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Winston Lord/Mr. Kissinger
9:30 am, October 14, 1972
K:
Win?
L:
Yes, sir.
K:
I might have an up to date copy first of all I insist that every
copy of these documents are numbered and that somebody keep
control.
L:
Right.
K:
Well, but here's Dick Camþbell handing out copies to ;me as if,
you know, as if it were a visiting card.
L:
There were three copies done over-night and put into my safe
and just told them by phone that you should have it if you asked
for it this morning, I didn't get a chance to number them.
K:
Okay, well that's all right.
L:
The rest are in my safe.
K:
But what I need is--the only way that I can live through this
stage is that I can keep drilling the stuff into mk head before
I go there. I'm not just a talking machine.
L:
Right.
K:
Well, I don't have any copy that has the three changes that you
gave them on Thursday.
L:
Yes, sir, I'm going to code that in. I haven't just done that yet.
K:
Yes, but could you just as soon as you get in one copy I need
two things, one copy with all the changes that we have given
them of a substantive nature, the three, and the two we gave
them yesterday. That makes four. And another copy that has
all the nit picks on it.
L:
A separate copy.
K:
Right.
L:
And the differences that I left behind.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telcon
Winston Lord/Mr. Kissinger
- -2-
9:30 am, October 14, 1972
K:
Plus the Sullivan nit picks
L:
Which we went ahead.
K:
Yeah.
L:
Fine.
K:
Bkut, they should be in different colors so that I--
L:
I understand.
K:
Beacause otherwise we'll never make it.
L:
Right.
K:
I want to change now one of the insertions we gave them but I
am trying to find what the God damned one was. I think the
easiest way to express this thing of control, rather than say
control, administrative control including foreign relations is
to say "pending the political settlement, the two parties will continue
to exercise their functions in the areas they control". Then you
don't get into the question of what these functions are--
L:
I don't see much of your mention foreign relations.
K:
Right.
L:
Well, I'm coming right in and I will get it up to you, it won't
take long at all.
K:
That's fine.
L:
Right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger
9:52 am, October 14, 1972
S:
Hello.
K:
Hello, Bill, two things, I just wanted to check with you- you are
working on this economic thing?
S:
Correct. And I've got the multilateral furnishings already here,
K:
And, then some bilateral- if ,you could get some idea of what
a bilateral agreement, you know, for a commission would like.
S:
For a commission, yeah.
K:
For a joint commission. The second thing is--
S:
Henry, let me ask on that--I'm very much an expert on that,
can I discuss that with anybody else.
K:
Oh, I'd rather not
S:
Okay, then mine will have to be fairly amateurish, I
wouldn' but I'll take a crack at it.
K:
Good. Second, we've just got to get you people set up over there.
S:
They ve just showed me the New York Times, but I don't know--
that sounds like an awful lot of speculation because--
K:
But, if they don't talk, there can't be any speculation. There's
no speculation coming out of here.
S:
Well, I don't know where the hell I tkxx think that--Murray
Marder's was clearly off the top of his head, it was so damened
inaccurate. There was nothing in it as far as I could see.
K:
Well, but, can't we just tell yo;ur people to shut up?
S:
Well, I do, and the Secretary has given that instruction.
Unfortunately, it's a lot of people who don't know anything whoc--
K:
Well, can't they just be ordered on the pain of getting thrown out
to shut up.
S:
I'll speak to the Secretary about it, kyes.
K:
I guarantee you, shut them up. My guys don't talk.
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TelCon
Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger
9:52, October 14, 1972
S:
I don't these things really represent--at least Murray Marder's
thing didn't represent anybody talking. The Stolz one looks a
little more like
K:
I haven't even seen the Stolz one.
S:
What he says is that State is supposed to be getting probable
responses from Hanoi as well as Saigon, with possible changes
in the American position. Where the hell all that is coming
from, I don't know.
K:
Well, I just wish that all would be quiet.
S:
Yeah. Henry, I talked with Alex last night. And this is his
situation. His mother is being operated on at 10:00 a. m.
California time which is 1:00 pm our time.
K;
Yeah.
S:
She should be out of intensive care at around 3:00 our time
The doctors have told Alex itis sort of a 50/50 chance that
she may not survive the operation.
K:
Oh.
S:
He will know, he says, by about 7:00 pm our time whether she's
stabilized. Now, if you really want him back to see him before
Monday, the only thing we can think of would be to send a plane
which would pick up his sister and she could go out and sort of
relieve him there, and he can turn around and come back on the
plane this evening, Saturday evening.
K:
Well, let's consider that, don't you think.
S:
The other way would be to stay ovser, he has missed tahe last
plane this evening, and come back on Sunday. What he proposes
to do is call me this evening after he sees whether she's stabilized,
but if you want to set the plane in motion, that has to be done prior
to that.
K:
Okay, well let me look into that first.
S:
Okay
K:
Good, thank you
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
- -3-
Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger
9:52, October 14, 1972
S:
I could start some of the stuff that you had proposed he start--
perhaps John and Al and I could get started on it and leave it
with Al and he could patch it with Alex later--
K:
Good, let's do that too.
S:
Okay, bye
K:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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DFild*
TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Kissinger
9:55 a.m. 10/15/72
AD:
Hello.
HK:
Anatol?
AD:
Yes. You called me yesterday.
HK:
I did.
AD:
Well, I just had a nice weekend with my wife.
HK:
Well, whenever they tell me you are in at car without a telephone
I know you are with Harriman.
AD:
I an started to call you back but they mentioned to me that you
had called back. It was around 11:00 of clock and I didn't want
to bother you.
HK:
Right. Two things: one, I'll get you that letter on the postpone-
ment.
AD:
Fine.
HK:
That's being written now and that's fine.
AD:
OK.
HK:
And also it looks like as if that Berlin thing is all right.
AD:
Oh, fine.
HK:
We will just confirm it. I'll let you know by noon, all right?
AD:
Good.
HK:
One urgent matter to discuss with you.
AD:
Yes.
HK:
I k discussed yesterday the settlement with the President.
AD:
On this.
HK:
No, with the Vietnamese.
AD:
Oh yes.
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2 I ,
HK:
And you know also discussed with him what they indicated the
problems were.
AD:
Yes.
HK:
For us really, the two biggest problems are not the ones they
mentioned, all of these could be settled. The two biggest prob-
lems are the units in the south. We recognize they can't pull
them all out, but if there could be at least some token move-
ment and most importantly the question of military supplies
to them. And what the President wants to do is to write a
letter to Brezhnev.
AD:
Yes.
HK:
And, which I can get to you this morning.
AD:
Um hum.
HK:
And see whether it is possible for you to express in a strictly
private way your general intentions in this respect.
AD:
I understand.
HK:
Because If that were done, then he would feel more justified to
take the steps, the formal steps that are in the agreement;
which, of course, would not be public.
AD:
I understand. This is just for his own consideration. I
could send him a
HK:
HK:
Now, you see one problem we have. We have almost no
incentive to settle it by November 7.
AD:
You have not?
HK:
No, I mean I'm honest with you.
AD:
Yes.
HK:
Because it can only make trouble and it cannot gain us a hell
of a lot. But on the other hand, it's a war that's gone on for
ten years and if the conditions are right one shouldn't say
just because there's an election one waits four more years.
And Hanoi does seem ready to settle now. So if the conditions
could If be met we would settle quickly. Also, for your informa-
tion I'm going to Salgon and I'll arrive there Tuesday. Now
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- 3 -
if it were possible to get some answer from you by If Wednesday.
I wouldn't use it there but it would K affect the confidence with
which I acts in insisting on a settlement which believe me will
not be easy for them to accept.
AD:
I understnad.
HK:
You see if it leads to a blowup in Saigon we will just have to
delay.
AD:
I understand.
HK:
We cannot have a public confrontation with Saigon during the
election ampaign.
AD:
I understand. But in this case does that mean that bith of us
will do something----
HK:
If we knew this, if we knew what your intentions are it would
really then enable us to take greater risks. It seems to me
you know, I don't want to speak for your government it seems
to me imporbable the t you would--that under conditions of
peace your incentive would certainly--would seem to me to
be less.
AD:
Yeah.
HK:
We would certainly be prepared to reduce our military aid
enoumously.
AD:
Yes, yes. Well you see, you would want the last two put in
the letter because I think with only two days left it would be
rather difficult to get all answers. The last onex you put to
me.
HK:
Schetk What's the last one?
AD:
You mentioned a reduce of our aid to North Vietnam.
HK:
I would like some indication of that, yes.
AD:
Well, I mean you may put in your letter but I am afraid that it would
be rather difficult to get by Wednesday a reply on the scope of
of questions.
HK:
What are the other questions?
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- a -
AD:
You mentioned about Hanoi in the sense that you would like
to have--about the token--and military supplies--token
movement out of south Vietnam.
HK:
Of their forces.
AD:
Yes well that is two and the third one as I understand.
HK:
No, we don't mean their supplies moved, we mean their
forces.
AD:
But on their supplies, you would like to have some kind of
understanding.
HK:
With you, yes.
AD:
Understanding with us or with them?
HK:
With you.
AD:
Then I didn't understand you. I thought you---
HK:
I don't want an understanding with them about the supplies.
AD:
I thought about supplies you remember you have an argument
or a question of----
HK:
I'll handle that.
AD:
Replacement.
HK:
We don't need you for that.
AD:
So it was replacements.
HK:
No, no I'm talking about the question of
AD:
Of token a movement of their troops.
HK:
Yes. The movement of their troops out of the country.
AD:
Token one. Yes then the have to recognize.
HK:
No, no, they just has do it. Our intelligence will pick it up.
AD:
Yes, all right. And the second about--
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- 1 -
HK:
or your supplies.
AD:
We have got to make some kind of indication to you.
HK:
That's right.
AD:
To you.
HK:
To us. And that might then enable us to make a very rapid
settlement.
AD:
Well, it's at rather difficult question but of course I will send
immediately this to the firse Secretary because it is a question
of rather serious importance as you perfectly understand.
HK:
Right.
not
AD:
Yes, I will do it. When is the letter but/ in reference to your
our talks.
HK:
The letter does not refer to our talks
AD:
Because it is government-to-government now.
HK:
No, no, what do you mean. The letter does not refer to anything
that you said to me.
AD:
Yes because.
HK:
No, you just tell him here is the problem.
AD:
OK. When you will give me this letter ?
HK:
By noon.
AD:
By noon today, yes. You will send some messenger?
HK:
You want to come over at noon?
AD:
As you like, I could come.
HK:
Why don't you come to the Map Room. And then I'll also have
the postponement letter for you.
AD:
OK.
So at noon.
HK:
Right
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TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Kissinger
10:20 a. m. 10/15/72
AD:
Yes.
HK:
Anatol?
HB:
Yes.
HK:
We're putting together that letter about the postponement.
What years do your records show that we agreed on?
AD:
Well, I don't have it here, I just will try to recall----
I remember it was, I think one year was including--
well I don't even, Henry, I am afraid--do you not have it
on your own?
HK:
Well, I'll find it, I just thought you might have it easier
than I did.
AD:
Well, I don't have it just unfortunately right now. I am afraid
I just don't---
HK:
OK, I'll
AD:
I do remember but I'm not so sure.
HK:
I'll find it.
AD:
There is, I think, a six-year--well including all the years
including one---'75, you remember.
HK:
I know '75 and '77 are years.
AD:
Yes, will I don't know, you look in your files. We don't
have any files here with me today.
HK:
Good, thank you.
AD:
Thank you very much.
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TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Joe Alsop
11:35 a.m. 10/14/72
HK:
Joe, how are you.
JA:
Hello, Henry. Are you less tired--have you recovered?
HK:
Not completely
JA:
Nancy told me you were dead tired
HK
She tells me she's arranged that we all get together tonight.
JA:
Yes indeed she has--I ordered a very quiet dinner here.
HK:
Oh good.
JA:
To save money and it is generally much quieter than a restaurant
and pleasanter in my opinion.
HK:
Good, shall we say--can we make it as late as 8:30? Or what time did
you set it ?
JA:
Well, I said 8:00, but you can--as near as you can make to 8:00
that's all right--it's just a matter of warming things up.
HK:
Good, as close to 8:00 as I can make it.
JA:
Good, good. Marvelous, lovely--see you then. I haven't asked
anyone else at all.
HK:
That's a relief.
JA:
Good, good.
HK:
See you then.
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TELCON
Secretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger
11:40
a.m.
10/14/72
SI:
Welcome home, Henry.
HK:
Thank you Jack.
SI:
You've hardly had time to sleep.
HK:
Not much.
SI:
Sorry to burden you further so soon after your very important
missions
HK:
That's all right.
SI:
I was calling just to - on this question of flank participation
of the MBFR. As you know for the past several months we have
taken the position that participations should be limited to those
whose troops were involved, and then we agreed because of the
strong pressures of the Turks and Italians and Greeks that we
would permit an observer--one observer from each flank that
would represent the three-flank nations for example in the south
--they would rotate. The Turks particularly came back hard on
that--against that. And in a less degree by the Italians, but they
didn't have to speak out because they had the Turks taking a strong
position. The Turkish FonMin spoke to the Secretary in New York
about it and made noises
HK:
Well the stupidity of NATO will never cease to astonish me. What
we are working ourselves into are two issues--one is this one, the
other one is the mania for introducing substantive discussions in
January. The Russians will do one of two things--they either will
not agree to it, or will use the January meeting as the substitute
for the whole MBFR. Now we have agreed with them and I must be
able to
SI:
This is why I am calling you, Henry, to know what your feel for
Russians are because
HK:
My feeling is first
SI:
foolish for us to be drafting cables and doing things unless
we have your feel of what
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Page 2
HK:
My feeling is the Russians will go through precisely with the procedure
we agreed to that is to say--a procedural MBFR conference which
can discuss agendas and- in January and the regular one in September.
If we start loading substance into it in January, it's going to collapse.
I see no need for it either. We aren't ready--
SI:
That's a separate issue than the flank participation--
HK:
The frank participation, I don't understand the Turks because they
will wind up expanding the area of this in a most undesirable way.
SI:
That's what we always--
HK:
That isn't our fault. I willing to listen to anything you suggest
SI:
I think the only other possibility is to if we agreed to accede to
the Turks in effect is to agree for the exploratory talks in January
but not necessarily for the negotiations until we see what happens
in the exploration--is to admit the flank states in effect that would
be five additional observers sitting there. Now this is what we have
been opposing, but the question then arises which is are we more apt
to have real problem with the Turks and Turkish government vis-a-vis
the undesirability of having these additionalmembers sitting there during
exploratory talks with the possibleprecedent for the negotiations but
without a commitment for it.
HK:
I think we haven't got much choice.
SI:
This is the point and the reason I think we sent over a draft of such
cable informally to you, that I didn't circulate around because as I
say I want to get your feel of what you - -happened in Moscow because
it does seem to me rather silly for us to be doing things when you may
have a very good feel of what is possible and what isn't.
HK:
Exactly.
SI:
On the other point I did send over a memorandum to the various people
which was more on the point you said on the question of whether or not
one should talk substance or not. we tried to point out the advantages
and disadvantages of both--and what the alternatives were.
HK:
But we are pretty well committed to keeping it non-substantive.
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Page 3
SI
This is the otherpoint that from my view I wanted to learn from
you what had happened and what--these were.
HK:
Yeh, we arepretty well committed to keeping it non-substantive.
Except for agenda
which of course gets you substance
indirectly.
SI:
Yeh. We can take it to whatever degree you think the traffic
will bear. And then we can take it from there. But other than
-going back to participation--i a sense I gather had been
preferred not to-lay for a while before we go back and say that
all the flank nations considered observers and so I've told our
people to do nothing until after the meeting on Monday--there's
a NATO council meeting on Monday--just sit and see what happens
-probably nothing much although there may be some more objections
and then make the final decision that I think my inclination will be
to go ahead and permit the observers for only exploration--hope
it doesn't set a precedent and see what recognize that
they may come back and say we won't--don't like these observers
and then it at least puts us in the position vis-a-vis Turks.
If we want to go ahead with the conference which we do we will have
to go ahead with it and just recognize the Turks.
HK:
Right.
SI:
One other thing on a different subject. We have to send in our
'74 budget to the OMB on development aid and support and assistance
and we're quite far apart from OMB on development aid and I think
it would be very helpful if I could get you and Weinberger together
for 15 minutes just SO everyone understood what the circumstances
were-
-
HK:
Why not try for that next week.
SI:
Yeh. I'll ask my secretary to try to set up a date.
HK:
Good.
SI:
Thank you sir.
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TelCon
Sen. Javits/Mr. Kissinger
11:50 am, Octosber 14, 1972
J:
Henry, how are you?
K:
Okay
J:
Welcome home.
K:
Tkhank you.
J:
Listen, Mary and I are having a big fun brunch in New York
tomorrow and thought you might be there.
K:
Unfortunately, I'm not. I'd love to come.
J:
We invited that Chinese gentlement/but we haven't heard
from him. Remember that fellow you told me about.
K:
Yeah.
him
J:
So, if you happen to see him or talk to him you might tell/that
we'll try again.
K:
Good.
J:
Henry, I had quite a talk with Dobrynin. And, sometime when
yo u get a minute, I'd like to tell you about it because he's in
effect, invited ideas. In other words, he asked me what
could I suggest to find some way out of this thing.
K:
Yeah.
J:
And, I said I'll, you know, I get some general ideas, for example,
I told him that in the Steeden/Long program in the United States
we let them work it off over a period of five ;years by
and so on, that we have forgiveness clauses, and there was nothing
like that in their measure. They said, well there might be something
to than I suggested the possibility of payment after the people left
out of their earnings, and he said no they wouldn't want that, it
would exaggerate the issue. But, he aaid he is very interested
in ideas and as soon as I get anything together to back to him.
What I was going to suggest is this: I'd like to put one or two of
my own people, even Humphrey would like to join me in trying to
work this out--and I'd like to if that's agreeable--
K:
That's fine.
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Telcon
Sen. Javits/Mr. Kissinger
11:50 am, October 14, 1972
-2-
J:
I'd like to put some of my own people to perhaps work with
one or more of your's because you people have undoubtedly
explored various ideas, and you know, I'd be very glad to
see what we can all come up with, and, for whatever it's
worth, propose it.
K:
All right, well let's see
J:q
Because he seems to be intxexskedinterested.
K:
Good, excellent idea.
J:
All right, well then, Henry, when you get a chance, I know you
are just loaded, and I hope everything you' re doing is just
blessed with success I hope that we can talk about this.
K:
I would love it.
J:
Well, I'll have my office, you know, see what your situation is.
K:
Good, great.
J:
Goodbye, take care.
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Telcon
The President/Mr. Kissinger
11:55 a. m., October 14, 1972
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Henry;, there is one thing I have to know; I will probably be talking
to Mike Mansfield later today due to the fact that he calls me when
they adjourn, if they adjourn. Now he may raise the China, I just
want to know---
K:
Yes, we haven't had an answer from them yet.
P:
All right, I can just sayeen
K:
Bkut we have submitted it to them.
P:
You have submitted it; that's all I need to know, thank you.
K:
Right, Mr. President
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TelCon
Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger
12:50 pm, October 14, 1972
K:
Hello
DK:
Hi, Henry
K:
How are you, Dave?
DK: Fine, how are you sir. Welcome home.
K:
Thank you
DK: Guess you're pretty warn down to a frazzle.
K:
Yes, it's pretty hectic.
DK: It must have been. Henry, it's probablkynot fair, but I have been
]
reading Murray's piece, and amm
K:
Nobody knows a God damned thing.
DK: Well, okay, don't get exercised but...
K:
Well,; but I have never seen such irresponsible stuff written.
DK: Well, okay.
K:
Do you think we would tell Murray at this stage?
DK:
No, I didn't think you would tell Murrgy anything, but I just wanted
to satisfy myself. You know, Le Duc Tho is on the recsord about
the difficulties-
K:
No, he wasn't on the record. A french journalist overheard him
talking to the Russian and Chinese ambassadors and we don't even
know the wording of what he said. You know, some people say he
said this "still some difficulties remaining". Obviously, or we
would announce the settlement.
(Laughter)
DK:
Well, is there any hand holding or guidance you can do for me on
this one.
K:
No, I really can t. I realy mustn³t.
DK: You think it would be too far to say that difference are narrowed
but that they' re still serious.
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TelCon
Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger
12:50 pm, October 14, 1972
K:
No, we obviously talked about serious matters or it wouldn't have
lasted SO long.
DK:
But it would fair to conclude that, you know, there have been a
narrowing of these differences and that
K:
In some areas, yeah, and h;ow serious they are just don't want to
characterize.
DK:
But there are problems remaining?
Obviously.
K:
Yeah.
DK: And one might reasonably expect that theye mught be another session?
K:
That would be a reasonable assumption.
DK:
Henry, is there any thing at all you can tell me for the rationale for
Thieu calling home the ambassadors.
K:
No. I just don't know what he's got in mind.
DK:
It's a mystery to you?
K:
Yeah.
DK:
Do you think it's fair to infer that he's a little nervous.
K:
Oh, yeahk, I think it is fair.
DK:
Then, that would be the explanation for it.
K:
That's quite possible
DK:
Okay, I can't bother you. I still hope we can have our luncheon,
but you seem to be flying off to Paris every time we try to get set.
K:
That's right.
DK:
Well, I'll call again on Monday if I may, and maybe I can set
something up with Dick.
K:
Good, Dave, Thank you.
DK:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
10/14/72 1:45 p.m.
AD:
Hello Henry. I just looked through the information that I received
and I would like to check with you some points. Well, in general
it is pretty close to what you said, but there are some things that
I would like to check with you. On a political side, I will just read
to you--there is an agreement reached of creation of a political
structure consisting of three parts--you know
HK:
It was administrative structure--
AD:
This says a political structure.
HK:
Well, we can't accept that. My test is the agreed upon text.
AD:
It says, Henry, it was an agreed upon--no, no, I do not have a
text of agreed text--it is just a summary that they make.
HK:
No, but the text I gave you is the agreed text--
AD:
It could be--I am simply telling you what it said--as a political structure
W
which will include the Revolutionary Government, Saigon, and some
neutral political forces. You will call created a council--I translate
from Russian now--Soviets of Reconciliation and accord like this one.
Then in relation of this Council of accord, then there is about elections,
then about organization six months after elections, then this structure
must not enter into military alliance, then the right for both governments
to keep their international links, in the
about principle of reuni-
fication, then there is a lengthy page about the creation of mixed two-side,
three-sides and four-sides commission and there is a function of them,
but it is not of great interest. And this is probably most interesting but
I am discussing with you personally because their summary--what is
not agreed upon, as yet. First, it has not reached an agreement upon
precise date of ceasefire,
HK:
That's right. But that's minor--we'll settle that next week.
AD:
Second, it is not agreed upon the procedure of releasing the prisoners.
They say that you would like to free all your American prisoners but
at the same time not all the prisoners which are in the hands of yours
and Saigon administration.
HK:
That's that issue I mentioned to you.
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Page 2
AD:
Yes, it's exactly what you mentioned, but I understand that you said
that within three months it could be settled.
HK:
Well, we would use our influence.
AD:
Yeh, along those lines. Then another one, they said it was not
settled the question of about replacements, about waapons
HK:
Right.
AD:
They said their impression is you would like to leave for Saigon
administration more weapons than for the troups of the revolutionary
government, then ceases equal principle--the principle of equality.
HK:
Well, if they count themselves in we will accept the principle of equality.
AD:
Laughs.'
HK:
Well, they cannot take the position that they have the unlimited right to
receive arms but Saigon does not.
AD:
But they feel that you want to have more for Saigon administration than
they.
HK:
It would be very easy to settle if they accept-include themselves in
this arrangement.
AD:
What do you mean include themselves--in what sense?
HK:
If they said--we are willing to say we will regular our military assistance
by the degree of military assistance they receive.
AD:
But they have on the principle of equality--what is not yet--
HK:
They don't consider themselves part of the PRG.
AD:
Oh you mean--
HK:
They want to take the position that they can receive unlimited aid
in the north, but then they will give to the PRG on the principle
of equality what we give to Saigon.
