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Telcon
HAK and George Carver (2pp.)
12/1/72
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Kissinger Transcripts -- Telephone Conversations
17
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DECLASSIFIED
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TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/
George Shultz
12/1/72
9:40 a. m.
HK:
Hi, George, I was going to call you.
G:
I think we have got to try to fish or cut baitwith Pete somehow
or other now.
HK:
I am beginning to leav towards cutting bait-- I don't want that quoted
to Peterson--first of all he is so totally disaffected; and second, I
really don't quite know how this thing is going to work.
G:
He has himself involved at least in six major responsibilities--
HK:
On this charter?
G:
In his charter, and I don't quite see how it will be possible to manage
all of that. So, something that comes closer to the original proposal,
and is much more modest-
the more workable thing, but he
clearly doesn't want that.
HK:
I mean he wants to be in charge of OECD, European Community and
NATO--
G:
US/Polish--
HK!
And US/Polish
G:
And coordinate all European economic things, including energy problems
which is a hell of a bundle-
HK:
It could be done if he were in my job you know what I mean? But to do
it without a real power base and without very clear lines of authority, I
have serious questions about--I like Pete if he were set up in Washington
as the special representative of the President for Europe,
G:
I think we could put it another way--that somehow or another the things
that he is telling us need to be done, do need to be done.
HK:
That's right.
G:
And he is right the first time in that they need to be done in Washington
primarily, although we do need to have people in NATO, EC and so forth
who are there and who can act as eyes and ears and interpreters and so
forth there but I think this job has to be done in Washington.
HK:
But you ask yourself, how can he formulate éuropean foreign policy
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Page 2
sitting in Europe--
G:
Right, that was his point in the first place, but the trouble is the
President doesn't want him in Washington--
HK:
That's right.
G:
And that is a fairly firm thing so you work within those parameters
and you come out no where.
HK:
I must say when I read that charter yesterday, It was funny I was going
to call you within 10 minutes to discuss it with you.
G:
I got it this morning.
HK:
That's why I dexed it down--so that I could discuss it with you.
G:
Well, we could get back to Pete and say "no go" - - why don't you go
ahead and accept one of those million dollar offers--
HK:
Goerge, let me put it this way if it's so desirable that he go to Europe,
we can make it go--I do not think it will work- he will resign within the
year - he will find out he's not going to have a major policy formulating
role - - because I've never known that to work from Europe; don't you think?
G:
Yeh.
HK:
On the other hand, he doesn't seem to want the major representative
role--
G:
The chairmanship of these commissions would seem to locate the daty-
to-day policy on those things with him rather than
HK:
He wants an office in the EOB.
G:
That seems to me all right--I think if he can do all these things--he
better have one. But--
HK:
No, no, I think he would do the chairmanship--his plan, I think, is to
keep Sally here and I think what he would plan is to spend a week, a
month in Washington--
G:
I see. So he'd keep his house, and Sally would stay here and he'd
establish an apartment abroad.
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Page 3
G:
Well, that's not what the President wants.
HK:
We can make it work for a year--he will certainly leave within a year.
G:
I think it's better for him to leave now then along with everybody else
because if he leaves within a year, it's likely to be in a flap.
HK:
I have great difficulty visualizing how this will work.
G:
I agree with you. So dio 1.
G:
a:
Shall we tell the President that you and I have discussed this--we discusse
it with Peterson, this seems to be the S ort of the ultimate counter-
proposal, we don't think it will work and we think we should stop now.
What the President proposed to him mainly overbroad, work with NATO
and The EC and help us formulate European policy, and the eyes, the
ears and representative over there. He doesn't want that.
And continue to be involved in the Russian and so forth, but that's involve-
ment--that's not being in charge of it. That he doesn't want. See the way
he has the things lined up for EC, OECD and NATO it makes it hard to
--for example the discussion about Rumsfeld going to NATO--well it's
hard to get Rumsfeld to go to NATO if he reports to Peterson. I suppose
on the other two posts it wouldn't be a problem, because this guy is there
right now anyway a civil service type. But if we decided to change that
it would become something of a problem.
want to
HK:
On whether Rumsfeld should go to NATO, I really/have a voice in who gets
to be Ambassador I don't thing we should shuffle people around that I
have to work with--
G:
What do you think about Rumsfeld and NATO?
G:
HK:
I am not one of Rumsfeld's admirers-Ayou would rather have him stay at
EC- would like the NATO job.
HK:
Oh, he would?
G:
Yeh. He's done quite a good job in the Cost of Living Council, I think.
HK:
Has he?
G:
Yeh, he works at it, he has a good sense of able young people, he
attracts them and gets them working hard and he thinks outside the
boundaries of the particular ruts that the existing bureaucracy has
and he's responsive and loyal--he wants to report in; then if you say
all right, now you handle, he's not afraid to go ahead and do it--he's
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Page 4
very good to work with.
HK:
All right, well maybe I've got him wrong.
G:
So I wouldn't be surprised but that he'd make a very good Ambassador
in NATO.
HK:
Well, one thing for sure he won't become Ambassador if Pete is
super Ambassador--
G:
No, no. Pete is an enormously energetic and capable person.
HK:
And I think what is being done is a terrible injustice.
G:
So do I--he's turned in a hell of a good performance--
HK:
He handled-
G:
The guy we've nominated for Secretary of Commerce is not in his class.
HK:
Who is he?
G:
His name is Fred Dent-
HK:
Oh, it is going to be Dent
G:
Who oddly enough was born and brought up in Connecticut and went to Yale.
HK:
There is no question that the economic negotiations with the S oviets would
hot have reached this point without Pete--he did a superlative job. Subtle,
able, in fact, I don't know how we will set up the economic relations with
the Soviets-
G:
You and axix I have to spend a lot of time together here in planning a way
in which this is all going to work.
HK:
What do you mean in Key Biscayne.
G:
No, I mean whenever we can find time together- I am coming back to
Washington this afternoon. I gather you are coming down--I probably
be coming back on the plane you're coming down on.
HK:
We couldn't be both there at the same time--the status problem. You
outrank me anyway.
G:
Not in seniority on the White House staff--as a labor relations fellow,
I recognize seniority--
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Page 5
HK:
Yes, but you got yourself a Cabinet position too.
G
I also recognize --I hate to inject this note into a somewhat humorous
exchange the tremendous ability you have--and as an old academic
I tend to give precedence to overriding ability.
HK:
George. the only people who say flatly doesn't get you anywhere are
the people who have never had flattery.
G:
(laughing) In this case it isn't flattery, because its meant.
HK:
We should get together, when I come back from Paris next week,
we should have a talk.
G:
All right. As far as this-
HK:
My instinct--let me tell you a cowardly thing--I'm a friend of Pete's
and therefore I don't want to get in caught in the position where it is
said I thought It couldn't work. I'd rather have it on the basis where
the President says he didn't want something that had somany facets
to it and its either the original job or nothing.
G:
Hm huh. Well, we have to make a report to the President.
HK:
No, I don't mind both of us making a report to the President, I'm
talking about what will be said to Pete.
G:
All right. Now this decision process is apining wildly here--Rumsfeld
--see they are announcing all the WH staff changes and so for and
somehow--he's got to fit into the picture--stay, leave, do something
and so the decisions are tracking around. So I think you should think
very carefully about the NATO business and Rumsfeld You don't seem
as though you feel like saying right now whether he would be acceptable
to you.
HK:
Oh hell, I suppose I can live with Rumsfeld- I don't have that much to
do with the NATO ambassador.
G:
You would find him quite--he fishes around at you some, but basically
he takes orders and carries them out.
HK:
Based on that--
G:
He's bright.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Page 6
HK:
Yeh, he's bright. I think he is a little - - frankly my objection is I
found him to be on the soft side of most issues and what we need
in Europe now is really some stern - but I might be wrong on that.
G:
I think there - the political side, the thing that appeals politically
right now is to be a pretty tough guy, so that being the case, that's
the way Rumsfeld is going to be. Because his basic orientation is
to his political future.
HK:
Okay.
G:
All right. You wouldn't be upset about him - - then -
HK:
No, but I will be upset if a lot of ambassadorial appointments are
made without my being consulted, even if I were to approve.
G:
Yeh, this is something that I'm not involved in on that subject--
HK:
This is just the WH reorganization
G:
I only know about the Rumsfeld thing because of his Cost of Living
Council and so on and what is he going to do and the President talked
to him about this possibility. But the structuring of the ambassadorial
business and so on, I
HK:
I'll talk to Haldeman about it tomorrow-
G:
Haldeman and I understand Flanigan is marketing names around too.
HK:
Okay good.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
November 1, 1972, 10:03 am
P:
I was just calling to get the morning report. Anything new on the
K:
No, I'm seeing the South Vietnamese at 10:30.
P:
At ten, huh. That's good.
K:
We've had a cable from Bunker in which he thinks they are going to
come along. But ungraciously.
P:
I don't care how they come along.
K:
They've been leaking in that direction. They've been saying you gave
them an ultimatum. That's been on NBC, that doesn't do any damage
in Paris, and that they were going to see how we did next week before
they make their final decision.
P:
Well. people I think that's what they are going to do. Let's be sure that none of our
kotxet people leak that I'm giving an ultimatum. Tell State, Sullivan
and all the rest I don't want that conversation because that was a son of a
bitch and tough conversation, and that was really rough.
K:
That was rough.
P:
Be sure that Haig and everybody knows that I didn't tell the Chiefs or
anybody.
K:
Right. I'll make sure that nothing gets to State.
P:
Or anybody. Just don't let it out, because we don't want to embarrass
them publicly. Then we'll build a backfire here on the Right Wing, you
know, and we just can't have that.
K:
Right, right. Well, nobody--
P:
Incidentally, I've been thinking a little about our meeting tommorrow
just so that you can prepare, I think on the negotiating strategy this
time that you ought to begin, not with the easy one but with the tough
one. And I think that, for example, on the priority you've got to say,
now, let's get one thing settled once and for all, we say first they
will have seen the picture of the Joint Chiefs, that will I assume be
carried in The World--
K:
:Yes, it's been in every paper.
P:
Has it.
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2
P contd:
Good. All right. Then I'd be cold as ice, the President is frankly
very relaxed about it but he's very disappointed in the progress of
this, and this is it. This is, as far as you are concerned, the last
meeting.
K:
Right.
P:
Then you go on to say, Now we've got to begin with one proposition
and that is the President is very disappojnted and cannot understand
your backing off of your proposal with regard to the key point of the
prisoners. If we back off--that's important now. What are you going
to do about that. You've got to get that settled right away because
we can talk all we want and settle 12 points, if we don't settle that
we have no deal.
K:
Exactly. I think, Mr. President, what we might consider, you might
want to think about it until tomorrow, is that I ask for a private meeting
with him first--
P:
Oh, sure, sure.
K:
With some of your stronger words that way so that there are not too
many people in the room when I say it. It's easier for them to take
it that way.
P:
That's right. Well, I'll go, I think I'll write a very tough note too
with what yo u have with your instructions. That may be helpful.
K:
That would be very helpful.
P:
What you can do is to have something prepared along that line. Let
him, you know, spend some time, you've got things to do. When I
get it, I'll edit it, then I'll send that with you. Now there a few other
brief points here, Henry. At least the North Vietnamese have indicated
in their message a willingness to discuss. Right.
K:
Absolutely. Let me get you the exact wording.
P:
Right, Okay.
K:
I'll you know, there's the usual palaver which isn't worth repeating
about the history of -
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3
P:
Oh yes. I ought to make a lot of palaver too, but now the damned
thing is going to be settled.
K:
Well, here is the operative paragraph. "If the U.S. is really determined
to end the war rapidly and restore peace in Vietnam, the Democratic
R epublic of Vietnam will also as resolutely advancøe in that direction.
The DRV side will come to the private meeting on December 4th with
good will and a very serious attitude. If the U.S. side also shows
good will and makes great effort like the Democratic Republic of
Vitenam is prepared to do, it is certain that the Vietnam question
will be rapidly settled in the interest of both sides. " That's pretty
forthcoming by their standards.
P:
Yeah, yeah.
K:
Because that in effect
P:
I just trust they don't think coming there with more concessions.
K:
Well, we have to come with something along the lines of--that we
discussed, Mr. President, on restoring some of the original language
on this committee.
P:
Well the language on the committee is--you're getting from Duc his
priorities or not.
K:
That's right.
P:
Or is he going to give you priorities.
K:
My--
P:
We know what his priorities are, what the hell, he just wants it to
look good and frankly we can make it look good. Now the other thing
that you've got to really hammer out with him is whether or not there
is going to be a meeting between me and here's a way you can
hurry their decision a bit, because I can't--you can say the President
can make, you know, you're putting this first, but he admits to his
budget preparations and so forth and he can't just take off and go
on 24 hours notice. Now if Thieu wants this meeting, we ought to do
it. I think he should want it, and I think the time to do it is before.
K:
Well, I think he should want it, I think the time to do it is--you ought
not to consent to doing it before because you could make the commitments
in a framework where it wouldn't look provocative, and it could be done
in the surge of peace and it would set up the subsequent trip to Hanoi
in a much better framework. But we'll get an answer to that in an hour,
I hope, but I will press it on him immediately.
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4
P:
Well, in an hour he's going to come in with his usual plaintive answer
and say well that business about being we are going to die six months
from now, we'll die now. That's just nonsense, and they want to talk
that way, well there's just no deal.
K:
Now, on the concessions, Mr. President, we cannot have there are
four outstanding issues, we can't have our way on all four of them.
P:
I understand that.
K:
Because, say, for example, they want the PRG mentioned in the document
once, they've agreed to delete it every place except in the preamble.
Now, I have found a formula which I've now checked with the lawyers
which will work which is that everybody except Saigon signs the pre-
amble mentioning the PRG, and Saigon has a different preamble. That
way the North Vietnamese gets three quarters of their way, and then
we make a unilateral statement saying --
P:
We recognize only one government.
K:
Exactly. Then we have shown our good will towards-
P:
Well, don't tell him that tomorrow. Don't tell him that today.
K:
Oh, no, I won't tell
P:
Don't tell him that today. That's something that you wangle out of
them next week and then say we've made a great big deal here.
K:
Exactly. I wanted to tell you that that's the way this one has to go,
we cannot get--
P:
I understand that. Anyway that doesn't make a damn bit of difference
whether it's mentioned or not. If we put out a unilateral statement
that we don't recognize them. That's the point they've got to understand.
K:
Now the second thing is I think of all the outstanding issues, the one
we've got to get back is the prisoner one.
P:
Well, that is why you've got to start with that.
K:
But, on the other hand, on that three segment committee, it's just
insane for the South to make--
P:
Well, how about putting in a phrase that this is not a coalition govern-
ment or something of that sort.
K:
Well, they won't agree to that.
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5
P:
Well, then we'll state it.
K:
Oh, yeah, that's easy. They have stated it. I have it in the protocol
that they have stated it. And, we can put out what they said.
P:
I know they've already made statements. I was just thinking of any
way that you--well go ahead.
K:
On the rest of the issues we can win.
P:
On the withdrawals, like what.
K:
Well, I think we can get them to withdraw some of their prisoners--
some of their troops on a de facto basis. I think we can get a state-
ment in there with respect for North Vietnamese oujtside
Vietnamese territory which is a sort of a code word for no troops.
Why don't
P:
Whak xx we say for the respect of the territory of both sides.
K:
That's how this would be done.
P:
That's right.
K;
And you can get a clau se in there that the demobilization should be
done within a three month reriod so that that's hooked to everything
else so if there's no demobilization, they don't have to have a committee.
P:
Well, I assume I wouldn't expect anything when you see him today
because he's, I mean, they are obviously waiting Bunker doesn't
know anything anyway does he.
K:
No. It was just his instinct.
P:
Well, from what we heard from that conversation yesterday, after what
we had told them, that was
K:
No, that was--by that time it was paetty mild.
P:
Well, I know toward the end he began to back off, but he doesn't have
anly authority. You know, you could tell by looking at him and the
Ambassador, I think that/he and the Ambassador were making a deal
we would have it right now. Don't you agree?
K:
Oh yes, no question. Not a question about it. Well, what they are
going to do, Mr. President, is to wait until he gets the deal in Paris
and then they'll accept it.
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6
P:
Yes, but then, you see, one of the reasons that I want this meeting
even from my standpoint is that I want it to appear, I want to be sure
the Right Wing hears, and all say that we sold out and all that crap.
Of course, you can brief and you can convince the --
K:
No, the meeting.
P:
with our enemies, the two of them. You understand that both the
Left and the Right would be disappointed with this. And because
the less for the reason that will want to find what is wrong with it,
in any event, they have a vested interested in defeat, and the Right
because they will honestly believe what Thieu says.
K:
Well, but I think it's going to go like the SALT agreement. That once
we got it, it's going to be an overwhelming--
P:
I think so too, but I meant the point is the symbolism is though of
his going along graciously is something. If he goes along ungraciously
it's all right, but I think we should tell Duc that, look just going along
here but having statements leaked out that they are going along re-
luctantly will make it more difficult for me to keep my commitments
to get the Congress on military aid and the rest because the Congress
will look for excuses.
K:
That's right. I'm going to tell them that it must be a settlement, that
the American people feel proud of--
P:
Oh, yes, it must be a settlement that the American- that particularly--
their strong supporters in the Congress, the Right Wing, so that they
will feel, will not be a let down. You see Henry, don't worry about the
Left. The hell with the Left and the Democrats and the rest. They
don' we could have the most great settlement in the world. Our
concern now is the Right here. It's a real problem. The thing to do
therefore is to get this across to this fellow that therefore that is why
they're going along has to be in some sort of a gracious manner or it
will be very difficult for us to get this money from the Congress. And
it really will. If the South Vietnam drags its feet.
K:
Right. I will make these points.
P:
There are a couple of other points. We will talk about it in the morning.
Two other points. When I talked to you about the Connally thing, I
want that on an urgent basis followed up on.
K:
I've got a call in to him Mr. President.
P:
Mr. Connally. Fine. Because we want him to be basically without
any portfolio because he represents various elements of both groups
but he is the guy that could put this deal together. I don't want it done
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7
under Commerce because if the government gets into it, we'll have
to be choosing between Arnold--between Hammar and Elysee Gass,
and we'll be in one hell of a spot. Id rather have Connally do the
brokering. Do you see my point.
K:
Right.
P:
I want us to stay out of it totally. I don't want anybody in Commerce,
I don't want anybody in the government to talk to any of the poeple on
this. You tell those people over there that.
K:
Right.
P:
The other thing is, on another note, I just gok want to be sure because
I made a commitment for him to do it, I want to be sure that you let
the Chinese know that we would like to have Bob Hope's application
be considered.
K:
I've already done that, Mr. President.
P:
You have. You see, Dave Mahoney got over there and that stirred
Hope up a little. He said what the hell
K:
No, no, I've done it on a number of occasions. They've just answered
us saying they can't do it now, but if he applies again in a few months
they'll consider it.
P:
All right, well then
K:
I've gotten in touch with Hope already and said that we've made an
effort--
P:
Be sure that he knows that you got to him at my request after my
conversation that the Chinese had a special problem at the moment
but that we have another front burner and you personally will follow
up. Will you do that.
K:
Absolutely.
P:
Cause he's been a great friend. I mean when all of the other stars
out there came along reluctantly, he's been pushing it, and we've
just got to go for our own people now.
K:
I couldn't agree more.
P:
Okay, we'll se you tomorrow.
K:q
Right.
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TelCon ALEXIS Johnson
See. Rogers / Mr. Kissinger
10:22, December 1, 1972
K:
Hello.
JR3,
Yes, Henry, I'm returning your call.
K:
I just wanted to check with you on that idea I had that Al tried out on
you yesterday.
JR.
Well, I gave him--
K:
Do you think this will work? I mean deag legally.
Oh, legally, there's no problem with the thing. It's not so much a
legal problem as it is a protocol problem.
K:
No, but how does it work in practice. Doesn't everybody signe every
document.
No, no. You have four parties sign four documents, and they each
exhange documents.
K:
So in other words, each party then holds three documents.
JR:
Each party has three documents, that's right. I have this, now, all
written out. I can get it right over to you.
I would appreciate that very much, yes. Don't you think that's a
rather ingenious formula.
I think it's an ingenious way of doing it. My old friend here, Charlie
Bevins agrees, and he is the one that comes up with ideas like this.
And I showed it to the Secretary this morning as well as to Bill
Dullivan and he sees no--
K:
But just before you guys start leaking again we thought of the idea.
You guys thought of the formula.
That's right. I entirely agree.
K:
Before it get started into the news papers how you saved us again.
JR:
Okay, all right, all right, all right.
K:
The formula you think will work, then.
JR:
The formula will work if the parties will buy it.
K:
Well I think it gives the communists three quarters of what they want.
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2
KJ:
The formula will work if they will buy it. Now it seems to me it
saves the South Vietnamese entirely. I don't see h; ow they could
have any objection to it. It's only the other side who could have any
objections to it. Now and what you can do of course--
K:
The other side though can get our name on a PRG document and
we can then make a unilatetral statement saying we only recongize
KJ:
We can do that. You know, each party can put virtually anything they
want into the preamble- mean they can word it in ways to suit them.
The essential thing is that they sign the substance, and exchange it.
I can get this right over to you.
K:
I'd appreciate that.
KJ:
Okay. Henry regard to our other talk yesterday on the ticker
K:
The Secretary talked--
J:
Oh, he has?
K:
About the possibility of Ambassador at Large.
J:
Well, but
K:
And Saigon.
J:
Vietnam. I talked to my wife last night. Maybe it's the moth being
attracted by the flame, but if this thing's going to hold together at all]
and we should be able to see that shortly, I'd be glad to, we'd both
be glad to go back there. You know, if that's what the boss would like
to have me do. It's going to be an interesting job.
K:
It's going to be a God damned interesting job and it takes somebody
who knows us and who knows
J:
Yes, and I would be glad to go back there, assuming of course
Ellsworth wants to go which--
K:
Yeah, he definitely wants to go. There's no question about it.
J:
If the thing holds together. If the thing falls apart completely, ob-
viously there'd not be much po9nt in my staying around.
K:
But our hope you know we want someone there who will hold it togethe r.
J:
And I think maybe on that maybe I'd have something to contribute.
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3
K:
I think you'd have a hell of a lot to contribute.
J:
They know me and they know my background. That might be some
help to them also, so I'm prepared to do it, my wife is too. I'll
have to--a little problem I'll have to talk to my doctor about it
and I might have to get out fairly frequently to a cooler climate, and
there'd be no golf or anything of that kind in that heat. But subject
to that, and I'm going to talk to him today, I'd be prepared to take it
on. Now the Secretary's idea, I think, has some merit--an Ambassador
at Large for the next couple of months while negotiating the and getting
things in place and all thattype of thing. But with it known that this
is going to be my responsibility, Ellsworth staying on ab long as he
wants to,my--
K:
Ellsworth wants to leave at the end of January.
J:
I'd like to have about 30 days leave before I go out.
K:
I'm sure we can extend him.
J:
Yes, I think that ought to work out. Well, all I wanted to pass on to
you is I tbld the Secretary this morning I'd be prepared to do this.
K:
Good, well I appreciate this, and I'll talk to the President.
J:
Subject to my doctor, and I'm going to talk to him today, but I thxixox
think he'll let me do it if I handle things within reason.
K:
I'll talk to the President tomorrow.
J:
All right. Okay Henry I'll get this right over to you.
K:
Right.
J:
Bye.
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TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Peter Flanigan
12/1/72
11:02 a.m.
(Tape began in middle)
PF:
committed to the Taiwan government that we would assemble
these Northrop planes in Taiwan.
HK:
Not if I can help it.
PF:
Well your guy Pickney--Piinkney--Pinkney
HK:
He isn't mine--he's a State Department guy.
PF:
I understood he was NSC.
HK:
No. I think so anway.
PF:
He works for Holdridge.
HK:
Oh really--
PF:
We think this is a lousy deal from an economic point of view. If
we made a commitment of course we have to live up to that--
HK:
Mel Laird has been pushing it but I frankly have been trying to drag
it to be on January 20 and get it killed after he leaves.
PF:
We've got it over here now, why don't we kill unless Pinckney
claimed that either you or the President considered this--and what
is meant by sympathetic consideration is yes we'd do it.
HK:
Baloney.
PF:
Baloney?
HK:
Yeh.
PF:
We can't find anyone really who thinks we should do it.
HK:
Let me talk to Haig to see if there is any history there which I don't
know about.
PF"
The reason we're against it is it doesn't save us any money, it
costs the Taiwanese 10M bucks, but they want it because it puts
them in the airplane business. Northrop wants it because it ties
them to Taiwanese.
HK:
Well I don't want it because I don't want to drive Peking out of a
.
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Page 2
PF:
I don't mind giving them back the airplanes but I don't for the
life of me see why we should--
HK:
No, of course, they must get the airplanes.
PF:
But we don't have to put another damn competent manufacturing
country in the airplane business in competition with us.
HK:
Yes.
you
PF:
Would/ask Al to give me an answer on it-- -
HK:
I'll get All to call you.
PF:
I'm late on it alreadyso I appreciate that.
Thank you.
HK:
Okay.
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TELCON
Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger
1:37 p.m., December 1, 1972
K:
Hello, Bob.
T:
I was just wondering if I would have a chance to see you down here
or are you going to be really bushed?
K:
Well, it's not a question of being bushed
I'm going to spend a lot
of time with the President and I might leave right after that. But I'll
keep it in mind.
T:
Okay. Because it¹s kind of difficult at this point Iº11 tell you the
problem I have in doing this profile point is obviously the blueprint
of your thinking pre-Administration is clear from what you've
written. The question of how much of the tactics that have been used
can be ascribed to sort of your thinking. That is, did you follow
out the tactics that you had thought would be effective or were these
significantly modified as you went along?
K:
With what?
T:
In terms of Vietnam.
K:
You mean from the beginning?
T:
Yeah.
K:
Yeah, that's an interesting question.
T:
Yeah, you know, I conclude roughly that say 90% of what was laid
out in your previous writings in terms of strategy.
K:
Yeah.
T:
But the tactics is kind of difficult. The other thing, Henry, was
whether or not you can give any guidance on the present situation.
I gather the reports that it may be coming unglued are all wrong.
K:
Yes.
T:
And was the Times story accurate? Because JCS was signed on
yesterday to the settlement?
K:
I haven⁸t read the Times story.
T:
Well, the gist of it was that they were called together to ratify
or to agree formally to the terms of the settlement that have now
been worked out.
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TELCON
Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger
1:37 p.m., December 1, 1972
K:
I just don't want to discuss that.
T:
Okay. I'm kind of puzzled at all the time that you and of course
the President has spent with Phu Duc and it's either a good massage
conference or something serious is up. I gather it's the former
though.
K:
Well, the Vietnamese are pretty time-consuming.
T:
[Laughter]
K:
North and South.
T:
[Laughter]
K:
It s a great deal of the former.
T:
Of the former, right. Can we expect in terms of your meeting
on Monday that this is going to be a sort of a resumation of the final
session? Is that kind of phraseology
K:
That's exactly right.
T:
How long would you expect it to last?
K:
Dare I
say three or four days.
T:
You dare. [Laughter] And after that you're going to have to go to
Saigon?
K:
Then we will have to see how it comes out. Okay, I've got to run.
T:
Okay. Thanks. Will you call me if you can make it?
K:
Yeah.
wgh.
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TelCon
Gov. Connally/Mr. Kissinger
1:47, Decembser 1, 1972
C:
Henry?
K:
Hell, Mr. Secretary.
C:
Doctor, how are you?
K:
Good. I'm calling you about that gas thing that you discussed
with the President yesterday.
C:
Right, right.
K:
I wanted to get a clearer picture from you just what it was. I
know the gas project, but I didn't know exactly what your relation-
ship to it was.
C:
Henry, my relationship at the moment is that I'm sitting astride
two different groups that are negotiating with the Russians. We've
got to, at all costs, try to keep the Russians from ripsawing these
two groups of people.
K:
I couldn't agree more.
C:
And, so what I want to do and what the President suggested was
that to the effect, warn Dobrynin, in effect say that I was, for
all practical purposes, the man that would say to Dobrynin how
when we are going to function, vis a vis, these two groups of people.
K:
Now what are these two groups?
C:
These two groups are, one is Texas Eastern Gas Transmission,
and CINGO, Tennessee Gas Transmission, and Brown & Root--
that is one group. The other group is El Paso Natural Gas Company
and they are joined with a minority interest by Dr. Hammar as
Occidental Petroleum.
K:
What's the routes--one is in--are they both in the same field.
C:
No, the contract started with the first group--the Texas Eastern
group, trying to get both projects. Then the
field, and
the one in the western part of the country that they call an All Star
project.
K:
Right. I know them both. I negotiated the general framework
with Brezknev when I was there, so I know the---I haven't gotten
in with the companies, of course.
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2
C:
Ell Paso then comes in and they are primarily interested in the
field with the JE apanese. Now the question is
whether or not we combine these two groups so that there are five
companies operating in both fields, or whether or not it is better
for the United States entørest for one group, the Texas Eastern
group, to take the North Star project, and the El Paso group to
take the Nutruske field.
K:
Well, I feel strongly about two things. One, we shouldnt be a bit
soft, secondly I would like to use this Cass deal enforce some
political compliance with them.
C:
I understand that. I'm at the present time sitting on top of it, and
I will keep you informed on everything that happens.
K:
And therefore I'd like to sort of stage these things to fit into our
political stragegy. Only if this is a good argument to have one
man in charge of it.
C:
All right.
K:
I'd be delighted to talk to Dobrynin about this. Could we have a
talk too so that I can give you the political side of it. I'm not
interested at all in the commercial side.
C:
Yes, sir. I'll come up whenever you get back.
K:
Good, let's do it that way, and you can be sure that I will make
clear to Dobrynin whom to deal with.
C:
Okay, that's great. We'll phase it in, that's precisely the purpose
of my visit.
