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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 1 Tckon HAK + the President C7 PP.) ANITIZED 4/9/72 B peR HR 7/7/05 FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER Kissinger Tclcons 13 FOLDER TITLE 9 Telephone Conversations- Chron. Fik 8-11 Apr. 1972 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION DECLASSIFIED S.GPO; 1989-235-084/00024 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NA 14021 (4-85) TELECON Mr. Kissinger/General Vogt 8:37 a. m., April 8, 1972 K: Johnny, I just want to talk once more. I just had the briefing again, and I know what the President is going to ask. All of the targeting in the north, or 98% of it, is on SAM's. We understanding your concern over the SAM's, but we are after those damn supplies. That is what is going to decide the battle. V: That is where we are going to hit. K: After 30 days, there will not be any bombing. We want to get those God-damned supplies. V: You have my promise. K: The weather you can't do anything about. V: The weather is good in one spot. We will dump everything in there. We will lay on a hell of a lot of strikes in concentrated form. Just keep working on that Haiphong package for us. K: We will be working on that. But we need to get some of the supplies. They were showing me maps of all the supplies stacked up on the route to Laos. They must have supplies backing up the DMZ. We are also very interested in these truck parks near Hanoi. V: They are real lucrative. K: Are they still there? V: There's been some reduction, but they are still there. We want to eliminate the threat to Saigon so Thieu won't get nervous. We will work that over with massive air. I will increase the FANK force in the area. K: Good. You have our backing. Come to us if you have trouble. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon The President 10:45 am; Apr 8, 1972 P: What is the report this morning from the WSAG meeting? K: They are beginning to round up the bomb damage estimate. These massive air strikes are doing considerable good. MR 2 physically counted in the B3 area 350 dead in one area just with air strike. MRI 2 SVN ranger battalions vs NVN battalion ground action killed 230. That's confirmed. They are knocking out 5 tanks here, 3 there. Battle lines stabilized for time being. Weather bad again over NVN. P: So Moorer knocked off his strikes up there again? K: Yes. P: What about B-52 strikes - knocked that off too. K: No. P: Doesn't need good weather? K: I told them we xhould do just to show we have control P: We have got to have something that is a signal. Who stopped that? K: Abrams feels he needs more. Has 32 more than he asked for. P: What became of the ones I told to go out there? I want 200 out there. Tell Moorer I am raising hell about this. Before we let ourselves in for any more double-talk are they going to do 52 strikes over some part of NVN or not? K: I will order it as soon as I get off the phone. P: They don't have to throw 100 or 10, just show there is a strike on that area. K: I could not x agree more. P: We haven't done one thing in the north that we should have done before that is the trouble with these people. K: We need something to show that the old rules don't apply. P: What la about the trucks Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- K: They are going to fly a drone to see if the trucks are still there. P: If they are there let's hit that. What else have they gone up with have they come up with any GD idea or not? K: They have found one other point in NVN suitable for 52 attacks. I think if they launch one attack -- that must be ordered now on the ground we can extend to 19th parallel. P: If negessary. K: Another think we can order is to give them right to attack all planes in the air from the 20 parallel down. P: Yes. K: And knock out some of the airfields there. But there is an argument to knocking out some of these MIGs because they are getting ready to deploy them into the south. K: Knock them out. But I don't think they have carried out any of the things I have ordered. They have got to start. When is Vogt getting out there? K: He will be there Sunday night our time. P: How can we get anything across to the SOB Abrams? K: We gave may have to send Haig out there next week. P: Can't Vogt do it? K: If Vogt can't do it he has heard everything. He knows what we want. I had a talk with him this morning. He said give me until I am in charge there and you will see a total change in the air picture. P: How does it all add up? They have 200 here, 200 there and farted around here and there. I am really getting damned disgusted with this thing. K: The fact is that the NVN are not advancing and I think we are going to break their backs. P: Now is the time to hit them. Just tell Abrams to launch one attack and publicize it. Have you done that? K: I have done it but he is not easy to talk to. P: Have Bunker tell Thieu. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -3- K: Right. Actually they are attacking along the river up there and we are getting on good. This guy from the NY Times is doing a good reporting foom the battle area. He will probably be fired for it. P? I think we must right now to things there for American public opinion. It will be with us. If we act strongly. When action begins debate ends. I have been ordering action for one full week and haven't gotten one thing done. People are moving a couple of carriers from their home ba leave. What are they doing? K: They are going to attack with the B-52s if I have to sit in the Chief's office all day today myself. P: When it came up in the WSAG - did it come up in the WSAG? K: I don't like to raise it in the WSAG. P: No because then you will have to go back to State again. K: State will begin crying. P: You have told me the troops in the WH and the WSAG feel this is the time to strike them. K: I talked to Mel Elfin again this morning. He says that the mood is entirely different. Don't pay any attention to the Democrats. They are frustrated. Don't know what to attack. P: On the other hand we have got to attack them. Have to talk to Colson to start that. K: I will do it immediately. I talked to Reagan yesterday. P: Reagan is fine but get McGregor, etc. to attack the NVN and attack the Democrats who are giving aid to the enemy. Would you mind doing that Henry? I can't get anything done down here. K: I will do it, Mr. President. P: The psychological thing could be effective here. If we move. I realize there are individial reporters that write the kind of thing we heard at the time of Laos. I has got to be a signal to the Russians and the Chinese. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -4- K: That we are too dangerous to monkey with. P: What in the name of God have they done? K: The trucks are worth hitting. P: The truck parks would be worth it in addition that they could put a 52 and in the battle area. K: We could have a 52 strike on Dong Hoi and that is the battle area. P: What about Vinh airfield? Is that still off-limits? K: We can extend the authority up there. It is right now off limits. P: Take Vinh out. That is one thing we will do. Take it out immediately. K: In that case the best thing is to give them the authority to take out the airfields south of the 20th parallel. P: Let's go on that right away Henry. Don't fool around. We are doing this the same way Johnson did it. Short of nuclear arms and getting too close to China we have got to do what is necessary. Don't any of these people understand that? K: They don't understand the political elements. I don't mean the domestic policy. P: That is my job. The hell with that. They just carry out the orders. Give them the airfields. They don't have to have clear weather. We can do that with radar, can't we? K: That's what I would have thought. P: I realize that a gun or SAM you have to have something you can see, but an airfield is a fixed thing. If you can land a plane in 00 why can't they bomb something there. I need that. / Shall Give I Moorer a call and ask what he has done about these new planes? K: Actually he is here. You can if you want to talk. P: Tell him if we don't take them out now, and why can't they bomb the airfields without being visual. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -5- K: You shouldn't have to personally give the orders. P: The airfields up to the 20 are ready K: Yes. P: Ask why can't they be bombed despite the weather. What about 52's Dong Hoi ? K: Yes. P: Is that a good target? K: That's the one they have come up with. P: Dong Hoi is where in terms of area? K: Dong Hoi is about 35 miles north. P: I don't want anything put out that we are limiting ourselves to any parallels. The point is you couldn't be more right. From the standpoint of American domestic psychology right now they want us to do something we haven't done before. They want the enemy to be outraged. From the standpoint of the NVN we have got to do something to let them know we aren't screwing around. K: Absolutely. P: Any other questions K: We have to give them an absolute shock now. There are 43 more 52s they can now send out but they will have only half the bomb capacity of the present ones. P: That's great - are they saying we can't use them? K: They are wailing around, but I think we should use them. P: Isn't it frustrating to work with such K: It is not to be believed. P: The lack of energy. Is he the one who is dragging his feet? K: No. They are all bureaucrats. Here they have a President who is begging them to do something and they have no ideas. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - P: With Moorer I would be very strong. Do you think you should get Abrams on the phone? K: No. He is too tough. Besides Vogt will be there now in 24 hours. P: We can get Moorer on the phone and give him the authority to hit those airfields. He doesn't get the authority to hit those airfields unless they are going to hit them in bad weather. K: I think we should make it conditional on a 52 strike P: We have got to make them fly some of the stuff in bad weather. Don't you agree? K: I agree. no I feel Mr. President that we are going to make it now. There is XXX extra division they have there reserve is on the move now. South to the MR 1. They have no defensives left in Vietnam. No combat division left P: Be sure to have commandoe raids. Would you order it please? Tell Moorer. Put some commandoes raids up high though. K: I will get on it immediately. P: Can you think of anything else, you and Haig have been sitting there. I hope you have thought of something. K: We thought of the truck parks. P: I think strikes on airfields go go forward. K: Moorer said there is another carrier he can send out - the SARATOGA. P: Get it out there. K: That is enough for one day, I think, Mr. President. P: The part of massive force is also going to have some effect. K: Absolutely. I think we are going to make somebody back off. If the SVN don't crack. P: If they don't crack this will be worth it, but they are not going to crack. Abrams couldn't have done that bad a job. I think they are going to do all right. They are not aggressive but what are your reports with regard to the SVN? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -7- K: There hasn't been a full-scale divisional attack yet, so we just can't tell. P: You mean the NVN haven't attacked by division? K: No, but on a battalion level they are fighting well. There is a tough fight in the Hue area with heavy casualties on both sides. They have not yet got the massive artillery fire on them and I want to be cautious. P: From B Abrams I want if they get airfield authority can they not hit an airfield in other than good weather. Second point, what about the tanks? Can they launch no tank attack any place? What is the situation on tanks? K: Nothing in addition to what I told you yesterday. P: Nothing being done then. The tanks are just sitting in defensive positions. K: I don't think so. P: They have got to move those tanks around. Any study of WW I or WW II indicates tanks are sitting ducks unless you move them. K: For better or worse we are stuck with the commandoes now. P: On the other hand, we are charging them up but if they don't do anything at least make that suggestion. K: I will immediately. P: E Say, why not a tank attack? What are they doing? More wars have been lost by political leaders relying on commanders than I can possibly count. Just put that down in your little book and don't be SO sensitive about the tactics. I will take responsibility for that. After what they did to us in Laos we are not going to rely on Abrams. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Mr. Kissinger/Jerry Schecter 4/8/72 12:25 p.m. (Came in late) HAK: But you won't identify it. it will hasten the end of the war considerable. JS: No/ and we explain that traditionally it was guerilla warfare but not a diferent war is being fought, and we are going to different tactics. HAK: In the sense of negotiations? JS: Yes, and we will say that this is a White House view and not a direct attribution HAK: You mean sober confident? JS: Yes, you are very good at editing. HAK: Listen, I would like to talk to you about Japan and China. JS: I have some comments from some people in Japan--Nichols says he is upset because you won't give a press conference. He says the Japanese will say it for you anyway. HAK: Okay. I have to see how this thing goes this week. I may have to postpone it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Bob Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger 12:30 p.m. 4/8/72 BH: We have been going around on the timing of the press conference and the President said you thought it should be done, but instead not until the following week? HAK: I said from a foreign policy point of view, but if the domes tic views are overriding. I don't think the military situation will be clear enough. If the attack is built up tremendously, then we have to take that into account. BH: You say Kennedy's and Mansfield's statements. How long do you want to wait with this silence from the President? HAK: I thought until Monday morning until finally decision. BH: You are not going to know much more Monday we should wait until Monday, but you should think it through before Monday. HAK: We will know on Monday how it is built up on Sunday. Also do you want a press conference or a speech by the President? BH: We think it should be a press conference. HAK: If we do it, we have to have a tough attitude and call the others sell-outers-- no dancing around. BH: We have to built that with other people before hand. HAK: Say this is a massive invasion and forces are in major countries now. BH: How do we handle the problem of avoiding being in a position of being confident about the outcome and then we undergo a setback. this would put the President's credibility into question. He has to say I am not getting into a discussion on that. HAK: He can say we have resources and and confidence in them and are going to be tested in battle he can say that. Depends on what he wants to do, if he wants to take the position that we are essentially Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Page 2 Bob Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger 12:30 p.m. 4/8/72 carrying out the democratic program, then we should wait a week. Or if he says we will not turn it over to the Communists, then it will be an asset--depends on how tough he wants to be. BH: Good point. I would think he would want the latter. HAK: And if it works, he can be peace-nicky in Moscow. We are now not in bad shape--if we lose it wasn't worth having anyway and if we win, we can come back from Moscow with many agreements. BH: My concern is the danger we are running in letter our side be carried by the Doles and Goldwaters while the President's opposition hammers away and the TV coverage continues as it does. HAK: The South Vietnames are doing quite well so far--I saw Mel Elfin and he says the newsmen are basically saying this is not like TET and says we have no choice--I don't know how they will play it, the bastards. Jerry Schecter said the is building to a prelude to negotiations then who is Kennedy to say that we are messing up a negotiation? I also talk strictly from a foreign policy point of view. I don't see the absolute need for it yet, but if he is willing to be tough, it depends on him then he must be absolutely positive. I am impressed with your Laos argument. But you are against his being on TV in a speech. BH: My gut feeling is that it would be better in a press conference. HAK: Can he get all the answers out that way? BH: He can take the first question and make it into a speech as it does. HAK: Let's say tentatively that he will do it unless the press plays it badly then we will have to reconsider. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rush 12:43 p. m., April 8, 1972 R: I just got through with a session with Mel. Everything is in order on this front except he insists on going to the President on the Saratoga. He said he would probably be overruled but he feels he has to go to the President. He is opposed to taking the Saratoga out of the Atlantic. Otherwise, all is in order. K: What does he think about the B-52's? R: He took it very well. There was no resistance. I gave it to him fairly strongly. I said the President was damned emphatic. I told him you let us read some of the transcript. He hates the WSAG -- he is jealous; he thinks the WSAG is taking away his authority. K: Did you tell him it didn't come out of the WSAG? R: I said it didn't have anything to do with it. Henry was emphatic and then the President called and Henry showed us the transcript. I told him the President feels he has been let down on the B-52 strikes and his orders are not being carried out. This shook Mel a little bit. Tom was with me. We started in with all the orders. He went along with all of them except the Saratoga. K: I was calling you because we have some sensitive German intelligence in which you told Bahr you might write Barzel. R: Bahr wanted me to write Barzel. K: While this crisis goes on we have to be sure there is no move which gives aid and comfort to the Soviets. If you can tell Bahr we cannot consider it, it would be helpful. R: I don't know how he got that. K: You know what an oily guy he is. R: I told Pauls when he saw Barzel that he (Pauls) could say he was talking to me and I was worried about the image of the German people. K: Yes, you told this to me. R: Bahr called me and asked if I would write Barzel, and I said no. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rush 12:43 p. m., April 8, 1972 2 K: Can you get it across to the Germans -- say to Bahr you and I have been talking and we are working in this direction. But we are confronted a second time in four months with an offensive backed by Soviet arms, and we have to reassess our whole situation. 1 R: I can get word to him on that. K: How? R: I can think of four ways: (1) go through your backchannel; (2) go through the State Department; (3) go ghrough Rolf Pauls K: Why not go through Pauls. That is the most likely to leak. Do it in a way saying we are not going to do it because we have to reassess. Do it as an individual and not as a government. Can you do it this weekend? R: I will do it right now. K: Can you let me know after you do it? R: Certainly. Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger 1:05 p.m., April 8, 1972 R: I got hold of Rolf and he has promised to send a message forth- with to Bahr. K: Under these conditions? R: I told him I told Bahr I would not write a letter. This was all we could do. However, there was no on your part or on my part personally with regard to changing of position, but as of now we could do nothing with regard to approving something for the Russians. Rolf understood completely. K: Did you put it in the context of this offensive? R: I said in light of this heavy invasion with nothing but Russian equipment we obviously could not get XXXX behind something the Russians wanted. K: Okay, Ken; well done. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Secretary Laird April 8, 1972; 12:55 p.m. L: Hi, Henry. K: I just wanted to check in with you after the WSAG meeting, just to discuss general things. I usually go up with Tom and Ken to review where we stand, and the President called while they were here and raised unshirted hell with me. L: That's too bad. I am sorry you are getting hell. K: Listen you character. You don't give a damn. L: I do too you son of a gun. I hate for you to get hell. K: At any rate, he wants to keep pouring reinforcements out there. I have given all the things he wants done to Ken. L: I have met with Ken and Tom. I think to go up with shore bombing to the 19th is OK but I would like to just move the battle are to 19 and let them use anything they want in there. K: OK, why don't you do that. I am sure the President will approve. L: As long as they are going up there with the destroyers, I told Tom I would talk to you or the President about because if they have what he wants I would favor taking 18 and moving to 19. K: Why don't you do that? L: Just consider any MIG flying between 19 and 20 as hostile and knock them down. K: That he has already approved. L: I think this is better than limiting gunfire to between 18 and 19. I disagreed with Tom. K: I will call the President and if you don't hear from me in 10 minutes, do it. L: On the SARATOGA, we can put it over there. The problem again is I think this is going to go on through to November and my problem is I want to be in a position where we can program assets right through. They are going to try to hold on to two capitals and ask for a ceasefire within 30 days. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- K: Within 30 days the SVN will collapse or they will be negotiating with us. L: The SVN aren't going to collapse, but that battle isn't going to be over this year. I think they will come up with a ceasefire and we must be ready to prepare what our answer is. I don't like to get in a position where there are no assets to continue over a long period of time. We can send the SARATOGA over there. witshx I think the Pacific carriers have done yoemens work. K: If you send the SARATOGA it would give you the options of pulling the ENTERPRISE out. Let's send the SARATOGA out and then if it looks like stabilizing I would pull the ENTERPRISE back or whichever you think is most in need of it. L: All right. For this period they will know we have the additional assets there. On the 52s, when X we put the G and H's in we can only run 25 to 26 bombs on them. That's 38-40 percent. K: I said this to the President and he said well he wanted another 100 out there. L: The thing is if we could fly them out, then justify flying out of Kadena. Couldn't we get permission? That is a 9** 9 1 /2 hour flight. K: Why don't you put the short-range ones into Thailand and the long-range into Guam? L: There is a question of bombload. K: Why don't you put the smaller bomb load into Thailand and the big bomb load into Guam? L: The ones that can carry the biggest load we will put into Thailand so we can get the biggest use. When you get the turnaround out of Guam as compared to Kadena. This is out of the question, do you think? K: I do, but shall I try State ? L: Try State. K: I will. L: You only get about 38 to 40 percent, something like that. In addition, you have 9 1/2 hour flight as compared to one-half that out of Kadena. K: I agree. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -3- L: Then this multiplies considerably. K: But he wants 43 additional ones out there even if you put 2 bombs on them. L: We will send them out. K: And I will raise the Kadena issue. L: I don't want everybody to think we are in a panic state, because this thing will work out. This fighting is going to go on for sometime. When they commit 12 regular divisions this fighting will go on for a while. They have made this decision to commit that much. The South Vietnamese are going to come through all right but I don't want everybody to think they can decide in two weeks there, then when it isn't decided in two weeks to give up because we can get our objective and accomplish it here. K: I don't know who is going to give up, but it will not be the White House. L: Everybody in town wants to back away every time I take a hard line. K: Who? L: No one wants to support the hard line I took yesterday. K: I told everybody to shut up. Didn't they tell you we don't want anybody to back away from you. L: OK, that's fine, but I just didn't want to get all this. K: I told them under no circumstances anyone to back away. L: I think they are going to make a proposal within 30 days. A ceasefire proposal. I am not sure it is one the President will want to accept 30 days from now. K: I think we are not going to talk until we get the back of this attack broken. L: I think the battle area should be moved from 18 to 19 degrees. K: If I don't call you within one-half hour, you can consider it approved. L: OK. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Admiral Moorer April 8, 1972; 1:20 p.m. K: How are you? M: Fine. K: You've got authorities running out of your ears. The only thing is, you won't use them. You have a bombing line now up to the 19th. M: I just got them. K: I want you to know the President just approved. M: And we will run the ships up that far, of course. K: That you can start right away. M: Yes. K: Are more ships coming out there? M: Absolutely. More arrive today and I am sending 10 destroyers to the MIDWAY. K: How many right now? M: How many firing? K: How many firing right now. M: Ten or 12, and a cruiser in there. K: Is that firing? M: Yes, 6" guns. Just north of Cua Viet River. Also we have 7 south and 6 north and going to make an adjustment X which would put more north but the OKLAHOMA CITY has 3 6" 47s and 3 5" 38s that are firing -- I told you wrong -- 12 destroyers and one cruiser out there now. I got Laird to agree to let us declare any aircraft south of 20 hostile. K: And you can attack any aircraft up to 20. M: Did you tell him that? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- K: I don't know, but that is what the President authorized. M: Good. He wanted me to leave the aircraft airborne but we should have authority to hit any either on the ground or in the air. I am sending a message to Abrams to conduct 52 strikes and provide minimum of six 52s to Godley if requested. K: Right, and you will let Godley know that. M: Yes, I will let him know it. K: Did you tell him what other reinforcements he is getting? M: Yes. I am writing a message now. K: The message will include that? M: The message I am sending Abrams, yes. K: You are sending another squadron of marines out there? M: We are checking names, but they are ready to go. We are looking for additional ramp spaces in Thailand, what the bottleneck is. You were talking about nothing but the SAM sites. We have now got the results of the missions flown on the 7th. (Read from BDA) K: Good. If you could send us consolidated reports like this I could show them to the President and everybody would be happier. M: (Continues reading from report.) So you see, as I told you, they had other targets besides the SAMs. K: Good, but if we could get those that would be good. M: I will send it right over. K: I think on the whole we have got this now. Laird also agreed to the SARATOGA once I talked to him. M: He did? Because he was going to talk to the President about that. K: Yes, but he changed his mind. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -3- M: X I think this is going to last a while, Henry. K: We can let one of the others come home. M: Some of them were due to come. K: That's right. But in the meantime the others are going to see that others are going out there. M: This is the thing about the Haiphong problem. K: As soon as you do something in the area. Abrams - X we will never get him to fly in the 18th again once we get all the SAM stuff there. M: Abrams doesn't schedule tacair. They will go in there - the SAMs are going all the way from Vinh south. I will see to it that doesn't happen. I will send a message to Vogt on that. K: OK. M: I will send you the message I just read to you right now. K: Good. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Secretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger 4/8/72 1:30 p.m. SI: The Washington officer got a call from our DCM in Paris-. he said that Waldheim had contacted him in Paris and said since he was in Paris, he suggested that he might meet with the four delegations and implied HAK: No, absolutely not. SI: That is my view and Bill Sullivan thinks we can do it in several ways--we can so flatly no or we don't think it has a proposal, but if he wants to he can ask the North Vietnames to call off the invasion, but then he is in the middle of it with them responding and then our responding, so I think that even assuming that he might come out and say we refused his mediations, but I think it is cleaner to say "no". HAK: Right. I think we should just turn it down. SI: Another thing, I am leaving for Chile on X& Wednesday and will be back on Saturday I know there is an SRG meeting on Tuesday afternoon. HAK: Let's talk after that. SI: I think we are in line with the DET (?) matter, but it depends on what we want to do. HAK: Right. Let's meet before the SRG meeting. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Mr. Kissinger 4/8/72 1:30 p.m. RN: Just completed talking with Bob. I think tentatively that the better course of action is the 1500 words, 10 minute talk. HAK: That is what I think. RN: I told him to call them to Saffire who will then talk to you HAK: Would you do it Wednesday night? I think that is the right decision. RN: Yes. And we can avoid commenting on how the battle is coming. HAK: The press would have a chance for needling questions in a conference. RN: Then I will go on the following week with a press conference and let the press ask questions and we should know by then how it is coming out. HAK: And we could say that we are notified that we would resume April . (?) RN: Maybe I should get Porter to see Monday. HAK: I would wait until Wednesday. One thing you should consider that these people are treacherous- that instead of doing it secretly, from now on announce we are willing to have April 24 meeting. HAK: We can argue that we have been trying to set up talks since the middle of February--when they stalled Porter sin ce--and that is why he walked out. RN: I am still ready to go but cannot talk whilethey are violating. If I announce it, it isn't private. HAK: But we can keep the content private. RN: I see. Between 1500 words and 10 minutes saying what we are doing, what they are doing and what the South Vietnames are doing and what we are prepared to do diplomatically. The difficulty with the question thing this week, there are some questions I don't want to be on the limb on-- at least we will know pretty well where we are. If it is too rough next week, maybe we won't go then, but we should try to though. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Mr. Kissinger 4/8/72 Page 2 HAK: Next week around the 20th, we will know where we stand at least more than we do now. RN: The point now is to hold the military feet to the fire and keep the situation going. Do you have any more reflections on what they can do. HAK: We have ordered the Saratoga out and 43 B52's. Attack all air fields south of the 20th. We want authority to go up to the 19th. RN: The 18th is better than the 19th. HAK: We can see how they fly on the 19th--I am not concerned about escalation charges what bothers me is if they are actually hitting the right areas. RN: Just given them the 19th to knock off SAM's? HAK: No just to cover a larger area. RN: I have no strong feelings about it you and Haig should talk it over. HAK: Haig should be there now should I have someone start drafting something I don't think Saffire knows how to do it. RN: I have dictated it to him--we have to move quickley. It is a speech to handle very simple questions people are asking and you can start: Call it a report on Vietnam Tone: Confidence and matter-of-fact that there has been a massive violent invasion by North Vietnamese in South Vietnam in violation of (and peat this point) our agreements. -- What we are doing to meet this invasion: --as far as this being met on the ground by the South Vietnamese forces - they are fighting to defend their homeland -- there will be no ground forces there of our; however, we are using our air power against those military installations both in South Vietnam and North Vietnam that will support this invasion (say with the most modern Soviet equipment) -- And say these attacks are to continue until the invasion (I don't know if we should use this phrase) is stopped. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Mr. Kissinger/President 4/8/72 Page 3 Now for the diplomatic front and not defensively- on January 25 we made a peace proposal and 12 trips (and give the essense of the offer a total withdrawal of our forces and use "ceasefire") and what has happened and been their answer: a continuing build up of forces and we showed restraint and offered to negotiate in private and public channels and they refused and continued to build up. Say they were attacking us and that is why the talks halted--Amb. Porter has offered to be back on the 13th (?) and is prepared to do SO when they stop their invasion (we shouldn't use that word I don't think). The private thing we must think about our real interest in having private negotiations and we should not say anything that that would really have a torpedoe effect hint at it maybe--we are prepared to negotiate publicly or privately, but not at the point of a gun. There are those who say that the US should not the North Vietnames, just withdraw and then negotiate. this would be no negotiation, just a surrender in turning over to the communists (use this word often and the word enemy), and that the US is nearing the end of this long war and point out when I came to office how many forces have been cut. And say that some men who were silent are now critical now that the war is winding down. And we ask for American support for the only honorable policy. This cannot be lengthy--make is short and terse and tell the people the things they need to know. We can say that we have consistently agreed to see their terms, but they have refused this and we will not support a surrender Let one of your guys and Saffire work on it so I can pull together the text. I need it at 8:00 Sunday night because Monday I am tied up. We can always look at it Wednesday to see what the situation is but we must lay out the report soon. HAK: You shouldn't be on the defensive. But the American people need to hear what the facts are--they need to hear from the President. RN: You feel the attitude is somewhat different. HAK: Yes. That is what the people need to hear-from the boss. Then you can give a press conference the following week. We can still rescue this in Moscow RN: Henry, we shouldn't get ourselves in the pesition of just being out of Vietnam we can't negotiate with them We should just knock off the summit. I think that if we are in a position that theSVietnam Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Mr. Kissinger 4/8/72 Page 4 government collapses, we will not go to Moscow to negotiate--they would be impossible to handle. HAK: How would you explain a SALT agreement? RN: And after they had supported massive invasions, we will not do this. Are you discouraged? I have a feeling that our air people are hitting something out there. HAK: No; I think they are hitting something I talked with Helms. He is sure that the attack on the front couldn't be gotten off because of the and they have lost another 250 men there yesterday. RN: That doesn't sound like many HAK: It amounts to something day after day. RN: Well our bombing must be giving them some casualties. HAK: Yes for every one, there are 2, 3 or 4 that we never hear about. RN: Are you concerned about the use of the 52 strikes in the North? HAK: No the defense people are using them in South Vietnam for tactical reasons. They have 31 more planes than they ever asked for. RN: You will get some screaming from the Kennedy's. HAK: The average American doesn't know the difference between B52's and DC 3s. If we hold three weeks, we can move Region 3 to Region 1 and start a bigger defensive- we can move two additional divisions to Region 1. RN: That is what we need. HAK: We can do it starting May 10. RN: What about the air losses? HAK: We have lost seven planes--the SAM's are getting knocked off. Vogt is out and Sunday sometime will take over Monday morning. RN: I hope he will make some things hum Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Mr. Kissinger 4/8/72 Page 5 HAK: He has been through Loas, Cambodia we have talked to him he knows you and has had contact with how you wish to operate RN: The real problem now is to demonstrate our thinking. I wish we could get the Chinese thing off. HAK: This isn't going to break us at one way or another if we lose, we don't lose anything and if we win, we get agreement power in Moscow. RN: Well, let's hope we win - we will win. HAK: Yes, Mr. President we will win. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Bill Safire/Mr. Kissinger 2:18 p. m., April 8, 1972 K: I understand you will work on the Vietnam speech. I just had a long talk with the President and have given my thoughts to Win who will work on it concurrently. S: Can we work on it together? K: He is prepared to work with you. S: Anytime I will be prepared to go into competition. K: The way we have done it in the past has had superlative results. Let Win give you the substance and you put it in your words. I know Haldeman gave you five points, but that is not enough. S: I could sit with you and interview you. K: Interview when? S: Right now. K: I have been trying to get out all day. It is now 2:30 and I have been trying to get out since 10:00. We want a tough summary of what has happened. We are dealing with an aggressor nation. Everyone of its combat divisions is outside of its borders. It knows it isn't going to be attacked. It has launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam across the DMZ in violation of the agreements (which Win can give you), which were pointed out by Clifford and Harriman in 1968. Ground combat is being conducted by South Vietnam. We are giving air support. I have given a list of what should be said about negotiations. At the end, we ask for support of the American people. Make it tough on the critics. Say with regard to this endless argument that it is our fault, the record leaves no doubt as to who broke off negotiations. S: (1) It used to be argued that a civil war was going on and the North Vietnamese were helping the Viet Cong. K: There are practically no South Vietnamese units fighting in this one. S: It is an invasion of the south. K: By the entire North Vietnamese force. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Bill Safire/Mr. Kissinger 2:18 p. m., April 8, 1972 2 S: Shouldn't the President point out this is an invasion from the North? K: That is the whole point of the first XXX part. S: (2) The question in most people's minds is what will this do to the trip to Moscow. K: That will not be mentioned in this speech -- except to mention Soviet equipment in one sentence so they know we are watching them. S: Winston will put down the things in point form? K: Yes. When will you have it? S: I will have it ready tomorrow morning. K: Good. Then I will talk to you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer 2:27 p. m., April 8, 1972 K: I just talked to the President. He is willing to give you authority up to the 19th. But he has the same concern as I do. He doesn't trust the way we are using our Air Force out there. He doesn't think you will watch them closely enough. M: It hurts me for him to think that. You don't have to worry about it at all. K: If you are going to use maximum effort where it will do the most good, you have the authority. M: This lets the gunships go up there, and I think we are going to concentrate around the battlefield and north of the DMZ and on up further. If we pick up units of the 325th Division and get a bead on it, we would have to wait for it to get to the 18th. K: He told me to tell you if you would watch it for him, he would give you the authority. M: He doesn't have to worry one bit. K: He is going to hang in tough on all these things. You will get the destroyers going up there? M: Right away. Ten are going out to the Midway. K: But they won't be there for two weeks. M: They can move into the breach. We have to replace some of the barrelb they wear them out shooting. But we have plenty of barrels out there. K: At any rate, what authorities were outstanding? This gives you everything you need, doesn't it? M: Have you talked to Laird about air authorities south of the 20th? K: No, I have to do that. M: He has already agreed to airborne. But I want this authority. K: ] You have it. But we won't give you Haiphong right now. Get Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Mr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer 2:27 p. m., April 8, 1972 2 me the pictures of those truck parks, and we will give you ahthority for that. M: I have drones going up. We might get one shot down, but we will get the pictures. K: Okay, Tom. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rush 2:35 p. m., April 8, 1972 K: Ken, there is some ambiguity which we want cleared up. The President gave authority not only to hit airborne planes but airfields south of the 20th. R: Below the 19th? K: Below the 20th -- airfields below the 20th; I have it in a transcript of a phone conversation if Mel wants to discuss it. In fact, he wants to hit them with all-weather planes. R: I'm glad to hear that. I will change it at once. K: Good. R: Fine, Henry. Thank you very much. K: Fine; thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger 10:15 a. m., April 9, 1972 Kr: Good morning, Henry. I have a number of questions I want to ask about Vietnam and your assessments. (1) Is it your assessment this will wind up fairly rapidly? K: Not necessarily. I wouldn't be surprised if it quieted down in May and then picked up again. I'm not sure it will wind down in a couple of weeks. I haven't really made up my mind. There are two possibilities. It could keep up all summer. The other one is this is one big shooting the works thing as a prelude to negotiations. A tremendous blast now and then a peace move. Then another blast in June. I lean toward that. Kr: You put quotes around "peace"? K: There is the usual ambiguity. It is not gentle -- it is not being made by pacifists. They are putting it to us either way. Kr: Have the Russians said anything to you at all? K: I can't talk about that. Kr: I know Vorontsov was in there last week, on Tuesday. K: If I saw somebody, it wouldn't be Vorontsov. He is handling the technical arrangements for the Summit. I did not see Vorontsov. I don't know whether he was in on Tuesday -- but he wasn't in to see me. Kr: I thought the Russians were putting out a statement yesterday in TASS. K: If they did, I haven't seen it. Kr: The secondary guys around the Department are talking about a statement. But I don't think it's so easy for them to put out a statement. K: It is not easy. Kr: I would think it would be hard. This plays so nicely into their purposes. K: Up to a point. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger 10:15 a. m., April 9, 1972 - 2 - Kr: Up to a considerable point. It would be very hard not to try to use it as a pressure point. K: If they do Kr: What do you do? I assume you postpone it. K: Let's see what happens. It would be a short-sighted thing for them to do. For once we have Soviet/American relations where if everything worked out -- leaving out Vietnam -- one could inject enough interest to move to again. Kr: I think they tend to do these things. The failure of any statement suggests they can't resist. I think it's a reversal of the Brezhnev/Kosygin role. Brezhnev could get away with both. K: I wouldn't bet on that. Kr: He is the kind who might bet on it. Kosygin is more nervous. People around town are telling me this. They say it is not a calculated plan because of Soviet inability to say 'no' to the North Vietnamese. Are they telling you that? K: They are telling me that, but not the Brezhnev/Kosygin thing. I have not heard Kosygin is nervous. Kr: I don't know what the exchanges were with the North Vietnamese. Kosygin had these exchanges on February 11 and they were very harsh. I think he should be saying something. Would it be harmful if I wrote something on this? K: It would not be harmful if you speculate along these lines. It would be helpful, in fact. Kr: I will do that. K: And you are probably correct. I can't speculate on the Brezhnev/Kosygin role. Kr: I won't do that. Does anyone have a good reading on what Marshal Kamitosky(?) said? You know, the Vice Minister of Defense and head of their Air Defense. Is it believable that the Russians could send this in as a package? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger 10:15 a. m., April 9, 1972 - 3 - K: This was a very far-sighted plan to really put to us - to show that when all is said and done, the Soviets can challenge the U.S. first in the Subcontinent and in Southeast Asia, and when we come to Moscow we are coming in total weakness. The other theory is they see the opportunity to out-maneuver Peking in Hanoi. Hanoi keeps bleeding equipment out of them and they don't have enough intelligence to know at what point their equipment becomes overwhelming; also they don't know a big offensive is planned and they get sucked in. I am tempted to believe the latter one. But I draw no consolation from it. I would rather have a formidable enemy. Kr: It's not the kind of equipment in volume that would enable them to make a decisive judgment. K: I am assuming they don't know what is going on in the south. Kr: The SAM's? K: Yes. Kr: Roadbuilding? K: Yes. Suppose they believe what we are saying. I am trying to put the case for blundering rather than a master-plan. Suppose they believe we are winning in the south and they want to maintain a balance. Assuming what they really want is to keep going, that makes a maximum dependence of Hanoi on them. A victorious Hanoi -- they can't count on gratitude. If Admiral Moorer had the general idea we wanted to support a country for political reasons, he would keep pouring things in. He wouldn't know where it crossed to a smashing superiority. Would prefer it to be a conspiracy. If they slid into that we are worse off in many ways. My interpretation may be the softer one. I don't know they planned the India/Pakistan war, but they made it inevitable. Kr: Yes, and there's '67, too. This is a repeated pattern. K: We have been low-keying it because we don't want to create expectations which would box us in. We have approached the Summit as a major turning point in relations with them -- not just a meeting. One way or the other, we thought Vietnam would be out of the way or would evolve where the outcome would be irrelevant to this even if it was a Communist victory. I would much rather have a conspiracy. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger 10:15 a. m., April 9, 1972 - 4 - Kr: I understand that, too. You could turn that off. They are not under any illusions, are they? K: They will not be under any illusions as to how we would respond. Kr: They must understand the impact on Germany. K: If this turns into a Soviet/US crisis, it complicates the passage of these treaties in an enormous way. There is no question we could stop passage of these treaties if we wanted to. Kr: That is very clear. K: To assume this is a conspiracy, you would have to assume an amount of duplicity on the part of the Soviets, but it would SO flagrant. If we were confinced this was carefully planned, we would have to get Dobrynin out of here. They are capable of it, but for big stakes and not putting all into the hands of a client. If this were a military action by them, I would have no doubt they were capable of total duplicity. Kr: If this were Czechoslovakia. K: Yes. But to turn it over to Hanoi where they cannot tell how it is going to come out -- we don't even know how it is going to come out. Kr: I will be writing something along these lines. But with some concern. K: I think it would be extremely helpful. Kr: Okay. I'll see you soon. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger (Secure Phone) 10:40 a. m., April 9, 1972 L: Henry, would you caution everybody not to use the White House board or open lines to talk about these B-52 strikes. There is some indication there has been some talk about these. I don't want people to be alert to the fact. Just be sure they are not using the regular telephone. K: You know who is the worst villain. L: No. K: The President. L: But you have to make sure that these guys are protected. These strikes are going to work out all right. Everything will be fine but it is a big escalation. I don't want anything to happen to the planes and pilots unnecessarily. K: You think there will be a lot of screaming here? L: Sure. But I don't want people to panic. This is a big symbol - like putting troops back in the importance of it. There will be civilian casualties and when you talk about three people and 10 people actually in the plane, that is true. You saw those pictures -- there is civilian housing around there. K: Are you, on balance, against it? L: No. But I don't want to alert them in advance. K: What is your real view? L: This will be the kind of plan the President wants as a major show of determination on his part. That is what he wants and he will get it. K: You think it's worth the heat? L: We have taken heat before on things like this. You can't back away from that plan of showing strong determination, and that is the plan now. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger (Secure Phone) 10:40 a. m., April 9, 1972 2 K: The President's judgment is this. If he keeps this thing going, you have to balance six weeks of agony against giving them a few shots. L: You will have agony anyway. But we don't want to given an interpretation of panic -- but determination rather than panic. K: If there is talking on open lines, it is mostly the President. L: I want to caution everybody. Do you think I should call him? K: X I will caution him. L: On this particular thing if it got out that security had been broken here, it would be a catastrophe. K: They have it penetrated on the other side. L: But they won't have any penetration on this strike unless it is done here in the U.S. K: We won't do anything here. I have a call in for the President, but when I talk to him I can't promise what he will do now. L: I want to caution everybody. Everybody in this building will be secure. That's most important, I feel. We can pouch the targets down to the President if he wants to look at these pictures. K: No, that's not necessary. L: Okay, Henry. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SANITIZED COPY TELECON Mr. Kissinger/The President 10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972 K: Hello, Mr. President. P: Henry, you are up early after the Gridiron. K: I have been at the Pentagon since 8:00 a. m. P: I am here with Al. K: I wanted to review with you this large attack. Laird doesn't want us to use on the phone the name of the planes -- which would come off this afternoon about 4:00. P: Does Abrams want to do it? K: Abrams' basic judgment is to use all assets in the military zones. The argument for doing this is not purely military. It is to show we are prepared to do massive escalation and warn the Soviets. P: Is Abrams concern loss of planes? Is that Vinh? K: In that area, yes. P: Is Laird sitting there with you? K: No. P: What is Laird's problem? K: I just felt obliged to check with you again. He is not opposed. Abrams has been opposed on the ground that he wants everything in his area, but. P: I wouldn't be concerned about the lines being tapped. If they are, that's fine. K: The problem is they can then get a defensive action under way. P: Why don't you go to where you can talk more safely. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 peR HR 7/7/05 By MH NARA, Date 4/10/19 SANITIZE _ASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential Library [7 pgs] This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Mr. Kissinger/The President 10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972 2 K: I can talk on a secure line. I don't think the target is so important as to give you one more chance at the decision. If we are going into it, this is as good a target as any. That is the only thing he is concerned about that we don't discuss targets. P: We won't. I understand -- any place in the northern area. The problem is Abrams doesn't want to divert 6 planes? K: 12 planes. He now has additional ones -- 30 of them are there. I don't think Abrams' concern is a paramount one. That is one on which you have better judgment. The amount of screaming in this country outbalances the message we get across to the other side. P: A day back in Washington gives you a chance to get the Potomac in your veins. If we are going to do the Wednesday thing, we might have to do the exercise after that rather than before. K: If you do the Wednesday thing, it will explain this. The average American doesn't know one plane from another. It's better if the screaming starts before you speak. P: Al is of your view that there is political screaming regret that the war is again in the news. But there is a very different attitude in terms of the whole situation because it is not involving our American ground forces and particularly because it does not involve an American incursion. How do you feel? K: That is how I feel. I am, on balance, in favor of doing it. P: That is the reason I am for it. If you have a good target, particularly one relatively safe, from the standpoint of SAM's, it seems to me. K: There are very few SAM's up there. P: it seems to me that they could give a little shot. But don't put out 18 press releases. K: No the press guidance is they just mention planes have been used and, in response to questions, they will say, 'yes, we have struck north. I P: Say 'we have struck in military areas in support of the invasion of the south. K: Exactly. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Mr. Kissinger/The President 10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972 X 3 P: What really inhibited Johnson throughout this thing was he was always worried more about the PR side. One part is right now anything that can be done that might tip the balance is something we have to undertake. We have to put the chips in the pot. You believe the Russians will be more affected by this. I don't think that makes much difference. The main thing is what effect will it have on the North Vietnamese. Abrams thinks there would be more effect on the North Vietnamese in the battle zone? K: 12 strikes in the battle zone will not make or break that operation. It will warn that restraints are coming off. P: So they will then step up. K: They are at the limit of what they can do. P: I think we have to go forward. We have to put the chips in the pot. The pot is too big now. We can't get out. This is something -- many other things have been suggested: truck parks, Haiphong. Why not this? K: Actually, we have a curious situation. Joe Kraft called Haig the other day saying I was too soft on the Soviets. That is a new situation. He called again this morning and asked me some questions. P: Soft how? K: I told him it was not a conspiracy - - but incompetency. He is going to write a column. P: We all know what this is. It is a damn conspiracy. The Indian thing, the UAR and this is a massive attempt on the Soviet part to put it to us. K: They haven't understood all the implications. I don't believe they would put the test to us into an area where their intelligence is so bad. They don't know how this can be going. I think they saw a chance of picking up a cheap trick against Peking and blundered into a confrontation with us again. That is more worrisome than the other. If it is a conspiracy, we X could turn it off. I think they are to blame -- no question. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Mr. Kissinger/The President 10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972 4 P: We are coming to the point -- with Safire working on the draft of knocking off of the Soviet Summit becomes more and more a possibility. K: I am afraid so. I do not have another view. I do not think we can survive a Soviet Summit as a country if we are humiliated in Vietnam. Unless they accept rules of conduct, we may have to confront them. It is easy for me to say. But if one looks at an election on that platform. P: The country ivould be done then. K: I think our bargaining position in Moscow, if it came out of a position of total weakness, would be hopeless. P: I have been arguing for sending more carriers, planes, etd. and taking the heat on it because I realize everything rides on this. If we lose this one, the other stuff won't hold up. Our great China initiative we at least opened the door, and handle ourselves as gracefully as we can -- and quietly leave the scene. K: That is essentially it. It is easier for me to say how I feel. P: With that much on the plate, we have to take whatever risks we can. I think we many times have done things like Menu which didn't have a psychological effect. K: That had an effect but never decisive enough. And this won't be decisive. P: But it will have some effect. K: If we hadn't acted the way we have P: We have to look closely at our whole American purpose as to whether or not it is possible for one Communist country to defend itself and leave. We know it is possible for a Communist country to do that. I am not sure. We shall see. All right; we will go forward now. K: It doesn't require an additional order. P: We told them. Laird won't run out? K: I have him on tape. I called him. He said if we want to get the message across, we do it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Mr. Kissinger/The President 10:45 a. m. , April 9, 1972 5 P: All right. How is everything going? Are Safire and Lord working. K: They are waiting for me now. On the military operations, in a tank battle the South Vietnamese have knocked out 24 tanks by ground action. XXX They cut it in half. P: What's interesting is the massive assault in the Saigon area. If they can't hold that. K: They can't sustain that. P: The weather is better there. When it's better in the north K: Yesterday the weather wasn't too good either. They flew 120 P: If we get a break in the weather we might clobber them. K: They are moving the 121st Division from MR-4. That will give them 4 divisions. If they can't hold Saigon now, it is not worth holding. I do believe they can hold it. There's a lot of RF and PF in there. It's mostly a diversion to keep the 21st pinned down. They can't sustain supplies down there. P: Our planes must have hit something. K: The daily toll doesn't look impressive. They estimate since May 30th that 4500 North Vietnamese troops have been killed. We know 832 South Vietnamese were killed. They usually kill 3 to 1 because of the fire power. I think 2000 is probably right. X P: That's probably right. K: In the 3 front, they found another 190 bodies from B-52 strikes. If they just dumped bombs out of the door, they would have to hit something. This is not a wide front. If we get a few good days, Laird thinks we are not going to be in bad shape. P: As Al says, everybody gets alarmist when an offensive begins. Considering the South Vietnamese are fighting in all territories with American air support, they should be able to hold it. Is it still your view we should do it Wednesday night? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SANITIZED COPY Mr. Kissinger/The President 10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972 6 K: Absolutely. It should be tough. P: When I do it it will be tough. K: I THINK I have found a way of mentioning the private things without blowing it. We have to shoot the works now. The ma in thing is to rally our people. If the North Vietnamese want to settle, they will. P: We have to get the Goldwaters, Towers, Buckleys. K: We have those. We have to get the confused middle ground. We will get them. There's a different mood. Max Frankel with a little coaching from me has an article on the front page which is not bad at all. P: You keep that up. K: He printed it pretty much as I gave it to him. P: Call Dobrynin in and tell him. K: He is coming in to see the Chinese filme this afternoon. P: Tell him the Summit is XIXEX on the line now. I think he has to know with this going as it is that we are under enormous pressure. The whole Summit is being jeopardized. Our hold card is to play more with the Chinese. K: I have talked to him sternly twice last week. I sent a message to Bahr. They requested a letter from you recommending ratification of the treaties. I was against it and sent a message saying under the circumstances since this is the second time Soviet arms are engaged in an offensive we are reassessing the whole policy. He will run to the Soviet Ambassador SANITIZED peR HR 7/7/05 P: I wonder if I shouldn't send a message to Brezhnev. K: The danger is if they don't see a way out they may have to confront you. They got the message and I would save this. Let me work out a scenario for you. SANITIZED COPY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Mr. Kissinger/The President 10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972 - 7 - P: We both agree to go ahead under those circumstances. I wondered if you could maybe on a line out there have a talk with. get a report directly from Bunker as to how the South Vietnamese are fighting and how their morale is. K: It's better by backchannel. I will do it from here. P: In the meantime, we will keep our chins up and keep kicking them in the balls. I made a decision no summit if this thing goes. We have no other choices now. We can't be in a position of kiying letting our whole policy be hostage to a couple of summits. K: That's the difference between us and the Democrats. P: Did anybody attack Teddy yet? K: Agnew and Goldwater. P: Okay, Henry. K: Right, Mr. President Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON David Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger 11:20 April 9 [1972] Kraslow: Good morning. Kissinger: Good morning. You're right after the President on the morning briefing. Kraslow: I hate to bother you. I saw Max Frankel's piece this morning. Are they moving south? Kissinger: They are moving down from Hanoi. Kraslow: When did that word come in? Kissinger: Yesterday afternoon or morning. Kraslow: How far down? Kissinger: About 40 miles from the DMZ. This moves the advance headquarters. Kraslow: The rest is how far behind? Kissinger: Not too far behind. Two regiments. They are not ready for combat for ten days or so. They are coming down Route 1. They generally come by rail part of the way and then by truck. Kraslow: Is this a ten thousand man division? Kissinger: 12000 usually. Kraslow: When is the President going to Canada? Kissinger: This Thursday. Kraslow: Is the trip still on? Kissinger: The trip will take place. Kraslow: When are you going to Japan? Kissinger: On Friday. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 2 Kraslow: Has the trip been postponed? You mentioned that it might be. Kissinger: I was just talking. I just don't know if it will be postponed. It's still on. Kraslow: If this situation deteriorates, will it affect the Summit? Kissinger: You are out to kill me. Kraslow: Why? Kissinger: You are having me jeopardize Kraslow: How can the President go to Moscow if he is being creamed in Vietnam? Kissinger: If you raise it, on your own it might be worth raising. This is not the contingency we anticipate. Kraslow: It has been discussed? Will I be shot down if I said that? Kissinger: You will get the answer that this is not something we anticipate. Kraslow: You're not anticipating the situation deteriorating in South Vietnam? Kissinger: We won't know for several weeks. Kraslow: Is this a going-for-broke thing? Kissinger: Total. Kraslow: How many troops are they going to commit to this thing? Kissinger: Over 100, 000. They will not have any combat divisions left in North Vietnam. I think they are figuring on pulling out from Laos and put them near Hanoi in another three weeks. Kraslow: Do they have anything in Cambodia? Kissinger: No, they moved them to South Vietnam. They have about four divisions in MR-1, three divisions in MR-3, and three divisions in MR-2. There is another division coming down. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 3 Kraslow: That makes thirteen. Kissinger: There may be one in the highlands. Kraslow: Is that II Corps? Kissinger: Yes. Kraslow: I took note of Max's reference to - Kissinger: I must go. I have guests in town whom I haven't seen who are waiting. Kraslow: Was Max trying to --- Kissinger: I really have to go. Kraslow: Thank you very much. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON David Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger 11:35 April 9 519721 Kraslow: Will you bear with me? Kissinger: Barely. Kraslow: Have we been in touch with the Soviets ? Kissinger: I can't talk about that. Kraslow: Can I say something on my own? Kissinger: Can say you are surmising. I cannot talk about it. Cannot let you surmise on it with my guidance. Kraslow: Fair inference then? Kissinger: You cannot say "Administration sources, White House sources, 11 or what have you. Kraslow: I'll do it on my own. Kissinger: If you do it that way, okay. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON William Buckley/Mr. Kissinger 11:55 a.m. April 9 [1972] Buckley: Hello Doc. Kissinger: Did you get my message that I sent through your brother? Buckley: When? Kissinger: About four weeks ago. Buckley: Yes. Kissinger: What message did he give you? Buckley: He told me that you told him that with me sitting in front of you in Shanghai with pencil and notebook that you had nothing to say. Kissinger: You destroyed my remaining self-confidence. You had sent me a message according to him with diminished enthusiasm and I replied with undiminished enthusiasm. Buckley: I understand. Kissinger: I think on the communique we ought to talk about it some- time. Whatever we did, we did in July, not in this communique. What I am calling about is what is going on in Vietnam is extremely serious. They are really putting it to us. Everyone of their combat divisions is in South Vietnam. We cannot go to Moscow if we are humiliated in Vietnam. You can disagree on the tactics, but there is no doubt about the analysis of it. We are going to go for broke now. We have more than doubled the B-52s out there, and are adding more. We have increased tactical air by 30%. We are not doing it in a modest way. Buckley: Can you hold the line with air power? Kissinger: With air power and naval power. We now have 18 destroyers. If we are going to lose, we have to lose in a way in which it is clear that we have made an overwhelming effort. But, we don't intend to lose. Whatever the disagreements of the Conservatives, we need an attack on the Liberals. Buckley: How bad have they been in the last couple of days? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 2 Kissinger: Well, Kennedy made one of his speeches. What we are going to do will start today, and will step up. We need somebody left to say surrender is the only thing left. In addition to this I believe that if the Conservatives came to bat and showed strength in the country, it would show in the attitudes of the President in the months and even years to come. Buckley: How do you handle the argument that Vietnamization is a failure? Kissinger: It is a tribute to Vietnamization because they are throwing everything into the pot. They didn't think they could wait the year until Vietnamization was completed. They're asking us to install a communist government for them. The South Vietnamèse airplanes cannot reach North Vietnam. Buckley: Whose fault is that? Kissinger: Ours. And they are equipped by the most modern Soviet equipment. Buckley: So can the question be publicly raised why? Kissinger: Why don't you raise it after the battle is over? If the Conservatives can concentrate on those who are 100% off rather than criticizing the President when he is 20% off. If we lose in Vietnam and as a result McGovern comes in there is nothing left to salvage. Hitler nearly won with a base of 60 million people and a GNP only a fraction of ours. You give the Soviets Hitler's victories and we're dead. Buckley: If the phase we are discussing will reach the crisis next week. Kissinger: That is when it will start. The more support we get, the more violent we can be. We are saving American honor. Buckley: Have you spoken to my brother? Kissinger: No. Buckley: Do you want me to? Kissinger: Yes. I will talk to him too. Yes, it would be helpful. I have talked to Reagan and Goldwater and others. Goldwater spoke last night at the Bridiron Club. He said his political views were well known. He's far to the right of President Nixon and just to the left of Vice President Nixon. Buckley: That's a good phrase. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 3 Kissinger: When will I see you again? Hope to see you soon. Buckley: Fine, good-bye. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer 12:10 p. m., April 9, 1972 K: I am calling because the President wants those airplanes in Danang. M: We will put them in there. K: How about an additional squadron in Thailand. ? M: I think we can do it. I put one in Kuwait and two in Luborne (phon.) I am going to try to shift some aircraft around to make more space and, secondly, work out a way to shift tankers in Thailand around -- - - maybe to Clark, and put more B-52's in there. K: Excellent. M: I might get resistance, but I will do it. K: If you get XXXXX If you get resistance, come to me and I will get a Presidential order. M: I have several things I want to talk to you about tomorrow. heat K: I will see you after the WSAG. We will be getting/kix starting tomorrow. M: Heat is heat. We have to capitalize on it. K: We have 3-4 weeks of massive things we can do. M: Good. I am on top of it. K: Good. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer 3:35 p.m., April 9, 1972 K: Tom, you let me know when you have word. M: They fired 3 missiles at them. I don't know the results. This is from an intercept. But there is activity up there. As soon as I find out I will let you know. K: As soon as they are clear of the area. We have iron-hand with them? M: Yes; I will let you know as soon as I find out. Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger 4:23 p. m., April 9, 1972 M: The first telephone report is all B-52's are clear. Second, we are checking on support aircraft. There was an intercept from Hanoi claiming they shot down one. I don't know if it was a B-52 or another aircraft. It's likely they didn't do it anyway. They are shooting through clouds. I am now checking on Iron-hand. K: But the B-52's are clear? M: Yes. K: Excellent. M: There was very little Mig activity and only 3 missiles. I will trace this report, but the B-52's are out. I will call you as soon as I hear. K: Good. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON The President/Mr. Kissinger 4:40 p. m., April 9, 1972 K: Mr. President. P: I hope you are getting your parents around a little. K: I'm showing them the Chinese films now. But I wanted to call you and tell you the attack is x completed and all planes returned. P: They went at night? K: Early in the morning. P: Thats 12? K: Yes and none lost. P: I guess there is no account wxxxxxxxxx of damage. K: Not yet. It was heavily overcast. P: They would have hit targets. It was the right decision. K: No question. P: To use your term, you have to put all the chips in the pot. It's table stakes now and we are going to play that way. Have you given more thought to the speech thing? K: Yes. I'm 50-50. P: Why? K: Because it is table stakes. All arguments you weight against it you can weight for it. Let's put it on the front page. If we gain, we gain. If we lose, we are no worse off. P: We will meet in the morning and talk about the thing. K: Right, Mr. President. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Admiral Moorer /Mr. Kissinger 5:20 p.m. April 9 C1972T Moorer: I've got our people listening in to see what the other side is saying about it. Kissinger: What are they saying? Moorer: Just general -- tactical stuff, missiles and airplanes. Kissinger: I told the President it was a good job. Moorer: It was a good job. I have our people looking into the revetments, and I'm going to send a message ordering the Marine go tomorrow. Kissinger: Good job; terrific. Moorer: I have got an eight inch carrier on the east coast, and I want to bring it around. I'll bring message to you at the meeting tomorrow morning. Kissinger: Good. We'll approve it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Gerard Smith (Secure Voice) 4/10/72 8:25 a. m. S: We're meeting this evening at 7:00 and I just wanted to touch base with you before talking to him. Is there any development in Washington I should know about? K: No, you must assume you will know about every development. I noticed in one of the last meetings with him was probing the Soviets as if you had to find out from them what was going on. S: No, he didn't have that in mind. I didn't get that impression. K: Butxthatxwas Be that as it may, there is no development here. There has been no development since I talked to you and I have yesterday approved your going ahead with tabling our proposal, but it should be put in the context of SLBM. S: Its certainly will be. K: Not as a proposal in its own right. S: It will be done that way. K: And I want to assure you again you will be kept fully informed. You can assume if they tell you something they are fishing. S: Your message of Saturday K: On What? S: General impression of where we stand and raised the possibility of whether Washington or Would that be agreeable K: Washington what? S: K: I see. Let me check that with the President. S: You may want to give kinxxa me authority to make a tentative proposal. K: If you can do it on the basis that you don't know if it will be approved. S: I can do it that way or I can make it even stronger, say I Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Gerard Smith (Secure Voide) 4/10/72 8:25 a. m. p. 2 doubt it will be approved, but am making a personal inquiry. K: Why don't you do that? S: The Soviets got the impression from the press conference just after we got here K: On SLBM? S: Yes. K: That is not correct. S: May I say I personally checked with the President and that is not correct? K: You may definitely tell him that. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Dobrynin/Kissinger 10:10 a.m. - 4/10/72 D: Thank you very much for yesterday's interesting day with Henry Kissinger. K: You were so sweet. My friends enjoyed meeting you. D: My wife liked your mother very much. Henry, I was going over with Vorontsov First, we agree with your change on the 19th of April. so all of them may come as mentioned by your assistant. Second, our lend-lease people are coming in 2 days. We agree with this environment thing by Japan and now I think everything is moving except Mr. D . K: Well, he isn't back from vacation. He has instructions to contact you as soon as he gets back within the next day or two. D: I think everything is moving except what I discussed with you yesterday. about the 19th of April as you proposed. So you may send the people. K: Let's just hope that all of this will work out properly. D: I really hope so. K: I talked to the President this morning and he says what I told you yesterday is exactly his view. D: What he has in mind. K: Yes, you have a pretty good idea I talk to you literally. D: I do understand it - you express the thoughts of the President. K: But this is a very constructive You know we are thinking of a lot of other things right now. Let's keep that momentum up. D: I understand. What about Wednesday or Thursday. K: You prefer Wednesday. I will let you know by this evening. D: And about my wife and Mrs. Nixon. K: I will let you know by tomorrow. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON B. Walters/Kissinger 1 :35 a.m. - 4/10/72 K: Barbara, how are you? W: Fine. I'm at my desk here at Radio City. I was beginning to think I had done something to you I haven't heard from you in so long. I saw a picture of you and Nancy at the opening of the "Godfather". It looked like she was wearing one of those jade things around her neck. K: No, it wasn't. W: I knew she didn't want any gifts. K: Well, she is changing her mind. Karsh W: I called you about something = have you heard of an extremely good photographer named Kosh (?) of Ottawa. He is a good friend of ours. He has photographed the President and would like to photograph you. K: When? W: Whenever you would like. K: Sure. W: He said he would do whenever and wherever you would like. He is rather shy and said he didn't want to bother you unless you would do it. K: Well, would you have him call my office? W: Sure. I wondered whether you would be interested. I was in Washington just one day. K: You didn't call me. W: Well, I was there for the meeting with the Congressional wives. K: Will you let me know when you come again? W: I will. Tell me - what do you think - I want to go back there and do a story on women and education. Do you think it's favorable? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 2 - K: Yes, it is easing all the time. W: I wrote to Mr. Maw - is that his name? K: Yes, but I would go through the Embassy. W: I just got a letter from Hugh Sidey. He talked about his impres- sions. It all seems so close to us now. It was so impossible at the time. I have no idea when I will be in Washington but I will let you know when I see you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Dobrynin/Kissinger 12:26 p.m. - 4/10/72 K: Anatol, one thing the President did ask me to tell you in answer to what it is that can be completely done. Our view is whatever is completely done must be done quietly. Any public pressure on us can only make matters worse. We don't want a huge propaganda campaign started. One way we judge the seriousness is if they have something to say, say it on the 24th. D: They come K: I don't see any chance in talking to them if they make a public proposal. D: I understand your point. K: No, this is in a friendly spirit as to waht can be done. We want to find something you can reasonably say to them. D: I understand. And secondly can I receive word from you on another matter about the American correspondents. We are prepared to accept up to 100 correspondents. K: Including television. D: They didn't say anything about that. They just said to tell Dr. Kissinger we are prepared to receive 100 correspondents. So perhaps I have to check back with them. K: Good. Check and I will tell Chapin. D: Thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Hugh Sidey/Kissinger 4:35 p.m. - 4/10/72 S: Hi, listen I got to put together a piece before tomorrow evening on Vietnam but more looking over toward Russia. K: Look how late can I talk to you? S: I got to leave to go out of town tomorrow afternoon. K: How late can I call you? S: I have a Board of Trustees meeting tonight. I'll leave the office about 6:30. K: I will do my best to catch you before then otherwise I will call you in the morning. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Henry Brandon/Kissinger 4:55 p.m. - 4/10/72 B: Hi, Henry. I did send you a little note - did you get it ? K: I got it but I didn't have a chance to look at it yet. In the next few days. B: I wondered if we could get together. You're going away again and I am a bit stuck. K: Let me call you tomorrow morning. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Kissinger 5:25 p.m. - 4/10/72 P: Henry, Mrs. Nixon is available now if you would like to come over and spend a little time with her. Do you have time now? K: I have some prisoners wives coming in, but I could come over and have them wait 15 minutes. P: All right. Why don't you drop over now. How long will the wives take? K: About 45 minutes to an hour. P: OK, why don't you drop over now. K: Right, Mr. President. I'll be right over. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON SecretaryLaird (Secure Voice) 4/11/72 8:18am L: I think you will find things here are in good shape -- ARVN in MR-1. They are in a good posture. I wanted to check a couple of things wit you. Haven't been able to get dewnx a drone in on that Chinese truck park K: No, what we want to get is those three around Hanoi. L: We will try to get some info on that. The last pictures of the Chimse truck park we have were taken in August. K: That we were going to throw in as a bonus. We want the three they are yelling about around Hanoi. You were the one who was talking about that one. L: I just don't want to insure there are trucks there. You understood that. K: I understood nothing. L: weather today in Hanoi or we will have gotten reconnaissance on that today. But we will as soon as possible. On the B-52s we have got that planned. It will be ready to go tomorrow afternonn. It will probably be that airfield. K: Can you give us a choise between that target and the airfield? L: We will have a choice on that. As far as the number of planes, I think the priority should still be in the battlefield. And I wouldn't go over 18. K: Hit something more lucrative. L: The most lucrative according to Abrams and McCain are in the battlefield area. K: They go through that all the time. They have lost us the war L: They have not lost us the war. K: For years they have been screaming about lack of restraint. Now we take the reins off and to get them to fly up north is like pulling teeth. L: No, they will fly up north. We are doing these other strikes for political purposes, not for military purposes. K: And showing the Russians we will come up north. L: We'll go there. The other area we have got to look at has to do with SALT. I would like to send a memo over today. I think this is a Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Secretary Laird (Secure Voice) 4/11/72 8:18 m. p. 2 critical stage going on in SALT. Have you been watching it closely? K: Yes. L: I believe the of the Fort Myer site rather than the Maelstrom site. K: I would be glad to have the recommendation. L: May I send it over today? K: Yes. L: I think we are at a crucial point now. Have you had a briefing yet? K: Yes. L: Did you have any problems with it? K: No, it was very good, except I agree with you the priority must be in the battle area, but we also have to give a folt to the North. L: I understand and we will do that Wednesday. I understand from befax the briefer that there is some criticism of having to send air sexexx cover and air diversion with the B-52s. K: No, I WO uldn't intervene in that; it's none of my business. L: And on Wednesday we will also have to divert between and sorties. They were firing 24 SAMs plus we anticipated having some MIGs up there. K: There's not the slightest question about that. We would like with tac air to make one strike over the weekend further north. That's why we were looking for truck parks. L: We will find something, but I wanted to tell we you we don't have verification of trucks together. We want to get that verified before don't we? K: Absolutely. Can we send another dro ne? L: The trouble is they can't recover it. They have got to see the drones to recover them. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Secretary Connally 4/11/72 9:15 a. m. K: I wanted you to know you are being watched. You thought you had me fully absorved in Vietnam. C: That's right I did. But you' re a slippery fellow. K: On Vietnam I would like to find a half hour today to bring you up to date on what's going on. C: All right sir. K: Can my office call you? C: I'll be over there from 3:30 to 5:00. So why don't I just check with your office? K: It might be better to do it before 3:30. C: Well, I've got lunch with the price commission. Could do it just before or just after lunch at 1:00. K: Can you hold for a minute? C: Sure. K: Right after lunch would be good. 2:30. C; Good. K: Secondly, Bob MacNamara wrote me a letter of which he sent you a copy. He also called me and suggested a phone call to Passman might spring it loose. I don't want to do it without checking with you. C: You can call him; he feels strongly about it. He said he wouldn't do anything without checking with me. But there's no harm in your talking to him. K: I will see whether I can use the Vice President's name, then will tell Passman he should work out the details with you. Want some White House backing behind it but want to make sure it doesn't run across you. C: No, I laid it on the line to him. He is extremely difficult on the subject, and withsome justification, but he said he won't turn it down. He won't hurt us, but he will probably have a counter-proposal. K: Let me see whether I can light a little fire under him. C: Goo Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Haldeman/President/Kissinger 10:50 a.m. - 4/11/72 K: Mr. President. H: This is Bob. I'm in the President's office. I was thinking of a stopping point on the way to Russia. I was wondering whether Austria is a possibility and going to Salzberg, not Vienna. Spending two nights as originally planned to do which would destroy the idea of a rest stopover. K: Well, if he wants to do that. I have no great objection to that. H: He is just wondering if that isn't better than going to Switzerland. (At this point, the President came on.) P: Hello. K: Hello, Mr. President. P: I db n't like the feeling of a Spanish base and I didn't like the feeling of the Azores. Switzerland poses a problem which you are aware of. Let me say this for Austria. I have always had a very close relation- ship with Austria. The Ambassador is a good friend of mine and also it is a country which is not allied to us or the Russians and rather than going to Vienna, going to Salzberg which is a lovely town. K: And the weather will be nice too. Can we land there? P: We landed there in a constellation last time. And I don't mind doing the Austrian thing. What's an hour's conversation during the day. K: I share your concern about Switzerland. And if you go there just over night you are going to have a tremendous operations there for one night's rest and if you go for two nights it looks like a vacation so I think Austria. P: You don't mind our exploring it. K: No. P: This Ambassador Hans Brun (?) is a helluva nice guy. I know him extremely well. I got to know him at the refugee period. K: And they certainly have the facilities there, Mr. President. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 2 - P: They do and the people will be friendly - that's another thing. We have no problem there of unfriendly people. They love Americans in Austria. K: I think if you are willing to see them P: Right. I think we should see them, but only have an hour's meeting. K: A courtesy call. P: Right, a courtesy call. We do need the two nights. K: I think, Mr. President, that is a good idea. P: I will have Bob check that out then. And do you want to check it with Gruber? K: Gruber? P: Yes. K: I could do it easily enough or my office could do it quickly. I will get you an answer by tomorrow. I am sure they will be enthusiastic. P: Fine, you go forward with Gruber. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Hugh Sidey/Kissinger 4/11/72 - 11:52 a. m. K: Hi, Hugh. S: Listen, tell me just briefly. I won't take much time. What is your strategy here? You are operating on several tracks at once. K: Well, I think because the Russians are operating on several tracks at once. This is the second time in 4 months that we are confronting an offensive which is made possible by massive infusions of Soviet arms. This is off-the-record. Even if the Soviets did not know the exact time of the offensive they know what is going on. The same thing India/Pakistan. S: I see. K: To do this before the Summit shows that they are always tempted. On the one hand we are always trying to advance on a braod front with them and on the other hand they back up on it and change things around. S: What? K: What we are trying to do is to bring on a qualified change. If you look at the history of Soviet-American relations whenever you get to a point where you think you will get some real progress, we find they are doing something that just picks up some tactical advantage. Of course, we don't ask them to cut off their aid to North Vietnam, but certainly In the case of India/Pakistan it was clearly the attack. S: I see your point. K: We didn't give the South Vietnamese any airplanes that could reach any distance in North Vietnam. S: But you are still going to go ahead and work out the summit? K: Yes, but this is one of the issues we have to address there. S: What about the B . Will he convey the same? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 2 - K: Well, he is a technician. S: Have you been in contact with Dobrynin? K: I don't want to go into that. S: Normal contact? K: Well, he cannot have failed to get the message. S: I think this thing has worked pretty well this time. low visibility. The bombing has gone on well as near as I can tell. K: That is the way it looks now. The additional in Military Region I and the fact that our airplanes are designed to only fight over the desert. I am joking, Hugh. S: I know it. K: Then why don't you laugh. They are not doing it with massive American air support, they are doing it pretty much. S: Our guys were pretty much impressed. Our guys from the field had some good reports on them. Tell me a little about the President. He's right at the center of it? K: Yes, but he is very calm. He's convinced it's a test of Vietnamization. The other day somebody said to him, "This is going to go now one way or the other. " He said, 'No, it's only going to go one way. " S: I see. K: That may be bravado, but any way. S: I think it looks pretty good. How long are we going to be in it? K: Probably months. S: What is your routine, has it changed at all? K: Two differences. I get a JCS briefing at 15 to 8 every morning and a WSAG meeting everyday at 10. S: What about at night? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 3 - K: Well, we talk about 11 o'clock at night. S: Where is that done? K: Almost always on the telephone. This is straight military - I find out if there have been any attacks, what the weather is, etc. S: But he decides on the overall decisions about dispatching ships. K: Absolutely. S: Then at 11 o'clock you have a K: This is it: At 7:45 is the JCS Briefing; then I join the White House Staff meeting; then at 9:00 I go over that situation when he comes in his office. Ususally while I am with him he will call Laird and Moorer on the telephone just to check this over; then he gives me instructions on the directions he wants to go. Then I go to the WSAGmeeting at 10 o'clock where we set the general strategy. Then I tell him the recommendations of the WSAG group and see what he wants, then by noon the decisions are made. It works out well. S: That human touch. I gather it's most favorable. He has been working hard? K: He has been very calm, very determined. S: But going over all details. K: Of course. He doesn't want to know which regiment is where because he doesn't feel it is a Presidential decision. S: Fine, Henry, I think he will come out of this better than he started because if they hold you will have proven something. K: We think if it had to happen it was just as well it came now. S: He knew it was coming? K: Oh sure. S: Good, Henry. Are you going to Japan? K: No, I am not. It's not that there is a crisis; there really isn't a crisis. It's just that when things are hanging in balance I don't want to be sitting in Japan Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 4 - S: You know, Henry, I want to say I have never seen things handled to smoothly and I admire this. It seems to me the thing is working. A lot of people may disagree with policy but that is another argument. The Government is better than I have ever seen it. K: Thank you, Hugh. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Sec. Rush/Kissinger 1:05 p.m. - 4/11/72 K: Ken, I understand the General who sat in the back went to Laird and said I attacked the courage of the Air Force and Pursley called Haig and said we are making aspersions on the Air Force. That's not true. R: That's not true at all. That's absolutely. K: I am being asked every day by the President about strikes in the north. The offensive started May 30 and in 9 days it is awfully hard to explain to the President who has leveled R: That General must be an ass. K: I don't want him there any more. R: Your right. This is absolutely ridiculous. K: Would you explain to Laird this did not happen. R: I certainly will. K: It is true I am trying to goose the Air Force into doing what the President wants. R: What you said is what the President wants. K: We want the major effort to be those but every once in a while we want another one. R: That's the point. There was no ambiguity about that. I will tell you that man. K: And I don't want that Air Force Major General either. Can't we get Moorer or if Moorer can't come somebody else. R: Moorer had to testify this morning. I think we want someone from the Joint Chiefs. K: That's fine. Whoever you think can be helpful. Certainly somebody's going to leak that I brutalized the Air Force. R: I will see he isn't there. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 2 - K: And on this thing tomorrow, I will get Haig to talk to somebody on the secure line. R: I told Mel about the things we want. K: Are they going to be done? R: Mel has just gone to the Hill and will be gone all afternoon. I also told him Al was going out to handle the message. I put it on a political basis and he said 'Should a military man carry this message?" K: Well, Al is going. Al is the man next to me who the President trusts more here. R: You see I couldn't tell Mel the real reason for his going. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Kissinger 2:45 p.m. - 4/11/72 P: Henry, did your meeting go all right at the WSAG today? K: Very well. P: Is there anything new today? K: Well, it's night there now. One thing I would like to suggest Mr. President, I don't think the Air Force has yet gotten the message of the need to do offensive operations against the north. They say the weather is bad. Well, goddamn it, Dong Hoi hasn't moved. They know where the supply depots are. P: What do you think it is - the loss of planes? K: Hardly, I think that Laird and Abrams want to prove that Vietnamization has succeeded. But it isn't enough to lick them in South Vietnam. P: the flight isn't going off? K: They must put up some tactical air support there and work over some of these supply dumps. P: Immediately above the DMZ? K: In the area just north of the DMZ. They have all the authorities, Mr. President but they aren't using them. P: What do you suggest? K: I recommend we send Haig out on Saturday. P: Why not Friday? K: We will be in Canada. I think he should be here while we are gone. P: Well, late Friday night. K: One thing, Laird will object. P: Well, I don't give a damn about Laird. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 2 - K: We can work over the south. P: But now with a little public opinion, we can work the north over. Does Haig agree? K: Completely and Rush does too. P: Can I suggest Haig ought to go so I can have a first hand. K: You may get a complaint from Laird that I have given you all the orders for these guys Where do they think they are going to fight their wars? P: One other point - how about having the Navy move further up that road? K: That's good. P: And how about the cruisers going up the road another 75 miles? K: Absolutely. P: Can this order be given. It's got to be given. K: It will be given immediately. I talked to John Connally and he is in complete agreement. P: Yes. With regard to Mansfield and Scott I think I will let you do a little talking. I haven't given any thought on what they should do to handle themselves. Have they been briefed? K: They have been briefed. P: What line shall I take with them? K: To keep off of Vietnam all together and they should show as much bipartisan support for your policy as they can. P: What about their attitude toward the Russians? Just have Mansfield berber off about the Russians being no threat? K: Yes, tell him that they should say terrific (?) things. P: Fine, Henry. Get that fLEET up there and on the air thing, the argument is stated that we will lose pilots, that's some argument, but on the other hand. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Walt Rostow 4/11/72 3:00pm R: In the wake of Presidenty Nixon's statement yesterday which seemed a little angled toward the Russians I wanted to be sure you were aware of a conversation on the eve of the October 31, 1968 bombing cessation. K: Which was what. R: Before he went ahead he sent a personal message which had these key paragraphs in it. [reads] direct quote from President Johnson to Kosygin. Now Kosygin came back in a turnaround that was the fastest we ever had. That was midnight of the 27th and by 2:00pm the next day Dobrynin was in my office. What he said was progress made at the meetings in Paris had been noted with satisfaction in Moscow [reads] The only point here I have no idea what's being exchanged between you and the Russians now. But I thought it might be useful for you to know President Johnson laid it out to the Russians aside from and wanted to make sure any actions he took would not be misunderstood by the Russians. K: This is extremely helpful and I appreciate it. R: Do you want the texts? K: Yes, could you get them up to me? R: Yes, I will. K: We all have to go through this once in office. R: And I think you are coming out on the right side. One more thing Henry, if they come out well, it would be good for the President to say 'these fellows have done well,' then recall everything else they have done, say 'these people have built a nation, they have proved that they mean it and I show a little pride in being associated with them. K: Right Walt, thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON William Downey/Kissinger 4:10 p.m. - 4/11/72 D: Mr. Kissinger, Bill Downey. K: How are you? D: Fine. Thank you for calling. I was calling because it occured to me that Senator Mansfield and Senator Scott are going to be visiting China this next week. K: We are seeing them this afternoon and we will urge them to raise this issue. D: Good. It would be consistent if they did raise it, but I didn't want to contact them unless you agreed. K: No, I am seeing them this afternoon and so is the President. We will mention it to them, but you are free to contact them if you wish. D: No, better it come from your end. K: You can be absolutely sure it will be done and when I get any information I will be sure to let you know. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger 7:00 p.m. 4/11/72 Secure Phone ADM: We asked them to take every precaution. We haven't gotten any bleat out of the first attack. HAK: Wonderful. ADM: Can I hlep give the brief tomorrow. HAK: No, President wants to have it done informally. ADM: I have been tied up all day--they kept me at the House with the Foreign Committee. I was just offering to help tomorrow. One other thing: There is no question in Congress that the attitude and support for the President is significantly different than Cambodia and Lan Pnom and the prisoner raid. HAK: Well, we have to take advantage of it - hit hard now so that they won't want to continue the war. ADM: We have to take action so that the Russians don't supply them. I told you about the submarines that are surfacing--they will shake them up. HAK: Good and you are going to look for targets for the tactical air north of the 19 - Did you get those drones (?) back. ADM: We expect it in on compass link I don't know what the condition of the film was though. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Mr. Kissinger/President 4/11/72 7:30 p.m. RN: Are you at dinner? HAK: No, I am going out. RN: Mrs. Nixon had a nice talk with Dobrynin. He said he wanted to give her a figt and was very courteous Dobrynin squeezed her hand and said HAK: She mentioned Vietnam RN: Oh yes, you know how my wife is she's real good with that, right on the nose. Did you get Laird off his ass? HAK: We are going to hit two or three targets with B-52's. RN: We are sending Haig, right? HAK: I would like him to stay until Saturday. RN: Okay. The important thing is a message needs to get out time is wasting. Harold Hammer from Los Angeles said "I know the Russians we must put it to them we will get away with it now". Connally is favorable in terms of a blockade this week. HAK: Moorer has put subs out and they will surface-- it will be most disconcerting to have a sub emerge beside their carriers. RN: This may not be the time for a blockade but some time it might be like two weeks before elections we can blockade-- HAK: Maybe earlier RN:- Well, if the thing drags out that long. Your conversation with Max Frankel was interesting. Nobody has already done this before. HAK: No one has called it this way before. I favor this occasional erratic moves-. They are afraid we are coming after them. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Mr. Kissinger Page 2 4/11/72 7:30 p.m. RN: In the STAR, these stories on the tanks that were knocked out by 52's. HAK: There is no way a B-52 could knock out a tank except by accident. 4/5 of the tanks were knocked out by the South Vietnamese. RN: This is moot. The question is we are going to kick the shit out of them no matter what the cost. HAK? And we can save the honor of the military establishment and our people in this country. You don't want Moorer at the brief tomorrow. RN: No. If I have Laird, I have to have Roger s. You will do better without him. We need a hard sell. Do it briefly--30 minutes. Rogerts will be protesting on the negotiations. HAK: Absolutely not Rogers and not Laird RN: Is Moorer going to carry out the orders to move naval ships within five miles of Hanoi. - they should hit Saipan or Hanoi-- HAK: Yes. Happleng RN: Regarding air strikes we should use tac air. HAK: When the weather is clear, we will hit with B 52 stomorrow and Thursday morning Porter will make a statement, so both will be in the same news. Then, by that time the weather will be clear. RN: Do you think. HAK: It must clear by then. RN: When it does, it will stay than. Connally's point is that right now you have got opinions with you--hit now and later it might change. HAK: I agree. We have to sit on top bf them. RN: Have you heard from State. HAK: Not a word--they are thinking if we lose, they will hang me. They are coming to the meetings at WSAG in good shape and doing good work. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Mr. Kissinger Page 3 RN: Well, you are SO ftgloving it with Dobrynin. Mansfield and Scott are seeing the Chinese and that is good. In the meantime tet's punish them. I told Haldeman, don't show me another poll. I don't care right now. HAK: You will go out of sight in the polls when you finish this. RN: The ships will go up, the planes will hit and they will follow my suggest that in any area in the B-3 front to go after and hit them Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