AD:
Hm, huh, I see. With one their own.
HK:
You see what I mean?
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Page 3
AD:
Yeh.
HK:
So there are two possibilities--9f they include themselves we accept
the principle of equality. If they don't include themselves we must
reserve the right to gear the replacements to what they receive.
AD:
Actually those who are in South Vietnam.
HK:
That's right.
AD:
I understand.
HK:
On this point, we will not yield.
AD:
Then there is another one they said there is no agreement on the
composition of the international control commission -- these is
a lengthy explanation that you don't like the present composition
about 4 members--
HK:
No we'll accept -- that will be settled.
AD:
Reports Hungary and Poland and you didn't agreed to this one and
you propose Canada and Indonesia and but very lengthy--I think this
is a small one. Then he says they were not agreed upon the function
about the international commission--you would like have broader
authority and including military contingent for international control
commission Then that you insist that both South Vietnamese parties
will inform the international commission on the location of their troops
and so on and so on. Well it isn't really big issue.
HK:
That's already passe. They must have given it to you on an earlier--
that is already settled.
AD:
No, no, they gave it to me just after he left--
HK:
I think they gave you things so that they could claim a victory afterwards.
AD:
Oh, it could be. (laughing) Well, about this decision, etc. that the month
about the circumstance and demonstrated--they quote you as you skid
I already mentioned to you. Then they said you mentioned to them that
after consultation with the President you will give a reply on a corrections
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Page 4
which those which agreement had not been reached. So now as I
understand your amendment or what you put in this agreed text
is your actual reply--yes?
HK:
Yeh.
AD:
Yes. Then you agreed that on the 17th you are going to meet with
Xuan Thuy, and then
and then they say you intend to go to
Hanoi. By the end they put it this way--as you mentioned to them that
the United States prepares or inclines to reach agreement of the
Indoshinese problem before November 7 but they are not so sure that
you will keep your promise.
HK:
(laughs).
AD:
This is completely off the record I am telling you. So this is the
situation I don't know why you put them and then do not assure you
will keep your promise? What promises you gave them? (laughing)
Did you give any promise?
HK:
No, that I would try to get it settled.
AD:
Yeh, but this is what they are quoting, you said that the United States is
looking for to solve all this before the 7th. Well, here we are--and this
is all the details. of course these are some maybe small differences
but it is only in sense of translation. Nothing really.
HK:
Good, well, 1 appreciate this.
AD:
So this is situation as it stands. We'll be in touch on Monday--you
are leaving on Monday morning or evening?
HK:
I leave Monday morning.
AD:
I will receive a letter from you on--
HK:
On Monday morning.
AD:
On the two Germanys--before you go. Then'I'll be in touch with
you on Monday morning.
HK:
Exactly. We'll talk to each other.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Stewart Alsop
10/b4/72 2:15 p.m.
SA:
Are you speaking to me again?
HK:
Only as long as you are sick.
SA:
(laughing) Otherwise there's not a chance, huh ?
HK:
That's right.
SA:
I never heard of anybody getting so damn angry because somebody
said he was indispensible.
HK:
Well because you achieved the exact opposite of what you said
and it's the last paragraph that did me the damage --
SA:
My brother Joe has told me that it was unwise and I can see that
it was unwise--
HK:
The rest of it, you know, I would rather not have happened,
but that would have been to your discretion. But that is nt why
I called you--I just wanted to find out how you were.
SA:
I have a little trouble again--I've got some pneumonia. But
I'm on antibiotics and will be out of here in a week or so. The
problem is that my defenses are so low--
HK:
That's what I was wondering about.
SA:
Yeh, my doctor thinks he is going to get me out of here.
HK:
Oh terrific. You sound much better--
SA:
I don't feel too bad. I have been wandering about the corridors
and have a temperature--but not a high one.
How are you Henry, you must be exhausted.
HK:
I have had a hectic week.
SA:
You sure have. I hear you are having a little dinner with my
aging brother.
HK:
That's right. Miss Maginess arranged it--I'm delighted but
this is the Alsop/Maginess access.
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Page 2
SA:
The last time the Alsop/Maginess access was established
was there, but I suppose he has a good excuse because I am
locked up in NIH.
HK:
We hope to see you when you get out.
SA:
All right, fine. Actually, I got from various conversations with
other officials that the
died down and I made it very clear
to everyone that --
HK:
Well you know it is somewhat an histerical period here. But
it can't affect my respect and affection for you--I was just
very annoyed that one week, but
SA:
I was carried away by a good phrase.
HK:
Look these things happen, you just get. back and--and continue
writing whatever you write. We need you.
SA:
All right, Henry.
HK:
Good Stewart, Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TelCon
Lord Cromer/Mr. Kissinger
3:40 pm, Oct. 14, 1972
K:
Hello.
C:
Welcome back.
K:
Thank you.
C.
You've had a very, very strenuous time, haven't you?
K:
Yes, I've had it pretty hectic.
C:
Yes, I'm sure you have.
K:
Your ambassador in Bonn has a little problem. He stated that
the four power group
C:
I thought he had
K:
And, you know, things I tell you shouldn't go into thos
C:
I'm extremely sorry about this, I don't know what the hell
happened. Quite honestly. And I apologize.
K:
Now, could he sort of square it away?
C:
Yes, what is the scenario ;going to be? Are they going to
produce
K:
Well, we will produce whatever text they've agreed on, and
the Russians will produce something, and let's agree on some-
thing in common.
C:
Yes, sure.
K:
I mean, all I wanted from the Russians was something that was
close enough to what we had so that it could be negotiated.
C:
Absolutely, but of course, where the
is concerned,
we are to go on asking the Russians to produce their piece of
paper.
K:
Well, we can both produce them. We'll produce the NATO paper
and they'll produce theirs, and then the four
gentlemen will get out.
C:
Yes.
K:
Okay.
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Telcon
Lord Cromer/Mr. Kissinger
3:40 pm/Oct. 14, 1972
C:
Yes, sure. I will explain that. I'm sorry about this, we
don't usually have a slip up, it'se been very troublesome.
KXXXXXXXXXXXX
K:
That's okay, as long as--I'm not worried, but it puts Stoessel
into a tough position because he worked with me without telling
his boss.
C:q
Yes, well, I'm sorry.
K:
Okay.
C:
There we are. There's no other news, have you.
K:
Okay.
C:
All right, thank you Henry.
K:
Bye.
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TELCON
Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger
8:02 p.m., October 15, 1972
K:
Mel.
L:
Yes, Henry.
K:
Oh, I think you're returning a call you've already returned.
L:
Oh, well, I was over here having dinner -- I've got my bride out at
Poor Richard's restaurant and there was a call here for me.
K:
Oh, no, that was the earlier call.
L:
Okay.
K:
Good to talk to you. Give my best to Barbara.
L:
Well, this is our 27th wedding anniversary.
K:
Oh, isn't that great!
L:
I thought I would take her out to dinner tonight.
K:
Isn't that great.
L:
Well, we're at Poor Richard's restaurant if you want us.
K:
Well, nobody is going to endure me for 27 years.
L:
Okay.
K:
Right.
L:
Take care. Bye, bye.
wgh
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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Telcon
Ambassador Dobrynin/HAK
Oct. 15, 1972; 8:35 p.m.
K; Hello
D: Hello, Henry. You are already back?
K: Yes, Anatol.
D: Have you had a chance to look through it ?
K: Yes, I had a chance to look through it.
D: Do you have any additional comments?
K: Well, here is the comment I have to make. We have had a study made
of all the prisoners there and of course we haven't been able to approach
the Saigon government yet.
D: Uh, huh.
K: Because I want to present the agreement to them myself. And I think
something can be done but first the other side must work with us realistically.
D: Uh, huh.
K: Now the biggest problem I have concerns their own forces in the south
because the practical consequence of their proposal is that not only do they
want to keep all of their forces in the south, they want Saigon to release
40, 000 people whom they consider, you know, guerrillas, to then join
those forces. And that is an almost impossible product to sell. Now you
know if we spend 6 weeks on it we can probably get something done.
D: Yeah.
K: If you are going to do it in 2 or 3 days they have to be concrete in one of
two ways. If they pull some of their units out, then I have a much better
basis to talk.
D: You mean along those lines you mentioned.
K: Along the lines I mentioned. Let them move some of the divisions. My
proposal to them was that they should move the divisions that were never in
the country before March 25th. That they moved in after March 25th. Most
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Most of them are in the northern part of the country so they wouldn't
really have to go all that far to go back.
D: You mean, oh, much rather, very much symbolic to begin with.
K: Yes,
K: Because, my impression was you said.
K: I am talking about, they have about 10 divisions there more or less.
If they kept 7, that would be
I don't want to say exactly how many they
should move.
D: It's a rather difficult thing for us to be involved in all this
how many
really.
K: But I don't even want to tell them how many they should move.
D: I understand.
should
K: It/seable be a noticeable number. If we can get some assurances of that
we are in a much better position to bring about the release of some of these
prisoners. I do not believe , I honestly do not believe that Thieu will
release them if the North Vietnamese forces stay. If we get out, he is
losing all our forces, he is losing the military strength, we are pulling
all our air force out. Now the other route is that they could enter the
agreement, I don't know, we have sent them yesterday a phrase which is
not in the text you have, at the end of paragraph 8 c) we have added a phrase
that says the two parties will do their utmost to achieve an agreement within
three months. I have already told you orally. We have said that we will
do our best and make a maximum effort. Now I think I can do even better.
I think we can get about, just looking at the list, we might be able to get
10, 000 released fairly quickly.
D: What is the essence of your second proposal?
K: The essence of my second proposal is if they gave us a combination of
the withdrawal of some forces then I could make more complete my
assurances.
D: It seems the second is the same as
because you said
K: The other route is
there are two routes. If they pull out their forces
we can release more of their forces faster.
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-3-
D: Yes. And what is the second route?
K: The second is that we forget about their forces in which case their
releases will be more along the lines we proposed to them.
D: You mean within the three months.
K: Within the three months an agreement.
D: Oh, an agreement.
K: Yes.
D: And if you are going to do something then it will be within the first
months so to speak.
K: That's right, within the first months.
D: Oh, I see. But I will not argue with you about the difference.
K: But there's a big difference because our present proposal is, not that
anyone should be released but that an agreement should be reached within
a three months period.
D: You mean the agreement on
K: On the release schedule.
D: But not the releases within the three months.
K: No.
D: Oh, I see. Then I misunderstand you.
K: And we are willing to give them an additional assurance that that we
are willing to use our maximum influence that these releases take place.
D: You are speaking about within three months you will reach agreement
or within three months you are going to release them?
K: The present proposal is that within three months we will reach the
agreement. And the second route is if they pull something out we will
have substantial releases within three months.
D: Well it is difficult these combinations, particularly in terms you
discussed with us, because you mentioned to us the suggestion from your
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-4-
side for our consideration, but now it's rather the second of your proposals.
At first I really thought you were proposing something noticeable from the
point of view of air force and then which gave all of you something to begin,
but now you are rather tied up not with the show of willingness from their
side to withdraw something for the time being but rather commit themselves
to a certain number of divisions. This is rather difficult for us to do anything.
K: No, no, you don't have to get into the divisions at all.
D: Yes, but you mentioned
K: But you asked me for an idea.
D: But the idea is now.
K: The idea is that they should withdraw some forces. How many let them
discuss it with us.
D: I understand. But I think I had better leave it on this basis without
going into all the details.
K: I don't think you should go into any details. You could say first they
want to move at the schedule they have established then we have the massive
problem of how to bring Saigon along with this.
D: No, I understand. But first there really is now the question with which
you are tied up with troop withdrawal one way or another, but it is up to
them to discuss it with you.
K: It is up to them.
D: OK.
K: But you can tell them this, Even without a withdrawal we will make some
efforts in that direction. It will just be harder.
D: Well, I understand. But in order to make it more quicker and sure
K: That's right.
D: OK. And this I will mention to Moscow. Of course my impression is
whether Moscow will look into this. And to take all the proposals, I said this
because just make it on the second part about troop withdrawals as a token of a
show of willingness or which now no need at all. Because I understood your
proposal
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K: A show of willingness would be very helpful.
D: But just a question of withdrawal
K: It would be very helpful.
D: But it is argued a show of willignesss in terms of divisions, because it
is difficult from our side I am thinking about.
K: You don't have to give them the numbers.
D: So I leave it as it was. On a new question you are tied up with this new
thing and I thought you preferred to discuss even without this side of it.
K: Without the prior agreement.
D: It would make it too difficult, otherwise you could be in a deadlock.
K: Well, if we are in a deadlock that's not the worse thing that can happen
to us.
D: Well some kind of things are relevant since we are going deeper into
other things (laughs]. This is the point.
K: We take your views very seriously, but
D: That's what you really listen to.
K: But we have made absolutely the maximum concessions that's possible
to make.
D: No, no, I am not arguing with you, but I simply tried to make it clear
our point of view and then I would like to be ready more what you are really
up to.
K: What we are up to without any withdrawal on their side we are willing to
make a big effort in Saigon, but I am not very optimistic. With some
withdrawals on their side we can make a bigger effort and we can have
bigger numbers released right away.
D: I understand.
K: That is a fact of life.
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D: No, no, I would like to hear more your position a little more. OK,
Henry and you are leaving tomorrow at 10?
K: 10:00-10:30.
D: 10:30. Well, in the morning we will have time to say hello.
K: Well, absolutely, Anatol.
D: I will telephone you. All right?
K: Good. And tell Gromyko not to coach them. They are tough enough
without it.
D: Well, we know this. This we know. Bye, bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Robert Haldeman/Kissinger
10:10 a.m.
-
10/16/72
RH:
Bob, Henry.
HK:
Yes, Bob.
RH:
I'm over at the President's house and he was wondering if
you could come up and chat with him for a bit sometime. today.
HK:
Oh, Jesus. It's almost--you know if he tells me to I haven
no choice.
RH:
Well, if it's a problem why don't you stay there and talk on the
phone. I'll suggest.
HK:
Because, you know, I am in the office with a 100 things to go
over.
RH:
Yeah.
HK:
And Between you and me I wanted to rest a couple of hours, too.
RH:
Yeah. OK. Let me see if you can just do it on the phone. Try
that anyway. You know, you ought to talk over this whole thing
about what we wer' talking about last night.
HK:
How about first thing in the morning. You know it doesn't matter
when I go.
RH:
OK. That'll be good. I'll make that point and we'll see what works
out. I'll get back to you.
HK:
I've had yet another idea. It would be an intermediate idea.
I'm pretty persuaded that we shouldn't stall it beyond first
of all the way this momentum is going I'd have to put brakes
on it in a way that would be transparent. But one thing that I
have thought of doing is go to Saigon, come back here and then
take the same route again next week and just add the final
destination. That would push the whole thing back by six days.
RH:
What good would that do?
HK:
That would save Thieu's face. You know, he wouldn't have been
blackjacked into it. It would give him a few more days to clean
up the security areas around Saigon and it prevents an absolute
confrontation next week.
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RH:
You don't know if you' re going to have one. That should be a
fallback position.
HK:
That's what I mean. Well if he goes along enthusiastically we
stick to the schedule.
RH:
Yeah.
HK:
If he stonewalls we have no choice except to break off anyway.
RH:
This would be an intermediate to that.
HK:
This would be an intermediate to that I would come back then
Saturday night I would be back.
RH:
Yeah.
HK:
And go on the road again Tuesday the same itinerary the only
thing is the President would then speak on the 31st rather than
on the 25th.
RH:
Yeah.
HK:
It has the additional advantage as I see it politically not that
it is closer to the election but that if anything gets unstuck
there's less time for it.
RH:
That's not valuable.
HK:
What?
RH:
I don't think that's there are more negatives to that than
positives. One side versus the K other that's a better position
than just dropping it at that point probably.
HK:
Well, that's what I think. See the problem is, Bob, I've reviewed
all the exchanges. We have used these time schedules really
ruthlessly to get changes in the text that otherwise would take
weeks to get. Now I'm doing a letter to Brezhnev from the
President today to get some you know, indication of Soviet
supplies.
RH:
Yeah.
HK:
Just to button up the agreement.
RH:
Yeah.
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- 3 -
HK:
You know, the more time we can get the better it is.
RH:
OK, I'll get back. to you.
HK:
OK, if you can spare me a trip up there I'd really appreciate
it because I couldn't leave before 2:00 p.m. anyway.
RH:
OK.
HK:
I've got Abrams and everyone else coming and McNamara.
RH:
OK:
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TelCon
Secy. Peterson/Mr. Kissinger
October 16, 1972, 10:32 am
P:
Three things I want to be sure we are coordinated on; one,
on this interest rate thing, Hal tells me you've completed that,
is that right, on the basis we discussed.
K:
No, no, no. I've, god dame it. I think he ---
P:
I got the impression that you'd reviewed it with-
K:
I mentioned it to Dobrynin as a thought, I didn't give hi;m any
figures.
P:
Oh, I see.
K:
And he is waiting for you--he said he thought it was a reasonable
idea. I told Hal to tell you on Saturday, God damn him, I have
not completed it. You told me not to complete it.
P:
No, I thought you ;had more or less worked it out at 4% and
$710, and that was fine with me if that was the deal. You have
not done that.
K:
No, Hal want ed to say start at 5 and go down, and I said, No,
I don't want more than 4.
P:
Right. Okay. But 4 and 710, if the numbers are right is fine
with you.
K:
Right, not more than that.
P:
Above 4 it starts hurting them, not too badly it seems to me.
K:
Right.
P:
All right. Second well I'm glad weve had it, because I saw
Alkimov and Patolichev last ni;ght and they didn't seem to
know anything, so okay. Now, as I understand, you do not
want an announcement tomorrow, you want it Wednesday.
K:
That's correct.
P:
All right. Now, Henry, my signals on the Maritime deal were
so unbelievably confused that I want to hear it from you. Whether
the President would be involved or not involved.
K:
I think on this one, the President probably wants to be involved.
P:
I woul d think so. Now, therefore, that suggests the ceremon;y
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TelCon
Secy Peterson/Mr. Kissinger
Oct. 16, 1972, 10:32 am
-2-
over there I would think.
K:
I agree.
P:
Okay, Tuesday is off for you; I'm tied up Thursday, Potolichev
wanted it tomorrow; but Wednesday, does that feel all right with
you?
K:
Wednesday is great.
P:
Okay, but do you see the President witnessing--
K:
I think the President might well want to be present at the
signing.
P:
Yeah, all right. Юкау. Now, the third thing that I want to
be sure you're aware that I am sensitive too is that there's
a very fine balance between getting a deal that is good back
home but ten not creating undue problems for you with them.
I've gota lot of questions, Henry, I want you to read the
briefing on this KVM business. I have done everything I could
to suggest Xxxxx they' ve cooperated with us, we very much appre-
ciate it, it was an unprecedented problem, and I don't want you
thinking that I generated any of the caving in business that appeared
in one of the newspapers, cause we haven't.
R:
Pete, I wouldn't think that.
P:
Yeah. But that's essentially where its coming from, and see
my answer and if you've got any other suggestions, fine, on how
to handle it.
K:
Good.
P:
Finally, with Patolichev you should know that he asked for a
couple of small things He wants a third guy in the commercial
office, for example, on both sides. You know the diplomatic---
K:
You handle that.
P:
And the Kama River Purchasing Commission he wants. And
that we think is okay with the DUREAUCRALY burocracy, and he would
like some assurance that I will give sympathetic attention to
further offices. Now, my sense of this deal after the bludgeoning
on the Martime deal is we should not move in a direction of
being accommodating.
K:
I agree completely.
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- -3-
TelCon
Secy. Peterson/Mr. Kissinger
Oct. 16, 1972; 10:32 am
P:
Now, i;ncidentally, on the Maritime deal
K:
Pete, I've got to run, I'll call you.
P:
Okay.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Robert McNamara/Kissinger
1:15 p.m. - 10/16/72
RM:
Henry, you asked for a progress report.
HK:
Yes.
RM:
It took God seven days to create the world, it's difficult to
recreate North Vietnam in two but I'll have a report for you
tonight. Where do you want it delivered?
HK:
To the situation room.
RM:
Yeah, what time?
HK:
Oh, I don't much care, 7:00 or 8:00.
RM:
Seven o'clockish.
HK:
Right. In what sort of state will it be ?
RM:
Well it will be typed three, four or five pages, we're typing
here we' re going to work on it this afternoon. But the figure
I think will be on the order of $600 million a year average.
HK:
And you get that how?
RM:
I'm not saying how we get it.
HK:
Is that in addition to bilateral US?
RM:
That's just---I understood you wanted to know how much they
need. That's how much they need. We don't discuss how they
can get it.
HK:
Right. Well what is your estimate of what you can get?
RM:
From whom?
HK:
I mean, I asked an estimate from us but do you think one could
get them that much?
RM:
Yeah. That depends on how much
puts up
but I think well it is clearly dependent on the US but I think
the answer is yes, the Nordic countries, multilateral institutions
the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, Japan if the
US puts up a substantial percentage of it you definitely could
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- 2 -
HK:
Right.
RM:
And I don't cover that at all.
HK:
Right.
And do you have it broken down according to some
categories?
RM:
Yes.
HK:
Well, that would be very helpful.
RM:
Food, etc.
HK:
Terrific.
RM:
You know it's a day and a half's effort.
HK:
Yes. Well it's enough to give me some idea I mean we're not
going to be able to make any agreement.
RM:
If you want to buy the dinner or supper and come in and have it
here when I'll give it to you here otherwise I'll take it to
the Situation Room at 7:00.
HK:
OK, I don't know what my own---I may have to go up to Camp
David.
RM:
All right.
HK:
Well, hell you don't have to take it in. I'll get it picked up.
RM:
OK, have it picked up here at 7:00 p.m. then.
HK:
Good.
RM:
If you want to come to supper x just give me a call and let us know.
HK:
Terrific.
RM:
Fine, thanks very much
HK:
OK.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Lloyd Shearer/Kissinger
1:20 p.m. - 10/16/72
HK:
Hello.
LS:
Hey, Henry, how are you?
HK:
OK Lloyd.
LS:
Do you let anybody photograph you at home ? Would you let
us photograph you at home?
HK:
My home in Washington ?
LS:
Yes sir.
HK:
It looks like a goddam doctor's office.
LS:
I know that's why--you know we got to get something for our
101 papers that nobody else has.
So if we could get a photo
on the john.
HK:
On the john, of course.
LS:
One of those kixx things, that would help us you know in the
upcoming story which we haven't yet done.
HK:
What is that story going to be again, you told me the other day.
LS:
Four years of Henry Kissinger.
HK:
If I survive the next four weeks you can do it.
LS:
Anyway, what the hell what's that restaurant. Is there a
restaurant in Paris called the Carlton Lucas?
HK:
Lucas Carlton, yes.
LS:
Lucas Carlton.
HK:
What about it ?
LS:
I was just wondering if you had been in that restaurant.
HK:
Yes I was.
LS:
Would you recommend it.
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HK:
Well it's the only one that serves at 10:30 at night.
LS:
There's a new one the Grand Favor.
HK:
And on Sunday.
LS:
Well you operate at such strange times.
HK:
Oh yes. But it is a good restaurant.
LS:
Apparently.
HK:
Why, are you going to run something on that, too.
LS:
I don't know what you have reference to, Henry. I don't know
the name.
HK:
That is true.
LS:
Trying to keep up with you is a hopeless occupation. Nobody
wants to do that. You know that you're the most colorful guy
in this Administration and
HK:
That's not saying a hell of a lot ---
LS:
Huh?
HK:
That's not saying an extraordinary amount but I'll take any
little compliment that comes my way.
LS:
That's right. Anyway what we would like to do is grab a few
shots of you in your hideway.
HK:
Certainly.
LS:
If that's OK with you.
HK:
Yes.
LS:
And so I would come over and take a few fast shots.
HK:
But when.
LS:
Today.
HK:
Today, you cant. Are you in town?
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LS:
Yes.
HK:
Oh no today is out of the question I'm working all day.
LS:
Henry, you can't do that, I mean you've got to stop for a few
minutes.
HK:
Today I can't but in principle you can do it sometime.