K:
Good.
C:
So we can phase it in so you can use whatever leverage there was
for your political purposes.
K:
I'll call you the day I get back.
C:
That's fine. Thanks Henry.
K:
Good, bye.
C:
Bye.
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TelCon
Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger
2:15, December 1, 1972
K:
Hello.
MK:
Henry, Hi. I just wanted to ask a question or two of you. Could
you tell me at this point--I can't believe the CBS report out of
Saigon this morning.
HK:
What is it?
MK:
Well, there was a report that Dick Wagner did quoting South
Vietnamese sources to the effect that we have--going to put one
of those proposals to Thieu that either he signs or he gets no
aid, and it just sounded wrong to me, I just wanted to double
check with you.
HK:
I just don't want to go into the discussions between us and the
South Vietnamese.
MK:
Do you have any sense of greater confidence now that you have
Saigon on board.
K:
I think we are making progress, yes.
MK:
Is there any prospect in your mind, Henry, of a--of we signing
without them.
K:
I don't think--that's going to happen. I don't think that's probable.
MK:
Right. Is it possible to have something by the end of this year?
K:
Definitely. I mean definitely possible.
MK:
Okay. Do you--has the North ever accepted the principle of with-
drawal?
K:
Well, I would have to go through a very complicated analysis of
provisions which I can't do. Withdrawal has not been part of any
American proposal since October 1970. All those were joint
proposals with the GVN. You are talking here about a ceasefire,
not a final settlement. I think the total accumulation of the provisions
of this agreement are bound to bring about a substantial reduction of
North's forces in the South.
MK:
And that is something that abviously they would not have gotten on
board if they didn't intend to carry out, do you feel?
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2
K:
Well, of course they can violate it. In that case, adding one more
provision that's going to be violated doesn't help any.
MK:
But, how would you explain the problem of not getting the South on
board if the question of withdrawal is not really the key?
K:
I think the real problem is the psychological problem of their
suddenly being left by themselves. You know, an attempt has
been entirely different from what they've gotten use to over 12
years.
MK:
That's right.
K:
I think that's at the heart of the problem, but that cannot be allowed.
MK:
That's one of the things I remember you saying is that one of the
most difficulty things would be to persuade them that they can exist
without it.
K:
That's right. That's the key to the problem. I mean I think that
is the essence much more than any particular provision because if
it weren't one there'd be another that is objected to.
MK:
Right. Henry, are you likely to try and initial anything next week.
K:
No, no.
MK:
And you are still planning to go to Saigon, aren't you.
K:
There are good signs of it.
MK:
Yeah. Listen Collingwood is going to be in Paris next week and I
think he's going to take the liberty of calling you. I'm just alerting
you.
K:
Good.
MK:
Good.
K:
Good, Marvin, and I'll call you when I get back.
MK:
Good luck, Henry.
K:
Thank you, bye.
MK::
Bye.
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TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger
2:36, December 1, 1972
P:
Mr. President.
P:
How did your meeting go.
with
K:
Mr. President I had about a three hour meeting NN these guys
and the first two hours went fine. We were talking about how
to implement a ceasefire, and went into detail and answered a
lot of questions. I'm going to see them again at 3:30 this after-
noon with Intelligence and DOD people. In the last hour, we got
back to the - what they told you Wednesday and what they told you
yesterday.
P:
Yeah. We said that we'd just go ahead and they will go their way.
K:
Well, they don't ever quite say this. They just say it's going to
be impossible as long as there are North Vietnamese forces
there. I'm beginning to worry, that they may have psyched
themselves to a point where they just can't get it off. There is
nothing inherently in this agreement that can't be carried off.
P:
Yeah.
K:
And we did make progress in working out details of the ceasefire
arrangement. I've checked with they actually haven't had any
new instructions, so they are probably just following their old
brief.
P:
Yeah.
K:
They've leaked to the newspapers that you've given them an ultimatum.
It was on CBS this morning.
P:
Uh huh. Well you can't tell, it might have come from other sources
too.
K:
No, they said it came from the Pallace. At any rate, it came from
Saigon.
P:
Uh huh. Well--the question is whether anybody should be sent out
there.
K:
I don't think so. I think if they can't take it from you there's no
one else who can be more convincing.
P:
Yeah.
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2
K:
I think the only other think that can happen now is a meeting between
you and Thieu. I don't think any lower level- -
P:
Yeah, but a meeting before we make the deal?
K:
I think a meeting before after the next round with the North
Vietnamese, but before we conclude the agreement.
P:
Yeah, but, you mean where he basically sits down and haggles about
this whole thing.
K:
No, no.
P:
You agree we can't do that.
K:
I agree completely.
P:
I mean, there is no way--
K:
No way.
P:
Maybe he just wouldn't have a meeting if there is nothing further
to negotiate.
K:
What I think is going to happen, Mr. President, is that they are
going to let us make the deal, they won't take any responsibility
for it and after it is concluded they'll join saying they had no choice.
In that context, I think he'll meet you. It's not a very--
P:
Well, you've got to tell them that this seriously jeopardize my
efforts to get these adequate aid programs.
K:
Well, I --
P:
That is, I can--to get the Congress to pass AID is always hard.
But if they go along with this in a way that it appears that theybare
negative, they are just going to play in the hands of their Congressional
enemies.
K:
I've told them that it is absolutely essential that we end this in a
way that Americans can be proud of it and feel that something
worthwhile was accomplished. Then we have an interest in pre-
serving it. But if they go along with it in this grudging attitude
they are going to make it very tough for us to support them.
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3
Not because of intention, but because of the Congress.
P:
What does Haig think about all this
K:
He's totally convinced that we should go ahead as we are going.
P:
Sees no other choice, huh?
K:
No. He's concerned about the fact as I am that they may be
flacking themselves too much. What they did up to a certain point
to extort better terms made sense, but it's reaching now the point
where they are doing damage only to themselves.
(change of tapes
)
P:
that if we don't get what they have laid down as their
minimal conditions, that we then would continue the war, and that's
an impossibility. We have told them. It's made so clearly, and
it happens also to be totally true, no way we can continue it. No
way. If the North Vietnamese come along on those three funda-
mental points, which they have done, unless they back off from the
people in South Vietnam
K:
I don't think they will. Well, they have backed off but I think we
can get that back.
P:
Uh huh. Well, what are you going to tell them at 3:30?
K:
At 3:30 we are just going over ceasefire maps.
P:
Oh, for Christ sakes. As far as putting it out that I gave them an
ultimatum, I---
K:
We denied that.
P:
Well, we denied that, but I mean, well we did give them an ultimatum.
But my point is that as far as putting it out I don't think that hurts
you a little in dealing with Hanoi.
K:
No, that helps with Hanoi.
P:
The only problem it does, it makes it difficult with our hawks here
at home. I'm not sure but Mel Laird is convinced, and he really is,
that all the hawks, Jerry Ford too, they want to get it over now.
We don't have hawk support--I mean as far as Congress is concerned
you've got a few nutheads--Agnew, did you see his letter.
K:
Yes.
P:
What did you think of that?
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4
K:
Well, he'
P:
The one that this POW wife sent in.
K:
He just isn't very bright.
P:
But you will talk to him, and
K:
Absolutely, I will talk to him before I
P:
Totally abort on this. He's to know that,I do that is important
if you can get him this afternoon, Henry, and say now look, the
deal is made, it's a good one--so that he can talk positively to
the hawks. Will you do that?
K:
I'll call him thi;s afternoon, Mr. President
P:
That will be helpful. Well, don't get discouraged--
K:
Oh, no, I think we are going to make it.
P:
We've been going around and around, and My God, I must say
I don't know what more we could do to--
K:
Well they didn't survive for 2000 years by being easy to get along
with.
P:
Yeah.
K:
I think we are going to get it. But--
P:
Yeah, but getting him reluctantly, Henry, I am very serious in
saying that we--when we have to present those AID requests, it's
going to be tough. You know what I mean, it hinges on the agree-
ment.
that
K:
Well if the human language can convey/, we 've done it. But I think
the trouble is that these two fellows here are convinced, but is this
little punk kid in the Pallace--
P:
Have him to come over.
K:
Well, we asked him to come over, he wouldn't come. He went as
far as Paris and brought his instructions and then he went home.
I checked with Bunker again and he thinks that it's absolutely the
best we could have gotten. In fact, better than he thought we would
get.
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5
P:
Uh huh. Did we talk to this kid.
K:
No. This kid is really, that's a real tough case. He's also very
young.
P:
Well.
K:
Twenty-nine years old, he's sufdenly been elevated, he was a press
officer and he d suddenly becomes a key adviser.
P:
Yeah. I wonder if Thieu can't be so foolish to think that he's going
to that I don't mean what I say.
K:
Oh, no, I've made that again clear to them. I think--
P:
You should also make it clear this afternoon that it is very painful
for me to have to take these positions. But I've never said anything
that I don't mean. Never.
K:
Well, he's going back tomorrow and he'll be talking to Thieu
personally. I believe that by the time we have this settlement
worked out with the North Vietnamese next week, these fellows
are going to come along.
P:
But then, they ought to be on the basis that they--just as soon as
it's worked out that he and I meet, but we meet for the purpose
of our arranging -- for what purpose do we meet? For me to talk
about the commitments?
K:
That's right, and to discuss future of our relations there.
P:
Future of our relations and also to discuss our interpretations of
the agreement.
K:
That's right. That part, of course, couldn't be made public.
P:
Only after we sign it.
K:
That's right.
P:
I know, but I figure the way I interpret the agreement, I think
that's the point you should make. That would be the purpos e of it.
We cannot change it. We'll discuss how we are going to interpretedx
it.
K:
Exactly.
P:
And that's very important. Saigon and the rest--I want to be sure
that Saigon--hell that's all they need to know, like they raise the
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6
point where the agreement doesn't provide for basically trip wires,
God, it's full of trip wires.
K:
It's full of trip wires, that's nonsense.
P:
Henry, let me ask you a question on another subject. Tricia
was talking to Haig and Haig was raising questions about her
including Egypt, Jordan and Israel in their trip because of the
Paris problems, frankly they don't have to go there, they'd like
to - do you think there is a serious problem, do you think they
should not do it?
K:
Well, there isn't one in Israel, but that's a good point about Egypt.
P:
Well, they can't go to Isreel without going to the other. I don't
want them to go to one without the other.
K:
No. They can't go to Israel without going to the Arab countries.
Let me just check with the CIA
P:
Well, I think Haig has done that, but---
K:
I think that is a problem. I don't think we should take a one percent
chance of kidnapping, or--
P:
Well, actually we've told them not to - why don't we just tell them
not
K:
I think it would be better, Mr. President. Jordan would be great
if they wanted to go there, it's a spectacular place anyway. And
that wouldn't have this difficulty.
P:
Okay, byeHenry.
K:
Thank you.
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TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger
6:02, December 1, 1972
P:
Hi Henry.
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Have you had the meeting yet?
K:
Yes, we've just finished it.
P:
I figured it would be an hour too long.
K:
It's tough going.
P:
How does it stand, the same?
K:
Well went over the details of the ceasefire, and that's working
beautifully.
P:
Oh, yes, I know, but that's not a problem.
K:
But then at the end of it I told him about our telephome conversation,
and spoke to him very seriously, and I said to him again it was
something that the Americans have to feel some pride in. He gave
me the same song and dance, that they can't provide the settlement
and they won't sign it and--my impression & is that he hadn't got
any new instructions and he's just repeating his old ones. At any
rate, we haven't picked up any new instructions and we usually get
them.
P:
Well, okay.
K:
I think, Mr. President, we have no cho;ice but to do the very best
we can in Paris next week and then--you've done everything we can.
I mean it's a tragedy.
P:
Anybody else advising--have you talked to Laird.
K:
No, I can't.
P:
Well, I don't know if it would mean much. I wonder if we should
Laird there ostensibly to check the ceasefire?
K:
Well, we can do it. I just don't see how---
P:
Well, my talking to him is one thing--I don't know. I think it's
getting the message through to this fellow himself.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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2
K:
Well--
P:
But, I'm getting the cold turkey message that politically we cannot
wheel the deal unless they want to go along and that's it. Because
if they are going to @&*¢ on it, we are goi;ng to have to turn on
him. It's going to be unpleasant, but we'll just have to do it.
I can't go down to that Congress and say, here they won't sign the
agreement but we want $4 Billion for AID, Henry, it won't work.
K:
Yeah.
P:
As much as we would want it to.
K:
Of course, I think also they are playing chicken with us, Mr.
President. I think--I frankly don't see what Laird can add to
what you've said, and it might give an impression of great in-
security. Nothing could be--I mean, more forceful of more
ominous than you have said, and --
P:
Well, shall I write him another note.
K:
No. I think we ought to ride with where we are now
P:
Uh huh. Well, do you think you'll be down tonight, will you?
K:
Yes. We can think about it and talk about it tomorrow.
P:
Fine. What time will you be in in the morning?
K:
I'll be in tonight. So any time you want me in the morning.
P:
Well, suppose you--you'll be at the 240 house I think, so that will
give you a little security and then you come--suppose we say, what
time do you think you'll be up because I have no problem, I have
nothing on in the morning.
K:
Oh, I'm sure I'll be up by 8:30.
P:
8:30, well, let's say 9:30, how's that?
K:
Fine.
P:
9:30, that give you a little time to sleep in a little, get ready for
the bout next week.
K:
Right.
P:
Well, as a matter of fact, we've gone the extra mile on the thing.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3
I suppose that if you want to regain, our problem is we've got
these guys out on the hook too early, and then had to but how
wete we to know.
K:
That's probably true. Although we got from the North, I think,
what they ever going to give.
P:
Not going to get any more in the way of a settlement, no. Because
they can't give any more than that and survive. They've got a
problem too.
K:
Yeah.
P:
Incidentally, I hope you didn't give to him that backup position that
you think we might try to negotiate.
K:
No, no.
P:
Then sign a separate agreement, or one without **** that what
you have in mind.
K:
Well they will singn a different preamp.
P:
Did I get the preamble?
K:
No, I haven't done that yet.
P:
Well, that's something we can sort of hold in reserve.
K:
Yeah.
P:
And you were through with this the fact that it's going to make
it very difficult to get the aid. I mean, even if they go along
reluctantly it's going to make it tough. How does it stand at the
present time with regard to his meeting me or what have you.
K:
I told them we had to have an answer and he just says he hasn't
any instructions. And I gave him the
P:
Well, look, we are not going to meet him if he's going to be re-
luctant. Dont't you agree?
K:
Absolutely.
P:
On that score, I imagine that we've just got to cold it right out,
because I think that the American people when they see those three
item my only thought is that one call you might make if you've
gotten Agnew yet by any chance?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
K:
No. But I'll call him within the next hour.
P:
Yes.
K:
I have talked to Connally.
P:
Yes, oh you did, good, on that other matter.
K:
Yes.
P:
And so, with regard to Agnew I just want him on board, just tell
him what decision-- if there is any of that whining just say, look,
it's been decided. Will you do that.
K:
Absolutely.
P:
Now the other point is--the only other one is worth talking to is
Laird just so that he reinfores the political judgment on it, you see.
Now, here it is, what is your opinion on the political side.
K:
Right.
P:
Dont' you think so?
K:
Right.
P:
Fine. At our meeting of course, Abrams just sat there like a
clam as usual. Does he ever say anything.
K:
No, he's not the most articulate nor the most heroic guy.
P:
I don't mind the articulate, but I do mind the heroics.
K:
He did the same thing in Saigon. We got him out there, and he
sat there like ta toad, he made one intervention after half an hour
which was slightly off the subject.
P:
I'll be damned. Too bad Haig isn't there now, isn't it.
K:
Yes.
P:
We made a mistake there.
K:
Well, no, we couldn't make him feel--
P:
I know, but yes, we could have. We could do a little--
K:
No, I think he should be made Chairman when Moorer leaves.
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5
P:
Yep, yeah, we jumped him right off.
K:
I think so.
P:
Well, don't get discouraged. My own feeling is that this just one
of those things like the others, that it's really no more difficult
in a sense to me than--we know what is right and we know the
other side is--that's the way it is, we get better as best we can
and we fly.
K:
Exactly.
P:
I think as far as the American people are concerned, most of them
don't give one damn.
K:
Well, Mr. President, if you explain this agreement to the American
people and say they don't come along, and just bleeding hard, we've
done everything we can, we have to go it alone. I think you'll get
very great support.
P:
Well the support will be also to drop him.
K:
Well, that's what I mean.
P:
That's the problem, isn't it?
K:
And it won't be that we have sold out, we have maintained our honor.
It's a disaster.
P:
Well, I can't believe looking at the facsts as they are that he can
allow it to go to that point.
K:
No, or that his colleagues will.
P:
Is Bunker just in his dotage, is that the problem.
K:
Bunker has no real stroke there.
P:
Well I think--
K:
The real problem I think, Mr. President, is that Thieu has no
confidence that he can win a political contest.
P:
I understand.
K:
And therefore, he--
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6
P:
Abrams saw that. He doesn't think he can walk alone.
K:
Therefore he wants to be able--what he needs is unconditional
surrender. A smashing victory. It isn't a victory, it is a com-
promise.
P:
It is a victory. We know that, it's a victory in terms of everything
they've insisted on before.
energegic
K:
Any/leader can play it into a victory. When I went there at the
end of October, this is where--we would welcome this and play
it into a victory.
P:
Paricularly when he was going to stay in power.
K:
That's right. And this is no different from any of the provisions
we've made before. It isn't that--
P:
Well, I think, that--did Buckley come through with a column or
not, are any of these people on our side, are any of them?
K:
Well Alsop did a few weeks ago, Don Rhodes--not very influential
-wrote a very good one today, and Buckley told me he would
write one
P:
Well, get a hold of Joe and tell him he's got to write a tough one.
K:
But Joe's in China, won't be back for a while.
P:
Well get a hold of Jim and tell him he's got to write a tough one.
K:
Okay.
P:
Get Wilson--use your friends.
K:
I think we'll manage it, Mr. President.
P:
Well, we'll see. The main thing is that we'll just continue to go on
and you keep in good shape, get down here and get a good night's
sleep. Incidentally 9:30, if you don't wake up, we'll make it 10:00.
K:
Right.
P:
We'll say between 9:30 and 10:00 o'clock. Bye, Henry.
K:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Roy Jenkins/Mr. Kissinger
7:55 p.m., December 1, 1972
K:
How are you? How nice to hear from you.
J:
How nice of you to call back. I'm very well. How are you?
K:
You always come when I'm in a crisis.
J:
You're in a crisis are you?
K:
[Laughter] No, no, I mean --
J:
You've been in one for some time.
K:
Last time you were here was during the India/Pakistan uproar.
J:
I was indeed and we dined at the Bruces.
K:
Yeah.
J:
You're going away I imagine on Monday, are you?
K:
Sunday. But you'll be up here next week -- down here next weekend
won't you?
J:
I'm going to be down here next weekend. Would you be back by then?
K:
Well, If I'm not, I'll be in deep trouble.
J:
Well, I hope very much I might see you then. I tell you what -- I called
because I had a word with David Bruce in London last week.
K:
Yes.
J:
And asked him what he thought and he said he had spoke to me since
I last called you and I hadn't seen the President for about 2 1/2 years.
K:
Yes.
J:
And I wondered whether there was any chance of having a short talk
with him. I would more or. less like to.talk to him about how he sees
some
policy now in relation with the EC.
K:
Well, and that would be during the period that you are down here.
the
J:
Well, I would in / normal way be down from Friday evening until
Sunday evening next week.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 2 -
Roy Jenkins/Mr. Kissinger
7:55 p. m., December 1, 1972
K:
Yes.
J:
And, of course, I would come down especially during the week if
that were easier for him.
K:
Yes. Well, let me raise it with him. He's for all practical purposes
in retreat right now.
J:
I know it. It's not an easy time and
K:
No, but I think he should see you. How long will you be in the
country?
J:
I'll be in the country until next Sunday night. That's 9 days from now.
I
I must fly back to London on the quarter of eight o'clock plane on
Sunday night.
K:
Well, let me see what I can do.
J:
Sunday week night. And obviously if one could do it the weekend when
I'm in Washington, that would be better but equally I would come down.
K:
Well, I will see what I can do.
J:
But I haven't seen him for nearly three years and would like to very
much. Particularly on this particular aspect at the present time.
Thank you very much.
K:
Right. He's not at this moment focusing on substance as much as
he will in another week or so.
J:
No, quite. No, he's focussing on appointments.
K:
Exactly.
J:
But I hope very muc h it's possible to see you.
K:
Oh, certainly Yes, I've planned on.
J:
Good. Look forward very much then. And I'll be here at this
number, which you got in New York City. Except I go away tomorrow
night to stay with the Harrimans in the country for 24 hours.
K:
Good.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 3 -
Roy Jenkins/Mr. Kissinger
7:55 p.m., December 1, 1972
J:
From tomorrow morning till Sunday afternoon.
K:
Good. Well, I will of course be gone most of next week.
J:
Right. Okay. Well, thank you very much.
K:
But I'll leave word though.
J:
Thank you so much.
K:
Right. Bye.
J:
Bye.
wgh
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Jerry Sche cter/Mr. Kissinger
8:00 p. m., December 1, 1972
S:
Henry.
K:
They're naming a street after me in Saigon.
S:
[Laughter]
K:
Did you know that?
S:
Ah -- Where? That's great! That's great. Well, the Editors in
their ultimate wisdom and judgment have decided to name the President
and you as men of the year.
K:
Jointly?
S:
Yeah.
K:
O-h-h-h-h-h.
S:
Yeah, really!
K:
Well, I didn't really want this job after all.
S:
[Laughter] I think we can do it --
K:
Can you sort of make my picture infinitesimal?
S:
[Laughter] Well, we'll as you say, we'll do it with dignity and --
K:
Can I be on a horse?
S:
[Laughter] Oh, you're terrific. Yeah, I think so. Riding into the
sunset.
K:
I can tell you -- as I told you yesterday or as I told somebody
yesterday -- there's one part of a horse's anatomy that'I've learned
very well here.
I thought that was
S:
[Laughter] Yeah,
!
a pretty quick recovery there. Well, I
K:
Well, I appreciate it. You know, I'm very flattered; it isn't going to
help me here but -- to put it mildly.
S:
Well, I talked with Ron and Hugh talked with Ron and I guess he'll --
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 2 -
Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger
8:00 p.m., December 1, 1972
K:
Have you talked to Ron already?
S:
Yeah.
K:
What does he say?
S:
[Laughter] Well, --
K:
What does he say, good
?
S:
Huh?
K:
He said we didn't like him anyway.
S:
[Laughter] No, --
K:
What did Ron really say?
S:
Well, just between us, huh?
K:
Yes, of course.
S:
Well, you know, he thinks that there's only one man over in his
White House and you know, it doesn't quite put the thing in the right
perspective. I explained to him that --
K:
You know, I would prefer that too.
S:
I explained to him that, you know, that you two are the most exciting
combination and that also the cover would deal with the President's
re-election and his victory and the domestic reasons behind it but it
would also deal with your relationship and, you know, how he has given
you his proxy and some things but, you know, it would make it clear that
he's the President and you're his adviser but it would also go into the
whole range of foreign policy and issues throughout the year and China,
Russia, and/Vietnam the peace thing, that's really the story of the year.
And the two of you in combination together is really what's changed things
this year.
K:
Yeah. Well, I'm flattered, Jerry, but it would make my life easier
if it weren¹t.
S:
Yeah. I'm not unaware of the --
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 3 -
Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger
8:00 p.m., December 1, 1972
K:
It's going to make my life unshirted hell.
S:
No, it won't really.
K:
Can you at least write the goddamn thing to make my subordinate
position clear?
S:
Yes, sir, really. I mean, that will be very clear. And that's really
why I wanted to get to you because I know - - I just thought that if I could
assure you and reassure you that it's going to be done in a tasteful and
dignified way which I hope expresses --
K:
Look, I'm enormously flattered and pleased but you know the atmosphere
it courts --
S:
Yes, sir. Well, [laughter] -- I think we'll be able to work it out and
there will be a letter coming down from Krunwald (sp?) I think that will
explain, you know, just exactly how we see this to make it clear that
it's the President who is after all the decision-maker and policy- maker
and as you say, your position is subordinate to his.
K:
Right.
S:
But it's still a very exciting relationship.
K:
Oh, it's a, you know, good relationship.
S:
I think that's what we want to emphasize and talk about it in terms of,
you know, how you've carried out his policy.
K:
Well, I guess I better give another interview to put things in perspective.
S:
[Laughter] Well, I hope we'll get a chance to talk at some point later
on, huh?
K:
Right.
S:
Good. Thanks a lot.
K:
Okay. Are you going to be over there next week?
S:
Yes, sir.
K:
Good. Well, I'll see you then.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 4 -
Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger
8:00 p. m., December 1, 1972
S:
Good. Thanks a lot, Henry.
K:
Bye.
S:
And really rest assured, I think we can do it in a way that I think
everybody's pleased.
K:
Good.
S:
Okay.
K:
Bye.
wgh.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Hedley Donovan/Mr. Kissinger
8:30 p.m., December 1, 1972
K:
Hedley, sorry to bother you.
D:
Very well.
K:
I had a call from Jerry Schecter who told me that Time is going to make
the President and me joint men of the year.
D:
We've talked about that some, yes.
K:
And while I'm really extremely flattered, I think anything that could be
done to avoid that honor would really help me enormously.
D:
[Laughter]
K:
You know, it's rather delicate relationship.
D:
Oh-h-h.
K:
I don't know whether that's a proper request to make.
a
D:
Well, it's proper point to register but I'll have to reserve some thought
about it. I have to confess to you I'm the originator of the thought.
K:
[Laughs] Well, I'm touched by it, Hedley. I really am very touched by
it. I think it will create a very complex situation here and that is before
I've talked to anybody. I don't know what their view is.
D:
I'm sorry, Henry, what?
K:
That is before I have talked to anybody. I mean, no one has mentioned
it to me.
D:
No.
K:
But I have a pretty good estimate of what the impact will be.
D:
Well, I think it's quite an accurate statement.
K:
Well, I'm in no position to judge that. I'm more thinking of what it will
do to my future usefulness.
D:
Well, I'm not sure I share that point of view.
K:
Well, maybe on the outside. On the outside probably not.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 2 -
Hedley Donovan/Mr. Kissinger
8:30 p.m., December 1, 1972
D:
No, no, no, no; I don't think that.
K:
Well, I think you understand my point, Hedley.
D:
Oh, I do but I also think that the President takes great pride in your
presence in his company and performances with some reason.
K:
Well, I have not had a chance -- You know, I don't know what his reaction
is or will be. I don't even know whether he knows about it.
D:
I'm not sure that he does either.
K:
But all of my immediate colleagues who know about it think that his pride
has limites, if it takes that form.
D:
He had it last year.
K:
I beg your pardon.
D:
He had it last year.
K:
Yeah.
D:
To the extent that he would be a very logical candidate this year. You're
so intermingled with that --
K:
Well, I'm not, you know --
D:
appeal to the idea of the both.
K:
Hedley, I'm sure you've never had this sort of request before.
D:
Well, perhaps once before. [Laughter]
K:
Well, I want you to know that I'm really very flattered but that if it should
transpire that he would be the sole man of the year, I would not be offended.
D:
No, I'm sure you would not be,
K:
To put it mildly. Indeed I would be much relieved.
D:
How would you feel about the other way?
K:
Oh, no; that would now be impossible.
D:
[Laughter]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 3 -
Hedley Donovan/Mr. Kissinger
8:30 p.m., December 1, 1972
K:
I don't know how I could disavow it but I would have --
D:
it is not up to you.
K:
Humm?
D:
Fortunately, it is not up to you.
K:
Yeah. No, the other way would really be very painful.
D:
Well, the press is notoriously irresponsible.
K:
Well, I think I've made my point. It's not really a decision that I can
make.
D:
The best way to get off, which I hope doesn't happen, is for the
settlement not to be wrapped up.
K:
[Laughter] Well, you've given me an idea!
D:
[Laughter]
K:
Okay.
D:
I'm sure your sense of public interest will rise above that,
K:
Well, I'll tell you I carried it beyond the election but it's --
D:
Yep, you did.
K:
No, I think we -- Unless both Vietnamese parties take leave of their
senses completely, we really ought to wrap it up now.
D:
Yeah. Well, it would be wonderful.
K:
It's just too close.
D:
It must be desired.
K:
Yeah, well, we're down to really issues that are so small compared
to what we started with.
D:
Oh, yeah.
K:
That it's almost, you know, it would be one of these tragic jokes almost
if it failed now. Well, I don't expect that.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 4 -
Hedley Donovan/Mr Kissinger
8:30 p. m., December 1, 1972
D:
now, Henry.
K:
I don't think it will happen. In fact, we have to bring both of them
along simultaneously and that takes a little time.
D:
Yeah.
K:
Good, Hedley. Let me know when you next come down.
D:
I will. Thank you for calling, Henry.
K:
[Laughter] Thank you for the thought!
D:
We'll take it under advisement.
K:
Good.
Thank you.
D:
Right.
Bye, bye.
wgh
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telcon
11:50 p.m. 12-6-72
Kennedy/ "D"
K: Hello.
D: Yes, Good Evening sir.
K: Good evening sir, how are you? I am sorry to be troubling you
again.
D: Well, that is alright.
K: We seem to do all our business at night. Sir, 1 have another message
which Henry wanted me to give to you. Can I read it so you can write
it down?
D: Is it a long one?
K: Well, not too long, a little bit.
At this point Col Kennedy dictated HAKTO 18 to D as follows:
BEGIN QUOTE:
At tomorrow's session both sides are committed to presenting their
minimum requirements. It is now obvious that Hanoi will attempt to
extract major changes for any changes which the U.S. seeks. They invariably
react in an extremely imbalanced way to require modifications which alter
the fundamental character of the agreement. Nevertheless the U.S. must
achieve the following rick-bottom alterations:
(1) obtain the proper Vietnamese phasse for "administrative structure."
