pressure.
P:
Now I want unbelievable pressure on the British this afternoon.
I want the Panamanians to be called to protect them, but still
what is wrong with the U.S., don't we protect them?
H:
The only way we can do that is through the Swiss.
P:
This is of the highest priority. Presently we are coming along
very well on India/Pakistan, aren't we?
H:
Yes, I am encouraged.
P:
Frankly, Al, I wish I had been there, but if this ever happens again.
We got the word at 2:30 from the captain that he was being shot at.
Right then those were to be ordered and nothing was done.
I ordered airplanes to scramble immediately to demonstrate to the
Cubans that we were about to take action. In the future I want the
planes scrambled if they see the Cuban gunboat. I want them to
sink it. Do you understand? They have no right.
H:
Yes, but the legality of being in British waters.
P:
Follow up on this, Al.
H:
Yes, Mr. President.
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TELCON
John Chancellor/Kissinger
2:50 p.m. - 12/16/71
C:
I came back to see Mrs. Gandhi's letter. How about that?
K:
Is it out?
C:
Let me read you something. I am going to be discreet about tabxixx you
and you will be about me.
K:
John, if I can do anything it is keep secrets.
C:
I know that. We have quoted in here a part of her letter which says
(He reads starting with "The great powers of the world.
11,
K:
I talked to her in July. There was never any question of them.
The question was how much time was there for a political solution
and she said none. This was in July.
C:
In July? That makes it strong.
K:
In the White House we read out three basic propositions to her -
unilateral withdrawal, discussion between the leaders of the Wambi
League and Yahya and consideration of letting Mujib appoint these
leaders. While she listened to all these three, she never gave the
slightest indication that an attack was evident.
C:
You said there were three points (1) unilateral withdrawal (2)
discussion with the leaders of India and Pakistan and
K:
And the third was Yahya.
C:
I don't get three. I get two and a little more.
K:
That's right.
C:
The Indians did know this?
K:
Absolutely. In fact it was told to Mrs. Gandhi and in July when
asked about the time for political solution she said there was none
even then and that they were prepared for what had happened. I
wouldn't say that.
C:
There are things in the AP which is all I have.
K:
But she has it in her letter.
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2
C:
That's interesting. Why would she say that in her letter?
K:
Well, to say we weren't paying attention to the urgency of it.
It was the first thing she talked about. On the other hand they
were in the better position you know
not to move with Yahya
having handed over power then was the case previously and if that
had not been the case there would still have been time to take the
extreme measure.
C:
All right, then I am not going to put "yesterday". Do you feel
now that her letter has been released, isn't it true we gave India
more aid since '47 than any other country?
K:
Absolutely.
C:
Do you have any analysis as to why she did the letter?
K:
To put us on the defensive. I think she was stunned by this criticism.
C:
It really doesn't make a very intelligent case to me - the letter.
I will look to you for guidance.
K:
This other business about the unilateral withdrawal and negotiations
with the Awambi League and the 20th still stands.
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TELECON
Jerry Schedter
12/16?/71 2:58pm
K: I understand you are making me Man of the Year.
S: Mrs. Ghandi seems to be doing it. That's quite a letter she sent the
President, particularly that point about calumny. What are your feelings about
the situation at this point?
K: Thought since we talked earlier this week we should complete it, or
should I talk to Sidey?
S: No, let's us do it.
K: Of course I always prefer to talk to senior people.
S: I can't see the expression on your face.
K: I'm joking. You think M.s. Ghandi is right?
S: No, but we have got an unfortunate situation there, The sending ofthe
carrier, according to Times, makes it look like we are trying to influence the
out come of the war,
K: The thing I find amazing in the press coverage of almost all of the
papers are stuck in the muck and writing from the vantage point of an ant. What
the Iddians are mada at is irrelevant. They will not want to be a Soviet
satellite. The same reasons that made them keep lines to the Soviets will make
them keep lines to us. There is also something plaintive about this letter.
What is she saying? She's complaining.
S: Yes that she was criticized for starting this. She is saying in her
letter there is no feasible political plan.
K: No, she is saying there is only one plan -- immediate release of
Mujib and making him the chief negotiator. But I didn't call you to discuss the
letter anyway. We'll be answering it and making our view clear. She is not
acknowledging the fact of what
we did on the refugees, none ofthe concessions made ton her in the fact that the
almost inevitable outcome would have beena political solution. All she is saying
is that her maximum demand wasn't met and wasn't mee immediately. Let's just see
if in three months they are still asking for release of Mujib and whether he'll
still be in office. The thing we were trying to do we've done
prevent
attack on West Pakistan and getting it settled. And it's hard to see how we
could have gotten it done if we hadn't kept calling attention to the danger of
aggressiveness,
S: I think that's putting a good face on the best situation,
K: What was the alternative?
S: The alternatives obviously fail, One has to get them not to go in there
or at some point to get the UN to ask for
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TELECON
Jerry Schedter
12/16?/71 2:58pm p. 2
K: And she urgently asked us not to go to the UN One two occasions we
were thinking of it and at the specific request of the Indian government we
didn't.
S: When?
K: October and the end of November.
S: Under what circumstances would wehave gone?
K: The Paks wanted to bring their intentions to the UN
Indians in
neither case wanted to go to the UN.
S: Did their request influence us?
K: Very importantly. In fact she wrote us a letter asking us not to.
S: When was that?
K: The middle of November. She sent it. Once the attack had started we
limited the damage as much as possible. Donet know what other course we had if
we wanted to limit damages and not have thewhole global system shaken.
S: Limited damages as much as possible
What about this view that's
cropping up now that there's a payoff in here for the Russians in submarine bases
and new military influence?
K: I doubt that, but that's between them and the Russians. I would be
amazed.
S: You don't feel that the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union and that part of the world is changed as a result of this war?
K: I think they have been to some extent changes as a result of the treaty
made during the summer, and some fo of the consequences that flowed from it.
That fact of life having been called, we tried our best to limit it. But there's
a. major philospphical difference; I know the point of view of Time.
S: It'snot my point of view,
K: In fact the other point of view hasn't even been presented in TIME in the
last week. We are not saying this was a victory.
S: No, certainly not.
K: We have limited some of the worst consequences of what could have been a
disaster for the whole international situation.
S: What's the status of our naval forces there now? Do you expect they'll
be used?
K: With the cease-fire there will be no need for any evacuätion,
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TELECON
Jerry Schecter
12/16?/71 p. 3
S: Are we going to get involved in Chief Mujib?
K: I think that will take care of itself.
S: How do you feel about that letter?
K: If you want to have your story look good six months from now, you'll say
the letter is a tactical event of no significance. It's something we have heard.
To me it reads defensive and plaintive. This is not from Administration sources;
I'm doing it for your guidance.
S: How do you want me to attribute this?
K: Say Administration official.
S: Okay, good.
K: If you people analyzed it cold-bloodedly you would have to say the only
way to avoid war would have been measures they'd have screamed to high heaven about.
The political solution, the only limit we put on that was we didn't want to bring
about the disintrgration of West Pakistan. The outcome was forordained. Actex
And would have occurred in a six-months period.
S; When was i t foreordained?
K: Would have been as soon as you brought the Awami League back into the
picture. But obviously you can't argue against the fact that the Indians did
attack.
S: Right.
K: The question is were they looking for an excuse to attack or an excuse no
to attack? They were given plenty of excuses not to attack.
S: But as unpleasant as this situation is you feel is has been limited now?
K: That is right, and I believe it was our actions that prevented to if
from getting out of control,
S: Good. Let me get that in.
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TELECON
Amb. Raza
12/16/71 3:55 p.m,
R: I got in touch with Mr. Bhutto; he has a very important message.
If you can see him Tuesday or Wednesday he will stay over,
K: I got disturbing news that your President thinks I promised him Amer-
ican military intervention after 24 hours. That is total nonsense.
r: No
I don't think he meant that, I never said that.
K: Everything I told you we did.
R: No, but I was told
not to go to the Security Council and to
wait for two days or so. They it said "but if you want to go, you do so."
K: And I wanted till we had cleared it with the Chinese.
R: You want me to read that message to you?
K: Yes.
R: I will read exactly what I said
K: Oh no, don't worry about it.
R: No, you never said intervention. If you wait until Friday I will have
the Chinese, but if you want to, you go yourself. But I will read it to you.
K: No, don't worry about it.
R; (Reads)
K: It's XX December 11 he claims I told him something about thsi.
R: No, in fact I have been pointing out it XX is most unlikely you will
be coming in. It may be intervention with the Russians or something like that,
K: That may be it.
r: Because I am not one of these people who breaks backs out of things. On
December 12 I sent a telegram in which I said "at noon today Nixon made a strong
statement
may move resolution
White House in touch with Saudi Arabia
and Turkey
K: Let's not worry about it. I just don't want your President to feel we
let him down.
R: No, On N vember 24 I sent a telegram observing that now is the time to
decide on the question of calling the Security Council. He advised that it might
be better to wait till he had a discussion with the Chinese and I had a. discussion,
I will go through all of the telegrams today,
K: Don't spend your time on that, I understand we are all under stress and
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TELECON
Amb. Raza
12/16/71 3:55pm p.2
patticularly your President. He must have misunderstood.
R: It might be intervention with the Russians.
K: I understand. Don't give it a second thought.
R: About Mr. Bhutto. If you can get him an appointment on Wednesday he
will wait, or he will fly to Florida.
K: I will work on it.
R: Do you have any time tomorrow?
K: I will try.
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TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
4:15 p.m.
12/16/71
L: There KSK has been some sort of communication fall down over here.
Yesterday in the early afternoon there was an approval over at the WH for
the Coast Guard to go in
K: The Preisdent is fit to be tied.
B: He should be. I was never notified that the President gave approval on that.
K: We gave approval and kast next thing I know is State is bellyaching and
Moorer and
saying we shouldn't do anything.
L: If I am not told I when order issued -- I want to protect the CG but they
never told me. They called after the MIGs had been scrambl e d and I got
that throught the back door. They should let me know.
K: We will make sure.
L: If the President authroized CG we have to back the CG up. I am upset about
this. We should have gotten F-4s into Guantanamo when the CG when out.
K: I agree.
L: I don't know who authroized this xtkx without telling me. I have nothing
to do with CG but I can help the CG.
K: President said do it and I say do it. An hour later Rogers calls and says it
cannot be.
L: It wouldn't have happened if I was there. But I was byl-passed. I am
stronger on these things. I didn't know President was upset about it.
K: The President's fit to be tied.
L: I am too.
K: You should have been told.
L: I didn't get word until it was dark.
K: The real mistake happened in the Task Force. Attack was at 2:30. First
I heard was at 4:00.
L: Have to communicate on things like that. I can keep this building together.
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Laird/Kissinger
4:15 p.m.
12/16/71
-2-
K: No question about it.
L: But I don;t want to be whipsawed by State and
.
K: Pursely was told.
L: Near darkness.
K: I am told by Haig that Pursley brought up unshirted hell. I don't know
what happened at 2:30. At 4:15 I heard about it. Shortly thereafter Pursely
knew about it.
L: Pursely got in touch with me after that. I was with Mahan. I said get
F-4s down there because F-8s not worth a damn. Pursley said we shouldn't
get involved. I said we will get involved and protect the CG. X I heard
nothing until 4:30 in the afternoon.
K: You gave a good party last night xxxx anyway.
L: The first time was at 4:30.
K: When I leave you don't have to throw a party because State will throw a
real wing-ding.
L: Dave makes out he deosn't like that but he had a good time. Great guy.
K: On that, there was a break down. You were informed as soon as we knew
We knew at 4:00 and State holding on it for an hour and a half.
L: I could have gotten assistance there.
K: I don't think breakdown was between you and us. It was between State and
the rest.
L: Pussely called me at 4:30.
K: I heard at 4:15 and Haig at 4:00.
L: I said we have to give assistance.
K: They got in touch with the President.
L: One American on that ship.
K: President is raising hell. He is xxx blaming me.
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Laird/Kissinger
4:15 p.m.
12/16/71
-3-
L: Then blame me.
K: No. I am blaming Haig. We have to settle the Defense budget. Every
day Shutlz says you are committing ? ? ? ?.
L: I talked with Cap Weinberger and he says we have worked it out at 78. 5.
I called Cap and said maybe you think it is worked out with Defense and
but you haven't worked it out with me.
K: Maybe we can get together tomorrow afternoon.
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TELECON
Amb. Bush
12/16/71 4:45pm
K: Did we ever get that resolution tabled?
B: We've got it working.
K: Russians now got a new resolution, but you can be sure they'll get theirs
tabled in a hurry.
1
B: We've got a problem. The non-permanent members are with the President.
What does theirs do?
K: It puts it all on the Paks. It's got a cease-fire in it. We could take parts
of it if we can take parts of the permanent ones. But we will be god-damned if we
wil let the Russian resolution settle it.
B: I know what you mean. We've been having trouble with the Italians. The
Britis h and are giving us a hard time. But I don't think the Russians will get
tabled if it draws opposition from the Chinese side because the British and French
won't go along with it.
K: Okay, but see how quickly you can get this one moved. And don't accept the
Russian one.
B:
and then pull out their own resolution. I thought we wanted to get
this in
whether the
and
,
are
commi ted to vote for it or not.
K: That is correct.
12/16/71
5:05pm
B: On this
the British are locked in iron saying they will not support it unless
it's unanimous
this damned Italian thing.
K: Then the hell with them. I've got Cromer here; if they want won't do it we will
get it done alone. We'll do it without them. I want this introduced before the Russians
surface theirs. Then we can come up with one that is not a Soviet resolution. It would
be nice if we could get the British with us, but if they won't support it the hell with it.
B: We have keep a profile on it of not being out in front but of pushing. Is that
still what you want?
K: Yes, stay off it as a sponsor because then we can ask the Soviets to join us
without their supporting a U.S. resolution, but I would like to have some thing tabled
before the Soviets table theirs so it won't be a Soviet draft. And if the British
won't come along, the hell with them.
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TELECON
The, President
12/26/71 5:15pm
P:
update on everything today.
K: Everything is now falling into place. The Soviets are tabling a
resolution; it's better than the old one but we still can't accept it, We can't
let it get settled on a. Soviet resolution and secondly it is still very one-
sided. Now the British are withdrawing theirs.
P: Are they going to support the Soviets?
K: That is unthinkable to me; that they wouldn't do, We have a good reso-
lution with the non-permanent members and I have given Bush urgent instructions
to get it tabled and teld Vorontsov we wouldn't accept theirs but hoped it
was negotiable and he said it probably was. He said let the people in New York
talk about it.
P: What about the exchange of letters?
K: Tbat's obviously off. It's just as well as far as the Chinese are
concerned. We cannot support a Soviet resolution,
P: There is a unilateral cease-fire
?
K: Yes, but we have a problem getting Yahya to accept/ it. The Indians
told the British our offer is good for only 24 hours. She may figure Yahya
****** can't move that fast. I have sent a cable urging Yahya to accept it at
least until the UN acts. This is all tactical maneuvering in the last 24 hours.
It is aggravating for the people concerned, but nothing you need to follow step
by step,
P: On this Cuban thing
K: You are absolutely right. It was a breakdown of communications between
the Coast Guard, State and us, We were not informed of it until 4:15.
P: This lady said messages started coming in at X 1:00.
K: Butthe White House didn't know about it until 4:15.
P: I want a report. You tell the State Department and the others I want
a report,
K: We have already done that.
P: But you can do it in my name, I am personally interested;
that
I am god-damned mad, Do we have a plan
You are trying to get the British
and Panamanians to protest, and we'll protest it to no one I suppose,
K: We'll protest through the Swiss.
P: Trying to get information; find out if they are dead or alive, I want
a contingency plan for this sort of thing in the future. If Castro gives us
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TELECON
The President
12/16/71 5:15pm p. 2
anything like this in the future I want a plan to go in and shoot them up. We
do nothing but make a timid protest. You say we will be on the edge of the law
and all that; that doesn't bother me. Does it bother you?
K: No. We were going to to into the British territorial waters. We were
giving orders here; the buraaucracy was baving heart attacks and then darkness fell.
We would have done it.
P: What is the objection from the bureaucracy on this?
K: Complaining about internationäl law; saying we would be getting into
an argument with the Russians.
P; Probably only you know how strongly I feel about the Cuban business. I
sharply stiffened Ziegler's statement this afternoon; it wasn't tough enough.
K: That's why I ordered these things without checking with you.
P: Abd about recognizing Castro
it's going to come up one day, but
you understand.
K: I do.
P: And you will have a contingency plan for the future?
K: Within 24 hours.
P: I am wrrting a memorandum on this and on Allende which is for your eyes
only so you will know in the future how far I am willing to go.
K: That will be very helpful.
P: I was on the plane then -- you acted but
K: It would have saved a half-hour's protest if I had had that piece of
paper to wave,
P: But you feel good about India-Pakistan?
K: Barring total treachery
P: On the part OS the Indians.
K: And the Russians. The real problem now is cosmetics,
P: What will this do to your backgrounder?
K: I still think we should do it/
P: But maybe not by noon tomorrow?
X
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TELECON
The President
12/16/71 5be6 5:15pm p. 3
K: I think it will be okay by then. The problem with a backgrounder is
the Washington Post is now no longer recognizes them. I маумиха mayhave to do
a series of individual interviews.
P: Or don't include the Washington Post.
K: But Knoght now goes along with the Post.
P: So do the private ones. Can you imagine the Brisish press doing this?
Why are they doing it? They never did it with Kennedy.
K: They are trying to knock me off the public forum. This wasn't even a
backgrounder. I said this was given on the Lindley rule. Kraslow made a very
strong statement saying he thought this was an outrage.
P: At least will you be sure we cover the Time Magazine? And maybe the
New York Times; that will screw the Post.
K: I think Time and Max Frankel.
P: And maybe the Saar.
K: Maybe George Herman.
P: Ask Colson about that; maybe it should be Hempstone. I hope you are go-
ing to get a good rest.
K: I am fine.
P: I told Bob that you should go directly to C lifornia from Key Biscayne.
Take your children and go out there. On the first I-am flying from here to
Washington to see Mrs. Nixon off. But this is a good time for you to get out
there. Go out on the 29th if your kids can go then.
K: I have to have my kids back by the 31st, so I am going to Boston. But
my kids will be in Key Biscayne with me.
P: Oh that's good.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Bush/Kissinger
5:45 p.m. 12/16/71
B:
I got over here to the Council and the Russians were putting their
draft out. They were just about to vote, nobody would put it in
so I just went ahead and read into the record that there is another
resolution getting wide circulation. I read this into the record. It
could be ours or ours and the Japanese.
K:
It is the one we approved earlier?
B:
It is the Italian draft with just a slight change. It is the one Pakistan
wants, the one the PRC would buy and exactly the one we have been
talking about. I;d like you to back me up on this.
K:
OK. You did absolutely right and if State complains you can blame
me. Tell them you couldn't operate with a Soviet draft.
B:
Good. I will leave it on the table.
K:
Well, as long as it is not the Soviet draft it doesn't bother me.
B:
We couldn't get any of the little countries. They will vote for it,
but not put their name on it.
K:
You did the right thing, George
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Rowland Evans/Kissinger
5:50 p.m.
12/16/71
K: Sorry I was so hard to get.
E:
Nx Anything going on?
We
K: It's winding up. Unless it is a perfidious trick, I think it will work.
She
will know by noon tomorrow.
E: When are you leaving town?
K: Sat. morning.
E: Early?
K: 9:00 or 10:00.
E: I would like a better view on some of this Soviet stuff.
K: I will do my best. Maybe we can have breakfast Sat. morning.
E: I will call your office tomorrow afternoon. I think there's a hell of an
important story but it fascinates me personally.
K: It's a fascinating story and they have played a shitty role.
