Ask the Scholar

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    "ocrText": "3\nPres: I wrote a memorandum to you. I aaid if you put them in South Vietnam\njust remove some of those god damned support forces that make up the ,000.\nWe've got to get them out of there anyway. Don't play games.\nHAK: That's what I think. I agree. And Laird agrees.\nPres: Well I see no reason be sure he follows up, that's the only thing.\nHAK: We're going to move those 3 squadrons on Monday. They've been put\non the alert already. I think we've got one more big attack coming.\nOn Hue. But we've got intelligence reports, for example, where they say\nthey are having trouble with their logistics and they have trouble getting\ndefensive positions. I consider that it is not a sign of great strength on\ntheir part that after they took DakT 0 they still haven't\nattacked\nKontum. You and I know they can take Kontum any time they want to.\nAnd that after this total rout in Quang Tri they still haven't launched the\nattack on Hue.\nPres: Well it seems to me that this would be all the more reason - that\nthis landing operation worked. Can't Abrams do something more like this.\nThe psychological effect in this country is enormous. It must be something\nin Vietnam. Do one other thing to the PIO people I mentioned to Haig.\nGet some sort of a story out of Vietnam, not on the morale of Thieu, but\non the morale of the South Vietnamese forces and people of my announcement.\nHAK: Absolutely.\nPres: Has that been done?\nHAK: I have to check.\nPres: Well, it's not been in the papers in any event. That's something\nthat's very important. Plant some CIA stories. Anything, you know,\nto say that\nit had an electric effect on the\nSouth\nVietnamese\nforces. You've got to get some emotional psychology\ngoing in that direction.\nHAK: Right.\nPres: Now to another subject. What are these 12 Soviet merchant men\nthat are supposed to be on their way.\nHAK: There's absolutely no confirmation of this.\nPres: It plays high up in the Times.\nHAK: The Times is looking for trouble. It is inconceivable to me that they"
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