(2) Provide for the establishment of a target date of three months for
the demobilization provision to provide the period during which the parties
will do their utmost to resolve this question. This will make this provision
parallel to the ones covering the other tasks included in paragraphs 8 (c)
(South Vietnamese prisoners) and 12 (a) (resolution of the political problems.)
(3) Provision of some reference in the agreement which relates to the
integrity of the territories of North and South Vietnam or establishes the
principle of the non-use of force between the North and South during the
post-settlement period.
(4) Provide for the implementation of a ceasefire in Laos within 10 days
vice 30 days.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
The above are the rock-bottom U.S. positions. Failure to achieve
any of them must result in the termination of the talks. These are a
drastically distilled final position which is unalterable and cannot be
subject to modification. Nor can we accept counterbalancing changes
demanded by the other side which fundamentally modify other features
of the agreement.
END QUOTE:
K:
Now lot me see If I can check that 30 days business.
D:
And I will read this back for myself, okay. I will just read
through.
[pause]
K:
Hello
D:
Pm just reading for myself, just once again with out loud,
because out loud I don't understand what I am reading.
[pause]
When is It are they to presenting their views, ahh, this is
position
either point, or be does it for observations.
I don't understand it, the first sentence.
25:
K:
Both sides are committed to presenting their minimum require-
ments ?
D:
Yes, that means that either one to present their minimum
requirements, or Menry does have some reservations?
K:
No, I think he is saying this, that each will do this.
D:
Oh, they agree that one. [pause]
Yes, I read it. Well quite frankly I could do this way. # Except
for number one, all that we will discuss with me -- for me and
for my government we'll do the completely in your paragraph.
1 don't think that for you as much as
a problem or not.
But we can discuss this paragraph with
* Eb--
K:
Except for the first one.
D:
Yes, so for me a new one in this sense that I must prepare to
even give a command because I have to look in
and look how they are. We can discuss with him the phrase.
So I give for my government on anything but
We discussed as I mentioned to you fourth paragraph.
K:
Yes, the four points.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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3
D:
Also, reasons - there really is only one. Just one and very
indirect way it is paragraph 2 bothers. But it all accounts
with
You see It in a different context.
K:
Yes.
D:
So, my present reservations, of course I will report to my
government what you just mention for them to know. Second
I am sure It will be rather difficult for them to act on this
particular message because neithers they nor I know anything
specific, I should say, because they have to consult. And
they will be in touch with
.
It is more difficult.
Because on a
something at this stage, everything
was clear, I got remind them what was told by Henry and they
already knew everything by heart.
K:
Yes,
D:
This is a little bit more complicated you see, You understand
now we are in at discussion of the questions we didn't even discuss
with you at all.
K:
Yes.
D:
I would like you to understand with Henry.
M
Yes.
D:
1 promise to send It to Moscow but on the other hand it will be
much more difficult for my leaders to Micht look now because
for them this particular paragraph will be different. Pm sure
they give it special
They will give a new one.
K:
Uh huh.
D:
This is a second observation and if you would rather, we can
discuss all the things with them. Henry promised to me not
to give them any difficult.
And this looks morelike
a
really. It is more important for out with communi-
cations with Hanoi to
demand all these, But I
don't know how my government will settle this subject, the last
one. But I promise I will send to Moscow right away.
K:
All right, sir.
D:
And in any case, now in Paris it is 8 o'clock--in Moscow I mean.
What I will write them, send them, they will refuse on the grounds
Noon, At noon in Paris It will be 2 hours difference, it will be
10 o'clock.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
K:
Yes.
D:
It will be less than four hours. We can't soon do anything
in four hours to communicate with Hanol, because we have
write and receive It here. They each other write cables.
So, I put It this way, it is my personal observation, I will
do second give them the major things, the third one now
Henry will patiently, both of them,
This is the situation as I look realistically. For me MMMMMX
yes I say, I will send this off. It is not so easy for me to act
on this one, on this particular last message. I sure It will be
very helpful for them to understand in Moscow what the situation
now is really concentrate, because now--up to now, there was
really rather feeling about the fourth paragraph as the major
one, and they consider it, and may make rather a new one,
They may say the same demand but a little differently way.
It's now easy to compare it right now
So this is kind of difficult as I am sure you understand.
K:
Yes.
D:
This message, really, I will send is immediately and hope
everything is all right.
Rather I should say in general in all the details I'm not sure,
a little bit personally, you know sometimes it is better to sit
down and discuss them.
K:
Yes.
D:
On this four, they discuss all, including the top men. Now
it is at new one thing. So 1 hope he will look, but he may not.
Tomorrow-- is is not easy--give them time to look and time
to get into Hanoi, but immediately. I do hope that they will
find on the basis of what we discussed, that they will find out.
But I will send this right away. This I promise,
Keep in touch tomorrow, okay.
K:
Thank you.
D:
Bye, bys.
K:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger
2:03, December 14, 1972
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Henry, Hi. I have, there's no urgency in time because I
am working on a lot of year end inaugural stuff and so forth,
but Id like to another round with you and Al some time this
afternoon.
K:
Right. We'll be over in about ten minutes.
P:
Any time, shall we say 2:30. That'll give me a little more
time.
K:
We'll be there at 2:30.
P:
Fine, is that a good time.
K:
We'll be there at 2:30.
P:
Is that a good time?
K:
Fine, we are seeing Dobrynin at 3:00, I'll delay him until
3:30.
P:
No, no, 2:30 is fine, and we'll call him and delay him at the
time.
K:
Right.
P:
Okay.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TelCon
Taft Schreiber/Mr. Kissinger
3:33, December 14, 1972
K:
Hello.
S:
Welcome home.
K:
Thank you Taft.
S:
I am happy you are back. Are you going to come out here
the following week with the President? I understand he's
scheduled it the 21st or the 20th.
K:
If you came on the 21st, I'd come the day after Christmas.
S:
Uh huh. Then I'll miss you because I am going to be--I'm
leaving for Hawaii on the 26th. I going to try to get a couple
of week's rest. But what I was calling about was that I thought
if I would see you that week, I'd like to set up a date for you
to meet with Lew.
K:
Well, I'd be glad to do that.
S:
You know, you've been reading the papers and everything,
things are steaming, and I'll pro#bably talk to you tomorrow
or over the weekend or something when we can have a little
talk. I know this is not the time. But if--you may be getting
freed up sooner than anybody thinks.
K:
Well, I'll be glad to talk to him. I'll almost certainly be
there the week of the 21st.
S:
Oh, that's perfect. Then I'll more or less sound with him and
have you both. get in touch. And then probably over the weekend-.
I can reach you through the switchboard, can't I.
K:
Always.
S:
And you can try to call me back or something on my line.
K:
Of course.
S:
Fine. Well, I'll be in touch with you.
K:
Marvelous, Taft.
S:
Take care. I'm glad that you are home and hope everything is
Fine.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
K:
Everything is going along good.
S:
That's great. Thank you, Henry.
K:
Bye.
S:
Bye, bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TelCon
Vice President/Mr. Kissinger
7:32, December 14, 1972
VP:
Hello.
K:
Mr. Vice President.
VP:
Hello, Henry.
K:
How are you?
VP:
All right.
K:
I wanted to call you to apologize for having kept you standing
by all week long.
VP:
Well, Mike told me that things had washed.
K:
It looks that way, yes. But what I would like to do is come
by tomorrow at some point and brief you about where we
stand.
VP:
All right. Why don't you--what time are you going to be
available in the office and I'll give you a call when I see
what my schedule is.
K:
Well, I'll be available--the best for me would be in the
afternoon.
VP:
All right. All right I'll call you in the morning and we'll
make the arrangements.
K:
Good, excellent, Mr. Vice President.
VP:
All right, fine. See you then. Bye.
K:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Marilyn Berger (Wash. Post)/Mr. Kissinger
9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972
K:
Hello
B:
Henry.
K:
The delicatessen is to the left of the Imperial Palace.
B:
I'm glad to know that. Welcome Home.
K:
Thank you.
B:
Isn't it incredible?
K:
How did you get the visa? I thought I had prevented it.
B:
What did you say?
like
K:
Well, I told them that we don't really/it. Are you going alone?
B:
Well, what happened was the National Committee on U.S. China relations
has a group going. Epstein, Luce, Pye (sp?), Scallopino, Barnett --
K:
Yeah.
B:
The letter came across my desk saying that they were going so I asked
if I could apply to cover their trip and the paper said, oh, hell; go ahead.
And thunder struck; they came through and said I could cover the trip in
part but to do general reporting as well.
K:
Isn't that marvelous.
B:
And I am the first reporter from the Washington Post --
K:
I know, they hate the Washington Post.
B:
Just like everybody else around here. As Epstein said, I don't know if it
will be to your advantage or disadvantage but the Washington Post has a
reputation for being anti-Administration.
K:
[Laughter]
B:
When I was up in Ottawa, they asked me all about the Post. I was up there
yesterday. In any case, they gave me a very generous visa as far as time
is concerned.
K:
How long are you going to be there?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 2 -
Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger
9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972
B:
Well, they said three weeks but they gave me a three-month visa.
K:
How long are you going to plan to be there?
B:
Well, I'm planning on three weeks for starters.
K:
Yeah.
B:
But I hope I'll be there when you make peace, that's the exciting part.
K:
Yeah, yeah.
B:
I think that's the time to be there. In fact, yesterday when I was up in
Ottawa, they kept stressing that it was only Vietnam that was preventing
better relations and they made Taiwan totally secondary.
K:
Yeah, that's true.
B:
How are things? I have not followed since a couple of days ago what you've
been up to?
K:
Marilyn, I called you out of friendship.
B:
Oh, all right. I'm really not -
K:
To tell you how pleased I am that you are going
B:
I'm taking off very early tomorrow morning so I'm not --
K:
In fact, if you would only once have a drink with me without pestering me
with questions, I'd even see you. You are the most relentless questioner that
I know.
B:
Would you like to come over and have a drink and talk to me about China?
K:
I can't do it tonight.
B:
[Laughter]
K:
[Laughter]] Where do you live? I can't come but tell me where you live.
B:
About two minutes from your house.
K:
Where do you live?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 3 -
Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger
9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972
B:
25th & Q. I enter the Parkway about two minutes from where your house
is.
K:
Oh, yeah.
B:
I have a P Street entrance. It's that row of apartment houses in Georgetown.
K:
Oh, yeah, yeah.
B:
You do live on Waterside Drive don't you?
K:
That's right, yes.
B:
For the times you are there. Is there anything in particular that is needed
knowing about China at this point that you feel should --
K:
Just remember that they are terribly subtle.
B:
Yes.
K:
And you don't have to hammer away at them the way you do at slower minds
like me.
B:
You pick on me!
K:
[Laughter]
B:
I really ask you direct questions because I don't understand you when you are
being uh --
K:
No, but I mean for your own good, if you see any of their top people -- those
are the only ones I know -- I mean, do it more allusively; don't do it like
a District Attorney.
B:
You know, I really am very embarrassed. You make me sound like such
a hard driving dame, which I don't think I am.
K:
No, no; I think you are basically very soft-hearted but you have a very good
mind and you don't take any baloney.
B:
Well, somebody said I'm going to be the secret weapon for the U.S. to get
something out of there. I don't know, I'm just -- I think Chou En-lai has to
be the world's great, great man in this day.
K:
Oh, he's terrific. I don't know whether you will see him -- Oh, I think you'll
see him. He'll --
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 4 -
Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger
9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972
B:
Well, if I'm with that group, I might.
K:
Oh, yeah, yeah. And he's a great fellow.
B:
And it's going to be New Year's Eve. My goodness -- where are you?
We have a terrible connection.
K:
I'm in my office.
B:
Oh, I wonder if I'm supposed to ask that.
K:
No, I'm in my office.
B:
I'm very hesitant to ask questions.
K:
[Laughter]
B:
You scare me.
K:
Will you call me when you get back?
B:
Of course.
K:
And I really wish you a great time. I'll read what you write with great
interest.
B:
Well, I wish you'd tell me what I -- Look, if anything happens on the
Vietnam thing --
K:
I'll think of you with nostalgia.
B:
I'm interested in, you know, seeing what they tell their people about what
happened on Vietnam.
K:
Well, I pray something will happen while you're there.
B:
Well, do it for me, Henry, if not for anyone else.
K:
Listen, at this stage, I have to do it for me or I'll lose my mind. You know,
when you meet with two groups of Vietnamese in the same day, you might
as well run an insane asylum.
B:
[Laughter]
K:
Because both of them have the worse combinations of confusionism and
French Cartesianism. Not a touch of relationship to reality. They'll tell
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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TELCON
- 5 -
Marily n Berger/Mr. Kissinger
9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972
K:
(cont'd) you it's logical and in fact -- this is not for publication.
B:
Um-humm.
K:
One evening I met the South Vietnamese and I did a parity, or what I
thought was a parity of the Le Duc Tho speech and it sounded perfectly
rational to them and they said, "Well, that's it; that's the way you have
to handle them. And we know how to do it." [Laughter]
B:
[Laughter] Well, you know, I'm just reading Dick Solomon's book
on the Chinese mind. It's a fascinating book. Have you read it?
K'
No.
B:
I didn't figure you would have had the time. But I think it's preparing me
for something although I don't know what.
K:
Oh, the Chinese though are much more subtle, much more elegant.
B:
Oh, they're marvelous. Even the few that I've met are marvelous.
K:
Oh, the Chinese are tremendous.
B:
You know, I feel they're as different from the, for example, there was
one man who looked a little bit like Hav En-lai (sp?) and I thought they are
as different from the North Vietnamese as the North Vietnamese are from
the South Vietnamese.
K:
More, more.
B:
And I know a delightful people. I'm afraid the same thing that happened
Alsop is going to happen to me.
K:
A great sense of humor. Oh, yes; if they want to.
B:
Yeah. Well, they really needn't be afraid of me; that's the point.
K:
Oh, you'll fix that.
B:
Oh, come on! There you go again.
K:
[Laughter] Marilyn, I really look forward to seeing you when you come
back.
B:
Is there anything I ought to look for as far as information on foreign policy
or anything of that sort?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
9 I I
Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger
9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972
K:
Marilyn, you don't look; they give you.
B:
Yeah.
K:
Yo u can't just run around and dig. That's not Washington.
B:
No, but I mean, I might ask a proper question at some point.
K:
Well, just use your instinct.
B:
[Laughter] I was told not to do that.
K:
Just use your instinct and a little restraint.
B:
[Laughter] Well, --
K:
Drop me a postcard, will you?
B:
I shall. But I wish you absolutely the best of luck on this other thing
because -- By the way, you said you'll lose your mind. Murray when I
used to say, "Murray, we're going to have Peace. 11 He would say,
"If we don't, I'm going to take the window instead of the elevator. "
K:
[Laughter] I feel the same way SO?
B:
Well, when Murray gets optimistic, I know things are all right. You saw
his piece today?
K:
No. I've got to read it.
B:
It was in the trend of the ones I was writing while he was away.
K:
Good, I'll read it later.
B:
I hope you don't make a liar out of me.
K:
Oh, we'll do our best
B:
I appreciate your calling back.
K:
Okay. Have a good trip. I'm delighted for you.
B:
I am too. Thanks very much.
K:
Bye.
B:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger
9:30 p.m, December 14, 1972
S:
Henry, how are you?
K:
Okay.
S:
Good. The only reason I wanted to call is I talked with Ron today.
K:
Yeah. What did he say?
S:
Well, he said he was going to talk to the President tonight or tomorrow
morning and then he was also going to talk to you. And he said that you
would have to decide what you wanted to do. I naturally told him that I
thought that it would be nice if everybody in the White House from the top
down sort of encouraged us on this project. And he said that he would try
to help.
K:
Yeah. Okay, I'll talk to him tomorrow.
S:
Okay. Are you going to talk to all of us tomorrow?
K:
T omorrow or Saturday.
S:
I see. How are you feeling?
K:
Right now I feel exhausted.
S:
I'll bet, I'll bet. I don't know how you do it because I'm feeling that way
too and I didn't go through what you went through.
K:
Well, if it all comes out all right, it will all be worth it.
S:
Yeah. Well, I hope so.
K:
And if it doesn't, you'll drop me from your cover so it will be even more
worth it.
S:
Oh, come on.
K:
[Laughter]
S:
Come on now. [Laughter] We have some scruples you know.
K:
No, Hedley Donovan told me the only way I could get off the cover is to screw
up these negotiations.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 2 -
Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger
9:30 p.m., December 14, 1972
S:
Yeah. Well, I'm sure you wouldn't do that.
K:
So he's given me an idea. No.
S:
No. [Laughter] That's too high a price to pay.
K:
I agree with you. No, actually, Jerry, the thing that I find most touching
is that -- You know, there is basically an adversary relations between the
press and officials but I really think all you guys are pulling for us.
S:
Well, we are.
K:
No, I know it. I really feel it.
B
S:
ut I must say, boy; -- Well, there have been lots of dirty tricks in the
last couple of weeks.
K:
By whom?
S:
I don't know. I mean, I was looking at that Helms
today and --
K:
That Helms what?
S:
Well, you know, that story that was leaked about Helms and then --
K:
Yeah, but there wasn't an iota of truth in it.
S:
I know but -- Well, that's beside the point now.
[Laughter]
K:
What else?
S:
Well, this whole business about the Oriana Fallaci interview, which at
some point we've got to discuss. There have been a lot of smoke about that.
K:
Well, well, you know, what is inherently improbable in that interview is --
after all, I have a record of giving interviews for four and a half years
without making a total utter ass of myself.
S:
[Laughter] Right.
K:
Why would I have done it with her?
S:
She sure --
K:
She sure killed me.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 3 -
Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger
9:30 p.m., December 14, 1972
S:
[Laughter] Yeah. Well, maybe we can correct the record on some of that.
K:
You know, I think the most merciful thing about that one is to forget it.
S:
[Laughter] Yeah, yeah.
K:
Okay, Jerry.
S:
Okay, great. Listen, Henry, one thing -- At some point we've got to get
together because I have been getting a lot of stuff from a lot of people
including some stuff from the Vietnamese now about how they say the talks
went, you know.
K:
What do they say?
S:
Well, they've got a whole version about your meeting with Thieu and the
cables back and forth to Hanoi and you know, Haig's meeting with Thieu
and that whole thing.
K:
With Thieu?
S:
Yeah.
K:
Which Vietnamese, the North or South?
S:
No, this is the South Vietnamese.
K:
What do they say?
S:
Well, I've got a whole kind of detailed thing.
K:
Well, there's one version that I saw somewhere that I kept interrupting him.
S:
[Laughter] This one has some juicier stuff than that in it.
K:
Like what?
S:
Well, you know, about when you let him see the draft.
K:
What about when I let him see the draft?
S:
Well, I mean, they say you wouldn't show him the draft.
K:
Well, that's just a blatant lie. When I had it? When I came there?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
4 ! I
Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger
9:30 p.m., December 14, 1972
S:
Well, no, they say it took two days before you got the draft and then he
held it for two days and then there was --
K:
When I got there?
S:
No, not when you got there. That when you got there, I don't know whether
you didn't have -- The way they say it, is that you didn't show it to them.
K:
That's a flat total lie.
He got it within an hour of my getting there
S:
Well, that's what this thing has.
K:
Well, look, for that we have 25 witnesses. Hell, we went over the whole
draft the next morning at an NSC meeting -- at a Vietnamese NSC meeting.
And it isn't true that he held it because all the members of the NSC had it.
I mean, that's not something that can be discussed, that's a fact.
S:
Well, okay. I mean, that's great.
K:
Look, Bunker will confirm this.
S:
Listen, Henry, I don't --
K:
Abrams will confirm this.
S:
All I need is you. I mean, I've got -- You know, I am in a position where
I have nothing to work on and I've got -- I mean, I don't pick this stuff up
on the street. These guys presumably, you know -- I mean, they don't have
all the details to say the least. But look, I don't want to -- I know you are
exhausted and I just --
K:
Who puts that out? State?
S:
No, no.
K:
The Vietnamese?
S:
Yeah. But at some point before all this gets away from us, I would like
to talk to you if I could.
K:
Okay.
S:
Okay.
K:
Right.
Nice to talk to you. Bye.
S:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
9:43 a.m. 12/15/72
Kay Graham/Mr. Kissinger
HK:
Hello ?
KG:
Hello, Henry.
HK:
Kay, you're trying to ruin me.
KG:
Oh listen, I am trying to be discreet, I left word that it was Mary
Smith.
HK:
Immediately when your name is announced the power in my phone goes
off.
KG:
(Laughing) Static--how are you Henry?
HK:
I'm doing fine.
KG:
What I wanted to say is that this is the quiet weekend at
anyway
for Mary, Donny and me and if: it in anyway suits you alone or with
Nancy I would urge you.
HK:
Aren't you nice. How far is it?
KG:
It's 50 miles and an hour in driving.
HK:
Maybe we'll come down Sunday
KG:
Marvelous
HK:
Can I call you?
KG:
No- - Donny and I are going to the football game alone which may suit
you and may not, maybe you'd rather see somebody-- if you'd rather
see somebody, I'll invite somebody, if you don't want to see somebody
I won't--I urge you Henry to
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
9:45 a.m. - 12/15/72
Kay Graham/Mr. Kissinger
K: Immediately when you name is mentioned the power in my phone
goes off.
G: Henry, how are you.
K: I'm doing fine.
G: What I wanted to say was my -- and this is the quiet weekend at
Glen Elby -- if it anyway for Mary, Donna and me, and if you
aren't alone with Nancy, I would urge you.
K: Aren't you nice. How far is it?
G: It's 50 miles. About an hour.
K: Maybe we'll come down Sunday. Can I call you?
G: Donny and I are going to the football game on Sunday, so it may
suit you and it may not. I don't know. May be you'd rather see
somebody, I'll invite someone. If you don't want to see someone,
I won't. urge you Henry. You could bring her down Saturday night.
Just because it makes a much more restful thing to drive down and
back, I'd love to have you, but it's not as much a rest. If you have
to bring
I'll put him up.
K: Yes, unfortunately I do.
G: It's all right, he can stay.
K: Do you think I could take a White House helicopter to your place.
G: You could really you know.
K: That would go over very well -- order a helicopter to Kay Graham's.
G: Oh yes. I'm told there is a rumor I want you to know that is
going up and down the eastern seaboard. This may sound as if I'm
kidding, but I'm not. But the reason Pete got fired was that he had been the
(laughter, not understandable). I thought this was a joke because
someone told me this from the Ford Foundation. Board meeting, you
know, and I think
my cousin who was there and then Bob told me
and I said, Bob, they must have been kidding. He said that it is a
serious rumor.
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K: Well, on that basis, I should be out a long time ago.
G: Yes, and so should Elliot Richardson who was there with him, so I
don't think it's quite true.
K: Well, I don't believe that's true.
G: Well, listen, one thing is that you don't need to tell me.
K: Well, I'll call you tomorrow and let you know.
G: What I suggest to you is that if you could come down whenever you
are free Saturday, you must be free for 24 hours. I think you'd
have a little bit of a rest. And we'll all go to bed like 9:30 or 10:00
or whatever you like, or we'll have a little chat, or watch a movie
on television, or do nothing.
K: You're terriffic, I'll call you tomorrow, or tonight.
G: All right, anytime. If you come, I'll need to know how many there
are.
you, Nancy, and a dick, or more.
K: I think maybe two dicks. They take care of themselves. There is a
town nearby, isn't there.
G: Well, no. They'll have to stay in the house and I can just stick them
in the children's rooms and I don't think they'd bother you.
K: How will I get you?
G: The Post can ring me. Or the number down there is 703-EM4-3141.
But also the Post rings direct.
K: Many thanks, Kay. You're a good friend as always. Use a different
name when you call me.
G: Yes. Morrie Smith from now on. I have a new friend in your office
now anyway.
K: Oh, yes, I know Julie Pineau. Well Henry told me and you were
pumping her for information.
G: Oh, yes. She has a lot I wanted.
have
K: She does/a lot, but she won't give it to you.
G:
She's charming and beautiful and a great addition.
K: She's a great girl.
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3
K: She's marvelous, and so beautifyl, Henry.
G: It's unfair
K: It is unfair, but I never play with girls who work for me. It takes
great restrain.
G: By that definition, you should fire her immediately.
K: Okay, we'll consider that.
G: Okay, well, whenever you call, fine.
K: Many thanks, Kay, bye.
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11:30 a.m. - 12/15/72
Director Helms/Mr. Kissinger
H: Good morning, Henry, how are you?
K: Okay, Dick, I guess I taught you that the price of disagreeing with
me.
H: I'm glad your sense of humor is in good form, this morning.
K: The two members of the Administration for whom I had personal
effects and have gotten fired. You haven't gotten fired but it's
really ironical. I spent my time in Paris being quoted on the
record, but then nobody would use about my
that
you'
re
the
best professional intelligence person I know, and, well, you know
what happened.
H: Oh, sure, sure.
K: You know that you've stayed three years longer than the intentions.
K:
H: Yes, I think that's right. My sould is at peace. /Look, I had a
talk with the President yesterday about your role in your new job,
and also I want to talk with you about somethings we are thinking of
doing. And I wondered if you could come over to see me at your
convenience today. What's a good time for you? Is 2:30 possible?
H: Well, let me see. I've got a meeting in Erhlichman's office at
3:30. How long would this take do you think?
K: Oh, about a half an hour.
H: Suppose, do you think I could see you at 3:00?
K: I was going to see the Vice President at 3:00 but I'll see if I can
shift him to 3:30, then you should come at 3:00. But you and I
should not need more than a half an hour.
H: I'll look forward to seeing you then, but if that is not possible, I'll
come earlier.
K: Good.
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11:42 a. m. - December 15, 1972
Ron Ziegler/Dr. Kissinger
K:
You want to come over here?
Z:
No, we'll cover it on the phone briefly. I'm going to say you
met with the President for two hours this morning. Right? And
K
I'm going to say that you have met with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs and also with the Secretary of State. When did you?
K:
Yesterday afternoon.
Z:
Anyone else?
K:
Secretary Laird. I had breakfast with him this morning, and
I'm seeing the Vice President this afternoon and Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Z:
Can I say CI (?)
K:
Yeah.
Z:
Okay, now I'm going to say that Henry will probably be available
for matters relating to negotiations in the near future -- I can't
say exactly when.
K:
Why say it?
(? )
Z:
Kass/said it yesterday. Remember yesterday you said not to
turn it off? I said I didn't have anything set.
K:
He'll probably say after his consultation he may meet with you.
Put it on that basis.
Z:
Okay. I feel good about this, don't you?
K:
I think it's the right thing to do.
Z:"
I do too, Henry. I really do.
K:
I mean these guys could beat us to death. You know we could
keep this charade going another three weeks.
Z:
Yeah. I want to sit down when you get a chance this afternoon
and give me a couple of
.
K:
Yes, I'd be eager to get that.
Z:
I really would. I'll call you and come up and talk to you about that.
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2
K:
I want to get your tender reaction to the press thing.
Z:
Okay. I'll be over to see you abx after I brief.
K:
Also, I'd like a little support in the face of this leaking that my
colleagues in this building are doing.
Z:
I'll tell you what I've been doing on that too.
K:
Okay.
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
11:42 a. m. - December 15, 1972
Sidney Gresson/Dr. Kissinger
G:
How are you, Henry. Are you still alive and kicking?
K:
When you deal with two maniacal Vietnamese parties, if you
aren't kicking, you're dead.
G:
Did you seeFlo over there?
K:
No, she's too bright, I'm afraid.
G:
She's too bright, but why are you discriminating against her?
K:
Because all she needs is one tiny, little fact and she puts the
rest together herself.
G:
Henry, look when we talked a few months ago and we were going
to get together and then you probably got screwed up running
Middle East or something. I still want very much
to talk with you. It has nothing to do with current affairs.
K:
No, I know what you want you to talk to me about,
G:
I'd like really to sit down and talk to you if we don't even go
further than that.
K:
No, we can't go further than that.
G:
No. whatever convenient time you have. Whatever is convenient
to you.
next
K:
You want to come down sometime/week?
G:
I'll fly down Monday morning, if it's any good.
K:
Well, let's have lunch on Monday.
G:
All right.
K:
Come to my office and we can go to the Sans Souci because the
food here is unbearable.
G:
Well, all right, I'll pick you up at your office at 12:30?
K:
Make it at 1:00.
G:
Look forward very much
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TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
11:45, Dec. 15, 1972
K:
Anatol!
D:
Oh, how are you?
K:
Okay.
ocean
D:
When are you going through Gleen? Doesn't difference in time
botheyou?
K:
Why?
Di
I mean when you go over, cause over the ocean I mean difference
in time, eight hours-
Kt
Yesterday I was very, very tired.
D:
You seem rather calm I should say.
K:
Yes, as I said--
D:
You are on a different note I should say.
K:
Well, you misunderstood me.
D:
You just want to show me a different mood come on.
K:
You know, when you are faced with a situation that indicates its
own direction it usually a very relaxing atmosphere.
Dt
I know you are rather well usually--
K:
I would not recommend your clients to try to call on the President.
D:
Well, Pm sure you know they are not going to make that kind of a
recommendation.
K:
No, but, if you want to get a feeling, you can read the text of the
last day for example.
D:
Of last-oh, I see. You show me tomorrow when I come--
K:
You want to come over for it.
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2
D:
Well 1 think yes tomorrow show me.
K:
Okay fine. Now the second thing is the President wanted to make
sure is that your people, I'll be glad to go over the issues with you.
But as you could have seen yesterday it isn't the issues, they
change issues so fast that we can't solve them quickly enough.
What we are trying to tell you is that you are really not being told
the truth. But would you like a page of what we think the issues
are?
