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    "ocrText": "-2-\nP: That's right. The point of hitting them we have to weigh in terms of\nwhat good it does. As far as psychological good, I don't know at this point.\nK: I think not hitting them would be psychologically weak.\nP: In that case we do it, but if we do it we have got to make it worthwhile.\nSince they sent those MIGs up we should take out 2 or 3 airfields.\nK: They would like to take out MIGs and SAMs.\nP: Certainly we ought to be able to do something in the general area.\nK: I think it is further south.\nP: The airfield?\nK: Yes, I think in the Dong Hoi area about 30 miles north of the DMZ.\nP: When we do hit it I think we should let the Chinese particularly, and\nthe Russians - it doesn't matter, the Chinese immediately when it is done.\nThey call off their dogs, otherwise they take the consequences.\nK: We should do it not more than 3 days or a 2-day\npackage and let it sit for a while.\nP: It doesn't make any differense whether 2 or 5, two is enough psychologically.\nI think we have got to get that across to the Air Force people - the psychological\neffect would be just hitting the North. But it is not going on for several days.\nThey must remember that. They don't have the weather problem, do they?\nOr do they always have the weather problem?\nK: We haven't had a month they didn't have the weather problem. From the\nmiddle of the month it should be improving in the North and getting worse\nin South Vietnam. That is why I think if they do attack it will be over by May 1.\nP: Sure. The thing I was going to say - Thompson's evaluation - did it take\ninto account this attack? He believes the attack can be contained?\nK: He wants an attack. He thinks it will be badly defeated.\nP: He told me it would be contained. He even goes further with you.\nK: He thinks it will be badly defeated. The South Vietnamese fight well\naccording to him. After that the North Vietnamese will be finished until well\ninto 1974 and after that we won't even need much airpower. I know his pre-\ndictions usually sound wild but they are almost always right."
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