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    "ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n1\nTckon\nHAK + the President C7 PP.)\nANITIZED\n4/9/72\nB\npeR HR 7/7/05\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Tclcons\n13\nFOLDER TITLE\n9\nTelephone Conversations- Chron. Fik 8-11 Apr. 1972\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED S.GPO; 1989-235-084/00024\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/General Vogt\n8:37 a. m., April 8, 1972\nK:\nJohnny, I just want to talk once more. I just had the briefing\nagain, and I know what the President is going to ask. All of the targeting\nin the north, or 98% of it, is on SAM's. We understanding your\nconcern over the SAM's, but we are after those damn supplies. That\nis what is going to decide the battle.\nV:\nThat is where we are going to hit.\nK:\nAfter 30 days, there will not be any bombing. We want to get\nthose God-damned supplies.\nV:\nYou have my promise.\nK:\nThe weather you can't do anything about.\nV:\nThe weather is good in one spot. We will dump everything\nin there. We will lay on a hell of a lot of strikes in concentrated form.\nJust keep working on that Haiphong package for us.\nK:\nWe will be working on that. But we need to get some of the\nsupplies. They were showing me maps of all the supplies stacked up\non the route to Laos. They must have supplies backing up the DMZ.\nWe are also very interested in these truck parks near Hanoi.\nV:\nThey are real lucrative.\nK:\nAre they still there?\nV:\nThere's been some reduction, but they are still there. We\nwant to eliminate the threat to Saigon so Thieu won't get nervous.\nWe will work that over with massive air. I will increase the FANK\nforce in the area.\nK:\nGood. You have our backing. Come to us if you have trouble.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nThe President\n10:45 am; Apr 8, 1972\nP: What is the report this morning from the WSAG meeting?\nK: They are beginning to round up the bomb damage estimate. These\nmassive air strikes are doing considerable good. MR 2 physically\ncounted in the B3 area 350 dead in one area just with air strike. MRI\n2 SVN ranger battalions vs NVN battalion ground action killed 230.\nThat's confirmed. They are knocking out 5 tanks here, 3 there. Battle\nlines stabilized for time being. Weather bad again over NVN.\nP: So Moorer knocked off his strikes up there again?\nK: Yes.\nP: What about B-52 strikes - knocked that off too.\nK: No.\nP: Doesn't need good weather?\nK: I told them we xhould do just to show we have control\nP: We have got to have something that is a signal. Who stopped that?\nK: Abrams feels he needs more. Has 32 more than he asked for.\nP: What became of the ones I told to go out there? I want 200 out there.\nTell Moorer I am raising hell about this. Before we let ourselves in for\nany more double-talk are they going to do 52 strikes over some part of\nNVN or not?\nK: I will order it as soon as I get off the phone.\nP: They don't have to throw 100 or 10, just show there is a strike on\nthat area.\nK: I could not x agree more.\nP: We haven't done one thing in the north that we should have done before\nthat is the trouble with these people.\nK: We need something to show that the old rules don't apply.\nP: What la about the trucks\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: They are going to fly a drone to see if the trucks are still there.\nP: If they are there let's hit that. What else have they gone up with\nhave they come up with any GD idea or not?\nK: They have found one other point in NVN suitable for 52 attacks.\nI think if they launch one attack -- that must be ordered now on the\nground we can extend to 19th parallel.\nP: If negessary.\nK: Another think we can order is to give them right to attack all planes\nin the air from the 20 parallel down.\nP: Yes.\nK: And knock out some of the airfields there. But there is an argument\nto knocking out some of these MIGs because they are getting ready to\ndeploy them into the south.\nK: Knock them out. But I don't think they have carried out any of the\nthings I have ordered. They have got to start. When is Vogt getting out there?\nK: He will be there Sunday night our time.\nP: How can we get anything across to the SOB Abrams?\nK: We gave may have to send Haig out there next week.\nP: Can't Vogt do it?\nK: If Vogt can't do it he has heard everything. He knows what we want.\nI had a talk with him this morning. He said give me until I am in charge\nthere and you will see a total change in the air picture.\nP: How does it all add up? They have 200 here, 200 there and farted\naround here and there. I am really getting damned disgusted with this thing.\nK: The fact is that the NVN are not advancing and I think we are going\nto break their backs.\nP: Now is the time to hit them. Just tell Abrams to launch one attack\nand publicize it. Have you done that?\nK: I have done it but he is not easy to talk to.\nP: Have Bunker tell Thieu.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nK: Right. Actually they are attacking along the river up there and we\nare getting on good. This guy from the NY Times is doing a good reporting\nfoom the battle area. He will probably be fired for it.\nP? I think we must right now to things there for American public opinion.\nIt will be with us. If we act strongly. When action begins debate ends.\nI have been ordering action for one full week and haven't gotten one\nthing done. People are moving a couple of carriers from their home ba\nleave. What are they doing?\nK: They are going to attack with the B-52s if I have to sit in the Chief's\noffice all day today myself.\nP: When it came up in the WSAG - did it come up in the WSAG?\nK: I don't like to raise it in the WSAG.\nP: No because then you will have to go back to State again.\nK: State will begin crying.\nP: You have told me the troops in the WH and the WSAG feel this is\nthe time to strike them.\nK: I talked to Mel Elfin again this morning. He says that the\nmood is entirely different. Don't pay any attention to the Democrats.\nThey are frustrated. Don't know what to attack.\nP: On the other hand we have got to attack them. Have to talk to Colson\nto start that.\nK: I will do it immediately. I talked to Reagan yesterday.\nP: Reagan is fine but get McGregor, etc. to attack the NVN and attack\nthe Democrats who are giving aid to the enemy. Would you mind doing\nthat Henry? I can't get anything done down here.\nK: I will do it, Mr. President.\nP: The psychological thing could be effective here. If we move. I\nrealize there are individial reporters that write the kind of thing we heard\nat the time of Laos. I has got to be a signal to the Russians and the Chinese.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4-\nK: That we are too dangerous to monkey with.\nP: What in the name of God have they done?\nK: The trucks are worth hitting.\nP: The truck parks would be worth it in addition that they could put\na 52 and in the battle area.\nK: We could have a 52 strike on Dong Hoi and that is the battle area.\nP: What about Vinh airfield? Is that still off-limits?\nK: We can extend the authority up there. It is right now off limits.\nP: Take Vinh out. That is one thing we will do. Take it out immediately.\nK: In that case the best thing is to give them the authority to take out\nthe airfields south of the 20th parallel.\nP: Let's go on that right away Henry. Don't fool around. We are doing\nthis the same way Johnson did it. Short of nuclear arms and getting too\nclose to China we have got to do what is necessary. Don't any of these\npeople understand that?\nK: They don't understand the political elements. I don't mean the\ndomestic policy.\nP: That is my job. The hell with that. They just carry out the orders.\nGive them the airfields. They don't have to have clear weather. We can\ndo that with radar, can't we?\nK: That's what I would have thought.\nP: I realize that a gun or SAM you have to have something you can see,\nbut an airfield is a fixed thing. If you can land a plane in 00 why can't\nthey bomb something there. I need that. / Shall Give I Moorer a call and ask\nwhat he has done about these new planes?\nK: Actually he is here. You can if you want to talk.\nP: Tell him if we don't take them out now, and why can't they bomb\nthe airfields without being visual.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-5-\nK: You shouldn't have to personally give the orders.\nP: The airfields up to the 20 are ready\nK: Yes.\nP: Ask why can't they be bombed despite the weather. What about\n52's Dong Hoi ?\nK: Yes.\nP: Is that a good target?\nK: That's the one they have come up with.\nP: Dong Hoi is where in terms of area?\nK: Dong Hoi is about 35 miles north.\nP: I don't want anything put out that we are limiting ourselves to any\nparallels. The point is you couldn't be more right. From the standpoint\nof American domestic psychology right now they want us to do something\nwe haven't done before. They want the enemy to be outraged. From the\nstandpoint of the NVN we have got to do something to let them know\nwe aren't screwing around.\nK: Absolutely.\nP: Any other questions\nK: We have to give them an absolute shock now. There are 43 more\n52s they can now send out but they will have only half the bomb capacity\nof the present ones.\nP: That's great - are they saying we can't use them?\nK: They are wailing around, but I think we should use them.\nP: Isn't it frustrating to work with such\nK: It is not to be believed.\nP: The lack of energy. Is he the one who is dragging his feet?\nK: No. They are all bureaucrats. Here they have a President who is\nbegging them to do something and they have no ideas.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-\nP: With Moorer I would be very strong. Do you think you should get\nAbrams on the phone?\nK: No. He is too tough. Besides Vogt will be there now in 24 hours.\nP: We can get Moorer on the phone and give him the authority to hit\nthose airfields. He doesn't get the authority to hit those airfields\nunless they are going to hit them in bad weather.\nK: I think we should make it conditional on a 52 strike\nP: We have got to make them fly some of the stuff in bad weather.\nDon't you agree?\nK: I agree. no I feel Mr. President that we are going to make it now.\nThere is XXX extra division they have there reserve is on the move now.\nSouth to the MR 1. They have no defensives left in Vietnam. No combat\ndivision left\nP: Be sure to have commandoe raids. Would you order it please?\nTell Moorer. Put some commandoes raids up high though.\nK: I will get on it immediately.\nP: Can you think of anything else, you and Haig have been sitting there.\nI hope you have thought of something.\nK: We thought of the truck parks.\nP: I think strikes on airfields go go forward.\nK: Moorer said there is another carrier he can send out - the SARATOGA.\nP: Get it out there.\nK: That is enough for one day, I think, Mr. President.\nP: The part of massive force is also going to have some effect.\nK: Absolutely. I think we are going to make somebody back off. If the\nSVN don't crack.\nP: If they don't crack this will be worth it, but they are not going to crack.\nAbrams couldn't have done that bad a job. I think they are going to do\nall right. They are not aggressive but what are your reports with regard\nto the SVN?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-7-\nK: There hasn't been a full-scale divisional attack yet, so we just\ncan't tell.\nP: You mean the NVN haven't attacked by division?\nK: No, but on a battalion level they are fighting well. There is a tough\nfight in the Hue area with heavy casualties on both sides. They have not\nyet got the massive artillery fire on them and I want to be cautious.\nP: From B Abrams I want if they get airfield authority can they not\nhit an airfield in other than good weather. Second point, what about the\ntanks? Can they launch no tank attack any place? What is the situation\non tanks?\nK: Nothing in addition to what I told you yesterday.\nP: Nothing being done then. The tanks are just sitting in defensive positions.\nK: I don't think so.\nP: They have got to move those tanks around. Any study of WW I or WW II\nindicates tanks are sitting ducks unless you move them.\nK: For better or worse we are stuck with the commandoes now.\nP: On the other hand, we are charging them up but if they don't do anything\nat least make that suggestion.\nK: I will immediately.\nP: E Say, why not a tank attack? What are they doing? More wars have\nbeen lost by political leaders relying on commanders than I can possibly\ncount. Just put that down in your little book and don't be SO sensitive\nabout the tactics. I will take responsibility for that. After what they did\nto us in Laos we are not going to rely on Abrams.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Jerry Schecter\n4/8/72 12:25 p.m.\n(Came in late)\nHAK: But you won't identify it.\nit will hasten the end of the war considerable.\nJS: No/ and we explain that traditionally it was guerilla warfare\nbut not a diferent war is being fought, and we are going to different\ntactics.\nHAK: In the sense of negotiations?\nJS: Yes, and we will say that this is a White House view and not\na direct attribution\nHAK: You mean sober confident?\nJS: Yes, you are very good at editing.\nHAK: Listen, I would like to talk to you about Japan and China.\nJS: I have some comments from some people in Japan--Nichols says\nhe is upset because you won't give a press conference. He says the\nJapanese will say it for you anyway.\nHAK: Okay. I have to see how this thing goes this week. I may\nhave to postpone it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nBob Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger\n12:30 p.m. 4/8/72\nBH: We have been going around on the timing of the press conference\nand the President said you thought it should be done, but instead not\nuntil the following week?\nHAK: I said from a foreign policy point of view, but if the domes tic\nviews are overriding.\nI don't think the military situation will be\nclear enough. If the attack is built up tremendously, then we have to\ntake that into account.\nBH: You say Kennedy's and Mansfield's statements. How long do\nyou want to wait with this silence from the President?\nHAK: I thought until Monday morning until finally decision.\nBH: You are not going to know much more Monday we should wait\nuntil Monday, but you should think it through before Monday.\nHAK: We will know on Monday how it is built up on Sunday. Also\ndo you want a press conference or a speech by the President?\nBH: We think it should be a press conference.\nHAK: If we do it, we have to have a tough attitude and call the others\nsell-outers-- no dancing around.\nBH:\nWe have to built that with other people before hand.\nHAK: Say this is a massive invasion and forces are in major countries\nnow.\nBH: How do we handle the problem of avoiding being in a position of\nbeing confident about the outcome and then we undergo a setback. this\nwould put the President's credibility into question. He has to say\nI\nam not getting into a discussion on that.\nHAK: He can say we have resources and and confidence in them and\nare going to be tested in battle he can say that. Depends on what he\nwants to do, if he wants to take the position that we are essentially\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nBob Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger\n12:30 p.m. 4/8/72\ncarrying out the democratic program, then we should wait a week.\nOr if he says we will not turn it over to the Communists, then it\nwill be an asset--depends on how tough he wants to be.\nBH: Good point. I would think he would want the latter.\nHAK: And if it works, he can be peace-nicky in Moscow. We are\nnow not in bad shape--if we lose it wasn't worth having anyway\nand if we win, we can come back from Moscow with many agreements.\nBH: My concern is the danger we are running in letter our side\nbe carried by the Doles and Goldwaters while the President's\nopposition hammers away and the TV coverage continues as it\ndoes.\nHAK: The South Vietnames are doing quite well so far--I saw\nMel Elfin and he says the newsmen are basically saying this is\nnot like TET and says we have no choice--I don't know how they\nwill play it, the bastards. Jerry Schecter said the\nis\nbuilding to a prelude to negotiations then who is Kennedy to say that we\nare messing up a negotiation? I also talk strictly from a foreign\npolicy point of view. I don't see the absolute need for it yet, but if\nhe is willing to be tough, it depends on him then he must be absolutely\npositive. I am impressed with your Laos argument. But you are\nagainst his being on TV in a speech.\nBH: My gut feeling is that it would be better in a press conference.\nHAK: Can he get all the answers out that way?\nBH: He can take the first question and make it into a speech as\nit does.\nHAK: Let's say tentatively that he will do it unless the press plays\nit badly then we will have to reconsider.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Rush\n12:43 p. m., April 8, 1972\nR:\nI just got through with a session with Mel. Everything is\nin order on this front except he insists on going to the President on\nthe Saratoga. He said he would probably be overruled but he feels\nhe has to go to the President. He is opposed to taking the Saratoga\nout of the Atlantic. Otherwise, all is in order.\nK:\nWhat does he think about the B-52's?\nR:\nHe took it very well. There was no resistance. I gave it to\nhim fairly strongly. I said the President was damned emphatic. I\ntold him you let us read some of the transcript. He hates the WSAG --\nhe is jealous; he thinks the WSAG is taking away his authority.\nK:\nDid you tell him it didn't come out of the WSAG?\nR:\nI said it didn't have anything to do with it. Henry was emphatic\nand then the President called and Henry showed us the transcript. I\ntold him the President feels he has been let down on the B-52 strikes\nand his orders are not being carried out. This shook Mel a little bit.\nTom was with me. We started in with all the orders. He went along\nwith all of them except the Saratoga.\nK:\nI was calling you because we have some sensitive German\nintelligence in which you told Bahr you might write Barzel.\nR:\nBahr wanted me to write Barzel.\nK:\nWhile this crisis goes on we have to be sure there is no move\nwhich gives aid and comfort to the Soviets. If you can tell Bahr we\ncannot consider it, it would be helpful.\nR:\nI don't know how he got that.\nK:\nYou know what an oily guy he is.\nR:\nI told Pauls when he saw Barzel that he (Pauls) could say he\nwas talking to me and I was worried about the image of the German\npeople.\nK:\nYes, you told this to me.\nR:\nBahr called me and asked if I would write Barzel, and I said no.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Rush\n12:43 p. m., April 8, 1972\n2\nK:\nCan you get it across to the Germans -- say to Bahr you and\nI have been talking and we are working in this direction. But we are\nconfronted a second time in four months with an offensive backed by\nSoviet arms, and we have to reassess our whole situation.\n1\nR:\nI can get word to him on that.\nK:\nHow?\nR:\nI can think of four ways: (1) go through your backchannel;\n(2) go through the State Department; (3) go ghrough Rolf Pauls\nK:\nWhy not go through Pauls. That is the most likely to leak.\nDo it in a way saying we are not going to do it because we have to\nreassess. Do it as an individual and not as a government. Can you\ndo it this weekend?\nR:\nI will do it right now.\nK:\nCan you let me know after you do it?\nR:\nCertainly.\nSecretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger\n1:05 p.m., April 8, 1972\nR:\nI got hold of Rolf and he has promised to send a message forth-\nwith to Bahr.\nK:\nUnder these conditions?\nR:\nI told him I told Bahr I would not write a letter. This was all\nwe could do. However, there was no\non your part or on my\npart personally with regard to changing of position, but as of now we\ncould do nothing with regard to approving something for the Russians.\nRolf understood completely.\nK:\nDid you put it in the context of this offensive?\nR:\nI said in light of this heavy invasion with nothing but Russian\nequipment we obviously could not get XXXX behind something the Russians\nwanted.\nK:\nOkay, Ken; well done.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nSecretary Laird\nApril 8, 1972; 12:55 p.m.\nL: Hi, Henry.\nK: I just wanted to check in with you after the WSAG meeting, just\nto discuss general things. I usually go up with Tom and Ken to review\nwhere we stand, and the President called while they were here and raised\nunshirted hell with me.\nL: That's too bad. I am sorry you are getting hell.\nK: Listen you character. You don't give a damn.\nL: I do too you son of a gun. I hate for you to get hell.\nK: At any rate, he wants to keep pouring reinforcements out there. I have\ngiven all the things he wants done to Ken.\nL: I have met with Ken and Tom. I think to go up with shore bombing to\nthe 19th is OK but I would like to just move the battle are to 19 and\nlet them use anything they want in there.\nK: OK, why don't you do that. I am sure the President will approve.\nL: As long as they are going up there with the destroyers, I told Tom\nI would talk to you or the President about because if they have what he wants\nI would favor taking 18 and moving to 19.\nK: Why don't you do that?\nL: Just consider any MIG flying between 19 and 20 as hostile and knock\nthem down.\nK: That he has already approved.\nL: I think this is better than limiting gunfire to between 18 and 19. I\ndisagreed with Tom.\nK: I will call the President and if you don't hear from me in 10 minutes,\ndo it.\nL: On the SARATOGA, we can put it over there. The problem again is\nI think this is going to go on through to November and my problem is\nI want to be in a position where we can program assets right through.\nThey are going to try to hold on to two capitals and ask for a ceasefire\nwithin 30 days.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: Within 30 days the SVN will collapse or they will be negotiating with us.\nL: The SVN aren't going to collapse, but that battle isn't going to be over\nthis year. I think they will come up with a ceasefire and we must be ready\nto prepare what our answer is. I don't like to get in a position where\nthere are no assets to continue over a long period of time. We can send\nthe SARATOGA over there. witshx I think the Pacific carriers have done\nyoemens work.\nK: If you send the SARATOGA it would give you the options of pulling the\nENTERPRISE out. Let's send the SARATOGA out and then if it looks like\nstabilizing I would pull the ENTERPRISE back or whichever you think\nis most in need of it.\nL: All right. For this period they will know we have the additional assets\nthere. On the 52s, when X we put the G and H's in we can only run 25 to\n26 bombs on them. That's 38-40 percent.\nK: I said this to the President and he said well he wanted another 100 out there.\nL: The thing is if we could fly them out, then justify flying out of Kadena.\nCouldn't we get permission? That is a 9** 9 1 /2 hour flight.\nK: Why don't you put the short-range ones into Thailand and the long-range\ninto Guam?\nL: There is a question of bombload.\nK: Why don't you put the smaller bomb load into Thailand and the big bomb\nload into Guam?\nL: The ones that can carry the biggest load we will put into Thailand so\nwe can get the biggest use. When you get the turnaround out of Guam as\ncompared to Kadena. This is out of the question, do you think?\nK: I do, but shall I try State ?\nL: Try State.\nK: I will.\nL: You only get about 38 to 40 percent, something like that. In addition,\nyou have 9 1/2 hour flight as compared to one-half that out of Kadena.\nK: I agree.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nL: Then this multiplies considerably.\nK: But he wants 43 additional ones out there even if you put 2 bombs on them.\nL: We will send them out.\nK: And I will raise the Kadena issue.\nL: I don't want everybody to think we are in a panic state, because this\nthing will work out. This fighting is going to go on for sometime. When\nthey commit 12 regular divisions this fighting will go on for a while.\nThey have made this decision to commit that much. The South Vietnamese\nare going to come through all right but I don't want everybody to think they\ncan decide in two weeks there, then when it isn't decided in two weeks\nto give up because we can get our objective and accomplish it here.\nK: I don't know who is going to give up, but it will not be the White House.\nL: Everybody in town wants to back away every time I take a hard line.\nK: Who?\nL: No one wants to support the hard line I took yesterday.\nK: I told everybody to shut up. Didn't they tell you we don't want anybody\nto back away from you.\nL: OK, that's fine, but I just didn't want to get all this.\nK: I told them under no circumstances anyone to back away.\nL: I think they are going to make a proposal within 30 days. A ceasefire\nproposal. I am not sure it is one the President will want to accept 30 days\nfrom now.\nK: I think we are not going to talk until we get the back of this attack broken.\nL: I think the battle area should be moved from 18 to 19 degrees.\nK: If I don't call you within one-half hour, you can consider it approved.\nL: OK.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nAdmiral Moorer\nApril 8, 1972; 1:20 p.m.\nK: How are you?\nM: Fine.\nK: You've got authorities running out of your ears. The only thing is,\nyou won't use them. You have a bombing line now up to the 19th.\nM: I just got them.\nK: I want you to know the President just approved.\nM: And we will run the ships up that far, of course.\nK: That you can start right away.\nM: Yes.\nK: Are more ships coming out there?\nM: Absolutely. More arrive today and I am sending 10 destroyers to the\nMIDWAY.\nK: How many right now?\nM: How many firing?\nK: How many firing right now.\nM: Ten or 12, and a cruiser in there.\nK: Is that firing?\nM: Yes, 6\" guns. Just north of Cua Viet River. Also we have 7 south and\n6 north and going to make an adjustment X which would put more north but\nthe OKLAHOMA CITY has 3 6\" 47s and 3 5\" 38s that are firing -- I told you\nwrong -- 12 destroyers and one cruiser out there now. I got Laird to agree\nto let us declare any aircraft south of 20 hostile.\nK: And you can attack any aircraft up to 20.\nM: Did you tell him that?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: I don't know, but that is what the President authorized.\nM: Good. He wanted me to leave the aircraft airborne but we should have\nauthority to hit any either on the ground or in the air. I am sending a\nmessage to Abrams to conduct 52 strikes and provide minimum of six\n52s to Godley if requested.\nK: Right, and you will let Godley know that.\nM: Yes, I will let him know it.\nK: Did you tell him what other reinforcements he is getting?\nM: Yes. I am writing a message now.\nK: The message will include that?\nM: The message I am sending Abrams, yes.\nK: You are sending another squadron of marines out there?