E: I will call your office.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
6:05 p.m.
12/16/71
H: I don't need to bother you because the President got caught up so I don't
need to.
K: Coming home. Indian unilateral ceasefire permanent if accepted in 24
hours
H: Pakistanis accept?
K: We are working on them. Getting UN to ratify. By tomoorow all done.
H: I thought it was back on track. I talked with Al this morning. We haven't
had any effort by Rogers to get through.
K: They are so far out of the game. Rogers said this morning he was taking
personal charge. That was after India announced ceasefire.
H: That's good. We are back on track?
K: Yes. We have saved W. Pakistan. We turned disaster into defeat. Best
we could do was save W. Pakistan. I am concerned about one other thing.
Ad vance party to China £ is turning into
.
We cannot announce new
3 heads of it. They have never heard of Zeigler. They expect Haig. Chapin
Zeigler and Al Haig. I think it should be cut down on TV numbers. This has
been a humiliating defeat to them. They are terrorized of an attack. So we
cannot be TV nuts.
H: I thought of that. But with ground station
K: They can do it with less. If Zeigler has to, he will.
H: We can cut back more. Let's try. It will smoke them out.
K: We are really skating on thin ice. You can trust me. I will background tom-
orrow afternoon. I have to do it with individuals. If groups, it will leak again.
H: You have trouble with the Washington Post and others will pick it up.
K: I didn't say I am making a major announcement on background.
H: Ben Bradlee will not accept background as background.
K: I said only on Lindley rule. Otherwise there was justification but not
on this.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Alton Marshall/Kissinger
6:20 p.m.
12/16/71
M: This is your friendly real estate broker.
K: I have just seen what you said about me in Cosmopolitan.
M: I said you are a sex fiend.
K: A moth around the flames.
M: Honest? What do adx I do? Since 1:00 when I got your call I find that the
Chinese group has contacted most of the real estate brokers in the city. So
I am looking at the same houses. I have about 18 possibilities and a coupld that
have been checked this afternoon.
K: Should they get in touch with you?
M: I would like to help them.
K: Let them contact you. What can you do for them?
M: I can put some of my people at their disposal to sort out with brokers what
they are being offered. Technical assistante. We are not brokers and don't deal
in residences. Ix When I made the call they knew what the interest was because
they had worked with them. I never used the name.
K: Where do they get you?
M: CI5-9000.
K: I will tell them what you said. Get in touch with brokers and technical
assistance.
M: And glad to do it.
K: Here's the quote: "No one in campaign $ ???? mankk moth
around the flame."
M: The last sentence has come out. He put that together. He asked
if you like politics. I said of course he likes the political
intrigue.
K: It's a friendly article. How are you?
M: I am great. I want you to see how great I am. We have the
XXXX orange crates in place.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELECON
General Casey
* 12.16.71 5x62pm 6:42pm
C: Did you get a copy of the note Leo Cherne sent to Safire to get to
your attention?
K: No.
c: Well, the International Rescue Committee is sending me to Calcutta
they are trying to get me to go with him.
K: To do what?
C: To review the refugee program there.
K: We don't want to give any encouragement to the Indians.
C: This is humanitarian business.
K: I don't want to give any moral support or backing to the Indians.
C: Well, I am not
about it.
K: I would just as soon you didn't.
C: Okay.
K: Okay, thank you for checking with me.
C : I wouldn't dare go xx without doing it.
K: Thank you.
C: Take care.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Shultz/Kissinger
6:57 p.m. 12/16/71
K: It looks like we are getting the war wound up.
S: Congratulations! It's an achievement under the akkiewx circumstances.
K: We have turned a disaster into a defeat. I am not kiding myself.
wind
S: I am on the subject of the Defense budget. I need to it up.
K: First of all the President is determined on increas on F-111. The $500
million part of it.
S: In terms of econimic employmentixx impacts a spending program in the
'73 budget has no impact prior to election.
K: The problem is somebody has to give on that and since the President will
not give orders and thinks I can get it done I don't know what to do. *********
I was content with 78.5. He wants to do it for political reasons.
S: Let me track down what the F-111 amounts to.
K: $200 million.
S: What's the other item? month We now have a sentence on pay (?) that takes 300
out. We have a 5th in which they have not had 6 million in outlay in '72.
Their spending level is below 6. Their ? ? ? ? 200 thousand between now and
the end of the year. They will have to push hard to get spending up. They
areawash with money over there. I will come back on the F-111.
K: Will you?
S: We do have to look this thing up. Another thing we have to be alert to.
Say in it foreign aid handled in Pentagon. They are loading it into service
budgets Bad from a lot of stand points, including if you are not grateful
careful you will have each branch of the service with its own foreign policy.
We have to have it here.
K: Where? Isn't it your job? They have it done there.
S: President would like that.
K: He doesn't care if it's donw there but not good through XRX Foreign Relations
Committee.
S: I will not succeed on that.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Shultz/Kissinger
6:57 p.m. 12/16/71
-2-
K: Can't you set up budget procedures? No one will fight you on that.
S: I ivill if I can. Tell them not to put it into the service budgets.
K: I am not XXXX sure I understand it.
S: I will get you a memo on it.
K: Next year we want to give only humanitarian stuff to India. Less then 100
million dollars. Maury Williams thinks ? ? ? ? ?
.
lump sum for
South Asia with Pakistan getting the most.
S: You want only humanitarian type aid for India.
K: We don't want to face it as an overt thing.
S: your numbers make it fi x difficult. Amount going into India is difficult
because people x can add and subtract.
K: We will take that risk.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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[Mr. Hubbard in Key Biscaynej
TELCON
Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger
8:25 p.m., December 16, 1971
H:
You called before and I got the message 10 minutes ago for which
I apologize.
K:
I was returning your call.
H:
Yes, I know. Have you had a good week so far?
K:
Yes.
H:
What happened on Air Force 1 and whether you had anything to say.
K:
No, I was trying to do it for the reporters as a favor. At their
urgent request to do something about the Azores and at the end of
it took some questions from them on India-Pakistan. I said, Look
this is not to be attributed and then I answered questions on it.
H:
When I gave you the Pool report
K:
I suppose I could have taken it out then but I figured it was the
Lindley Rule and they would take it out. If they had said it might
and without ascribing Administration sources, I would have been
better off putting on on background because then I could have edited
it out.
H:
You were ill served by some of my close colleagues.
K:
The only part
use the background technique to hide a major
announcement. I was trying to be helpful to the reporters on Air Force 1
It was a long ride and boring. I should have taken it out of the Pool
report. Using my name was no worse than using Administration
sources.
H:
I suppose so. Everything that you said has been forgotten because
of all this fuss on ground rules. Dave Kraslow didn't hurt himself.
K:
No, no; if they blow the whole background thing, I think they will
get less information.
H:
I don't understand my colleagues at the Washington Post sometimes.
To deal with matters of substance, what have you been saying about
your two breakfasts with Pompidou, how shall we deal with that,
can you say what you discussed?
K:
You can say we discussed the agenda, that we tried to narrow the
issues for decision.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
- 2 -
Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger
8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971
H:
Oh, really. So that necessarily involved you in monetary affairs
as well as national affairs.
K:
Whatever was on the agenda.
H:
Did you trade impressions on Brezhnev?
K:
I don't think it would be right for me to comment on discussions.
H:
Did you cover what discussions he would have with the President?
K:
If within manageable proposals. I do it almost always. If not with
the principal, with the principal's assistant.
H:
On this, why not the head of State. Was there no one else there who
could play that role?
K:
In this case there were matters of more than usual sensitivities.
H:
Fair enough.
K:
And I happen to know Pompidou and in fact, I did this the last time
he was here.
H:
Oh, I didn't know that. Was it known?
K:
I don't think so but this wouldn't have been known either but it is hard
to move in the Azores.
H:
Do you think you will be satisfied with the way things came out?
K:
They came out very well. I think everybody got their issues covered
which is what they wanted.
H:
On South Asia, things have worked out well to the extent that they - -
K:
Worked out best way they could
I am not saying we wanted
East Pakistan to go this way but when the war started we set ourselves - -
It is boring as hell - - - did we talk about it last week?
H:
No.
K:
It was Jerry Schecter I talked to about it.
H:
(laughter)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
- 3 -
Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger
8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971
K:
You didn't ask to see me.
H:
I'm not complaining.
K:
Our problem was to preserve West Pakistan and I think it is working
out. A major crisis has been avoided by bringing all the factors into
play including the Soviets.
H:
About the hard line you and the President took on the Indian thing,
there is a strain in relationships.
K:
Yeah, I think we told
H:
Was there a reason for it?
K:
Yeah, but I don't want to go any further into it. Do not ascribe this
In fact, I have information that it is very probable that India would
attack West Pakistan and smabh West Pakistan.
H:
But the Soviet Union --
K:
If we had not taken an anti-Indian line, they almost certainly would
have continued.
H:
I have no doubt of that.
Actually, people say we drove India awa
/
K:
There is no doubt. We don't do this
India bought about $600
million worth of Russian equipment while we were giving it billions
of aid so we didn't move it intentionally into the Russian orbit, nor
will their future policy during the crisis. They want to be independent
of the Soviet Union and we have no reason to believe they will wish
to become Soviet satelittes.
The consequences of going
along with it would have been the destruction of a country of 100 million
people.
H:
Any reason to believe the Soviets responded to U.S. comments or
pressures.
K:
I wouldn't say pressures but there were
xxx
very active conversations
with Moscow.
H:
Moscow or Dobrynin?
K:
I don't want to mention the channels used but there was very active
action.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
4 I I
Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger
8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971
H:
Finally they responded.
K:
Let's wait until how the Security Council goes.
H:
Would you say there was a change in Soviet attitude? In other words,
either another 70 or another experience in adventure.
K:
I think what we are in, the Soviets helped either deliberately or
accidentally which like 67 they had great difficulty controlling.
H:
That's a much softer line than you took on the plane.
K:
On the plane I said they don't do nothing to restrain
H:
Because they don't know how or because they choose not to.
K:
Because they don't
but I think they were one of the factors
that brought it out reasonably well, assuming it came out reasonably
well. We will have to hold our breath for a few days.
H:
Did you take note of the Jack Anderson column this morning quoting you?
K:
Look, I would be very leery of going with things took totally out of
context.
H:
It is pretty clear that it is out of context but are the quotes correct?
K:
My minutes don't show it but my minutes might not report every word.
H:
It is fair to say and it is
that you were way out ahead of
President Nixon even more behind
K:
How could I survive in this Government where half the town is laying
for me? You know there is nothing half the bureaucracy would like
to find more than me with no support from the President. I try to
give a moderate interpretation of what I believe are his views.
H:
Would it be fair to say he was outraged or
.
K:
It has never been our style
H:
On India, to say it was ran from the White House with you executing
from the White House.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
- 5 -
Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger
8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971
K:
As the crisis got worse, not at the beginning but where it reached
the point when the [heads of governments became involved. We
brought it to the conclusion that was attainable.
H:
It is difficult to argue with what it now considered success.
K:
We turned a disaster into a net-minus.
H:
Well phrased.
K:
I am not claiming success of what had the capacity of being an enormous
disaster bak put into containable limits.
H:
Soviet supported Indian aggression.
K:
In the case of military, active. I think I have stayed away from the
word aggression.
H:
You used it, we didn't.
K:
I mean I haven't pressed on it.
H:
Have we all overlooked
K:
On a Lindley Rule basis, if there is still people to use it with.
H:
It is easy to use it with one man but not with 150.
K:
The Lindley Rule inconsistent with the Pool report. I blew it, I was
just damn stupid, therefore, I am not claiming
.
H:
Is that on-the-record, that you blew it?
K:
No, no; you are not going to write about this?
H:
No, I wasn't calling you about that. I wasn't going to use anything you
said without your authorization. Oh, hell let's forget about that,
it is not that important a story. It is over and done with and you
needn't concern yourself with that. I am really interested in the
Soviet-US. relationship.
K:
On the Lindley Rule, you have to say it is worrisome. If you read
what I said in the backgrounder about U.S. -Soviet relations, you will
see that I was being very, very careful not to use unilateral advantage.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
- 6 -
Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger
8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971
H:
In the arena that the argument takes place
K:
In the Middle East
H:
For they are totally unable to resist?
K:
They are encouraged to resist. We can't possibly get into the position
of counting Indian actions
and frankly, I have to say the
report has totally missed. Again, off-the-record,
she misled us
and the President was anything but cold-blooded if there was some
irritation in these conversations.
Once the war started, it didn't
make a goddamn difference what happened in Bangla Desh. Whatever
mistake we made in letting it get started, we tried to get it done and
limit the damange. We can repair our relations with India after th e
war, that problem is much deeper.
H:
That makes much more sense than what we have seen reported.
K:
Newsweek wasn't as bad as Time.
H:
I haven't seen Time but Newsweek was a disaster.
K:
I thought Time was so awful that Newsweek didn't seem as bad. Our
nightmare last week was that the whole situation in the world could
get unraveled.
H:
How did it get out of hand at first? Either we were too soft with them
or it fell between the cracks.
K:
Or the Indians were so determined to use this, nothing would have made
any difference.
We cut $31 of $35 million worth of military
equipment. You can't say these are not actions of condemnation. Yahya
is not going to win any IQ tests -- that's off-the-record. He never
managed to package into proposals
If he had publically instead of
dribbling them out one at a time.
There was constant pressure
to take the Indian intervention to the UN but the Indians always asked us
not to do it. If we had recognized in October
the worse judgment
we made is that we thought we had more time.
H:
At the end?
K:
The whole time. It was just hard to believe I'm not looking for
credit but I must have been the only one who thought the Indians would
attack.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
- 7 -
Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger
8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971
H:
Are you including the President?
K:
Yeah, and after all we didn't make negligible concessions. We had
discussions with
offered to establish talks with Mujibur and
his lawyer
They were never given a chance to develop. I
am not trying to judge here, I am just saying India is not to be
underrated.
H:
The final solution on the Pakistani
K:
Of course they may find out -- they will almost certainly be
The East Benglais suffered under the East Pakistanis from neglect but
the Indians have a positive way to keep it under control because they
can not have a completely independent Bangla Desh.
They have a positive interest to keep it in some sort of relationship
and you have to remember when people say an elected government in
Dacca was overthrown, this was perfectly true. In Calcutta there is
presidential control.
Of course, I am not going to say
Yahya was right.
H:
Dealing with the situation given.
K:
Our problem, given the danger of war, was to prevent it.
H:
K:
I didn't mention China before because we didn't want
the trip to Peking to be a success but didn't want China to think it is
a threat.
H:
From the Soviet Union?
K:
From several of its neighbors.
H:
On the plane, I thought it was an actual reflection of what you wanted
the Russians to understand.
K:
We had other means of conveying it. Will you check other quotes with
me?
H:
Yes. Are you coming down here?
K:
No, I am out of favor. Look, the President -- this was his strategy
and he didn't know what I was doing. He wanted us to get across to the
Soviets that this had profound consequences.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
- 8 -
Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger
8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971
H:
All right.
K:
On what basis were we talking here?
H:
Ell, I think the basis is I will use the knowledge you have imparted
upon me on my own and I will check quotes with you.
K:
That would be very good. What about your other story?
H:
I haven't finished it yet. I really ought to see you once more.
K:
Yes, there's one part I ought to see you about. You know you asked
me how much is mine and how much is the President's -- I shouldn't
write it that way.
H:
My impression leans toward the idea of your creation of the President
that he has assigned you powers and if anything he is a
little bit out ahead of you.
K:
I think that's right. That is a fair impression.
H:
I am willing that you can shape your
K:
Up to a certain point.
H:
He does have his own mind.
K:
Of course, he does.
H:
It is friendly --
K:
and professional.
H:
But that he knows who you are and what you both are doing. That
your loyalty is to the
K:
I think that is very perceptive. We can get together next week sometime.
Or are you going to go to Key Biscayne.
H:
Oh, is he coming back here. I will stick around next week and I think
they will have somebody else here.
K:
All right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
President/Kissinger
10:00 a. m. - 12/17/71
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Hello, Henry, what's the topic today?
K:
It looks like we are in business. The Paks have accepted it.
P:
Does that mean she (Mrs. Gandhi) won't break it?
K:
Well, she has no pretext to break it. Oh, they are bringing me
in a flash cable. The Celanese want us to put some of our ships
in the Indian Ocean into Colombo.
P:
Why do they want them?
K:
They would like to show our presence.
P:
I see.
K:
But at any rate, Yahya has accepted it now. The Security Council
in essence killed the Soviet resolution last night. What we did after
you and I talked - the British were horsing around with this non-
permanent residents resolution and the Soviets were running around
with one. We just took the resolution of the others as ours. We had
to because the Soviets were going to
As it was the Soviet
one was killed - never got to a vote. They adjourned and this was
better for us. It means both sides have accepted the ceasefire.
P:
As far as the Security Council is concerned, what will they do?
K:
Well, my view is that if the fighting flares up again the attacker will
be violating a UN order - this is the only advantage. The disadvantage
is that it legitimizes aggression. Our position is if anyone wants to
vote for our resolution we will be ddighted to let it pass.
P:
Yes, I think that is a good point. Now at the present time the
Paks are satisfied, the Chinese are satisfied and the Russians.
That is fine.
K:
We have come out of this amazingly well and we scared the pants
off the Russians. One shouldn't give somebody who drops a match
into a fire, credit for calling the fire department.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN08-51/12400 Per Hr. 9/11/2013
By RS IMIH NARA, Date 5/12/2017
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
[p.1 of 4]
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2
P:
Are you going to do a background thing?
K:
I talked to Scalli. I will have a backgrounder with two or three
groups of two each and in a general way explain our strategy.
I think it is too early to put out the details.
P:
Yes, I think that is very important. What will we get out of it?
K:
Well, Henry Hubbard called me yesterday and he said the President
did it again. We were all screaming at him and he was vindicated
by events. And Kleiman was in from the New York Times this
morning, but I didn't do too much with him.
P:
He must be pretty pleased with the Azores trip.
K:
The Azores he was delighted with but the Post had a grudging position.
P:
I see. Henry, I do believe we have got to get the Cabinet meetings
leaked out.
K:
Well, this is one of our great sources of intelligence. What we can
get out is that they were planning to attack but not say how.
P:
Well, now if the question is raised about aid to India, I would be
just completely
I wouldn't tell them anything. The thing to do is
to do it but don't tell them anything. But on the other hand, it is XXX
thing what we do not what we say.
K:
Mrs. Gandhi has written a letter which has been leaked to the press.
P:
That is outrageous.
K:
We are drafting a reply and I think we ought to release it.
P:
Release it before she gets it.
K:
Right, because that gives us another chance to make our case.
P:
Now, what points
Does Scalli think it is important for you to
do the background thing?
K:
Yes, he thinks it is essential.
P:
What points are you going to get across basically?
K:
The point that I want to get across.
P:
What I mean is to bring on the details.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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3
K:
We have to let them know this was not a war just between India
and Pakistan, but whatever are the initial reasons.
P:
I think you ought to make the point very strongly that if we dixdn't
hadn't used our influence as strongly as possible, it never would
have come out the way it did. The word would have been carried
on from one UN member to another. I think that is the point.
K:
Well, that is a good point and also that it would have had a very
serious impact if the Soviet Union had.
P:
And in other parts of the world it would have been resisted.
K:
Your whole strategy from the beginning was to bring about what
in fact we did. There are many who heard me talk about this
last week.
P:
That is right so they are prepared for it.
K:
Even Henry Hubbard said for a few days we thought we had to change
our evaluation a little bit, but you have come out right again.
But what I will not do is put out all the exchanges. That is premature.
P:
Yes, and I suppose we should stay away from any interagency
bickering and all of that. I should think everyone is happy.
(State)
K:
No, now they want to take credit for it.