D:
I really would like because this is a point because my impressions
sometimes they, I mean our friends, this is rather mixed up --
K:
All that I would bet on Gromyko and Breshnev is --
D:
Yes, it is hard for Russion to understand but--
K:
the main thing--
D:
Main thing this one and yourposition this one.
K:
For your own sake don't get yourself locked into a position that
they tell you because it's now
what you told me. They
are lying to you too. But you don't have to comment on it, but
the factsyou give me, you couldn't invent. I mean, you don't know
enough about the negotiations to invent them. So it's hard to believe
that they are giving this to you.
D:
Well, this is the point, too, 1 should say, and this point you think'
it will be useful.
K:
I will give them to you but be careful about, you know, he's going
to have a horror story. The basic facty is we are ready tosettle
very quickly, and they are not. I mean that is the fact.
D:
This is your--and there is a reservation?
K:
There is no doubt of it. Every day that we narrow it, the next day
they come in with four or five more issues. New this particular
excuse they use at any given time is really unimportant.
D:
Yes, I understand. But as of today where we stand in your under-
standing?
K
K:
I'll send it over this afternoon.
Dr
What do you feel, not one or two, make it five, six, seven, it's
entirely up to you, I would really like to show Gromyko just what
is it, as we are today, because if you give him two sides it is useful.
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3
1 understand it's not because--
K:
You read the transcript of the last day'smeeting, you will see
that its irrelevant. But I will send It to you.
D:
Yes, I will simply look out for it. You understand, it's not really
I am asking for you giving me up but I think it's, 1 do feeling
something better--
K:
Yes, well incidentally the President on a personal note is very
touched by your wife going-- them
time they
D:
Well she's going next time, by that/want to send some Christmas
gift, rather my wife could take it.
K:
Right.
D:
If she is going there---
K:
How long are you going to be gone?
Dt
Really I don't know, I intend to go around Monday now because
then its the 20th 21st, 22nd and afterall I don't know because
Breshnev wants me to receive, but whether I am eloquent or not
for, -- it may be better for me to stay for vacation, or he might
have some ideas to go for the President, at this particular answer,
I don't know.
Ki:
He actually thinks it would be useful. I think it would be very
quiet here in January, and if you could consider for example to
come here for a couple of days, say around the first of January
and then go back to Moscow just so that we both have the work
program.
D:
Well, maybe this is idea. I don't th--
K:
I don't think frankly unless you friends in Hanoi drive us to a point
of no return, but that's you know.
D:
I know of
of no return.
K:
At any rate that wouldn't involve you. So I don't expect any major
moves here.
D:
That is my impression to because my relation, in general, is really
international, except Vietnam. Nothing --
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4
K:
What Iw ould like is that you-the only business you and I could do
is to plan the
with us.
D:
Yes, this is the point.
K:
So that we could get the bureaucracy working and then you can
go back to Moscow frankly for more of January.
D:
Are you going for vacation yourself?
K:
I will go myself as soon as Vietnam has broken one way or the other.
D:
You can exchange your
for the full of January
or you could do it and be on vacation too.
K:
If it's still going in January we will exchange more than letters,
believe me. (Laughter)
D:
You just pit it in moth-that way (laughter) About your talk with
Le Due The when you are strolling along the park, I think---
K:
Le Due The thinks he's making a monkey out of me. Le Due Tho
thinks that if he can just I. be nice to me that I'm so vain and then
puts me on television and he smiles and thinks we are all nicely
paranoid.
D:
Yes, Mr. Due Tho looks and says -- look here, everything is
all right there because just look how they are going (laughter),
so you see how it could be.
K:
Of course. I'm convinced that a member of the Politburo of the
Vietnamese communist party will give me terms because he likes
me a lot better than anyone else. Don't you think that's reasonable?
D:
Yeah--
(end of tape)
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5
D:
**** is this specific announcement on the latt--
K:
We are playing with the idea -- maybe I will have an informal
meeting with the President at some point.
D:
Oh, I see.
K:
Well I might have a press conference, I haven't decided ket, I
doubt it. I know there will be an official announcement.
D:
I understand. But just about---
K:
About what?
Dt
you are thinking along the line of a press conference--on the record
or off the record?
K:
I haven't really decided yet what we are going to do.
D:
Okay, Henry, then I will see you tomorrow then.
K:
I willsee you tomorrow.
D:
8:30?
K:
8:30, I'll let you have that transscription to--glance at it. You
won't understand it but you will see that it's ---
D:
I'm like your friend Breshnev, I don't understand what you--
K:
Well no, because it refers to articles in the agreement. I will also
give you a copy of the text as it now stands.
D:
This I think it will be a good idea.
K:
Okay.
D:
Yes, it is understood but only in your particular structure of the
phase--
K:
Right.
D:
Otherwise I think we are trying to tto do ----
K:
If at all a rationale discussion
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6
D:
What you are going to give me is only for our own information.
We won't argue with them. It was a pleasant approach--he ap-
proach me, we will have a reading, a really expansive talk,
that's all. Like our Mr. Breshnev, my presence here is not
arguing but taking what they say - quote, unquote.
K:
Yeah.
D:
So this is for our understanding--
K:
I really don't know what we could ask you to do because--
D:
No, no, this is what we discuss yesterday really it is difficult
for us to do to go and argue with them about one point means
they say their position is different and at the same time things
not to be the same as you.
send the letter
and just say they agree, but what you sent of the text they have
to sign it?
K:
That's right.
D:
This is rather small detail but quite a detail as you say.
K:
They could sign the text without a Preamble. They can sign every
obligation---
D:
They could sign the text without saying they agreeing and then you
may always interpret it in principle but agreeing, but they could
say I don't like, I will not agree--for the whole text.
K:
Exactly.
D:
Well whatever. May make strike them, make measures in this
way. Unless our Ambassador may make some provision but I
doubt it because of what we are talking. Okay, Henry, I will see
you tomorrow. Bye, bye.
K:
Bye.
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TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Taft Schreiber
12/15/72
TS:
Good morning, Henry.
HK:
Taft, how are you?
TS:
Fine. Say I talked to Ted Cummings and he is very happy to have
you at the house.
HK:
Good.
TS:
Also we played golf with Lynn Firestone and he said, gee if he's
coming down, tell him we have a party on the 28th--the Annabergs
are coming over and some more-not a big one then he said tell
him about it. I said call and invite him yourself- he said well if
he's coming out naturally if he's available nicky will call or we'll
call: him. I thought I would give you at least Cummings home number
and have you aide call him.
HK:
Right. That's very nice of you.
TS:
its 213-277-2168.
HK:
Right.
TS:
And that way if you re going down for the 26th. You can meet wtih
Lou there the 27, 28, 29th--how long would you stay?
HK:
Either until the 31 st or 2nd, I haven t decided yet.
TS:
I just want to tell you where the action is the Anabergs are giving the
New Year's party down there--we're invited my doctor and his wife
to take them to Hawaii-. so they are going as our guests and I couldn't
call that off but this is going to be the social event of the year down
there. So if you' re going to be there, I'll pass word to let them know
where you are and that your'e going to be there.
HK:
Good that's great.
TS:
You might as well be in all the action.
HK:
Might as well you' re my social secretary
TS:
Listen, I've been accused of everything. how do you feel Henry.
HK:
I'm in great shape.
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TS:
I'll see you soon I've go the dubious honor of being an elector today
so I've go to go up to San Francisco and cast a ballot.
HK:
Right.
TS:
My contribution to society is nothing but a plane trip today.
HK:
I'll talk to you soon.
HS:
All right - you have you aide=call or you call Ted youself and I'm
sure you'd love to go.
HK:
Thank you Taft.
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TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird
(Secure Phone) 12/15/72 12:05 p.m.
SL:
The last wave is out of there. We lost one more. Another
B-52 was shot down.
HK:
Oh really?
SL:
Two for every 100 strike isn't bad. We expected that--Ithink
I told you that.
HK:
Yeh, but we actually lost three.
SL:
The other one got back. We lost two total, a crew of 12 and
1 F-111 thus far.
HK:
And are we going to do this Tacair tomorrow?
SL
No, because of the weather--we are going back with the 52's
and Flll's.
HK:
Isn't the weather good tonight.
SL:
No and we will go back within 24 hours with 60 more B'52's
and we told them to go with minimum of 60 and try for 90
and then the Flll's. If the weather would clear we would go
in with tacair. As you know these 16 targets that we are hitting
are the only ones that are acceptable for this kind of bombing. There're
For some other bridges and other targets we should open up
and hit.
HK:
Have the 52's hit those targets or tacair--can a 52 hit a bridge?
SL:
The Flll's can be put on the bridges. Smart bombs need visual
because they are guided by beam. We will let them go tomorrow
where they are going--and hope for clear weather.
HK:
That's fine with me. Then let them hit a few additional targets.
The screaming is starting-. Symington is comin g after me.
SL:
State wants briefed why the losses are so high--they think the
loss rate is high, but for the number of bombers we are sending
that ratio isn't bad. As you know we lost two crews thenx-the
other 52 is burning and on fire but we got the crew. We recovered
a crew of six. Well give you a full briefing tomorrow, Henry.
HK:
I appreciate that. I'll tell the President tonight.
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TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Mrs. Cerf
12:05 p.m.
12/15/72
HK:
How sweet of youto call.
un-
C:
Well, I thought of you and I know how disappointed and I XM happy
you are with you announcement.
HK:
Well, I think it will stil 1 work out.
C:
I am sure it will I know you'd rather still it be another announcement.
HK:
That's for sure.
to
C:
I just wanted to say that I love you and I know it's going/work out.
HK:
Aren't you great.
C:
I'm not, you are.
HK:
It's been so long since I've seen you.
C:
I know and I resent it. Very very much.
HK:
So do I when are you coming down.
C:
I'm not coming down when are you coming up.
HK:
When this present frenzy eases, I'll come up and let's have dinner.
C:
I am going out to Palm Springs two days after Christmas-.
HK:
Oh, I may be out there for a couple of days-
C:
Really? I'm going to Franks on the 27th.
HK:
I'm thinking of going out on the26th and stay 4 or 5 days.
C:
That's exactly what we sort of will be-doing. That's wonderful.
HK:
Then I'll see you there.
C:
That's perfect. In any case, then we'll make the plans to get together
in an evening in New York--for some relaxation for my feelow
HK:
That'd be terrific you're a good friend.
C:
I'm a very loving friend I don't bother you I'm always here if you
need anythingruced
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HK:
You never could bother me.
C:
Okay, see you soon.
HK:
Bye.
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TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Eovernor Reagan:
12/15/72
12:35
p.m.
RR:
Henry?
HK:
Ron, howare you?
RR:
Pretty good.
HK:
I saw your television show the othernight--I didn't enjoy it anymore
than you did.
RR:
But I sure had some familiar and nostalgic notes out of it.
I called because this isn't just curiousity or wanting to find out
anything, but Henry at the risk of being very presumptuous,
and not knowing all of the facts of course because only those of
/
you there who are handling them do know them--can I tell you some-
thing that made me feel nostalgic
HK:
Sure.
RR:
As I say you'v been there and maybe this is totally unnecessary--
but when you were talking of course I remembered Penh wa Huang (sp)
which for all those years, we had the same problem with them, but
way back in the 40's Penh wen Swuam (?) turned out not to be a surprise
to me here in Hollywood and I'll brief this as much as I can--we had
a great cataclysmic upheavel under the guise of a jurisdictional strike-.
HK:
Yeh.
RR:
We actually had, although we never used the word oxpressing openly and
didn't do any redbaiting, we had a small group of Hollywood unions
that had come under total communist domination and they used this
jurisdictional gimmick to bring about this attempt to close down the
motion picture industry. The actors were the key if they could keep
us out obviously the studioes closed down--we continued to go to work.
And I was President of the Guild at the time and Henry for seven
months--I'm not exaggerating- twice a day seven days a week, I
led a group of actors that met with the leadership of these communist
unionists trying to arrive at a solution that would save the business
and I have got to tell you that when --you even used the right number--
when you said 15 the other night. I used to come home night after
night scattered through those seven months and say hey I think it's
all set--we met again at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning to just finalize
it and I think we've done it. At 10 the next morning, they'd welk in
with their lawyers and all of a sudden there'd be 15 new demands layed
out on the table that we'd never heard of before and it was always as
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Page 2
you said - just beyond reach and Henry this has been haunting me
the whole weekend to relate this experience. evidently the communists
do business the same way-because the only way it was finally solved
at the end of those seven months is toward the end of the 7th, we
finally awoke to what was going on they they were just going to keep
on negotiatingand striking and stalling ad infinitum to the place where
we just finally said to hell with it there is no further distance we
can go at all and they are either in or out of the motion picture
business and that's the way it's going to be and the way it round
wound up was they were out of the motion picture business and those
unions to this day are still out bf the picture business and we WX just
closed it out and went to work and kept the studios going.
HK:
Yeh.
RR:
And txbx I just couldn't help but tell you this because they like meetings
Maybe this is all useless in view of all the facts that you have but I
had to get it off my chest.
HK:
No I appreciate this I want you to know incidentally, we have resumed
bombing North Vietnam today.
RR:
Ahhh
HK:
And after it hits the press it won't for a couple of hour anything
you could say supporting us would be appreciated-
RR:
Oh listen
in
HK:
I am assuming you are/agreement with it.
RR:
Last night we had a party and couple of people got me in a corner and
said look just play if I were king, what would you do right now if you
were there and I said I'll answer the question but on one condition
that you recognize we don't know the facts that the President and
Henry have I said granted that if things are as they appear in the
news--if there are no circumstances about which we don't know. if
they are just the way they look, I said I'd put the biggest fleet of
B-52's they'd ever seen and just blow the hell out of the section of
North Vietnam and just keep eyeballing them, making no more
concessions and let this happen day after day until finally they recognize
the only thing to do is put down the paper and sign this thing.
HK:
Well that's what we are doing.
RR:
Wonderful it brightens my day.
HK:
I was afraid you'd oppose it.
RR.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page 3
RR:
The hell you haven't been out here often enough. you have got
to come and visit. incidentally are you coming out here for the
holidays
HK:
I may come to Palm Springs for a few days between Christmas and
New Year's
RR:
If you come into town let'us know, we'd love to see you.
HK:
Good, I'd love to see you - I'll be sure to let you know.
RR:
I'll be shouting out loud and long about what you are doing.
Is it like our motion picture unions?
HK:
That's what it looks like to me.
RR:
They play this game
HK:
Well they® re going to try it but not for long - something has to give.
RR:
Make it be them.
They play a game in which first of all in which they have no pressures
on them from the standpoint of humanitarianism or the lives of their
people because they don't even consider that and they just feel
we do. Twenty-five years at the negotiating tables don't get tired
when you finally come down to the nub, the side that wins thatx is
the side
than the other fellow.
HK:
That's what usually happens.
RR:
I'm delighted to hear of it Good to talk to you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telcon
Ron Ziegler/Dr. Kissinger
12/15/72 - 12:52
Z:
Henry?
K:
Yes Ron.
Z:
The
is about ready to go with a story. Before
we get into the press line, let's talk about the facts. That the
President sent you to see Zumwalt about a month ago and tell
him that he would be removed as Chief of the Navy because of
the racial prob.wantedReston.
K:
Total nonsense.
Z:
They say they have it from Hill sources who are willing to be
quoted. You never did do that did you?
K:
I haven't seen Zumwalt in two months - I didn't see Zumwalt
with any such message.
Z:
Did you discuss this? The aspect
of his leaving?
K:
I never discussed his leaving and I don't think he is leaving.
Z:
Well, fine that's what I wanted to know.
K:
So it is a flat totally, total untruth - I once discussed with him
at Ed's (?) request what he planned to do about this racial problem.
what was it on the Constellation?
Z;
Yes.
K:
But he called me to explain it to me.
Z:
But you didn't talk about him leaving.
K:
He was telling me what the situation was, I really wouldn't get
into it.
Z:
Okay fine.
K:
I would just say that I have not seen Zumwalt in two months, I have
never discussed his leaving with him in any form whatsoever.
Z:
I'll see you a little later this afternoon.
K:
Right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
5:41 pm, December 15, 1972
K:
Anatol!
D:
Y
Yes, Henry, how are you?
K:
How are you?
D:
Thank y ou very much.
K:
I sent you over that list just in case Le Due Tho--
D:
He just arrived in Moscow.
K:
Just crying on your shoulders, huh?
[Laughter]
D:
I'm sure he will. Well, he's here. Next time I will wait
until you go to Moscow. I will show to Moscow how he does the,
really, talks to you.
K:
Oh, Le Due The
D:
Okay, when realism he arrive in Moscow., I will come and tell & show the
Moscow/to him how nice the is and so on, then I think he
will watch with you then his realism, (laughter) and he will
change his command I'm sure (laughter) you understand
the background?
K:
Yes I understand it very well, very well.
D:
Or maybe he will be hearing some music with some members
of the government and so in that way confident situation of this
particular realism (laughter).
K:
Look, I will send it to you--are you going to be in another hour,
we are retyping it.
D:
Okay, I will be here another hour, yes.
K:
Good, by 7:00 you'll have it.
D:
That's all right.
K:
That way, they can have it tomorrow morning.
D;
Yeah, tomorrow morning. Well, thank you very much, Henry.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
K:
Okay, Anatol, and I'll see you tomorrow morning for
breakfast.
D:
Yes, 8:30.
K:
In the Map Room.
D:
For breakfast, or how, or sometime they call it---
K:
I wouldn't have you come here at a member of the
Central Committee for a prayer meeting.
D:
Well, I don't know, maybe it would be interesting your
kind of prayer, because I'm sure you have not heard
those prayers, ma ybe an international prayer or many things.
K:
Well, we can try it to see whether we can agree.
D:
Will you prepare the third draft please, for tomorrow
K:
Okay, blaye.
D:
Bye, bye, thank you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TelCon
Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger
5:45, Dec. 15, 1972
H:
How are you Henry?
K:
Okay.
H:
How are you feeling?
K:
I'm okay.
H:
Not to take too long, we are tempted to write a very highly anticipatory
piece this week. Not just exactly what will happen, but a decisive
time is coming. You've spent an awful lot of time with the President
and you've had a great many meetings and it certainly suggests how,
as Scotty Reston suggested today, that the President is engaging now.
Will take necessary steps. Is that kind of a column appropriate, or
are we speculating too much.
K:
Well it depends what steps you're suggesting he' going to take.
H:q We re not. We're not going to be so foolhardy to suggest--it's just
that he will try to be very decisive. To bring this thing to a completion.
As far as we suggest anything, it will be that he'll privately or publicly
pretty well accept what's been negotiated in Paris and present it to
the South Vietnamese for their approval in a forceful way. I'm
assuming that Haig will be gone in a day or so, is that true.
K:
I don't know. They don't tell me anything. He free wheels all over
the place. When do you close.
H:
We close tomorrow. Are you going to brief tomorrow?
K:
I may.
H:
Well, will you be able to give anything substantive about where do we
go from here.
K:
No. Why don't you wait until after and then you'll get a better feel
for where we stand.
H:
All right. Are the two Reston columnists pretty much on the mark.
I know they're from Paris.
K:
Yeah, but the second one the first one he have had a brief talk
with me but really not quite on the subject he wrote. The second one
he did entirely on his own.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
H:
But he did make the point about--just try to put everything together
as best we can. The question of legality or whatever it is, is a
sticking point with the South Vietnamese. The Sovereignty is the - -
were we far off if adopt that.
K:
Well, I'd stay away from the sovereignty word.
H:
Well, that we figure is too strong a word, but just the hell it's all
in the context of a political future of South Vietnam.
K:
From the point of view of not having a legal basis for constant North
Vietnamese intervention, yes.
H:
It's a question of political legitimacy of the North Vietnamese in
South Vietnam. How many of the PRG are in the North Vietnamese
troops.
K:
The PRG is something else from the North Vietnamese.
H:
Okay. Well I'll just look forward to the briefing tomorrow.
K:
I think you may do that. You're just translating it.
H:
From the original Vietnamese, huh.
K:
That's right.
H:
You don't have David Engel, can you think without him anymore.
K:
Not really.
H:
Okay.
[Tape change here] Okay, we'll wait until tomorrow.
K:
Okay.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Nick Thimmesch/Mr. Kissinger
6:15 p.m., December 15, 1972
T:
Hello, Henry, your secretary has demoted you to Mister.
K:
No, that's a promotion. I know how PHDs are acquired.
T:
All right. Sir, just a few things I want to have straight in my mind here
before I sit down and try to put this together. When you discussed the
business about intervention, I gather then that withdrawal of North Vietnamese
troops is not in the agreement then.
K:
Well, we've never said it was.
T:
Yeah, but I just wanted to make absolutely sure that that was not in the
agreement and that
was understood that they would be allowed to keep
their troops there but --
K:
But not to reinforce them.
T:
Yeah. But the issue is then intervention meaning they could take military
actions.
K:
Well, I just don't want to go any further into it.
T:
intervention means whether it's --
K:
Well, a constant right to intervene. There's a difference between Well,
I just don't want to go into this. Between what will have to be a process
of attrition and a process of constant right to intervene in South Vietnamese
affairs.
T:
Political and military?
K:
Yes.
T:
Okay. All right. Well, I've got that one straightened out then. Now on
this supervisory body, is the question there over the makeup of it or the
role and the rules of operation or
K:
More the role and rules of operation.
T:
The role and rules of operation. There's no dispute over the nations that
have been mentioned; there's none of those are unacceptable I gather than.
K:
Well, that No.
T:
Okay.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 2 -
Nick Thimmesch/Mr. Kissinger
6:15 p. m., December 15, 1972
K:
But I really, Nick, cannot go into the agreement in detail.
T:
All right. Well, I just needed things though that were said between us; I
just wanted to get them clear in my mind.
K:
Right.
T:
Here's something I did not bring up and I should have. The Cambodians
recently have made statements to the effect they don't press the North
Vietnamese on this. Can you tell me anything about that?
K:
Well, I think the reservoir of trust in the North Vietnamese is not unlimited.
To put it mildly.
T:
All right. That's across the board or is that just Cambodia?
K:
Well, I think that's - I don't think the South Vietnamese trust the North
Vietnamese particularly. But we're not asking anyone to trust them.
T:
Right. Now on this business about a possible trip to Saigon by yourself,
is that a decision as to whether to go or when to go?
K:
That's a decision that has to be made yet by the President.
T:
Yeah.
K:
Who is to go and when.
T:
Oh, it's not clear then that you will go alone?
K:
Well, that will become apparent before your column can be printed.
T:
All right. Now you talked about six months and one year -- yo u used those
two terms there -- you would never make a decision without planning on
six months to one year -- it would last six months to one year. Now that's
a little vague in my notes here.
K:
No, no; I said it doesn't do us any good to have an agreement that falls
apart in a year.
T:
Oh, so any agreement that would make you would want reasonable assurance
that it would last at least one year.
K:
Oh, no, don't pay any attention to that. That was just a figure of speech.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 3 -
Nick Thimmesch/Mr. Kissinger
6:15 p.m., December 15, 1972
T:
I see. The time doesn't mean anything then?
K:
Well, except that it should last indefinitely.
T:
Yeah. Okay. That's kind of a qualitative statement rathern than quanitative
then?
K:
That's right.
T:
This is just a little technical thing that I'm curious about, how do you
keep in contact with Hanoi? Is that done through --
K:
I can't tell you that.
T:
Is it by radio or telephone or what is it?
K:
No, not telephone. And not radio either but we have very good
communications.
T:
All right. It's direct contact though. I mean, in terms of telecommunications
you have direct contact with them?
K:
No, not from here.
T:
No, all right. Now is there to be a press briefing tomorrow?
K:
We' re thinking of it.
T:
You're thinking about it?
K:
Right.
T:
Okay. If there is a briefing, how will you be identified there? Are they
going to have --
K:
No, no, I'll be quoted.
T:
You will be quoted?
K:
Yeah.
T:
Will you be covering the same material you and I discussed?
K:
I doubt it.
T:
You doubt it?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 4 -
Nick Thimmesch/Mr. Kissinger
6:15 p.m., December 15, 1972
K:
Yeah.
T:
All right. Well, then I'll keep this as masked as possible then.
K:
Right. If it should be different, then you can of course use it more freely.
T:
Yeah. Well, my problem is that they will have to mail this tonight you see.
K:
Well, we haven't definitely decided yet what I should do and how.
T:
I see. But there's no decision that you will definitely brief the press
tomorrow?
K:
No, although it's sort of leaning towards it.
T:
Leaning towards it at 11 o'clock.
K:
I guess 11:30.
T:
11:30. All right.
K:
Okay, Nick.
T:
Thank you for calling back and again I say it, I don't like to press you all
the time. I mean, I -- when I ask to see you or --
K:
No, no; you can be sure when you ask to see, I'll try to do it in a reasonable
time.
T:
That's why I try to be stearing that way.
K:
Right.
T:
Okay.
K:
Bye.