\nM: We are checking names, but they are ready to go. We are looking\nfor additional ramp spaces in Thailand, what the bottleneck is. You were\ntalking about nothing but the SAM sites. We have now got the results\nof the missions flown on the 7th. (Read from BDA)\nK: Good. If you could send us consolidated reports like this I could show\nthem to the President and everybody would be happier.\nM: (Continues reading from report.) So you see, as I told you, they had\nother targets besides the SAMs.\nK: Good, but if we could get those that would be good.\nM: I will send it right over.\nK: I think on the whole we have got this now. Laird also agreed to the\nSARATOGA once I talked to him.\nM: He did? Because he was going to talk to the President about that.\nK: Yes, but he changed his mind.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nM: X I think this is going to last a while, Henry.\nK: We can let one of the others come home.\nM: Some of them were due to come.\nK: That's right. But in the meantime the others are going to see that\nothers are going out there.\nM: This is the thing about the Haiphong problem.\nK: As soon as you do something in the area. Abrams - X we will never\nget him to fly in the 18th again once we get all the SAM stuff there.\nM: Abrams doesn't schedule tacair. They will go in there - the SAMs\nare going all the way from Vinh south. I will see to it that doesn't\nhappen. I will send a message to Vogt on that.\nK: OK.\nM: I will send you the message I just read to you right now.\nK: Good.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSecretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger\n4/8/72 1:30 p.m.\nSI: The Washington officer got a call from our DCM in Paris-.\nhe said that Waldheim had contacted him in Paris and said since\nhe was in Paris, he suggested that he might meet with the four\ndelegations and implied\nHAK: No, absolutely not.\nSI: That is my view and Bill Sullivan thinks we can do it in\nseveral ways--we can so flatly no or we don't think it has\na proposal, but if he wants to he can ask the North Vietnames\nto call off the invasion, but then he is in the middle of it with\nthem responding and then our responding, so I think that even\nassuming that he might come out and say we refused his\nmediations, but I think it is cleaner to say \"no\".\nHAK: Right. I think we should just turn it down.\nSI: Another thing, I am leaving for Chile on X& Wednesday and\nwill be back on Saturday I know there is an SRG meeting on\nTuesday afternoon.\nHAK: Let's talk after that.\nSI: I think we are in line with the DET (?) matter, but it depends\non what we want to do.\nHAK: Right. Let's meet before the SRG meeting.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Mr. Kissinger\n4/8/72 1:30 p.m.\nRN: Just completed talking with Bob. I think tentatively that the better\ncourse of action is the 1500 words, 10 minute talk.\nHAK: That is what I think.\nRN: I told him to call them to Saffire who will then talk to you\nHAK: Would you do it Wednesday night? I think that is the right decision.\nRN: Yes. And we can avoid commenting on how the battle is coming.\nHAK: The press would have a chance for needling questions in a conference.\nRN: Then I will go on the following week with a press conference and let\nthe press ask questions and we should know by then how it is coming out.\nHAK: And we could say that we are notified that we would resume April\n. (?)\nRN: Maybe I should get Porter to see Monday.\nHAK: I would wait until Wednesday. One thing you should consider that\nthese people are treacherous- that instead of doing it secretly, from now\non announce we are willing to have April 24 meeting.\nHAK: We can argue that we have been trying to set up talks since the\nmiddle of February--when they stalled Porter sin ce--and that is why\nhe walked out.\nRN: I am still ready to go but cannot talk whilethey are violating. If I\nannounce it, it isn't private.\nHAK: But we can keep the content private.\nRN: I see. Between 1500 words and 10 minutes saying what we are doing,\nwhat they are doing and what the South Vietnames are doing and what we\nare prepared to do diplomatically. The difficulty with the question thing\nthis week, there are some questions I don't want to be on the limb on--\nat least we will know pretty well where we are. If it is too rough next\nweek, maybe we won't go then, but we should try to though.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Mr. Kissinger\n4/8/72 Page 2\nHAK: Next week around the 20th, we will know where we stand at least\nmore than we do now.\nRN: The point now is to hold the military feet to the fire and keep the\nsituation going. Do you have any more reflections on what they can do.\nHAK: We have ordered the Saratoga out and 43 B52's. Attack all air\nfields south of the 20th. We want authority to go up to the 19th.\nRN: The 18th is better than the 19th.\nHAK: We can see how they fly on the 19th--I am not concerned about\nescalation charges what bothers me is if they are actually hitting the\nright areas.\nRN: Just given them the 19th to knock off SAM's?\nHAK: No just to cover a larger area.\nRN: I have no strong feelings about it you and Haig should talk it over.\nHAK: Haig should be there now should I have someone start drafting\nsomething I don't think Saffire knows how to do it.\nRN: I have dictated it to him--we have to move quickley. It is a speech\nto handle very simple questions people are asking and you can start:\nCall it a report on Vietnam\nTone: Confidence and matter-of-fact that there has been a massive\nviolent invasion by North Vietnamese in South Vietnam in violation of\n(and peat this point) our agreements.\n-- What we are doing to meet this invasion:\n--as far as this being met on the ground by the South Vietnamese\nforces - they are fighting to defend their homeland\n-- there will be no ground forces there of our; however, we are\nusing our air power against those military installations both in South\nVietnam and North Vietnam that will support this invasion (say with the\nmost modern Soviet equipment)\n-- And say these attacks are to continue until the invasion\n(I don't know if we should use this phrase) is stopped.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/President\n4/8/72\nPage 3\nNow for the diplomatic front and not defensively- on January 25 we\nmade a peace proposal and 12 trips (and give the essense of the\noffer a total withdrawal of our forces and use \"ceasefire\") and what\nhas happened and been their answer: a continuing build up of forces\nand we showed restraint and offered to negotiate in private and public\nchannels and they refused and continued to build up. Say they were\nattacking us and that is why the talks halted--Amb. Porter has offered\nto be back on the 13th (?) and is prepared to do SO when they stop\ntheir invasion (we shouldn't use that word I don't think). The private\nthing we must think about our real interest in having private negotiations\nand we should not say anything that that would really have a torpedoe\neffect hint at it maybe--we are prepared to negotiate publicly or\nprivately, but not at the point of a gun. There are those who say that\nthe US should not\nthe North Vietnames, just withdraw and then\nnegotiate. this would be no negotiation, just a surrender in turning\nover to the communists (use this word often and the word enemy), and\nthat the US is nearing the end of this long war and point out when I came\nto office how many forces have been cut. And say that some men who\nwere silent are now critical now that the war is winding down. And we\nask for American support for the only honorable policy.\nThis cannot be lengthy--make is short and terse and tell the people the\nthings they need to know. We can say that we have consistently agreed\nto see their terms, but they have refused this and we will not support\na surrender\nLet one of your guys and Saffire work on it so I can pull together the\ntext. I need it at 8:00 Sunday night because Monday I am tied up. We\ncan always look at it Wednesday to see what the situation is but we\nmust lay out the report soon.\nHAK: You shouldn't be on the defensive. But the American people need\nto hear what the facts are--they need to hear from the President.\nRN: You feel the attitude is somewhat different.\nHAK: Yes. That is what the people need to hear-from the boss. Then\nyou can give a press conference the following week. We can still rescue\nthis in Moscow\nRN: Henry, we shouldn't get ourselves in the pesition of just being\nout of Vietnam we can't negotiate with them\nWe should just knock\noff the summit. I think that if we are in a position that theSVietnam\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Mr. Kissinger\n4/8/72 Page 4\ngovernment collapses, we will not go to Moscow to negotiate--they\nwould be impossible to handle.\nHAK: How would you explain a SALT agreement?\nRN: And after they had supported massive invasions, we will not\ndo this. Are you discouraged? I have a feeling that our air people are hitting\nsomething out there.\nHAK: No; I think they are hitting something I talked with Helms. He is sure that\nthe attack on the front couldn't be gotten off because of the\nand\nthey have lost another 250 men there yesterday.\nRN: That doesn't sound like many\nHAK: It amounts to something day after day.\nRN: Well our bombing must be giving them some casualties.\nHAK: Yes for every one, there are 2, 3 or 4 that we never hear about.\nRN: Are you concerned about the use of the 52 strikes in the North?\nHAK: No the defense people are using them in South Vietnam for\ntactical reasons. They have 31 more planes than they ever asked for.\nRN: You will get some screaming from the Kennedy's.\nHAK: The average American doesn't know the difference between B52's\nand DC 3s. If we hold three weeks, we can move Region 3 to Region\n1 and start a bigger defensive- we can move two additional divisions to\nRegion 1.\nRN: That is what we need.\nHAK: We can do it starting May 10.\nRN: What about the air losses?\nHAK: We have lost seven planes--the SAM's are getting knocked off.\nVogt is out and Sunday sometime will take over Monday morning.\nRN: I hope he will make some things hum\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Mr. Kissinger\n4/8/72 Page 5\nHAK: He has been through Loas, Cambodia we have talked to him\nhe knows you and has had contact with how you wish to operate\nRN: The real problem now is to demonstrate our thinking. I wish\nwe could get the Chinese thing off.\nHAK: This isn't going to break us at one way or another if we\nlose, we don't lose anything and if we win, we get agreement\npower in Moscow.\nRN: Well, let's hope we win - we will win.\nHAK: Yes, Mr. President we will win.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nBill Safire/Mr. Kissinger\n2:18 p. m., April 8, 1972\nK:\nI understand you will work on the Vietnam speech. I just had\na long talk with the President and have given my thoughts to Win who\nwill work on it concurrently.\nS:\nCan we work on it together?\nK:\nHe is prepared to work with you.\nS:\nAnytime I will be prepared to go into competition.\nK:\nThe way we have done it in the past has had superlative results.\nLet Win give you the substance and you put it in your words. I know\nHaldeman gave you five points, but that is not enough.\nS:\nI could sit with you and interview you.\nK:\nInterview when?\nS:\nRight now.\nK:\nI have been trying to get out all day. It is now 2:30 and I have\nbeen trying to get out since 10:00. We want a tough summary of what\nhas happened. We are dealing with an aggressor nation. Everyone\nof its combat divisions is outside of its borders. It knows it isn't\ngoing to be attacked. It has launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam\nacross the DMZ in violation of the agreements (which Win can give you),\nwhich were pointed out by Clifford and Harriman in 1968. Ground combat\nis being conducted by South Vietnam. We are giving air support. I\nhave given a list of what should be said about negotiations. At the end,\nwe ask for support of the American people. Make it tough on the critics.\nSay with regard to this endless argument that it is our fault, the\nrecord leaves no doubt as to who broke off negotiations.\nS:\n(1) It used to be argued that a civil war was going on and the\nNorth Vietnamese were helping the Viet Cong.\nK:\nThere are practically no South Vietnamese units fighting in\nthis one.\nS:\nIt is an invasion of the south.\nK:\nBy the entire North Vietnamese force.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nBill Safire/Mr. Kissinger\n2:18 p. m., April 8, 1972\n2\nS:\nShouldn't the President point out this is an invasion from the\nNorth?\nK:\nThat is the whole point of the first XXX part.\nS:\n(2) The question in most people's minds is what will this do\nto the trip to Moscow.\nK:\nThat will not be mentioned in this speech -- except to mention\nSoviet equipment in one sentence so they know we are watching them.\nS:\nWinston will put down the things in point form?\nK:\nYes. When will you have it?\nS:\nI will have it ready tomorrow morning.\nK:\nGood. Then I will talk to you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer\n2:27 p. m., April 8, 1972\nK:\nI just talked to the President. He is willing to give you\nauthority up to the 19th. But he has the same concern as I do. He\ndoesn't trust the way we are using our Air Force out there. He\ndoesn't think you will watch them closely enough.\nM:\nIt hurts me for him to think that. You don't have to worry\nabout it at all.\nK:\nIf you are going to use maximum effort where it will do the\nmost good, you have the authority.\nM:\nThis lets the gunships go up there, and I think we are going\nto concentrate around the battlefield and north of the DMZ and on up\nfurther. If we pick up units of the 325th Division and get a bead on it,\nwe would have to wait for it to get to the 18th.\nK:\nHe told me to tell you if you would watch it for him, he would\ngive you the authority.\nM:\nHe doesn't have to worry one bit.\nK:\nHe is going to hang in tough on all these things. You will\nget the destroyers going up there?\nM:\nRight away. Ten are going out to the Midway.\nK:\nBut they won't be there for two weeks.\nM:\nThey can move into the breach. We have to replace some\nof the barrelb they wear them out shooting. But we have plenty\nof barrels out there.\nK:\nAt any rate, what authorities were outstanding? This gives\nyou everything you need, doesn't it?\nM:\nHave you talked to Laird about air authorities south of the\n20th?\nK:\nNo, I have to do that.\nM:\nHe has already agreed to airborne. But I want this authority.\nK:\n]\nYou have it. But we won't give you Haiphong right now. Get\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer\n2:27 p. m., April 8, 1972\n2\nme the pictures of those truck parks, and we will give you ahthority\nfor that.\nM:\nI have drones going up. We might get one shot down, but we\nwill get the pictures.\nK:\nOkay, Tom.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Rush\n2:35 p. m., April 8, 1972\nK:\nKen, there is some ambiguity which we want cleared up.\nThe President gave authority not only to hit airborne planes but airfields\nsouth of the 20th.\nR:\nBelow the 19th?\nK:\nBelow the 20th -- airfields below the 20th; I have it in a\ntranscript of a phone conversation if Mel wants to discuss it. In fact,\nhe wants to hit them with all-weather planes.\nR:\nI'm glad to hear that. I will change it at once.\nK:\nGood.\nR:\nFine, Henry. Thank you very much.\nK:\nFine; thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nJoe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger\n10:15 a. m., April 9, 1972\nKr:\nGood morning, Henry. I have a number of questions I want\nto ask about Vietnam and your assessments. (1) Is it your assessment\nthis will wind up fairly rapidly?\nK:\nNot necessarily. I wouldn't be surprised if it quieted down in\nMay and then picked up again. I'm not sure it will wind down in a\ncouple of weeks. I haven't really made up my mind. There are two\npossibilities. It could keep up all summer. The other one is this is\none big shooting the works thing as a prelude to negotiations. A\ntremendous blast now and then a peace move. Then another blast in\nJune. I lean toward that.\nKr:\nYou put quotes around \"peace\"?\nK:\nThere is the usual ambiguity. It is not gentle -- it is not being\nmade by pacifists. They are putting it to us either way.\nKr:\nHave the Russians said anything to you at all?\nK:\nI can't talk about that.\nKr:\nI know Vorontsov was in there last week, on Tuesday.\nK:\nIf I saw somebody, it wouldn't be Vorontsov. He is handling\nthe technical arrangements for the Summit. I did not see Vorontsov.\nI don't know whether he was in on Tuesday -- but he wasn't in to see\nme.\nKr:\nI thought the Russians were putting out a statement yesterday\nin TASS.\nK:\nIf they did, I haven't seen it.\nKr:\nThe secondary guys around the Department are talking about\na statement. But I don't think it's so easy for them to put out a statement.\nK:\nIt is not easy.\nKr:\nI would think it would be hard. This plays so nicely into their\npurposes.\nK:\nUp to a point.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nJoe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger\n10:15 a. m., April 9, 1972\n- 2 -\nKr:\nUp to a considerable point. It would be very hard not to try\nto use it as a pressure point.\nK:\nIf they do\nKr:\nWhat do you do? I assume you postpone it.\nK:\nLet's see what happens. It would be a short-sighted thing\nfor them to do. For once we have Soviet/American relations where\nif everything worked out -- leaving out Vietnam -- one could inject\nenough interest to move to\nagain.\nKr:\nI think they tend to do these things. The failure of any\nstatement suggests they can't resist. I think it's a reversal of the\nBrezhnev/Kosygin role. Brezhnev could get away with both.\nK:\nI wouldn't bet on that.\nKr:\nHe is the kind who might bet on it. Kosygin is more nervous.\nPeople around town are telling me this. They say it is not a calculated\nplan because of Soviet inability to say 'no' to the North Vietnamese.\nAre they telling you that?\nK:\nThey are telling me that, but not the Brezhnev/Kosygin thing.\nI have not heard Kosygin is nervous.\nKr:\nI don't know what the exchanges were with the North Vietnamese.\nKosygin had these exchanges on February 11 and they were very harsh.\nI think he should be saying something. Would it be harmful if I wrote\nsomething on this?\nK:\nIt would not be harmful if you speculate along these lines. It\nwould be helpful, in fact.\nKr:\nI will do that.\nK:\nAnd you are probably correct. I can't speculate on the\nBrezhnev/Kosygin role.\nKr:\nI won't do that. Does anyone have a good reading on what\nMarshal Kamitosky(?) said? You know, the Vice Minister of Defense\nand head of their Air Defense. Is it believable that the Russians could\nsend this in as a package?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nJoe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger\n10:15 a. m., April 9, 1972\n- 3 -\nK:\nThis was a very far-sighted plan to really put to us - to show\nthat when all is said and done, the Soviets can challenge the U.S. first\nin the Subcontinent and in Southeast Asia, and when we come to Moscow\nwe are coming in total weakness. The other theory is they see the\nopportunity to out-maneuver Peking in Hanoi. Hanoi keeps bleeding\nequipment out of them and they don't have enough intelligence to know at\nwhat point their equipment becomes overwhelming; also they don't know\na big offensive is planned and they get sucked in. I am tempted to\nbelieve the latter one. But I draw no consolation from it. I would\nrather have a formidable enemy.\nKr:\nIt's not the kind of equipment in volume that would enable\nthem to make a decisive judgment.\nK:\nI am assuming they don't know what is going on in the south.\nKr:\nThe SAM's?\nK:\nYes.\nKr:\nRoadbuilding?\nK:\nYes. Suppose they believe what we are saying. I am trying\nto put the case for blundering rather than a master-plan. Suppose\nthey believe we are winning in the south and they want to maintain a\nbalance. Assuming what they really want is to keep going, that makes\na maximum dependence of Hanoi on them. A victorious Hanoi -- they\ncan't count on gratitude. If Admiral Moorer had the general idea\nwe wanted to support a country for political reasons, he would keep\npouring things in. He wouldn't know where it crossed to a smashing\nsuperiority. Would prefer it to be a conspiracy. If they slid into that\nwe are worse off in many ways. My interpretation may be the softer\none. I don't know they planned the India/Pakistan war, but they made\nit inevitable.\nKr:\nYes, and there's '67, too. This is a repeated pattern.\nK:\nWe have been low-keying it because we don't want to create\nexpectations which would box us in. We have approached the Summit\nas a major turning point in relations with them -- not just a meeting.\nOne way or the other, we thought Vietnam would be out of the way or\nwould evolve where the outcome would be irrelevant to this even if it\nwas a Communist victory. I would much rather have a conspiracy.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nJoe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger\n10:15 a. m., April 9, 1972\n- 4 -\nKr:\nI understand that, too. You could turn that off. They are\nnot under any illusions, are they?\nK:\nThey will not be under any illusions as to how we would respond.\nKr:\nThey must understand the impact on Germany.\nK:\nIf this turns into a Soviet/US crisis, it complicates the passage\nof these treaties in an enormous way. There is no question we could\nstop passage of these treaties if we wanted to.\nKr:\nThat is very clear.\nK:\nTo assume this is a conspiracy, you would have to assume an\namount of duplicity on the part of the Soviets, but it would SO flagrant.\nIf we were confinced this was carefully planned, we would have to get\nDobrynin out of here. They are capable of it, but for big stakes and\nnot putting all into the hands of a client. If this were a military action\nby them, I would have no doubt they were capable of total duplicity.\nKr:\nIf this were Czechoslovakia.\nK:\nYes. But to turn it over to Hanoi where they cannot tell how\nit is going to come out -- we don't even know how it is going to come\nout.\nKr:\nI will be writing something along these lines. But with some\nconcern.\nK:\nI think it would be extremely helpful.\nKr:\nOkay. I'll see you soon.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger (Secure Phone)\n10:40 a. m., April 9, 1972\nL:\nHenry, would you caution everybody not to use the White House\nboard or open lines to talk about these B-52 strikes. There is some\nindication there has been some talk about these. I don't want people\nto be alert to the fact. Just be sure they are not using the regular\ntelephone.\nK:\nYou know who is the worst villain.\nL:\nNo.\nK:\nThe President.\nL:\nBut you have to make sure that these guys are protected.\nThese strikes are going to work out all right. Everything will be fine\nbut it is a big escalation. I don't want anything to happen to the planes\nand pilots unnecessarily.\nK:\nYou think there will be a lot of screaming here?\nL:\nSure. But I don't want people to panic. This is a big symbol -\nlike putting troops back in the importance of it. There will be\ncivilian casualties and when you talk about three people and 10 people actually\nin the plane, that is true. You saw those pictures -- there is civilian\nhousing around there.\nK:\nAre you, on balance, against it?\nL:\nNo. But I don't want to alert them in advance.\nK:\nWhat is your real view?\nL:\nThis will be the kind of plan the President wants as a major\nshow of determination on his part. That is what he wants and he will\nget it.\nK:\nYou think it's worth the heat?\nL:\nWe have taken heat before on things like this. You can't back\naway from that plan of showing strong determination, and that is the\nplan now.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger (Secure Phone)\n10:40 a. m., April 9, 1972\n2\nK:\nThe President's judgment is this. If he keeps this thing going,\nyou have to balance six weeks of agony against giving them a few shots.\nL:\nYou will have agony anyway. But we don't want to given an\ninterpretation of panic -- but determination rather than panic.\nK:\nIf there is talking on open lines, it is mostly the President.\nL:\nI want to caution everybody. Do you think I should call him?\nK:\nX\nI will caution him.\nL:\nOn this particular thing if it got out that security had been\nbroken here, it would be a catastrophe.\nK:\nThey have it penetrated on the other side.\nL:\nBut they won't have any penetration on this strike unless it is\ndone here in the U.S.\nK:\nWe won't do anything here. I have a call in for the President,\nbut when I talk to him I can't promise what he will do now.\nL:\nI want to caution everybody. Everybody in this building will\nbe secure. That's most important, I feel. We can pouch the targets\ndown to the President if he wants to look at these pictures.\nK:\nNo, that's not necessary.\nL:\nOkay, Henry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSANITIZED COPY\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972\nK:\nHello, Mr. President.\nP:\nHenry, you are up early after the Gridiron.\nK:\nI have been at the Pentagon since 8:00 a. m.\nP:\nI am here with Al.\nK:\nI wanted to review with you this large attack. Laird doesn't\nwant us to use on the phone the name of the planes -- which would come\noff this afternoon about 4:00.\nP:\nDoes Abrams want to do it?\nK:\nAbrams' basic judgment is to use all assets in the military zones.\nThe argument for doing this is not purely military. It is to show we\nare prepared to do massive escalation and warn the Soviets.\nP:\nIs Abrams concern loss of planes? Is that Vinh?\nK:\nIn that area, yes.\nP:\nIs Laird sitting there with you?\nK:\nNo.\nP:\nWhat is Laird's problem?\nK:\nI just felt obliged to check with you again. He is not opposed.\nAbrams has been opposed on the ground that he wants everything in his\narea, but.\nP:\nI wouldn't be concerned about the lines being tapped. If they\nare, that's fine.\nK:\nThe problem is they can then get a defensive action under way.\nP:\nWhy don't you go to where you can talk more safely.