LS:
All right the next time I'm in principle which is a very good
community we'll do it.
HK:
Will you do that?
LS:
Of course.
HK:
Good, I didn't know you were in town.
LS:
Right, I have to come from time to time.
HK:
Well, let me know next time and drop in, you've never been in
my---
LS:
Yes I have.
HK:
You've been in my office?
LS:
Yes. OK, well THEN we'll do it some other time, but we would
like to do it and the reason I thought we might do it now is we
would like to do it before the year is out and we're coming down
to it in October.
HK:
You can do it within the next two or three weeks.
LS:
I don't like to come back to Washington.
HK:
I'm screwed up I don't know when I'll get home.
LS:
Let me ask you this, OK look if you do get a break we could do
it early in the morning maybe you could just call the hotel and
leave a message for me. Would you do that like a good guy?
HK:
I will but I doubt it.
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LS:
I doubt it too, but once in a while you do a good king thing for
your country and your god.
HK:
Good.
LS:
All right, Henry, nice to talk to you.
HK:
Nice to talk to you.
HK:
You bet.
XXX
LS:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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HTi
Jelson
sile
TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Kissinger
2:00 p.m. - 10/16/72
AD:
Hello.
HK:
Anatol?
AD:
Oh, you are the idiot
HK:
Incidentally can you send me back if you agree to that letter?
It was our only copy the one on
AD:
You mean what you made me?
HK:
On deferment, on postponement.
AD:
I'll call back, no problem.
HK:
OK, we are going to delete that sentence we discussed the
one in the letter from the President to the Secretary General.
We will delete the first sentence.
AD:
The last sentence on the first page?
HK:
Right and we will instead, such an indication from you
AD:
Just a minute I would like to write it.
HK:
Why don't I send you over the correct.
AD:
You will send it, IK that would be even better.
HK:
I'll send it right over because the President also added
another sentence that we don't think we're doing it only for
public opinion.
AD:
I understand.
HK:
It is as not relevant to anything you have to do but is an
AD:
Could you read me over what you added.
HK:
At the end of the first page last paragraph, "such an indication
from you would do much to accelerate agreement between the
United States and the DRV".
AD:
And indication, yah. What is the next one?
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HK:
Then at the end of the second paragraph you know where
we talk about the American public.
AD:
Yeah.
HK:
After that we add this sentence: "Moreover, such a one-sided
arrangement would violate the principle of reciprocity and
equality of commitment which must be the foundation of any
lasting settlement and which is the foundation on which it has
been possible to build the significant progress this that has
been achieved in our own bilateral relations.
AD:
What foundation do you mean?
HK:
The foundation of xx receiprocity and equality of commitment
whichenost.dx
AD:
Oh, and commitment.
HK:
Right that is not in reference to you that is in reference to
the DRV.
AD:
I understand.
OK you will send right now?
HK:
Right.
AD:
With a messenger.
HK:
Right.
AD
And I will convey in a very few hours, all right.
HK:
Right.
AD:
I would like to check the other two or three points. One, on
this United Nations business on the two Germanies you do not
put into the motion the whole
the reply from
Gromyko.
HK:
Right.
AD:
For the time being it is a private discussion between you and
him.
HK:
Exactly.
AD:
So this is the understanding as of now. Second about the
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- 3 -
you mean only Hanoi or the whole of North Vietnam.
HK:
What do you mean?
AD:
About the
you said when you will be in Hanoi.
HK:
No, no it will be the whole of North Vietnam.
AD:
And you are going to reduce all of the North Vietnam the bombing.
It is a matter of clarification. This is all I need. OK, please
send me this right now and I will send it to Breshnev.
HK:
Good, thank you.
AD:
You will leave tomorrow in the morning?
HK:
I'll be there til about 10:00.
AD:
About 10:00, just in case, General Haig will be here ?
HK:
Right.
AD:
OK Henry, bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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TELCON
Marvin Kalb/Kissinger
3:55 pm - Oct. 23, 1972
K:
Hello.
MK: Hello.
K:
Marvin, how are you?
MK: Good. You must be absolutely exhausted.
K:
Well, I'm a little tired.
MK: I guess you got a little rest on the plane.
K:
Well, actually, I think it exhausts you on a long flight. It isn't
fatigue. I think something must happen on this east/west leg that
isn't just fatigue.
MK: Yes. Listen, help a poor struggling fellow--
K:
Listen, you bastard, you've been putting out stuff I'm finding out
what I'm doing from reading your transcript.
MK: Tell me where I've been right or wrong. (Laughter)
K:
Get it from your own intelligence.
MK: Well, it's a diplomatic response, but was that experience of the
last five days uncommonly difficult?
K:
Well, it had its moments.
MK: Yeah. Has it held up anything?
K:
One thing that was totally wrong is that the meeting with the Foreign
Minister was arranged berause Thieu refused to meet.
MK: And that's wrong.
K:
That is wrong. I mean, that had been set up that way. That was of
a more technical nature.
MK: I see. Well, this is something that they passed to us from Saigon.
K:
Yeah.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Marvin Kalb/Kissinger
2
3:55 pm - Oct. 23, 1972
MK: Do you have the sense that y ou are on the time table that you set up?
Or, will it be held up a bit.
K:
No, it's more or less on -- you know, you can make it slow, or medium
and fast one I think it is on the medium one.
MK: And is there any
K:
This is off the record.
MK:
Okay, okay. For guidance then. Is the election emphasis to the
public comment realistic?
K:
Well, not as far as we are concerned. Absolutely not.
MK:
Absolutely not.
K:
Look, Marvin, you've read a lot of what I've written inside on this
war.
MK; Yes, I have.
K:
But, you know whether I'm right in my judgments or not. What we
wanted to get out this war--whatever mistakes we made in getting
into it was a sense that when we left it the public could feel it was
an act of statesmanship and we could at last deny them something
and put it behind us. Now we can have no incentive whatever to have
this thing promised by political debate.
MK: Right.
K:
And, you know I don't know what the motives of the other side are.
MK: Right.
K:
But we are going at an orderly pace, you know, that perhaps progress
is being made, which is more than we've ever said before.
MK: Do you think that you will be know obliged to a--in a couple of days
go semi-public on this.
K:
Well I have said, yesterday, and when I arrived that I would have a
press conference in a couple ;of days.
MK:
You did say that! !
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Marvin Kalb/Kissinger
3:55 pm - Oct. 23, 1972
3
Thursday
K:
Yes, I'll have the press conference tomorrow or Wednesday, regard-
less of what happens. I had always intended that.
MK: I see, well
K: And while I won't be able to give -- what I want to do with the press
conference is enough guidance so the people will know the parameters
of the game that's being played now.
MK: Well, that would be enormously helpful.
K: And not speculate -- it is not spent widely all over the place, and
you know, everybody--the North Vietnamese, thekSouth, and expecially
the Vietnamese party's have their own audiences to satisfy. And
since it's no secret to say what's being intended as a compromise.
Neither side is going to have everything it wanted. And, therefore,
they both have to posture themselves as this process is being completed.
Many of these leaks are pretty self-serving.
MK: Well, I had a talk last night at a dinner with a very respected
Communist diplomat who told me that you and Le Duc Tho has pretty
well reached a deal, and that there were, according to what he said,
very minor things to be taken care of and that he would be astonished
if it couldn't be wrapped up very quickly.
K:
Well, I wouldn't be quite that optimistic, because as you get to that
phase of the negotiation you always want the nuances to start getting
important. But, when you compare a situation where you are looking
for a change in tense in sentences, you feel that you are making pro-
gress.
MK: Exactly.
K: Now, they are talking about refinements and one or two items of
some principle. You are really in a different ball game.
MK: Yeah. Well this is--everybody is watching you like crazy.
K: Don't watch me with a November 7th deadline in mind.
MK: That would be foolish?
K:
Foolish--maybe yes, maybe no, but it's - we are absolutely not
playing for that.
MK: Right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
x5x 4
Kalb/Kissinger
K:
Most enduring thing we can is something that people can say afterwards
whatever he thinks these sons of bitch did, that they did the end of it.
MK: Right.
K:
Nobody will remember two years from ngw whether it was done on
November 2nd orDecember 2nd.
MK: Right. I get the impression that you feel pretty well along at this
point.
K:
Well, I febl, you know--before I had. to give you an analysis of why
it might happen, now I can see how it might happen.
MK: Right. Do you think it will be tomorrow.?
K:
The press conference?
MK: Yes.
K:
I think it's more likely to be Thursday.
MK: Right, I shall be looking forward to seeing you.
K:
Good.
MK: Right.
K:
Now this is off the record.
MK: I understand.
K:
Good.
MK:
Thank you, bye.
K:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger
3:55 pm - October 23, 1972
K:
Hello.
T:
Hi.
K:
How are you, Bob.
T:
All right. Did you bring peace to - -
K:
Of course.
T:
I wonder if I could sort of pick your brains on some of the things
that went on.
K:
(Laughter) That's what I've been waiting for - for you to phone to
pick my brains. They are addled anyway.
T:
I can at least try, huh. I'm just wondering- I gather from what I've
heard around is that you didn't go to sell any coalition government.
K:
K:
That is correct.
T:
But going back and reading the January offer that we made, he talked
about an electorial commission of all segments-
K:
Well, I won't go into what we did discuss. And it isn't so true I was
trying to settle or not settle. You know, these were discussions
I've been meeting and one shouldn't be surprised that in three days--
this is a question of peace and war for a country that's been fighting
for ten years. Why shouldn't I take some time to think about it.
T:
You mean in terms of what you put on the table.
K:
Well in terms of the general discussions.
T:
Well, there were some reports that your discussions weren't exactly
cordial.
K:
Well, they didn't come from me. Because--
T:
Well, the re was some talk tha t they weren't as friendly as they could
have been, but I really am asking you whether or not there were any
hard words spoken.
K:
No hard words were spoken. They were very businesslike.
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TELCON
Toth/Kissinger
2
T:
Very frank!
K:
Very businesslike. This is not for quotation.
T:
No.
K:
But it is for guidance.
T:
Yeah. Did you find that they were resisting the progress that had
been made, or just examining it to see all its ramifiaations?
K:
They were examining it. There were certain things that have a
different context for them than for us. After a settlement, we
will be gone and they will be there so they obviously have to look
at certain things more minutely than we would. I mean the South
Vietnamese will be there and we will be gone, and all of this was
more or less expected.
T:
Well, did you go to lay out what had happened in previous sessions
with Le Duc Tho? Was that the purpose of it, that is to really
fully brief them or were you there to bring them one step further in terms
to future negotiations.
K:
Well, you know, these two things are hard to separate. They've been
kept pretty well informed all along, but of course, there's no substitute,
you can't get in all the details by cable.
T:
Well, can we expect you to have another session with Le Duc Tho
before the, you know, within the next two weeks.
K:
You know, we never say this ahead of time.
T:
Yeah.
K:
You can certainly expect that these exchanges will continue. And
that they are in an extremely active skage phase. And after all,
Pham Van Dong said that progress was being made.
T:
When will all this be out.
K:
In the new wecan give that progress, or whatever he called it, that
progress is being made.
T:
Well, Henry, if significant progress is made, it goes to the President
offering- if we had significant progress, well it - he put it another way,
unless significant progress is made in the negotiations, the bombing
and mining will continue. As there has been significant progress,
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TELCON
3
Toth/Kissinger
this would give credence to the reports that we have curtailed bombing.
K:
Well, it might give credence to them, yes.
T:
But, is that a fair conclusion that the bombings has been--there have
been reports that the bombing around Hanoi is eased as a gesture, is
that right?
K:
Well,; that seems to be right reading the daily reports.
T:
Would expect any further sort of de-escalation of the conflict before
an overall settlement is at least agreed in principle?
K:
I don't to go into that. I'm going to have a press conference anyway
in a couple of days--either tomorrow or Thursday.
T:
Big news?
K:
No. Just to put it into context.
T:
Uh huh. Well, you don't want to talk about the coalition business at all.
K:
Not particularly.
T:
Because, you can get into this area of how you can compromise, it
seems like we backed off on terms of Presidential elections in favor
of a constituent assembly election.
K:
Well, that's what some newspapers say, it doesn't mean that we've
done it.
T:
Oh. Well, can you give me any guidance on that?
K:
I won't give you any guidance on that but I will tell you to stay away
from any specific formula.
T:
Oh, I see, that had been printed. Well, that's fair enough. The talk
about an imminent end of the hostilities, before implementation of the
political settlement begins, is that pretty far off speculation.
K:
Well, I won't go into any other discussion. Don't draw any conclusion
from that, but any intelligent man is going to narrow it to two or three
issues and if I deny some and no comment the others you can know
where we are.
T:
I wish I were that clever
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TELCON
4
Toth/Kissinger
T:
But, I'm going to sit back and think about what you said for about
two hours before I--
I
K:
Bob, you've been closer to correct than any other journalist. /Hand it to yo
You were the only one who understood what I was saying in September.
T:
Well, I have to submit all my pieces for
the pulitzer
K:
And, all the issue are to people won't understand.
[Laughter[
T:
Listen, my people don't understand it.
K:
I know, because they have certain fixed ideas as to what was possible,
how it could be done.
T:
A little while ago, I made a series of paragraphs in my stories, you
know, the only thing you have in this bu;siness is your byline. You
get kinda KNXXXXX serious when--
K:
You actually put in their own paragraphs.
I
T:
They actually did it, the insisted on it, they/said take my byline off,
they said we need your byline, can't we negotiate this. But is was
serving an inocuous paragraph at the same it made me look a little
foolish. It was unclear what this means. Well, if it was unclear
what it means, and my explanation that followed (laughter)
K:
Really, I tell you--this is not to flatter you--but your judgment
has been very good and your instinct on this, I told them that. No
matter how improper it looks in the light of what you read in--most
of the newsmen are sucking their own thumbs and are writing the stuff
they said was going to happen as already having happened.
T:
Yes, that's true. I can see that and some of them are very good
friends of mine.
K:
Many of them are extremely able journalists, it's no reflection on
them.
T:
Yeah. Well, Henry, thanks a lot and I look forward to your press
conference.
K:
Good, bye.
T:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
11:22 p. m., October 23, 1972
D:
brother and his wife.
K:
Oh, you were at that
D:
And they think that you are traveling too much.
K:
(laughter)
D:
That's why he said he was really much more thinner than you are.
And he said, "Well, I have some responsibility and he's just traveling
around the world."
K:
(laughter) Somebody asked him why he didn't have an accent and I did
and he said, "Because he's the Kissinger who listens. #
D:
(laughter)
...
talk along those lines.
K:
Anatol, I called you -- I just got in.
D:
Yes, so I imagine.
K:
And I will see you tomorrow.
D:
Yes. When do you want me to come?
K:
Actually, I think I'm free for lunch. Are you free for lunch?
D:
Tomorrow, yes.
K:
Why don't you come over here for lunch.
D:
Okay. Will be fine with me. One o'clock?
K:
One o'clock. But what I wanted to do is to see whether I could tell you
the following tonight because time is of some importance.
D:
Yes, I understand, so go ahead.
K:
We received a somewhat threatening message from Hanoi and the
situation is this.
D:
Yes.
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TELCON
- 2 -
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972
K:
They don't understand the American domestic situation at all.
D:
Yeah.
K:
If 1 had wanted to protract the negotiations, I could have easily
protracted them without this theater.
D:
Without?
K:
Without going through all this exercise.
D:
I understand.
K:
Because I could have just haggled over every paragraph for weeks.
D:
Yeah, I understand.
K:
So what we wanted to do is to settle it.
D:
Yeah.
K:
On the other hand, what we cannot do is to have a public confrontation
with the South Vietnamese in the last two weeks of the elections and
be accused of everyone of undermining the people for whom we've been
fighting for 4 years. Now that is a fact of life.
D:
Yes.
K:
Therefore if Hanoi forces us to choose between a confrontation with
South Vietnam and a confrontation with North Vietnam, we will
unhesitatingly choose a confrontation with North Vietnam because that's
what we've been having.
D:
Yeah.
K:
Now I have made a serious effort.
D:
Yes.
K:
And there have been certain difficulties which I will discuss with you
tomorrow.
D:
Yes.
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TELCON
- 3 -
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
11:22 p. m., October 23, 1972
K:
ut for the moment what I want to say is this, we have proposed to them
that they meet us again next week.
D:
Not this week?
K:
Or any time they want to, let them give the date. I'll meet them this
weekend If they want. To work out some of these issues. It is my
judgment that most of them or all of them are a lot easier than the issues
we've already settled.
D:
Yes. What was really the issues, Henry? Because I've tried to get
from General Haig but I
K:
Well, I'll go into details with you tomorrow.
D:
For me it was Important only one thing really. The question on the
schedule -- your schedule with them on October 10th or it's rather
as I understood yesterday and today from General Haig you would like
to discuss a new question -- well, this is not really new one but to
the extent that you would like some kind of commitment on the issue of
their troops so what is really the issue because
K:
What I want to discuss with them -- three categories of problems.
One are simply drafting changes which some are almost entirely
cosmetic.
D:
In agreement which you make, huh?
K:
Yes. They are of no consequence and I won't bore you with them.
D:
Yeah, okay.
K:
I am sure they will accept 80% of those.
D:
Yeah.
K:
I mean, they really are the sort of thing that come up at the end of
every agreement but that would enable the South Vietnamese to say they
made a contribution.
D:
Yeah.
K:
The senond is a proposal by me on how we could redraft the political - -- one
political paragraph that has some substantive meaning -- it will not change
the outcome but it would change the presentation a little bit.
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TELCON
- 4 -
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
11:22 p. m. October 23, 1972
D:
But the paragraph is in the agreement?
K:
Yes, And the third has to do with some practical arrangement about
their troops. I will make a very concrete proposal to you that does not
have to go into the agreement.
D:
Yeah.
K:
And I think It can be worked out also.
D:
Yeah.
K:
Now If we then can agree on that document, then we believe we have
discharged our responsibilities towards our allies. And we will then
be able to proceed in returning to Salgon and bringing about a succession.
D:
I understand. You see the question really is what --
K:
They have really an important choice to make. If they think -- they may
think we are deliberately delaying It beyond November 7th so we can
bomb them or do something. I give you the solemn assurance of the
President that this is not the case and make an engagement to your
government on that issue. Second, we have an obligation to our allies,
however, and we cannot act in an unprincipled way. And we always told
them we would have to discuss It with out allies. Now they must have
enough sources of information in Saigon to know what difficulties I have
had. And I must say that the interview which Pham Van Dong gave at
the critical moment certainly made life even harder.
D:
yes. Well, Henry, the question really isn't now
if it is now.
Because what you mentioned -- let me put It this
way -- quite frankly, everything I discussed practically; I mean, the most
Important I discussed with Haig, but between us we informed Hanoi,
K:
Right.
D:
What you mentioned to me today, the reason I think that you -- I mean,
in substance I mean, of course, on this issue you are going to tell me
tomorrow I am sure
so I am really looking practically what --
K:
Practically what they have to understand is
D:
What I couldhave it
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TELCON
- 5 -
Amb, Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972
K:
Now what you can add to it is, when we next agree on a document
it will have included all the objections other allies have made and we
can then proceed with great confidence. Secondly, that we are not
delaying it frivolously. And thirdly, that if they take us on in the
interval, we will just 100% back Saigon.
D:
Well, actually the point but it is rather
matter of
and they really felt before
are the topics
they were
representing the case that they were making
not only
there but in Moscow that they made several concessions to you.
K:
They have made concessions --
D:
Point 7, point 10, and this
about Laos and Cambodia thing.
So to us they tell us that everything now match -- and ours and you
really proposal from your side have a
agreement so this --
K:
No, what's in the agreement is very easy to handle.
D:
Yes.
K:
It's very easy to handle, you just have to take my word for it. Except
possibly one point which is also nothing compared to what we have already
settled.
D:
So what really to proceed --
K:
Well, I want to keep them -- I cannot get a message back to them for
about 24 to 36 hours because I have to meet with the President tomorrow
who has been in New York today.
D:
Yeah, I understand. Really, Henry, situations like this one I simply
would like to check it with you. Okay? The general message is that you
called and really you expressed it must be in at certain way but
practically the same message. I send this telegram to Moscow. So I
am prepared to send once again just saying that you spoke with me and
you are really just repeating on your own what's said because there is
nothing specifically. But the question really is first do you think It
could be done everything or is now doesn't look
practical
but they sometimes interests me, before the election or after the election?
K:
I think the final signature should now be after the election.
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TELCON
- 6 -
Amb. Debrynin/Mr. Kissinger
11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972
D:
But the agreements, I mean --
K:
But we could agree on the document we will support in Salgon and we
will assume the responsibility and we will not have to go back to them.
D:
Yeah, I understand.
K:
But they will have to give us B few weeks to get it done.
D:
You mean after?
K:
Yes. We will do it as fast as possible but we have to do it in our own
way.
B:
But your old schedule which
is it really do you
think everything is kept as it was before except final signature or you have
some ...
K:
No after Supposing Le Due The and I met next week and supposing we
could agree, then the only thing that has to be obtained is the agreement
of our allies. There will not be another appeal for changes.
D:
I understand.
K:
And we will make that as at flat commitment to you, not just to them.
D:
Yeah, that after agreement with them, you will only
......
K:
And they have always known that I would have to go to Saigon. But now
that I have all of Saigon's comments, but I'm not supporting all of them.
If we can work out something, that will be then the final text as far as we
are concerned.
D:
After the talk with them, you are going to Saigon and
if they make
you come back with another one?
K:
You can guarantee that if we talk to them, I will not ask them for anymore
changes.
D:
.....
unfortunately, they were under the impression
K:
I have trouble hearing you.
D:
You see unfortunate, Henry, that they got the impression and we to 0
from them and from you rather --
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TELCON
4. # #
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972
T
K:
he ambiguity was always this, I have always told them that I had to
to to Salgon and that I would do my best. Now you can read from the
newspapers that I have met with the Salgon people 15 hours a day for
4 days. Now you have dealt with Vietnamese and you know it doesn't
work so fast.
D:
Yeah. So if I might shorten your message in this way because It's now
in Moscow already 8 o'clock in the morning so if we take into
consideration some urgence of the message. Se I may put it this way,
you called and
......
received some messages from my co-government
and you feel it's rather threatening and may have on the whole
but what you are suggesting now is really to
give a chance to meet once more and to discuss some maybe changes
which you feel as you put It are rather cosmetic ones.
K:
That is correct.
D:
Yes, and that's why you really like them not to be hasty in their decision
but rather to look further into this -- to the
commitment or
rather statement you make that you are serious and once you really
come to agreement, then there will be no any more changes.
K:
I will make a commitment that we will not ask for any more changes.
D:
Yes, this is it. And you are going to tell me tomorrow what really it's
all about?
K:
Exactly.
D:
What is the major issue, which you think is difficult? Could you
mention to me right now? Is it their troops?
K:
Well, the major Issue is to do something about their troops, not all
of them.
D:
Yes,
....
some but it's not to be in a --
K:
And it's not to be written in the agreement.
D:
Yeah, I understand.
K:
And another issue is, you know, where we talk about this Committee.
D:
Committee of what?
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TELCON
- B -
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972
K:
of National Reconcillation.
D:
Oh, yes, yes, yes.
K:
If we could find a synonym for three equal segments, without changing
the substance.
D:
What do you mean synonyms?
K:
You know, some phrase that means the same thing without using that
phrase.
D:
About Committee?
K:
No, equal segments.
D:
Oh, I understand.
K:
Because Thicu has said he will never accept that. Now in practice he will
almost certainly be prepared to accept the substance if we can find some
phrases other than that word. And all the rest la really of a nature that
I shouldn't have to bother you with.
D:
No, no, 1 don't think really because what I would like to mention to
Moscow because I have to make a decision now. Because if then that's
everything, so now they have to -- rather to give the messages to you
really. I've got to do in this case -- up to now we just make it in our
own way but this to understand really I've got to use this occasion
because otherwise it
36 hours coming and then of course
our own command as you would like to make it.
K:
Yes, Now, of course, we will send our own message also,
D:
I understand. I understand but ours could be there as soon.
