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    "title": "April 8-11, 1972",
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    "ocrText": "Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger\n10:15 a. m., April 9, 1972\n- 3 -\nK:\nThis was a very far-sighted plan to really put to us -- to show\nthat when all is said and done, the Soviets can challenge the U.S. first\nin the Subcontinent and in Southeast Asia, and when we come to Moscow\nwe are coming in total weakness. The other theory is they see the\nopportunity to out-maneuver Peking in Hanoi. Hanoi keeps bleeding\nequipment out of them and they don't have enough intelligence to know at\nwhat point their equipment becomes overwhelming; also they don't know\na big offensive is planned and they get sucked in. I am tempted to\nbelieve the latter one. But I draw no consolation from it. I would\nrather have a formidable enemy.\nKr:\nIt's not the kind of equipment in volume that would enable\nthem to make a decisive judgment.\nK:\nI am assuming they don't know what is going on in the south.\nKr:\nThe SAM's?\nK:\nYes.\nKr:\nRoadbuilding?\nK:\nYes. Suppose they believe what we are saying. I am trying\nto put the case for blundering rather than a master-plan. Suppose\nthey believe we are winning in the south and they want to maintain a\nbalance. Assuming what they really want is to keep going, that makes\na maximum dependence of Hanoi on them. A victorious Hanoi -- they\ncan't count on gratitude. If Admiral Moorer had the general idea\nwe wanted to support a country for political reasons, he would keep\npouring things in. He wouldn't know where it crossed to a smashing\nsuperiority. Would prefer it to be a conspiracy. If they slid into that\nwe are worse off in many ways. My interpretation may be the softer\none. I don't know they planned the India/Pakistan war, but they made\nit inevitable.\nKr:\nYes, and there's '67, too. This is a repeated pattern.\nK:\nWe have been low-keying it because we don't want to create\nexpectations which would box us in. We have approached the Summit\nas a major turning point in relations with them -- not just a meeting.\nOne way or the other, we thought Vietnam would be out of the way or\nwould evolve where the outcome would be irrelevant to this even if it\nwas a Communist victory. I would much rather have a conspiracy."
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