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\npeR HR 7/7/05\nBy MH\nNARA, Date 4/10/19\nSANITIZE _ASSIFIED\nRichard Nixon Presidential Library\n[7 pgs]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972\n2\nK:\nI can talk on a secure line. I don't think the target is so important\nas to give you one more chance at the decision. If we are going into it,\nthis is as good a target as any. That is the only thing he is concerned\nabout that we don't discuss targets.\nP:\nWe won't. I understand -- any place in the northern area. The\nproblem is Abrams doesn't want to divert 6 planes?\nK:\n12 planes. He now has additional ones -- 30 of them are there.\nI don't think Abrams' concern is a paramount one. That is one on which\nyou have better judgment. The amount of screaming in this country\noutbalances the message we get across to the other side.\nP:\nA day back in Washington gives you a chance to get the Potomac\nin your veins. If we are going to do the Wednesday thing, we might\nhave to do the exercise after that rather than before.\nK:\nIf you do the Wednesday thing, it will explain this. The average\nAmerican doesn't know one plane from another. It's better if the\nscreaming starts before you speak.\nP:\nAl is of your view that there is political screaming regret\nthat the war is again in the news. But there is a very different attitude\nin terms of the whole situation because it is not involving our American\nground forces and particularly because it does not involve an American\nincursion. How do you feel?\nK:\nThat is how I feel. I am, on balance, in favor of doing it.\nP:\nThat is the reason I am for it. If you have a good target, particularly\none relatively safe, from the standpoint of SAM's, it seems to me.\nK:\nThere are very few SAM's up there.\nP:\nit seems to me that they could give a little shot. But don't\nput out 18 press releases.\nK:\nNo the press guidance is they just mention planes have been\nused and, in response to questions, they will say, 'yes, we have struck\nnorth.\nI\nP:\nSay 'we have struck in military areas in support of the invasion\nof the south.\nK:\nExactly.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972\nX 3\nP:\nWhat really inhibited Johnson throughout this thing was he\nwas always worried more about the PR side. One part is right now\nanything that can be done that might tip the balance is something we\nhave to undertake. We have to put the chips in the pot. You believe\nthe Russians will be more affected by this. I don't think that makes\nmuch difference. The main thing is what effect will it have on the\nNorth Vietnamese. Abrams thinks there would be more effect on\nthe North Vietnamese in the battle zone?\nK:\n12 strikes in the battle zone will not make or break that\noperation. It will warn that restraints are coming off.\nP:\nSo they will then step up.\nK:\nThey are at the limit of what they can do.\nP:\nI think we have to go forward. We have to put the chips in the\npot. The pot is too big now. We can't get out. This is something --\nmany other things have been suggested: truck parks, Haiphong. Why\nnot this?\nK:\nActually, we have a curious situation. Joe Kraft called Haig\nthe other day saying I was too soft on the Soviets. That is a new situation.\nHe called again this morning and asked me some questions.\nP:\nSoft how?\nK:\nI told him it was not a conspiracy - - but incompetency. He\nis going to write a column.\nP:\nWe all know what this is. It is a damn conspiracy. The Indian\nthing, the UAR and this is a massive attempt on the Soviet part to put\nit to us.\nK:\nThey haven't understood all the implications. I don't believe\nthey would put the test to us into an area where their intelligence is\nso bad. They don't know how this can be going. I think they saw a\nchance of picking up a cheap trick against Peking and blundered into\na confrontation with us again. That is more worrisome than the other.\nIf it is a conspiracy, we X could turn it off. I think they are to blame --\nno question.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972\n4\nP:\nWe are coming to the point -- with Safire working on the\ndraft of knocking off of the Soviet Summit becomes more and more\na possibility.\nK:\nI am afraid so. I do not have another view. I do not think we\ncan survive a Soviet Summit as a country if we are humiliated in\nVietnam. Unless they accept rules of conduct, we may have to confront\nthem. It is easy for me to say. But if one looks at an election on\nthat platform.\nP:\nThe country ivould be done then.\nK:\nI think our bargaining position in Moscow, if it came out of a\nposition of total weakness, would be hopeless.\nP:\nI have been arguing for sending more carriers, planes, etd.\nand taking the heat on it because I realize everything rides on this.\nIf we lose this one, the other stuff won't hold up. Our great China\ninitiative we at least opened the door, and handle ourselves as\ngracefully as we can -- and quietly leave the scene.\nK:\nThat is essentially it. It is easier for me to say how I feel.\nP:\nWith that much on the plate, we have to take whatever risks\nwe can. I think we many times have done things like Menu which\ndidn't have a psychological effect.\nK:\nThat had an effect but never decisive enough. And this won't\nbe decisive.\nP:\nBut it will have some effect.\nK:\nIf we hadn't acted the way we have\nP:\nWe have to look closely at our whole American purpose as to\nwhether or not it is possible for one Communist country to defend itself\nand leave. We know it is possible for a Communist country to do that.\nI am not sure. We shall see. All right; we will go forward now.\nK:\nIt doesn't require an additional order.\nP:\nWe told them. Laird won't run out?\nK:\nI have him on tape. I called him. He said if we want to get the\nmessage across, we do it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n10:45 a. m. , April 9, 1972\n5\nP:\nAll right. How is everything going? Are Safire and Lord\nworking.\nK:\nThey are waiting for me now. On the military operations,\nin a tank battle the South Vietnamese have knocked out 24 tanks by\nground action. XXX They cut it in half.\nP:\nWhat's interesting is the massive assault in the Saigon area.\nIf they can't hold that.\nK:\nThey can't sustain that.\nP:\nThe weather is better there. When it's better in the north\nK:\nYesterday the weather wasn't too good either. They flew 120\nP:\nIf we get a break in the weather we might clobber them.\nK:\nThey are moving the 121st Division from MR-4. That will\ngive them 4 divisions. If they can't hold Saigon now, it is not worth\nholding. I do believe they can hold it. There's a lot of RF and PF\nin there. It's mostly a diversion to keep the 21st pinned down. They\ncan't sustain supplies down there.\nP:\nOur planes must have hit something.\nK:\nThe daily toll doesn't look impressive. They estimate since\nMay 30th that 4500 North Vietnamese troops have been killed. We\nknow 832 South Vietnamese were killed. They usually kill 3 to 1\nbecause of the fire power. I think 2000 is probably right.\nX\nP:\nThat's probably right.\nK:\nIn\nthe\n3 front, they found another 190 bodies from B-52\nstrikes. If they just dumped bombs out of the door, they would have\nto hit something. This is not a wide front. If we get a few good days,\nLaird thinks we are not going to be in bad shape.\nP:\nAs Al says, everybody gets alarmist when an offensive begins.\nConsidering the South Vietnamese are fighting in all territories with\nAmerican air support, they should be able to hold it. Is it still your\nview we should do it Wednesday night?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSANITIZED COPY\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972\n6\nK:\nAbsolutely. It should be tough.\nP:\nWhen I do it it will be tough.\nK:\nI THINK I have found a way of mentioning the private things\nwithout blowing it. We have to shoot the works now. The ma in thing\nis to rally our people. If the North Vietnamese want to settle, they\nwill.\nP:\nWe have to get the Goldwaters, Towers, Buckleys.\nK:\nWe have those. We have to get the confused middle ground.\nWe will get them. There's a different mood. Max Frankel with\na little coaching from me has an article on the front\npage which is not bad at all.\nP:\nYou keep that up.\nK:\nHe printed it pretty much as I gave it to him.\nP:\nCall Dobrynin in and tell him.\nK:\nHe is coming in to see the Chinese filme this afternoon.\nP:\nTell him the Summit is XIXEX on the line now. I think he has\nto know with this going as it is that we are under enormous pressure.\nThe whole Summit is being jeopardized. Our hold card is to play\nmore with the Chinese.\nK:\nI have talked to him sternly twice last week. I sent a message\nto Bahr. They requested a letter from you recommending ratification\nof the treaties. I was against it and sent a message saying under the\ncircumstances since this is the second time Soviet arms are engaged\nin an offensive we are reassessing the whole policy. He will run\nto the Soviet Ambassador\nSANITIZED peR HR 7/7/05\nP:\nI wonder if I shouldn't send a message to Brezhnev.\nK:\nThe danger is if they don't see a way out they may have to\nconfront you. They got the message and I would save this. Let me\nwork out a scenario for you.\nSANITIZED COPY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n10:45 a. m., April 9, 1972\n- 7 -\nP:\nWe both agree to go ahead under those circumstances. I\nwondered if you could maybe on a line out there have a talk with.\nget a report directly from Bunker as to how the South Vietnamese\nare fighting and how their morale is.\nK:\nIt's better by backchannel. I will do it from here.\nP:\nIn the meantime, we will keep our chins up and keep kicking\nthem in the balls. I made a decision no summit if this thing goes.\nWe have no other choices now. We can't be in a position of kiying letting\nour whole policy be hostage to a couple of summits.\nK:\nThat's the difference between us and the Democrats.\nP:\nDid anybody attack Teddy yet?\nK:\nAgnew and Goldwater.\nP:\nOkay, Henry.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDavid Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger\n11:20 April 9 [1972]\nKraslow: Good morning.\nKissinger: Good morning. You're right after the President on the\nmorning briefing.\nKraslow: I hate to bother you. I saw Max Frankel's piece this\nmorning. Are they moving south?\nKissinger: They are moving down from Hanoi.\nKraslow: When did that word come in?\nKissinger: Yesterday afternoon or morning.\nKraslow: How far down?\nKissinger: About 40 miles from the DMZ. This moves the advance\nheadquarters.\nKraslow: The rest is how far behind?\nKissinger: Not too far behind. Two regiments. They are not ready\nfor combat for ten days or so. They are coming down Route 1.\nThey generally come by rail part of the way and then by truck.\nKraslow: Is this a ten thousand man division?\nKissinger: 12000 usually.\nKraslow: When is the President going to Canada?\nKissinger: This Thursday.\nKraslow: Is the trip still on?\nKissinger: The trip will take place.\nKraslow: When are you going to Japan?\nKissinger: On Friday.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nKraslow: Has the trip been postponed? You mentioned that it might be.\nKissinger: I was just talking. I just don't know if it will be postponed.\nIt's still on.\nKraslow: If this situation deteriorates, will it affect the Summit?\nKissinger: You are out to kill me.\nKraslow: Why?\nKissinger: You are having me jeopardize\nKraslow: How can the President go to Moscow if he is being creamed\nin Vietnam?\nKissinger: If you raise it, on your own it might be worth raising.\nThis is not the contingency we anticipate.\nKraslow: It has been discussed? Will I be shot down if I said that?\nKissinger: You will get the answer that this is not something we\nanticipate.\nKraslow: You're not anticipating the situation deteriorating in South\nVietnam?\nKissinger: We won't know for several weeks.\nKraslow: Is this a going-for-broke thing?\nKissinger: Total.\nKraslow: How many troops are they going to commit to this thing?\nKissinger: Over 100, 000. They will not have any combat divisions\nleft in North Vietnam. I think they are figuring on pulling out\nfrom Laos and put them near Hanoi in another three weeks.\nKraslow: Do they have anything in Cambodia?\nKissinger: No, they moved them to South Vietnam. They have about\nfour divisions in MR-1, three divisions in MR-3, and three divisions\nin MR-2. There is another division coming down.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nKraslow: That makes thirteen.\nKissinger: There may be one in the highlands.\nKraslow: Is that II Corps?\nKissinger: Yes.\nKraslow: I took note of Max's reference to -\nKissinger: I must go. I have guests in town whom I haven't seen who\nare waiting.\nKraslow: Was Max trying to ---\nKissinger: I really have to go.\nKraslow: Thank you very much.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDavid Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger\n11:35 April 9 519721\nKraslow: Will you bear with me?\nKissinger: Barely.\nKraslow: Have we been in touch with the Soviets ?\nKissinger: I can't talk about that.\nKraslow: Can I say something on my own?\nKissinger: Can say you are surmising. I cannot talk about it. Cannot\nlet you surmise on it with my guidance.\nKraslow: Fair inference then?\nKissinger: You cannot say \"Administration sources, White House sources, 11\nor what have you.\nKraslow: I'll do it on my own.\nKissinger: If you do it that way, okay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nWilliam Buckley/Mr. Kissinger\n11:55 a.m. April 9 [1972]\nBuckley: Hello Doc.\nKissinger: Did you get my message that I sent through your brother?\nBuckley: When?\nKissinger: About four weeks ago.\nBuckley: Yes.\nKissinger: What message did he give you?\nBuckley: He told me that you told him that with me sitting in front of\nyou in Shanghai with pencil and notebook that you had nothing to\nsay.\nKissinger: You destroyed my remaining self-confidence. You had sent\nme a message according to him with diminished enthusiasm and I\nreplied with undiminished enthusiasm.\nBuckley: I understand.\nKissinger: I think on the communique we ought to talk about it some-\ntime. Whatever we did, we did in July, not in this communique.\nWhat I am calling about is what is going on in Vietnam is extremely\nserious. They are really putting it to us. Everyone of their\ncombat divisions is in South Vietnam. We cannot go to Moscow if\nwe are humiliated in Vietnam. You can disagree on the tactics, but\nthere is no doubt about the analysis of it. We are going to go for\nbroke now. We have more than doubled the B-52s out there, and\nare adding more. We have increased tactical air by 30%. We are\nnot doing it in a modest way.\nBuckley: Can you hold the line with air power?\nKissinger: With air power and naval power. We now have 18 destroyers.\nIf we are going to lose, we have to lose in a way in which it is clear\nthat we have made an overwhelming effort. But, we don't intend to\nlose. Whatever the disagreements of the Conservatives, we need\nan attack on the Liberals.\nBuckley: How bad have they been in the last couple of days?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nKissinger: Well, Kennedy made one of his speeches. What we are going\nto do will start today, and will step up. We need somebody left to\nsay surrender is the only thing left. In addition to this I believe that\nif the Conservatives came to bat and showed strength in the country,\nit would show in the attitudes of the President in the months and even\nyears to come.\nBuckley: How do you handle the argument that Vietnamization is a failure?\nKissinger: It is a tribute to Vietnamization because they are throwing\neverything into the pot. They didn't think they could wait the year\nuntil Vietnamization was completed. They're asking us to install\na communist government for them. The South Vietnamèse airplanes\ncannot reach North Vietnam.\nBuckley: Whose fault is that?\nKissinger: Ours. And they are equipped by the most modern Soviet\nequipment.\nBuckley: So can the question be publicly raised why?\nKissinger: Why don't you raise it after the battle is over? If the\nConservatives can concentrate on those who are 100% off rather\nthan criticizing the President when he is 20% off. If we lose in\nVietnam and as a result McGovern comes in there is nothing left\nto salvage. Hitler nearly won with a base of 60 million people\nand a GNP only a fraction of ours. You give the Soviets Hitler's\nvictories and we're dead.\nBuckley: If the phase we are discussing will reach the crisis next week.\nKissinger: That is when it will start. The more support we get, the\nmore violent we can be. We are saving American honor.\nBuckley: Have you spoken to my brother?\nKissinger: No.\nBuckley: Do you want me to?\nKissinger: Yes. I will talk to him too. Yes, it would be helpful.\nI have talked to Reagan and Goldwater and others. Goldwater spoke\nlast night at the Bridiron Club. He said his political views were\nwell known. He's far to the right of President Nixon and just to the\nleft of Vice President Nixon.\nBuckley: That's a good phrase.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nKissinger: When will I see you again? Hope to see you soon.\nBuckley: Fine, good-bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer\n12:10 p. m., April 9, 1972\nK:\nI am calling because the President wants those airplanes in\nDanang.\nM:\nWe will put them in there.\nK:\nHow about an additional squadron in Thailand.\n?\nM:\nI think we can do it. I put one in Kuwait and two in Luborne (phon.)\nI am going to try to shift some aircraft around to make more space\nand, secondly, work out a way to shift tankers in Thailand around -- - -\nmaybe to Clark, and put more B-52's in there.\nK:\nExcellent.\nM:\nI might get resistance, but I will do it.\nK:\nIf you get XXXXX If you get resistance, come to me and I will\nget a Presidential order.\nM:\nI have several things I want to talk to you about tomorrow.\nheat\nK:\nI will see you after the WSAG. We will be getting/kix starting\ntomorrow.\nM:\nHeat is heat. We have to capitalize on it.\nK:\nWe have 3-4 weeks of massive things we can do.\nM:\nGood. I am on top of it.\nK:\nGood.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer\n3:35 p.m., April 9, 1972\nK:\nTom, you let me know when you have word.\nM:\nThey fired 3 missiles at them. I don't know the results. This\nis from an intercept. But there is activity up there. As soon as I\nfind out I will let you know.\nK:\nAs soon as they are clear of the area. We have iron-hand with\nthem?\nM:\nYes; I will let you know as soon as I find out.\nAdmiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger\n4:23 p. m., April 9, 1972\nM:\nThe first telephone report is all B-52's are clear. Second,\nwe are checking on support aircraft. There was an intercept from\nHanoi claiming they shot down one. I don't know if it was a B-52\nor another aircraft. It's likely they didn't do it anyway. They are\nshooting through clouds. I am now checking on Iron-hand.\nK:\nBut the B-52's are clear?\nM:\nYes.\nK:\nExcellent.\nM:\nThere was very little Mig activity and only 3 missiles. I\nwill trace this report, but the B-52's are out. I will call you as soon\nas I hear.\nK:\nGood.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n4:40 p. m., April 9, 1972\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nI hope you are getting your parents around a little.\nK:\nI'm showing them the Chinese films now. But I wanted to\ncall you and tell you the attack is x completed and all planes returned.\nP:\nThey went at night?\nK:\nEarly in the morning.\nP:\nThats 12?\nK:\nYes and none lost.\nP:\nI guess there is no account wxxxxxxxxx of damage.\nK:\nNot yet. It was heavily overcast.\nP:\nThey would have hit targets. It was the right decision.\nK:\nNo question.\nP:\nTo use your term, you have to put all the chips in the pot.\nIt's table stakes now and we are going to play that way. Have you\ngiven more thought to the speech thing?\nK:\nYes. I'm 50-50.\nP:\nWhy?\nK:\nBecause it is table stakes. All arguments you weight against\nit you can weight for it. Let's put it on the front page. If we gain,\nwe gain. If we lose, we are no worse off.\nP:\nWe will meet in the morning and talk about the thing.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAdmiral Moorer /Mr. Kissinger\n5:20 p.m. April 9 C1972T\nMoorer: I've got our people listening in to see what the other side is\nsaying about it.\nKissinger: What are they saying?\nMoorer: Just general -- tactical stuff, missiles and airplanes.\nKissinger: I told the President it was a good job.\nMoorer: It was a good job. I have our people looking into the revetments,\nand I'm going to send a message ordering the Marine go tomorrow.\nKissinger: Good job; terrific.\nMoorer: I have got an eight inch carrier on the east coast, and I want\nto bring it around. I'll bring message to you at the meeting\ntomorrow morning.\nKissinger: Good. We'll approve it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGerard Smith\n(Secure Voice)\n4/10/72 8:25 a. m.\nS: We're meeting this evening at 7:00 and I just wanted to\ntouch base with you before talking to him. Is there any development\nin Washington I should know about?\nK: No, you must assume you will know about every development.\nI noticed in one of the last meetings with him\nwas\nprobing the Soviets as if you had to find out from them what was going on.\nS: No, he didn't have that in mind. I didn't get that impression.\nK: Butxthatxwas Be that as it may, there is no development here.\nThere has been no development since I talked to you and I have yesterday\napproved your going ahead with tabling our proposal, but it should be put\nin the context of SLBM.\nS: Its certainly will be.\nK: Not as a proposal in its own right.\nS: It will be done that way.\nK: And I want to assure you again you will be kept fully informed.\nYou can assume if they tell you something they are fishing.\nS: Your message of Saturday\nK: On What?\nS: General impression of where we stand and raised the possibility\nof\nwhether Washington\nor\nWould that be agreeable\nK: Washington what?\nS:\nK: I see. Let me check that with the President.\nS: You may want to give kinxxa me authority to make a tentative\nproposal.\nK: If you can do it on the basis that you don't know if it will be\napproved.\nS: I can do it that way or I can make it even stronger, say I\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGerard Smith\n(Secure Voide)\n4/10/72 8:25 a. m. p. 2\ndoubt it will be approved, but am making a personal inquiry.\nK: Why don't you do that?\nS: The Soviets got the impression from the press conference\njust after we got here\nK: On SLBM?\nS: Yes.\nK: That is not correct.\nS: May I say I personally checked with the President and that\nis not correct?\nK: You may definitely tell him that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n10:10 a.m. - 4/10/72\nD:\nThank you very much for yesterday's interesting day with Henry\nKissinger.\nK:\nYou were so sweet. My friends enjoyed meeting you.\nD:\nMy wife liked your mother very much. Henry, I was going over\nwith Vorontsov\nFirst, we agree with your change on the\n19th of April.\nso all of them may come as mentioned by\nyour assistant. Second, our lend-lease people are coming in 2\ndays. We agree with this environment thing by Japan and now\nI think everything is moving except Mr. D\n.\nK:\nWell, he isn't back from vacation. He has instructions to contact\nyou as soon as he gets back within the next day or two.\nD:\nI think everything is moving except what I discussed with you\nyesterday.\nabout the 19th of April as you proposed.\nSo you may send the people.\nK:\nLet's just hope that all of this will work out properly.\nD:\nI really hope so.\nK:\nI talked to the President this morning and he says what I told\nyou yesterday is exactly his view.\nD:\nWhat he has in mind.\nK:\nYes, you have a pretty good idea\nI talk to you literally.\nD:\nI do understand it - you express the thoughts of the President.\nK:\nBut this is a very constructive\nYou know we are thinking\nof a lot of other things right now.\nLet's keep that momentum\nup.\nD:\nI understand. What about\nWednesday or Thursday.\nK:\nYou prefer Wednesday. I will let you know by this evening.\nD:\nAnd about my wife and Mrs. Nixon.\nK:\nI will let you know by tomorrow.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nB. Walters/Kissinger\n1 :35 a.m. - 4/10/72\nK:\nBarbara, how are you?\nW:\nFine. I'm at my desk here at Radio City. I was beginning to think\nI had done something to you I haven't heard from you in so long.\nI saw a picture of you and Nancy at the opening of the \"Godfather\".\nIt looked like she was wearing one of those jade things around her\nneck.\nK:\nNo, it wasn't.\nW:\nI knew she didn't want any gifts.\nK:\nWell, she is changing her mind.\nKarsh\nW:\nI called you about something = have you heard of an extremely\ngood photographer named Kosh (?) of Ottawa. He is a good friend\nof ours. He has photographed the President and would like to\nphotograph you.\nK:\nWhen?\nW:\nWhenever you would like.\nK:\nSure.\nW:\nHe said he would do whenever and wherever you would like. He\nis rather shy and said he didn't want to bother you unless you would\ndo it.\nK:\nWell, would you have him call my office?\nW:\nSure. I wondered whether you would be interested. I was in\nWashington just one day.\nK:\nYou didn't call me.\nW:\nWell, I was there for the meeting with the Congressional wives.\nK:\nWill you let me know when you come again?\nW:\nI will. Tell me - what do you think - I want to go back there and\ndo a story on women and education. Do you think it's favorable?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nK:\nYes, it is easing all the time.\nW:\nI wrote to Mr. Maw - is that his name?\nK:\nYes, but I would go through the Embassy.\nW:\nI just got a letter from Hugh Sidey. He talked about his impres-\nsions. It all seems so close to us now. It was so impossible at\nthe time. I have no idea when I will be in Washington but I will\nlet you know when I see you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n12:26 p.m. - 4/10/72\nK:\nAnatol, one thing the President did ask me to tell you in answer\nto what it is that can be completely done. Our view is whatever\nis completely done must be done quietly. Any public pressure\non us can only make matters worse. We don't want a huge\npropaganda campaign started. One way we judge the seriousness\nis if they have something to say, say it on the 24th.