wgh
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page data
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"ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n1\nTelcon\nHAK and George Carver (2pp.)\n12/1/72\nB\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Transcripts -- Telephone Conversations\n17\nFOLDER TITLE\nDec.\n5\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential | ibrary\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/\nGeorge Shultz\n12/1/72\n9:40 a. m.\nHK:\nHi, George, I was going to call you.\nG:\nI think we have got to try to fish or cut baitwith Pete somehow\nor other now.\nHK:\nI am beginning to leav towards cutting bait-- I don't want that quoted\nto Peterson--first of all he is so totally disaffected; and second, I\nreally don't quite know how this thing is going to work.\nG:\nHe has himself involved at least in six major responsibilities--\nHK:\nOn this charter?\nG:\nIn his charter, and I don't quite see how it will be possible to manage\nall of that. So, something that comes closer to the original proposal,\nand is much more modest-\nthe more workable thing, but he\nclearly doesn't want that.\nHK:\nI mean he wants to be in charge of OECD, European Community and\nNATO--\nG:\nUS/Polish--\nHK!\nAnd US/Polish\nG:\nAnd coordinate all European economic things, including energy problems\nwhich is a hell of a bundle-\nHK:\nIt could be done if he were in my job you know what I mean? But to do\nit without a real power base and without very clear lines of authority, I\nhave serious questions about--I like Pete if he were set up in Washington\nas the special representative of the President for Europe,\nG:\nI think we could put it another way--that somehow or another the things\nthat he is telling us need to be done, do need to be done.\nHK:\nThat's right.\nG:\nAnd he is right the first time in that they need to be done in Washington\nprimarily, although we do need to have people in NATO, EC and so forth\nwho are there and who can act as eyes and ears and interpreters and so\nforth there but I think this job has to be done in Washington.\nHK:\nBut you ask yourself, how can he formulate éuropean foreign policy\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nsitting in Europe--\nG:\nRight, that was his point in the first place, but the trouble is the\nPresident doesn't want him in Washington--\nHK:\nThat's right.\nG:\nAnd that is a fairly firm thing so you work within those parameters\nand you come out no where.\nHK:\nI must say when I read that charter yesterday, It was funny I was going\nto call you within 10 minutes to discuss it with you.\nG:\nI got it this morning.\nHK:\nThat's why I dexed it down--so that I could discuss it with you.\nG:\nWell, we could get back to Pete and say \"no go\" - - why don't you go\nahead and accept one of those million dollar offers--\nHK:\nGoerge, let me put it this way if it's so desirable that he go to Europe,\nwe can make it go--I do not think it will work- he will resign within the\nyear - he will find out he's not going to have a major policy formulating\nrole - - because I've never known that to work from Europe; don't you think?\nG:\nYeh.\nHK:\nOn the other hand, he doesn't seem to want the major representative\nrole--\nG:\nThe chairmanship of these commissions would seem to locate the daty-\nto-day policy on those things with him rather than\nHK:\nHe wants an office in the EOB.\nG:\nThat seems to me all right--I think if he can do all these things--he\nbetter have one. But--\nHK:\nNo, no, I think he would do the chairmanship--his plan, I think, is to\nkeep Sally here and I think what he would plan is to spend a week, a\nmonth in Washington--\nG:\nI see. So he'd keep his house, and Sally would stay here and he'd\nestablish an apartment abroad.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nG:\nWell, that's not what the President wants.\nHK:\nWe can make it work for a year--he will certainly leave within a year.\nG:\nI think it's better for him to leave now then along with everybody else\nbecause if he leaves within a year, it's likely to be in a flap.\nHK:\nI have great difficulty visualizing how this will work.\nG:\nI agree with you. So dio 1.\nG:\na:\nShall we tell the President that you and I have discussed this--we discusse\nit with Peterson, this seems to be the S ort of the ultimate counter-\nproposal, we don't think it will work and we think we should stop now.\nWhat the President proposed to him mainly overbroad, work with NATO\nand The EC and help us formulate European policy, and the eyes, the\nears and representative over there. He doesn't want that.\nAnd continue to be involved in the Russian and so forth, but that's involve-\nment--that's not being in charge of it. That he doesn't want. See the way\nhe has the things lined up for EC, OECD and NATO it makes it hard to\n--for example the discussion about Rumsfeld going to NATO--well it's\nhard to get Rumsfeld to go to NATO if he reports to Peterson. I suppose\non the other two posts it wouldn't be a problem, because this guy is there\nright now anyway a civil service type. But if we decided to change that\nit would become something of a problem.\nwant to\nHK:\nOn whether Rumsfeld should go to NATO, I really/have a voice in who gets\nto be Ambassador I don't thing we should shuffle people around that I\nhave to work with--\nG:\nWhat do you think about Rumsfeld and NATO?\nG:\nHK:\nI am not one of Rumsfeld's admirers-Ayou would rather have him stay at\nEC- would like the NATO job.\nHK:\nOh, he would?\nG:\nYeh. He's done quite a good job in the Cost of Living Council, I think.\nHK:\nHas he?\nG:\nYeh, he works at it, he has a good sense of able young people, he\nattracts them and gets them working hard and he thinks outside the\nboundaries of the particular ruts that the existing bureaucracy has\nand he's responsive and loyal--he wants to report in; then if you say\nall right, now you handle, he's not afraid to go ahead and do it--he's\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 4\nvery good to work with.\nHK:\nAll right, well maybe I've got him wrong.\nG:\nSo I wouldn't be surprised but that he'd make a very good Ambassador\nin NATO.\nHK:\nWell, one thing for sure he won't become Ambassador if Pete is\nsuper Ambassador--\nG:\nNo, no. Pete is an enormously energetic and capable person.\nHK:\nAnd I think what is being done is a terrible injustice.\nG:\nSo do I--he's turned in a hell of a good performance--\nHK:\nHe handled-\nG:\nThe guy we've nominated for Secretary of Commerce is not in his class.\nHK:\nWho is he?\nG:\nHis name is Fred Dent-\nHK:\nOh, it is going to be Dent\nG:\nWho oddly enough was born and brought up in Connecticut and went to Yale.\nHK:\nThere is no question that the economic negotiations with the S oviets would\nhot have reached this point without Pete--he did a superlative job. Subtle,\nable, in fact, I don't know how we will set up the economic relations with\nthe Soviets-\nG:\nYou and axix I have to spend a lot of time together here in planning a way\nin which this is all going to work.\nHK:\nWhat do you mean in Key Biscayne.\nG:\nNo, I mean whenever we can find time together- I am coming back to\nWashington this afternoon. I gather you are coming down--I probably\nbe coming back on the plane you're coming down on.\nHK:\nWe couldn't be both there at the same time--the status problem. You\noutrank me anyway.\nG:\nNot in seniority on the White House staff--as a labor relations fellow,\nI recognize seniority--\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 5\nHK:\nYes, but you got yourself a Cabinet position too.\nG\nI also recognize --I hate to inject this note into a somewhat humorous\nexchange the tremendous ability you have--and as an old academic\nI tend to give precedence to overriding ability.\nHK:\nGeorge. the only people who say flatly doesn't get you anywhere are\nthe people who have never had flattery.\nG:\n(laughing) In this case it isn't flattery, because its meant.\nHK:\nWe should get together, when I come back from Paris next week,\nwe should have a talk.\nG:\nAll right. As far as this-\nHK:\nMy instinct--let me tell you a cowardly thing--I'm a friend of Pete's\nand therefore I don't want to get in caught in the position where it is\nsaid I thought It couldn't work. I'd rather have it on the basis where\nthe President says he didn't want something that had somany facets\nto it and its either the original job or nothing.\nG:\nHm huh. Well, we have to make a report to the President.\nHK:\nNo, I don't mind both of us making a report to the President, I'm\ntalking about what will be said to Pete.\nG:\nAll right. Now this decision process is apining wildly here--Rumsfeld\n--see they are announcing all the WH staff changes and so for and\nsomehow--he's got to fit into the picture--stay, leave, do something\nand so the decisions are tracking around. So I think you should think\nvery carefully about the NATO business and Rumsfeld You don't seem\nas though you feel like saying right now whether he would be acceptable\nto you.\nHK:\nOh hell, I suppose I can live with Rumsfeld- I don't have that much to\ndo with the NATO ambassador.\nG:\nYou would find him quite--he fishes around at you some, but basically\nhe takes orders and carries them out.\nHK:\nBased on that--\nG:\nHe's bright.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 6\nHK:\nYeh, he's bright. I think he is a little - - frankly my objection is I\nfound him to be on the soft side of most issues and what we need\nin Europe now is really some stern - but I might be wrong on that.\nG:\nI think there - the political side, the thing that appeals politically\nright now is to be a pretty tough guy, so that being the case, that's\nthe way Rumsfeld is going to be. Because his basic orientation is\nto his political future.\nHK:\nOkay.\nG:\nAll right. You wouldn't be upset about him - - then -\nHK:\nNo, but I will be upset if a lot of ambassadorial appointments are\nmade without my being consulted, even if I were to approve.\nG:\nYeh, this is something that I'm not involved in on that subject--\nHK:\nThis is just the WH reorganization\nG:\nI only know about the Rumsfeld thing because of his Cost of Living\nCouncil and so on and what is he going to do and the President talked\nto him about this possibility. But the structuring of the ambassadorial\nbusiness and so on, I\nHK:\nI'll talk to Haldeman about it tomorrow-\nG:\nHaldeman and I understand Flanigan is marketing names around too.\nHK:\nOkay good.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nNovember 1, 1972, 10:03 am\nP:\nI was just calling to get the morning report. Anything new on the\nK:\nNo, I'm seeing the South Vietnamese at 10:30.\nP:\nAt ten, huh. That's good.\nK:\nWe've had a cable from Bunker in which he thinks they are going to\ncome along. But ungraciously.\nP:\nI don't care how they come along.\nK:\nThey've been leaking in that direction. They've been saying you gave\nthem an ultimatum. That's been on NBC, that doesn't do any damage\nin Paris, and that they were going to see how we did next week before\nthey make their final decision.\nP:\nWell. people I think that's what they are going to do. Let's be sure that none of our\nkotxet people leak that I'm giving an ultimatum. Tell State, Sullivan\nand all the rest I don't want that conversation because that was a son of a\nbitch and tough conversation, and that was really rough.\nK:\nThat was rough.\nP:\nBe sure that Haig and everybody knows that I didn't tell the Chiefs or\nanybody.\nK:\nRight. I'll make sure that nothing gets to State.\nP:\nOr anybody. Just don't let it out, because we don't want to embarrass\nthem publicly. Then we'll build a backfire here on the Right Wing, you\nknow, and we just can't have that.\nK:\nRight, right. Well, nobody--\nP:\nIncidentally, I've been thinking a little about our meeting tommorrow\njust so that you can prepare, I think on the negotiating strategy this\ntime that you ought to begin, not with the easy one but with the tough\none. And I think that, for example, on the priority you've got to say,\nnow, let's get one thing settled once and for all, we say first they\nwill have seen the picture of the Joint Chiefs, that will I assume be\ncarried in The World--\nK:\n:Yes, it's been in every paper.\nP:\nHas it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nP contd:\nGood. All right. Then I'd be cold as ice, the President is frankly\nvery relaxed about it but he's very disappointed in the progress of\nthis, and this is it. This is, as far as you are concerned, the last\nmeeting.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nThen you go on to say, Now we've got to begin with one proposition\nand that is the President is very disappojnted and cannot understand\nyour backing off of your proposal with regard to the key point of the\nprisoners. If we back off--that's important now. What are you going\nto do about that. You've got to get that settled right away because\nwe can talk all we want and settle 12 points, if we don't settle that\nwe have no deal.\nK:\nExactly. I think, Mr. President, what we might consider, you might\nwant to think about it until tomorrow, is that I ask for a private meeting\nwith him first--\nP:\nOh, sure, sure.\nK:\nWith some of your stronger words that way so that there are not too\nmany people in the room when I say it. It's easier for them to take\nit that way.\nP:\nThat's right. Well, I'll go, I think I'll write a very tough note too\nwith what yo u have with your instructions. That may be helpful.\nK:\nThat would be very helpful.\nP:\nWhat you can do is to have something prepared along that line. Let\nhim, you know, spend some time, you've got things to do. When I\nget it, I'll edit it, then I'll send that with you. Now there a few other\nbrief points here, Henry. At least the North Vietnamese have indicated\nin their message a willingness to discuss. Right.\nK:\nAbsolutely. Let me get you the exact wording.\nP:\nRight, Okay.\nK:\nI'll you know, there's the usual palaver which isn't worth repeating\nabout the history of -\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nP:\nOh yes. I ought to make a lot of palaver too, but now the damned\nthing is going to be settled.\nK:\nWell, here is the operative paragraph. \"If the U.S. is really determined\nto end the war rapidly and restore peace in Vietnam, the Democratic\nR epublic of Vietnam will also as resolutely advancøe in that direction.\nThe DRV side will come to the private meeting on December 4th with\ngood will and a very serious attitude. If the U.S. side also shows\ngood will and makes great effort like the Democratic Republic of\nVitenam is prepared to do, it is certain that the Vietnam question\nwill be rapidly settled in the interest of both sides. \" That's pretty\nforthcoming by their standards.\nP:\nYeah, yeah.\nK:\nBecause that in effect\nP:\nI just trust they don't think coming there with more concessions.\nK:\nWell, we have to come with something along the lines of--that we\ndiscussed, Mr. President, on restoring some of the original language\non this committee.\nP:\nWell the language on the committee is--you're getting from Duc his\npriorities or not.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nOr is he going to give you priorities.\nK:\nMy--\nP:\nWe know what his priorities are, what the hell, he just wants it to\nlook good and frankly we can make it look good. Now the other thing\nthat you've got to really hammer out with him is whether or not there\nis going to be a meeting between me and here's a way you can\nhurry their decision a bit, because I can't--you can say the President\ncan make, you know, you're putting this first, but he admits to his\nbudget preparations and so forth and he can't just take off and go\non 24 hours notice. Now if Thieu wants this meeting, we ought to do\nit. I think he should want it, and I think the time to do it is before.\nK:\nWell, I think he should want it, I think the time to do it is--you ought\nnot to consent to doing it before because you could make the commitments\nin a framework where it wouldn't look provocative, and it could be done\nin the surge of peace and it would set up the subsequent trip to Hanoi\nin a much better framework. But we'll get an answer to that in an hour,\nI hope, but I will press it on him immediately.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nP:\nWell, in an hour he's going to come in with his usual plaintive answer\nand say well that business about being we are going to die six months\nfrom now, we'll die now. That's just nonsense, and they want to talk\nthat way, well there's just no deal.\nK:\nNow, on the concessions, Mr. President, we cannot have there are\nfour outstanding issues, we can't have our way on all four of them.\nP:\nI understand that.\nK:\nBecause, say, for example, they want the PRG mentioned in the document\nonce, they've agreed to delete it every place except in the preamble.\nNow, I have found a formula which I've now checked with the lawyers\nwhich will work which is that everybody except Saigon signs the pre-\namble mentioning the PRG, and Saigon has a different preamble. That\nway the North Vietnamese gets three quarters of their way, and then\nwe make a unilateral statement saying --\nP:\nWe recognize only one government.\nK:\nExactly. Then we have shown our good will towards-\nP:\nWell, don't tell him that tomorrow. Don't tell him that today.\nK:\nOh, no, I won't tell\nP:\nDon't tell him that today. That's something that you wangle out of\nthem next week and then say we've made a great big deal here.\nK:\nExactly. I wanted to tell you that that's the way this one has to go,\nwe cannot get--\nP:\nI understand that. Anyway that doesn't make a damn bit of difference\nwhether it's mentioned or not. If we put out a unilateral statement\nthat we don't recognize them. That's the point they've got to understand.\nK:\nNow the second thing is I think of all the outstanding issues, the one\nwe've got to get back is the prisoner one.\nP:\nWell, that is why you've got to start with that.\nK:\nBut, on the other hand, on that three segment committee, it's just\ninsane for the South to make--\nP:\nWell, how about putting in a phrase that this is not a coalition govern-\nment or something of that sort.\nK:\nWell, they won't agree to that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nP:\nWell, then we'll state it.\nK:\nOh, yeah, that's easy. They have stated it. I have it in the protocol\nthat they have stated it. And, we can put out what they said.\nP:\nI know they've already made statements. I was just thinking of any\nway that you--well go ahead.\nK:\nOn the rest of the issues we can win.\nP:\nOn the withdrawals, like what.\nK:\nWell, I think we can get them to withdraw some of their prisoners--\nsome of their troops on a de facto basis. I think we can get a state-\nment in there with respect for North Vietnamese oujtside\nVietnamese territory which is a sort of a code word for no troops.\nWhy don't\nP:\nWhak xx we say for the respect of the territory of both sides.\nK:\nThat's how this would be done.\nP:\nThat's right.\nK;\nAnd you can get a clau se in there that the demobilization should be\ndone within a three month reriod so that that's hooked to everything\nelse so if there's no demobilization, they don't have to have a committee.\nP:\nWell, I assume I wouldn't expect anything when you see him today\nbecause he's, I mean, they are obviously waiting Bunker doesn't\nknow anything anyway does he.\nK:\nNo. It was just his instinct.\nP:\nWell, from what we heard from that conversation yesterday, after what\nwe had told them, that was\nK:\nNo, that was--by that time it was paetty mild.\nP:\nWell, I know toward the end he began to back off, but he doesn't have\nanly authority. You know, you could tell by looking at him and the\nAmbassador, I think that/he and the Ambassador were making a deal\nwe would have it right now. Don't you agree?\nK:\nOh yes, no question. Not a question about it. Well, what they are\ngoing to do, Mr. President, is to wait until he gets the deal in Paris\nand then they'll accept it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\nP:\nYes, but then, you see, one of the reasons that I want this meeting\neven from my standpoint is that I want it to appear, I want to be sure\nthe Right Wing hears, and all say that we sold out and all that crap.\nOf course, you can brief and you can convince the --\nK:\nNo, the meeting.\nP:\nwith our enemies, the two of them. You understand that both the\nLeft and the Right would be disappointed with this. And because\nthe less for the reason that will want to find what is wrong with it,\nin any event, they have a vested interested in defeat, and the Right\nbecause they will honestly believe what Thieu says.\nK:\nWell, but I think it's going to go like the SALT agreement. That once\nwe got it, it's going to be an overwhelming--\nP:\nI think so too, but I meant the point is the symbolism is though of\nhis going along graciously is something. If he goes along ungraciously\nit's all right, but I think we should tell Duc that, look just going along\nhere but having statements leaked out that they are going along re-\nluctantly will make it more difficult for me to keep my commitments\nto get the Congress on military aid and the rest because the Congress\nwill look for excuses.\nK:\nThat's right. I'm going to tell them that it must be a settlement, that\nthe American people feel proud of--\nP:\nOh, yes, it must be a settlement that the American- that particularly--\ntheir strong supporters in the Congress, the Right Wing, so that they\nwill feel, will not be a let down. You see Henry, don't worry about the\nLeft. The hell with the Left and the Democrats and the rest. They\ndon' we could have the most great settlement in the world. Our\nconcern now is the Right here. It's a real problem. The thing to do\ntherefore is to get this across to this fellow that therefore that is why\nthey're going along has to be in some sort of a gracious manner or it\nwill be very difficult for us to get this money from the Congress. And\nit really will. If the South Vietnam drags its feet.\nK:\nRight. I will make these points.\nP:\nThere are a couple of other points. We will talk about it in the morning.\nTwo other points. When I talked to you about the Connally thing, I\nwant that on an urgent basis followed up on.\nK:\nI've got a call in to him Mr. President.\nP:\nMr. Connally. Fine. Because we want him to be basically without\nany portfolio because he represents various elements of both groups\nbut he is the guy that could put this deal together. I don't want it done\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7\nunder Commerce because if the government gets into it, we'll have\nto be choosing between Arnold--between Hammar and Elysee Gass,\nand we'll be in one hell of a spot. Id rather have Connally do the\nbrokering. Do you see my point.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nI want us to stay out of it totally. I don't want anybody in Commerce,\nI don't want anybody in the government to talk to any of the poeple on\nthis. You tell those people over there that.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nThe other thing is, on another note, I just gok want to be sure because\nI made a commitment for him to do it, I want to be sure that you let\nthe Chinese know that we would like to have Bob Hope's application\nbe considered.\nK:\nI've already done that, Mr. President.\nP:\nYou have. You see, Dave Mahoney got over there and that stirred\nHope up a little. He said what the hell\nK:\nNo, no, I've done it on a number of occasions. They've just answered\nus saying they can't do it now, but if he applies again in a few months\nthey'll consider it.\nP:\nAll right, well then\nK:\nI've gotten in touch with Hope already and said that we've made an\neffort--\nP:\nBe sure that he knows that you got to him at my request after my\nconversation that the Chinese had a special problem at the moment\nbut that we have another front burner and you personally will follow\nup. Will you do that.\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nP:\nCause he's been a great friend. I mean when all of the other stars\nout there came along reluctantly, he's been pushing it, and we've\njust got to go for our own people now.\nK:\nI couldn't agree more.\nP:\nOkay, we'll se you tomorrow.\nK:q\nRight.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon ALEXIS Johnson\nSee. Rogers / Mr. Kissinger\n10:22, December 1, 1972\nK:\nHello.\nJR3,\nYes, Henry, I'm returning your call.\nK:\nI just wanted to check with you on that idea I had that Al tried out on\nyou yesterday.\nJR.\nWell, I gave him--\nK:\nDo you think this will work? I mean deag legally.\nOh, legally, there's no problem with the thing. It's not so much a\nlegal problem as it is a protocol problem.\nK:\nNo, but how does it work in practice. Doesn't everybody signe every\ndocument.\nNo, no. You have four parties sign four documents, and they each\nexhange documents.\nK:\nSo in other words, each party then holds three documents.\nJR:\nEach party has three documents, that's right. I have this, now, all\nwritten out. I can get it right over to you.\nI would appreciate that very much, yes. Don't you think that's a\nrather ingenious formula.\nI think it's an ingenious way of doing it. My old friend here, Charlie\nBevins agrees, and he is the one that comes up with ideas like this.\nAnd I showed it to the Secretary this morning as well as to Bill\nDullivan and he sees no--\nK:\nBut just before you guys start leaking again we thought of the idea.\nYou guys thought of the formula.\nThat's right. I entirely agree.\nK:\nBefore it get started into the news papers how you saved us again.\nJR:\nOkay, all right, all right, all right.\nK:\nThe formula you think will work, then.\nJR:\nThe formula will work if the parties will buy it.\nK:\nWell I think it gives the communists three quarters of what they want.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nKJ:\nThe formula will work if they will buy it. Now it seems to me it\nsaves the South Vietnamese entirely. I don't see h; ow they could\nhave any objection to it. It's only the other side who could have any\nobjections to it. Now and what you can do of course--\nK:\nThe other side though can get our name on a PRG document and\nwe can then make a unilatetral statement saying we only recongize\nKJ:\nWe can do that. You know, each party can put virtually anything they\nwant into the preamble- mean they can word it in ways to suit them.\nThe essential thing is that they sign the substance, and exchange it.\nI can get this right over to you.\nK:\nI'd appreciate that.\nKJ:\nOkay. Henry regard to our other talk yesterday on the ticker\nK:\nThe Secretary talked--\nJ:\nOh, he has?\nK:\nAbout the possibility of Ambassador at Large.\nJ:\nWell, but\nK:\nAnd Saigon.\nJ:\nVietnam. I talked to my wife last night. Maybe it's the moth being\nattracted by the flame, but if this thing's going to hold together at all]\nand we should be able to see that shortly, I'd be glad to, we'd both\nbe glad to go back there. You know, if that's what the boss would like\nto have me do. It's going to be an interesting job.\nK:\nIt's going to be a God damned interesting job and it takes somebody\nwho knows us and who knows\nJ:\nYes, and I would be glad to go back there, assuming of course\nEllsworth wants to go which--\nK:\nYeah, he definitely wants to go. There's no question about it.\nJ:\nIf the thing holds together. If the thing falls apart completely, ob-\nviously there'd not be much po9nt in my staying around.\nK:\nBut our hope you know we want someone there who will hold it togethe r.\nJ:\nAnd I think maybe on that maybe I'd have something to contribute.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nK:\nI think you'd have a hell of a lot to contribute.\nJ:\nThey know me and they know my background. That might be some\nhelp to them also, so I'm prepared to do it, my wife is too. I'll\nhave to--a little problem I'll have to talk to my doctor about it\nand I might have to get out fairly frequently to a cooler climate, and\nthere'd be no golf or anything of that kind in that heat. But subject\nto that, and I'm going to talk to him today, I'd be prepared to take it\non. Now the Secretary's idea, I think, has some merit--an Ambassador\nat Large for the next couple of months while negotiating the and getting\nthings in place and all thattype of thing. But with it known that this\nis going to be my responsibility, Ellsworth staying on ab long as he\nwants to,my--\nK:\nEllsworth wants to leave at the end of January.\nJ:\nI'd like to have about 30 days leave before I go out.\nK:\nI'm sure we can extend him.\nJ:\nYes, I think that ought to work out. Well, all I wanted to pass on to\nyou is I tbld the Secretary this morning I'd be prepared to do this.\nK:\nGood, well I appreciate this, and I'll talk to the President.\nJ:\nSubject to my doctor, and I'm going to talk to him today, but I thxixox\nthink he'll let me do it if I handle things within reason.\nK:\nI'll talk to the President tomorrow.\nJ:\nAll right. Okay Henry I'll get this right over to you.\nK:\nRight.\nJ:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Peter Flanigan\n12/1/72\n11:02 a.m.\n(Tape began in middle)\nPF:\ncommitted to the Taiwan government that we would assemble\nthese Northrop planes in Taiwan.\nHK:\nNot if I can help it.\nPF:\nWell your guy Pickney--Piinkney--Pinkney\nHK:\nHe isn't mine--he's a State Department guy.\nPF:\nI understood he was NSC.\nHK:\nNo. I think so anway.\nPF:\nHe works for Holdridge.\nHK:\nOh really--\nPF:\nWe think this is a lousy deal from an economic point of view. If\nwe made a commitment of course we have to live up to that--\nHK:\nMel Laird has been pushing it but I frankly have been trying to drag\nit to be on January 20 and get it killed after he leaves.\nPF:\nWe've got it over here now, why don't we kill unless Pinckney\nclaimed that either you or the President considered this--and what\nis meant by sympathetic consideration is yes we'd do it.\nHK:\nBaloney.\nPF:\nBaloney?\nHK:\nYeh.\nPF:\nWe can't find anyone really who thinks we should do it.\nHK:\nLet me talk to Haig to see if there is any history there which I don't\nknow about.\nPF\"\nThe reason we're against it is it doesn't save us any money, it\ncosts the Taiwanese 10M bucks, but they want it because it puts\nthem in the airplane business. Northrop wants it because it ties\nthem to Taiwanese.\nHK:\nWell I don't want it because I don't want to drive Peking out of a\n.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nPF:\nI don't mind giving them back the airplanes but I don't for the\nlife of me see why we should--\nHK:\nNo, of course, they must get the airplanes.\nPF:\nBut we don't have to put another damn competent manufacturing\ncountry in the airplane business in competition with us.\nHK:\nYes.\nyou\nPF:\nWould/ask Al to give me an answer on it-- -\nHK:\nI'll get All to call you.\nPF:\nI'm late on it alreadyso I appreciate that.\nThank you.\nHK:\nOkay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nBob Toth/Mr. Kissinger\n1:37 p.m., December 1, 1972\nK:\nHello, Bob.\nT:\nI was just wondering if I would have a chance to see you down here\nor are you going to be really bushed?\nK:\nWell, it's not a question of being bushed\nI'm going to spend a lot\nof time with the President and I might leave right after that. But I'll\nkeep it in mind.\nT:\nOkay. Because it¹s kind of difficult at this point Iº11 tell you the\nproblem I have in doing this profile point is obviously the blueprint\nof your thinking pre-Administration is clear from what you've\nwritten. The question of how much of the tactics that have been used\ncan be ascribed to sort of your thinking. That is, did you follow\nout the tactics that you had thought would be effective or were these\nsignificantly modified as you went along?\nK:\nWith what?\nT:\nIn terms of Vietnam.\nK:\nYou mean from the beginning?\nT:\nYeah.\nK:\nYeah, that's an interesting question.\nT:\nYeah, you know, I conclude roughly that say 90% of what was laid\nout in your previous writings in terms of strategy.\nK:\nYeah.\nT:\nBut the tactics is kind of difficult. The other thing, Henry, was\nwhether or not you can give any guidance on the present situation.\nI gather the reports that it may be coming unglued are all wrong.\nK:\nYes.\nT:\nAnd was the Times story accurate? Because JCS was signed on\nyesterday to the settlement?\nK:\nI haven⁸t read the Times story.\nT:\nWell, the gist of it was that they were called together to ratify\nor to agree formally to the terms of the settlement that have now\nbeen worked out.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nBob Toth/Mr. Kissinger\n1:37 p.m., December 1, 1972\nK:\nI just don't want to discuss that.\nT:\nOkay. I'm kind of puzzled at all the time that you and of course\nthe President has spent with Phu Duc and it's either a good massage\nconference or something serious is up. I gather it's the former\nthough.\nK:\nWell, the Vietnamese are pretty time-consuming.\nT:\n[Laughter]\nK:\nNorth and South.\nT:\n[Laughter]\nK:\nIt s a great deal of the former.\nT:\nOf the former, right. Can we expect in terms of your meeting\non Monday that this is going to be a sort of a resumation of the final\nsession? Is that kind of phraseology\nK:\nThat's exactly right.\nT:\nHow long would you expect it to last?\nK:\nDare I\nsay three or four days.\nT:\nYou dare. [Laughter] And after that you're going to have to go to\nSaigon?\nK:\nThen we will have to see how it comes out. Okay, I've got to run.\nT:\nOkay. Thanks. Will you call me if you can make it?\nK:\nYeah.\nwgh.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n/\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\nContains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nGov. Connally/Mr. Kissinger\n1:47, Decembser 1, 1972\nC:\nHenry?\nK:\nHell, Mr. Secretary.\nC:\nDoctor, how are you?\nK:\nGood. I'm calling you about that gas thing that you discussed\nwith the President yesterday.\nC:\nRight, right.