P:
Anything further on my Cuban friends?
K:
The British gave permission to the Coast Guard at 2:30 in the
afternoon to enter the waters.
P:
Permission, they should have ordered them to do it.
K:
Well, wasn't passed on to the White House
until 4:15
P:
Someone is going to get fired. I want to know what was going on
between 2:15 and 4:15. You tell them the President wants to know
what happened during that time. Those two hours meant danger
to a lot of lives. Are you going to get out a contingency plan?
K:
Oh, sure.
P:
You understand I feel very strongly in human terms about this.
I don't think Castro is going to get away with this sort of thing
in the future. Do you agree?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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4
K:
Yes, we have to act much more
P:
What was it the Tripoli bipartite?
K:
Yes.
P:
Good, that's the principal I want to play.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
President/Kissinger
10:43 a.m.
12/17/7½
P: On this one other thing on the Cuban thing and backgrounder.
On the Cuban thing we have done everything we can about getting
information and filing protext?
K: The protest has been filed.
P: British going to protest?
K: I have not heard their reply.
P: Panamanians have?
K: That's right.
P: Follow it thru ruthlessly. Great public £* visibility. I
want the Russians to know we are raising hell about it.
K: I fully understand that.
P: I was just looking at the morning papers here and probably
TV too. Great Indian victory and Dacca and ceasefire. It's importa:
to get across fact that Indians were aggressiors and when she did
ceasefire it wasn't an act of grace. She shouldn't get credit for
starting the fire and then calling in the fire department. The size
of a country or its form of government cannot justify aggression.
The U.S. does not take issues on side of who has the power. It's
back to Hitler and
.
It's a moral position. My whole view
is not anti-Indian or pro-Pakistan but anti-aggression. I don't wan
India to get the victory.
K: They have a victory.
P: But they shouldn't praise it.
K: Right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Richard Scaife/Paul Hayworth/Kissinger
11:15 a.m.
12/17/7½
S: I am so frustrated. I listened to NBC news this morning. You
know what's going on in the world. I have my editorial page editor
here. I want good news to come out.
K: What's NBC doing?
S: Shaking everyone up. Will you tell Hayworth your views?
H: It's an honor to talk with you, sir. The overall public feeling
that we have blown it in the India-Pakistan situation. I would like
something positive. I know it's a comples situation. I am trying
to look at possible areas of X future solutions for this area.
K: What's the basis of saying we have blown it?
H: We were indecisive in the area. Damned if we do and damned if
we don't. No concret steps. That's oversimplistic.
K: Total nonsense. We took major steps but India determined to have
war. Only steps to prevent war -- pouring military aid Ínto
Pakistan -- we couldn't talk. Major steps that would have been
perfectly (concordant ?) with
but India WIN didn't want
it. They were egged on by the Russians.
H: Best you could, trying to reduce --
K: We have given more relief to refugees then rest of the world
put together We have done a whole list of things. I could have
an assistant call you and tell you what we have done. Once we are
started President moved to keep it from spreading to West and U.S.
deserves credit for not letting it spread.
H: It's a good point. We are about to cut it to 14 days. Where
are we going now as it stands? Eventual recognition of Bangla Desh?
K: We want to defuse the situation.
H: How?
K: I don't want to go into that.
H: A definite plan you hope to follow?
K: Hopt to be active. Pressident's desx decisive moves towards
India and Soviets were a major factor that brought war to a conclusi
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Scaife/Hayworth/Kissinger
11:15 a.m.
12/17/7½
-2-
H: I appreciate this.
K: Whom should my assistant call?
H: Paul Hayworth. 412/834-1151. You have been most kind. Much
luok.
K: I appreciate it. Someone will call you within the hour.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
McCloy/Kissinger
11:23 a.m.
12/17/7½
M: I tried to get you yesterday.
K: I have been in over my head.
M: Had a thought to get you out of difficulties with a nomination.
K: Why don't you write a letter to the President?
M: Suggesting it? I don't see how Fulbright can turn him down.
K: It's an excellent idea.
M: I thought of some time back of writing you a little note of what
I thought he might be ready to do. You don't need it, do you?
K: I transmitted it to the President. He has a horror of
commissions and special
.
M: The other ***** wasn't my dish of tea. I see a light in the
tunnel on the monetary situation.
(The "he" referred to above for nomination is Dave Packard)
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TELCON
Rabin/Kissinger
11:36 a.m.
12/17/71
R: It was my
from Joe. Started X by Secretary saying
he wants this eschange. It would help to have a special meeting
but because of time table it's impossible. He started by asking
our Foreign Minister for his analysis and estimate of what happened
in the Gen. Assembly and results of talk yesterday with Jarring.
With Jarring it's freezed and no flexibility from our point of view.
The Secy. was not sorry about
at mission. Israel would
have found more positive language to answer Jarring message of
Feb. 8. The main issue as the Secy. sees it is resumption of
talks on
.
Our Foreign Minister said that talks in NX
there's no interim settlement. The Secy. said no, the U.S. has its
own reasons that beginning of January the Egyptians might agree.
I am afraid even though the Foreign Minister said there is basic
differences between the U.S. and Israelon interim settlement and
how it can work, I wouldn't be surprised if the Secy.
got the impression that we would talk.
K: You were not supposed to do that.
R: I am having lunch with Sisco. Unfortunately the Foreign
Minister forgot that there XXX were certain qualifications of the
U.S. we asked and not answered yet.
K: Can't you do that?
R: I will do it.
K: Make sure it stays in phase. That
doesn't get ahead
of what I am doing.
R: The Foreign Minister goes back Sunday.
K: Can you come in at 5:00?
R: Yeah. Sisco says now we are free to go ahead --
K: He said I had to talk with you.
R: I will call him and say definitian of ? ? ? ?.
K: Time consuming proceedures.
R: I am leaving on the 29th and probably return on 6 or 7.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Rabin/Kissinger
11:36 a.m.
12/17/7½
-2-
K: I will see you at 5:00 in the Map Room. Good.
R: One point more. I think the PM mentioned last Friday letting
the Russians know there were some talks and resumption of hostilities
K: Before I go to Bermuda I will do this.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Amb. Bush/Kissinger
11:43 a.m.
12/17/7½
B: We are X waiting to hear from Bhutto. I talked to him earlier.
The British --
K: I just talked with Cromer. On
resolution. What's
your view?
B: It's a lower common denominator. It's an attempt to subvert
what Somalia's trying to do. They said he was making progress and
this looks like beying out for India at the cheapest possible price.
But if we want to get off perhaps its way to do it.
K: Ceasefire and withdrawal.
B: The one we worked on yesterday? Bhutto said this mornigg he
didn't want to legitimize surrender. I am seeing the Ambassador
at 12:00. Our resolution had withdrawal in there.
K: I saw it.
B: It had also humanitarian thing. The British are buying off the
lowest
common
dexx denominator to get the Security Council off the
matter. They probably see in our resolution a support of other
activities going through.
K: Then we stuck with ours.
B: I X may get a call from
saying minister wants to buy
off on it.
K: On British? We have no reason to be more Pakistani then the
Pakistanis. Do the R Pakistanis have the British resolution?
B: Ghutto in press conference so I cannot be sure.
K: Let me know where the state of play is. I prefer our resoljtion.
I share your views on the British. But if the Pakistanis are ready
to go, we are. It's a lousy, cheap exercise. I have expressed
it to the British Ambassador. Would Russians have accepted last nigh
B: No. The Indian Foreign Minister said okay, you would have to go
back to Moscow. I said yeah. As soon as Pakistan ambassador comes
back -- he wanted what we had last night.
K: Don't press them.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Amb. Bush/Kissinger
11:43 a.m.
12/17/7½
-2-
B: I won't. He said they wanted it.
K: As long as chance for ours stick with ours. Talk with me or
Haig.
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TELCON
J. Alsop/Kissinger
3:13 p.m.
12/17/71
A: I hear you claim you made a disaster into a setback and I claim
you have turned a catastrophe into a disaster.
K: At least we stopped the fighting into the West.
A: I am going to write about it and you can't stop me. I was going
to see Al Monday.
K: I won't be here.
A: Let's waxk set a time on Wed. How about 11:00?
K: I have to keep my mornings free.
A: Let's make lunch.
K: We will.
A: No, I can't change my plans. How about later in the morning?
K: Let me aim for 12:30 in the morning.
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TELCON
Amb. Raza/Kissinger
3:25 p.m.
12/17/71
R: I was at it until 12:00 last night going through each telegram.
I prepared a statement and signed every page and want to hand it
over to you. I don't want to let my friends down. It's clear
so I would like to come for 5 mins.
K: Come at 4:30.
R: Did you ask about Mr. Bhutto?
K: Not yet but I will know by the end of the day.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Justice Godberg/Kissinger
3:55 p.m.
12/17/71
G: What I have to call you about is probably outdated for the moment. This is
latest businesss about Jacobsen.
K: I don't know where it stand at the minute.
G: Nx Anybody suggested to you the fustration of the Soviet manuever?
K: Veto any condidate except Jacobsen on first ballot.
G: It seems absurd to let them off the hook.
K: You know the UN.
went
G: I to the UN with high hopes. They don't want our to say that a Finn and
Jew is not acceptable and a private unmarked poll is theix way around it.
K: It's my private recommendation to State. I don't think the President should
become involved.
G: It's what I would do automatically. I went to Pittsburgh and when I heard about
it I said I would not kike let them get away with it. He would differ with getting to
public against India.
K: We had to do it to keep them off W. Pakistan. We weren't concerned so
much about East Pakstan.
G: I am out of govte and don't know the facts. I have no sympathy with them
aka at all. I never hesitated to punch them in the nose when they misbehaved.
We are a great power too. You pass it on to the Dept.
K: No one expects to ? ? ? ? . Everyone talksx takes your views with utmost
.
I have no pain about what you said.
G: If we have time in NY - - the President shouldn't get involved. People should
handle without involving him. Handles in NY. I would never have agreed to
this procedure. I would have said let's go ahead and vote.
K: They proposed it. Let me check on it. OK. Nice to talk with you.
G: Let's get together soon.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
M. Bundy/Kissinger
4:22 p.m. 12/17/71
B: I am coming down tomorrow to Billy and Lucy Moor head's 25th wedding
anniverary. Are you going to be in town?
K: I will be out of town.
B: I want to talk with you about how to go on the next step on India and Pakistan.
What's your schedule aft er that?
K: Mon. and Tues. in Bermuda. How about lunch on Wed. ?
B: I will be there. Have they stopped shooting?
K: Yes. ?7????.
B: I am no longer optimistic on that point. I have the Goldwater version of
the Kissinger papers and I see what you are trying to do.
K: It makes ixx it easier for his successor.
B: I have no quarrel with effort that was made. When one gets preoccupied
with what happens on one plan when it's necessary to discuss next plan. On
the ceasefire one the ENTERPRISE come home?
K: Yes. Is Thurs. equally good for you?
B: Hold a second. Thurs. is better.
K: Let's do it Thurs.
B: Lunch?
K: Yes.
B: If complications, pass the word to me.
K: On the ENTERRRISE we wanted to make sure same thing did not happen in
W. Pakistan and that's what she was planning.
B: That's over now.
K: So we have no additional reason for keeping her there.
B: The sooner she goes off to my war the better off you will be.
DECLASSIFIED
K: I will get a war of my own.
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN08-51/12401 Per Hr. 9/11/2013
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library RS WITH NARA, Date 5/12/2017
DECLASSIFIED
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TELCON
Henry Brandon/Kissinger
4:50 p.m.
12/17/71
B: I would like to see you for a few minutes about the Heath meeting.
K: I doubt it.
B: Anything special on your side?
K: No. We have to wipe up the mess on the subcontinent. It ended after the
tragedy of it's beginning. We at least saved W. Pakistan. That's what we were
after.
B: What do you think should be done now?
K: You know what can be done now? Can't -- there's not much that can be done
now. We have to face the facts of what this means.
B: What does it mean to you?
K: You know my views. It could not have happened without the Soviet Union.
B: Yeah.
K: It's also true it could not have ended without the Soviet Union. But I don't
throws
know if someone who takes a match into a powder keg should get credit for
bring the fire dept.
B: It was their doing.
K: Like the M. E. war was. It could not have happened XXX without them.
B: In terms of common action.
K: Whose?
B: U.S. and U.K.
K: I am not sure that common action is the motto of your govt at the moment.
B: I think it may be true. I am not sure that it may be a little bit of pick
in this.
02 what ?
The action earlier on the part of the U.S.
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H. Brandon/Kissinger
4:50 p.m.
12/17/71
-2-
K: On the China trip?
B: And the economic stuff.
Mx K: The point has now been xxixlx made and penetrated. They don't owe us
one anymore.
B: Can we get together when you are back? In two weeks time I will have to
do a major piece on state of anglo-American relations.
K: Better to do it after.
B: I have a Christmas present for you here.
K: You are nice. If you said it right away you would be in now.
B: That's why I didn't say it. I will be in Vt.
K: I will be here until 7:00-7:30.
B: I will just drop it in.
K: And we can chat for 5 mins. How's Muffie?
B: She has gone.
K: You will be back Wed. ?
B: No, not until Sun. a week.
K: I will be in Key Biscayne.
B: Until when?
K: Through the Brandt meeting.
B: OK. Then we will see.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
D. Frost/Kissinger
5:00 p.m.
12/17/71
HAK said he could not do dinner in NY on Sunday evening as he had to fly to
Bermuda that night. DF asked if he was going to be on the coast for Christmas
and HAK said no, but at the first week in Jan. Frost then reiterated his invita-
tion to lunch on the 12th.
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TELCON
President/Kissinger
5:42 p.m.
- 12/17/71
K:
Mr. President.
P:
I worked that thing out with Bhutto. I told Bob and we are doing
it at 1:30. I think it is a very good idea. I would like to stick
it to the Indians and under no circumstances will I see the Indian
Ambassador. We will give Bhutto a good showing. He is coming
in for a half hour. You have a little cold?
K:
No, I have probably been talking a lot today.
P:
You feel all right though.
K:
I feel fine.
P:
How is everything going?
K:
It looks like there won't be any Security Council Resolution. The
Paks won't accept the British. The British have been outrageous.
I have been talking with Cromer and he says the British don't want
a big announcement out of Bermuda.
P:
Then why the hell go to Bermuda?
K:
But I think it is important not to let them off the hook and tell them
we
are
xxxxxxx
xxith disatisfied with the degree of unity there has
been on this and other things.
P:
What is the matter with them? Are they playing the Russian line?
K:
Well, they are playing a Jekyl line.
P:
Did you try to use the French?
K:
They have just separated themselves. The British have actually
worked against us as they did on the presentation issue.
P:
What do they want? Just be on the side of the Indians?
K:
Well, they don't want to do anything that displeases the Indians.
Reston had a very good comment. He said the only ones who
understood what was involved was the Administration; it finally
understood the larger strategic challenge of Moscow's power play.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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2
P:
You know it probably was the backgrounder thing that did it.
Now how have you done today?
K:
I talked to the AP and UP through Scali. That worked very well.
Scalli is doing Kalb.
P:
You do Time-Life and Frankel.
K:
Well, Frankel is in another country. I did a little bit with Kleiman
in the morning.
P:
Do it simple.
K:
Now I talked to Time but Time is way off on the Indian side. Now
they will claim their letter to you is a terrible pushoff and I think
we ought to put off your reply tomorrow so it hits the same cycle.
P:
OK.
K:
I am getting a reply ready now on the things we have done so this
is a matter of record.
P:
I would think State would have done it already.
K:
Oh, State, it took them 10 hours to get two paragraphs over here.
P:
Let's give it a full reply and shoot it off. Make it on plain white
paper.
K:
But we will have to get it out before the newspapers close.
P:
You will have to do it fast.
K:
I think we will come out well on that. I talked to the Board of
Directors at the Hoover Institute today. They asked some questions
about India and Pakistan and I really let them have it.
P:
OK, well, I wouldn't be too concerned about it. Try to get the rest
of it out. You have done the wire services, but I wouldn't be too
feverish about it. If time is a losing cause, forget it. How do
you think Reston came to his view?
K:
I don't know because I didn't even talk tohim.
P:
Did he know about the ceasefire?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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3
K:
He noted in the article that everyone has missed the point.
It had to do with Moscow's power play.
P:
You know they wouldn't understand it that way. Moscow's power
play - that's what it was all about.
K :
Mr. President, if it hadn't been for us Pakistan would have been
destroyed.
P:
Well I would say we saved more than 40% of it.
K:
We saved more than the situation permitted.
P:
As far as American public opinion is concerned I don't think they
gave a damn.
K:
No, they don't give a damn. All they can say is there was a war and
we helped to end it in 10 days.
P:
Well, on Bhutto I think.
K:
I think it is a good move and it also commits us to the preservation
of Pakistan.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Amb. Rxxx Raza/Kissinger
5:52 p.m.
12/17/71
K" We will see your Minister at 1:30 tomorrow for half an hour.
R:
I may be with him. Is that all right.
K: Certainly.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
6:08 p.m. 12/17/71
K: You called me earlier.
L: At the time I was calling to talk over if you wanted me to come down on list
of options I was sending you. I sent them.
K: Which list?
L: A, D, C. The Cuban thing. It was noon and it's worked out.
K: On the God-damned x Defense Budget? How will we £ get it done?
LL They are here this weekend.
K: I will not be available until Wed.
L: We have to get a print out.
K: Can it wait?
L: Then I will let these people go until then. Is there a disagreement?
K: & 78. 5 and 79. 5.
ULMS
L: It all depends on whether you want to put the alms and sorties.
K: How much for alms?
L: 200 million.
K: And 200 million for F-111.
L: What they have decided to do a on that is to go in and use that on the
supplemental. George has agreed on that and Boeing 747 is ????? .
K: 200 is alms we can give you.
L: And I want capability on sortie to carry out President's directive.
K: Then 79.
L: Then no 400 million on all volunteer force/
K: It's knocked out anyway.
L: It's not in 78. 5.
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Laird/Kissinger
6:08 p.m.
12/17/71
-2-
K: I can justify 200 for alms and 200 for sorties. How about 100 more for
all volunteer?
L: Then knock me down on 200.
K: What will budget read?
ULM)
L: 200 on alms and 200 on sorties and only 100 on all volunteer --
K: Then you will be at 79. Can we settle on that?
L: I can settle on anything. I would like 100 million for research and developmen
But I will not be an SOB on these things.
K: I like working XXXX with you. You make your arguement and you never give
trouble to the President when he makes his decisions. You are not a cry baby
and in '73 we will sext still be friends.
L: I hear you talked with the Hoover Institute.
K: I gave it to them.
L: The alms and sorties. I would like to have that. I reclamaed on volunteer
forces because President
K: He WX is willing to give it up.
L: He wasn't for it in the first place.
K: Let me try to get George on it tonight.
L: If you can get him to come 200 on alms and 200 on sorites I would like to
have 100 for RDT&E. Then the new intix initiatives such as F-111 we will do in
a '72 supplemental and also the Boeing 747.
K: For what purpose?
L: Airborne command.
K: I don't need his trips to NY.
L: To what Flanigan (?) is working on.
K: The airconditioning has broken down here. They are putting heat on me.
L: If you can't get it 79. 1
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Laird/Kissinger
6:08 p.m.
12/17/71
-3- -
K: Or 79.
L: that's where you want to go.
K: George Shultz will caryy on like a maniac as it is.
L: So you want to separate the differences between George and me. I can see
what you are doing.
K: I will get it done.
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TELCON
Kissinger/Zeigler
12-17-71 6:30 p.m.
Zeigler: Should I announce the Bhutto thing?
HAK: Wait until tomorrow morning. Do it tomorrow morning.
RZ: Let me talk to Al.