\nD:\nThey come\nK:\nI don't see any chance in talking to them if they make a public\nproposal.\nD:\nI understand your point.\nK:\nNo, this is in a friendly spirit as to waht can be done. We want\nto find something you can reasonably say to them.\nD:\nI understand. And secondly can I receive word from you\non another matter about the American correspondents. We are\nprepared to accept up to 100 correspondents.\nK:\nIncluding television.\nD:\nThey didn't say anything about that. They just said to tell Dr.\nKissinger we are prepared to receive 100 correspondents. So\nperhaps I have to check back with them.\nK:\nGood. Check and I will tell Chapin.\nD:\nThank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHugh Sidey/Kissinger\n4:35 p.m. - 4/10/72\nS:\nHi, listen I got to put together a piece before tomorrow evening\non Vietnam but more looking over toward Russia.\nK:\nLook how late can I talk to you?\nS:\nI got to leave to go out of town tomorrow afternoon.\nK:\nHow late can I call you?\nS:\nI have a Board of Trustees meeting tonight. I'll leave the office\nabout 6:30.\nK:\nI will do my best to catch you before then otherwise I will call\nyou in the morning.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHenry Brandon/Kissinger\n4:55 p.m. - 4/10/72\nB:\nHi, Henry. I did send you a little note - did you get it ?\nK:\nI got it but I didn't have a chance to look at it yet. In the next\nfew days.\nB:\nI wondered if we could get together. You're going away again\nand I am a bit stuck.\nK:\nLet me call you tomorrow morning.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n5:25 p.m. - 4/10/72\nP:\nHenry, Mrs. Nixon is available now if you would like to come\nover and spend a little time with her. Do you have time now?\nK:\nI have some prisoners wives coming in, but I could come over\nand have them wait 15 minutes.\nP:\nAll right. Why don't you drop over now. How long will the wives\ntake?\nK:\nAbout 45 minutes to an hour.\nP:\nOK, why don't you drop over now.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President. I'll be right over.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretaryLaird\n(Secure Voice)\n4/11/72 8:18am\nL: I think you will find things here are in good shape -- ARVN\nin MR-1. They are in a good posture. I wanted to check a couple of things wit\nyou. Haven't been able to get dewnx a drone in on that Chinese truck park\nK: No, what we want to get is those three around Hanoi.\nL: We will try to get some info on that. The last pictures of\nthe Chimse truck park we have were taken in August.\nK: That we were going to throw in as a bonus. We want the three\nthey are yelling about around Hanoi. You were the one who was talking\nabout that one.\nL: I just don't want to insure there are trucks there. You understood\nthat.\nK: I understood nothing.\nL:\nweather today in Hanoi or we will have gotten\nreconnaissance on that today. But we will as soon as possible. On the B-52s\nwe have got that planned. It will be ready to go tomorrow afternonn. It will\nprobably be that airfield.\nK: Can you give us a choise between that target and the airfield?\nL: We will have a choice on that. As far as the number of planes,\nI think the priority should still be in the battlefield. And I wouldn't go over 18.\nK: Hit something more lucrative.\nL: The most lucrative according to Abrams and McCain are\nin the battlefield area.\nK: They go through that all the time. They have lost us the war\nL: They have not lost us the war.\nK: For years they have been screaming about lack of restraint.\nNow we take the reins off and to get them to fly up north is like pulling teeth.\nL: No, they will fly up north. We are doing these other strikes\nfor political purposes, not for military purposes.\nK: And showing the Russians we will come up north.\nL: We'll go there. The other area we have got to look at has to\ndo with SALT. I would like to send a memo over today. I think this is a\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Laird\n(Secure Voice)\n4/11/72 8:18 m. p. 2\ncritical stage going on in SALT. Have you been watching it closely?\nK: Yes.\nL: I believe the\nof the Fort Myer site rather than\nthe Maelstrom site.\nK: I would be glad to have the recommendation.\nL: May I send it over today?\nK: Yes.\nL: I think we are at a crucial point now. Have you had a briefing\nyet?\nK: Yes.\nL: Did you have any problems with it?\nK: No, it was very good, except I agree with you the priority\nmust be in the battle area, but we also have to give a folt to the North.\nL: I understand and we will do that Wednesday. I understand\nfrom befax the briefer that there is some criticism of having to send air sexexx\ncover and air diversion with the B-52s.\nK: No, I WO uldn't intervene in that; it's none of my business.\nL: And on Wednesday we will also have to divert between\nand\nsorties. They were firing 24 SAMs plus we anticipated having\nsome MIGs up there.\nK: There's not the slightest question about that. We would like\nwith tac air to make one strike over the weekend further north. That's why we\nwere looking for truck parks.\nL: We will find something, but I wanted to tell we you we don't have\nverification of trucks together. We want to get that verified before don't we?\nK: Absolutely. Can we send another dro ne?\nL: The trouble is they can't recover it. They have got to see the\ndrones to recover them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Connally\n4/11/72 9:15 a. m.\nK: I wanted you to know you are being watched. You thought\nyou had me fully absorved in Vietnam.\nC: That's right I did. But you' re a slippery fellow.\nK: On Vietnam I would like to find a half hour today\nto bring you up to date on what's going on.\nC: All right sir.\nK: Can my office call you?\nC: I'll be over there from 3:30 to 5:00. So why don't I just\ncheck with your office?\nK: It might be better to do it before 3:30.\nC: Well, I've got lunch with the price commission. Could\ndo it just before or just after lunch at 1:00.\nK: Can you hold for a minute?\nC: Sure.\nK:\nRight after lunch would be good. 2:30.\nC; Good.\nK: Secondly, Bob MacNamara wrote me a letter of which he\nsent you a copy. He also called me and suggested a phone call to\nPassman might spring it loose. I don't want to do it without checking\nwith you.\nC: You can call him; he feels strongly about it. He said he wouldn't\ndo anything without checking with me. But there's no harm in your talking to\nhim.\nK: I will see whether I can use the Vice President's name, then\nwill tell Passman he should work out the details with you. Want some\nWhite House backing behind it but want to make sure it doesn't run\nacross you.\nC: No, I laid it on the line to him. He is extremely difficult\non the subject, and withsome justification, but he said he won't turn it\ndown. He won't hurt us, but he will probably have a counter-proposal.\nK: Let me see whether I can light a little fire under him.\nC: Goo\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHaldeman/President/Kissinger\n10:50 a.m. - 4/11/72\nK:\nMr. President.\nH:\nThis is Bob. I'm in the President's office. I was thinking of a\nstopping point on the way to Russia. I was wondering whether Austria\nis a possibility and going to Salzberg, not Vienna. Spending two\nnights as originally planned to do which would destroy the idea of\na rest stopover.\nK:\nWell, if he wants to do that. I have no great objection to that.\nH:\nHe is just wondering if that isn't better than going to Switzerland.\n(At this point, the President came on.)\nP:\nHello.\nK:\nHello, Mr. President.\nP:\nI db n't like the feeling of a Spanish base and I didn't like the feeling\nof the Azores. Switzerland poses a problem which you are aware of.\nLet me say this for Austria. I have always had a very close relation-\nship with Austria. The Ambassador is a good friend of mine and also\nit is a country which is not allied to us or the Russians and rather\nthan going to Vienna, going to Salzberg which is a lovely town.\nK:\nAnd the weather will be nice too. Can we land there?\nP:\nWe landed there in a constellation last time. And I don't mind doing\nthe Austrian thing. What's an hour's conversation during the day.\nK:\nI share your concern about Switzerland. And if you go there just over\nnight you are going to have a tremendous operations there for one\nnight's rest and if you go for two nights it looks like a vacation so I\nthink Austria.\nP:\nYou don't mind our exploring it.\nK:\nNo.\nP:\nThis Ambassador Hans Brun (?) is a helluva nice guy. I know him\nextremely well. I got to know him at the\nrefugee period.\nK:\nAnd they certainly have the facilities there, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nP:\nThey do and the people will be friendly - that's another thing. We\nhave no problem there of unfriendly people. They love Americans\nin Austria.\nK:\nI think if you are willing to see them\nP:\nRight. I think we should see them, but only have an hour's meeting.\nK:\nA courtesy call.\nP:\nRight, a courtesy call. We do need the two nights.\nK:\nI think, Mr. President, that is a good idea.\nP:\nI will have Bob check that out then. And do you want to check it\nwith Gruber?\nK:\nGruber?\nP:\nYes.\nK:\nI could do it easily enough or my office could do it quickly. I will\nget you an answer by tomorrow. I am sure they will be enthusiastic.\nP:\nFine, you go forward with Gruber.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHugh Sidey/Kissinger\n4/11/72 - 11:52 a. m.\nK:\nHi, Hugh.\nS:\nListen, tell me just briefly. I won't take much time. What is\nyour strategy here? You are operating on several tracks at\nonce.\nK:\nWell, I think because the Russians are operating on several tracks\nat once. This is the second time in 4 months that we are confronting\nan offensive which is made possible by massive infusions of Soviet\narms. This is off-the-record. Even if the Soviets did not know\nthe exact time of the offensive they know what is going on. The same\nthing\nIndia/Pakistan.\nS:\nI see.\nK:\nTo do this before the Summit shows that they are always tempted.\nOn the one hand we are always trying to advance on a braod front\nwith them and on the other hand they back up on it and change\nthings around.\nS:\nWhat?\nK:\nWhat we are trying to do is to bring on a qualified change. If you\nlook at the history of Soviet-American relations whenever you get\nto a point where you think you will get some real progress, we\nfind they are doing something that just picks up some tactical\nadvantage. Of course, we don't ask them to cut off their aid to\nNorth Vietnam, but certainly\nIn the case of India/Pakistan\nit was clearly the\nattack.\nS:\nI see your point.\nK:\nWe didn't give the South Vietnamese any airplanes that could reach\nany distance in North Vietnam.\nS:\nBut you are still going to go ahead and work out the summit?\nK:\nYes, but this is one of the issues we have to address there.\nS:\nWhat about the B\n.\nWill he convey the same?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nK:\nWell, he is a technician.\nS:\nHave you been in contact with Dobrynin?\nK:\nI don't want to go into that.\nS:\nNormal contact?\nK:\nWell, he cannot have failed to get the message.\nS:\nI think this thing has worked pretty well this time.\nlow visibility.\nThe bombing has gone on well as near as I can tell.\nK:\nThat is the way it looks now. The additional\nin Military\nRegion I and the fact that our airplanes are designed to only fight\nover the desert. I am joking, Hugh.\nS:\nI know it.\nK:\nThen why don't you laugh. They are not doing it with massive\nAmerican air support, they are doing it pretty much.\nS:\nOur guys were pretty much impressed. Our guys from the field\nhad some good reports on them. Tell me a little about the\nPresident. He's right at the center of it?\nK:\nYes, but he is very calm. He's convinced it's a test of Vietnamization.\nThe other day somebody said to him, \"This is going to go now one\nway or the other. \" He said, 'No, it's only going to go one way. \"\nS:\nI see.\nK:\nThat may be bravado, but any way.\nS:\nI think it looks pretty good. How long are we going to be in it?\nK:\nProbably months.\nS:\nWhat is your routine, has it changed at all?\nK:\nTwo differences. I get a JCS briefing at 15 to 8 every morning\nand a WSAG meeting everyday at 10.\nS:\nWhat about at night?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nK:\nWell, we talk about 11 o'clock at night.\nS:\nWhere is that done?\nK:\nAlmost always on the telephone. This is straight military -\nI find out if there have been any attacks, what the weather is, etc.\nS:\nBut he decides on the overall decisions about dispatching ships.\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nS:\nThen at 11 o'clock you have a\nK:\nThis is it: At 7:45 is the JCS Briefing; then I join the White House\nStaff meeting; then at 9:00 I go over that situation when he comes\nin his office. Ususally while I am with him he will call Laird\nand Moorer on the telephone just to check this over; then he gives\nme instructions on the directions he wants to go. Then I go to the\nWSAGmeeting at 10 o'clock where we set the general strategy.\nThen I tell him the recommendations of the WSAG group and see\nwhat he wants, then by noon the decisions are made. It works\nout well.\nS:\nThat human touch. I gather it's most favorable. He has been\nworking hard?\nK:\nHe has been very calm, very determined.\nS:\nBut going over all details.\nK:\nOf course. He doesn't want to know which regiment is where\nbecause he doesn't feel it is a Presidential decision.\nS:\nFine, Henry, I think he will come out of this better than he started\nbecause if they hold you will have proven something.\nK:\nWe think if it had to happen it was just as well it came now.\nS:\nHe knew it was coming?\nK:\nOh sure.\nS:\nGood, Henry. Are you going to Japan?\nK:\nNo, I am not. It's not that there is a crisis; there really isn't\na crisis. It's just that when things are hanging in balance I don't\nwant to be sitting in Japan\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 4 -\nS:\nYou know, Henry, I want to say I have never seen things handled\nto smoothly and I admire this. It seems to me the thing is\nworking. A lot of people may disagree with policy but that is\nanother argument. The Government is better than I have ever seen\nit.\nK:\nThank you, Hugh.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSec. Rush/Kissinger\n1:05 p.m. - 4/11/72\nK:\nKen, I understand the General who sat in the back went to Laird\nand said I attacked the courage of the Air Force and Pursley called\nHaig and said we are making aspersions on the Air Force. That's\nnot true.\nR:\nThat's not true at all. That's absolutely.\nK:\nI am being asked every day by the President about strikes in the\nnorth. The offensive started May 30 and in 9 days it is awfully\nhard to explain to the President who has leveled\nR:\nThat General must be an ass.\nK:\nI don't want him there any more.\nR:\nYour right. This is absolutely ridiculous.\nK:\nWould you explain to Laird this did not happen.\nR:\nI certainly will.\nK:\nIt is true I am trying to goose the Air Force into doing what the\nPresident wants.\nR:\nWhat you said is what the President wants.\nK:\nWe want the major effort to be those but every once in a while we\nwant another one.\nR:\nThat's the point. There was no ambiguity about that. I will tell\nyou that man.\nK:\nAnd I don't want that Air Force Major General either. Can't we\nget Moorer or if Moorer can't come somebody else.\nR:\nMoorer had to testify this morning. I think we want someone from\nthe Joint Chiefs.\nK:\nThat's fine. Whoever you think can be helpful. Certainly somebody's\ngoing to leak that I brutalized the Air Force.\nR:\nI will see he isn't there.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nK:\nAnd on this thing tomorrow, I will get Haig to talk to somebody\non the secure line.\nR:\nI told Mel about the things we want.\nK:\nAre they going to be done?\nR:\nMel has just gone to the Hill and will be gone all afternoon. I also\ntold him Al was going out to handle the message. I put it on a\npolitical basis and he said 'Should a military man carry this message?\"\nK:\nWell, Al is going. Al is the man next to me who the President\ntrusts more here.\nR:\nYou see I couldn't tell Mel the real reason for his going.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n2:45 p.m. - 4/11/72\nP:\nHenry, did your meeting go all right at the WSAG today?\nK:\nVery well.\nP:\nIs there anything new today?\nK:\nWell, it's night there now. One thing I would like to suggest\nMr. President, I don't think the Air Force has yet gotten the message\nof the need to do offensive operations against the north. They say\nthe weather is bad. Well, goddamn it, Dong Hoi hasn't moved.\nThey know where the supply depots are.\nP:\nWhat do you think it is - the loss of planes?\nK:\nHardly, I think that Laird and Abrams want to prove that Vietnamization\nhas succeeded. But it isn't enough to lick them in South Vietnam.\nP:\nthe flight isn't going off?\nK:\nThey must put up some tactical air support there and work over some\nof these supply dumps.\nP:\nImmediately above the DMZ?\nK:\nIn the area just north of the DMZ. They have all the authorities,\nMr. President but they aren't using them.\nP:\nWhat do you suggest?\nK:\nI recommend we send Haig out on Saturday.\nP:\nWhy not Friday?\nK:\nWe will be in Canada. I think he should be here while we are gone.\nP:\nWell, late Friday night.\nK:\nOne thing, Laird will object.\nP:\nWell, I don't give a damn about Laird.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nK:\nWe can work over the south.\nP:\nBut now with a little public opinion, we can work the north over.\nDoes Haig agree?\nK:\nCompletely and Rush does too.\nP:\nCan I suggest Haig ought to go so I can have a first hand.\nK:\nYou may get a complaint from Laird that I have given you all the\norders for these guys Where do they think they are going to fight\ntheir wars?\nP:\nOne other point - how about having the Navy move further up that\nroad?\nK:\nThat's good.\nP:\nAnd how about the cruisers going up the road another 75 miles?\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nP:\nCan this order be given. It's got to be given.\nK:\nIt will be given immediately. I talked to John Connally and he is\nin complete agreement.\nP:\nYes. With regard to Mansfield and Scott I think I will let you do a\nlittle talking. I haven't given any thought on what they should do to\nhandle themselves. Have they been briefed?\nK:\nThey have been briefed.\nP:\nWhat line shall I take with them?\nK:\nTo keep off of Vietnam all together and they should show as much\nbipartisan support for your policy as they can.\nP:\nWhat about their attitude toward the Russians? Just have Mansfield\nberber off about the Russians being no threat?\nK:\nYes, tell him that they should say terrific (?) things.\nP:\nFine, Henry. Get that fLEET up there and on the air thing,\nthe argument is stated that we will lose pilots, that's some argument,\nbut on the other hand.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nWalt Rostow\n4/11/72 3:00pm\nR: In the wake of Presidenty Nixon's statement yesterday which seemed\na little angled toward the Russians I wanted to be sure you were aware of a\nconversation on the eve of the October 31, 1968 bombing cessation.\nK: Which was what.\nR: Before he went ahead he sent a personal message which had these\nkey paragraphs in it. [reads]\ndirect quote from President\nJohnson to Kosygin. Now Kosygin came back in a turnaround that was the fastest\nwe ever had. That was midnight of the 27th and by 2:00pm the next day Dobrynin\nwas in my office. What he said was progress made at the meetings in Paris\nhad been noted with satisfaction in Moscow\n[reads]\nThe only point here I have no idea what's being exchanged between you and\nthe Russians now. But I thought it might be useful for you to know President\nJohnson laid it out to the Russians aside from\nand wanted to\nmake sure any actions he took would not be misunderstood by the Russians.\nK: This is extremely helpful and I appreciate it.\nR: Do you want the texts?\nK: Yes, could you get them up to me?\nR: Yes, I will.\nK: We all have to go through this once in office.\nR: And I think you are coming out on the right side. One more thing\nHenry, if they come out well, it would be good for the President to say 'these\nfellows have done well,' then recall everything else they have done, say 'these\npeople have built a nation, they have proved that they mean it and\nI\nshow a little pride in being associated with them.\nK: Right Walt, thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nWilliam Downey/Kissinger\n4:10 p.m. - 4/11/72\nD:\nMr. Kissinger, Bill Downey.\nK:\nHow are you?\nD:\nFine. Thank you for calling. I was calling because it occured to\nme that Senator Mansfield and Senator Scott are going to be visiting\nChina this next week.\nK:\nWe are seeing them this afternoon and we will urge them to raise\nthis issue.\nD:\nGood. It would be consistent if they did raise it, but I didn't want\nto contact them unless you agreed.\nK:\nNo, I am seeing them this afternoon and so is the President. We\nwill mention it to them, but you are free to contact them if you wish.\nD:\nNo, better it come from your end.\nK:\nYou can be absolutely sure it will be done and when I get any\ninformation I will be sure to let you know.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAdmiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger\n7:00 p.m.\n4/11/72 Secure Phone\nADM: We asked them to take every precaution. We haven't gotten\nany bleat out of the first attack.\nHAK: Wonderful.\nADM: Can I hlep give the brief tomorrow.\nHAK: No, President wants to have it done informally.\nADM: I have been tied up all day--they kept me at the House\nwith the Foreign Committee. I was just offering to help tomorrow.\nOne other thing: There is no question in Congress that the attitude\nand support for the President is significantly different than Cambodia\nand Lan Pnom and the prisoner raid.\nHAK: Well, we have to take advantage of it - hit hard now so that\nthey won't want to continue the war.\nADM: We have to take action so that the Russians don't supply\nthem. I told you about the submarines that are surfacing--they\nwill shake them up.\nHAK: Good and you are going to look for targets for the tactical\nair north of the 19 - Did you get those drones (?) back.\nADM: We expect it in on compass link I don't know what the\ncondition of the film was though.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/President\n4/11/72 7:30 p.m.\nRN:\nAre you at dinner?\nHAK: No, I am going out.\nRN: Mrs. Nixon had a nice talk with Dobrynin. He said he wanted\nto give her a figt and was very courteous Dobrynin squeezed her\nhand and said\nHAK:\nShe mentioned Vietnam\nRN: Oh yes, you know how my wife is she's real good with that,\nright on the nose. Did you get Laird off his ass?\nHAK: We are going to hit two or three targets with B-52's.\nRN: We are sending Haig, right?\nHAK: I would like him to stay until Saturday.\nRN: Okay. The important thing is a message needs to get out time\nis wasting. Harold Hammer from Los Angeles said \"I know the\nRussians we must put it to them we will get away with it now\".\nConnally is favorable in terms of a blockade this week.\nHAK: Moorer has put subs out and they will surface-- it will be\nmost disconcerting to have a sub emerge beside their carriers.\nRN: This may not be the time for a blockade but some time it might\nbe like two weeks before elections we can blockade--\nHAK: Maybe earlier\nRN:- Well, if the thing drags out that long. Your conversation\nwith Max Frankel was interesting. Nobody has already done\nthis before.\nHAK: No one has called it this way before. I favor this occasional\nerratic moves-. They are afraid we are coming after them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Mr. Kissinger\nPage 2 4/11/72 7:30 p.m.\nRN: In the STAR, these stories on the tanks that were knocked\nout by 52's.\nHAK: There is no way a B-52 could knock out a tank except by\naccident. 4/5 of the tanks were knocked out by the South Vietnamese.\nRN: This is moot. The question is\nwe are going to kick the\nshit out of them no matter what the cost.\nHAK? And we can save the honor of the military establishment\nand our people in this country. You don't want Moorer at the\nbrief tomorrow.\nRN: No. If I have Laird, I have to have Roger s. You will do\nbetter without him. We need a hard sell. Do it briefly--30 minutes.\nRogerts will be protesting on the negotiations.\nHAK: Absolutely not Rogers and not Laird\nRN: Is Moorer going to carry out the orders to move naval ships\nwithin five miles of Hanoi. - they should hit Saipan or Hanoi--\nHAK: Yes.\nHappleng\nRN: Regarding air strikes we should use tac air.\nHAK: When the weather is clear, we will hit with B 52 stomorrow\nand Thursday morning Porter will make a statement, so both will\nbe in the same news. Then, by that time the weather will be clear.\nRN: Do you think.\nHAK: It must clear by then.\nRN: When it does, it will stay than. Connally's point is that right now\nyou have got opinions with you--hit now and later it might change.\nHAK: I agree. We have to sit on top bf them.\nRN: Have you heard from State.\nHAK: Not a word--they are thinking if we lose, they will hang me.\nThey are coming to the meetings at WSAG in good shape and doing\ngood work.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Mr. Kissinger\nPage 3\nRN: Well, you are SO ftgloving it with Dobrynin. Mansfield and\nScott are seeing the Chinese and that is good. In the meantime\ntet's punish them. I told Haldeman, don't show me another\npoll. I don't care right now.\nHAK: You will go out of sight in the polls when you finish this.\nRN: The ships will go up, the planes will hit and they will follow\nmy suggest that in any area in the B-3 front to go after and hit\nthem\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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