\nK:\nI wanted to get a clearer picture from you just what it was. I\nknow the gas project, but I didn't know exactly what your relation-\nship to it was.\nC:\nHenry, my relationship at the moment is that I'm sitting astride\ntwo different groups that are negotiating with the Russians. We've\ngot to, at all costs, try to keep the Russians from ripsawing these\ntwo groups of people.\nK:\nI couldn't agree more.\nC:\nAnd, so what I want to do and what the President suggested was\nthat to the effect, warn Dobrynin, in effect say that I was, for\nall practical purposes, the man that would say to Dobrynin how\nwhen we are going to function, vis a vis, these two groups of people.\nK:\nNow what are these two groups?\nC:\nThese two groups are, one is Texas Eastern Gas Transmission,\nand CINGO, Tennessee Gas Transmission, and Brown & Root--\nthat is one group. The other group is El Paso Natural Gas Company\nand they are joined with a minority interest by Dr. Hammar as\nOccidental Petroleum.\nK:\nWhat's the routes--one is in--are they both in the same field.\nC:\nNo, the contract started with the first group--the Texas Eastern\ngroup, trying to get both projects. Then the\nfield, and\nthe one in the western part of the country that they call an All Star\nproject.\nK:\nRight. I know them both. I negotiated the general framework\nwith Brezknev when I was there, so I know the---I haven't gotten\nin with the companies, of course.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nC:\nEll Paso then comes in and they are primarily interested in the\nfield with the JE apanese. Now the question is\nwhether or not we combine these two groups so that there are five\ncompanies operating in both fields, or whether or not it is better\nfor the United States entørest for one group, the Texas Eastern\ngroup, to take the North Star project, and the El Paso group to\ntake the Nutruske field.\nK:\nWell, I feel strongly about two things. One, we shouldnt be a bit\nsoft, secondly I would like to use this Cass deal enforce some\npolitical compliance with them.\nC:\nI understand that. I'm at the present time sitting on top of it, and\nI will keep you informed on everything that happens.\nK:\nAnd therefore I'd like to sort of stage these things to fit into our\npolitical stragegy. Only if this is a good argument to have one\nman in charge of it.\nC:\nAll right.\nK:\nI'd be delighted to talk to Dobrynin about this. Could we have a\ntalk too so that I can give you the political side of it. I'm not\ninterested at all in the commercial side.\nC:\nYes, sir. I'll come up whenever you get back.\nK:\nGood, let's do it that way, and you can be sure that I will make\nclear to Dobrynin whom to deal with.\nC:\nOkay, that's great. We'll phase it in, that's precisely the purpose\nof my visit.\nK:\nGood.\nC:\nSo we can phase it in so you can use whatever leverage there was\nfor your political purposes.\nK:\nI'll call you the day I get back.\nC:\nThat's fine. Thanks Henry.\nK:\nGood, bye.\nC:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nMarvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger\n2:15, December 1, 1972\nK:\nHello.\nMK:\nHenry, Hi. I just wanted to ask a question or two of you. Could\nyou tell me at this point--I can't believe the CBS report out of\nSaigon this morning.\nHK:\nWhat is it?\nMK:\nWell, there was a report that Dick Wagner did quoting South\nVietnamese sources to the effect that we have--going to put one\nof those proposals to Thieu that either he signs or he gets no\naid, and it just sounded wrong to me, I just wanted to double\ncheck with you.\nHK:\nI just don't want to go into the discussions between us and the\nSouth Vietnamese.\nMK:\nDo you have any sense of greater confidence now that you have\nSaigon on board.\nK:\nI think we are making progress, yes.\nMK:\nIs there any prospect in your mind, Henry, of a--of we signing\nwithout them.\nK:\nI don't think--that's going to happen. I don't think that's probable.\nMK:\nRight. Is it possible to have something by the end of this year?\nK:\nDefinitely. I mean definitely possible.\nMK:\nOkay. Do you--has the North ever accepted the principle of with-\ndrawal?\nK:\nWell, I would have to go through a very complicated analysis of\nprovisions which I can't do. Withdrawal has not been part of any\nAmerican proposal since October 1970. All those were joint\nproposals with the GVN. You are talking here about a ceasefire,\nnot a final settlement. I think the total accumulation of the provisions\nof this agreement are bound to bring about a substantial reduction of\nNorth's forces in the South.\nMK:\nAnd that is something that abviously they would not have gotten on\nboard if they didn't intend to carry out, do you feel?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nK:\nWell, of course they can violate it. In that case, adding one more\nprovision that's going to be violated doesn't help any.\nMK:\nBut, how would you explain the problem of not getting the South on\nboard if the question of withdrawal is not really the key?\nK:\nI think the real problem is the psychological problem of their\nsuddenly being left by themselves. You know, an attempt has\nbeen entirely different from what they've gotten use to over 12\nyears.\nMK:\nThat's right.\nK:\nI think that's at the heart of the problem, but that cannot be allowed.\nMK:\nThat's one of the things I remember you saying is that one of the\nmost difficulty things would be to persuade them that they can exist\nwithout it.\nK:\nThat's right. That's the key to the problem. I mean I think that\nis the essence much more than any particular provision because if\nit weren't one there'd be another that is objected to.\nMK:\nRight. Henry, are you likely to try and initial anything next week.\nK:\nNo, no.\nMK:\nAnd you are still planning to go to Saigon, aren't you.\nK:\nThere are good signs of it.\nMK:\nYeah. Listen Collingwood is going to be in Paris next week and I\nthink he's going to take the liberty of calling you. I'm just alerting\nyou.\nK:\nGood.\nMK:\nGood.\nK:\nGood, Marvin, and I'll call you when I get back.\nMK:\nGood luck, Henry.\nK:\nThank you, bye.\nMK::\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n2:36, December 1, 1972\nP:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHow did your meeting go.\nwith\nK:\nMr. President I had about a three hour meeting NN these guys\nand the first two hours went fine. We were talking about how\nto implement a ceasefire, and went into detail and answered a\nlot of questions. I'm going to see them again at 3:30 this after-\nnoon with Intelligence and DOD people. In the last hour, we got\nback to the - what they told you Wednesday and what they told you\nyesterday.\nP:\nYeah. We said that we'd just go ahead and they will go their way.\nK:\nWell, they don't ever quite say this. They just say it's going to\nbe impossible as long as there are North Vietnamese forces\nthere. I'm beginning to worry, that they may have psyched\nthemselves to a point where they just can't get it off. There is\nnothing inherently in this agreement that can't be carried off.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nAnd we did make progress in working out details of the ceasefire\narrangement. I've checked with they actually haven't had any\nnew instructions, so they are probably just following their old\nbrief.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nThey've leaked to the newspapers that you've given them an ultimatum.\nIt was on CBS this morning.\nP:\nUh huh. Well you can't tell, it might have come from other sources\ntoo.\nK:\nNo, they said it came from the Pallace. At any rate, it came from\nSaigon.\nP:\nUh huh. Well--the question is whether anybody should be sent out\nthere.\nK:\nI don't think so. I think if they can't take it from you there's no\none else who can be more convincing.\nP:\nYeah.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nK:\nI think the only other think that can happen now is a meeting between\nyou and Thieu. I don't think any lower level- -\nP:\nYeah, but a meeting before we make the deal?\nK:\nI think a meeting before after the next round with the North\nVietnamese, but before we conclude the agreement.\nP:\nYeah, but, you mean where he basically sits down and haggles about\nthis whole thing.\nK:\nNo, no.\nP:\nYou agree we can't do that.\nK:\nI agree completely.\nP:\nI mean, there is no way--\nK:\nNo way.\nP:\nMaybe he just wouldn't have a meeting if there is nothing further\nto negotiate.\nK:\nWhat I think is going to happen, Mr. President, is that they are\ngoing to let us make the deal, they won't take any responsibility\nfor it and after it is concluded they'll join saying they had no choice.\nIn that context, I think he'll meet you. It's not a very--\nP:\nWell, you've got to tell them that this seriously jeopardize my\nefforts to get these adequate aid programs.\nK:\nWell, I --\nP:\nThat is, I can--to get the Congress to pass AID is always hard.\nBut if they go along with this in a way that it appears that theybare\nnegative, they are just going to play in the hands of their Congressional\nenemies.\nK:\nI've told them that it is absolutely essential that we end this in a\nway that Americans can be proud of it and feel that something\nworthwhile was accomplished. Then we have an interest in pre-\nserving it. But if they go along with it in this grudging attitude\nthey are going to make it very tough for us to support them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nNot because of intention, but because of the Congress.\nP:\nWhat does Haig think about all this\nK:\nHe's totally convinced that we should go ahead as we are going.\nP:\nSees no other choice, huh?\nK:\nNo. He's concerned about the fact as I am that they may be\nflacking themselves too much. What they did up to a certain point\nto extort better terms made sense, but it's reaching now the point\nwhere they are doing damage only to themselves.\n(change of tapes\n)\nP:\nthat if we don't get what they have laid down as their\nminimal conditions, that we then would continue the war, and that's\nan impossibility. We have told them. It's made so clearly, and\nit happens also to be totally true, no way we can continue it. No\nway. If the North Vietnamese come along on those three funda-\nmental points, which they have done, unless they back off from the\npeople in South Vietnam\nK:\nI don't think they will. Well, they have backed off but I think we\ncan get that back.\nP:\nUh huh. Well, what are you going to tell them at 3:30?\nK:\nAt 3:30 we are just going over ceasefire maps.\nP:\nOh, for Christ sakes. As far as putting it out that I gave them an\nultimatum, I---\nK:\nWe denied that.\nP:\nWell, we denied that, but I mean, well we did give them an ultimatum.\nBut my point is that as far as putting it out I don't think that hurts\nyou a little in dealing with Hanoi.\nK:\nNo, that helps with Hanoi.\nP:\nThe only problem it does, it makes it difficult with our hawks here\nat home. I'm not sure but Mel Laird is convinced, and he really is,\nthat all the hawks, Jerry Ford too, they want to get it over now.\nWe don't have hawk support--I mean as far as Congress is concerned\nyou've got a few nutheads--Agnew, did you see his letter.\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nWhat did you think of that?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nK:\nWell, he'\nP:\nThe one that this POW wife sent in.\nK:\nHe just isn't very bright.\nP:\nBut you will talk to him, and\nK:\nAbsolutely, I will talk to him before I\nP:\nTotally abort on this. He's to know that,I do that is important\nif you can get him this afternoon, Henry, and say now look, the\ndeal is made, it's a good one--so that he can talk positively to\nthe hawks. Will you do that?\nK:\nI'll call him thi;s afternoon, Mr. President\nP:\nThat will be helpful. Well, don't get discouraged--\nK:\nOh, no, I think we are going to make it.\nP:\nWe've been going around and around, and My God, I must say\nI don't know what more we could do to--\nK:\nWell they didn't survive for 2000 years by being easy to get along\nwith.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nI think we are going to get it. But--\nP:\nYeah, but getting him reluctantly, Henry, I am very serious in\nsaying that we--when we have to present those AID requests, it's\ngoing to be tough. You know what I mean, it hinges on the agree-\nment.\nthat\nK:\nWell if the human language can convey/, we 've done it. But I think\nthe trouble is that these two fellows here are convinced, but is this\nlittle punk kid in the Pallace--\nP:\nHave him to come over.\nK:\nWell, we asked him to come over, he wouldn't come. He went as\nfar as Paris and brought his instructions and then he went home.\nI checked with Bunker again and he thinks that it's absolutely the\nbest we could have gotten. In fact, better than he thought we would\nget.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nP:\nUh huh. Did we talk to this kid.\nK:\nNo. This kid is really, that's a real tough case. He's also very\nyoung.\nP:\nWell.\nK:\nTwenty-nine years old, he's sufdenly been elevated, he was a press\nofficer and he d suddenly becomes a key adviser.\nP:\nYeah. I wonder if Thieu can't be so foolish to think that he's going\nto that I don't mean what I say.\nK:\nOh, no, I've made that again clear to them. I think--\nP:\nYou should also make it clear this afternoon that it is very painful\nfor me to have to take these positions. But I've never said anything\nthat I don't mean. Never.\nK:\nWell, he's going back tomorrow and he'll be talking to Thieu\npersonally. I believe that by the time we have this settlement\nworked out with the North Vietnamese next week, these fellows\nare going to come along.\nP:\nBut then, they ought to be on the basis that they--just as soon as\nit's worked out that he and I meet, but we meet for the purpose\nof our arranging -- for what purpose do we meet? For me to talk\nabout the commitments?\nK:\nThat's right, and to discuss future of our relations there.\nP:\nFuture of our relations and also to discuss our interpretations of\nthe agreement.\nK:\nThat's right. That part, of course, couldn't be made public.\nP:\nOnly after we sign it.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nI know, but I figure the way I interpret the agreement, I think\nthat's the point you should make. That would be the purpos e of it.\nWe cannot change it. We'll discuss how we are going to interpretedx\nit.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nAnd that's very important. Saigon and the rest--I want to be sure\nthat Saigon--hell that's all they need to know, like they raise the\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\npoint where the agreement doesn't provide for basically trip wires,\nGod, it's full of trip wires.\nK:\nIt's full of trip wires, that's nonsense.\nP:\nHenry, let me ask you a question on another subject. Tricia\nwas talking to Haig and Haig was raising questions about her\nincluding Egypt, Jordan and Israel in their trip because of the\nParis problems, frankly they don't have to go there, they'd like\nto - do you think there is a serious problem, do you think they\nshould not do it?\nK:\nWell, there isn't one in Israel, but that's a good point about Egypt.\nP:\nWell, they can't go to Isreel without going to the other. I don't\nwant them to go to one without the other.\nK:\nNo. They can't go to Israel without going to the Arab countries.\nLet me just check with the CIA\nP:\nWell, I think Haig has done that, but---\nK:\nI think that is a problem. I don't think we should take a one percent\nchance of kidnapping, or--\nP:\nWell, actually we've told them not to - why don't we just tell them\nnot\nK:\nI think it would be better, Mr. President. Jordan would be great\nif they wanted to go there, it's a spectacular place anyway. And\nthat wouldn't have this difficulty.\nP:\nOkay, byeHenry.\nK:\nThank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n6:02, December 1, 1972\nP:\nHi Henry.\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHave you had the meeting yet?\nK:\nYes, we've just finished it.\nP:\nI figured it would be an hour too long.\nK:\nIt's tough going.\nP:\nHow does it stand, the same?\nK:\nWell went over the details of the ceasefire, and that's working\nbeautifully.\nP:\nOh, yes, I know, but that's not a problem.\nK:\nBut then at the end of it I told him about our telephome conversation,\nand spoke to him very seriously, and I said to him again it was\nsomething that the Americans have to feel some pride in. He gave\nme the same song and dance, that they can't provide the settlement\nand they won't sign it and--my impression & is that he hadn't got\nany new instructions and he's just repeating his old ones. At any\nrate, we haven't picked up any new instructions and we usually get\nthem.\nP:\nWell, okay.\nK:\nI think, Mr. President, we have no cho;ice but to do the very best\nwe can in Paris next week and then--you've done everything we can.\nI mean it's a tragedy.\nP:\nAnybody else advising--have you talked to Laird.\nK:\nNo, I can't.\nP:\nWell, I don't know if it would mean much. I wonder if we should\nLaird there ostensibly to check the ceasefire?\nK:\nWell, we can do it. I just don't see how---\nP:\nWell, my talking to him is one thing--I don't know. I think it's\ngetting the message through to this fellow himself.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nK:\nWell--\nP:\nBut, I'm getting the cold turkey message that politically we cannot\nwheel the deal unless they want to go along and that's it. Because\nif they are going to @&*¢ on it, we are goi;ng to have to turn on\nhim. It's going to be unpleasant, but we'll just have to do it.\nI can't go down to that Congress and say, here they won't sign the\nagreement but we want $4 Billion for AID, Henry, it won't work.\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nAs much as we would want it to.\nK:\nOf course, I think also they are playing chicken with us, Mr.\nPresident. I think--I frankly don't see what Laird can add to\nwhat you've said, and it might give an impression of great in-\nsecurity. Nothing could be--I mean, more forceful of more\nominous than you have said, and --\nP:\nWell, shall I write him another note.\nK:\nNo. I think we ought to ride with where we are now\nP:\nUh huh. Well, do you think you'll be down tonight, will you?\nK:\nYes. We can think about it and talk about it tomorrow.\nP:\nFine. What time will you be in in the morning?\nK:\nI'll be in tonight. So any time you want me in the morning.\nP:\nWell, suppose you--you'll be at the 240 house I think, so that will\ngive you a little security and then you come--suppose we say, what\ntime do you think you'll be up because I have no problem, I have\nnothing on in the morning.\nK:\nOh, I'm sure I'll be up by 8:30.\nP:\n8:30, well, let's say 9:30, how's that?\nK:\nFine.\nP:\n9:30, that give you a little time to sleep in a little, get ready for\nthe bout next week.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nWell, as a matter of fact, we've gone the extra mile on the thing.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nI suppose that if you want to regain, our problem is we've got\nthese guys out on the hook too early, and then had to but how\nwete we to know.\nK:\nThat's probably true. Although we got from the North, I think,\nwhat they ever going to give.\nP:\nNot going to get any more in the way of a settlement, no. Because\nthey can't give any more than that and survive. They've got a\nproblem too.\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nIncidentally, I hope you didn't give to him that backup position that\nyou think we might try to negotiate.\nK:\nNo, no.\nP:\nThen sign a separate agreement, or one without **** that what\nyou have in mind.\nK:\nWell they will singn a different preamp.\nP:\nDid I get the preamble?\nK:\nNo, I haven't done that yet.\nP:\nWell, that's something we can sort of hold in reserve.\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nAnd you were through with this the fact that it's going to make\nit very difficult to get the aid. I mean, even if they go along\nreluctantly it's going to make it tough. How does it stand at the\npresent time with regard to his meeting me or what have you.\nK:\nI told them we had to have an answer and he just says he hasn't\nany instructions. And I gave him the\nP:\nWell, look, we are not going to meet him if he's going to be re-\nluctant. Dont't you agree?\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nP:\nOn that score, I imagine that we've just got to cold it right out,\nbecause I think that the American people when they see those three\nitem my only thought is that one call you might make if you've\ngotten Agnew yet by any chance?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nK:\nNo. But I'll call him within the next hour.\nP:\nYes.\nK:\nI have talked to Connally.\nP:\nYes, oh you did, good, on that other matter.\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nAnd so, with regard to Agnew I just want him on board, just tell\nhim what decision-- if there is any of that whining just say, look,\nit's been decided. Will you do that.\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nP:\nNow the other point is--the only other one is worth talking to is\nLaird just so that he reinfores the political judgment on it, you see.\nNow, here it is, what is your opinion on the political side.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nDont' you think so?\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nFine. At our meeting of course, Abrams just sat there like a\nclam as usual. Does he ever say anything.\nK:\nNo, he's not the most articulate nor the most heroic guy.\nP:\nI don't mind the articulate, but I do mind the heroics.\nK:\nHe did the same thing in Saigon. We got him out there, and he\nsat there like ta toad, he made one intervention after half an hour\nwhich was slightly off the subject.\nP:\nI'll be damned. Too bad Haig isn't there now, isn't it.\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nWe made a mistake there.\nK:\nWell, no, we couldn't make him feel--\nP:\nI know, but yes, we could have. We could do a little--\nK:\nNo, I think he should be made Chairman when Moorer leaves.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nP:\nYep, yeah, we jumped him right off.\nK:\nI think so.\nP:\nWell, don't get discouraged. My own feeling is that this just one\nof those things like the others, that it's really no more difficult\nin a sense to me than--we know what is right and we know the\nother side is--that's the way it is, we get better as best we can\nand we fly.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nI think as far as the American people are concerned, most of them\ndon't give one damn.\nK:\nWell, Mr. President, if you explain this agreement to the American\npeople and say they don't come along, and just bleeding hard, we've\ndone everything we can, we have to go it alone. I think you'll get\nvery great support.\nP:\nWell the support will be also to drop him.\nK:\nWell, that's what I mean.\nP:\nThat's the problem, isn't it?\nK:\nAnd it won't be that we have sold out, we have maintained our honor.\nIt's a disaster.\nP:\nWell, I can't believe looking at the facsts as they are that he can\nallow it to go to that point.\nK:\nNo, or that his colleagues will.\nP:\nIs Bunker just in his dotage, is that the problem.\nK:\nBunker has no real stroke there.\nP:\nWell I think--\nK:\nThe real problem I think, Mr. President, is that Thieu has no\nconfidence that he can win a political contest.\nP:\nI understand.\nK:\nAnd therefore, he--\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\nP:\nAbrams saw that. He doesn't think he can walk alone.\nK:\nTherefore he wants to be able--what he needs is unconditional\nsurrender. A smashing victory. It isn't a victory, it is a com-\npromise.\nP:\nIt is a victory. We know that, it's a victory in terms of everything\nthey've insisted on before.\nenergegic\nK:\nAny/leader can play it into a victory. When I went there at the\nend of October, this is where--we would welcome this and play\nit into a victory.\nP:\nParicularly when he was going to stay in power.\nK:\nThat's right. And this is no different from any of the provisions\nwe've made before. It isn't that--\nP:\nWell, I think, that--did Buckley come through with a column or\nnot, are any of these people on our side, are any of them?\nK:\nWell Alsop did a few weeks ago, Don Rhodes--not very influential\n-wrote a very good one today, and Buckley told me he would\nwrite one\nP:\nWell, get a hold of Joe and tell him he's got to write a tough one.\nK:\nBut Joe's in China, won't be back for a while.\nP:\nWell get a hold of Jim and tell him he's got to write a tough one.\nK:\nOkay.\nP:\nGet Wilson--use your friends.\nK:\nI think we'll manage it, Mr. President.\nP:\nWell, we'll see. The main thing is that we'll just continue to go on\nand you keep in good shape, get down here and get a good night's\nsleep. Incidentally 9:30, if you don't wake up, we'll make it 10:00.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nWe'll say between 9:30 and 10:00 o'clock. Bye, Henry.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRoy Jenkins/Mr. Kissinger\n7:55 p.m., December 1, 1972\nK:\nHow are you? How nice to hear from you.\nJ:\nHow nice of you to call back. I'm very well. How are you?\nK:\nYou always come when I'm in a crisis.\nJ:\nYou're in a crisis are you?\nK:\n[Laughter] No, no, I mean --\nJ:\nYou've been in one for some time.\nK:\nLast time you were here was during the India/Pakistan uproar.\nJ:\nI was indeed and we dined at the Bruces.\nK:\nYeah.\nJ:\nYou're going away I imagine on Monday, are you?\nK:\nSunday. But you'll be up here next week -- down here next weekend\nwon't you?\nJ:\nI'm going to be down here next weekend. Would you be back by then?\nK:\nWell, If I'm not, I'll be in deep trouble.\nJ:\nWell, I hope very much I might see you then. I tell you what -- I called\nbecause I had a word with David Bruce in London last week.\nK:\nYes.\nJ:\nAnd asked him what he thought and he said he had spoke to me since\nI last called you and I hadn't seen the President for about 2 1/2 years.\nK:\nYes.\nJ:\nAnd I wondered whether there was any chance of having a short talk\nwith him. I would more or. less like to.talk to him about how he sees\nsome\npolicy now in relation with the EC.\nK:\nWell, and that would be during the period that you are down here.\nthe\nJ:\nWell, I would in / normal way be down from Friday evening until\nSunday evening next week.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nRoy Jenkins/Mr. Kissinger\n7:55 p. m., December 1, 1972\nK:\nYes.\nJ:\nAnd, of course, I would come down especially during the week if\nthat were easier for him.\nK:\nYes. Well, let me raise it with him. He's for all practical purposes\nin retreat right now.\nJ:\nI know it. It's not an easy time and\nK:\nNo, but I think he should see you. How long will you be in the\ncountry?\nJ:\nI'll be in the country until next Sunday night. That's 9 days from now.\nI\nI must fly back to London on the quarter of eight o'clock plane on\nSunday night.\nK:\nWell, let me see what I can do.\nJ:\nSunday week night. And obviously if one could do it the weekend when\nI'm in Washington, that would be better but equally I would come down.\nK:\nWell, I will see what I can do.\nJ:\nBut I haven't seen him for nearly three years and would like to very\nmuch. Particularly on this particular aspect at the present time.\nThank you very much.\nK:\nRight. He's not at this moment focusing on substance as much as\nhe will in another week or so.\nJ:\nNo, quite. No, he's focussing on appointments.\nK:\nExactly.\nJ:\nBut I hope very muc h it's possible to see you.\nK:\nOh, certainly Yes, I've planned on.\nJ:\nGood. Look forward very much then. And I'll be here at this\nnumber, which you got in New York City. Except I go away tomorrow\nnight to stay with the Harrimans in the country for 24 hours.\nK:\nGood.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 3 -\nRoy Jenkins/Mr. Kissinger\n7:55 p.m., December 1, 1972\nJ:\nFrom tomorrow morning till Sunday afternoon.\nK:\nGood. Well, I will of course be gone most of next week.\nJ:\nRight. Okay. Well, thank you very much.\nK:\nBut I'll leave word though.\nJ:\nThank you so much.\nK:\nRight. Bye.\nJ:\nBye.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nJerry Sche cter/Mr. Kissinger\n8:00 p. m., December 1, 1972\nS:\nHenry.\nK:\nThey're naming a street after me in Saigon.\nS:\n[Laughter]\nK:\nDid you know that?\nS:\nAh -- Where? That's great! That's great. Well, the Editors in\ntheir ultimate wisdom and judgment have decided to name the President\nand you as men of the year.\nK:\nJointly?\nS:\nYeah.\nK:\nO-h-h-h-h-h.\nS:\nYeah, really!\nK:\nWell, I didn't really want this job after all.\nS:\n[Laughter] I think we can do it --\nK:\nCan you sort of make my picture infinitesimal?\nS:\n[Laughter] Well, we'll as you say, we'll do it with dignity and --\nK:\nCan I be on a horse?\nS:\n[Laughter] Oh, you're terrific. Yeah, I think so. Riding into the\nsunset.\nK:\nI can tell you -- as I told you yesterday or as I told somebody\nyesterday -- there's one part of a horse's anatomy that'I've learned\nvery well here.\nI thought that was\nS:\n[Laughter] Yeah,\n!\na pretty quick recovery there. Well, I\nK:\nWell, I appreciate it. You know, I'm very flattered; it isn't going to\nhelp me here but -- to put it mildly.\nS:\nWell, I talked with Ron and Hugh talked with Ron and I guess he'll --\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nJerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger\n8:00 p.m., December 1, 1972\nK:\nHave you talked to Ron already?\nS:\nYeah.\nK:\nWhat does he say?\nS:\n[Laughter] Well, --\nK:\nWhat does he say, good\n?\nS:\nHuh?\nK:\nHe said we didn't like him anyway.\nS:\n[Laughter] No, --\nK:\nWhat did Ron really say?\nS:\nWell, just between us, huh?\nK:\nYes, of course.\nS:\nWell, you know, he thinks that there's only one man over in his\nWhite House and you know, it doesn't quite put the thing in the right\nperspective. I explained to him that --\nK:\nYou know, I would prefer that too.\nS:\nI explained to him that, you know, that you two are the most exciting\ncombination and that also the cover would deal with the President's\nre-election and his victory and the domestic reasons behind it but it\nwould also deal with your relationship and, you know, how he has given\nyou his proxy and some things but, you know, it would make it clear that\nhe's the President and you're his adviser but it would also go into the\nwhole range of foreign policy and issues throughout the year and China,\nRussia, and/Vietnam the peace thing, that's really the story of the year.\nAnd the two of you in combination together is really what's changed things\nthis year.\nK:\nYeah. Well, I'm flattered, Jerry, but it would make my life easier\nif it weren¹t.\nS:\nYeah. I'm not unaware of the --\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 3 -\nJerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger\n8:00 p.m., December 1, 1972\nK:\nIt's going to make my life unshirted hell.\nS:\nNo, it won't really.\nK:\nCan you at least write the goddamn thing to make my subordinate\nposition clear?\nS:\nYes, sir, really. I mean, that will be very clear. And that's really\nwhy I wanted to get to you because I know - - I just thought that if I could\nassure you and reassure you that it's going to be done in a tasteful and\ndignified way which I hope expresses --\nK:\nLook, I'm enormously flattered and pleased but you know the atmosphere\nit courts --\nS:\nYes, sir. Well, [laughter] -- I think we'll be able to work it out and\nthere will be a letter coming down from Krunwald (sp?) I think that will\nexplain, you know, just exactly how we see this to make it clear that\nit's the President who is after all the decision-maker and policy- maker\nand as you say, your position is subordinate to his.\nK:\nRight.\nS:\nBut it's still a very exciting relationship.\nK:\nOh, it's a, you know, good relationship.\nS:\nI think that's what we want to emphasize and talk about it in terms of,\nyou know, how you've carried out his policy.\nK:\nWell, I guess I better give another interview to put things in perspective.\nS:\n[Laughter] Well, I hope we'll get a chance to talk at some point later\non, huh?\nK:\nRight.\nS:\nGood. Thanks a lot.\nK:\nOkay. Are you going to be over there next week?\nS:\nYes, sir.\nK:\nGood. Well, I'll see you then.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 4 -\nJerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger\n8:00 p. m., December 1, 1972\nS:\nGood. Thanks a lot, Henry.\nK:\nBye.\nS:\nAnd really rest assured, I think we can do it in a way that I think\neverybody's pleased.\nK:\nGood.\nS:\nOkay.\nK:\nBye.\nwgh.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHedley Donovan/Mr. Kissinger\n8:30 p.m., December 1, 1972\nK:\nHedley, sorry to bother you.\nD:\nVery well.\nK:\nI had a call from Jerry Schecter who told me that Time is going to make\nthe President and me joint men of the year.\nD:\nWe've talked about that some, yes.\nK:\nAnd while I'm really extremely flattered, I think anything that could be\ndone to avoid that honor would really help me enormously.\nD:\n[Laughter]\nK:\nYou know, it's rather delicate relationship.\nD:\nOh-h-h.\nK:\nI don't know whether that's a proper request to make.\na\nD:\nWell, it's proper point to register but I'll have to reserve some thought\nabout it. I have to confess to you I'm the originator of the thought.\nK:\n[Laughs] Well, I'm touched by it, Hedley. I really am very touched by\nit. I think it will create a very complex situation here and that is before\nI've talked to anybody. I don't know what their view is.\nD:\nI'm sorry, Henry, what?\nK:\nThat is before I have talked to anybody. I mean, no one has mentioned\nit to me.\nD:\nNo.\nK:\nBut I have a pretty good estimate of what the impact will be.\nD:\nWell, I think it's quite an accurate statement.\nK:\nWell, I'm in no position to judge that. I'm more thinking of what it will\ndo to my future usefulness.