K:
But yours will be there faster because I have to catch some time with
the President for the exact text tomorrow.
D:
Yeah, I understand. Their answer was about.
K:
Well, their answer was only that they are very serious and we should
keep to the schedule and that we are responsible for the sonsequences.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
6 , .
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
11:22 p. m., October 23, 1972
D:
They mentioned to us the same. The same, saying that we feel that this
was at commitment -- a full commitment, otherwise it is a political
influence.
K:
Well, that's what I want to get across, that it is not a trick.
D:
Yeah. Well, okay, I will send this telegram now to Moscow.
K:
Good, and I'll see you for lunch at one o'clock,
D:
At one o'clock.
K:
Good.
D:
Okay.
K:
Thank you.
D:
Bye, bye, Henry.
wgh
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TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
12:10 a. m., October 24, 1972
K:
[Called in on outside line] I thought you might be someplace where it
didn't --
D:
Oh, no, no, no. You are in the same -- It's better, it's much more --
K:
I'll call you on it in a minute.
D:
Hello.
K:
Anatol.
D:
It's much better because otherwise it's very difficult to by the telephone.
K:
No, I understand.
D:
Yes.
K:
1 wanted to tell you one other thing. I've just talked to the President again.
We as a sign of our good faith are going to stop bombing north of the
20th parallel.
D:
20th parallel.
K:
Yes.
D:
In other words, tomorrow?
K:
It's already been ordered.
D:
Ordered, yeah. North of 20th parallel.
K:
North of the 20th parallel.
D:
Okay. I think it is too rather important.
K:
And we will maintain this as long as we are negotiating.
D;
Yes, okay. I think it's good -- a show of goodwill.
K:
Good.
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TELCON
- 2 -
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
12:10 a. m., October 24, 1972
D:
Okay, I'm sending right now at telegram.
K:
Good, thank you.
D:
Well, until tomorrow. Thank you.
K:
Right. Bye.
D:
Bye, bye.
wgh
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Ambassador Bunker/Kissinger
8:53 a.m. - 10/24/72
K: Hello.
B:
Hello, Henry.
K:
Ellsworth, how are you?
B:
Fine.
K:
Ellsworth, I'm getting in touch with you by cable.
B:
Right.
K:
On that one matter you sent me which I just received about the
misinterpretation. Now if that stuff is put out it is total suicide.
This is what we are fighting in the press here. Now if they say
that's what it is, we're dead.
B:
Yeh.
K:
Then whether words are taken in or out is immaterial.
B:
Right.
K:
They are giving this thing - first of all there is no talk whatever
of the lower level stuff. I don't know where they get that from.
B:
Well, what they're talking about is what was in the - what was in
some of the previous proposals. That's what Lam is talking about.
K:
Yeh, but if he wants to be able to play in some achievements he
ought to see that this is not the current thing and that they should
stay a million miles away from that sort of an accusation. They' re
committing total suicide here. I mean not with us, we're trying to
be helpful but in the way the public debate is going to be shaped here.
B:
Yeh. Yeh.
K:
The reason I call you so urgently is just if there is any chance of
getting to them tonight to calm them down.
B:
I doubt it very much Henry.
K:
Well, at least first thing in the morning.
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2
B:
Yes, well I think of what is taking place here now. There are
mass meetings being organized all around the country and people
are getting stirred up against - all of the talk is against a coalition
government and they are against a three-segment coalition govern-
ment.
K:
Well, it's either
B:
They are given the impression that this is what's trying to be forced
on them.
K:
This could either be very clever or very insane. It depends on how
they then represent the outcome.
B:
Yes, that's right. That's what I say. That's what I said in that
message.
K:
Yeh. Ellsworth, you've been a tower of strength and we'll be getting
in touch with you by cable with details, of course.
B:
Right. All right. Fine.
K:
But it's essentially here the way I told you it would be.
B:
It is.
K:
Yeh.
B:
Well, I'll probably get a cable from you in the morning, would I?
K:
No doubt.
B:
OK. All right, fine Henry.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Ziegler/Kissinger
9:50 a.m. - 10/24/72
K:
Hello.
Z:
Hi, Henry.
K:
Yes, Ron.
Z:
We're going to do a press picture of your ten o'clock meeting, OK ?
K:
Yes. Do I have to be on my knees?
Z:
No, just be there. I mentioned it to the President and I did it in
a different way then I did it to Rogers, but - and I am going to
mention it to Rogers - that the film that we use will be film where
they'll underline stories about the negotiations and so forth. So
I mentioned that to the President. He should get the word and I
think he has that during the picture session there shouldn't be
smiling and stuff - nothing stern, but it should be serious-looking.
K:
Right.
Z:
Now I'll cover that with Rogers. I've already mentioned it to the
President. OK?
K:
Ok.
Z:
You do agree, don't you?
K:
Yes, we should look optimistic.
Z:
Yeh, not down, not too serious, but also not laughing and smiling.
Just a serious to it.
K:
Absolutely. Good.
Z:
Thank you, Henry.
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TELCON
Clark MacGregor/Kissinger
12:50 p.m. - 11/24/72
K:
Hello.
M:
How are you, sir. Welcome home.
K:
I'm fine, thank you.
M:
Henry, the purpose of my call is very simple and hear me out for
about a minute because I know your initial reaction - or I suspect
your initial reaction will be as negative as mine was and then I
thought about it a little bit more and I thought maybe I could accom-
plish something. Here is the purpose of my call. NBC's TODAY
show has called this office, the campaign headquarters for the
President, and said "We would like a program exclusively on Vietnam
tomorrow morning. We would like Mr. MacGregor to appear and
we would like some representative of George McGovern to appear. 11
My initial reaction, for obvious reasons, was negative and then I
began, Henry, to think about it a little bit more and to think about
how we have been damaged by McGovern's appearance, hour long
appearance on FACE THE NATION or ISSUES AND ANSWERS,
whatever it was on Sunday and by his repeated misstatement of the
record.
K:
I don't mind your appearing.
M:
It occurred to me if I appeared and confined my remarks exclusively
to the record of efforts that the President has ma de through you
and others to achieve
K:
I think you should appear.
M:
OK.
K:
And I think you should come over here and get a little briefing from
Haig before you do it.
M:
Oh, I will. I wouldn't even consider it unless that was acceptable
to you.
K:
Yes. Because for example they keep saying that what we are doing
is what they've been proposing. You can't tell them what we're doing
but you can say the record will demonstrate that this is a total
outrageous misstatement. Then another thing they're saying is that
we could have settled on the terms we are now negotiating for years
ago. You just call that a total absolute lie.
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2
M:
Good. That'll be very helpful and I think it's necessary right no W,
Henry.
K:
Well, you go ahead and do that.
M:
All right and I'll call Muriel and make a date with Al.
K:
Right.
M:
OK.
K:
Good. Can you put it off one more day?
M:
I'll try but they want it tomorrow morning.
K:
Well, if you could do it till Thursday because a number of things
are happening.
M:
I see.
K:
If you could just delay it one day.
M:
All right. I'll see what I can do.
K:
Good.
M:
Thank you.
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TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
3:07 pm - 10/24/72
K:
Hello.
L:
Henry, welcome back!
K:
How are you?
L:
Pretty good. Did you survive all right?
K:
Yes, barely. I want to thank you for all the cooperation from
your people.
L:
Well, I think they've--
K:
You've been terrific. You're going away tomorrow, aren't you?
L:
Well, I just wondered if I should or not. I've got this nuclear
planning.
K:
I think you should. What time are you leaving?
L:
I'm leaving about 9:00 o'clock.
K:
I'm just wondering whether you want to have breakfast first?
L:
Well, maybe it would be a good idea, Henry, to have it.
K:
At 8:00 o'clock.
L:
Okay.
K:
Are you going to yell at me as I come in?
L:
No, I never yell at you. I think though it probably- - Ben will stay
here. He'll be here and be in touch with me all the time.
K:
Good. Nothing is going to happen, I think. How long are you going
to be gone?
L:
I'll be back here Monday night.
K:
I think you are safe.
L:
You think I'm safe!
K:
Yes.
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TELCON
-2-
Laird/Kissinger
3:-7 pm - 10/24/72
L:
Well I think probably, well I don't like to have--the Chairman's
going with me, and I'll get him back here maybe. - - he was going
on to Germany, and I don't think we'd better stay there too long.
K:
Well, let's decide when we talk in the morning.
L:
All right, fine.
K:
8:00 o'clock and I'll bring Haig.
L:
Good.
K:
Okay.
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TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Joe Kraft
10/24/72 4:17
JK:
Hi, Henry, how are you?
HK:
Okay. Joe I may have a little trouble getting to you, I know
you asked to see me and I just wanted to call you to explain
that I'm going to be pretty busy for a couple of days.
JK:
I see. You couldn't see me thursday, you don't think.
HK:
Oh Thursday, I probably could, but not before Thursday.
JK:
Well, if yoiu could Thursday morning, that would be fine.
HK:
I'll do my best. I'm planning a press conference on Thursday
sometime.
JK:
I see.
HK:
So after that.
JK:
Okay fine. Could you indicate on the phone what you think
you they've really moved quite a long way haven't
they?
HK:
Oh yeh, I think we are making.
JK:
I mean both on prisoners and the time limit between ceasefire
and political settlement0-
HK:
I think we made good progress.
JK:
Are there other areas where you think.
HK:
Oh I think we've made all along good progress.
JK:
No, no, I mean in other areas where you think there's been
movement on their part-
HK:
Ah
Oh yeh, oh yes.
JK:
At the ceasefire arrangements
HK:
Well I don't want to go into ahm
JK:
I see. Are you going to be going back to paris?
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Page 2
HK:
I really haven't set a date yet, but I would expect--obviously
conversations are going to continue --
JK:
Yeh. Is there a reparations agreement?
HK:
No.
JK:
Nom-no figure or anything like that?
HK:
No.
JK:
Where does Thieu stand--is he coming along or digging in.
HK:
Well you know when you make a compromise peace both sides--
Iwouldnt I take what either side now says as the gospel because
both sides now have to posture themselves, ah vis-a-vis
what they've been saying previously.
JK:
Oh I see--
HK:
I wouldn't take at face value all the various forumla that are being
printed about the nature of the settlement that are being discussed.
JK:
I see, yeh. How about timing. is there going to be something that
he can do between now and then-or election day?
HK:
That we can do between now and election day?
JK:
Yeh.
HK:
You know, I know this sounds riduclous, but we've not working on
in terms of election day--
JK:
I know, but I think Mr. Thieu is.
HK:
In what sense?
JK:
To delay things, halt things--
HK:
What difference does it make?
JK:
I don't think it makes much to me but I think it makes some to him.
I think it means something to Van Dong--that was an extremely
adroit interview that he gave.
HK:
That's what you expect from Pham Van Dong--
JK:
I know. I was beginning to doubt him--no that is what you'd expect.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Page 3
HK:
No, but you know, I've always had the view that whenever they'd
make concessions, they'd make them all at once, rather than in
dibblets. I consider the election an artificial deadline There
might have been a reason in '68 to rough it for the election on the
one hand and there may have been a reason for Thieu to hold out
beyond the election but that won't change the basic outcome now.
I mean unless McGovern is to win the election in which case but
that wouldn't improve Thieu's position.
JK:
No, not at all. Will the President be mkaing a statement?
HK:
That depends on developments.
JK:
I see.
HK:
You know I don't say it's impossible, but yousee as you get to
a certain phase of negotiations you suddenly then discover a lot
of nuances which you sort of brush aside when you can⁺t even
begin to see the the shape of it--now they may be complex and
they may take time, but they are of a different order of difficulty
than you original problem which is what's the shape of the settlement
going to belike. I mean you knew take SALT you knew in the last
two months there was going to be an agreement whether it was
going to be signed one month or another was really a subsidiary
question. It's not a perfect analogy but what I am saying is take
categories in which you have some fundamental agreement then
you suddenly become very conscious of details which previously
you didn't even examine now they'll take you some to work out
even
they may XX produce a temporary impasse but you know damn well
that if you could settle the fundamental question, you're going to
find a way out of that impasse because it¹s in a position which you
are both determined to reach-
JK:
Can you indicate what the details are that are in the nuances
that have suddenly become --
HK:
No, you know the trouble is if I tell you these things, you'll draw
very profound conclusions from them I'm trying to give you the
order of problems that arise and that it is possible to be
hard to know whether you can tell them one week or another week.
But you don' have the sense as you had a month ago where I
had one theory of how it might end and someone else had on another
theory, but neither side really had a hell of a lot to go except
its assessment of the situation very little empirical proof.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page 4
JK:
Yeh, Okay--
HK:
But I'll see you Thursday Joe and things may be a littler clearer
by then
JK:
Good, fine. Thanks a lot.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Alex Johnson
10/24/72 4:30 p.m.
HK:
Alex, how are you?
AJ:
How are you, that's the question.
HK:
I'm okay--well, we've had a hectic day--
AJ:
I must say, just from a physical point of view and an emotional one.
This is--
HK:
That was about the roughest four days I've ever had.
AJ:
About the roughest you; ve had, I'm sure.
HK:
I've had brutal ones but they won't so emotionally painful.
AJ:
No, and such crucial issues as this.
HK:
Yeh, Bill Sullivan incidentally was terrif ic-
AJ:
Well thanks--I have great regard for him.
HK:
It was a tremendous contribution and it really lays the basis for a
sort of cooperation which will be characteristic rather than --
AJ:
Fine, very good. Well, I must say he speaks very high for you--
Henry, I talked to him this morning, of course.
HK:
I mean not with him just, but I think we can do this now on a regular
basis
AJ:
Good, good.
HK:
His contribution was first af all, totally loyal, discreet, and substantively
he couldn't have been better.
AJ:
He's got a good grasp of it.
HK:
And he told you about all the changes we obtained-.
AJ:
Yes, Of course I don't have any text here, sometime when it is convenient
I might come over and just go through--
HK:
By all means.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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Page 2
AJ:
I haven't seen the unilateral statements at all.
HK:
We got major ones on Cambodia and Laos
AJ:
That's what I understand.
HK:
I mean really major ones on Cambodia and Laos unbelievable.
AJ:
Yeh, yeh. Well let me say Al did a superb job of keeping us informed
--we find him very fine to work with.
HK:
Alex I have just heard from Ellsworth that Lamb has been briefing
foreign ambassadors and you know these guys are on one of their
AJ:
Did you see the message of Ellsworth came in with this morning
there is a message in from him saying he heard kt hat they were
talking for giving out a briefing paper; he sent Charlie Whitehouse
over right away Charlie Whitehouse got it and was horrified-
HK:
Well they are doing it on the basis of an old plan
AJ:
Then then Charlie got some changes made and Ellsworth sent in the
change paper--have you seen this exchange-
HK:
No I haven't seen the changed papers-
AJ:
There are three telegrams, one saying that they were doing this
then one sending in the original paper and then two the paper that
he'd been able to get modified
HK:
They are talking on the basis of a proposal we no longer maintain.
AJ:
I find it hard to know what they are talking about- I haven't got the
full text of -
HK:
Would you have been able- the thing that I was proudest of was that
we had destroyed the coalition government.
AJ:
You know, Thieu is also in his speech talking about coalition government
-well of course this comes out of de Bourchgrave (I always have trouble
with his name) interview up there in Hanoi Now in that interview
if you read the text of it, the text Pham Van Dong is very careful not
to use the word government, however, the Newsweek article and all
the other articles based on it very freely use the word--
HK:
Because the goddamn newsmen have a vested interest in it.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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Page 3
HK:
But if we would take the position this is clearly not a coalition
government--
AJ:
I agree.
HK:
The thing that worries me is that Ellsworth is under the impression
that they have for example told the British the membership of that
control commission--
AJ:
Isee.
HK
And if that's the case, I think we better start talking to Canada and
Indonesia.
AJ:
That's what I feel I don't know did you talk at all with I talked
to Secretary earlier this mo rning--
HK:
No I didn't have a chance to mention it to the Secretary-. I used to be
opposed to it.
AJ:,
Yes, yes, I know you W ere.
HK:
But I wonder whether the maniacs have leaked it.
AJ:
I have no indication yet that it's got to the Canadians bf the Indonesians
however, I would expect Lon Nol probably to tell the Indonesians and
I would expect the British to pick this up--or the Canadians to pick this
up in Saigon, but I don't have any indication yet that they' ve done so.
HK:
Do you think we should talk to them or what do you think?
AJ:
I think the earlier we talk to them the better I don't see how we'd lose
much by it. They are going to get us at a distorted form--
HK:
Why don't you make a suggestion how to do it.
AJ:
All right, the way we should do it is to have Bill Rogers arrange to
see Mitchell Sharp in New York or something of that kind to make thhe
broad pitch to him on it.
HK
Well then why don't we plan on it.
AJ:
The Canadaians are not going to be -enthusiastic about this.
HK:
But Bill thinks if we appeal to Trudesu he might do it.
AJ:
No Bill thinks he might do better with Mitchell Sharp than we might
do with Trudeau.
HK:
I meant that Bill Sullivan thought--
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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Page 4
AJ:
Oh, Bill Sullivan thought--he just meant to appeal to the Canadians.
HK:
No, no, let's try sharp first and we can always go to Trudeau from
there.
AJ:
Yes, yes. All right. The Secretary can do that at any time.
HK"
Why don't we wait until tomorrow and keep it in mind.
AJ:
And then a letter or something from the Secretary to Malek or
--we will have to have somebody go out to Djkarta and explain it
to him. Now what we were thinking about was if and when you
--if and when Bill at least makes another trip out there--
HK:
Yeh, but I thought if those bastards haven't kicked us in the groins
I was going to send Bill down from
AJ:
That's what he mentioned.
HK:
from Saigon.
AJ:
Yeh, all right, let me talk to the Secretary again, I think that he
and Mitchell xxe getting together in New York quietly and then something
from him to Malek and sending somebody out to --
HK:
or from the President to Suharto I don't know which is better.
AJ:
I don't know either we can do them both on the one, two; that is,
try it at the level and keep the President in reserve or I don't know
how does he feel or how do you feel. On Suharto I don't know.
HK:
I am sure on Canada the Secretary and Sharp are the best level.
AJ:
Yeh, I'm clear on that.
HK:
On the other, Ithink the President and Suhart may be better.
AJ:
I agree, all right, let me work something up on this.
HK:
Good and we'll be in close touch and keep you fully informed. We keep
getting little billydos from the North Vietnamese screaming --insisting
we sign the agreement this month.
AJ:
Yeh, I know, now you are expecting something later on this evening.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page 5
HK:
Yeh.
AJ:
I think you are doing exactly the right thing - - let's keep the dialog
open--
HK:
What we' ve told them is that we need another round after that now
that XX our consultations are completed in Saigon that ought to be
definitive
AJ:
That's perfectly reasonable.
HK:
I don't know how we are going to bring Saigon along, to tell you the truth.
AJ:
I think they are going to come.
HK:
There are two explanations either he's gone the Diem route or the
new route or he's setting up strong men which he can then knock down
and say he drove--
AJ:
That's right. I hope of course it's the latter he really has no place to
go, but of course hesperfectly capable like all Vietnamese completely
irrational too.
HK:
Because when he talks about this unfortunate ceasefire here we have
been proposing it since October, 1970, he signed off on all of them,
there wasn't one proposal for withdrawal of NVA forces in any of the
ceasefire proposals, so what the hell are we doing to him.
AJ:
I know, I know, I know, I know. You'll get no argument out of me
on that.
HK:
I thought you were going to take his side.
AJ:
(laughing)
AJ:
HK:
Okay thanks for letting us have Bill Sullivan-he's yours to be of any
help he can any time.
HK:
He'll be in as an equal partner from now on.