XXXXX
HAK: This is his view--it isn't a big deal don't get them together,
if you don't have a normal briefing. That is not a good idea to
get the impression that he is coming back just to see Bhutto. We
will also be having a letter go to Mrs. Candhi tomorrow or Sunday.
RZ: Hard-lined?
HAK: Yes, either tomorrow or Sunday.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELOON
Rogers/Kissinger
12-17-71 6:35 p.m.
WR: We got word from the Panamanian government, but they rejected
our help. To do anything with these vessels, we hhad to have requests
from the Panamanian government to do it. We cant to anything and comply
in international law. To give protection to our vessels
HAK: As long as the President is in Florida, he will do anything
WR: I know.
HAK: You know what the mood is down there. What do you suggest?
I know what the President will say---"I don't give a damn, bomb the
Cubans this is piracy. 11
WR: Nothing can be done tonight. I thought you should know, but
part of the deal was getting the Panamanians hot to reverse themselves.
They think these Cubans (interruption) Panamanians don't want
involved
HAK:
WR: When one of these ships followed Miami, and we are scrambling
planes and sending destroyers to protect it. Let me find out where
we are militarily. We just got word from
Will you give some
more briefing on the Paks?
HAK: I am doing nothing.
WR: I thought someone told me the President asked you to deal with
these fellows on an individual basis.
HAK: I have given Scali some points, but I am not seeing anyone.
WR: If you do, I would appreciate it if you would touch base with me.
I am trying to get my people quiet. We should figure out a way to
give the President some credit and it should be coordinated.
HAK: I agree
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Scali/Kissinger
6:50 p.m. 12-17-71
HAK: Did you tell Rogers that I was briefing newsmen? I called you
and you were on another phone.
Scali: The I am in hot water because I said no backgrounders for
the next number of days.
HAK: There is no question of backgrounders--somebody said we were
doing it on an individual basis.
you had said
JS: He had talked with you and/that there would be no backgrounders
and there would be none for the next few days and that it would be
coordinated with State.
HAK: I just said I gave some basic facts to Scali.
JS: I didn't acknowledge doing anything with it. I said it was too early
to start crowing about how we had handled it.
HAK: He wants to do the crowing.
JS: Said it should be coordinated. He said I am available with the
President wants it, and said he was holding a backgrounder next
week. I said good, I agreed. I haven't found anything to disagree.
Now he will say that John Scali mislead him
HAK: No, he will say I have misled him. I have never heard him
coming forward with any help before.
JS: Did he say that you were doing individually?
HAK: Have you talked with any one else?
JS: I have talked with Kraslow, Kalb, Gill, Gurtzman.
HK: What is Kraslow saying?
JS: The story is being understood, so there is not a problem--the
only one is in the State Department.
HAK: I will take the blame.
JS: Al said no--we should not have told him anything.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Asst. AG Mardian
7:30 12-17/71
HAK: I have a question which will drive you up the wall, but I won't
do it unless you tell me. You remember McDonald? His wife was
murdered in Trenton. Yes, mugged and murdered.
Mardian: She was?
HAK: Her funeral is tomorrow. Would it hurt your case if I went
to the funeral?
Mardian: Well, they will use it, of course, but I don't think so.
HAK: He is a mad Irishman.
Mardian: Will attempt to use it as evidence. I don't think that should
stand in you way. Our case isn't that week. There will be a lot
of publicity, sure.
HAK: She was a Negro.
Mardian: I didn't know that. The fact that you were compassionate
enough to attend the funeral wouldn't hurt the Administration.
Was it Brian McDonald?
HAK: Yes, Brian.
Mardian: Your involvement will give the attorneys an excuse to
credit him for your attendance.
HAK: I would go surprisingly.
Mardian: It is not that significant. It shouldn't do one thing or the
other for our case--
HAK: I will let you know what I decide.
Mardian? Okay
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger
7:58 p.m., December 17, 1971
K:
Ron, I am already 45 minutes late,
Z:
This will only take a second. Your stuff is starting to move.
quite well on the network news tonight.
K:
Oh, is it.
Z:
And I am starting to get calls from people. People call me who
are willing to pick this up on the AP & UPI, I
will say I am not going to give you a quote from the White House
but off-the-record that it is all good. Is that all right.
K:
I think that's fine.
Z:
NBC had the hotline thing.
K:
I don't know where they got that.
Z:
They have it and I will be asked in the briefing.
K:
Just say we do not discuss the channel.
Z:
But off-the-record I can say, yes.
K:
No. I would just say "no comment. on that. This they did not
get this from me.
Z:
NBC using that, is that all right.
K:
The Russians are just getting madder and madder. Ron, just
do not confirm it.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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"ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD - RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nTelcon\nHAK and The President (5 pg.)\n12/16/71\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-51/12339\nDECLASSIFIED\npor\nHr. 9/11/2013\n2\nTelcon\nHAK and The President (4 pgs.)\n12/17/71\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-51/12400\nDECLASSIFIED per Hr. 9/11/2013\n3\nTelcon\nHAK and McGeorge Bundy (1 pg.)\n12/17/71\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-51/12401\nDECLASSIFIED per Hr. 9/11/2013\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX\nKissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations (Telcons)\n12\nFOLDER TITLE\n[7] 1971 16-17 Dec.\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential\nPolicy\ncommercial or financial information.\nB. National security classified information.\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate\ncompiled for law enforcement purposes.\nan individual's rights.\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\ninvasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n1\nTaken\nHAK and the President (5 pp.)\n12/16/71\nB\nN\nTckon\nHAK and the President C4 Pp.)\n12/17/71\nB\n3\nTelcon\nHAK and meberge Bundy Clp.)\n12/17/71\nB\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nkissings Transcripts - Telephone Conversations\n12\nFOLDER TITLE\n1971 16-17 Dec. 7\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential H. Withdrawn Library and returned non-historical material.\nDECLASSIFIED\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES This document AND RECORDS has been ADMINISTRATION reviewed pursuant to Executive Order *U. GPO:1989-235-084/00024 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NA 14021 (4-85)\nMarshall/Kissinger\n6:20 a.m.\n12/16/7½\n-2-\nK: You have the girl I have been after for years.\nM: Are you coming up for Christmas eve?\nK: I may be up in NY.\nM: Would you consider coming to our apt. with Nancy? For eggnog.\nIt's Sarah's first house with a Christmas tree.\nK: If I come, I will.\nM: She would be so thrilled. Would you make an effort to do that?\nK: I will.\nM: If you come before we would like you to come up. 7:30 or 8:00.\nWhatever fits your schedule. Would you?\nK: Certainly.\nM: Not a big group. Bill Wicker (?) who sings at the Met. In town\nand stopping by for a drink. Maybe another girl and another couple.\nNo background briefing.\nK: I will do my damndest.\nM:\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n9:30 m. - 12/16/71\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHenry, did you sleep any better last night?\nK:\nYes, I did. Much better. It takes about 36 hours to get back.\nI feel fine. I think the Azores thing is still playing beautifully.\nP:\nYes, it came off very well. The market is going smoothly, too.\nK:\nJack Javits was in this morning. He said it was a tremendous act\nof statesmanship. Joe Kraft has a column where he is almost beside\nhimself saying the President is in complete charge. He ran it very\nwell.\nP:\nYes, isn't that interesting.\nK:\nHave you seen it?\nP:\nNo, I haven't read it yet\nK:\nHe said some people will say the French gained something but all\nthey got was a shadow; the President got all the substance. It\nproves the President is in complete charge.\nP:\nIsn't that good. That was a line of perfume used very effectively.\nThat meeting in the morning was indispensable. You are going down\nto see Heath Monday night?\nK:\nSunday night. I am going Sunday night and going to see him Monday\nmorning.\nP:\nOn the India - Pakistan thing, Dacca has surrendered and now the\nissue is\nK:\nNow, if in the next 24 hours the Indians don't agree to a ceasefire in\nthe West we are in for it. Up until now it could be explained that\nthe Soviets wanted to wait until Dacca had surrendered.\nP:\nHas the proposal been put up in.\nK:\nNo, it has been tabled and there will probably be a vote today.\nAnd that will be the test.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN08-51/12399 Per Hr. 9/11/2013\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential\nNARA, Date 5/12/2017\nDECLASSIFIED\n[p.1of5]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nP:\nWell, they will veto it.\nK:\nWell, I don't know. They aren't saying anything any more.\nP:\nThen under the circumstances, would they just continue the war?\nK:\nThere are three possibilities: First, the British proposal carries;\nSecond, India-Pakistan ceasefire and third, the Indians continue the\nwar until they smash the Pakistanis in Kashmir. Now we have had\nanother appeal from the Pakistanis last night. Action is picking up\nin the West and they are asking for American planes, but we cannot\neven consider this. If this isn't settled by tomorrow night we will\nknow the Russians have put it to us.\nP:\nThe one thing I am disappointed about, really teed off at is that\nyou were unable to get out that Indian cabinet meeting thing. We\nhave got to get it out.\nK:\nWe will do it.\nP:\nI know there are a lot of pro-Indian people in State and who are trying\nto delay this. But I want it. We ought to be pressing the Indians\nevery day. Now that Dacca has fallen we have got to get that Am-\nbassador in her e and tell him the President is outraged about what\nhe has done using our television and radio facilities to do it.\nSecond, someone has got to say something about the Indian aid.\nThe figure they have been using is not correct. I want a report.\nI want everything in it: PL-480, unilateral and multilateral assistance\nbecause some pressures have got to go. The Russians will only go\nas far as the Indians want to go. The Indians have got to make\na decision whether they want to be totally a Russian satellite or not.\nAlso there have been these Indian cabinet meetings, we have to get\nreports on those.\nK:\nYes, Mr. President.\nP:\nActually with regard to the Indian aid thing, couldn't Javits or one\nof the liberals on the Hill see if they couldn't stop this now.\nK:\nThe next thing we could do is there is $123 million in goods that is\nmoving to India. We could seize those but that would get us\ninto endless litigation.\nP:\nGoods of what type?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nK:\nThey have been part of the economic program. It has been paid\nfor already. We can do it. It has been done before\nP:\nIf the Indians continue the course they are on we have even got to\nbreak diplomatic relations with them. Don't you agree, Henry?\nK:\nI agree. There is already a strong victory statement and an un-\nbelievable setback for the Chinese which is none of our business\nbut they have certainly humiliated them.\nP:\nAnd also let it be known they have done nothing.\nK:\nThat is right.\nP:\nIn the event they\nWest Pakistan, is there anything more\nthat can be done? Are they going\nK:\nThey gave us flat assurances there wouldn't be. If that happens we\nwill have to reassess our position with the Russians. We will have\nuntil Saturday morning to see that.\nP:\nWhat are they doing?\nK:\nI said to Vorontsov if you don't do it at the UN, do it as a bilateral\nexchange of letters.\nP:\nAnd they have not responded?\nK:\nNo, it is a little early. They could have if they wanted to.\nP:\nThe question is\nK:\nWell, the question is - let's look at objectively. So they put it to us\nand they saw because you acted in such a\nway here, we are\ngoing to drop the summit.\nP:\nWell, dropping the summit is not the first thing I would do.\nK:\nWell, you have to look to see how much we are willing to pay in\nterms of where we are going.\ntaxex\nxpxuxtx\ntax\nixrx\nP:\nTo keep ourselves in perspective we have to realize the Russians have\nput it to us previously in other parts of the world so we have to just\ngrin and bear it, right?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nK:\nBut not you, Mr. President.\nP:\nNo, but my point is we try everything that we can, but we have to\nrealize the Russians - we have to let them know our options.\nK:\nOur options are limited.\nP:\nThey are limited, but even with them we can't deal with those\nSoviets and continue to talk about sales and various other problems.\nK:\nOur options are not all that good.\nP:\nThey are not good but they will get results. If after all these appeals\nand\nK:\nThey are going to continue to butter you up.\nP:\nMy view is this: I dax won't let them do this.\nDid the Jordans\nsend planes.\nK:\n17\nP:\nWell, my point is so we have done a check of these little things.\nNow in the event we are going to end up by saying to the Russians\nyou proved to be so untrustworthy we can't deal with you on any\nissues. Let's use that card now.\nK:\nWe have pretty well told them that.\nP:\nWell, we told them that privately, they may not believe that.\nK:\nWell, if they don't believe the President of the United States in a\nprivate meeting\nP:\nYou don't understand. We threatened it. Let's do it.\nK:\nNo, for that it is premature, Mr. President. That we cannot do because\nthey still may get us a ceasefire. If they don't get a ceasefire, what\ndo we do then?\nP:\nCut off the Middle East talks, pour arms into Israel, discontinue\nour talks on SALT and the Economic Security Council can go the\npublic and tell them what the danger is. It is a risk group but the\nright one. It is pretty clear: I would go further. We have to stop\nour talks on trade, don't let Smith have any further things on the\nMiddle East and stop seeing Dobrynin under any circumstances.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nK:\nThat is right. Break the White House channel.\nP:\nAnd be very cold in our public statements toward them. What I am\ngetting at is if we are prepared to go and have the card to play where\nwe would not talk at all. Another thing I would beef up the Defnese\nBudget plans then.\nK:q\nThe Defense Budget is being worked on.\nP:\nYou will have that done\nby Friday night?\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nNow, Henry, I am not yet satisfied and I am really made that this\nassistance report is not down here.\nLDX it down here in two\nhours - Indian aid for next year and last, how much PL-480, how\nmuch economic assistance, unilateral assistance - I want to see it.\nP:\nK:\nWe have got it, but we will get it down. / I know the bigger game is\nthe Russian game, but the Indians also have played us for squares\nhere. They have done this once and when this is over they will\ncome to us ask us to forgive and forget. This we must not do.\nIf they want to be dependent on the Russians, let them be, but when\nthe chips are down India has shown that it is a Russian satellite.\nWhat I am really saying here is and what I am proposing to do - if\nIndia pursues this course, then we will reevaluate their program\nof aid and cut it off.\nHas anybody told them that?\nwould\nK:\nWe dixk, but remember you have got to realize everything is being\ndone out of this office. We have a bureaucratic system to deal with.\nI think it would be better if State told them.\nP:\nCall Sisco. He is to call in the Indian Ambassador and tell him that\nthe U.S., under the circumstances, if there is not a ceasefire we\nwill have no choice and all Indian assistance of all types will be\ntaken out of the budget and call me in an hour.\nK:\nYes, Mr. President\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRowland Evans/Kissinger\n1,0:18 a. m.\n12/16/71\nE: How about that? Bhutto's performance yesterday.\nK: At the UN.\nE: It's tragic. What do you hear XIXIXIX from the Soviets?\nK: NOthing yet.\nE: What do you think?\nK: The next 36 hours tells us whether we are dealing with people who are\nmaking a play for a strategic a break\nOR with people where some\nco-existance is possible.\nE: ? ? ? 345 Pakistani tanks at Kashmir border.\nK: Today? Haven't seen it.\nE: W. Pakistanis are talking as if they want war to continue in West.\nK: They are ready to settle. Running out of spare parts and POL. They haven't\nhad military equipment since '65 and other side being taken care of all along.\nI would have said inconceivable Soviets would jeopardize everything but now I\ndon't know.\nE: Can you tell me ? ? ? ?\nK: Have to wait.\nE: Do you think it will blow up?\nK: No but could have bad effect on middle and long term relations.\nE: Could and still may. Do you know if any Soviet advisors helping?\nK: Not for use, as a friend. Theyxkk x x ungx They did much of reconnaissance\nin East and West.\nE: Why can't I write this?\nK: Because you can;t.\nE: On my own?\nK: No.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRowland Evans/Kissinger\n10:18 a. m.\n12/16/71\n-2-\nE: Henry?\nK: Wait a minute. It looks as if we need made it. Indians have ordered\ntheir troops to stop fighting along their borders.\nE: Original borders?\n(joke)\nK: Right. If it weren't for the imcompetence of Haig who's in my office \"we\nwould have done it 24 hours earlier.\nE: Any word on how word was passed to Soviets --\nK: What's the latest?\nE: 1:00.\nK: Absolute?\nE: 3:00\nK: You have been decent. I will tell you everything includex including\nreconnaissance when it's over.\nE: I will call at 3:00.\nK: I will be here. You tell Bradlee that it's one thing shooting\non\nsomething. It's another when you apply the Lindly rule.\nE: Have you told Bradlee?\nK: No and I won't argue with him.\nE: I will call you at 3:00.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRogers/Kissinger\n10:37 a. m.\n12/16/71\nK: I think in light of bulletin we should hold off on seeing the Ambassador.\nR: We don't want the President to think we are dragging our feet. We have\ncalled him in but we will soften it. I don't want to say drastic measures.\nK: Say it has to be permanent and President teed off on his speech.\nR: On advance (?) I have said make sure we approve it here first. We don 't\nwant to agree with what's happening in E. Pakistan.\nt\nK: They are for the British Resolution.\nR: They are so confused. We want to be sure signals are right. Joe and\nI will watch it closely and let you know if there's any problem.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n10:40 a.m.\n12/16/71\nK: The Indians have just declared a unilateral ceasefire in the West. We have\nmake it.\nP: What's it mean?\nK: Ordered forces to stop fighting.\nP: What's territory? From what you said yeaterday - - taken Kashmir?\nK: In West have\nsome desert and Pakistanis have taken a bit of Kashmir.\nMajor\nis to stop defeat of Pakistan army.\nP: What's the source?\nK: Official announcement.\nP: It's the Russians working for us. We have to get the story out.\nK: Already a call from State. Until this morning we were running the UN thing.\nNow they are and say they will go over resolution. They are pulling off the\nBritish Resolution. You pulled it through and should take credit. I will give\na backgrounder tomorrow afternoon.\nP: Get people in and set story for the weekly news magazines.\nK: Can't do it today. We have to clean it up.\nP: Any other thing in view of Time Man of the Year thing get Schechter in.\nHe will understand it. Or who at Time would know more about this subject?\nK: I will start with Schechter. He has been decent.\nP: Time might write best analysis of crisis. You really feel that they mean\nlet me come back to it. You were bearish last k night.\nK: I felt nothing happen until Dacca fell. Soviets were dragging their feet becaus\nIndians took longer on taking Dacca then they figured. So this morning I said\nnext 24 hours will tell.\nP: If Soviets have cooperated on this I think we have got to play on an\narms-length deal.\nK: We have to get straight what they did.\nP: What they did in '67 June war.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPresident/Kissinger\n10:40 a. m. ;\n12/16/71\n-2-\nK: 60% instead of 100%.\nP: June war.\nK: Except they lost.\nP: They got credit for bringing peace to the M.E. Agreed to peace after\ndefeat of their army. And they were responsible for the war. Not a public\nstatement but internal rebations with Soviets. You handle that. ????\nYou agree?\nthey\nK: Absolutely. So WEX far/wahave not done anything. Indians did official doing.\nBut I am sure it's Soviets that produced it.\nP: On unilateral ceasefire what?\nK: UN resolution na aking it official. XXXXX When in\nfor weeks they\nwant to come out and mastermind it. We have agreed to the British. Chinese\nare set with it. I will say I have talked with you and it is what you want done.\nP: The President is committed to it. Wehave told the British and Chinese.\nWill the Russians accept it?\nK: Probably.\nP: Minght not. If they do it's done.\nK: One way or other there will be a resolution to put it together. State is\ntrying to scavenge on your agony. Put it together xxlx with a UN resolution.\nP: The average person doesn't understand about this. Pick the real movers\nand shakers. Ask Scali and let him sit in. Ask him who and Zeigler. xMa\nMake it small enough to be poserful. I don't care if they are friends or enemies.