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TELCON Hugh Sidey/Kissinger 4/11/72 - 11:52 a. m. K: Hi, Hugh. S: Listen, tell me just briefly. I won't take much time. What is your strategy here? You are operating on several tracks at once. K: Well, I think because the Russians are operating on several tracks at once. This is the second time in 4 months that we are confronting an offensive which is made possible by massive infusions of Soviet arms. This is -the-record Even if the Soviets did not know the exact time of the offensive they know what is going on. The same thing India/Pakistan. S: I see. K: To do this before the Summit shows that they are always tempted. On the one hand we are always trying to advance on a braod front with them and on the other hand they back up on it and change things around. S: What? K: What we are trying to do is to bring on a qualified change. If you look at the history of Soviet-American relations whenever you get to a point where you think you will get some real progress, we find they are doing something that just picks up some tactical advantage. Of course, we don't ask them to cut off their aid to North Vietnam, but certainly In the case of India/Pakistan it was clearly the attack. S: I see your point. K: We didn't give the South Vietnamese any airplanes that could reach any distance in North Vietnam. S: But you are still going to go ahead and work out the summit? K: Yes, but this is one of the issues we have to address there. S: What about the B . Will he convey the same?

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    "ocrText": "TELCON\nHugh Sidey/Kissinger\n4/11/72 - 11:52 a. m.\nK:\nHi, Hugh.\nS:\nListen, tell me just briefly. I won't take much time. What is\nyour strategy here? You are operating on several tracks at\nonce.\nK:\nWell, I think because the Russians are operating on several tracks\nat once. This is the second time in 4 months that we are confronting\nan offensive which is made possible by massive infusions of Soviet\narms. This is -the-record Even if the Soviets did not know\nthe exact time of the offensive they know what is going on. The same\nthing\nIndia/Pakistan.\nS:\nI see.\nK:\nTo do this before the Summit shows that they are always tempted.\nOn the one hand we are always trying to advance on a braod front\nwith them and on the other hand they back up on it and change\nthings around.\nS:\nWhat?\nK:\nWhat we are trying to do is to bring on a qualified change. If you\nlook at the history of Soviet-American relations whenever you get\nto a point where you think you will get some real progress, we\nfind they are doing something that just picks up some tactical\nadvantage. Of course, we don't ask them to cut off their aid to\nNorth Vietnam, but certainly\nIn the case of India/Pakistan\nit was clearly the\nattack.\nS:\nI see your point.\nK:\nWe didn't give the South Vietnamese any airplanes that could reach\nany distance in North Vietnam.\nS:\nBut you are still going to go ahead and work out the summit?\nK:\nYes, but this is one of the issues we have to address there.\nS:\nWhat about the B\n.\nWill he convey the same?"
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