AJ:
Thanks a lot.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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"ocrText": "TelCon\nWinston Lord/Mr. Kissinger\n9:30 am, October 14, 1972\nK:\nWin?\nL:\nYes, sir.\nK:\nI might have an up to date copy first of all I insist that every\ncopy of these documents are numbered and that somebody keep\ncontrol.\nL:\nRight.\nK:\nWell, but here's Dick Camþbell handing out copies to ;me as if,\nyou know, as if it were a visiting card.\nL:\nThere were three copies done over-night and put into my safe\nand just told them by phone that you should have it if you asked\nfor it this morning, I didn't get a chance to number them.\nK:\nOkay, well that's all right.\nL:\nThe rest are in my safe.\nK:\nBut what I need is--the only way that I can live through this\nstage is that I can keep drilling the stuff into mk head before\nI go there. I'm not just a talking machine.\nL:\nRight.\nK:\nWell, I don't have any copy that has the three changes that you\ngave them on Thursday.\nL:\nYes, sir, I'm going to code that in. I haven't just done that yet.\nK:\nYes, but could you just as soon as you get in one copy I need\ntwo things, one copy with all the changes that we have given\nthem of a substantive nature, the three, and the two we gave\nthem yesterday. That makes four. And another copy that has\nall the nit picks on it.\nL:\nA separate copy.\nK:\nRight.\nL:\nAnd the differences that I left behind.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nWinston Lord/Mr. Kissinger\n- -2-\n9:30 am, October 14, 1972\nK:\nPlus the Sullivan nit picks\nL:\nWhich we went ahead.\nK:\nYeah.\nL:\nFine.\nK:\nBkut, they should be in different colors so that I--\nL:\nI understand.\nK:\nBeacause otherwise we'll never make it.\nL:\nRight.\nK:\nI want to change now one of the insertions we gave them but I\nam trying to find what the God damned one was. I think the\neasiest way to express this thing of control, rather than say\ncontrol, administrative control including foreign relations is\nto say \"pending the political settlement, the two parties will continue\nto exercise their functions in the areas they control\". Then you\ndon't get into the question of what these functions are--\nL:\nI don't see much of your mention foreign relations.\nK:\nRight.\nL:\nWell, I'm coming right in and I will get it up to you, it won't\ntake long at all.\nK:\nThat's fine.\nL:\nRight.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger\n9:52 am, October 14, 1972\nS:\nHello.\nK:\nHello, Bill, two things, I just wanted to check with you- you are\nworking on this economic thing?\nS:\nCorrect. And I've got the multilateral furnishings already here,\nK:\nAnd, then some bilateral- if ,you could get some idea of what\na bilateral agreement, you know, for a commission would like.\nS:\nFor a commission, yeah.\nK:\nFor a joint commission. The second thing is--\nS:\nHenry, let me ask on that--I'm very much an expert on that,\ncan I discuss that with anybody else.\nK:\nOh, I'd rather not\nS:\nOkay, then mine will have to be fairly amateurish, I\nwouldn' but I'll take a crack at it.\nK:\nGood. Second, we've just got to get you people set up over there.\nS:\nThey ve just showed me the New York Times, but I don't know--\nthat sounds like an awful lot of speculation because--\nK:\nBut, if they don't talk, there can't be any speculation. There's\nno speculation coming out of here.\nS:\nWell, I don't know where the hell I tkxx think that--Murray\nMarder's was clearly off the top of his head, it was so damened\ninaccurate. There was nothing in it as far as I could see.\nK:\nWell, but, can't we just tell yo;ur people to shut up?\nS:\nWell, I do, and the Secretary has given that instruction.\nUnfortunately, it's a lot of people who don't know anything whoc--\nK:\nWell, can't they just be ordered on the pain of getting thrown out\nto shut up.\nS:\nI'll speak to the Secretary about it, kyes.\nK:\nI guarantee you, shut them up. My guys don't talk.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nAmb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger\n9:52, October 14, 1972\nS:\nI don't these things really represent--at least Murray Marder's\nthing didn't represent anybody talking. The Stolz one looks a\nlittle more like\nK:\nI haven't even seen the Stolz one.\nS:\nWhat he says is that State is supposed to be getting probable\nresponses from Hanoi as well as Saigon, with possible changes\nin the American position. Where the hell all that is coming\nfrom, I don't know.\nK:\nWell, I just wish that all would be quiet.\nS:\nYeah. Henry, I talked with Alex last night. And this is his\nsituation. His mother is being operated on at 10:00 a. m.\nCalifornia time which is 1:00 pm our time.\nK;\nYeah.\nS:\nShe should be out of intensive care at around 3:00 our time\nThe doctors have told Alex itis sort of a 50/50 chance that\nshe may not survive the operation.\nK:\nOh.\nS:\nHe will know, he says, by about 7:00 pm our time whether she's\nstabilized. Now, if you really want him back to see him before\nMonday, the only thing we can think of would be to send a plane\nwhich would pick up his sister and she could go out and sort of\nrelieve him there, and he can turn around and come back on the\nplane this evening, Saturday evening.\nK:\nWell, let's consider that, don't you think.\nS:\nThe other way would be to stay ovser, he has missed tahe last\nplane this evening, and come back on Sunday. What he proposes\nto do is call me this evening after he sees whether she's stabilized,\nbut if you want to set the plane in motion, that has to be done prior\nto that.\nK:\nOkay, well let me look into that first.\nS:\nOkay\nK:\nGood, thank you\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- -3-\nAmb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger\n9:52, October 14, 1972\nS:\nI could start some of the stuff that you had proposed he start--\nperhaps John and Al and I could get started on it and leave it\nwith Al and he could patch it with Alex later--\nK:\nGood, let's do that too.\nS:\nOkay, bye\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDFild*\nTELCON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Kissinger\n9:55 a.m. 10/15/72\nAD:\nHello.\nHK:\nAnatol?\nAD:\nYes. You called me yesterday.\nHK:\nI did.\nAD:\nWell, I just had a nice weekend with my wife.\nHK:\nWell, whenever they tell me you are in at car without a telephone\nI know you are with Harriman.\nAD:\nI an started to call you back but they mentioned to me that you\nhad called back. It was around 11:00 of clock and I didn't want\nto bother you.\nHK:\nRight. Two things: one, I'll get you that letter on the postpone-\nment.\nAD:\nFine.\nHK:\nThat's being written now and that's fine.\nAD:\nOK.\nHK:\nAnd also it looks like as if that Berlin thing is all right.\nAD:\nOh, fine.\nHK:\nWe will just confirm it. I'll let you know by noon, all right?\nAD:\nGood.\nHK:\nOne urgent matter to discuss with you.\nAD:\nYes.\nHK:\nI k discussed yesterday the settlement with the President.\nAD:\nOn this.\nHK:\nNo, with the Vietnamese.\nAD:\nOh yes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2 I ,\nHK:\nAnd you know also discussed with him what they indicated the\nproblems were.\nAD:\nYes.\nHK:\nFor us really, the two biggest problems are not the ones they\nmentioned, all of these could be settled. The two biggest prob-\nlems are the units in the south. We recognize they can't pull\nthem all out, but if there could be at least some token move-\nment and most importantly the question of military supplies\nto them. And what the President wants to do is to write a\nletter to Brezhnev.\nAD:\nYes.\nHK:\nAnd, which I can get to you this morning.\nAD:\nUm hum.\nHK:\nAnd see whether it is possible for you to express in a strictly\nprivate way your general intentions in this respect.\nAD:\nI understand.\nHK:\nBecause If that were done, then he would feel more justified to\ntake the steps, the formal steps that are in the agreement;\nwhich, of course, would not be public.\nAD:\nI understand. This is just for his own consideration. I\ncould send him a\nHK:\nHK:\nNow, you see one problem we have. We have almost no\nincentive to settle it by November 7.\nAD:\nYou have not?\nHK:\nNo, I mean I'm honest with you.\nAD:\nYes.\nHK:\nBecause it can only make trouble and it cannot gain us a hell\nof a lot. But on the other hand, it's a war that's gone on for\nten years and if the conditions are right one shouldn't say\njust because there's an election one waits four more years.\nAnd Hanoi does seem ready to settle now. So if the conditions\ncould If be met we would settle quickly. Also, for your informa-\ntion I'm going to Salgon and I'll arrive there Tuesday. Now\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nif it were possible to get some answer from you by If Wednesday.\nI wouldn't use it there but it would K affect the confidence with\nwhich I acts in insisting on a settlement which believe me will\nnot be easy for them to accept.\nAD:\nI understnad.\nHK:\nYou see if it leads to a blowup in Saigon we will just have to\ndelay.\nAD:\nI understand.\nHK:\nWe cannot have a public confrontation with Saigon during the\nelection ampaign.\nAD:\nI understand. But in this case does that mean that bith of us\nwill do something----\nHK:\nIf we knew this, if we knew what your intentions are it would\nreally then enable us to take greater risks. It seems to me\nyou know, I don't want to speak for your government it seems\nto me imporbable the t you would--that under conditions of\npeace your incentive would certainly--would seem to me to\nbe less.\nAD:\nYeah.\nHK:\nWe would certainly be prepared to reduce our military aid\nenoumously.\nAD:\nYes, yes. Well you see, you would want the last two put in\nthe letter because I think with only two days left it would be\nrather difficult to get all answers. The last onex you put to\nme.\nHK:\nSchetk What's the last one?\nAD:\nYou mentioned a reduce of our aid to North Vietnam.\nHK:\nI would like some indication of that, yes.\nAD:\nWell, I mean you may put in your letter but I am afraid that it would\nbe rather difficult to get by Wednesday a reply on the scope of\nof questions.\nHK:\nWhat are the other questions?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- a -\nAD:\nYou mentioned about Hanoi in the sense that you would like\nto have--about the token--and military supplies--token\nmovement out of south Vietnam.\nHK:\nOf their forces.\nAD:\nYes well that is two and the third one as I understand.\nHK:\nNo, we don't mean their supplies moved, we mean their\nforces.\nAD:\nBut on their supplies, you would like to have some kind of\nunderstanding.\nHK:\nWith you, yes.\nAD:\nUnderstanding with us or with them?\nHK:\nWith you.\nAD:\nThen I didn't understand you. I thought you---\nHK:\nI don't want an understanding with them about the supplies.\nAD:\nI thought about supplies you remember you have an argument\nor a question of----\nHK:\nI'll handle that.\nAD:\nReplacement.\nHK:\nWe don't need you for that.\nAD:\nSo it was replacements.\nHK:\nNo, no I'm talking about the question of\nAD:\nOf token a movement of their troops.\nHK:\nYes. The movement of their troops out of the country.\nAD:\nToken one. Yes then the have to recognize.\nHK:\nNo, no, they just has do it. Our intelligence will pick it up.\nAD:\nYes, all right. And the second about--\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 1 -\nHK:\nor your supplies.\nAD:\nWe have got to make some kind of indication to you.\nHK:\nThat's right.\nAD:\nTo you.\nHK:\nTo us. And that might then enable us to make a very rapid\nsettlement.\nAD:\nWell, it's at rather difficult question but of course I will send\nimmediately this to the firse Secretary because it is a question\nof rather serious importance as you perfectly understand.\nHK:\nRight.\nnot\nAD:\nYes, I will do it. When is the letter but/ in reference to your\nour talks.\nHK:\nThe letter does not refer to our talks\nAD:\nBecause it is government-to-government now.\nHK:\nNo, no, what do you mean. The letter does not refer to anything\nthat you said to me.\nAD:\nYes because.\nHK:\nNo, you just tell him here is the problem.\nAD:\nOK. When you will give me this letter ?\nHK:\nBy noon.\nAD:\nBy noon today, yes. You will send some messenger?\nHK:\nYou want to come over at noon?\nAD:\nAs you like, I could come.\nHK:\nWhy don't you come to the Map Room. And then I'll also have\nthe postponement letter for you.\nAD:\nOK.\nSo at noon.\nHK:\nRight\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Kissinger\n10:20 a. m. 10/15/72\nAD:\nYes.\nHK:\nAnatol?\nHB:\nYes.\nHK:\nWe're putting together that letter about the postponement.\nWhat years do your records show that we agreed on?\nAD:\nWell, I don't have it here, I just will try to recall----\nI remember it was, I think one year was including--\nwell I don't even, Henry, I am afraid--do you not have it\non your own?\nHK:\nWell, I'll find it, I just thought you might have it easier\nthan I did.\nAD:\nWell, I don't have it just unfortunately right now. I am afraid\nI just don't---\nHK:\nOK, I'll\nAD:\nI do remember but I'm not so sure.\nHK:\nI'll find it.\nAD:\nThere is, I think, a six-year--well including all the years\nincluding one---'75, you remember.\nHK:\nI know '75 and '77 are years.\nAD:\nYes, will I don't know, you look in your files. We don't\nhave any files here with me today.\nHK:\nGood, thank you.\nAD:\nThank you very much.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Joe Alsop\n11:35 a.m. 10/14/72\nHK:\nJoe, how are you.\nJA:\nHello, Henry. Are you less tired--have you recovered?\nHK:\nNot completely\nJA:\nNancy told me you were dead tired\nHK\nShe tells me she's arranged that we all get together tonight.\nJA:\nYes indeed she has--I ordered a very quiet dinner here.\nHK:\nOh good.\nJA:\nTo save money and it is generally much quieter than a restaurant\nand pleasanter in my opinion.\nHK:\nGood, shall we say--can we make it as late as 8:30? Or what time did\nyou set it ?\nJA:\nWell, I said 8:00, but you can--as near as you can make to 8:00\nthat's all right--it's just a matter of warming things up.\nHK:\nGood, as close to 8:00 as I can make it.\nJA:\nGood, good. Marvelous, lovely--see you then. I haven't asked\nanyone else at all.\nHK:\nThat's a relief.\nJA:\nGood, good.\nHK:\nSee you then.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSecretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger\n11:40\na.m.\n10/14/72\nSI:\nWelcome home, Henry.\nHK:\nThank you Jack.\nSI:\nYou've hardly had time to sleep.\nHK:\nNot much.\nSI:\nSorry to burden you further so soon after your very important\nmissions\nHK:\nThat's all right.\nSI:\nI was calling just to - on this question of flank participation\nof the MBFR. As you know for the past several months we have\ntaken the position that participations should be limited to those\nwhose troops were involved, and then we agreed because of the\nstrong pressures of the Turks and Italians and Greeks that we\nwould permit an observer--one observer from each flank that\nwould represent the three-flank nations for example in the south\n--they would rotate. The Turks particularly came back hard on\nthat--against that. And in a less degree by the Italians, but they\ndidn't have to speak out because they had the Turks taking a strong\nposition. The Turkish FonMin spoke to the Secretary in New York\nabout it and made noises\nHK:\nWell the stupidity of NATO will never cease to astonish me. What\nwe are working ourselves into are two issues--one is this one, the\nother one is the mania for introducing substantive discussions in\nJanuary. The Russians will do one of two things--they either will\nnot agree to it, or will use the January meeting as the substitute\nfor the whole MBFR. Now we have agreed with them and I must be\nable to\nSI:\nThis is why I am calling you, Henry, to know what your feel for\nRussians are because\nHK:\nMy feeling is first\nSI:\nfoolish for us to be drafting cables and doing things unless\nwe have your feel of what\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nHK:\nMy feeling is the Russians will go through precisely with the procedure\nwe agreed to that is to say--a procedural MBFR conference which\ncan discuss agendas and- in January and the regular one in September.\nIf we start loading substance into it in January, it's going to collapse.\nI see no need for it either. We aren't ready--\nSI:\nThat's a separate issue than the flank participation--\nHK:\nThe frank participation, I don't understand the Turks because they\nwill wind up expanding the area of this in a most undesirable way.\nSI:\nThat's what we always--\nHK:\nThat isn't our fault. I willing to listen to anything you suggest\nSI:\nI think the only other possibility is to if we agreed to accede to\nthe Turks in effect is to agree for the exploratory talks in January\nbut not necessarily for the negotiations until we see what happens\nin the exploration--is to admit the flank states in effect that would\nbe five additional observers sitting there. Now this is what we have\nbeen opposing, but the question then arises which is are we more apt\nto have real problem with the Turks and Turkish government vis-a-vis\nthe undesirability of having these additionalmembers sitting there during\nexploratory talks with the possibleprecedent for the negotiations but\nwithout a commitment for it.\nHK:\nI think we haven't got much choice.\nSI:\nThis is the point and the reason I think we sent over a draft of such\ncable informally to you, that I didn't circulate around because as I\nsay I want to get your feel of what you - -happened in Moscow because\nit does seem to me rather silly for us to be doing things when you may\nhave a very good feel of what is possible and what isn't.\nHK:\nExactly.\nSI:\nOn the other point I did send over a memorandum to the various people\nwhich was more on the point you said on the question of whether or not\none should talk substance or not. we tried to point out the advantages\nand disadvantages of both--and what the alternatives were.\nHK:\nBut we are pretty well committed to keeping it non-substantive.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nSI\nThis is the otherpoint that from my view I wanted to learn from\nyou what had happened and what--these were.\nHK:\nYeh, we arepretty well committed to keeping it non-substantive.\nExcept for agenda\nwhich of course gets you substance\nindirectly.\nSI:\nYeh. We can take it to whatever degree you think the traffic\nwill bear. And then we can take it from there. But other than\n-going back to participation--i a sense I gather had been\npreferred not to-lay for a while before we go back and say that\nall the flank nations considered observers and so I've told our\npeople to do nothing until after the meeting on Monday--there's\na NATO council meeting on Monday--just sit and see what happens\n-probably nothing much although there may be some more objections\nand then make the final decision that I think my inclination will be\nto go ahead and permit the observers for only exploration--hope\nit doesn't set a precedent and see what recognize that\nthey may come back and say we won't--don't like these observers\nand then it at least puts us in the position vis-a-vis Turks.\nIf we want to go ahead with the conference which we do we will have\nto go ahead with it and just recognize the Turks.\nHK:\nRight.\nSI:\nOne other thing on a different subject. We have to send in our\n'74 budget to the OMB on development aid and support and assistance\nand we're quite far apart from OMB on development aid and I think\nit would be very helpful if I could get you and Weinberger together\nfor 15 minutes just SO everyone understood what the circumstances\nwere-\n-\nHK:\nWhy not try for that next week.\nSI:\nYeh. I'll ask my secretary to try to set up a date.\nHK:\nGood.\nSI:\nThank you sir.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nSen. Javits/Mr. Kissinger\n11:50 am, Octosber 14, 1972\nJ:\nHenry, how are you?\nK:\nOkay\nJ:\nWelcome home.\nK:\nTkhank you.\nJ:\nListen, Mary and I are having a big fun brunch in New York\ntomorrow and thought you might be there.\nK:\nUnfortunately, I'm not. I'd love to come.\nJ:\nWe invited that Chinese gentlement/but we haven't heard\nfrom him. Remember that fellow you told me about.\nK:\nYeah.\nhim\nJ:\nSo, if you happen to see him or talk to him you might tell/that\nwe'll try again.\nK:\nGood.\nJ:\nHenry, I had quite a talk with Dobrynin. And, sometime when\nyo u get a minute, I'd like to tell you about it because he's in\neffect, invited ideas. In other words, he asked me what\ncould I suggest to find some way out of this thing.\nK:\nYeah.\nJ:\nAnd, I said I'll, you know, I get some general ideas, for example,\nI told him that in the Steeden/Long program in the United States\nwe let them work it off over a period of five ;years by\nand so on, that we have forgiveness clauses, and there was nothing\nlike that in their measure. They said, well there might be something\nto than I suggested the possibility of payment after the people left\nout of their earnings, and he said no they wouldn't want that, it\nwould exaggerate the issue. But, he aaid he is very interested\nin ideas and as soon as I get anything together to back to him.\nWhat I was going to suggest is this: I'd like to put one or two of\nmy own people, even Humphrey would like to join me in trying to\nwork this out--and I'd like to if that's agreeable--\nK:\nThat's fine.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nSen. Javits/Mr. Kissinger\n11:50 am, October 14, 1972\n-2-\nJ:\nI'd like to put some of my own people to perhaps work with\none or more of your's because you people have undoubtedly\nexplored various ideas, and you know, I'd be very glad to\nsee what we can all come up with, and, for whatever it's\nworth, propose it.\nK:\nAll right, well let's see\nJ:q\nBecause he seems to be intxexskedinterested.\nK:\nGood, excellent idea.\nJ:\nAll right, well then, Henry, when you get a chance, I know you\nare just loaded, and I hope everything you' re doing is just\nblessed with success I hope that we can talk about this.\nK:\nI would love it.\nJ:\nWell, I'll have my office, you know, see what your situation is.\nK:\nGood, great.\nJ:\nGoodbye, take care.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n11:55 a. m., October 14, 1972\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHenry;, there is one thing I have to know; I will probably be talking\nto Mike Mansfield later today due to the fact that he calls me when\nthey adjourn, if they adjourn. Now he may raise the China, I just\nwant to know---\nK:\nYes, we haven't had an answer from them yet.\nP:\nAll right, I can just sayeen\nK:\nBkut we have submitted it to them.\nP:\nYou have submitted it; that's all I need to know, thank you.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nDave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger\n12:50 pm, October 14, 1972\nK:\nHello\nDK:\nHi, Henry\nK:\nHow are you, Dave?\nDK: Fine, how are you sir. Welcome home.\nK:\nThank you\nDK: Guess you're pretty warn down to a frazzle.\nK:\nYes, it's pretty hectic.\nDK: It must have been. Henry, it's probablkynot fair, but I have been\n]\nreading Murray's piece, and amm\nK:\nNobody knows a God damned thing.\nDK: Well, okay, don't get exercised but...\nK:\nWell,; but I have never seen such irresponsible stuff written.\nDK: Well, okay.\nK:\nDo you think we would tell Murray at this stage?\nDK:\nNo, I didn't think you would tell Murrgy anything, but I just wanted\nto satisfy myself. You know, Le Duc Tho is on the recsord about\nthe difficulties-\nK:\nNo, he wasn't on the record. A french journalist overheard him\ntalking to the Russian and Chinese ambassadors and we don't even\nknow the wording of what he said. You know, some people say he\nsaid this \"still some difficulties remaining\". Obviously, or we\nwould announce the settlement.\n(Laughter)\nDK:\nWell, is there any hand holding or guidance you can do for me on\nthis one.\nK:\nNo, I really can t. I realy mustn³t.\nDK: You think it would be too far to say that difference are narrowed\nbut that they' re still serious.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nDave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger\n12:50 pm, October 14, 1972\nK:\nNo, we obviously talked about serious matters or it wouldn't have\nlasted SO long.\nDK:\nBut it would fair to conclude that, you know, there have been a\nnarrowing of these differences and that\nK:\nIn some areas, yeah, and h;ow serious they are just don't want to\ncharacterize.\nDK:\nBut there are problems remaining?\nObviously.\nK:\nYeah.\nDK: And one might reasonably expect that theye mught be another session?\nK:\nThat would be a reasonable assumption.\nDK:\nHenry, is there any thing at all you can tell me for the rationale for\nThieu calling home the ambassadors.\nK:\nNo. I just don't know what he's got in mind.\nDK:\nIt's a mystery to you?\nK:\nYeah.\nDK:\nDo you think it's fair to infer that he's a little nervous.\nK:\nOh, yeahk, I think it is fair.\nDK:\nThen, that would be the explanation for it.\nK:\nThat's quite possible\nDK:\nOkay, I can't bother you. I still hope we can have our luncheon,\nbut you seem to be flying off to Paris every time we try to get set.\nK:\nThat's right.\nDK:\nWell, I'll call again on Monday if I may, and maybe I can set\nsomething up with Dick.\nK:\nGood, Dave, Thank you.\nDK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n10/14/72 1:45 p.m.\nAD:\nHello Henry. I just looked through the information that I received\nand I would like to check with you some points. Well, in general\nit is pretty close to what you said, but there are some things that\nI would like to check with you. On a political side, I will just read\nto you--there is an agreement reached of creation of a political\nstructure consisting of three parts--you know\nHK:\nIt was administrative structure--\nAD:\nThis says a political structure.\nHK:\nWell, we can't accept that. My test is the agreed upon text.\nAD:\nIt says, Henry, it was an agreed upon--no, no, I do not have a\ntext of agreed text--it is just a summary that they make.\nHK:\nNo, but the text I gave you is the agreed text--\nAD:\nIt could be--I am simply telling you what it said--as a political structure\nW\nwhich will include the Revolutionary Government, Saigon, and some\nneutral political forces. You will call created a council--I translate\nfrom Russian now--Soviets of Reconciliation and accord like this one.\nThen in relation of this Council of accord, then there is about elections,\nthen about organization six months after elections, then this structure\nmust not enter into military alliance, then the right for both governments\nto keep their international links, in the\nabout principle of reuni-\nfication, then there is a lengthy page about the creation of mixed two-side,\nthree-sides and four-sides commission and there is a function of them,\nbut it is not of great interest. And this is probably most interesting but\nI am discussing with you personally because their summary--what is\nnot agreed upon, as yet. First, it has not reached an agreement upon\nprecise date of ceasefire,\nHK:\nThat's right. But that's minor--we'll settle that next week.\nAD:\nSecond, it is not agreed upon the procedure of releasing the prisoners.\nThey say that you would like to free all your American prisoners but\nat the same time not all the prisoners which are in the hands of yours\nand Saigon administration.