\nMaybe Kraft. It's very important to do Time poeple and maybe a couple of\nnetwork people.\nK: Chancellor.\nP: Anybody. You sit down there. Work it out. Get hold of Scali. A cold,\nblooded deal. On other levels let Scali carry the line. And Zeigler.\nK: That would be good.\nP: It's good to hear.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPresident/Kissinger\n10:40 a.m.\n12/16/71\n-3- -\nK: The record will show again that you were ready to go the whole way this\nmorning.\nP: I almost called at midnight last night to say to Russians we are putting\nthe summit on the line.\nK: India would have taken Kashmir and\n.\nP: Shastri got India's X victory wings. Only 30% of them.\nK: 30% more then we expected.\nP: You think the Russians did it? India would not have done it for us.\nK: For us they would have done it (?).\nP: I want strictest -- President make own decision. Hannah, Sisco, Rogers.\nI don't want Indian aid to max leak out but I will decide it. Shultz to examine\nbudget and no Indian Aid init.\nK: $300 millionfor S. Asia. $200 million to Pakistan and rest we will\nhold.\nP: Give it to Ceylong.\nK: Then we don't get arguement we are cutting it. We can give agricultural\nstuff to India for economic relief.\nP: They have to pay for aid.\nK: Congratulations, Mr. President. You saved W. Pakistan.\nP: Go off to other. No backgrounder until tomorrow.\nK: As soon as it's cleaned up. I will get on it.\nP: Don't do it pre-maturely.\nK: Get Sunday papers.\nP: Time and networks.\nK: Congratulations!\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSec. Connally\n12/16/71 11:00pm\nK: I wanted to tell you the Indians have just declared a unilateral\ncease-fire in the West and will let the UN ratify it, so we've made it.\nC: That's great. XX God-damn, that's wonderful. Congrasulations.\nK: This one went down to the wire. You were a help\nC: No, no.\nK: No, in givigg one the moral courage to do it. It was a tough decision\nto make.\nC: It sure was a tough one. You've performed a major miracle. Thank you\nfor telling me.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nJohn Chancellor\n12/16/71 11:10am\nK: I just wanted you to know that it's beginning to look as fi that 72-\nhour prediction may come true.\nC: I noticed there's a. ******* ceasefire in the West.\nK: That's what we were after.\nC : I saw it just\nWe've got Scali here, going over the footage on\nthe one-hour show on the President. I saw the bulletin as I came down.\nK: You are giving me 38 minutes of that aren't you?\nC: As a matterm of fact you are in it quite prominently at the beginning\nwith the maps. We have to say something tonight about the overall situation;\nhow does your day look?\nK: Why don't you give me a call.\nC: I'd like to as soon as I get something on paper.\nK: Good, you give me a call.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nBhutto/Kissinger\n11:15 a. m.\n12/16/71\nK: I have been seeing you on every TV show. If your pobitio political position\nis over in Pakistan which I hope not you can come here.\nB: I hope not. I hope my country will last.\nK: I have seen the Indian X ceasefire offer. I think we should formalize it\nas soon as possible.\nB: The ceasefire but not dictation of political terms.\nK: The text I have XX from Indian radio is that they have declared India\nhas no territorial ambitions. Ceasefire everywhere. Effective tomorrow,\n17 Dec. 24 hours from now. Hope there will be corresponding action from\nPakistan. Statement at UN tonight. So I think a simple ceasefire resolution\nwill do it now.\nB: It will but if India try to get Poles and Russians to say more.\nK: We will go with The British Resolution. Is it still acceptable to you?\nB: It is.\nK: We will have Bush go ahead and no reason not to accept it.\nB: Another point. In view of situation I was thinking if some reference to\nGeneral Assembly which might prevent other countries recognizing E.\nPakistan as Bangla Desh. India will try to get recognition. Eastern Europe\nfirst.\nK: If we can get Security Council resolution. Mian thing is to get it\nformalized.\nB: Next steps later.\nK: We will before you go back I will talk with you. We are determined never\nto be in this position again.\nB: I have a telegram from Yahya saying I should talk with the President. Will\nyou say I have talked with you and it's as good as talking with him? I hate to\nkeep saying I have tried.\nK: I have always checked with the President.\nB: Tell Farland SO kxlonxthe doesn't think I haven't tried.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmb. Bush\n12/16/71 11:23am\nB: I'm confused; what's happening?\nK: Indaa, as I understand it, has offered a cease-fire and unilaterally\ndeclared it. I understand their Foreign Minister has been asked to submit\nit to the UN. Now we better get it wound up. There's no reason not to vote\nfor the British resolution.\nB: I have asked\nurgently to meet me at\n.\nK: I justed talked to Bhutto. He still wants us to press for the British\nresolution.\nB: He will take it as it is?\nK: That's right. I told the British now there is no longer an excuse to\ndelay the thing.\nB: I will. Maybe when the meeting convenes, Singh will make that announce-\nment. What's happening is the non-permanent members are getting restless,\ncoming up with other drafts. Now we'll get the British one resurrected fully.\nWe've been telling them all along this is what we want.\nK: Right. State now wants to get into the bloddy act. The esident's\ninstructions are to stick with the British resolution and get it voted on.\nB: All right. We will do our best.\nK: And don't screw it up the way you asually do.\nB: I want a transfer when this is over. But I don't want to go to the\nNSC. I wan t a nice quiet place like Rwanda.\nK: This was a hairy one but I think we've got it now.\nB: I just got a note saying\nis trying to see Bhutto. They\nare all running around like chickens with their heads off.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n12:15 p.m.\n12/16/71\nP: I thought you should know. I called Mitchell on a couple of things. He\nwas in a drug meeting with Rogers at the WH. I got Bill on the phone and told\nhim that I X wanted Sisco and whoever at State to take a hardline on economic\nassistance thing. He said fine. I will do it myself. So he is on Salvo. Don't\ndo it publicly. That's the line, don't you agree?\nK: Exactly.\nP: On your x background that's the way I would play it. Don't bust India\npublicly. It's where we want to have effect.\nK: She's written a lett to you asking where she went wrong. The pdx policy\nis working.\nP: You work with Sisco on conciliatory attitude. vis a vis State. Let them\nbe tough instead of us.\nK: I agree.\nP: No reason for you to talk with the Indian Ambassador.\nK: No trouble with State now that it's over. We are trying to get the British\nto? ? ???. We have her text so it's genuine offer. Trying to formalize\nit because she can rxexingx renege at any time. Talked with Bhutto and having\nRaza in. He thinks\nand extremely XXXX grateful to President. He\nhas Chinese aboard to.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nCromer/Kissinger\n12:26 p.m.\n12/16/71\nC: It's nbt going well.\nK: Why?\nC: Because the instructions our people have at the moment is that if the Russians\nXIX say they will veto they shouldn't press ahead. And the Russians will veto.\nK: They are? I find it unbelievable that in surrender you cannot pass a cease-\nfire when a country will veto.\nC: (I agree). Why should Russians veto this?\nK: I don't know.\nC: I think this is all I can do.\nK: The major thing I want your people to understand is that we have people\ndancing around on the town XX so will you have your people check with us?\nC: No one xh but you telling his anything except of course in NY.\nK: Bush is our man.\nC: This is state of play at the moment.\nK: Should we get together on what will come out of Bermuda meeting? This\nafternonn.\nC: Later part?\nK: 4:00.\nC: I will be there.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President\n12/16/71 12:40pm\nP: I don't know whether with the other thing you are aware of it, but a\nbig story down here is the shoot-out\nK: Yes, I was following it yesterday and we scrambled planes to\nP: The wife of the captured captain is out here at the gate and I'm going\nto go out and express my simpathy on it. We cannot have this situation where\nthe Cubans can pick up a boat in Bahamian waters and shoot it up. XX Are we\nprotesting?\nK: Yes, we moved four F-4s to Guantanamo,\nP: Is there anything wrong with my expressing smypathy on this?\nK: I would like to know first what it was doing there.\nP: It was not in Cuban waters or attacking.\nK: It would have been on a raid.\nP: It wasn't. But if it was, I'm for that too.\nK: But you don't want to do it publicly.\nP: But I want to take a hard line when Americans are being shot up. I\nwant a. hard line, This boat was in British waters and was shot,\nK: If it hadn't been dark we would have gone in to do rescue work last\nnight which is illegal, but the British would have shut their eyes.\nP: Are you hitting Vorontsov hard on their joining with us?\nK: I am da to hear from him today. If I don't by the end of the day\nwith unilateral caase-fire resolution\nP: Are you watching for the Russians too?\nK: There reply to what we gave them yesterday morning.\n12/16/71 12:42 p.m.\nP: You need to do some further checking. The report from our Coast Guard\nis that $his ship dumped cargo at Haiti, It came down fromHaiti to the U.S.\nunarmed. At 2:30 the Captain wired for assistance, So theyhad three hours of\ndaylight; what were we doing in those three hours?\nK: We got word at 4:00. We ordered an immediate scramble of F-4s out of\nhere against everybody's protest. State was having a heart attack\nP: Of course. No, why was that\n?\nK: Because it was in British waters and we had no right and all of that.\nWe called C r omer and he said he couldn't give us permission to get it. I said we\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President\n12/16/71 12:40 p.m. p. 2\nwere going to do it unilaterally.\nP: It's the old story; they keep nibbling off pieces. But уди were\nabsolutely right to order the scramble,\nK: And we put the F-4s in there. We did it from here. I didn't want to\nbother youand knew how you would feexxx feel.\nP: I supposed there is nothing we can do; a protest will fall on ctct\ndeaf ears. But I want a very hard line taken. These are American citizens who ar\nbeing shot up.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Haig\n1:30 p.m. - 12/16/71\nP:\nAl, I just met with the wife and children of the captured boat. It\nis quite an experience because basically, as I have the story, the\ncaptain of the boat came over in 1960, an American citizen. He\nhas made this run from Haiti to the U.S. with a little 1500 ton\nboat and a 15 man crew, all American. What we have here is a\ncase of piracy on the high seas by an international outlaw. Correct?\nH:\nYes, but worse than that it was in the territorial waters of another\nstate.\nP:\nNow I am going to have Zumwalt put out a statement here saying\nthat this is a case of piracy in international waters. They came\nto ask for mercy. What do we do here?\nH:\nWe have use the Swiss in Havana, call the Panamanian government\nand urge them to take the strongest stand and we have to get the\nBritish to bring pressure.\nP:\nNow I want unbelievable pressure on the British this afternoon.\nI want the Panamanians to be called to protect them, but still\nwhat is wrong with the U.S., don't we protect them?\nH:\nThe only way we can do that is through the Swiss.\nP:\nThis is of the highest priority. Presently we are coming along\nvery well on India/Pakistan, aren't we?\nH:\nYes, I am encouraged.\nP:\nFrankly, Al, I wish I had been there, but if this ever happens again.\nWe got the word at 2:30 from the captain that he was being shot at.\nRight then those were to be ordered and nothing was done.\nI ordered airplanes to scramble immediately to demonstrate to the\nCubans that we were about to take action. In the future I want the\nplanes scrambled if they see the Cuban gunboat. I want them to\nsink it. Do you understand? They have no right.\nH:\nYes, but the legality of being in British waters.\nP:\nFollow up on this, Al.\nH:\nYes, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nJohn Chancellor/Kissinger\n2:50 p.m. - 12/16/71\nC:\nI came back to see Mrs. Gandhi's letter. How about that?\nK:\nIs it out?\nC:\nLet me read you something. I am going to be discreet about tabxixx you\nand you will be about me.\nK:\nJohn, if I can do anything it is keep secrets.\nC:\nI know that. We have quoted in here a part of her letter which says\n(He reads starting with \"The great powers of the world.\n11,\nK:\nI talked to her in July. There was never any question of them.\nThe question was how much time was there for a political solution\nand she said none. This was in July.\nC:\nIn July? That makes it strong.\nK:\nIn the White House we read out three basic propositions to her -\nunilateral withdrawal, discussion between the leaders of the Wambi\nLeague and Yahya and consideration of letting Mujib appoint these\nleaders. While she listened to all these three, she never gave the\nslightest indication that an attack was evident.\nC:\nYou said there were three points (1) unilateral withdrawal (2)\ndiscussion with the leaders of India and Pakistan and\nK:\nAnd the third was Yahya.\nC:\nI don't get three. I get two and a little more.\nK:\nThat's right.\nC:\nThe Indians did know this?\nK:\nAbsolutely. In fact it was told to Mrs. Gandhi and in July when\nasked about the time for political solution she said there was none\neven then and that they were prepared for what had happened. I\nwouldn't say that.\nC:\nThere are things in the AP which is all I have.\nK:\nBut she has it in her letter.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nC:\nThat's interesting. Why would she say that in her letter?\nK:\nWell, to say we weren't paying attention to the urgency of it.\nIt was the first thing she talked about. On the other hand they\nwere in the better position you know\nnot to move with Yahya\nhaving handed over power then was the case previously and if that\nhad not been the case there would still have been time to take the\nextreme measure.\nC:\nAll right, then I am not going to put \"yesterday\". Do you feel\nnow that her letter has been released, isn't it true we gave India\nmore aid since '47 than any other country?\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nC:\nDo you have any analysis as to why she did the letter?\nK:\nTo put us on the defensive. I think she was stunned by this criticism.\nC:\nIt really doesn't make a very intelligent case to me - the letter.\nI will look to you for guidance.\nK:\nThis other business about the unilateral withdrawal and negotiations\nwith the Awambi League and the 20th still stands.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nJerry Schedter\n12/16?/71 2:58pm\nK: I understand you are making me Man of the Year.\nS: Mrs. Ghandi seems to be doing it. That's quite a letter she sent the\nPresident, particularly that point about calumny. What are your feelings about\nthe situation at this point?\nK: Thought since we talked earlier this week we should complete it, or\nshould I talk to Sidey?\nS: No, let's us do it.\nK: Of course I always prefer to talk to senior people.\nS: I can't see the expression on your face.\nK: I'm joking. You think M.s. Ghandi is right?\nS: No, but we have got an unfortunate situation there, The sending ofthe\ncarrier, according to Times, makes it look like we are trying to influence the\nout come of the war,\nK: The thing I find amazing in the press coverage of almost all of the\npapers are stuck in the muck and writing from the vantage point of an ant. What\nthe Iddians are mada at is irrelevant. They will not want to be a Soviet\nsatellite. The same reasons that made them keep lines to the Soviets will make\nthem keep lines to us. There is also something plaintive about this letter.\nWhat is she saying? She's complaining.\nS: Yes that she was criticized for starting this. She is saying in her\nletter there is no feasible political plan.\nK: No, she is saying there is only one plan -- immediate release of\nMujib and making him the chief negotiator. But I didn't call you to discuss the\nletter anyway. We'll be answering it and making our view clear. She is not\nacknowledging the fact of what\nwe did on the refugees, none ofthe concessions made ton her in the fact that the\nalmost inevitable outcome would have beena political solution. All she is saying\nis that her maximum demand wasn't met and wasn't mee immediately. Let's just see\nif in three months they are still asking for release of Mujib and whether he'll\nstill be in office. The thing we were trying to do we've done\nprevent\nattack on West Pakistan and getting it settled. And it's hard to see how we\ncould have gotten it done if we hadn't kept calling attention to the danger of\naggressiveness,\nS: I think that's putting a good face on the best situation,\nK: What was the alternative?\nS: The alternatives obviously fail, One has to get them not to go in there\nor at some point to get the UN to ask for\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nJerry Schedter\n12/16?/71 2:58pm p. 2\nK: And she urgently asked us not to go to the UN One two occasions we\nwere thinking of it and at the specific request of the Indian government we\ndidn't.\nS: When?\nK: October and the end of November.\nS: Under what circumstances would wehave gone?\nK: The Paks wanted to bring their intentions to the UN\nIndians in\nneither case wanted to go to the UN.\nS: Did their request influence us?\nK: Very importantly. In fact she wrote us a letter asking us not to.\nS: When was that?\nK: The middle of November. She sent it. Once the attack had started we\nlimited the damage as much as possible. Donet know what other course we had if\nwe wanted to limit damages and not have thewhole global system shaken.\nS: Limited damages as much as possible\nWhat about this view that's\ncropping up now that there's a payoff in here for the Russians in submarine bases\nand new military influence?\nK: I doubt that, but that's between them and the Russians. I would be\namazed.\nS: You don't feel that the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet\nUnion and that part of the world is changed as a result of this war?\nK: I think they have been to some extent changes as a result of the treaty\nmade during the summer, and some fo of the consequences that flowed from it.\nThat fact of life having been called, we tried our best to limit it. But there's\na. major philospphical difference; I know the point of view of Time.\nS: It'snot my point of view,\nK: In fact the other point of view hasn't even been presented in TIME in the\nlast week. We are not saying this was a victory.\nS: No, certainly not.\nK: We have limited some of the worst consequences of what could have been a\ndisaster for the whole international situation.\nS: What's the status of our naval forces there now? Do you expect they'll\nbe used?\nK: With the cease-fire there will be no need for any evacuätion,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nJerry Schecter\n12/16?/71 p. 3\nS: Are we going to get involved in Chief Mujib?\nK: I think that will take care of itself.\nS: How do you feel about that letter?\nK: If you want to have your story look good six months from now, you'll say\nthe letter is a tactical event of no significance. It's something we have heard.\nTo me it reads defensive and plaintive. This is not from Administration sources;\nI'm doing it for your guidance.\nS: How do you want me to attribute this?\nK: Say Administration official.\nS: Okay, good.\nK: If you people analyzed it cold-bloodedly you would have to say the only\nway to avoid war would have been measures they'd have screamed to high heaven about.\nThe political solution, the only limit we put on that was we didn't want to bring\nabout the disintrgration of West Pakistan. The outcome was forordained. Actex\nAnd would have occurred in a six-months period.\nS; When was i t foreordained?\nK: Would have been as soon as you brought the Awami League back into the\npicture. But obviously you can't argue against the fact that the Indians did\nattack.\nS: Right.\nK: The question is were they looking for an excuse to attack or an excuse no\nto attack? They were given plenty of excuses not to attack.\nS: But as unpleasant as this situation is you feel is has been limited now?\nK: That is right, and I believe it was our actions that prevented to if\nfrom getting out of control,\nS: Good. Let me get that in.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmb. Raza\n12/16/71 3:55 p.m,\nR: I got in touch with Mr. Bhutto; he has a very important message.\nIf you can see him Tuesday or Wednesday he will stay over,\nK: I got disturbing news that your President thinks I promised him Amer-\nican military intervention after 24 hours. That is total nonsense.\nr: No\nI don't think he meant that, I never said that.\nK: Everything I told you we did.\nR: No, but I was told\nnot to go to the Security Council and to\nwait for two days or so. They it said \"but if you want to go, you do so.\"\nK: And I wanted till we had cleared it with the Chinese.\nR: You want me to read that message to you?\nK: Yes.\nR: I will read exactly what I said\nK: Oh no, don't worry about it.\nR: No, you never said intervention. If you wait until Friday I will have\nthe Chinese, but if you want to, you go yourself. But I will read it to you.\nK: No, don't worry about it.\nR; (Reads)\nK: It's XX December 11 he claims I told him something about thsi.\nR: No, in fact I have been pointing out it XX is most unlikely you will\nbe coming in. It may be intervention with the Russians or something like that,\nK: That may be it.