\nD:\nWell, I'm not sure I share that point of view.\nK:\nWell, maybe on the outside. On the outside probably not.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nHedley Donovan/Mr. Kissinger\n8:30 p.m., December 1, 1972\nD:\nNo, no, no, no; I don't think that.\nK:\nWell, I think you understand my point, Hedley.\nD:\nOh, I do but I also think that the President takes great pride in your\npresence in his company and performances with some reason.\nK:\nWell, I have not had a chance -- You know, I don't know what his reaction\nis or will be. I don't even know whether he knows about it.\nD:\nI'm not sure that he does either.\nK:\nBut all of my immediate colleagues who know about it think that his pride\nhas limites, if it takes that form.\nD:\nHe had it last year.\nK:\nI beg your pardon.\nD:\nHe had it last year.\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nTo the extent that he would be a very logical candidate this year. You're\nso intermingled with that --\nK:\nWell, I'm not, you know --\nD:\nappeal to the idea of the both.\nK:\nHedley, I'm sure you've never had this sort of request before.\nD:\nWell, perhaps once before. [Laughter]\nK:\nWell, I want you to know that I'm really very flattered but that if it should\ntranspire that he would be the sole man of the year, I would not be offended.\nD:\nNo, I'm sure you would not be,\nK:\nTo put it mildly. Indeed I would be much relieved.\nD:\nHow would you feel about the other way?\nK:\nOh, no; that would now be impossible.\nD:\n[Laughter]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 3 -\nHedley Donovan/Mr. Kissinger\n8:30 p.m., December 1, 1972\nK:\nI don't know how I could disavow it but I would have --\nD:\nit is not up to you.\nK:\nHumm?\nD:\nFortunately, it is not up to you.\nK:\nYeah. No, the other way would really be very painful.\nD:\nWell, the press is notoriously irresponsible.\nK:\nWell, I think I've made my point. It's not really a decision that I can\nmake.\nD:\nThe best way to get off, which I hope doesn't happen, is for the\nsettlement not to be wrapped up.\nK:\n[Laughter] Well, you've given me an idea!\nD:\n[Laughter]\nK:\nOkay.\nD:\nI'm sure your sense of public interest will rise above that,\nK:\nWell, I'll tell you I carried it beyond the election but it's --\nD:\nYep, you did.\nK:\nNo, I think we -- Unless both Vietnamese parties take leave of their\nsenses completely, we really ought to wrap it up now.\nD:\nYeah. Well, it would be wonderful.\nK:\nIt's just too close.\nD:\nIt must be desired.\nK:\nYeah, well, we're down to really issues that are so small compared\nto what we started with.\nD:\nOh, yeah.\nK:\nThat it's almost, you know, it would be one of these tragic jokes almost\nif it failed now. Well, I don't expect that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 4 -\nHedley Donovan/Mr Kissinger\n8:30 p. m., December 1, 1972\nD:\nnow, Henry.\nK:\nI don't think it will happen. In fact, we have to bring both of them\nalong simultaneously and that takes a little time.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nGood, Hedley. Let me know when you next come down.\nD:\nI will. Thank you for calling, Henry.\nK:\n[Laughter] Thank you for the thought!\nD:\nWe'll take it under advisement.\nK:\nGood.\nThank you.\nD:\nRight.\nBye, bye.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\n11:50 p.m. 12-6-72\nKennedy/ \"D\"\nK: Hello.\nD: Yes, Good Evening sir.\nK: Good evening sir, how are you? I am sorry to be troubling you\nagain.\nD: Well, that is alright.\nK: We seem to do all our business at night. Sir, 1 have another message\nwhich Henry wanted me to give to you. Can I read it so you can write\nit down?\nD: Is it a long one?\nK: Well, not too long, a little bit.\nAt this point Col Kennedy dictated HAKTO 18 to D as follows:\nBEGIN QUOTE:\nAt tomorrow's session both sides are committed to presenting their\nminimum requirements. It is now obvious that Hanoi will attempt to\nextract major changes for any changes which the U.S. seeks. They invariably\nreact in an extremely imbalanced way to require modifications which alter\nthe fundamental character of the agreement. Nevertheless the U.S. must\nachieve the following rick-bottom alterations:\n(1) obtain the proper Vietnamese phasse for \"administrative structure.\"\n(2) Provide for the establishment of a target date of three months for\nthe demobilization provision to provide the period during which the parties\nwill do their utmost to resolve this question. This will make this provision\nparallel to the ones covering the other tasks included in paragraphs 8 (c)\n(South Vietnamese prisoners) and 12 (a) (resolution of the political problems.)\n(3) Provision of some reference in the agreement which relates to the\nintegrity of the territories of North and South Vietnam or establishes the\nprinciple of the non-use of force between the North and South during the\npost-settlement period.\n(4) Provide for the implementation of a ceasefire in Laos within 10 days\nvice 30 days.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nThe above are the rock-bottom U.S. positions. Failure to achieve\nany of them must result in the termination of the talks. These are a\ndrastically distilled final position which is unalterable and cannot be\nsubject to modification. Nor can we accept counterbalancing changes\ndemanded by the other side which fundamentally modify other features\nof the agreement.\nEND QUOTE:\nK:\nNow lot me see If I can check that 30 days business.\nD:\nAnd I will read this back for myself, okay. I will just read\nthrough.\n[pause]\nK:\nHello\nD:\nPm just reading for myself, just once again with out loud,\nbecause out loud I don't understand what I am reading.\n[pause]\nWhen is It are they to presenting their views, ahh, this is\nposition\neither point, or be does it for observations.\nI don't understand it, the first sentence.\n25:\nK:\nBoth sides are committed to presenting their minimum require-\nments ?\nD:\nYes, that means that either one to present their minimum\nrequirements, or Menry does have some reservations?\nK:\nNo, I think he is saying this, that each will do this.\nD:\nOh, they agree that one. [pause]\nYes, I read it. Well quite frankly I could do this way. # Except\nfor number one, all that we will discuss with me -- for me and\nfor my government we'll do the completely in your paragraph.\n1 don't think that for you as much as\na problem or not.\nBut we can discuss this paragraph with\n* Eb--\nK:\nExcept for the first one.\nD:\nYes, so for me a new one in this sense that I must prepare to\neven give a command because I have to look in\nand look how they are. We can discuss with him the phrase.\nSo I give for my government on anything but\nWe discussed as I mentioned to you fourth paragraph.\nK:\nYes, the four points.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nD:\nAlso, reasons - there really is only one. Just one and very\nindirect way it is paragraph 2 bothers. But it all accounts\nwith\nYou see It in a different context.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nSo, my present reservations, of course I will report to my\ngovernment what you just mention for them to know. Second\nI am sure It will be rather difficult for them to act on this\nparticular message because neithers they nor I know anything\nspecific, I should say, because they have to consult. And\nthey will be in touch with\n.\nIt is more difficult.\nBecause on a\nsomething at this stage, everything\nwas clear, I got remind them what was told by Henry and they\nalready knew everything by heart.\nK:\nYes,\nD:\nThis is a little bit more complicated you see, You understand\nnow we are in at discussion of the questions we didn't even discuss\nwith you at all.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nI would like you to understand with Henry.\nM\nYes.\nD:\n1 promise to send It to Moscow but on the other hand it will be\nmuch more difficult for my leaders to Micht look now because\nfor them this particular paragraph will be different. Pm sure\nthey give it special\nThey will give a new one.\nK:\nUh huh.\nD:\nThis is a second observation and if you would rather, we can\ndiscuss all the things with them. Henry promised to me not\nto give them any difficult.\nAnd this looks morelike\na\nreally. It is more important for out with communi-\ncations with Hanoi to\ndemand all these, But I\ndon't know how my government will settle this subject, the last\none. But I promise I will send to Moscow right away.\nK:\nAll right, sir.\nD:\nAnd in any case, now in Paris it is 8 o'clock--in Moscow I mean.\nWhat I will write them, send them, they will refuse on the grounds\nNoon, At noon in Paris It will be 2 hours difference, it will be\n10 o'clock.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nIt will be less than four hours. We can't soon do anything\nin four hours to communicate with Hanol, because we have\nwrite and receive It here. They each other write cables.\nSo, I put It this way, it is my personal observation, I will\ndo second give them the major things, the third one now\nHenry will patiently, both of them,\nThis is the situation as I look realistically. For me MMMMMX\nyes I say, I will send this off. It is not so easy for me to act\non this one, on this particular last message. I sure It will be\nvery helpful for them to understand in Moscow what the situation\nnow is really concentrate, because now--up to now, there was\nreally rather feeling about the fourth paragraph as the major\none, and they consider it, and may make rather a new one,\nThey may say the same demand but a little differently way.\nIt's now easy to compare it right now\nSo this is kind of difficult as I am sure you understand.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nThis message, really, I will send is immediately and hope\neverything is all right.\nRather I should say in general in all the details I'm not sure,\na little bit personally, you know sometimes it is better to sit\ndown and discuss them.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nOn this four, they discuss all, including the top men. Now\nit is at new one thing. So 1 hope he will look, but he may not.\nTomorrow-- is is not easy--give them time to look and time\nto get into Hanoi, but immediately. I do hope that they will\nfind on the basis of what we discussed, that they will find out.\nBut I will send this right away. This I promise,\nKeep in touch tomorrow, okay.\nK:\nThank you.\nD:\nBye, bys.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n2:03, December 14, 1972\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHenry, Hi. I have, there's no urgency in time because I\nam working on a lot of year end inaugural stuff and so forth,\nbut Id like to another round with you and Al some time this\nafternoon.\nK:\nRight. We'll be over in about ten minutes.\nP:\nAny time, shall we say 2:30. That'll give me a little more\ntime.\nK:\nWe'll be there at 2:30.\nP:\nFine, is that a good time.\nK:\nWe'll be there at 2:30.\nP:\nIs that a good time?\nK:\nFine, we are seeing Dobrynin at 3:00, I'll delay him until\n3:30.\nP:\nNo, no, 2:30 is fine, and we'll call him and delay him at the\ntime.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nOkay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nTaft Schreiber/Mr. Kissinger\n3:33, December 14, 1972\nK:\nHello.\nS:\nWelcome home.\nK:\nThank you Taft.\nS:\nI am happy you are back. Are you going to come out here\nthe following week with the President? I understand he's\nscheduled it the 21st or the 20th.\nK:\nIf you came on the 21st, I'd come the day after Christmas.\nS:\nUh huh. Then I'll miss you because I am going to be--I'm\nleaving for Hawaii on the 26th. I going to try to get a couple\nof week's rest. But what I was calling about was that I thought\nif I would see you that week, I'd like to set up a date for you\nto meet with Lew.\nK:\nWell, I'd be glad to do that.\nS:\nYou know, you've been reading the papers and everything,\nthings are steaming, and I'll pro#bably talk to you tomorrow\nor over the weekend or something when we can have a little\ntalk. I know this is not the time. But if--you may be getting\nfreed up sooner than anybody thinks.\nK:\nWell, I'll be glad to talk to him. I'll almost certainly be\nthere the week of the 21st.\nS:\nOh, that's perfect. Then I'll more or less sound with him and\nhave you both. get in touch. And then probably over the weekend-.\nI can reach you through the switchboard, can't I.\nK:\nAlways.\nS:\nAnd you can try to call me back or something on my line.\nK:\nOf course.\nS:\nFine. Well, I'll be in touch with you.\nK:\nMarvelous, Taft.\nS:\nTake care. I'm glad that you are home and hope everything is\nFine.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nK:\nEverything is going along good.\nS:\nThat's great. Thank you, Henry.\nK:\nBye.\nS:\nBye, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nVice President/Mr. Kissinger\n7:32, December 14, 1972\nVP:\nHello.\nK:\nMr. Vice President.\nVP:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nHow are you?\nVP:\nAll right.\nK:\nI wanted to call you to apologize for having kept you standing\nby all week long.\nVP:\nWell, Mike told me that things had washed.\nK:\nIt looks that way, yes. But what I would like to do is come\nby tomorrow at some point and brief you about where we\nstand.\nVP:\nAll right. Why don't you--what time are you going to be\navailable in the office and I'll give you a call when I see\nwhat my schedule is.\nK:\nWell, I'll be available--the best for me would be in the\nafternoon.\nVP:\nAll right. All right I'll call you in the morning and we'll\nmake the arrangements.\nK:\nGood, excellent, Mr. Vice President.\nVP:\nAll right, fine. See you then. Bye.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMarilyn Berger (Wash. Post)/Mr. Kissinger\n9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972\nK:\nHello\nB:\nHenry.\nK:\nThe delicatessen is to the left of the Imperial Palace.\nB:\nI'm glad to know that. Welcome Home.\nK:\nThank you.\nB:\nIsn't it incredible?\nK:\nHow did you get the visa? I thought I had prevented it.\nB:\nWhat did you say?\nlike\nK:\nWell, I told them that we don't really/it. Are you going alone?\nB:\nWell, what happened was the National Committee on U.S. China relations\nhas a group going. Epstein, Luce, Pye (sp?), Scallopino, Barnett --\nK:\nYeah.\nB:\nThe letter came across my desk saying that they were going so I asked\nif I could apply to cover their trip and the paper said, oh, hell; go ahead.\nAnd thunder struck; they came through and said I could cover the trip in\npart but to do general reporting as well.\nK:\nIsn't that marvelous.\nB:\nAnd I am the first reporter from the Washington Post --\nK:\nI know, they hate the Washington Post.\nB:\nJust like everybody else around here. As Epstein said, I don't know if it\nwill be to your advantage or disadvantage but the Washington Post has a\nreputation for being anti-Administration.\nK:\n[Laughter]\nB:\nWhen I was up in Ottawa, they asked me all about the Post. I was up there\nyesterday. In any case, they gave me a very generous visa as far as time\nis concerned.\nK:\nHow long are you going to be there?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nMarilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger\n9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972\nB:\nWell, they said three weeks but they gave me a three-month visa.\nK:\nHow long are you going to plan to be there?\nB:\nWell, I'm planning on three weeks for starters.\nK:\nYeah.\nB:\nBut I hope I'll be there when you make peace, that's the exciting part.\nK:\nYeah, yeah.\nB:\nI think that's the time to be there. In fact, yesterday when I was up in\nOttawa, they kept stressing that it was only Vietnam that was preventing\nbetter relations and they made Taiwan totally secondary.\nK:\nYeah, that's true.\nB:\nHow are things? I have not followed since a couple of days ago what you've\nbeen up to?\nK:\nMarilyn, I called you out of friendship.\nB:\nOh, all right. I'm really not -\nK:\nTo tell you how pleased I am that you are going\nB:\nI'm taking off very early tomorrow morning so I'm not --\nK:\nIn fact, if you would only once have a drink with me without pestering me\nwith questions, I'd even see you. You are the most relentless questioner that\nI know.\nB:\nWould you like to come over and have a drink and talk to me about China?\nK:\nI can't do it tonight.\nB:\n[Laughter]\nK:\n[Laughter]] Where do you live? I can't come but tell me where you live.\nB:\nAbout two minutes from your house.\nK:\nWhere do you live?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 3 -\nMarilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger\n9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972\nB:\n25th & Q. I enter the Parkway about two minutes from where your house\nis.\nK:\nOh, yeah.\nB:\nI have a P Street entrance. It's that row of apartment houses in Georgetown.\nK:\nOh, yeah, yeah.\nB:\nYou do live on Waterside Drive don't you?\nK:\nThat's right, yes.\nB:\nFor the times you are there. Is there anything in particular that is needed\nknowing about China at this point that you feel should --\nK:\nJust remember that they are terribly subtle.\nB:\nYes.\nK:\nAnd you don't have to hammer away at them the way you do at slower minds\nlike me.\nB:\nYou pick on me!\nK:\n[Laughter]\nB:\nI really ask you direct questions because I don't understand you when you are\nbeing uh --\nK:\nNo, but I mean for your own good, if you see any of their top people -- those\nare the only ones I know -- I mean, do it more allusively; don't do it like\na District Attorney.\nB:\nYou know, I really am very embarrassed. You make me sound like such\na hard driving dame, which I don't think I am.\nK:\nNo, no; I think you are basically very soft-hearted but you have a very good\nmind and you don't take any baloney.\nB:\nWell, somebody said I'm going to be the secret weapon for the U.S. to get\nsomething out of there. I don't know, I'm just -- I think Chou En-lai has to\nbe the world's great, great man in this day.\nK:\nOh, he's terrific. I don't know whether you will see him -- Oh, I think you'll\nsee him. He'll --\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 4 -\nMarilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger\n9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972\nB:\nWell, if I'm with that group, I might.\nK:\nOh, yeah, yeah. And he's a great fellow.\nB:\nAnd it's going to be New Year's Eve. My goodness -- where are you?\nWe have a terrible connection.\nK:\nI'm in my office.\nB:\nOh, I wonder if I'm supposed to ask that.\nK:\nNo, I'm in my office.\nB:\nI'm very hesitant to ask questions.\nK:\n[Laughter]\nB:\nYou scare me.\nK:\nWill you call me when you get back?\nB:\nOf course.\nK:\nAnd I really wish you a great time. I'll read what you write with great\ninterest.\nB:\nWell, I wish you'd tell me what I -- Look, if anything happens on the\nVietnam thing --\nK:\nI'll think of you with nostalgia.\nB:\nI'm interested in, you know, seeing what they tell their people about what\nhappened on Vietnam.\nK:\nWell, I pray something will happen while you're there.\nB:\nWell, do it for me, Henry, if not for anyone else.\nK:\nListen, at this stage, I have to do it for me or I'll lose my mind. You know,\nwhen you meet with two groups of Vietnamese in the same day, you might\nas well run an insane asylum.\nB:\n[Laughter]\nK:\nBecause both of them have the worse combinations of confusionism and\nFrench Cartesianism. Not a touch of relationship to reality. They'll tell\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 5 -\nMarily n Berger/Mr. Kissinger\n9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972\nK:\n(cont'd) you it's logical and in fact -- this is not for publication.\nB:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nOne evening I met the South Vietnamese and I did a parity, or what I\nthought was a parity of the Le Duc Tho speech and it sounded perfectly\nrational to them and they said, \"Well, that's it; that's the way you have\nto handle them. And we know how to do it.\" [Laughter]\nB:\n[Laughter] Well, you know, I'm just reading Dick Solomon's book\non the Chinese mind. It's a fascinating book. Have you read it?\nK'\nNo.\nB:\nI didn't figure you would have had the time. But I think it's preparing me\nfor something although I don't know what.\nK:\nOh, the Chinese though are much more subtle, much more elegant.\nB:\nOh, they're marvelous. Even the few that I've met are marvelous.\nK:\nOh, the Chinese are tremendous.\nB:\nYou know, I feel they're as different from the, for example, there was\none man who looked a little bit like Hav En-lai (sp?) and I thought they are\nas different from the North Vietnamese as the North Vietnamese are from\nthe South Vietnamese.\nK:\nMore, more.\nB:\nAnd I know a delightful people. I'm afraid the same thing that happened\nAlsop is going to happen to me.\nK:\nA great sense of humor. Oh, yes; if they want to.\nB:\nYeah. Well, they really needn't be afraid of me; that's the point.\nK:\nOh, you'll fix that.\nB:\nOh, come on! There you go again.\nK:\n[Laughter] Marilyn, I really look forward to seeing you when you come\nback.\nB:\nIs there anything I ought to look for as far as information on foreign policy\nor anything of that sort?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n9 I I\nMarilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger\n9:25 p.m., December 14, 1972\nK:\nMarilyn, you don't look; they give you.\nB:\nYeah.\nK:\nYo u can't just run around and dig. That's not Washington.\nB:\nNo, but I mean, I might ask a proper question at some point.\nK:\nWell, just use your instinct.\nB:\n[Laughter] I was told not to do that.\nK:\nJust use your instinct and a little restraint.\nB:\n[Laughter] Well, --\nK:\nDrop me a postcard, will you?\nB:\nI shall. But I wish you absolutely the best of luck on this other thing\nbecause -- By the way, you said you'll lose your mind. Murray when I\nused to say, \"Murray, we're going to have Peace. 11 He would say,\n\"If we don't, I'm going to take the window instead of the elevator. \"\nK:\n[Laughter] I feel the same way SO?\nB:\nWell, when Murray gets optimistic, I know things are all right. You saw\nhis piece today?\nK:\nNo. I've got to read it.\nB:\nIt was in the trend of the ones I was writing while he was away.\nK:\nGood, I'll read it later.\nB:\nI hope you don't make a liar out of me.\nK:\nOh, we'll do our best\nB:\nI appreciate your calling back.\nK:\nOkay. Have a good trip. I'm delighted for you.\nB:\nI am too. Thanks very much.\nK:\nBye.\nB:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nJerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger\n9:30 p.m, December 14, 1972\nS:\nHenry, how are you?\nK:\nOkay.\nS:\nGood. The only reason I wanted to call is I talked with Ron today.\nK:\nYeah. What did he say?\nS:\nWell, he said he was going to talk to the President tonight or tomorrow\nmorning and then he was also going to talk to you. And he said that you\nwould have to decide what you wanted to do. I naturally told him that I\nthought that it would be nice if everybody in the White House from the top\ndown sort of encouraged us on this project. And he said that he would try\nto help.\nK:\nYeah. Okay, I'll talk to him tomorrow.\nS:\nOkay. Are you going to talk to all of us tomorrow?\nK:\nT omorrow or Saturday.\nS:\nI see. How are you feeling?\nK:\nRight now I feel exhausted.\nS:\nI'll bet, I'll bet. I don't know how you do it because I'm feeling that way\ntoo and I didn't go through what you went through.\nK:\nWell, if it all comes out all right, it will all be worth it.\nS:\nYeah. Well, I hope so.\nK:\nAnd if it doesn't, you'll drop me from your cover so it will be even more\nworth it.\nS:\nOh, come on.\nK:\n[Laughter]\nS:\nCome on now. [Laughter] We have some scruples you know.\nK:\nNo, Hedley Donovan told me the only way I could get off the cover is to screw\nup these negotiations.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nJerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger\n9:30 p.m., December 14, 1972\nS:\nYeah. Well, I'm sure you wouldn't do that.\nK:\nSo he's given me an idea. No.\nS:\nNo. [Laughter] That's too high a price to pay.\nK:\nI agree with you. No, actually, Jerry, the thing that I find most touching\nis that -- You know, there is basically an adversary relations between the\npress and officials but I really think all you guys are pulling for us.\nS:\nWell, we are.\nK:\nNo, I know it. I really feel it.\nB\nS:\nut I must say, boy; -- Well, there have been lots of dirty tricks in the\nlast couple of weeks.\nK:\nBy whom?\nS:\nI don't know. I mean, I was looking at that Helms\ntoday and --\nK:\nThat Helms what?\nS:\nWell, you know, that story that was leaked about Helms and then --\nK:\nYeah, but there wasn't an iota of truth in it.\nS:\nI know but -- Well, that's beside the point now.\n[Laughter]\nK:\nWhat else?\nS:\nWell, this whole business about the Oriana Fallaci interview, which at\nsome point we've got to discuss. There have been a lot of smoke about that.\nK:\nWell, well, you know, what is inherently improbable in that interview is --\nafter all, I have a record of giving interviews for four and a half years\nwithout making a total utter ass of myself.\nS:\n[Laughter] Right.\nK:\nWhy would I have done it with her?\nS:\nShe sure --\nK:\nShe sure killed me.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 3 -\nJerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger\n9:30 p.m., December 14, 1972\nS:\n[Laughter] Yeah. Well, maybe we can correct the record on some of that.\nK:\nYou know, I think the most merciful thing about that one is to forget it.\nS:\n[Laughter] Yeah, yeah.\nK:\nOkay, Jerry.\nS:\nOkay, great. Listen, Henry, one thing -- At some point we've got to get\ntogether because I have been getting a lot of stuff from a lot of people\nincluding some stuff from the Vietnamese now about how they say the talks\nwent, you know.\nK:\nWhat do they say?\nS:\nWell, they've got a whole version about your meeting with Thieu and the\ncables back and forth to Hanoi and you know, Haig's meeting with Thieu\nand that whole thing.\nK:\nWith Thieu?\nS:\nYeah.\nK:\nWhich Vietnamese, the North or South?\nS:\nNo, this is the South Vietnamese.\nK:\nWhat do they say?\nS:\nWell, I've got a whole kind of detailed thing.\nK:\nWell, there's one version that I saw somewhere that I kept interrupting him.\nS:\n[Laughter] This one has some juicier stuff than that in it.\nK:\nLike what?\nS:\nWell, you know, about when you let him see the draft.\nK:\nWhat about when I let him see the draft?\nS:\nWell, I mean, they say you wouldn't show him the draft.\nK:\nWell, that's just a blatant lie. When I had it? When I came there?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n4 ! I\nJerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger\n9:30 p.m., December 14, 1972\nS:\nWell, no, they say it took two days before you got the draft and then he\nheld it for two days and then there was --\nK:\nWhen I got there?\nS:\nNo, not when you got there. That when you got there, I don't know whether\nyou didn't have -- The way they say it, is that you didn't show it to them.\nK:\nThat's a flat total lie.\nHe got it within an hour of my getting there\nS:\nWell, that's what this thing has.\nK:\nWell, look, for that we have 25 witnesses. Hell, we went over the whole\ndraft the next morning at an NSC meeting -- at a Vietnamese NSC meeting.\nAnd it isn't true that he held it because all the members of the NSC had it.\nI mean, that's not something that can be discussed, that's a fact.\nS:\nWell, okay. I mean, that's great.\nK:\nLook, Bunker will confirm this.\nS:\nListen, Henry, I don't --\nK:\nAbrams will confirm this.\nS:\nAll I need is you. I mean, I've got -- You know, I am in a position where\nI have nothing to work on and I've got -- I mean, I don't pick this stuff up\non the street. These guys presumably, you know -- I mean, they don't have\nall the details to say the least. But look, I don't want to -- I know you are\nexhausted and I just --\nK:\nWho puts that out? State?\nS:\nNo, no.\nK:\nThe Vietnamese?\nS:\nYeah. But at some point before all this gets away from us, I would like\nto talk to you if I could.\nK:\nOkay.\nS:\nOkay.\nK:\nRight.\nNice to talk to you. Bye.\nS:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n9:43 a.m. 12/15/72\nKay Graham/Mr. Kissinger\nHK:\nHello ?\nKG:\nHello, Henry.\nHK:\nKay, you're trying to ruin me.\nKG:\nOh listen, I am trying to be discreet, I left word that it was Mary\nSmith.\nHK:\nImmediately when your name is announced the power in my phone goes\noff.\nKG:\n(Laughing) Static--how are you Henry?\nHK:\nI'm doing fine.\nKG:\nWhat I wanted to say is that this is the quiet weekend at\nanyway\nfor Mary, Donny and me and if: it in anyway suits you alone or with\nNancy I would urge you.\nHK:\nAren't you nice. How far is it?\nKG:\nIt's 50 miles and an hour in driving.\nHK:\nMaybe we'll come down Sunday\nKG:\nMarvelous\nHK:\nCan I call you?\nKG:\nNo- - Donny and I are going to the football game alone which may suit\nyou and may not, maybe you'd rather see somebody-- if you'd rather\nsee somebody, I'll invite somebody, if you don't want to see somebody\nI won't--I urge you Henry to\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n9:45 a.m. - 12/15/72\nKay Graham/Mr. Kissinger\nK: Immediately when you name is mentioned the power in my phone\ngoes off.\nG: Henry, how are you.\nK: I'm doing fine.\nG: What I wanted to say was my -- and this is the quiet weekend at\nGlen Elby -- if it anyway for Mary, Donna and me, and if you\naren't alone with Nancy, I would urge you.\nK: Aren't you nice. How far is it?\nG: It's 50 miles. About an hour.\nK: Maybe we'll come down Sunday. Can I call you?\nG: Donny and I are going to the football game on Sunday, so it may\nsuit you and it may not. I don't know. May be you'd rather see\nsomebody, I'll invite someone. If you don't want to see someone,\nI won't. urge you Henry. You could bring her down Saturday night.\nJust because it makes a much more restful thing to drive down and\nback, I'd love to have you, but it's not as much a rest. If you have\nto bring\nI'll put him up.\nK: Yes, unfortunately I do.\nG: It's all right, he can stay.\nK: Do you think I could take a White House helicopter to your place.\nG: You could really you know.\nK: That would go over very well -- order a helicopter to Kay Graham's.\nG: Oh yes. I'm told there is a rumor I want you to know that is\ngoing up and down the eastern seaboard. This may sound as if I'm\nkidding, but I'm not. But the reason Pete got fired was that he had been the\n(laughter, not understandable). I thought this was a joke because\nsomeone told me this from the Ford Foundation. Board meeting, you\nknow, and I think\nmy cousin who was there and then Bob told me\nand I said, Bob, they must have been kidding. He said that it is a\nserious rumor.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nK: Well, on that basis, I should be out a long time ago.\nG: Yes, and so should Elliot Richardson who was there with him, so I\ndon't think it's quite true.\nK: Well, I don't believe that's true.\nG: Well, listen, one thing is that you don't need to tell me.\nK: Well, I'll call you tomorrow and let you know.\nG: What I suggest to you is that if you could come down whenever you\nare free Saturday, you must be free for 24 hours. I think you'd\nhave a little bit of a rest. And we'll all go to bed like 9:30 or 10:00\nor whatever you like, or we'll have a little chat, or watch a movie\non television, or do nothing.\nK: You're terriffic, I'll call you tomorrow, or tonight.\nG: All right, anytime. If you come, I'll need to know how many there\nare.\nyou, Nancy, and a dick, or more.\nK: I think maybe two dicks. They take care of themselves. There is a\ntown nearby, isn't there.\nG: Well, no. They'll have to stay in the house and I can just stick them\nin the children's rooms and I don't think they'd bother you.\nK: How will I get you?\nG: The Post can ring me. Or the number down there is 703-EM4-3141.\nBut also the Post rings direct.\nK: Many thanks, Kay. You're a good friend as always. Use a different\nname when you call me.\nG: Yes. Morrie Smith from now on. I have a new friend in your office\nnow anyway.\nK: Oh, yes, I know Julie Pineau. Well Henry told me and you were\npumping her for information.\nG: Oh, yes. She has a lot I wanted.\nhave\nK: She does/a lot, but she won't give it to you.\nG:\nShe's charming and beautiful and a great addition.\nK: She's a great girl.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nK: She's marvelous, and so beautifyl, Henry.\nG: It's unfair\nK: It is unfair, but I never play with girls who work for me. It takes\ngreat restrain.\nG: By that definition, you should fire her immediately.\nK: Okay, we'll consider that.\nG: Okay, well, whenever you call, fine.\nK: Many thanks, Kay, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n11:30 a.m. - 12/15/72\nDirector Helms/Mr. Kissinger\nH: Good morning, Henry, how are you?\nK: Okay, Dick, I guess I taught you that the price of disagreeing with\nme.\nH: I'm glad your sense of humor is in good form, this morning.\nK: The two members of the Administration for whom I had personal\neffects and have gotten fired. You haven't gotten fired but it's\nreally ironical. I spent my time in Paris being quoted on the\nrecord, but then nobody would use about my\nthat\nyou'\nre\nthe\nbest professional intelligence person I know, and, well, you know\nwhat happened.\nH: Oh, sure, sure.\nK: You know that you've stayed three years longer than the intentions.\nK:\nH: Yes, I think that's right. My sould is at peace. /Look, I had a\ntalk with the President yesterday about your role in your new job,\nand also I want to talk with you about somethings we are thinking of\ndoing. And I wondered if you could come over to see me at your\nconvenience today. What's a good time for you? Is 2:30 possible?\nH: Well, let me see. I've got a meeting in Erhlichman's office at\n3:30. How long would this take do you think?\nK: Oh, about a half an hour.\nH: Suppose, do you think I could see you at 3:00?