\nHK:\nThat's that issue I mentioned to you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nAD:\nYes, it's exactly what you mentioned, but I understand that you said\nthat within three months it could be settled.\nHK:\nWell, we would use our influence.\nAD:\nYeh, along those lines. Then another one, they said it was not\nsettled the question of about replacements, about waapons\nHK:\nRight.\nAD:\nThey said their impression is you would like to leave for Saigon\nadministration more weapons than for the troups of the revolutionary\ngovernment, then ceases equal principle--the principle of equality.\nHK:\nWell, if they count themselves in we will accept the principle of equality.\nAD:\nLaughs.'\nHK:\nWell, they cannot take the position that they have the unlimited right to\nreceive arms but Saigon does not.\nAD:\nBut they feel that you want to have more for Saigon administration than\nthey.\nHK:\nIt would be very easy to settle if they accept-include themselves in\nthis arrangement.\nAD:\nWhat do you mean include themselves--in what sense?\nHK:\nIf they said--we are willing to say we will regular our military assistance\nby the degree of military assistance they receive.\nAD:\nBut they have on the principle of equality--what is not yet--\nHK:\nThey don't consider themselves part of the PRG.\nAD:\nOh you mean--\nHK:\nThey want to take the position that they can receive unlimited aid\nin the north, but then they will give to the PRG on the principle\nof equality what we give to Saigon.\nAD:\nHm, huh, I see. With one their own.\nHK:\nYou see what I mean?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nAD:\nYeh.\nHK:\nSo there are two possibilities--9f they include themselves we accept\nthe principle of equality. If they don't include themselves we must\nreserve the right to gear the replacements to what they receive.\nAD:\nActually those who are in South Vietnam.\nHK:\nThat's right.\nAD:\nI understand.\nHK:\nOn this point, we will not yield.\nAD:\nThen there is another one they said there is no agreement on the\ncomposition of the international control commission -- these is\na lengthy explanation that you don't like the present composition\nabout 4 members--\nHK:\nNo we'll accept -- that will be settled.\nAD:\nReports Hungary and Poland and you didn't agreed to this one and\nyou propose Canada and Indonesia and but very lengthy--I think this\nis a small one. Then he says they were not agreed upon the function\nabout the international commission--you would like have broader\nauthority and including military contingent for international control\ncommission Then that you insist that both South Vietnamese parties\nwill inform the international commission on the location of their troops\nand so on and so on. Well it isn't really big issue.\nHK:\nThat's already passe. They must have given it to you on an earlier--\nthat is already settled.\nAD:\nNo, no, they gave it to me just after he left--\nHK:\nI think they gave you things so that they could claim a victory afterwards.\nAD:\nOh, it could be. (laughing) Well, about this decision, etc. that the month\nabout the circumstance and demonstrated--they quote you as you skid\nI already mentioned to you. Then they said you mentioned to them that\nafter consultation with the President you will give a reply on a corrections\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 4\nwhich those which agreement had not been reached. So now as I\nunderstand your amendment or what you put in this agreed text\nis your actual reply--yes?\nHK:\nYeh.\nAD:\nYes. Then you agreed that on the 17th you are going to meet with\nXuan Thuy, and then\nand then they say you intend to go to\nHanoi. By the end they put it this way--as you mentioned to them that\nthe United States prepares or inclines to reach agreement of the\nIndoshinese problem before November 7 but they are not so sure that\nyou will keep your promise.\nHK:\n(laughs).\nAD:\nThis is completely off the record I am telling you. So this is the\nsituation I don't know why you put them and then do not assure you\nwill keep your promise? What promises you gave them? (laughing)\nDid you give any promise?\nHK:\nNo, that I would try to get it settled.\nAD:\nYeh, but this is what they are quoting, you said that the United States is\nlooking for to solve all this before the 7th. Well, here we are--and this\nis all the details. of course these are some maybe small differences\nbut it is only in sense of translation. Nothing really.\nHK:\nGood, well, 1 appreciate this.\nAD:\nSo this is situation as it stands. We'll be in touch on Monday--you\nare leaving on Monday morning or evening?\nHK:\nI leave Monday morning.\nAD:\nI will receive a letter from you on--\nHK:\nOn Monday morning.\nAD:\nOn the two Germanys--before you go. Then'I'll be in touch with\nyou on Monday morning.\nHK:\nExactly. We'll talk to each other.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Stewart Alsop\n10/b4/72 2:15 p.m.\nSA:\nAre you speaking to me again?\nHK:\nOnly as long as you are sick.\nSA:\n(laughing) Otherwise there's not a chance, huh ?\nHK:\nThat's right.\nSA:\nI never heard of anybody getting so damn angry because somebody\nsaid he was indispensible.\nHK:\nWell because you achieved the exact opposite of what you said\nand it's the last paragraph that did me the damage --\nSA:\nMy brother Joe has told me that it was unwise and I can see that\nit was unwise--\nHK:\nThe rest of it, you know, I would rather not have happened,\nbut that would have been to your discretion. But that is nt why\nI called you--I just wanted to find out how you were.\nSA:\nI have a little trouble again--I've got some pneumonia. But\nI'm on antibiotics and will be out of here in a week or so. The\nproblem is that my defenses are so low--\nHK:\nThat's what I was wondering about.\nSA:\nYeh, my doctor thinks he is going to get me out of here.\nHK:\nOh terrific. You sound much better--\nSA:\nI don't feel too bad. I have been wandering about the corridors\nand have a temperature--but not a high one.\nHow are you Henry, you must be exhausted.\nHK:\nI have had a hectic week.\nSA:\nYou sure have. I hear you are having a little dinner with my\naging brother.\nHK:\nThat's right. Miss Maginess arranged it--I'm delighted but\nthis is the Alsop/Maginess access.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nSA:\nThe last time the Alsop/Maginess access was established\nwas there, but I suppose he has a good excuse because I am\nlocked up in NIH.\nHK:\nWe hope to see you when you get out.\nSA:\nAll right, fine. Actually, I got from various conversations with\nother officials that the\ndied down and I made it very clear\nto everyone that --\nHK:\nWell you know it is somewhat an histerical period here. But\nit can't affect my respect and affection for you--I was just\nvery annoyed that one week, but\nSA:\nI was carried away by a good phrase.\nHK:\nLook these things happen, you just get. back and--and continue\nwriting whatever you write. We need you.\nSA:\nAll right, Henry.\nHK:\nGood Stewart, Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nLord Cromer/Mr. Kissinger\n3:40 pm, Oct. 14, 1972\nK:\nHello.\nC:\nWelcome back.\nK:\nThank you.\nC.\nYou've had a very, very strenuous time, haven't you?\nK:\nYes, I've had it pretty hectic.\nC:\nYes, I'm sure you have.\nK:\nYour ambassador in Bonn has a little problem. He stated that\nthe four power group\nC:\nI thought he had\nK:\nAnd, you know, things I tell you shouldn't go into thos\nC:\nI'm extremely sorry about this, I don't know what the hell\nhappened. Quite honestly. And I apologize.\nK:\nNow, could he sort of square it away?\nC:\nYes, what is the scenario ;going to be? Are they going to\nproduce\nK:\nWell, we will produce whatever text they've agreed on, and\nthe Russians will produce something, and let's agree on some-\nthing in common.\nC:\nYes, sure.\nK:\nI mean, all I wanted from the Russians was something that was\nclose enough to what we had so that it could be negotiated.\nC:\nAbsolutely, but of course, where the\nis concerned,\nwe are to go on asking the Russians to produce their piece of\npaper.\nK:\nWell, we can both produce them. We'll produce the NATO paper\nand they'll produce theirs, and then the four\ngentlemen will get out.\nC:\nYes.\nK:\nOkay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nLord Cromer/Mr. Kissinger\n3:40 pm/Oct. 14, 1972\nC:\nYes, sure. I will explain that. I'm sorry about this, we\ndon't usually have a slip up, it'se been very troublesome.\nKXXXXXXXXXXXX\nK:\nThat's okay, as long as--I'm not worried, but it puts Stoessel\ninto a tough position because he worked with me without telling\nhis boss.\nC:q\nYes, well, I'm sorry.\nK:\nOkay.\nC:\nThere we are. There's no other news, have you.\nK:\nOkay.\nC:\nAll right, thank you Henry.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSecretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger\n8:02 p.m., October 15, 1972\nK:\nMel.\nL:\nYes, Henry.\nK:\nOh, I think you're returning a call you've already returned.\nL:\nOh, well, I was over here having dinner -- I've got my bride out at\nPoor Richard's restaurant and there was a call here for me.\nK:\nOh, no, that was the earlier call.\nL:\nOkay.\nK:\nGood to talk to you. Give my best to Barbara.\nL:\nWell, this is our 27th wedding anniversary.\nK:\nOh, isn't that great!\nL:\nI thought I would take her out to dinner tonight.\nK:\nIsn't that great.\nL:\nWell, we're at Poor Richard's restaurant if you want us.\nK:\nWell, nobody is going to endure me for 27 years.\nL:\nOkay.\nK:\nRight.\nL:\nTake care. Bye, bye.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nAmbassador Dobrynin/HAK\nOct. 15, 1972; 8:35 p.m.\nK; Hello\nD: Hello, Henry. You are already back?\nK: Yes, Anatol.\nD: Have you had a chance to look through it ?\nK: Yes, I had a chance to look through it.\nD: Do you have any additional comments?\nK: Well, here is the comment I have to make. We have had a study made\nof all the prisoners there and of course we haven't been able to approach\nthe Saigon government yet.\nD: Uh, huh.\nK: Because I want to present the agreement to them myself. And I think\nsomething can be done but first the other side must work with us realistically.\nD: Uh, huh.\nK: Now the biggest problem I have concerns their own forces in the south\nbecause the practical consequence of their proposal is that not only do they\nwant to keep all of their forces in the south, they want Saigon to release\n40, 000 people whom they consider, you know, guerrillas, to then join\nthose forces. And that is an almost impossible product to sell. Now you\nknow if we spend 6 weeks on it we can probably get something done.\nD: Yeah.\nK: If you are going to do it in 2 or 3 days they have to be concrete in one of\ntwo ways. If they pull some of their units out, then I have a much better\nbasis to talk.\nD: You mean along those lines you mentioned.\nK: Along the lines I mentioned. Let them move some of the divisions. My\nproposal to them was that they should move the divisions that were never in\nthe country before March 25th. That they moved in after March 25th. Most\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nMost of them are in the northern part of the country so they wouldn't\nreally have to go all that far to go back.\nD: You mean, oh, much rather, very much symbolic to begin with.\nK: Yes,\nK: Because, my impression was you said.\nK: I am talking about, they have about 10 divisions there more or less.\nIf they kept 7, that would be\nI don't want to say exactly how many they\nshould move.\nD: It's a rather difficult thing for us to be involved in all this\nhow many\nreally.\nK: But I don't even want to tell them how many they should move.\nD: I understand.\nshould\nK: It/seable be a noticeable number. If we can get some assurances of that\nwe are in a much better position to bring about the release of some of these\nprisoners. I do not believe , I honestly do not believe that Thieu will\nrelease them if the North Vietnamese forces stay. If we get out, he is\nlosing all our forces, he is losing the military strength, we are pulling\nall our air force out. Now the other route is that they could enter the\nagreement, I don't know, we have sent them yesterday a phrase which is\nnot in the text you have, at the end of paragraph 8 c) we have added a phrase\nthat says the two parties will do their utmost to achieve an agreement within\nthree months. I have already told you orally. We have said that we will\ndo our best and make a maximum effort. Now I think I can do even better.\nI think we can get about, just looking at the list, we might be able to get\n10, 000 released fairly quickly.\nD: What is the essence of your second proposal?\nK: The essence of my second proposal is if they gave us a combination of\nthe withdrawal of some forces then I could make more complete my\nassurances.\nD: It seems the second is the same as\nbecause you said\nK: The other route is\nthere are two routes. If they pull out their forces\nwe can release more of their forces faster.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nD: Yes. And what is the second route?\nK: The second is that we forget about their forces in which case their\nreleases will be more along the lines we proposed to them.\nD: You mean within the three months.\nK: Within the three months an agreement.\nD: Oh, an agreement.\nK: Yes.\nD: And if you are going to do something then it will be within the first\nmonths so to speak.\nK: That's right, within the first months.\nD: Oh, I see. But I will not argue with you about the difference.\nK: But there's a big difference because our present proposal is, not that\nanyone should be released but that an agreement should be reached within\na three months period.\nD: You mean the agreement on\nK: On the release schedule.\nD: But not the releases within the three months.\nK: No.\nD: Oh, I see. Then I misunderstand you.\nK: And we are willing to give them an additional assurance that that we\nare willing to use our maximum influence that these releases take place.\nD: You are speaking about within three months you will reach agreement\nor within three months you are going to release them?\nK: The present proposal is that within three months we will reach the\nagreement. And the second route is if they pull something out we will\nhave substantial releases within three months.\nD: Well it is difficult these combinations, particularly in terms you\ndiscussed with us, because you mentioned to us the suggestion from your\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4-\nside for our consideration, but now it's rather the second of your proposals.\nAt first I really thought you were proposing something noticeable from the\npoint of view of air force and then which gave all of you something to begin,\nbut now you are rather tied up not with the show of willingness from their\nside to withdraw something for the time being but rather commit themselves\nto a certain number of divisions. This is rather difficult for us to do anything.\nK: No, no, you don't have to get into the divisions at all.\nD: Yes, but you mentioned\nK: But you asked me for an idea.\nD: But the idea is now.\nK: The idea is that they should withdraw some forces. How many let them\ndiscuss it with us.\nD: I understand. But I think I had better leave it on this basis without\ngoing into all the details.\nK: I don't think you should go into any details. You could say first they\nwant to move at the schedule they have established then we have the massive\nproblem of how to bring Saigon along with this.\nD: No, I understand. But first there really is now the question with which\nyou are tied up with troop withdrawal one way or another, but it is up to\nthem to discuss it with you.\nK: It is up to them.\nD: OK.\nK: But you can tell them this, Even without a withdrawal we will make some\nefforts in that direction. It will just be harder.\nD: Well, I understand. But in order to make it more quicker and sure\nK: That's right.\nD: OK. And this I will mention to Moscow. Of course my impression is\nwhether Moscow will look into this. And to take all the proposals, I said this\nbecause just make it on the second part about troop withdrawals as a token of a\nshow of willingness or which now no need at all. Because I understood your\nproposal\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-5-\nK: A show of willingness would be very helpful.\nD: But just a question of withdrawal\nK: It would be very helpful.\nD: But it is argued a show of willignesss in terms of divisions, because it\nis difficult from our side I am thinking about.\nK: You don't have to give them the numbers.\nD: So I leave it as it was. On a new question you are tied up with this new\nthing and I thought you preferred to discuss even without this side of it.\nK: Without the prior agreement.\nD: It would make it too difficult, otherwise you could be in a deadlock.\nK: Well, if we are in a deadlock that's not the worse thing that can happen\nto us.\nD: Well some kind of things are relevant since we are going deeper into\nother things (laughs]. This is the point.\nK: We take your views very seriously, but\nD: That's what you really listen to.\nK: But we have made absolutely the maximum concessions that's possible\nto make.\nD: No, no, I am not arguing with you, but I simply tried to make it clear\nour point of view and then I would like to be ready more what you are really\nup to.\nK: What we are up to without any withdrawal on their side we are willing to\nmake a big effort in Saigon, but I am not very optimistic. With some\nwithdrawals on their side we can make a bigger effort and we can have\nbigger numbers released right away.\nD: I understand.\nK: That is a fact of life.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-6-\nD: No, no, I would like to hear more your position a little more. OK,\nHenry and you are leaving tomorrow at 10?\nK: 10:00-10:30.\nD: 10:30. Well, in the morning we will have time to say hello.\nK: Well, absolutely, Anatol.\nD: I will telephone you. All right?\nK: Good. And tell Gromyko not to coach them. They are tough enough\nwithout it.\nD: Well, we know this. This we know. Bye, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRobert Haldeman/Kissinger\n10:10 a.m.\n-\n10/16/72\nRH:\nBob, Henry.\nHK:\nYes, Bob.\nRH:\nI'm over at the President's house and he was wondering if\nyou could come up and chat with him for a bit sometime. today.\nHK:\nOh, Jesus. It's almost--you know if he tells me to I haven\nno choice.\nRH:\nWell, if it's a problem why don't you stay there and talk on the\nphone. I'll suggest.\nHK:\nBecause, you know, I am in the office with a 100 things to go\nover.\nRH:\nYeah.\nHK:\nAnd Between you and me I wanted to rest a couple of hours, too.\nRH:\nYeah. OK. Let me see if you can just do it on the phone. Try\nthat anyway. You know, you ought to talk over this whole thing\nabout what we wer' talking about last night.\nHK:\nHow about first thing in the morning. You know it doesn't matter\nwhen I go.\nRH:\nOK. That'll be good. I'll make that point and we'll see what works\nout. I'll get back to you.\nHK:\nI've had yet another idea. It would be an intermediate idea.\nI'm pretty persuaded that we shouldn't stall it beyond first\nof all the way this momentum is going I'd have to put brakes\non it in a way that would be transparent. But one thing that I\nhave thought of doing is go to Saigon, come back here and then\ntake the same route again next week and just add the final\ndestination. That would push the whole thing back by six days.\nRH:\nWhat good would that do?\nHK:\nThat would save Thieu's face. You know, he wouldn't have been\nblackjacked into it. It would give him a few more days to clean\nup the security areas around Saigon and it prevents an absolute\nconfrontation next week.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nRH:\nYou don't know if you' re going to have one. That should be a\nfallback position.\nHK:\nThat's what I mean. Well if he goes along enthusiastically we\nstick to the schedule.\nRH:\nYeah.\nHK:\nIf he stonewalls we have no choice except to break off anyway.\nRH:\nThis would be an intermediate to that.\nHK:\nThis would be an intermediate to that I would come back then\nSaturday night I would be back.\nRH:\nYeah.\nHK:\nAnd go on the road again Tuesday the same itinerary the only\nthing is the President would then speak on the 31st rather than\non the 25th.\nRH:\nYeah.\nHK:\nIt has the additional advantage as I see it politically not that\nit is closer to the election but that if anything gets unstuck\nthere's less time for it.\nRH:\nThat's not valuable.\nHK:\nWhat?\nRH:\nI don't think that's there are more negatives to that than\npositives. One side versus the K other that's a better position\nthan just dropping it at that point probably.\nHK:\nWell, that's what I think. See the problem is, Bob, I've reviewed\nall the exchanges. We have used these time schedules really\nruthlessly to get changes in the text that otherwise would take\nweeks to get. Now I'm doing a letter to Brezhnev from the\nPresident today to get some you know, indication of Soviet\nsupplies.\nRH:\nYeah.\nHK:\nJust to button up the agreement.\nRH:\nYeah.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nHK:\nYou know, the more time we can get the better it is.\nRH:\nOK, I'll get back. to you.\nHK:\nOK, if you can spare me a trip up there I'd really appreciate\nit because I couldn't leave before 2:00 p.m. anyway.\nRH:\nOK.\nHK:\nI've got Abrams and everyone else coming and McNamara.\nRH:\nOK:\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nSecy. Peterson/Mr. Kissinger\nOctober 16, 1972, 10:32 am\nP:\nThree things I want to be sure we are coordinated on; one,\non this interest rate thing, Hal tells me you've completed that,\nis that right, on the basis we discussed.\nK:\nNo, no, no. I've, god dame it. I think he ---\nP:\nI got the impression that you'd reviewed it with-\nK:\nI mentioned it to Dobrynin as a thought, I didn't give hi;m any\nfigures.\nP:\nOh, I see.\nK:\nAnd he is waiting for you--he said he thought it was a reasonable\nidea. I told Hal to tell you on Saturday, God damn him, I have\nnot completed it. You told me not to complete it.\nP:\nNo, I thought you ;had more or less worked it out at 4% and\n$710, and that was fine with me if that was the deal. You have\nnot done that.\nK:\nNo, Hal want ed to say start at 5 and go down, and I said, No,\nI don't want more than 4.\nP:\nRight. Okay. But 4 and 710, if the numbers are right is fine\nwith you.\nK:\nRight, not more than that.\nP:\nAbove 4 it starts hurting them, not too badly it seems to me.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nAll right. Second well I'm glad weve had it, because I saw\nAlkimov and Patolichev last ni;ght and they didn't seem to\nknow anything, so okay. Now, as I understand, you do not\nwant an announcement tomorrow, you want it Wednesday.\nK:\nThat's correct.\nP:\nAll right. Now, Henry, my signals on the Maritime deal were\nso unbelievably confused that I want to hear it from you. Whether\nthe President would be involved or not involved.\nK:\nI think on this one, the President probably wants to be involved.\nP:\nI woul d think so. Now, therefore, that suggests the ceremon;y\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nSecy Peterson/Mr. Kissinger\nOct. 16, 1972, 10:32 am\n-2-\nover there I would think.\nK:\nI agree.\nP:\nOkay, Tuesday is off for you; I'm tied up Thursday, Potolichev\nwanted it tomorrow; but Wednesday, does that feel all right with\nyou?\nK:\nWednesday is great.\nP:\nOkay, but do you see the President witnessing--\nK:\nI think the President might well want to be present at the\nsigning.\nP:\nYeah, all right. Юкау. Now, the third thing that I want to\nbe sure you're aware that I am sensitive too is that there's\na very fine balance between getting a deal that is good back\nhome but ten not creating undue problems for you with them.\nI've gota lot of questions, Henry, I want you to read the\nbriefing on this KVM business. I have done everything I could\nto suggest Xxxxx they' ve cooperated with us, we very much appre-\nciate it, it was an unprecedented problem, and I don't want you\nthinking that I generated any of the caving in business that appeared\nin one of the newspapers, cause we haven't.\nR:\nPete, I wouldn't think that.\nP:\nYeah. But that's essentially where its coming from, and see\nmy answer and if you've got any other suggestions, fine, on how\nto handle it.\nK:\nGood.\nP:\nFinally, with Patolichev you should know that he asked for a\ncouple of small things He wants a third guy in the commercial\noffice, for example, on both sides. You know the diplomatic---\nK:\nYou handle that.\nP:\nAnd the Kama River Purchasing Commission he wants. And\nthat we think is okay with the DUREAUCRALY burocracy, and he would\nlike some assurance that I will give sympathetic attention to\nfurther offices. Now, my sense of this deal after the bludgeoning\non the Martime deal is we should not move in a direction of\nbeing accommodating.\nK:\nI agree completely.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- -3-\nTelCon\nSecy. Peterson/Mr. Kissinger\nOct. 16, 1972; 10:32 am\nP:\nNow, i;ncidentally, on the Maritime deal\nK:\nPete, I've got to run, I'll call you.\nP:\nOkay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRobert McNamara/Kissinger\n1:15 p.m. - 10/16/72\nRM:\nHenry, you asked for a progress report.\nHK:\nYes.\nRM:\nIt took God seven days to create the world, it's difficult to\nrecreate North Vietnam in two but I'll have a report for you\ntonight. Where do you want it delivered?\nHK:\nTo the situation room.\nRM:\nYeah, what time?\nHK:\nOh, I don't much care, 7:00 or 8:00.\nRM:\nSeven o'clockish.\nHK:\nRight. In what sort of state will it be ?\nRM:\nWell it will be typed three, four or five pages, we're typing\nhere we' re going to work on it this afternoon. But the figure\nI think will be on the order of $600 million a year average.\nHK:\nAnd you get that how?\nRM:\nI'm not saying how we get it.\nHK:\nIs that in addition to bilateral US?\nRM:\nThat's just---I understood you wanted to know how much they\nneed. That's how much they need. We don't discuss how they\ncan get it.\nHK:\nRight. Well what is your estimate of what you can get?\nRM:\nFrom whom?\nHK:\nI mean, I asked an estimate from us but do you think one could\nget them that much?\nRM:\nYeah. That depends on how much\nputs up\nbut I think well it is clearly dependent on the US but I think\nthe answer is yes, the Nordic countries, multilateral institutions\nthe Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, Japan if the\nUS puts up a substantial percentage of it you definitely could\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nHK:\nRight.\nRM:\nAnd I don't cover that at all.\nHK:\nRight.\nAnd do you have it broken down according to some\ncategories?\nRM:\nYes.\nHK:\nWell, that would be very helpful.\nRM:\nFood, etc.\nHK:\nTerrific.\nRM:\nYou know it's a day and a half's effort.\nHK:\nYes. Well it's enough to give me some idea I mean we're not\ngoing to be able to make any agreement.\nRM:\nIf you want to buy the dinner or supper and come in and have it\nhere when I'll give it to you here otherwise I'll take it to\nthe Situation Room at 7:00.\nHK:\nOK, I don't know what my own---I may have to go up to Camp\nDavid.\nRM:\nAll right.\nHK:\nWell, hell you don't have to take it in. I'll get it picked up.