\nr: Because I am not one of these people who breaks backs out of things. On\nDecember 12 I sent a telegram in which I said \"at noon today Nixon made a strong\nstatement\nmay move resolution\nWhite House in touch with Saudi Arabia\nand Turkey\nK: Let's not worry about it. I just don't want your President to feel we\nlet him down.\nR: No, On N vember 24 I sent a telegram observing that now is the time to\ndecide on the question of calling the Security Council. He advised that it might\nbe better to wait till he had a discussion with the Chinese and I had a. discussion,\nI will go through all of the telegrams today,\nK: Don't spend your time on that, I understand we are all under stress and\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmb. Raza\n12/16/71 3:55pm p.2\npatticularly your President. He must have misunderstood.\nR: It might be intervention with the Russians.\nK: I understand. Don't give it a second thought.\nR: About Mr. Bhutto. If you can get him an appointment on Wednesday he\nwill wait, or he will fly to Florida.\nK: I will work on it.\nR: Do you have any time tomorrow?\nK: I will try.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n4:15 p.m.\n12/16/71\nL: There KSK has been some sort of communication fall down over here.\nYesterday in the early afternoon there was an approval over at the WH for\nthe Coast Guard to go in\nK: The Preisdent is fit to be tied.\nB: He should be. I was never notified that the President gave approval on that.\nK: We gave approval and kast next thing I know is State is bellyaching and\nMoorer and\nsaying we shouldn't do anything.\nL: If I am not told I when order issued -- I want to protect the CG but they\nnever told me. They called after the MIGs had been scrambl e d and I got\nthat throught the back door. They should let me know.\nK: We will make sure.\nL: If the President authroized CG we have to back the CG up. I am upset about\nthis. We should have gotten F-4s into Guantanamo when the CG when out.\nK: I agree.\nL: I don't know who authroized this xtkx without telling me. I have nothing\nto do with CG but I can help the CG.\nK: President said do it and I say do it. An hour later Rogers calls and says it\ncannot be.\nL: It wouldn't have happened if I was there. But I was byl-passed. I am\nstronger on these things. I didn't know President was upset about it.\nK: The President's fit to be tied.\nL: I am too.\nK: You should have been told.\nL: I didn't get word until it was dark.\nK: The real mistake happened in the Task Force. Attack was at 2:30. First\nI heard was at 4:00.\nL: Have to communicate on things like that. I can keep this building together.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nLaird/Kissinger\n4:15 p.m.\n12/16/71\n-2-\nK: No question about it.\nL: But I don;t want to be whipsawed by State and\n.\nK: Pursely was told.\nL: Near darkness.\nK: I am told by Haig that Pursley brought up unshirted hell. I don't know\nwhat happened at 2:30. At 4:15 I heard about it. Shortly thereafter Pursely\nknew about it.\nL: Pursely got in touch with me after that. I was with Mahan. I said get\nF-4s down there because F-8s not worth a damn. Pursley said we shouldn't\nget involved. I said we will get involved and protect the CG. X I heard\nnothing until 4:30 in the afternoon.\nK: You gave a good party last night xxxx anyway.\nL: The first time was at 4:30.\nK: When I leave you don't have to throw a party because State will throw a\nreal wing-ding.\nL: Dave makes out he deosn't like that but he had a good time. Great guy.\nK: On that, there was a break down. You were informed as soon as we knew\nWe knew at 4:00 and State holding on it for an hour and a half.\nL: I could have gotten assistance there.\nK: I don't think breakdown was between you and us. It was between State and\nthe rest.\nL: Pussely called me at 4:30.\nK: I heard at 4:15 and Haig at 4:00.\nL: I said we have to give assistance.\nK: They got in touch with the President.\nL: One American on that ship.\nK: President is raising hell. He is xxx blaming me.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nLaird/Kissinger\n4:15 p.m.\n12/16/71\n-3-\nL: Then blame me.\nK: No. I am blaming Haig. We have to settle the Defense budget. Every\nday Shutlz says you are committing ? ? ? ?.\nL: I talked with Cap Weinberger and he says we have worked it out at 78. 5.\nI called Cap and said maybe you think it is worked out with Defense and\nbut you haven't worked it out with me.\nK: Maybe we can get together tomorrow afternoon.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmb. Bush\n12/16/71 4:45pm\nK: Did we ever get that resolution tabled?\nB: We've got it working.\nK: Russians now got a new resolution, but you can be sure they'll get theirs\ntabled in a hurry.\n1\nB: We've got a problem. The non-permanent members are with the President.\nWhat does theirs do?\nK: It puts it all on the Paks. It's got a cease-fire in it. We could take parts\nof it if we can take parts of the permanent ones. But we will be god-damned if we\nwil let the Russian resolution settle it.\nB: I know what you mean. We've been having trouble with the Italians. The\nBritis h and are giving us a hard time. But I don't think the Russians will get\ntabled if it draws opposition from the Chinese side because the British and French\nwon't go along with it.\nK: Okay, but see how quickly you can get this one moved. And don't accept the\nRussian one.\nB:\nand then pull out their own resolution. I thought we wanted to get\nthis in\nwhether the\nand\n,\nare\ncommi ted to vote for it or not.\nK: That is correct.\n12/16/71\n5:05pm\nB: On this\nthe British are locked in iron saying they will not support it unless\nit's unanimous\nthis damned Italian thing.\nK: Then the hell with them. I've got Cromer here; if they want won't do it we will\nget it done alone. We'll do it without them. I want this introduced before the Russians\nsurface theirs. Then we can come up with one that is not a Soviet resolution. It would\nbe nice if we could get the British with us, but if they won't support it the hell with it.\nB: We have keep a profile on it of not being out in front but of pushing. Is that\nstill what you want?\nK: Yes, stay off it as a sponsor because then we can ask the Soviets to join us\nwithout their supporting a U.S. resolution, but I would like to have some thing tabled\nbefore the Soviets table theirs so it won't be a Soviet draft. And if the British\nwon't come along, the hell with them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe, President\n12/26/71 5:15pm\nP:\nupdate on everything today.\nK: Everything is now falling into place. The Soviets are tabling a\nresolution; it's better than the old one but we still can't accept it, We can't\nlet it get settled on a. Soviet resolution and secondly it is still very one-\nsided. Now the British are withdrawing theirs.\nP: Are they going to support the Soviets?\nK: That is unthinkable to me; that they wouldn't do, We have a good reso-\nlution with the non-permanent members and I have given Bush urgent instructions\nto get it tabled and teld Vorontsov we wouldn't accept theirs but hoped it\nwas negotiable and he said it probably was. He said let the people in New York\ntalk about it.\nP: What about the exchange of letters?\nK: Tbat's obviously off. It's just as well as far as the Chinese are\nconcerned. We cannot support a Soviet resolution,\nP: There is a unilateral cease-fire\n?\nK: Yes, but we have a problem getting Yahya to accept/ it. The Indians\ntold the British our offer is good for only 24 hours. She may figure Yahya\n****** can't move that fast. I have sent a cable urging Yahya to accept it at\nleast until the UN acts. This is all tactical maneuvering in the last 24 hours.\nIt is aggravating for the people concerned, but nothing you need to follow step\nby step,\nP: On this Cuban thing\nK: You are absolutely right. It was a breakdown of communications between\nthe Coast Guard, State and us, We were not informed of it until 4:15.\nP: This lady said messages started coming in at X 1:00.\nK: Butthe White House didn't know about it until 4:15.\nP: I want a report. You tell the State Department and the others I want\na report,\nK: We have already done that.\nP: But you can do it in my name, I am personally interested;\nthat\nI am god-damned mad, Do we have a plan\nYou are trying to get the British\nand Panamanians to protest, and we'll protest it to no one I suppose,\nK: We'll protest through the Swiss.\nP: Trying to get information; find out if they are dead or alive, I want\na contingency plan for this sort of thing in the future. If Castro gives us\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President\n12/16/71 5:15pm p. 2\nanything like this in the future I want a plan to go in and shoot them up. We\ndo nothing but make a timid protest. You say we will be on the edge of the law\nand all that; that doesn't bother me. Does it bother you?\nK: No. We were going to to into the British territorial waters. We were\ngiving orders here; the buraaucracy was baving heart attacks and then darkness fell.\nWe would have done it.\nP: What is the objection from the bureaucracy on this?\nK: Complaining about internationäl law; saying we would be getting into\nan argument with the Russians.\nP; Probably only you know how strongly I feel about the Cuban business. I\nsharply stiffened Ziegler's statement this afternoon; it wasn't tough enough.\nK: That's why I ordered these things without checking with you.\nP: Abd about recognizing Castro\nit's going to come up one day, but\nyou understand.\nK: I do.\nP: And you will have a contingency plan for the future?\nK: Within 24 hours.\nP: I am wrrting a memorandum on this and on Allende which is for your eyes\nonly so you will know in the future how far I am willing to go.\nK: That will be very helpful.\nP: I was on the plane then -- you acted but\nK: It would have saved a half-hour's protest if I had had that piece of\npaper to wave,\nP: But you feel good about India-Pakistan?\nK: Barring total treachery\nP: On the part OS the Indians.\nK: And the Russians. The real problem now is cosmetics,\nP: What will this do to your backgrounder?\nK: I still think we should do it/\nP: But maybe not by noon tomorrow?\nX\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President\n12/16/71 5be6 5:15pm p. 3\nK: I think it will be okay by then. The problem with a backgrounder is\nthe Washington Post is now no longer recognizes them. I маумиха mayhave to do\na series of individual interviews.\nP: Or don't include the Washington Post.\nK: But Knoght now goes along with the Post.\nP: So do the private ones. Can you imagine the Brisish press doing this?\nWhy are they doing it? They never did it with Kennedy.\nK: They are trying to knock me off the public forum. This wasn't even a\nbackgrounder. I said this was given on the Lindley rule. Kraslow made a very\nstrong statement saying he thought this was an outrage.\nP: At least will you be sure we cover the Time Magazine? And maybe the\nNew York Times; that will screw the Post.\nK: I think Time and Max Frankel.\nP: And maybe the Saar.\nK: Maybe George Herman.\nP: Ask Colson about that; maybe it should be Hempstone. I hope you are go-\ning to get a good rest.\nK: I am fine.\nP: I told Bob that you should go directly to C lifornia from Key Biscayne.\nTake your children and go out there. On the first I-am flying from here to\nWashington to see Mrs. Nixon off. But this is a good time for you to get out\nthere. Go out on the 29th if your kids can go then.\nK: I have to have my kids back by the 31st, so I am going to Boston. But\nmy kids will be in Key Biscayne with me.\nP: Oh that's good.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nBush/Kissinger\n5:45 p.m. 12/16/71\nB:\nI got over here to the Council and the Russians were putting their\ndraft out. They were just about to vote, nobody would put it in\nso I just went ahead and read into the record that there is another\nresolution getting wide circulation. I read this into the record. It\ncould be ours or ours and the Japanese.\nK:\nIt is the one we approved earlier?\nB:\nIt is the Italian draft with just a slight change. It is the one Pakistan\nwants, the one the PRC would buy and exactly the one we have been\ntalking about. I;d like you to back me up on this.\nK:\nOK. You did absolutely right and if State complains you can blame\nme. Tell them you couldn't operate with a Soviet draft.\nB:\nGood. I will leave it on the table.\nK:\nWell, as long as it is not the Soviet draft it doesn't bother me.\nB:\nWe couldn't get any of the little countries. They will vote for it,\nbut not put their name on it.\nK:\nYou did the right thing, George\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRowland Evans/Kissinger\n5:50 p.m.\n12/16/71\nK: Sorry I was so hard to get.\nE:\nNx Anything going on?\nWe\nK: It's winding up. Unless it is a perfidious trick, I think it will work.\nShe\nwill know by noon tomorrow.\nE: When are you leaving town?\nK: Sat. morning.\nE: Early?\nK: 9:00 or 10:00.\nE: I would like a better view on some of this Soviet stuff.\nK: I will do my best. Maybe we can have breakfast Sat. morning.\nE: I will call your office tomorrow afternoon. I think there's a hell of an\nimportant story but it fascinates me personally.\nK: It's a fascinating story and they have played a shitty role.\nE: I will call your office.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHaldeman/Kissinger\n6:05 p.m.\n12/16/71\nH: I don't need to bother you because the President got caught up so I don't\nneed to.\nK: Coming home. Indian unilateral ceasefire permanent if accepted in 24\nhours\nH: Pakistanis accept?\nK: We are working on them. Getting UN to ratify. By tomoorow all done.\nH: I thought it was back on track. I talked with Al this morning. We haven't\nhad any effort by Rogers to get through.\nK: They are so far out of the game. Rogers said this morning he was taking\npersonal charge. That was after India announced ceasefire.\nH: That's good. We are back on track?\nK: Yes. We have saved W. Pakistan. We turned disaster into defeat. Best\nwe could do was save W. Pakistan. I am concerned about one other thing.\nAd vance party to China £ is turning into\n.\nWe cannot announce new\n3 heads of it. They have never heard of Zeigler. They expect Haig. Chapin\nZeigler and Al Haig. I think it should be cut down on TV numbers. This has\nbeen a humiliating defeat to them. They are terrorized of an attack. So we\ncannot be TV nuts.\nH: I thought of that. But with ground station\nK: They can do it with less. If Zeigler has to, he will.\nH: We can cut back more. Let's try. It will smoke them out.\nK: We are really skating on thin ice. You can trust me. I will background tom-\norrow afternoon. I have to do it with individuals. If groups, it will leak again.\nH: You have trouble with the Washington Post and others will pick it up.\nK: I didn't say I am making a major announcement on background.\nH: Ben Bradlee will not accept background as background.\nK: I said only on Lindley rule. Otherwise there was justification but not\non this.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAlton Marshall/Kissinger\n6:20 p.m.\n12/16/71\nM: This is your friendly real estate broker.\nK: I have just seen what you said about me in Cosmopolitan.\nM: I said you are a sex fiend.\nK: A moth around the flames.\nM: Honest? What do adx I do? Since 1:00 when I got your call I find that the\nChinese group has contacted most of the real estate brokers in the city. So\nI am looking at the same houses. I have about 18 possibilities and a coupld that\nhave been checked this afternoon.\nK: Should they get in touch with you?\nM: I would like to help them.\nK: Let them contact you. What can you do for them?\nM: I can put some of my people at their disposal to sort out with brokers what\nthey are being offered. Technical assistante. We are not brokers and don't deal\nin residences. Ix When I made the call they knew what the interest was because\nthey had worked with them. I never used the name.\nK: Where do they get you?\nM: CI5-9000.\nK: I will tell them what you said. Get in touch with brokers and technical\nassistance.\nM: And glad to do it.\nK: Here's the quote: \"No one in campaign $ ???? mankk moth\naround the flame.\"\nM: The last sentence has come out. He put that together. He asked\nif you like politics. I said of course he likes the political\nintrigue.\nK: It's a friendly article. How are you?\nM: I am great. I want you to see how great I am. We have the\nXXXX orange crates in place.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGeneral Casey\n* 12.16.71 5x62pm 6:42pm\nC: Did you get a copy of the note Leo Cherne sent to Safire to get to\nyour attention?\nK: No.\nc: Well, the International Rescue Committee is sending me to Calcutta\nthey are trying to get me to go with him.\nK: To do what?\nC: To review the refugee program there.\nK: We don't want to give any encouragement to the Indians.\nC: This is humanitarian business.\nK: I don't want to give any moral support or backing to the Indians.\nC: Well, I am not\nabout it.\nK: I would just as soon you didn't.\nC: Okay.\nK: Okay, thank you for checking with me.\nC : I wouldn't dare go xx without doing it.\nK: Thank you.\nC: Take care.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nShultz/Kissinger\n6:57 p.m. 12/16/71\nK: It looks like we are getting the war wound up.\nS: Congratulations! It's an achievement under the akkiewx circumstances.\nK: We have turned a disaster into a defeat. I am not kiding myself.\nwind\nS: I am on the subject of the Defense budget. I need to it up.\nK: First of all the President is determined on increas on F-111. The $500\nmillion part of it.\nS: In terms of econimic employmentixx impacts a spending program in the\n'73 budget has no impact prior to election.\nK: The problem is somebody has to give on that and since the President will\nnot give orders and thinks I can get it done I don't know what to do. *********\nI was content with 78.5. He wants to do it for political reasons.\nS: Let me track down what the F-111 amounts to.\nK: $200 million.\nS: What's the other item? month We now have a sentence on pay (?) that takes 300\nout. We have a 5th in which they have not had 6 million in outlay in '72.\nTheir spending level is below 6. Their ? ? ? ? 200 thousand between now and\nthe end of the year. They will have to push hard to get spending up. They\nareawash with money over there. I will come back on the F-111.\nK: Will you?\nS: We do have to look this thing up. Another thing we have to be alert to.\nSay in it foreign aid handled in Pentagon. They are loading it into service\nbudgets Bad from a lot of stand points, including if you are not grateful\ncareful you will have each branch of the service with its own foreign policy.\nWe have to have it here.\nK: Where? Isn't it your job? They have it done there.\nS: President would like that.\nK: He doesn't care if it's donw there but not good through XRX Foreign Relations\nCommittee.\nS: I will not succeed on that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nShultz/Kissinger\n6:57 p.m. 12/16/71\n-2-\nK: Can't you set up budget procedures? No one will fight you on that.\nS: I ivill if I can. Tell them not to put it into the service budgets.\nK: I am not XXXX sure I understand it.\nS: I will get you a memo on it.\nK: Next year we want to give only humanitarian stuff to India. Less then 100\nmillion dollars. Maury Williams thinks ? ? ? ? ?\n.\nlump sum for\nSouth Asia with Pakistan getting the most.\nS: You want only humanitarian type aid for India.\nK: We don't want to face it as an overt thing.\nS: your numbers make it fi x difficult. Amount going into India is difficult\nbecause people x can add and subtract.\nK: We will take that risk.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n[Mr. Hubbard in Key Biscaynej\nTELCON\nHenry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger\n8:25 p.m., December 16, 1971\nH:\nYou called before and I got the message 10 minutes ago for which\nI apologize.\nK:\nI was returning your call.\nH:\nYes, I know. Have you had a good week so far?\nK:\nYes.\nH:\nWhat happened on Air Force 1 and whether you had anything to say.\nK:\nNo, I was trying to do it for the reporters as a favor. At their\nurgent request to do something about the Azores and at the end of\nit took some questions from them on India-Pakistan. I said, Look\nthis is not to be attributed and then I answered questions on it.\nH:\nWhen I gave you the Pool report\nK:\nI suppose I could have taken it out then but I figured it was the\nLindley Rule and they would take it out. If they had said it might\nand without ascribing Administration sources, I would have been\nbetter off putting on on background because then I could have edited\nit out.\nH:\nYou were ill served by some of my close colleagues.\nK:\nThe only part\nuse the background technique to hide a major\nannouncement. I was trying to be helpful to the reporters on Air Force 1\nIt was a long ride and boring. I should have taken it out of the Pool\nreport. Using my name was no worse than using Administration\nsources.\nH:\nI suppose so. Everything that you said has been forgotten because\nof all this fuss on ground rules. Dave Kraslow didn't hurt himself.\nK:\nNo, no; if they blow the whole background thing, I think they will\nget less information.\nH:\nI don't understand my colleagues at the Washington Post sometimes.\nTo deal with matters of substance, what have you been saying about\nyour two breakfasts with Pompidou, how shall we deal with that,\ncan you say what you discussed?\nK:\nYou can say we discussed the agenda, that we tried to narrow the\nissues for decision.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nHenry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger\n8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971\nH:\nOh, really. So that necessarily involved you in monetary affairs\nas well as national affairs.\nK:\nWhatever was on the agenda.\nH:\nDid you trade impressions on Brezhnev?\nK:\nI don't think it would be right for me to comment on discussions.\nH:\nDid you cover what discussions he would have with the President?\nK:\nIf within manageable proposals. I do it almost always. If not with\nthe principal, with the principal's assistant.\nH:\nOn this, why not the head of State. Was there no one else there who\ncould play that role?\nK:\nIn this case there were matters of more than usual sensitivities.\nH:\nFair enough.\nK:\nAnd I happen to know Pompidou and in fact, I did this the last time\nhe was here.\nH:\nOh, I didn't know that. Was it known?\nK:\nI don't think so but this wouldn't have been known either but it is hard\nto move in the Azores.\nH:\nDo you think you will be satisfied with the way things came out?\nK:\nThey came out very well. I think everybody got their issues covered\nwhich is what they wanted.\nH:\nOn South Asia, things have worked out well to the extent that they - -\nK:\nWorked out best way they could\nI am not saying we wanted\nEast Pakistan to go this way but when the war started we set ourselves - -\nIt is boring as hell - - - did we talk about it last week?\nH:\nNo.\nK:\nIt was Jerry Schecter I talked to about it.\nH:\n(laughter)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 3 -\nHenry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger\n8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971\nK:\nYou didn't ask to see me.\nH:\nI'm not complaining.\nK:\nOur problem was to preserve West Pakistan and I think it is working\nout. A major crisis has been avoided by bringing all the factors into\nplay including the Soviets.\nH:\nAbout the hard line you and the President took on the Indian thing,\nthere is a strain in relationships.\nK:\nYeah, I think we told\nH:\nWas there a reason for it?\nK:\nYeah, but I don't want to go any further into it. Do not ascribe this\nIn fact, I have information that it is very probable that India would\nattack West Pakistan and smabh West Pakistan.\nH:\nBut the Soviet Union --\nK:\nIf we had not taken an anti-Indian line, they almost certainly would\nhave continued.\nH:\nI have no doubt of that.\nActually, people say we drove India awa\n/\nK:\nThere is no doubt. We don't do this\nIndia bought about $600\nmillion worth of Russian equipment while we were giving it billions\nof aid so we didn't move it intentionally into the Russian orbit, nor\nwill their future policy during the crisis. They want to be independent\nof the Soviet Union and we have no reason to believe they will wish\nto become Soviet satelittes.\nThe consequences of going\nalong with it would have been the destruction of a country of 100 million\npeople.\nH:\nAny reason to believe the Soviets responded to U.S. comments or\npressures.\nK:\nI wouldn't say pressures but there were\nxxx\nvery active conversations\nwith Moscow.\nH:\nMoscow or Dobrynin?\nK:\nI don't want to mention the channels used but there was very active\naction.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n4 I I\nHenry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger\n8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971\nH:\nFinally they responded.\nK:\nLet's wait until how the Security Council goes.\nH:\nWould you say there was a change in Soviet attitude? In other words,\neither another 70 or another experience in adventure.\nK:\nI think what we are in, the Soviets helped either deliberately or\naccidentally which like 67 they had great difficulty controlling.\nH:\nThat's a much softer line than you took on the plane.\nK:\nOn the plane I said they don't do nothing to restrain\nH:\nBecause they don't know how or because they choose not to.\nK:\nBecause they don't\nbut I think they were one of the factors\nthat brought it out reasonably well, assuming it came out reasonably\nwell. We will have to hold our breath for a few days.\nH:\nDid you take note of the Jack Anderson column this morning quoting you?\nK:\nLook, I would be very leery of going with things took totally out of\ncontext.\nH:\nIt is pretty clear that it is out of context but are the quotes correct?\nK:\nMy minutes don't show it but my minutes might not report every word.\nH:\nIt is fair to say and it is\nthat you were way out ahead of\nPresident Nixon even more behind\nK:\nHow could I survive in this Government where half the town is laying\nfor me? You know there is nothing half the bureaucracy would like\nto find more than me with no support from the President. I try to\ngive a moderate interpretation of what I believe are his views.\nH:\nWould it be fair to say he was outraged or\n.\nK:\nIt has never been our style\nH:\nOn India, to say it was ran from the White House with you executing\nfrom the White House.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 5 -\nHenry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger\n8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971\nK:\nAs the crisis got worse, not at the beginning but where it reached\nthe point when the [heads of governments became involved. We\nbrought it to the conclusion that was attainable.\nH:\nIt is difficult to argue with what it now considered success.\nK:\nWe turned a disaster into a net-minus.\nH:\nWell phrased.\nK:\nI am not claiming success of what had the capacity of being an enormous\ndisaster bak put into containable limits.\nH:\nSoviet supported Indian aggression.\nK:\nIn the case of military, active. I think I have stayed away from the\nword aggression.\nH:\nYou used it, we didn't.\nK:\nI mean I haven't pressed on it.\nH:\nHave we all overlooked\nK:\nOn a Lindley Rule basis, if there is still people to use it with.\nH:\nIt is easy to use it with one man but not with 150.\nK:\nThe Lindley Rule inconsistent with the Pool report. I blew it, I was\njust damn stupid, therefore, I am not claiming\n.\nH:\nIs that on-the-record, that you blew it?\nK:\nNo, no; you are not going to write about this?\nH:\nNo, I wasn't calling you about that. I wasn't going to use anything you\nsaid without your authorization. Oh, hell let's forget about that,\nit is not that important a story. It is over and done with and you\nneedn't concern yourself with that. I am really interested in the\nSoviet-US. relationship.\nK:\nOn the Lindley Rule, you have to say it is worrisome. If you read\nwhat I said in the backgrounder about U.S. -Soviet relations, you will\nsee that I was being very, very careful not to use unilateral advantage.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 6 -\nHenry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger\n8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971\nH:\nIn the arena that the argument takes place\nK:\nIn the Middle East\nH:\nFor they are totally unable to resist?\nK:\nThey are encouraged to resist. We can't possibly get into the position\nof counting Indian actions\nand frankly, I have to say the\nreport has totally missed. Again, off-the-record,\nshe misled us\nand the President was anything but cold-blooded if there was some\nirritation in these conversations.\nOnce the war started, it didn't\nmake a goddamn difference what happened in Bangla Desh. Whatever\nmistake we made in letting it get started, we tried to get it done and\nlimit the damange. We can repair our relations with India after th e\nwar, that problem is much deeper.\nH:\nThat makes much more sense than what we have seen reported.\nK:\nNewsweek wasn't as bad as Time.\nH:\nI haven't seen Time but Newsweek was a disaster.\nK:\nI thought Time was so awful that Newsweek didn't seem as bad. Our\nnightmare last week was that the whole situation in the world could\nget unraveled.\nH:\nHow did it get out of hand at first? Either we were too soft with them\nor it fell between the cracks.\nK:\nOr the Indians were so determined to use this, nothing would have made\nany difference.\nWe cut $31 of $35 million worth of military\nequipment. You can't say these are not actions of condemnation. Yahya\nis not going to win any IQ tests -- that's off-the-record. He never\nmanaged to package into proposals\nIf he had publically instead of\ndribbling them out one at a time.\nThere was constant pressure\nto take the Indian intervention to the UN but the Indians always asked us\nnot to do it. If we had recognized in October\nthe worse judgment\nwe made is that we thought we had more time.\nH:\nAt the end?\nK:\nThe whole time. It was just hard to believe I'm not looking for\ncredit but I must have been the only one who thought the Indians would\nattack.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 7 -\nHenry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger\n8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971\nH:\nAre you including the President?\nK:\nYeah, and after all we didn't make negligible concessions. We had\ndiscussions with\noffered to establish talks with Mujibur and\nhis lawyer\nThey were never given a chance to develop. I\nam not trying to judge here, I am just saying India is not to be\nunderrated.\nH:\nThe final solution on the Pakistani\nK:\nOf course they may find out -- they will almost certainly be\nThe East Benglais suffered under the East Pakistanis from neglect but\nthe Indians have a positive way to keep it under control because they\ncan not have a completely independent Bangla Desh.\nThey have a positive interest to keep it in some sort of relationship\nand you have to remember when people say an elected government in\nDacca was overthrown, this was perfectly true. In Calcutta there is\npresidential control.\nOf course, I am not going to say\nYahya was right.\nH:\nDealing with the situation given.\nK:\nOur problem, given the danger of war, was to prevent it.\nH:\nK:\nI didn't mention China before because we didn't want\nthe trip to Peking to be a success but didn't want China to think it is\na threat.\nH:\nFrom the Soviet Union?\nK:\nFrom several of its neighbors.\nH:\nOn the plane, I thought it was an actual reflection of what you wanted\nthe Russians to understand.\nK:\nWe had other means of conveying it. Will you check other quotes with\nme?\nH:\nYes. Are you coming down here?\nK:\nNo, I am out of favor. Look, the President -- this was his strategy\nand he didn't know what I was doing. He wanted us to get across to the\nSoviets that this had profound consequences.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 8 -\nHenry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger\n8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971\nH:\nAll right.\nK:\nOn what basis were we talking here?\nH:\nEll, I think the basis is I will use the knowledge you have imparted\nupon me on my own and I will check quotes with you.\nK:\nThat would be very good. What about your other story?\nH:\nI haven't finished it yet. I really ought to see you once more.\nK:\nYes, there's one part I ought to see you about. You know you asked\nme how much is mine and how much is the President's -- I shouldn't\nwrite it that way.\nH:\nMy impression leans toward the idea of your creation of the President\nthat he has assigned you powers and if anything he is a\nlittle bit out ahead of you.\nK:\nI think that's right. That is a fair impression.\nH:\nI am willing that you can shape your\nK:\nUp to a certain point.\nH:\nHe does have his own mind.\nK:\nOf course, he does.\nH:\nIt is friendly --\nK:\nand professional.\nH:\nBut that he knows who you are and what you both are doing. That\nyour loyalty is to the\nK:\nI think that is very perceptive. We can get together next week sometime.\nOr are you going to go to Key Biscayne.\nH:\nOh, is he coming back here. I will stick around next week and I think\nthey will have somebody else here.\nK:\nAll right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n10:00 a. m. - 12/17/71\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHello, Henry, what's the topic today?\nK:\nIt looks like we are in business. The Paks have accepted it.\nP:\nDoes that mean she (Mrs. Gandhi) won't break it?\nK:\nWell, she has no pretext to break it. Oh, they are bringing me\nin a flash cable. The Celanese want us to put some of our ships\nin the Indian Ocean into Colombo.\nP:\nWhy do they want them?\nK:\nThey would like to show our presence.\nP:\nI see.\nK:\nBut at any rate, Yahya has accepted it now. The Security Council\nin essence killed the Soviet resolution last night. What we did after\nyou and I talked - the British were horsing around with this non-\npermanent residents resolution and the Soviets were running around\nwith one. We just took the resolution of the others as ours. We had\nto because the Soviets were going to\nAs it was the Soviet\none was killed - never got to a vote. They adjourned and this was\nbetter for us. It means both sides have accepted the ceasefire.\nP:\nAs far as the Security Council is concerned, what will they do?\nK:\nWell, my view is that if the fighting flares up again the attacker will\nbe violating a UN order - this is the only advantage. The disadvantage\nis that it legitimizes aggression. Our position is if anyone wants to\nvote for our resolution we will be ddighted to let it pass.\nP:\nYes, I think that is a good point. Now at the present time the\nPaks are satisfied, the Chinese are satisfied and the Russians.\nThat is fine.\nK:\nWe have come out of this amazingly well and we scared the pants\noff the Russians. One shouldn't give somebody who drops a match\ninto a fire, credit for calling the fire department.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN08-51/12400 Per Hr. 9/11/2013\nBy RS IMIH NARA, Date 5/12/2017\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\n[p.1 of 4]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nP:\nAre you going to do a background thing?\nK:\nI talked to Scalli. I will have a backgrounder with two or three\ngroups of two each and in a general way explain our strategy.\nI think it is too early to put out the details.\nP:\nYes, I think that is very important. What will we get out of it?\nK:\nWell, Henry Hubbard called me yesterday and he said the President\ndid it again. We were all screaming at him and he was vindicated\nby events. And Kleiman was in from the New York Times this\nmorning, but I didn't do too much with him.\nP:\nHe must be pretty pleased with the Azores trip.\nK:\nThe Azores he was delighted with but the Post had a grudging position.\nP:\nI see. Henry, I do believe we have got to get the Cabinet meetings\nleaked out.\nK:\nWell, this is one of our great sources of intelligence. What we can\nget out is that they were planning to attack but not say how.\nP:\nWell, now if the question is raised about aid to India, I would be\njust completely\nI wouldn't tell them anything. The thing to do is\nto do it but don't tell them anything. But on the other hand, it is XXX\nthing what we do not what we say.\nK:\nMrs. Gandhi has written a letter which has been leaked to the press.\nP:\nThat is outrageous.\nK:\nWe are drafting a reply and I think we ought to release it.\nP:\nRelease it before she gets it.\nK:\nRight, because that gives us another chance to make our case.\nP:\nNow, what points\nDoes Scalli think it is important for you to\ndo the background thing?\nK:\nYes, he thinks it is essential.\nP:\nWhat points are you going to get across basically?\nK:\nThe point that I want to get across.\nP:\nWhat I mean is to bring on the details.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nK:\nWe have to let them know this was not a war just between India\nand Pakistan, but whatever are the initial reasons.\nP:\nI think you ought to make the point very strongly that if we dixdn't\nhadn't used our influence as strongly as possible, it never would\nhave come out the way it did. The word would have been carried\non from one UN member to another. I think that is the point.\nK:\nWell, that is a good point and also that it would have had a very\nserious impact if the Soviet Union had.\nP:\nAnd in other parts of the world it would have been resisted.\nK:\nYour whole strategy from the beginning was to bring about what\nin fact we did. There are many who heard me talk about this\nlast week.\nP:\nThat is right so they are prepared for it.\nK:\nEven Henry Hubbard said for a few days we thought we had to change\nour evaluation a little bit, but you have come out right again.\nBut what I will not do is put out all the exchanges. That is premature.\nP:\nYes, and I suppose we should stay away from any interagency\nbickering and all of that. I should think everyone is happy.\n(State)\nK:\nNo, now they want to take credit for it.\nP:\nAnything further on my Cuban friends?\nK:\nThe British gave permission to the Coast Guard at 2:30 in the\nafternoon to enter the waters.\nP:\nPermission, they should have ordered them to do it.\nK:\nWell, wasn't passed on to the White House\nuntil 4:15\nP:\nSomeone is going to get fired. I want to know what was going on\nbetween 2:15 and 4:15. You tell them the President wants to know\nwhat happened during that time. Those two hours meant danger\nto a lot of lives. Are you going to get out a contingency plan?\nK:\nOh, sure.\nP:\nYou understand I feel very strongly in human terms about this.\nI don't think Castro is going to get away with this sort of thing\nin the future. Do you agree?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nK:\nYes, we have to act much more\nP:\nWhat was it the Tripoli bipartite?\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nGood, that's the principal I want to play.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n10:43 a.m.\n12/17/7½\nP: On this one other thing on the Cuban thing and backgrounder.\nOn the Cuban thing we have done everything we can about getting\ninformation and filing protext?\nK: The protest has been filed.\nP: British going to protest?\nK: I have not heard their reply.\nP: Panamanians have?\nK: That's right.\nP: Follow it thru ruthlessly. Great public £* visibility. I\nwant the Russians to know we are raising hell about it.\nK: I fully understand that.\nP: I was just looking at the morning papers here and probably\nTV too. Great Indian victory and Dacca and ceasefire. It's importa:\nto get across fact that Indians were aggressiors and when she did\nceasefire it wasn't an act of grace. She shouldn't get credit for\nstarting the fire and then calling in the fire department. The size\nof a country or its form of government cannot justify aggression.\nThe U.S. does not take issues on side of who has the power. It's\nback to Hitler and\n.\nIt's a moral position. My whole view\nis not anti-Indian or pro-Pakistan but anti-aggression. I don't wan\nIndia to get the victory.\nK: They have a victory.\nP: But they shouldn't praise it.\nK: Right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRichard Scaife/Paul Hayworth/Kissinger\n11:15 a.m.\n12/17/7½\nS: I am so frustrated. I listened to NBC news this morning. You\nknow what's going on in the world. I have my editorial page editor\nhere. I want good news to come out.\nK: What's NBC doing?\nS: Shaking everyone up. Will you tell Hayworth your views?\nH: It's an honor to talk with you, sir. The overall public feeling\nthat we have blown it in the India-Pakistan situation. I would like\nsomething positive. I know it's a comples situation. I am trying\nto look at possible areas of X future solutions for this area.\nK: What's the basis of saying we have blown it?\nH: We were indecisive in the area. Damned if we do and damned if\nwe don't. No concret steps. That's oversimplistic.\nK: Total nonsense. We took major steps but India determined to have\nwar. Only steps to prevent war -- pouring military aid Ínto\nPakistan -- we couldn't talk. Major steps that would have been\nperfectly (concordant ?) with\nbut India WIN didn't want\nit. They were egged on by the Russians.\nH: Best you could, trying to reduce --\nK: We have given more relief to refugees then rest of the world\nput together We have done a whole list of things. I could have\nan assistant call you and tell you what we have done. Once we are\nstarted President moved to keep it from spreading to West and U.S.\ndeserves credit for not letting it spread.\nH: It's a good point. We are about to cut it to 14 days. Where\nare we going now as it stands? Eventual recognition of Bangla Desh?\nK: We want to defuse the situation.\nH: How?\nK: I don't want to go into that.\nH: A definite plan you hope to follow?\nK: Hopt to be active. Pressident's desx decisive moves towards\nIndia and Soviets were a major factor that brought war to a conclusi\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nScaife/Hayworth/Kissinger\n11:15 a.m.\n12/17/7½\n-2-\nH: I appreciate this.\nK: Whom should my assistant call?\nH: Paul Hayworth. 412/834-1151. You have been most kind. Much\nluok.\nK: I appreciate it. Someone will call you within the hour.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMcCloy/Kissinger\n11:23 a.m.\n12/17/7½\nM: I tried to get you yesterday.\nK: I have been in over my head.\nM: Had a thought to get you out of difficulties with a nomination.\nK: Why don't you write a letter to the President?\nM: Suggesting it? I don't see how Fulbright can turn him down.\nK: It's an excellent idea.\nM: I thought of some time back of writing you a little note of what\nI thought he might be ready to do. You don't need it, do you?\nK: I transmitted it to the President. He has a horror of\ncommissions and special\n.\nM: The other ***** wasn't my dish of tea. I see a light in the\ntunnel on the monetary situation.\n(The \"he\" referred to above for nomination is Dave Packard)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRabin/Kissinger\n11:36 a.m.\n12/17/71\nR: It was my\nfrom Joe. Started X by Secretary saying\nhe wants this eschange. It would help to have a special meeting\nbut because of time table it's impossible. He started by asking\nour Foreign Minister for his analysis and estimate of what happened\nin the Gen. Assembly and results of talk yesterday with Jarring.\nWith Jarring it's freezed and no flexibility from our point of view.\nThe Secy. was not sorry about\nat mission. Israel would\nhave found more positive language to answer Jarring message of\nFeb. 8. The main issue as the Secy. sees it is resumption of\ntalks on\n.\nOur Foreign Minister said that talks in NX\nthere's no interim settlement. The Secy. said no, the U.S. has its\nown reasons that beginning of January the Egyptians might agree.\nI am afraid even though the Foreign Minister said there is basic\ndifferences between the U.S. and Israelon interim settlement and\nhow it can work, I wouldn't be surprised if the Secy.