\nRM:\nOK, have it picked up here at 7:00 p.m. then.\nHK:\nGood.\nRM:\nIf you want to come to supper x just give me a call and let us know.\nHK:\nTerrific.\nRM:\nFine, thanks very much\nHK:\nOK.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLloyd Shearer/Kissinger\n1:20 p.m. - 10/16/72\nHK:\nHello.\nLS:\nHey, Henry, how are you?\nHK:\nOK Lloyd.\nLS:\nDo you let anybody photograph you at home ? Would you let\nus photograph you at home?\nHK:\nMy home in Washington ?\nLS:\nYes sir.\nHK:\nIt looks like a goddam doctor's office.\nLS:\nI know that's why--you know we got to get something for our\n101 papers that nobody else has.\nSo if we could get a photo\non the john.\nHK:\nOn the john, of course.\nLS:\nOne of those kixx things, that would help us you know in the\nupcoming story which we haven't yet done.\nHK:\nWhat is that story going to be again, you told me the other day.\nLS:\nFour years of Henry Kissinger.\nHK:\nIf I survive the next four weeks you can do it.\nLS:\nAnyway, what the hell what's that restaurant. Is there a\nrestaurant in Paris called the Carlton Lucas?\nHK:\nLucas Carlton, yes.\nLS:\nLucas Carlton.\nHK:\nWhat about it ?\nLS:\nI was just wondering if you had been in that restaurant.\nHK:\nYes I was.\nLS:\nWould you recommend it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nHK:\nWell it's the only one that serves at 10:30 at night.\nLS:\nThere's a new one the Grand Favor.\nHK:\nAnd on Sunday.\nLS:\nWell you operate at such strange times.\nHK:\nOh yes. But it is a good restaurant.\nLS:\nApparently.\nHK:\nWhy, are you going to run something on that, too.\nLS:\nI don't know what you have reference to, Henry. I don't know\nthe name.\nHK:\nThat is true.\nLS:\nTrying to keep up with you is a hopeless occupation. Nobody\nwants to do that. You know that you're the most colorful guy\nin this Administration and\nHK:\nThat's not saying a hell of a lot ---\nLS:\nHuh?\nHK:\nThat's not saying an extraordinary amount but I'll take any\nlittle compliment that comes my way.\nLS:\nThat's right. Anyway what we would like to do is grab a few\nshots of you in your hideway.\nHK:\nCertainly.\nLS:\nIf that's OK with you.\nHK:\nYes.\nLS:\nAnd so I would come over and take a few fast shots.\nHK:\nBut when.\nLS:\nToday.\nHK:\nToday, you cant. Are you in town?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nLS:\nYes.\nHK:\nOh no today is out of the question I'm working all day.\nLS:\nHenry, you can't do that, I mean you've got to stop for a few\nminutes.\nHK:\nToday I can't but in principle you can do it sometime.\nLS:\nAll right the next time I'm in principle which is a very good\ncommunity we'll do it.\nHK:\nWill you do that?\nLS:\nOf course.\nHK:\nGood, I didn't know you were in town.\nLS:\nRight, I have to come from time to time.\nHK:\nWell, let me know next time and drop in, you've never been in\nmy---\nLS:\nYes I have.\nHK:\nYou've been in my office?\nLS:\nYes. OK, well THEN we'll do it some other time, but we would\nlike to do it and the reason I thought we might do it now is we\nwould like to do it before the year is out and we're coming down\nto it in October.\nHK:\nYou can do it within the next two or three weeks.\nLS:\nI don't like to come back to Washington.\nHK:\nI'm screwed up I don't know when I'll get home.\nLS:\nLet me ask you this, OK look if you do get a break we could do\nit early in the morning maybe you could just call the hotel and\nleave a message for me. Would you do that like a good guy?\nHK:\nI will but I doubt it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 4 -\nLS:\nI doubt it too, but once in a while you do a good king thing for\nyour country and your god.\nHK:\nGood.\nLS:\nAll right, Henry, nice to talk to you.\nHK:\nNice to talk to you.\nHK:\nYou bet.\nXXX\nLS:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHTi\nJelson\nsile\nTELCON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Kissinger\n2:00 p.m. - 10/16/72\nAD:\nHello.\nHK:\nAnatol?\nAD:\nOh, you are the idiot\nHK:\nIncidentally can you send me back if you agree to that letter?\nIt was our only copy the one on\nAD:\nYou mean what you made me?\nHK:\nOn deferment, on postponement.\nAD:\nI'll call back, no problem.\nHK:\nOK, we are going to delete that sentence we discussed the\none in the letter from the President to the Secretary General.\nWe will delete the first sentence.\nAD:\nThe last sentence on the first page?\nHK:\nRight and we will instead, such an indication from you\nAD:\nJust a minute I would like to write it.\nHK:\nWhy don't I send you over the correct.\nAD:\nYou will send it, IK that would be even better.\nHK:\nI'll send it right over because the President also added\nanother sentence that we don't think we're doing it only for\npublic opinion.\nAD:\nI understand.\nHK:\nIt is as not relevant to anything you have to do but is an\nAD:\nCould you read me over what you added.\nHK:\nAt the end of the first page last paragraph, \"such an indication\nfrom you would do much to accelerate agreement between the\nUnited States and the DRV\".\nAD:\nAnd indication, yah. What is the next one?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nHK:\nThen at the end of the second paragraph you know where\nwe talk about the American public.\nAD:\nYeah.\nHK:\nAfter that we add this sentence: \"Moreover, such a one-sided\narrangement would violate the principle of reciprocity and\nequality of commitment which must be the foundation of any\nlasting settlement and which is the foundation on which it has\nbeen possible to build the significant progress this that has\nbeen achieved in our own bilateral relations.\nAD:\nWhat foundation do you mean?\nHK:\nThe foundation of xx receiprocity and equality of commitment\nwhichenost.dx\nAD:\nOh, and commitment.\nHK:\nRight that is not in reference to you that is in reference to\nthe DRV.\nAD:\nI understand.\nOK you will send right now?\nHK:\nRight.\nAD:\nWith a messenger.\nHK:\nRight.\nAD\nAnd I will convey in a very few hours, all right.\nHK:\nRight.\nAD:\nI would like to check the other two or three points. One, on\nthis United Nations business on the two Germanies you do not\nput into the motion the whole\nthe reply from\nGromyko.\nHK:\nRight.\nAD:\nFor the time being it is a private discussion between you and\nhim.\nHK:\nExactly.\nAD:\nSo this is the understanding as of now. Second about the\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nyou mean only Hanoi or the whole of North Vietnam.\nHK:\nWhat do you mean?\nAD:\nAbout the\nyou said when you will be in Hanoi.\nHK:\nNo, no it will be the whole of North Vietnam.\nAD:\nAnd you are going to reduce all of the North Vietnam the bombing.\nIt is a matter of clarification. This is all I need. OK, please\nsend me this right now and I will send it to Breshnev.\nHK:\nGood, thank you.\nAD:\nYou will leave tomorrow in the morning?\nHK:\nI'll be there til about 10:00.\nAD:\nAbout 10:00, just in case, General Haig will be here ?\nHK:\nRight.\nAD:\nOK Henry, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMarvin Kalb/Kissinger\n3:55 pm - Oct. 23, 1972\nK:\nHello.\nMK: Hello.\nK:\nMarvin, how are you?\nMK: Good. You must be absolutely exhausted.\nK:\nWell, I'm a little tired.\nMK: I guess you got a little rest on the plane.\nK:\nWell, actually, I think it exhausts you on a long flight. It isn't\nfatigue. I think something must happen on this east/west leg that\nisn't just fatigue.\nMK: Yes. Listen, help a poor struggling fellow--\nK:\nListen, you bastard, you've been putting out stuff I'm finding out\nwhat I'm doing from reading your transcript.\nMK: Tell me where I've been right or wrong. (Laughter)\nK:\nGet it from your own intelligence.\nMK: Well, it's a diplomatic response, but was that experience of the\nlast five days uncommonly difficult?\nK:\nWell, it had its moments.\nMK: Yeah. Has it held up anything?\nK:\nOne thing that was totally wrong is that the meeting with the Foreign\nMinister was arranged berause Thieu refused to meet.\nMK: And that's wrong.\nK:\nThat is wrong. I mean, that had been set up that way. That was of\na more technical nature.\nMK: I see. Well, this is something that they passed to us from Saigon.\nK:\nYeah.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMarvin Kalb/Kissinger\n2\n3:55 pm - Oct. 23, 1972\nMK: Do you have the sense that y ou are on the time table that you set up?\nOr, will it be held up a bit.\nK:\nNo, it's more or less on -- you know, you can make it slow, or medium\nand fast one I think it is on the medium one.\nMK: And is there any\nK:\nThis is off the record.\nMK:\nOkay, okay. For guidance then. Is the election emphasis to the\npublic comment realistic?\nK:\nWell, not as far as we are concerned. Absolutely not.\nMK:\nAbsolutely not.\nK:\nLook, Marvin, you've read a lot of what I've written inside on this\nwar.\nMK; Yes, I have.\nK:\nBut, you know whether I'm right in my judgments or not. What we\nwanted to get out this war--whatever mistakes we made in getting\ninto it was a sense that when we left it the public could feel it was\nan act of statesmanship and we could at last deny them something\nand put it behind us. Now we can have no incentive whatever to have\nthis thing promised by political debate.\nMK: Right.\nK:\nAnd, you know I don't know what the motives of the other side are.\nMK: Right.\nK:\nBut we are going at an orderly pace, you know, that perhaps progress\nis being made, which is more than we've ever said before.\nMK: Do you think that you will be know obliged to a--in a couple of days\ngo semi-public on this.\nK:\nWell I have said, yesterday, and when I arrived that I would have a\npress conference in a couple ;of days.\nMK:\nYou did say that! !\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMarvin Kalb/Kissinger\n3:55 pm - Oct. 23, 1972\n3\nThursday\nK:\nYes, I'll have the press conference tomorrow or Wednesday, regard-\nless of what happens. I had always intended that.\nMK: I see, well\nK: And while I won't be able to give -- what I want to do with the press\nconference is enough guidance so the people will know the parameters\nof the game that's being played now.\nMK: Well, that would be enormously helpful.\nK: And not speculate -- it is not spent widely all over the place, and\nyou know, everybody--the North Vietnamese, thekSouth, and expecially\nthe Vietnamese party's have their own audiences to satisfy. And\nsince it's no secret to say what's being intended as a compromise.\nNeither side is going to have everything it wanted. And, therefore,\nthey both have to posture themselves as this process is being completed.\nMany of these leaks are pretty self-serving.\nMK: Well, I had a talk last night at a dinner with a very respected\nCommunist diplomat who told me that you and Le Duc Tho has pretty\nwell reached a deal, and that there were, according to what he said,\nvery minor things to be taken care of and that he would be astonished\nif it couldn't be wrapped up very quickly.\nK:\nWell, I wouldn't be quite that optimistic, because as you get to that\nphase of the negotiation you always want the nuances to start getting\nimportant. But, when you compare a situation where you are looking\nfor a change in tense in sentences, you feel that you are making pro-\ngress.\nMK: Exactly.\nK: Now, they are talking about refinements and one or two items of\nsome principle. You are really in a different ball game.\nMK: Yeah. Well this is--everybody is watching you like crazy.\nK: Don't watch me with a November 7th deadline in mind.\nMK: That would be foolish?\nK:\nFoolish--maybe yes, maybe no, but it's - we are absolutely not\nplaying for that.\nMK: Right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nx5x 4\nKalb/Kissinger\nK:\nMost enduring thing we can is something that people can say afterwards\nwhatever he thinks these sons of bitch did, that they did the end of it.\nMK: Right.\nK:\nNobody will remember two years from ngw whether it was done on\nNovember 2nd orDecember 2nd.\nMK: Right. I get the impression that you feel pretty well along at this\npoint.\nK:\nWell, I febl, you know--before I had. to give you an analysis of why\nit might happen, now I can see how it might happen.\nMK: Right. Do you think it will be tomorrow.?\nK:\nThe press conference?\nMK: Yes.\nK:\nI think it's more likely to be Thursday.\nMK: Right, I shall be looking forward to seeing you.\nK:\nGood.\nMK: Right.\nK:\nNow this is off the record.\nMK: I understand.\nK:\nGood.\nMK:\nThank you, bye.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nBob Toth/Mr. Kissinger\n3:55 pm - October 23, 1972\nK:\nHello.\nT:\nHi.\nK:\nHow are you, Bob.\nT:\nAll right. Did you bring peace to - -\nK:\nOf course.\nT:\nI wonder if I could sort of pick your brains on some of the things\nthat went on.\nK:\n(Laughter) That's what I've been waiting for - for you to phone to\npick my brains. They are addled anyway.\nT:\nI can at least try, huh. I'm just wondering- I gather from what I've\nheard around is that you didn't go to sell any coalition government.\nK:\nK:\nThat is correct.\nT:\nBut going back and reading the January offer that we made, he talked\nabout an electorial commission of all segments-\nK:\nWell, I won't go into what we did discuss. And it isn't so true I was\ntrying to settle or not settle. You know, these were discussions\nI've been meeting and one shouldn't be surprised that in three days--\nthis is a question of peace and war for a country that's been fighting\nfor ten years. Why shouldn't I take some time to think about it.\nT:\nYou mean in terms of what you put on the table.\nK:\nWell in terms of the general discussions.\nT:\nWell, there were some reports that your discussions weren't exactly\ncordial.\nK:\nWell, they didn't come from me. Because--\nT:\nWell, the re was some talk tha t they weren't as friendly as they could\nhave been, but I really am asking you whether or not there were any\nhard words spoken.\nK:\nNo hard words were spoken. They were very businesslike.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nToth/Kissinger\n2\nT:\nVery frank!\nK:\nVery businesslike. This is not for quotation.\nT:\nNo.\nK:\nBut it is for guidance.\nT:\nYeah. Did you find that they were resisting the progress that had\nbeen made, or just examining it to see all its ramifiaations?\nK:\nThey were examining it. There were certain things that have a\ndifferent context for them than for us. After a settlement, we\nwill be gone and they will be there so they obviously have to look\nat certain things more minutely than we would. I mean the South\nVietnamese will be there and we will be gone, and all of this was\nmore or less expected.\nT:\nWell, did you go to lay out what had happened in previous sessions\nwith Le Duc Tho? Was that the purpose of it, that is to really\nfully brief them or were you there to bring them one step further in terms\nto future negotiations.\nK:\nWell, you know, these two things are hard to separate. They've been\nkept pretty well informed all along, but of course, there's no substitute,\nyou can't get in all the details by cable.\nT:\nWell, can we expect you to have another session with Le Duc Tho\nbefore the, you know, within the next two weeks.\nK:\nYou know, we never say this ahead of time.\nT:\nYeah.\nK:\nYou can certainly expect that these exchanges will continue. And\nthat they are in an extremely active skage phase. And after all,\nPham Van Dong said that progress was being made.\nT:\nWhen will all this be out.\nK:\nIn the new wecan give that progress, or whatever he called it, that\nprogress is being made.\nT:\nWell, Henry, if significant progress is made, it goes to the President\noffering- if we had significant progress, well it - he put it another way,\nunless significant progress is made in the negotiations, the bombing\nand mining will continue. As there has been significant progress,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n3\nToth/Kissinger\nthis would give credence to the reports that we have curtailed bombing.\nK:\nWell, it might give credence to them, yes.\nT:\nBut, is that a fair conclusion that the bombings has been--there have\nbeen reports that the bombing around Hanoi is eased as a gesture, is\nthat right?\nK:\nWell,; that seems to be right reading the daily reports.\nT:\nWould expect any further sort of de-escalation of the conflict before\nan overall settlement is at least agreed in principle?\nK:\nI don't to go into that. I'm going to have a press conference anyway\nin a couple of days--either tomorrow or Thursday.\nT:\nBig news?\nK:\nNo. Just to put it into context.\nT:\nUh huh. Well, you don't want to talk about the coalition business at all.\nK:\nNot particularly.\nT:\nBecause, you can get into this area of how you can compromise, it\nseems like we backed off on terms of Presidential elections in favor\nof a constituent assembly election.\nK:\nWell, that's what some newspapers say, it doesn't mean that we've\ndone it.\nT:\nOh. Well, can you give me any guidance on that?\nK:\nI won't give you any guidance on that but I will tell you to stay away\nfrom any specific formula.\nT:\nOh, I see, that had been printed. Well, that's fair enough. The talk\nabout an imminent end of the hostilities, before implementation of the\npolitical settlement begins, is that pretty far off speculation.\nK:\nWell, I won't go into any other discussion. Don't draw any conclusion\nfrom that, but any intelligent man is going to narrow it to two or three\nissues and if I deny some and no comment the others you can know\nwhere we are.\nT:\nI wish I were that clever\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n4\nToth/Kissinger\nT:\nBut, I'm going to sit back and think about what you said for about\ntwo hours before I--\nI\nK:\nBob, you've been closer to correct than any other journalist. /Hand it to yo\nYou were the only one who understood what I was saying in September.\nT:\nWell, I have to submit all my pieces for\nthe pulitzer\nK:\nAnd, all the issue are to people won't understand.\n[Laughter[\nT:\nListen, my people don't understand it.\nK:\nI know, because they have certain fixed ideas as to what was possible,\nhow it could be done.\nT:\nA little while ago, I made a series of paragraphs in my stories, you\nknow, the only thing you have in this bu;siness is your byline. You\nget kinda KNXXXXX serious when--\nK:\nYou actually put in their own paragraphs.\nI\nT:\nThey actually did it, the insisted on it, they/said take my byline off,\nthey said we need your byline, can't we negotiate this. But is was\nserving an inocuous paragraph at the same it made me look a little\nfoolish. It was unclear what this means. Well, if it was unclear\nwhat it means, and my explanation that followed (laughter)\nK:\nReally, I tell you--this is not to flatter you--but your judgment\nhas been very good and your instinct on this, I told them that. No\nmatter how improper it looks in the light of what you read in--most\nof the newsmen are sucking their own thumbs and are writing the stuff\nthey said was going to happen as already having happened.\nT:\nYes, that's true. I can see that and some of them are very good\nfriends of mine.\nK:\nMany of them are extremely able journalists, it's no reflection on\nthem.\nT:\nYeah. Well, Henry, thanks a lot and I look forward to your press\nconference.\nK:\nGood, bye.\nT:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n11:22 p. m., October 23, 1972\nD:\nbrother and his wife.\nK:\nOh, you were at that\nD:\nAnd they think that you are traveling too much.\nK:\n(laughter)\nD:\nThat's why he said he was really much more thinner than you are.\nAnd he said, \"Well, I have some responsibility and he's just traveling\naround the world.\"\nK:\n(laughter) Somebody asked him why he didn't have an accent and I did\nand he said, \"Because he's the Kissinger who listens. #\nD:\n(laughter)\n...\ntalk along those lines.\nK:\nAnatol, I called you -- I just got in.\nD:\nYes, so I imagine.\nK:\nAnd I will see you tomorrow.\nD:\nYes. When do you want me to come?\nK:\nActually, I think I'm free for lunch. Are you free for lunch?\nD:\nTomorrow, yes.\nK:\nWhy don't you come over here for lunch.\nD:\nOkay. Will be fine with me. One o'clock?\nK:\nOne o'clock. But what I wanted to do is to see whether I could tell you\nthe following tonight because time is of some importance.\nD:\nYes, I understand, so go ahead.\nK:\nWe received a somewhat threatening message from Hanoi and the\nsituation is this.\nD:\nYes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972\nK:\nThey don't understand the American domestic situation at all.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nIf 1 had wanted to protract the negotiations, I could have easily\nprotracted them without this theater.\nD:\nWithout?\nK:\nWithout going through all this exercise.\nD:\nI understand.\nK:\nBecause I could have just haggled over every paragraph for weeks.\nD:\nYeah, I understand.\nK:\nSo what we wanted to do is to settle it.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nOn the other hand, what we cannot do is to have a public confrontation\nwith the South Vietnamese in the last two weeks of the elections and\nbe accused of everyone of undermining the people for whom we've been\nfighting for 4 years. Now that is a fact of life.\nD:\nYes.\nK:\nTherefore if Hanoi forces us to choose between a confrontation with\nSouth Vietnam and a confrontation with North Vietnam, we will\nunhesitatingly choose a confrontation with North Vietnam because that's\nwhat we've been having.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nNow I have made a serious effort.\nD:\nYes.\nK:\nAnd there have been certain difficulties which I will discuss with you\ntomorrow.\nD:\nYes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 3 -\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n11:22 p. m., October 23, 1972\nK:\nut for the moment what I want to say is this, we have proposed to them\nthat they meet us again next week.\nD:\nNot this week?\nK:\nOr any time they want to, let them give the date. I'll meet them this\nweekend If they want. To work out some of these issues. It is my\njudgment that most of them or all of them are a lot easier than the issues\nwe've already settled.\nD:\nYes. What was really the issues, Henry? Because I've tried to get\nfrom General Haig but I\nK:\nWell, I'll go into details with you tomorrow.\nD:\nFor me it was Important only one thing really. The question on the\nschedule -- your schedule with them on October 10th or it's rather\nas I understood yesterday and today from General Haig you would like\nto discuss a new question -- well, this is not really new one but to\nthe extent that you would like some kind of commitment on the issue of\ntheir troops so what is really the issue because\nK:\nWhat I want to discuss with them -- three categories of problems.\nOne are simply drafting changes which some are almost entirely\ncosmetic.\nD:\nIn agreement which you make, huh?\nK:\nYes. They are of no consequence and I won't bore you with them.\nD:\nYeah, okay.\nK:\nI am sure they will accept 80% of those.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nI mean, they really are the sort of thing that come up at the end of\nevery agreement but that would enable the South Vietnamese to say they\nmade a contribution.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nThe senond is a proposal by me on how we could redraft the political - -- one\npolitical paragraph that has some substantive meaning -- it will not change\nthe outcome but it would change the presentation a little bit.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 4 -\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n11:22 p. m. October 23, 1972\nD:\nBut the paragraph is in the agreement?\nK:\nYes, And the third has to do with some practical arrangement about\ntheir troops. I will make a very concrete proposal to you that does not\nhave to go into the agreement.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nAnd I think It can be worked out also.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nNow If we then can agree on that document, then we believe we have\ndischarged our responsibilities towards our allies. And we will then\nbe able to proceed in returning to Salgon and bringing about a succession.\nD:\nI understand. You see the question really is what --\nK:\nThey have really an important choice to make. If they think -- they may\nthink we are deliberately delaying It beyond November 7th so we can\nbomb them or do something. I give you the solemn assurance of the\nPresident that this is not the case and make an engagement to your\ngovernment on that issue. Second, we have an obligation to our allies,\nhowever, and we cannot act in an unprincipled way. And we always told\nthem we would have to discuss It with out allies. Now they must have\nenough sources of information in Saigon to know what difficulties I have\nhad. And I must say that the interview which Pham Van Dong gave at\nthe critical moment certainly made life even harder.\nD:\nyes. Well, Henry, the question really isn't now\nif it is now.\nBecause what you mentioned -- let me put It this\nway -- quite frankly, everything I discussed practically; I mean, the most\nImportant I discussed with Haig, but between us we informed Hanoi,\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nWhat you mentioned to me today, the reason I think that you -- I mean,\nin substance I mean, of course, on this issue you are going to tell me\ntomorrow I am sure\nso I am really looking practically what --\nK:\nPractically what they have to understand is\nD:\nWhat I couldhave it\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 5 -\nAmb, Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972\nK:\nNow what you can add to it is, when we next agree on a document\nit will have included all the objections other allies have made and we\ncan then proceed with great confidence. Secondly, that we are not\ndelaying it frivolously. And thirdly, that if they take us on in the\ninterval, we will just 100% back Saigon.\nD:\nWell, actually the point but it is rather\nmatter of\nand they really felt before\nare the topics\nthey were\nrepresenting the case that they were making\nnot only\nthere but in Moscow that they made several concessions to you.\nK:\nThey have made concessions --\nD:\nPoint 7, point 10, and this\nabout Laos and Cambodia thing.\nSo to us they tell us that everything now match -- and ours and you\nreally proposal from your side have a\nagreement so this --\nK:\nNo, what's in the agreement is very easy to handle.\nD:\nYes.\nK:\nIt's very easy to handle, you just have to take my word for it. Except\npossibly one point which is also nothing compared to what we have already\nsettled.\nD:\nSo what really to proceed --\nK:\nWell, I want to keep them -- I cannot get a message back to them for\nabout 24 to 36 hours because I have to meet with the President tomorrow\nwho has been in New York today.\nD:\nYeah, I understand. Really, Henry, situations like this one I simply\nwould like to check it with you. Okay? The general message is that you\ncalled and really you expressed it must be in at certain way but\npractically the same message. I send this telegram to Moscow. So I\nam prepared to send once again just saying that you spoke with me and\nyou are really just repeating on your own what's said because there is\nnothing specifically. But the question really is first do you think It\ncould be done everything or is now doesn't look\npractical\nbut they sometimes interests me, before the election or after the election?