\ngot the impression that we would talk.\nK: You were not supposed to do that.\nR: I am having lunch with Sisco. Unfortunately the Foreign\nMinister forgot that there XXX were certain qualifications of the\nU.S. we asked and not answered yet.\nK: Can't you do that?\nR: I will do it.\nK: Make sure it stays in phase. That\ndoesn't get ahead\nof what I am doing.\nR: The Foreign Minister goes back Sunday.\nK: Can you come in at 5:00?\nR: Yeah. Sisco says now we are free to go ahead --\nK: He said I had to talk with you.\nR: I will call him and say definitian of ? ? ? ?.\nK: Time consuming proceedures.\nR: I am leaving on the 29th and probably return on 6 or 7.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRabin/Kissinger\n11:36 a.m.\n12/17/7½\n-2-\nK: I will see you at 5:00 in the Map Room. Good.\nR: One point more. I think the PM mentioned last Friday letting\nthe Russians know there were some talks and resumption of hostilities\nK: Before I go to Bermuda I will do this.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmb. Bush/Kissinger\n11:43 a.m.\n12/17/7½\nB: We are X waiting to hear from Bhutto. I talked to him earlier.\nThe British --\nK: I just talked with Cromer. On\nresolution. What's\nyour view?\nB: It's a lower common denominator. It's an attempt to subvert\nwhat Somalia's trying to do. They said he was making progress and\nthis looks like beying out for India at the cheapest possible price.\nBut if we want to get off perhaps its way to do it.\nK: Ceasefire and withdrawal.\nB: The one we worked on yesterday? Bhutto said this mornigg he\ndidn't want to legitimize surrender. I am seeing the Ambassador\nat 12:00. Our resolution had withdrawal in there.\nK: I saw it.\nB: It had also humanitarian thing. The British are buying off the\nlowest\ncommon\ndexx denominator to get the Security Council off the\nmatter. They probably see in our resolution a support of other\nactivities going through.\nK: Then we stuck with ours.\nB: I X may get a call from\nsaying minister wants to buy\noff on it.\nK: On British? We have no reason to be more Pakistani then the\nPakistanis. Do the R Pakistanis have the British resolution?\nB: Ghutto in press conference so I cannot be sure.\nK: Let me know where the state of play is. I prefer our resoljtion.\nI share your views on the British. But if the Pakistanis are ready\nto go, we are. It's a lousy, cheap exercise. I have expressed\nit to the British Ambassador. Would Russians have accepted last nigh\nB: No. The Indian Foreign Minister said okay, you would have to go\nback to Moscow. I said yeah. As soon as Pakistan ambassador comes\nback -- he wanted what we had last night.\nK: Don't press them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmb. Bush/Kissinger\n11:43 a.m.\n12/17/7½\n-2-\nB: I won't. He said they wanted it.\nK: As long as chance for ours stick with ours. Talk with me or\nHaig.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nJ. Alsop/Kissinger\n3:13 p.m.\n12/17/71\nA: I hear you claim you made a disaster into a setback and I claim\nyou have turned a catastrophe into a disaster.\nK: At least we stopped the fighting into the West.\nA: I am going to write about it and you can't stop me. I was going\nto see Al Monday.\nK: I won't be here.\nA: Let's waxk set a time on Wed. How about 11:00?\nK: I have to keep my mornings free.\nA: Let's make lunch.\nK: We will.\nA: No, I can't change my plans. How about later in the morning?\nK: Let me aim for 12:30 in the morning.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmb. Raza/Kissinger\n3:25 p.m.\n12/17/71\nR: I was at it until 12:00 last night going through each telegram.\nI prepared a statement and signed every page and want to hand it\nover to you. I don't want to let my friends down. It's clear\nso I would like to come for 5 mins.\nK: Come at 4:30.\nR: Did you ask about Mr. Bhutto?\nK: Not yet but I will know by the end of the day.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nJustice Godberg/Kissinger\n3:55 p.m.\n12/17/71\nG: What I have to call you about is probably outdated for the moment. This is\nlatest businesss about Jacobsen.\nK: I don't know where it stand at the minute.\nG: Nx Anybody suggested to you the fustration of the Soviet manuever?\nK: Veto any condidate except Jacobsen on first ballot.\nG: It seems absurd to let them off the hook.\nK: You know the UN.\nwent\nG: I to the UN with high hopes. They don't want our to say that a Finn and\nJew is not acceptable and a private unmarked poll is theix way around it.\nK: It's my private recommendation to State. I don't think the President should\nbecome involved.\nG: It's what I would do automatically. I went to Pittsburgh and when I heard about\nit I said I would not kike let them get away with it. He would differ with getting to\npublic against India.\nK: We had to do it to keep them off W. Pakistan. We weren't concerned so\nmuch about East Pakstan.\nG: I am out of govte and don't know the facts. I have no sympathy with them\naka at all. I never hesitated to punch them in the nose when they misbehaved.\nWe are a great power too. You pass it on to the Dept.\nK: No one expects to ? ? ? ? . Everyone talksx takes your views with utmost\n.\nI have no pain about what you said.\nG: If we have time in NY - - the President shouldn't get involved. People should\nhandle without involving him. Handles in NY. I would never have agreed to\nthis procedure. I would have said let's go ahead and vote.\nK: They proposed it. Let me check on it. OK. Nice to talk with you.\nG: Let's get together soon.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nM. Bundy/Kissinger\n4:22 p.m. 12/17/71\nB: I am coming down tomorrow to Billy and Lucy Moor head's 25th wedding\nanniverary. Are you going to be in town?\nK: I will be out of town.\nB: I want to talk with you about how to go on the next step on India and Pakistan.\nWhat's your schedule aft er that?\nK: Mon. and Tues. in Bermuda. How about lunch on Wed. ?\nB: I will be there. Have they stopped shooting?\nK: Yes. ?7????.\nB: I am no longer optimistic on that point. I have the Goldwater version of\nthe Kissinger papers and I see what you are trying to do.\nK: It makes ixx it easier for his successor.\nB: I have no quarrel with effort that was made. When one gets preoccupied\nwith what happens on one plan when it's necessary to discuss next plan. On\nthe ceasefire one the ENTERPRISE come home?\nK: Yes. Is Thurs. equally good for you?\nB: Hold a second. Thurs. is better.\nK: Let's do it Thurs.\nB: Lunch?\nK: Yes.\nB: If complications, pass the word to me.\nK: On the ENTERRRISE we wanted to make sure same thing did not happen in\nW. Pakistan and that's what she was planning.\nB: That's over now.\nK: So we have no additional reason for keeping her there.\nB: The sooner she goes off to my war the better off you will be.\nDECLASSIFIED\nK: I will get a war of my own.\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN08-51/12401 Per Hr. 9/11/2013\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library RS WITH NARA, Date 5/12/2017\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determinedo be declassified.\nTELCON\nHenry Brandon/Kissinger\n4:50 p.m.\n12/17/71\nB: I would like to see you for a few minutes about the Heath meeting.\nK: I doubt it.\nB: Anything special on your side?\nK: No. We have to wipe up the mess on the subcontinent. It ended after the\ntragedy of it's beginning. We at least saved W. Pakistan. That's what we were\nafter.\nB: What do you think should be done now?\nK: You know what can be done now? Can't -- there's not much that can be done\nnow. We have to face the facts of what this means.\nB: What does it mean to you?\nK: You know my views. It could not have happened without the Soviet Union.\nB: Yeah.\nK: It's also true it could not have ended without the Soviet Union. But I don't\nthrows\nknow if someone who takes a match into a powder keg should get credit for\nbring the fire dept.\nB: It was their doing.\nK: Like the M. E. war was. It could not have happened XXX without them.\nB: In terms of common action.\nK: Whose?\nB: U.S. and U.K.\nK: I am not sure that common action is the motto of your govt at the moment.\nB: I think it may be true. I am not sure that it may be a little bit of pick\nin this.\n02 what ?\nThe action earlier on the part of the U.S.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nH. Brandon/Kissinger\n4:50 p.m.\n12/17/71\n-2-\nK: On the China trip?\nB: And the economic stuff.\nMx K: The point has now been xxixlx made and penetrated. They don't owe us\none anymore.\nB: Can we get together when you are back? In two weeks time I will have to\ndo a major piece on state of anglo-American relations.\nK: Better to do it after.\nB: I have a Christmas present for you here.\nK: You are nice. If you said it right away you would be in now.\nB: That's why I didn't say it. I will be in Vt.\nK: I will be here until 7:00-7:30.\nB: I will just drop it in.\nK: And we can chat for 5 mins. How's Muffie?\nB: She has gone.\nK: You will be back Wed. ?\nB: No, not until Sun. a week.\nK: I will be in Key Biscayne.\nB: Until when?\nK: Through the Brandt meeting.\nB: OK. Then we will see.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nD. Frost/Kissinger\n5:00 p.m.\n12/17/71\nHAK said he could not do dinner in NY on Sunday evening as he had to fly to\nBermuda that night. DF asked if he was going to be on the coast for Christmas\nand HAK said no, but at the first week in Jan. Frost then reiterated his invita-\ntion to lunch on the 12th.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n5:42 p.m.\n- 12/17/71\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nI worked that thing out with Bhutto. I told Bob and we are doing\nit at 1:30. I think it is a very good idea. I would like to stick\nit to the Indians and under no circumstances will I see the Indian\nAmbassador. We will give Bhutto a good showing. He is coming\nin for a half hour. You have a little cold?\nK:\nNo, I have probably been talking a lot today.\nP:\nYou feel all right though.\nK:\nI feel fine.\nP:\nHow is everything going?\nK:\nIt looks like there won't be any Security Council Resolution. The\nPaks won't accept the British. The British have been outrageous.\nI have been talking with Cromer and he says the British don't want\na big announcement out of Bermuda.\nP:\nThen why the hell go to Bermuda?\nK:\nBut I think it is important not to let them off the hook and tell them\nwe\nare\nxxxxxxx\nxxith disatisfied with the degree of unity there has\nbeen on this and other things.\nP:\nWhat is the matter with them? Are they playing the Russian line?\nK:\nWell, they are playing a Jekyl line.\nP:\nDid you try to use the French?\nK:\nThey have just separated themselves. The British have actually\nworked against us as they did on the presentation issue.\nP:\nWhat do they want? Just be on the side of the Indians?\nK:\nWell, they don't want to do anything that displeases the Indians.\nReston had a very good comment. He said the only ones who\nunderstood what was involved was the Administration; it finally\nunderstood the larger strategic challenge of Moscow's power play.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nP:\nYou know it probably was the backgrounder thing that did it.\nNow how have you done today?\nK:\nI talked to the AP and UP through Scali. That worked very well.\nScalli is doing Kalb.\nP:\nYou do Time-Life and Frankel.\nK:\nWell, Frankel is in another country. I did a little bit with Kleiman\nin the morning.\nP:\nDo it simple.\nK:\nNow I talked to Time but Time is way off on the Indian side. Now\nthey will claim their letter to you is a terrible pushoff and I think\nwe ought to put off your reply tomorrow so it hits the same cycle.\nP:\nOK.\nK:\nI am getting a reply ready now on the things we have done so this\nis a matter of record.\nP:\nI would think State would have done it already.\nK:\nOh, State, it took them 10 hours to get two paragraphs over here.\nP:\nLet's give it a full reply and shoot it off. Make it on plain white\npaper.\nK:\nBut we will have to get it out before the newspapers close.\nP:\nYou will have to do it fast.\nK:\nI think we will come out well on that. I talked to the Board of\nDirectors at the Hoover Institute today. They asked some questions\nabout India and Pakistan and I really let them have it.\nP:\nOK, well, I wouldn't be too concerned about it. Try to get the rest\nof it out. You have done the wire services, but I wouldn't be too\nfeverish about it. If time is a losing cause, forget it. How do\nyou think Reston came to his view?\nK:\nI don't know because I didn't even talk tohim.\nP:\nDid he know about the ceasefire?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nK:\nHe noted in the article that everyone has missed the point.\nIt had to do with Moscow's power play.\nP:\nYou know they wouldn't understand it that way. Moscow's power\nplay - that's what it was all about.\nK :\nMr. President, if it hadn't been for us Pakistan would have been\ndestroyed.\nP:\nWell I would say we saved more than 40% of it.\nK:\nWe saved more than the situation permitted.\nP:\nAs far as American public opinion is concerned I don't think they\ngave a damn.\nK:\nNo, they don't give a damn. All they can say is there was a war and\nwe helped to end it in 10 days.\nP:\nWell, on Bhutto I think.\nK:\nI think it is a good move and it also commits us to the preservation\nof Pakistan.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmb. Rxxx Raza/Kissinger\n5:52 p.m.\n12/17/71\nK\" We will see your Minister at 1:30 tomorrow for half an hour.\nR:\nI may be with him. Is that all right.\nK: Certainly.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n6:08 p.m. 12/17/71\nK: You called me earlier.\nL: At the time I was calling to talk over if you wanted me to come down on list\nof options I was sending you. I sent them.\nK: Which list?\nL: A, D, C. The Cuban thing. It was noon and it's worked out.\nK: On the God-damned x Defense Budget? How will we £ get it done?\nLL They are here this weekend.\nK: I will not be available until Wed.\nL: We have to get a print out.\nK: Can it wait?\nL: Then I will let these people go until then. Is there a disagreement?\nK: & 78. 5 and 79. 5.\nULMS\nL: It all depends on whether you want to put the alms and sorties.\nK: How much for alms?\nL: 200 million.\nK: And 200 million for F-111.\nL: What they have decided to do a on that is to go in and use that on the\nsupplemental. George has agreed on that and Boeing 747 is ????? .\nK: 200 is alms we can give you.\nL: And I want capability on sortie to carry out President's directive.\nK: Then 79.\nL: Then no 400 million on all volunteer force/\nK: It's knocked out anyway.\nL: It's not in 78. 5.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nLaird/Kissinger\n6:08 p.m.\n12/17/71\n-2-\nK: I can justify 200 for alms and 200 for sorties. How about 100 more for\nall volunteer?\nL: Then knock me down on 200.\nK: What will budget read?\nULM)\nL: 200 on alms and 200 on sorties and only 100 on all volunteer --\nK: Then you will be at 79. Can we settle on that?\nL: I can settle on anything. I would like 100 million for research and developmen\nBut I will not be an SOB on these things.\nK: I like working XXXX with you. You make your arguement and you never give\ntrouble to the President when he makes his decisions. You are not a cry baby\nand in '73 we will sext still be friends.\nL: I hear you talked with the Hoover Institute.\nK: I gave it to them.\nL: The alms and sorties. I would like to have that. I reclamaed on volunteer\nforces because President\nK: He WX is willing to give it up.\nL: He wasn't for it in the first place.\nK: Let me try to get George on it tonight.\nL: If you can get him to come 200 on alms and 200 on sorites I would like to\nhave 100 for RDT&E. Then the new intix initiatives such as F-111 we will do in\na '72 supplemental and also the Boeing 747.\nK: For what purpose?\nL: Airborne command.\nK: I don't need his trips to NY.\nL: To what Flanigan (?) is working on.\nK: The airconditioning has broken down here. They are putting heat on me.\nL: If you can't get it 79. 1\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nLaird/Kissinger\n6:08 p.m.\n12/17/71\n-3- -\nK: Or 79.\nL: that's where you want to go.\nK: George Shultz will caryy on like a maniac as it is.\nL: So you want to separate the differences between George and me. I can see\nwhat you are doing.\nK: I will get it done.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nKissinger/Zeigler\n12-17-71 6:30 p.m.\nZeigler: Should I announce the Bhutto thing?\nHAK: Wait until tomorrow morning. Do it tomorrow morning.\nRZ: Let me talk to Al.\nXXXXX\nHAK: This is his view--it isn't a big deal don't get them together,\nif you don't have a normal briefing. That is not a good idea to\nget the impression that he is coming back just to see Bhutto. We\nwill also be having a letter go to Mrs. Candhi tomorrow or Sunday.\nRZ: Hard-lined?\nHAK: Yes, either tomorrow or Sunday.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELOON\nRogers/Kissinger\n12-17-71 6:35 p.m.\nWR: We got word from the Panamanian government, but they rejected\nour help. To do anything with these vessels, we hhad to have requests\nfrom the Panamanian government to do it. We cant to anything and comply\nin international law. To give protection to our vessels\nHAK: As long as the President is in Florida, he will do anything\nWR: I know.\nHAK: You know what the mood is down there. What do you suggest?\nI know what the President will say---\"I don't give a damn, bomb the\nCubans this is piracy. 11\nWR: Nothing can be done tonight. I thought you should know, but\npart of the deal was getting the Panamanians hot to reverse themselves.\nThey think these Cubans (interruption) Panamanians don't want\ninvolved\nHAK:\nWR: When one of these ships followed Miami, and we are scrambling\nplanes and sending destroyers to protect it. Let me find out where\nwe are militarily. We just got word from\nWill you give some\nmore briefing on the Paks?\nHAK: I am doing nothing.\nWR: I thought someone told me the President asked you to deal with\nthese fellows on an individual basis.\nHAK: I have given Scali some points, but I am not seeing anyone.\nWR: If you do, I would appreciate it if you would touch base with me.\nI am trying to get my people quiet. We should figure out a way to\ngive the President some credit and it should be coordinated.\nHAK: I agree\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nScali/Kissinger\n6:50 p.m. 12-17-71\nHAK: Did you tell Rogers that I was briefing newsmen? I called you\nand you were on another phone.\nScali: The I am in hot water because I said no backgrounders for\nthe next number of days.\nHAK: There is no question of backgrounders--somebody said we were\ndoing it on an individual basis.\nyou had said\nJS: He had talked with you and/that there would be no backgrounders\nand there would be none for the next few days and that it would be\ncoordinated with State.\nHAK: I just said I gave some basic facts to Scali.\nJS: I didn't acknowledge doing anything with it. I said it was too early\nto start crowing about how we had handled it.\nHAK: He wants to do the crowing.\nJS: Said it should be coordinated. He said I am available with the\nPresident wants it, and said he was holding a backgrounder next\nweek. I said good, I agreed. I haven't found anything to disagree.\nNow he will say that John Scali mislead him\nHAK: No, he will say I have misled him. I have never heard him\ncoming forward with any help before.\nJS: Did he say that you were doing individually?\nHAK: Have you talked with any one else?\nJS: I have talked with Kraslow, Kalb, Gill, Gurtzman.\nHK: What is Kraslow saying?\nJS: The story is being understood, so there is not a problem--the\nonly one is in the State Department.\nHAK: I will take the blame.\nJS: Al said no--we should not have told him anything.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Asst. AG Mardian\n7:30 12-17/71\nHAK: I have a question which will drive you up the wall, but I won't\ndo it unless you tell me. You remember McDonald? His wife was\nmurdered in Trenton. Yes, mugged and murdered.\nMardian: She was?\nHAK: Her funeral is tomorrow. Would it hurt your case if I went\nto the funeral?\nMardian: Well, they will use it, of course, but I don't think so.\nHAK: He is a mad Irishman.\nMardian: Will attempt to use it as evidence. I don't think that should\nstand in you way. Our case isn't that week. There will be a lot\nof publicity, sure.\nHAK: She was a Negro.\nMardian: I didn't know that. The fact that you were compassionate\nenough to attend the funeral wouldn't hurt the Administration.\nWas it Brian McDonald?\nHAK: Yes, Brian.\nMardian: Your involvement will give the attorneys an excuse to\ncredit him for your attendance.\nHAK: I would go surprisingly.\nMardian: It is not that significant. It shouldn't do one thing or the\nother for our case--\nHAK: I will let you know what I decide.\nMardian? Okay\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRon Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger\n7:58 p.m., December 17, 1971\nK:\nRon, I am already 45 minutes late,\nZ:\nThis will only take a second. Your stuff is starting to move.\nquite well on the network news tonight.\nK:\nOh, is it.\nZ:\nAnd I am starting to get calls from people. People call me who\nare willing to pick this up on the AP & UPI, I\nwill say I am not going to give you a quote from the White House\nbut off-the-record that it is all good. Is that all right.\nK:\nI think that's fine.\nZ:\nNBC had the hotline thing.\nK:\nI don't know where they got that.\nZ:\nThey have it and I will be asked in the briefing.\nK:\nJust say we do not discuss the channel.\nZ:\nBut off-the-record I can say, yes.\nK:\nNo. I would just say \"no comment. on that. This they did not\nget this from me.\nZ:\nNBC using that, is that all right.\nK:\nThe Russians are just getting madder and madder. Ron, just\ndo not confirm it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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