\nK:\nI think the final signature should now be after the election.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 6 -\nAmb. Debrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972\nD:\nBut the agreements, I mean --\nK:\nBut we could agree on the document we will support in Salgon and we\nwill assume the responsibility and we will not have to go back to them.\nD:\nYeah, I understand.\nK:\nBut they will have to give us B few weeks to get it done.\nD:\nYou mean after?\nK:\nYes. We will do it as fast as possible but we have to do it in our own\nway.\nB:\nBut your old schedule which\nis it really do you\nthink everything is kept as it was before except final signature or you have\nsome ...\nK:\nNo after Supposing Le Due The and I met next week and supposing we\ncould agree, then the only thing that has to be obtained is the agreement\nof our allies. There will not be another appeal for changes.\nD:\nI understand.\nK:\nAnd we will make that as at flat commitment to you, not just to them.\nD:\nYeah, that after agreement with them, you will only\n......\nK:\nAnd they have always known that I would have to go to Saigon. But now\nthat I have all of Saigon's comments, but I'm not supporting all of them.\nIf we can work out something, that will be then the final text as far as we\nare concerned.\nD:\nAfter the talk with them, you are going to Saigon and\nif they make\nyou come back with another one?\nK:\nYou can guarantee that if we talk to them, I will not ask them for anymore\nchanges.\nD:\n.....\nunfortunately, they were under the impression\nK:\nI have trouble hearing you.\nD:\nYou see unfortunate, Henry, that they got the impression and we to 0\nfrom them and from you rather --\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n4. # #\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972\nT\nK:\nhe ambiguity was always this, I have always told them that I had to\nto to Salgon and that I would do my best. Now you can read from the\nnewspapers that I have met with the Salgon people 15 hours a day for\n4 days. Now you have dealt with Vietnamese and you know it doesn't\nwork so fast.\nD:\nYeah. So if I might shorten your message in this way because It's now\nin Moscow already 8 o'clock in the morning so if we take into\nconsideration some urgence of the message. Se I may put it this way,\nyou called and\n......\nreceived some messages from my co-government\nand you feel it's rather threatening and may have on the whole\nbut what you are suggesting now is really to\ngive a chance to meet once more and to discuss some maybe changes\nwhich you feel as you put It are rather cosmetic ones.\nK:\nThat is correct.\nD:\nYes, and that's why you really like them not to be hasty in their decision\nbut rather to look further into this -- to the\ncommitment or\nrather statement you make that you are serious and once you really\ncome to agreement, then there will be no any more changes.\nK:\nI will make a commitment that we will not ask for any more changes.\nD:\nYes, this is it. And you are going to tell me tomorrow what really it's\nall about?\nK:\nExactly.\nD:\nWhat is the major issue, which you think is difficult? Could you\nmention to me right now? Is it their troops?\nK:\nWell, the major Issue is to do something about their troops, not all\nof them.\nD:\nYes,\n....\nsome but it's not to be in a --\nK:\nAnd it's not to be written in the agreement.\nD:\nYeah, I understand.\nK:\nAnd another issue is, you know, where we talk about this Committee.\nD:\nCommittee of what?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- B -\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972\nK:\nof National Reconcillation.\nD:\nOh, yes, yes, yes.\nK:\nIf we could find a synonym for three equal segments, without changing\nthe substance.\nD:\nWhat do you mean synonyms?\nK:\nYou know, some phrase that means the same thing without using that\nphrase.\nD:\nAbout Committee?\nK:\nNo, equal segments.\nD:\nOh, I understand.\nK:\nBecause Thicu has said he will never accept that. Now in practice he will\nalmost certainly be prepared to accept the substance if we can find some\nphrases other than that word. And all the rest la really of a nature that\nI shouldn't have to bother you with.\nD:\nNo, no, 1 don't think really because what I would like to mention to\nMoscow because I have to make a decision now. Because if then that's\neverything, so now they have to -- rather to give the messages to you\nreally. I've got to do in this case -- up to now we just make it in our\nown way but this to understand really I've got to use this occasion\nbecause otherwise it\n36 hours coming and then of course\nour own command as you would like to make it.\nK:\nYes, Now, of course, we will send our own message also,\nD:\nI understand. I understand but ours could be there as soon.\nK:\nBut yours will be there faster because I have to catch some time with\nthe President for the exact text tomorrow.\nD:\nYeah, I understand. Their answer was about.\nK:\nWell, their answer was only that they are very serious and we should\nkeep to the schedule and that we are responsible for the sonsequences.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n6 , .\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n11:22 p. m., October 23, 1972\nD:\nThey mentioned to us the same. The same, saying that we feel that this\nwas at commitment -- a full commitment, otherwise it is a political\ninfluence.\nK:\nWell, that's what I want to get across, that it is not a trick.\nD:\nYeah. Well, okay, I will send this telegram now to Moscow.\nK:\nGood, and I'll see you for lunch at one o'clock,\nD:\nAt one o'clock.\nK:\nGood.\nD:\nOkay.\nK:\nThank you.\nD:\nBye, bye, Henry.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n12:10 a. m., October 24, 1972\nK:\n[Called in on outside line] I thought you might be someplace where it\ndidn't --\nD:\nOh, no, no, no. You are in the same -- It's better, it's much more --\nK:\nI'll call you on it in a minute.\nD:\nHello.\nK:\nAnatol.\nD:\nIt's much better because otherwise it's very difficult to by the telephone.\nK:\nNo, I understand.\nD:\nYes.\nK:\n1 wanted to tell you one other thing. I've just talked to the President again.\nWe as a sign of our good faith are going to stop bombing north of the\n20th parallel.\nD:\n20th parallel.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nIn other words, tomorrow?\nK:\nIt's already been ordered.\nD:\nOrdered, yeah. North of 20th parallel.\nK:\nNorth of the 20th parallel.\nD:\nOkay. I think it is too rather important.\nK:\nAnd we will maintain this as long as we are negotiating.\nD;\nYes, okay. I think it's good -- a show of goodwill.\nK:\nGood.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n12:10 a. m., October 24, 1972\nD:\nOkay, I'm sending right now at telegram.\nK:\nGood, thank you.\nD:\nWell, until tomorrow. Thank you.\nK:\nRight. Bye.\nD:\nBye, bye.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmbassador Bunker/Kissinger\n8:53 a.m. - 10/24/72\nK: Hello.\nB:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nEllsworth, how are you?\nB:\nFine.\nK:\nEllsworth, I'm getting in touch with you by cable.\nB:\nRight.\nK:\nOn that one matter you sent me which I just received about the\nmisinterpretation. Now if that stuff is put out it is total suicide.\nThis is what we are fighting in the press here. Now if they say\nthat's what it is, we're dead.\nB:\nYeh.\nK:\nThen whether words are taken in or out is immaterial.\nB:\nRight.\nK:\nThey are giving this thing - first of all there is no talk whatever\nof the lower level stuff. I don't know where they get that from.\nB:\nWell, what they're talking about is what was in the - what was in\nsome of the previous proposals. That's what Lam is talking about.\nK:\nYeh, but if he wants to be able to play in some achievements he\nought to see that this is not the current thing and that they should\nstay a million miles away from that sort of an accusation. They' re\ncommitting total suicide here. I mean not with us, we're trying to\nbe helpful but in the way the public debate is going to be shaped here.\nB:\nYeh. Yeh.\nK:\nThe reason I call you so urgently is just if there is any chance of\ngetting to them tonight to calm them down.\nB:\nI doubt it very much Henry.\nK:\nWell, at least first thing in the morning.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nB:\nYes, well I think of what is taking place here now. There are\nmass meetings being organized all around the country and people\nare getting stirred up against - all of the talk is against a coalition\ngovernment and they are against a three-segment coalition govern-\nment.\nK:\nWell, it's either\nB:\nThey are given the impression that this is what's trying to be forced\non them.\nK:\nThis could either be very clever or very insane. It depends on how\nthey then represent the outcome.\nB:\nYes, that's right. That's what I say. That's what I said in that\nmessage.\nK:\nYeh. Ellsworth, you've been a tower of strength and we'll be getting\nin touch with you by cable with details, of course.\nB:\nRight. All right. Fine.\nK:\nBut it's essentially here the way I told you it would be.\nB:\nIt is.\nK:\nYeh.\nB:\nWell, I'll probably get a cable from you in the morning, would I?\nK:\nNo doubt.\nB:\nOK. All right, fine Henry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nZiegler/Kissinger\n9:50 a.m. - 10/24/72\nK:\nHello.\nZ:\nHi, Henry.\nK:\nYes, Ron.\nZ:\nWe're going to do a press picture of your ten o'clock meeting, OK ?\nK:\nYes. Do I have to be on my knees?\nZ:\nNo, just be there. I mentioned it to the President and I did it in\na different way then I did it to Rogers, but - and I am going to\nmention it to Rogers - that the film that we use will be film where\nthey'll underline stories about the negotiations and so forth. So\nI mentioned that to the President. He should get the word and I\nthink he has that during the picture session there shouldn't be\nsmiling and stuff - nothing stern, but it should be serious-looking.\nK:\nRight.\nZ:\nNow I'll cover that with Rogers. I've already mentioned it to the\nPresident. OK?\nK:\nOk.\nZ:\nYou do agree, don't you?\nK:\nYes, we should look optimistic.\nZ:\nYeh, not down, not too serious, but also not laughing and smiling.\nJust a serious to it.\nK:\nAbsolutely. Good.\nZ:\nThank you, Henry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nClark MacGregor/Kissinger\n12:50 p.m. - 11/24/72\nK:\nHello.\nM:\nHow are you, sir. Welcome home.\nK:\nI'm fine, thank you.\nM:\nHenry, the purpose of my call is very simple and hear me out for\nabout a minute because I know your initial reaction - or I suspect\nyour initial reaction will be as negative as mine was and then I\nthought about it a little bit more and I thought maybe I could accom-\nplish something. Here is the purpose of my call. NBC's TODAY\nshow has called this office, the campaign headquarters for the\nPresident, and said \"We would like a program exclusively on Vietnam\ntomorrow morning. We would like Mr. MacGregor to appear and\nwe would like some representative of George McGovern to appear. 11\nMy initial reaction, for obvious reasons, was negative and then I\nbegan, Henry, to think about it a little bit more and to think about\nhow we have been damaged by McGovern's appearance, hour long\nappearance on FACE THE NATION or ISSUES AND ANSWERS,\nwhatever it was on Sunday and by his repeated misstatement of the\nrecord.\nK:\nI don't mind your appearing.\nM:\nIt occurred to me if I appeared and confined my remarks exclusively\nto the record of efforts that the President has ma de through you\nand others to achieve\nK:\nI think you should appear.\nM:\nOK.\nK:\nAnd I think you should come over here and get a little briefing from\nHaig before you do it.\nM:\nOh, I will. I wouldn't even consider it unless that was acceptable\nto you.\nK:\nYes. Because for example they keep saying that what we are doing\nis what they've been proposing. You can't tell them what we're doing\nbut you can say the record will demonstrate that this is a total\noutrageous misstatement. Then another thing they're saying is that\nwe could have settled on the terms we are now negotiating for years\nago. You just call that a total absolute lie.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nM:\nGood. That'll be very helpful and I think it's necessary right no W,\nHenry.\nK:\nWell, you go ahead and do that.\nM:\nAll right and I'll call Muriel and make a date with Al.\nK:\nRight.\nM:\nOK.\nK:\nGood. Can you put it off one more day?\nM:\nI'll try but they want it tomorrow morning.\nK:\nWell, if you could do it till Thursday because a number of things\nare happening.\nM:\nI see.\nK:\nIf you could just delay it one day.\nM:\nAll right. I'll see what I can do.\nK:\nGood.\nM:\nThank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n3:07 pm - 10/24/72\nK:\nHello.\nL:\nHenry, welcome back!\nK:\nHow are you?\nL:\nPretty good. Did you survive all right?\nK:\nYes, barely. I want to thank you for all the cooperation from\nyour people.\nL:\nWell, I think they've--\nK:\nYou've been terrific. You're going away tomorrow, aren't you?\nL:\nWell, I just wondered if I should or not. I've got this nuclear\nplanning.\nK:\nI think you should. What time are you leaving?\nL:\nI'm leaving about 9:00 o'clock.\nK:\nI'm just wondering whether you want to have breakfast first?\nL:\nWell, maybe it would be a good idea, Henry, to have it.\nK:\nAt 8:00 o'clock.\nL:\nOkay.\nK:\nAre you going to yell at me as I come in?\nL:\nNo, I never yell at you. I think though it probably- - Ben will stay\nhere. He'll be here and be in touch with me all the time.\nK:\nGood. Nothing is going to happen, I think. How long are you going\nto be gone?\nL:\nI'll be back here Monday night.\nK:\nI think you are safe.\nL:\nYou think I'm safe!\nK:\nYes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n-2-\nLaird/Kissinger\n3:-7 pm - 10/24/72\nL:\nWell I think probably, well I don't like to have--the Chairman's\ngoing with me, and I'll get him back here maybe. - - he was going\non to Germany, and I don't think we'd better stay there too long.\nK:\nWell, let's decide when we talk in the morning.\nL:\nAll right, fine.\nK:\n8:00 o'clock and I'll bring Haig.\nL:\nGood.\nK:\nOkay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Joe Kraft\n10/24/72 4:17\nJK:\nHi, Henry, how are you?\nHK:\nOkay. Joe I may have a little trouble getting to you, I know\nyou asked to see me and I just wanted to call you to explain\nthat I'm going to be pretty busy for a couple of days.\nJK:\nI see. You couldn't see me thursday, you don't think.\nHK:\nOh Thursday, I probably could, but not before Thursday.\nJK:\nWell, if yoiu could Thursday morning, that would be fine.\nHK:\nI'll do my best. I'm planning a press conference on Thursday\nsometime.\nJK:\nI see.\nHK:\nSo after that.\nJK:\nOkay fine. Could you indicate on the phone what you think\nyou they've really moved quite a long way haven't\nthey?\nHK:\nOh yeh, I think we are making.\nJK:\nI mean both on prisoners and the time limit between ceasefire\nand political settlement0-\nHK:\nI think we made good progress.\nJK:\nAre there other areas where you think.\nHK:\nOh I think we've made all along good progress.\nJK:\nNo, no, I mean in other areas where you think there's been\nmovement on their part-\nHK:\nAh\nOh yeh, oh yes.\nJK:\nAt the ceasefire arrangements\nHK:\nWell I don't want to go into ahm\nJK:\nI see. Are you going to be going back to paris?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nHK:\nI really haven't set a date yet, but I would expect--obviously\nconversations are going to continue --\nJK:\nYeh. Is there a reparations agreement?\nHK:\nNo.\nJK:\nNom-no figure or anything like that?\nHK:\nNo.\nJK:\nWhere does Thieu stand--is he coming along or digging in.\nHK:\nWell you know when you make a compromise peace both sides--\nIwouldnt I take what either side now says as the gospel because\nboth sides now have to posture themselves, ah vis-a-vis\nwhat they've been saying previously.\nJK:\nOh I see--\nHK:\nI wouldn't take at face value all the various forumla that are being\nprinted about the nature of the settlement that are being discussed.\nJK:\nI see, yeh. How about timing. is there going to be something that\nhe can do between now and then-or election day?\nHK:\nThat we can do between now and election day?\nJK:\nYeh.\nHK:\nYou know, I know this sounds riduclous, but we've not working on\nin terms of election day--\nJK:\nI know, but I think Mr. Thieu is.\nHK:\nIn what sense?\nJK:\nTo delay things, halt things--\nHK:\nWhat difference does it make?\nJK:\nI don't think it makes much to me but I think it makes some to him.\nI think it means something to Van Dong--that was an extremely\nadroit interview that he gave.\nHK:\nThat's what you expect from Pham Van Dong--\nJK:\nI know. I was beginning to doubt him--no that is what you'd expect.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nHK:\nNo, but you know, I've always had the view that whenever they'd\nmake concessions, they'd make them all at once, rather than in\ndibblets. I consider the election an artificial deadline There\nmight have been a reason in '68 to rough it for the election on the\none hand and there may have been a reason for Thieu to hold out\nbeyond the election but that won't change the basic outcome now.\nI mean unless McGovern is to win the election in which case but\nthat wouldn't improve Thieu's position.\nJK:\nNo, not at all. Will the President be mkaing a statement?\nHK:\nThat depends on developments.\nJK:\nI see.\nHK:\nYou know I don't say it's impossible, but yousee as you get to\na certain phase of negotiations you suddenly then discover a lot\nof nuances which you sort of brush aside when you can⁺t even\nbegin to see the the shape of it--now they may be complex and\nthey may take time, but they are of a different order of difficulty\nthan you original problem which is what's the shape of the settlement\ngoing to belike. I mean you knew take SALT you knew in the last\ntwo months there was going to be an agreement whether it was\ngoing to be signed one month or another was really a subsidiary\nquestion. It's not a perfect analogy but what I am saying is take\ncategories in which you have some fundamental agreement then\nyou suddenly become very conscious of details which previously\nyou didn't even examine now they'll take you some to work out\neven\nthey may XX produce a temporary impasse but you know damn well\nthat if you could settle the fundamental question, you're going to\nfind a way out of that impasse because it¹s in a position which you\nare both determined to reach-\nJK:\nCan you indicate what the details are that are in the nuances\nthat have suddenly become --\nHK:\nNo, you know the trouble is if I tell you these things, you'll draw\nvery profound conclusions from them I'm trying to give you the\norder of problems that arise and that it is possible to be\nhard to know whether you can tell them one week or another week.\nBut you don' have the sense as you had a month ago where I\nhad one theory of how it might end and someone else had on another\ntheory, but neither side really had a hell of a lot to go except\nits assessment of the situation very little empirical proof.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 4\nJK:\nYeh, Okay--\nHK:\nBut I'll see you Thursday Joe and things may be a littler clearer\nby then\nJK:\nGood, fine. Thanks a lot.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Alex Johnson\n10/24/72 4:30 p.m.\nHK:\nAlex, how are you?\nAJ:\nHow are you, that's the question.\nHK:\nI'm okay--well, we've had a hectic day--\nAJ:\nI must say, just from a physical point of view and an emotional one.\nThis is--\nHK:\nThat was about the roughest four days I've ever had.\nAJ:\nAbout the roughest you; ve had, I'm sure.\nHK:\nI've had brutal ones but they won't so emotionally painful.\nAJ:\nNo, and such crucial issues as this.\nHK:\nYeh, Bill Sullivan incidentally was terrif ic-\nAJ:\nWell thanks--I have great regard for him.\nHK:\nIt was a tremendous contribution and it really lays the basis for a\nsort of cooperation which will be characteristic rather than --\nAJ:\nFine, very good. Well, I must say he speaks very high for you--\nHenry, I talked to him this morning, of course.\nHK:\nI mean not with him just, but I think we can do this now on a regular\nbasis\nAJ:\nGood, good.\nHK:\nHis contribution was first af all, totally loyal, discreet, and substantively\nhe couldn't have been better.\nAJ:\nHe's got a good grasp of it.\nHK:\nAnd he told you about all the changes we obtained-.\nAJ:\nYes, Of course I don't have any text here, sometime when it is convenient\nI might come over and just go through--\nHK:\nBy all means.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nAJ:\nI haven't seen the unilateral statements at all.\nHK:\nWe got major ones on Cambodia and Laos\nAJ:\nThat's what I understand.\nHK:\nI mean really major ones on Cambodia and Laos unbelievable.\nAJ:\nYeh, yeh. Well let me say Al did a superb job of keeping us informed\n--we find him very fine to work with.\nHK:\nAlex I have just heard from Ellsworth that Lamb has been briefing\nforeign ambassadors and you know these guys are on one of their\nAJ:\nDid you see the message of Ellsworth came in with this morning\nthere is a message in from him saying he heard kt hat they were\ntalking for giving out a briefing paper; he sent Charlie Whitehouse\nover right away Charlie Whitehouse got it and was horrified-\nHK:\nWell they are doing it on the basis of an old plan\nAJ:\nThen then Charlie got some changes made and Ellsworth sent in the\nchange paper--have you seen this exchange-\nHK:\nNo I haven't seen the changed papers-\nAJ:\nThere are three telegrams, one saying that they were doing this\nthen one sending in the original paper and then two the paper that\nhe'd been able to get modified\nHK:\nThey are talking on the basis of a proposal we no longer maintain.\nAJ:\nI find it hard to know what they are talking about- I haven't got the\nfull text of -\nHK:\nWould you have been able- the thing that I was proudest of was that\nwe had destroyed the coalition government.\nAJ:\nYou know, Thieu is also in his speech talking about coalition government\n-well of course this comes out of de Bourchgrave (I always have trouble\nwith his name) interview up there in Hanoi Now in that interview\nif you read the text of it, the text Pham Van Dong is very careful not\nto use the word government, however, the Newsweek article and all\nthe other articles based on it very freely use the word--\nHK:\nBecause the goddamn newsmen have a vested interest in it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nHK:\nBut if we would take the position this is clearly not a coalition\ngovernment--\nAJ:\nI agree.\nHK:\nThe thing that worries me is that Ellsworth is under the impression\nthat they have for example told the British the membership of that\ncontrol commission--\nAJ:\nIsee.\nHK\nAnd if that's the case, I think we better start talking to Canada and\nIndonesia.\nAJ:\nThat's what I feel I don't know did you talk at all with I talked\nto Secretary earlier this mo rning--\nHK:\nNo I didn't have a chance to mention it to the Secretary-. I used to be\nopposed to it.\nAJ:,\nYes, yes, I know you W ere.\nHK:\nBut I wonder whether the maniacs have leaked it.\nAJ:\nI have no indication yet that it's got to the Canadians bf the Indonesians\nhowever, I would expect Lon Nol probably to tell the Indonesians and\nI would expect the British to pick this up--or the Canadians to pick this\nup in Saigon, but I don't have any indication yet that they' ve done so.\nHK:\nDo you think we should talk to them or what do you think?\nAJ:\nI think the earlier we talk to them the better I don't see how we'd lose\nmuch by it. They are going to get us at a distorted form--\nHK:\nWhy don't you make a suggestion how to do it.\nAJ:\nAll right, the way we should do it is to have Bill Rogers arrange to\nsee Mitchell Sharp in New York or something of that kind to make thhe\nbroad pitch to him on it.\nHK\nWell then why don't we plan on it.\nAJ:\nThe Canadaians are not going to be -enthusiastic about this.\nHK:\nBut Bill thinks if we appeal to Trudesu he might do it.\nAJ:\nNo Bill thinks he might do better with Mitchell Sharp than we might\ndo with Trudeau.\nHK:\nI meant that Bill Sullivan thought--\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 4\nAJ:\nOh, Bill Sullivan thought--he just meant to appeal to the Canadians.\nHK:\nNo, no, let's try sharp first and we can always go to Trudeau from\nthere.\nAJ:\nYes, yes. All right. The Secretary can do that at any time.\nHK\"\nWhy don't we wait until tomorrow and keep it in mind.\nAJ:\nAnd then a letter or something from the Secretary to Malek or\n--we will have to have somebody go out to Djkarta and explain it\nto him. Now what we were thinking about was if and when you\n--if and when Bill at least makes another trip out there--\nHK:\nYeh, but I thought if those bastards haven't kicked us in the groins\nI was going to send Bill down from\nAJ:\nThat's what he mentioned.\nHK:\nfrom Saigon.\nAJ:\nYeh, all right, let me talk to the Secretary again, I think that he\nand Mitchell xxe getting together in New York quietly and then something\nfrom him to Malek and sending somebody out to --\nHK:\nor from the President to Suharto I don't know which is better.\nAJ:\nI don't know either we can do them both on the one, two; that is,\ntry it at the level and keep the President in reserve or I don't know\nhow does he feel or how do you feel. On Suharto I don't know.\nHK:\nI am sure on Canada the Secretary and Sharp are the best level.\nAJ:\nYeh, I'm clear on that.\nHK:\nOn the other, Ithink the President and Suhart may be better.\nAJ:\nI agree, all right, let me work something up on this.\nHK:\nGood and we'll be in close touch and keep you fully informed. We keep\ngetting little billydos from the North Vietnamese screaming --insisting\nwe sign the agreement this month.\nAJ:\nYeh, I know, now you are expecting something later on this evening.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 5\nHK:\nYeh.\nAJ:\nI think you are doing exactly the right thing - - let's keep the dialog\nopen--\nHK:\nWhat we' ve told them is that we need another round after that now\nthat XX our consultations are completed in Saigon that ought to be\ndefinitive\nAJ:\nThat's perfectly reasonable.\nHK:\nI don't know how we are going to bring Saigon along, to tell you the truth.\nAJ:\nI think they are going to come.\nHK:\nThere are two explanations either he's gone the Diem route or the\nnew route or he's setting up strong men which he can then knock down\nand say he drove--\nAJ:\nThat's right. I hope of course it's the latter he really has no place to\ngo, but of course hesperfectly capable like all Vietnamese completely\nirrational too.\nHK:\nBecause when he talks about this unfortunate ceasefire here we have\nbeen proposing it since October, 1970, he signed off on all of them,\nthere wasn't one proposal for withdrawal of NVA forces in any of the\nceasefire proposals, so what the hell are we doing to him.\nAJ:\nI know, I know, I know, I know. You'll get no argument out of me\non that.\nHK:\nI thought you were going to take his side.\nAJ:\n(laughing)\nAJ:\nHK:\nOkay thanks for letting us have Bill Sullivan-he's yours to be of any\nhelp he can any time.\nHK:\nHe'll be in as an equal partner from now on.\nAJ:\nThanks a lot.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
}