\nK: I was going to see the Vice President at 3:00 but I'll see if I can\nshift him to 3:30, then you should come at 3:00. But you and I\nshould not need more than a half an hour.\nH: I'll look forward to seeing you then, but if that is not possible, I'll\ncome earlier.\nK: Good.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n11:42 a. m. - December 15, 1972\nRon Ziegler/Dr. Kissinger\nK:\nYou want to come over here?\nZ:\nNo, we'll cover it on the phone briefly. I'm going to say you\nmet with the President for two hours this morning. Right? And\nK\nI'm going to say that you have met with the Chairman of the Joint\nChiefs and also with the Secretary of State. When did you?\nK:\nYesterday afternoon.\nZ:\nAnyone else?\nK:\nSecretary Laird. I had breakfast with him this morning, and\nI'm seeing the Vice President this afternoon and Director of the\nCentral Intelligence Agency.\nZ:\nCan I say CI (?)\nK:\nYeah.\nZ:\nOkay, now I'm going to say that Henry will probably be available\nfor matters relating to negotiations in the near future -- I can't\nsay exactly when.\nK:\nWhy say it?\n(? )\nZ:\nKass/said it yesterday. Remember yesterday you said not to\nturn it off? I said I didn't have anything set.\nK:\nHe'll probably say after his consultation he may meet with you.\nPut it on that basis.\nZ:\nOkay. I feel good about this, don't you?\nK:\nI think it's the right thing to do.\nZ:\"\nI do too, Henry. I really do.\nK:\nI mean these guys could beat us to death. You know we could\nkeep this charade going another three weeks.\nZ:\nYeah. I want to sit down when you get a chance this afternoon\nand give me a couple of\n.\nK:\nYes, I'd be eager to get that.\nZ:\nI really would. I'll call you and come up and talk to you about that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nK:\nI want to get your tender reaction to the press thing.\nZ:\nOkay. I'll be over to see you abx after I brief.\nK:\nAlso, I'd like a little support in the face of this leaking that my\ncolleagues in this building are doing.\nZ:\nI'll tell you what I've been doing on that too.\nK:\nOkay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n11:42 a. m. - December 15, 1972\nSidney Gresson/Dr. Kissinger\nG:\nHow are you, Henry. Are you still alive and kicking?\nK:\nWhen you deal with two maniacal Vietnamese parties, if you\naren't kicking, you're dead.\nG:\nDid you seeFlo over there?\nK:\nNo, she's too bright, I'm afraid.\nG:\nShe's too bright, but why are you discriminating against her?\nK:\nBecause all she needs is one tiny, little fact and she puts the\nrest together herself.\nG:\nHenry, look when we talked a few months ago and we were going\nto get together and then you probably got screwed up running\nMiddle East or something. I still want very much\nto talk with you. It has nothing to do with current affairs.\nK:\nNo, I know what you want you to talk to me about,\nG:\nI'd like really to sit down and talk to you if we don't even go\nfurther than that.\nK:\nNo, we can't go further than that.\nG:\nNo. whatever convenient time you have. Whatever is convenient\nto you.\nnext\nK:\nYou want to come down sometime/week?\nG:\nI'll fly down Monday morning, if it's any good.\nK:\nWell, let's have lunch on Monday.\nG:\nAll right.\nK:\nCome to my office and we can go to the Sans Souci because the\nfood here is unbearable.\nG:\nWell, all right, I'll pick you up at your office at 12:30?\nK:\nMake it at 1:00.\nG:\nLook forward very much\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n11:45, Dec. 15, 1972\nK:\nAnatol!\nD:\nOh, how are you?\nK:\nOkay.\nocean\nD:\nWhen are you going through Gleen? Doesn't difference in time\nbotheyou?\nK:\nWhy?\nDi\nI mean when you go over, cause over the ocean I mean difference\nin time, eight hours-\nKt\nYesterday I was very, very tired.\nD:\nYou seem rather calm I should say.\nK:\nYes, as I said--\nD:\nYou are on a different note I should say.\nK:\nWell, you misunderstood me.\nD:\nYou just want to show me a different mood come on.\nK:\nYou know, when you are faced with a situation that indicates its\nown direction it usually a very relaxing atmosphere.\nDt\nI know you are rather well usually--\nK:\nI would not recommend your clients to try to call on the President.\nD:\nWell, Pm sure you know they are not going to make that kind of a\nrecommendation.\nK:\nNo, but, if you want to get a feeling, you can read the text of the\nlast day for example.\nD:\nOf last-oh, I see. You show me tomorrow when I come--\nK:\nYou want to come over for it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nD:\nWell 1 think yes tomorrow show me.\nK:\nOkay fine. Now the second thing is the President wanted to make\nsure is that your people, I'll be glad to go over the issues with you.\nBut as you could have seen yesterday it isn't the issues, they\nchange issues so fast that we can't solve them quickly enough.\nWhat we are trying to tell you is that you are really not being told\nthe truth. But would you like a page of what we think the issues\nare?\nD:\nI really would like because this is a point because my impressions\nsometimes they, I mean our friends, this is rather mixed up --\nK:\nAll that I would bet on Gromyko and Breshnev is --\nD:\nYes, it is hard for Russion to understand but--\nK:\nthe main thing--\nD:\nMain thing this one and yourposition this one.\nK:\nFor your own sake don't get yourself locked into a position that\nthey tell you because it's now\nwhat you told me. They\nare lying to you too. But you don't have to comment on it, but\nthe factsyou give me, you couldn't invent. I mean, you don't know\nenough about the negotiations to invent them. So it's hard to believe\nthat they are giving this to you.\nD:\nWell, this is the point, too, 1 should say, and this point you think'\nit will be useful.\nK:\nI will give them to you but be careful about, you know, he's going\nto have a horror story. The basic facty is we are ready tosettle\nvery quickly, and they are not. I mean that is the fact.\nD:\nThis is your--and there is a reservation?\nK:\nThere is no doubt of it. Every day that we narrow it, the next day\nthey come in with four or five more issues. New this particular\nexcuse they use at any given time is really unimportant.\nD:\nYes, I understand. But as of today where we stand in your under-\nstanding?\nK\nK:\nI'll send it over this afternoon.\nDr\nWhat do you feel, not one or two, make it five, six, seven, it's\nentirely up to you, I would really like to show Gromyko just what\nis it, as we are today, because if you give him two sides it is useful.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\n1 understand it's not because--\nK:\nYou read the transcript of the last day'smeeting, you will see\nthat its irrelevant. But I will send It to you.\nD:\nYes, I will simply look out for it. You understand, it's not really\nI am asking for you giving me up but I think it's, 1 do feeling\nsomething better--\nK:\nYes, well incidentally the President on a personal note is very\ntouched by your wife going-- them\ntime they\nD:\nWell she's going next time, by that/want to send some Christmas\ngift, rather my wife could take it.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nIf she is going there---\nK:\nHow long are you going to be gone?\nDt\nReally I don't know, I intend to go around Monday now because\nthen its the 20th 21st, 22nd and afterall I don't know because\nBreshnev wants me to receive, but whether I am eloquent or not\nfor, -- it may be better for me to stay for vacation, or he might\nhave some ideas to go for the President, at this particular answer,\nI don't know.\nKi:\nHe actually thinks it would be useful. I think it would be very\nquiet here in January, and if you could consider for example to\ncome here for a couple of days, say around the first of January\nand then go back to Moscow just so that we both have the work\nprogram.\nD:\nWell, maybe this is idea. I don't th--\nK:\nI don't think frankly unless you friends in Hanoi drive us to a point\nof no return, but that's you know.\nD:\nI know of\nof no return.\nK:\nAt any rate that wouldn't involve you. So I don't expect any major\nmoves here.\nD:\nThat is my impression to because my relation, in general, is really\ninternational, except Vietnam. Nothing --\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nK:\nWhat Iw ould like is that you-the only business you and I could do\nis to plan the\nwith us.\nD:\nYes, this is the point.\nK:\nSo that we could get the bureaucracy working and then you can\ngo back to Moscow frankly for more of January.\nD:\nAre you going for vacation yourself?\nK:\nI will go myself as soon as Vietnam has broken one way or the other.\nD:\nYou can exchange your\nfor the full of January\nor you could do it and be on vacation too.\nK:\nIf it's still going in January we will exchange more than letters,\nbelieve me. (Laughter)\nD:\nYou just pit it in moth-that way (laughter) About your talk with\nLe Due The when you are strolling along the park, I think---\nK:\nLe Due The thinks he's making a monkey out of me. Le Due Tho\nthinks that if he can just I. be nice to me that I'm so vain and then\nputs me on television and he smiles and thinks we are all nicely\nparanoid.\nD:\nYes, Mr. Due Tho looks and says -- look here, everything is\nall right there because just look how they are going (laughter),\nso you see how it could be.\nK:\nOf course. I'm convinced that a member of the Politburo of the\nVietnamese communist party will give me terms because he likes\nme a lot better than anyone else. Don't you think that's reasonable?\nD:\nYeah--\n(end of tape)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nD:\n**** is this specific announcement on the latt--\nK:\nWe are playing with the idea -- maybe I will have an informal\nmeeting with the President at some point.\nD:\nOh, I see.\nK:\nWell I might have a press conference, I haven't decided ket, I\ndoubt it. I know there will be an official announcement.\nD:\nI understand. But just about---\nK:\nAbout what?\nDt\nyou are thinking along the line of a press conference--on the record\nor off the record?\nK:\nI haven't really decided yet what we are going to do.\nD:\nOkay, Henry, then I will see you tomorrow then.\nK:\nI willsee you tomorrow.\nD:\n8:30?\nK:\n8:30, I'll let you have that transscription to--glance at it. You\nwon't understand it but you will see that it's ---\nD:\nI'm like your friend Breshnev, I don't understand what you--\nK:\nWell no, because it refers to articles in the agreement. I will also\ngive you a copy of the text as it now stands.\nD:\nThis I think it will be a good idea.\nK:\nOkay.\nD:\nYes, it is understood but only in your particular structure of the\nphase--\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nOtherwise I think we are trying to tto do ----\nK:\nIf at all a rationale discussion\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\nD:\nWhat you are going to give me is only for our own information.\nWe won't argue with them. It was a pleasant approach--he ap-\nproach me, we will have a reading, a really expansive talk,\nthat's all. Like our Mr. Breshnev, my presence here is not\narguing but taking what they say - quote, unquote.\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nSo this is for our understanding--\nK:\nI really don't know what we could ask you to do because--\nD:\nNo, no, this is what we discuss yesterday really it is difficult\nfor us to do to go and argue with them about one point means\nthey say their position is different and at the same time things\nnot to be the same as you.\nsend the letter\nand just say they agree, but what you sent of the text they have\nto sign it?\nK:\nThat's right.\nD:\nThis is rather small detail but quite a detail as you say.\nK:\nThey could sign the text without a Preamble. They can sign every\nobligation---\nD:\nThey could sign the text without saying they agreeing and then you\nmay always interpret it in principle but agreeing, but they could\nsay I don't like, I will not agree--for the whole text.\nK:\nExactly.\nD:\nWell whatever. May make strike them, make measures in this\nway. Unless our Ambassador may make some provision but I\ndoubt it because of what we are talking. Okay, Henry, I will see\nyou tomorrow. Bye, bye.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Taft Schreiber\n12/15/72\nTS:\nGood morning, Henry.\nHK:\nTaft, how are you?\nTS:\nFine. Say I talked to Ted Cummings and he is very happy to have\nyou at the house.\nHK:\nGood.\nTS:\nAlso we played golf with Lynn Firestone and he said, gee if he's\ncoming down, tell him we have a party on the 28th--the Annabergs\nare coming over and some more-not a big one then he said tell\nhim about it. I said call and invite him yourself- he said well if\nhe's coming out naturally if he's available nicky will call or we'll\ncall: him. I thought I would give you at least Cummings home number\nand have you aide call him.\nHK:\nRight. That's very nice of you.\nTS:\nits 213-277-2168.\nHK:\nRight.\nTS:\nAnd that way if you re going down for the 26th. You can meet wtih\nLou there the 27, 28, 29th--how long would you stay?\nHK:\nEither until the 31 st or 2nd, I haven t decided yet.\nTS:\nI just want to tell you where the action is the Anabergs are giving the\nNew Year's party down there--we're invited my doctor and his wife\nto take them to Hawaii-. so they are going as our guests and I couldn't\ncall that off but this is going to be the social event of the year down\nthere. So if you' re going to be there, I'll pass word to let them know\nwhere you are and that your'e going to be there.\nHK:\nGood that's great.\nTS:\nYou might as well be in all the action.\nHK:\nMight as well you' re my social secretary\nTS:\nListen, I've been accused of everything. how do you feel Henry.\nHK:\nI'm in great shape.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nTS:\nI'll see you soon I've go the dubious honor of being an elector today\nso I've go to go up to San Francisco and cast a ballot.\nHK:\nRight.\nTS:\nMy contribution to society is nothing but a plane trip today.\nHK:\nI'll talk to you soon.\nHS:\nAll right - you have you aide=call or you call Ted youself and I'm\nsure you'd love to go.\nHK:\nThank you Taft.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird\n(Secure Phone) 12/15/72 12:05 p.m.\nSL:\nThe last wave is out of there. We lost one more. Another\nB-52 was shot down.\nHK:\nOh really?\nSL:\nTwo for every 100 strike isn't bad. We expected that--Ithink\nI told you that.\nHK:\nYeh, but we actually lost three.\nSL:\nThe other one got back. We lost two total, a crew of 12 and\n1 F-111 thus far.\nHK:\nAnd are we going to do this Tacair tomorrow?\nSL\nNo, because of the weather--we are going back with the 52's\nand Flll's.\nHK:\nIsn't the weather good tonight.\nSL:\nNo and we will go back within 24 hours with 60 more B'52's\nand we told them to go with minimum of 60 and try for 90\nand then the Flll's. If the weather would clear we would go\nin with tacair. As you know these 16 targets that we are hitting\nare the only ones that are acceptable for this kind of bombing. There're\nFor some other bridges and other targets we should open up\nand hit.\nHK:\nHave the 52's hit those targets or tacair--can a 52 hit a bridge?\nSL:\nThe Flll's can be put on the bridges. Smart bombs need visual\nbecause they are guided by beam. We will let them go tomorrow\nwhere they are going--and hope for clear weather.\nHK:\nThat's fine with me. Then let them hit a few additional targets.\nThe screaming is starting-. Symington is comin g after me.\nSL:\nState wants briefed why the losses are so high--they think the\nloss rate is high, but for the number of bombers we are sending\nthat ratio isn't bad. As you know we lost two crews thenx-the\nother 52 is burning and on fire but we got the crew. We recovered\na crew of six. Well give you a full briefing tomorrow, Henry.\nHK:\nI appreciate that. I'll tell the President tonight.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Mrs. Cerf\n12:05 p.m.\n12/15/72\nHK:\nHow sweet of youto call.\nun-\nC:\nWell, I thought of you and I know how disappointed and I XM happy\nyou are with you announcement.\nHK:\nWell, I think it will stil 1 work out.\nC:\nI am sure it will I know you'd rather still it be another announcement.\nHK:\nThat's for sure.\nto\nC:\nI just wanted to say that I love you and I know it's going/work out.\nHK:\nAren't you great.\nC:\nI'm not, you are.\nHK:\nIt's been so long since I've seen you.\nC:\nI know and I resent it. Very very much.\nHK:\nSo do I when are you coming down.\nC:\nI'm not coming down when are you coming up.\nHK:\nWhen this present frenzy eases, I'll come up and let's have dinner.\nC:\nI am going out to Palm Springs two days after Christmas-.\nHK:\nOh, I may be out there for a couple of days-\nC:\nReally? I'm going to Franks on the 27th.\nHK:\nI'm thinking of going out on the26th and stay 4 or 5 days.\nC:\nThat's exactly what we sort of will be-doing. That's wonderful.\nHK:\nThen I'll see you there.\nC:\nThat's perfect. In any case, then we'll make the plans to get together\nin an evening in New York--for some relaxation for my feelow\nHK:\nThat'd be terrific you're a good friend.\nC:\nI'm a very loving friend I don't bother you I'm always here if you\nneed anythingruced\nat the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nHK:\nYou never could bother me.\nC:\nOkay, see you soon.\nHK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Eovernor Reagan:\n12/15/72\n12:35\np.m.\nRR:\nHenry?\nHK:\nRon, howare you?\nRR:\nPretty good.\nHK:\nI saw your television show the othernight--I didn't enjoy it anymore\nthan you did.\nRR:\nBut I sure had some familiar and nostalgic notes out of it.\nI called because this isn't just curiousity or wanting to find out\nanything, but Henry at the risk of being very presumptuous,\nand not knowing all of the facts of course because only those of\n/\nyou there who are handling them do know them--can I tell you some-\nthing that made me feel nostalgic\nHK:\nSure.\nRR:\nAs I say you'v been there and maybe this is totally unnecessary--\nbut when you were talking of course I remembered Penh wa Huang (sp)\nwhich for all those years, we had the same problem with them, but\nway back in the 40's Penh wen Swuam (?) turned out not to be a surprise\nto me here in Hollywood and I'll brief this as much as I can--we had\na great cataclysmic upheavel under the guise of a jurisdictional strike-.\nHK:\nYeh.\nRR:\nWe actually had, although we never used the word oxpressing openly and\ndidn't do any redbaiting, we had a small group of Hollywood unions\nthat had come under total communist domination and they used this\njurisdictional gimmick to bring about this attempt to close down the\nmotion picture industry. The actors were the key if they could keep\nus out obviously the studioes closed down--we continued to go to work.\nAnd I was President of the Guild at the time and Henry for seven\nmonths--I'm not exaggerating- twice a day seven days a week, I\nled a group of actors that met with the leadership of these communist\nunionists trying to arrive at a solution that would save the business\nand I have got to tell you that when --you even used the right number--\nwhen you said 15 the other night. I used to come home night after\nnight scattered through those seven months and say hey I think it's\nall set--we met again at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning to just finalize\nit and I think we've done it. At 10 the next morning, they'd welk in\nwith their lawyers and all of a sudden there'd be 15 new demands layed\nout on the table that we'd never heard of before and it was always as\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nyou said - just beyond reach and Henry this has been haunting me\nthe whole weekend to relate this experience. evidently the communists\ndo business the same way-because the only way it was finally solved\nat the end of those seven months is toward the end of the 7th, we\nfinally awoke to what was going on they they were just going to keep\non negotiatingand striking and stalling ad infinitum to the place where\nwe just finally said to hell with it there is no further distance we\ncan go at all and they are either in or out of the motion picture\nbusiness and that's the way it's going to be and the way it round\nwound up was they were out of the motion picture business and those\nunions to this day are still out bf the picture business and we WX just\nclosed it out and went to work and kept the studios going.\nHK:\nYeh.\nRR:\nAnd txbx I just couldn't help but tell you this because they like meetings\nMaybe this is all useless in view of all the facts that you have but I\nhad to get it off my chest.\nHK:\nNo I appreciate this I want you to know incidentally, we have resumed\nbombing North Vietnam today.\nRR:\nAhhh\nHK:\nAnd after it hits the press it won't for a couple of hour anything\nyou could say supporting us would be appreciated-\nRR:\nOh listen\nin\nHK:\nI am assuming you are/agreement with it.\nRR:\nLast night we had a party and couple of people got me in a corner and\nsaid look just play if I were king, what would you do right now if you\nwere there and I said I'll answer the question but on one condition\nthat you recognize we don't know the facts that the President and\nHenry have I said granted that if things are as they appear in the\nnews--if there are no circumstances about which we don't know. if\nthey are just the way they look, I said I'd put the biggest fleet of\nB-52's they'd ever seen and just blow the hell out of the section of\nNorth Vietnam and just keep eyeballing them, making no more\nconcessions and let this happen day after day until finally they recognize\nthe only thing to do is put down the paper and sign this thing.\nHK:\nWell that's what we are doing.\nRR:\nWonderful it brightens my day.\nHK:\nI was afraid you'd oppose it.\nRR.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nRR:\nThe hell you haven't been out here often enough. you have got\nto come and visit. incidentally are you coming out here for the\nholidays\nHK:\nI may come to Palm Springs for a few days between Christmas and\nNew Year's\nRR:\nIf you come into town let'us know, we'd love to see you.\nHK:\nGood, I'd love to see you - I'll be sure to let you know.\nRR:\nI'll be shouting out loud and long about what you are doing.\nIs it like our motion picture unions?\nHK:\nThat's what it looks like to me.\nRR:\nThey play this game\nHK:\nWell they® re going to try it but not for long - something has to give.\nRR:\nMake it be them.\nThey play a game in which first of all in which they have no pressures\non them from the standpoint of humanitarianism or the lives of their\npeople because they don't even consider that and they just feel\nwe do. Twenty-five years at the negotiating tables don't get tired\nwhen you finally come down to the nub, the side that wins thatx is\nthe side\nthan the other fellow.\nHK:\nThat's what usually happens.\nRR:\nI'm delighted to hear of it Good to talk to you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nRon Ziegler/Dr. Kissinger\n12/15/72 - 12:52\nZ:\nHenry?\nK:\nYes Ron.\nZ:\nThe\nis about ready to go with a story. Before\nwe get into the press line, let's talk about the facts. That the\nPresident sent you to see Zumwalt about a month ago and tell\nhim that he would be removed as Chief of the Navy because of\nthe racial prob.wantedReston.\nK:\nTotal nonsense.\nZ:\nThey say they have it from Hill sources who are willing to be\nquoted. You never did do that did you?\nK:\nI haven't seen Zumwalt in two months - I didn't see Zumwalt\nwith any such message.\nZ:\nDid you discuss this? The aspect\nof his leaving?\nK:\nI never discussed his leaving and I don't think he is leaving.\nZ:\nWell, fine that's what I wanted to know.\nK:\nSo it is a flat totally, total untruth - I once discussed with him\nat Ed's (?) request what he planned to do about this racial problem.\nwhat was it on the Constellation?\nZ;\nYes.\nK:\nBut he called me to explain it to me.\nZ:\nBut you didn't talk about him leaving.\nK:\nHe was telling me what the situation was, I really wouldn't get\ninto it.\nZ:\nOkay fine.\nK:\nI would just say that I have not seen Zumwalt in two months, I have\nnever discussed his leaving with him in any form whatsoever.\nZ:\nI'll see you a little later this afternoon.\nK:\nRight.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n5:41 pm, December 15, 1972\nK:\nAnatol!\nD:\nY\nYes, Henry, how are you?\nK:\nHow are you?\nD:\nThank y ou very much.\nK:\nI sent you over that list just in case Le Due Tho--\nD:\nHe just arrived in Moscow.\nK:\nJust crying on your shoulders, huh?\n[Laughter]\nD:\nI'm sure he will. Well, he's here. Next time I will wait\nuntil you go to Moscow. I will show to Moscow how he does the,\nreally, talks to you.\nK:\nOh, Le Due The\nD:\nOkay, when realism he arrive in Moscow., I will come and tell & show the\nMoscow/to him how nice the is and so on, then I think he\nwill watch with you then his realism, (laughter) and he will\nchange his command I'm sure (laughter) you understand\nthe background?\nK:\nYes I understand it very well, very well.\nD:\nOr maybe he will be hearing some music with some members\nof the government and so in that way confident situation of this\nparticular realism (laughter).\nK:\nLook, I will send it to you--are you going to be in another hour,\nwe are retyping it.\nD:\nOkay, I will be here another hour, yes.\nK:\nGood, by 7:00 you'll have it.\nD:\nThat's all right.\nK:\nThat way, they can have it tomorrow morning.\nD;\nYeah, tomorrow morning. Well, thank you very much, Henry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nK:\nOkay, Anatol, and I'll see you tomorrow morning for\nbreakfast.\nD:\nYes, 8:30.\nK:\nIn the Map Room.\nD:\nFor breakfast, or how, or sometime they call it---\nK:\nI wouldn't have you come here at a member of the\nCentral Committee for a prayer meeting.\nD:\nWell, I don't know, maybe it would be interesting your\nkind of prayer, because I'm sure you have not heard\nthose prayers, ma ybe an international prayer or many things.\nK:\nWell, we can try it to see whether we can agree.\nD:\nWill you prepare the third draft please, for tomorrow\nK:\nOkay, blaye.\nD:\nBye, bye, thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nHenry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger\n5:45, Dec. 15, 1972\nH:\nHow are you Henry?\nK:\nOkay.\nH:\nHow are you feeling?\nK:\nI'm okay.\nH:\nNot to take too long, we are tempted to write a very highly anticipatory\npiece this week. Not just exactly what will happen, but a decisive\ntime is coming. You've spent an awful lot of time with the President\nand you've had a great many meetings and it certainly suggests how,\nas Scotty Reston suggested today, that the President is engaging now.\nWill take necessary steps. Is that kind of a column appropriate, or\nare we speculating too much.\nK:\nWell it depends what steps you're suggesting he' going to take.\nH:q We re not. We're not going to be so foolhardy to suggest--it's just\nthat he will try to be very decisive. To bring this thing to a completion.\nAs far as we suggest anything, it will be that he'll privately or publicly\npretty well accept what's been negotiated in Paris and present it to\nthe South Vietnamese for their approval in a forceful way. I'm\nassuming that Haig will be gone in a day or so, is that true.\nK:\nI don't know. They don't tell me anything. He free wheels all over\nthe place. When do you close.\nH:\nWe close tomorrow. Are you going to brief tomorrow?\nK:\nI may.\nH:\nWell, will you be able to give anything substantive about where do we\ngo from here.\nK:\nNo. Why don't you wait until after and then you'll get a better feel\nfor where we stand.\nH:\nAll right. Are the two Reston columnists pretty much on the mark.\nI know they're from Paris.\nK:\nYeah, but the second one the first one he have had a brief talk\nwith me but really not quite on the subject he wrote. The second one\nhe did entirely on his own.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nH:\nBut he did make the point about--just try to put everything together\nas best we can. The question of legality or whatever it is, is a\nsticking point with the South Vietnamese. The Sovereignty is the - -\nwere we far off if adopt that.\nK:\nWell, I'd stay away from the sovereignty word.\nH:\nWell, that we figure is too strong a word, but just the hell it's all\nin the context of a political future of South Vietnam.\nK:\nFrom the point of view of not having a legal basis for constant North\nVietnamese intervention, yes.\nH:\nIt's a question of political legitimacy of the North Vietnamese in\nSouth Vietnam. How many of the PRG are in the North Vietnamese\ntroops.\nK:\nThe PRG is something else from the North Vietnamese.\nH:\nOkay. Well I'll just look forward to the briefing tomorrow.\nK:\nI think you may do that. You're just translating it.\nH:\nFrom the original Vietnamese, huh.\nK:\nThat's right.\nH:\nYou don't have David Engel, can you think without him anymore.\nK:\nNot really.\nH:\nOkay.\n[Tape change here] Okay, we'll wait until tomorrow.\nK:\nOkay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nNick Thimmesch/Mr. Kissinger\n6:15 p.m., December 15, 1972\nT:\nHello, Henry, your secretary has demoted you to Mister.\nK:\nNo, that's a promotion. I know how PHDs are acquired.\nT:\nAll right. Sir, just a few things I want to have straight in my mind here\nbefore I sit down and try to put this together. When you discussed the\nbusiness about intervention, I gather then that withdrawal of North Vietnamese\ntroops is not in the agreement then.\nK:\nWell, we've never said it was.\nT:\nYeah, but I just wanted to make absolutely sure that that was not in the\nagreement and that\nwas understood that they would be allowed to keep\ntheir troops there but --\nK:\nBut not to reinforce them.\nT:\nYeah. But the issue is then intervention meaning they could take military\nactions.\nK:\nWell, I just don't want to go any further into it.\nT:\nintervention means whether it's --\nK:\nWell, a constant right to intervene. There's a difference between Well,\nI just don't want to go into this. Between what will have to be a process\nof attrition and a process of constant right to intervene in South Vietnamese\naffairs.\nT:\nPolitical and military?\nK:\nYes.\nT:\nOkay. All right. Well, I've got that one straightened out then. Now on\nthis supervisory body, is the question there over the makeup of it or the\nrole and the rules of operation or\nK:\nMore the role and rules of operation.\nT:\nThe role and rules of operation. There's no dispute over the nations that\nhave been mentioned; there's none of those are unacceptable I gather than.\nK:\nWell, that No.\nT:\nOkay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nNick Thimmesch/Mr. Kissinger\n6:15 p. m., December 15, 1972\nK:\nBut I really, Nick, cannot go into the agreement in detail.\nT:\nAll right. Well, I just needed things though that were said between us; I\njust wanted to get them clear in my mind.\nK:\nRight.\nT:\nHere's something I did not bring up and I should have. The Cambodians\nrecently have made statements to the effect they don't press the North\nVietnamese on this. Can you tell me anything about that?\nK:\nWell, I think the reservoir of trust in the North Vietnamese is not unlimited.\nTo put it mildly.\nT:\nAll right. That's across the board or is that just Cambodia?\nK:\nWell, I think that's - I don't think the South Vietnamese trust the North\nVietnamese particularly. But we're not asking anyone to trust them.\nT:\nRight. Now on this business about a possible trip to Saigon by yourself,\nis that a decision as to whether to go or when to go?\nK:\nThat's a decision that has to be made yet by the President.\nT:\nYeah.\nK:\nWho is to go and when.\nT:\nOh, it's not clear then that you will go alone?\nK:\nWell, that will become apparent before your column can be printed.\nT:\nAll right. Now you talked about six months and one year -- yo u used those\ntwo terms there -- you would never make a decision without planning on\nsix months to one year -- it would last six months to one year. Now that's\na little vague in my notes here.\nK:\nNo, no; I said it doesn't do us any good to have an agreement that falls\napart in a year.\nT:\nOh, so any agreement that would make you would want reasonable assurance\nthat it would last at least one year.\nK:\nOh, no, don't pay any attention to that. That was just a figure of speech.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 3 -\nNick Thimmesch/Mr. Kissinger\n6:15 p.m., December 15, 1972\nT:\nI see. The time doesn't mean anything then?\nK:\nWell, except that it should last indefinitely.\nT:\nYeah. Okay. That's kind of a qualitative statement rathern than quanitative\nthen?\nK:\nThat's right.\nT:\nThis is just a little technical thing that I'm curious about, how do you\nkeep in contact with Hanoi? Is that done through --\nK:\nI can't tell you that.\nT:\nIs it by radio or telephone or what is it?\nK:\nNo, not telephone. And not radio either but we have very good\ncommunications.\nT:\nAll right. It's direct contact though. I mean, in terms of telecommunications\nyou have direct contact with them?\nK:\nNo, not from here.\nT:\nNo, all right. Now is there to be a press briefing tomorrow?\nK:\nWe' re thinking of it.\nT:\nYou're thinking about it?\nK:\nRight.\nT:\nOkay. If there is a briefing, how will you be identified there? Are they\ngoing to have --\nK:\nNo, no, I'll be quoted.\nT:\nYou will be quoted?\nK:\nYeah.\nT:\nWill you be covering the same material you and I discussed?\nK:\nI doubt it.\nT:\nYou doubt it?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 4 -\nNick Thimmesch/Mr. Kissinger\n6:15 p.m., December 15, 1972\nK:\nYeah.\nT:\nAll right. Well, then I'll keep this as masked as possible then.\nK:\nRight. If it should be different, then you can of course use it more freely.\nT:\nYeah. Well, my problem is that they will have to mail this tonight you see.\nK:\nWell, we haven't definitely decided yet what I should do and how.\nT:\nI see. But there's no decision that you will definitely brief the press\ntomorrow?\nK:\nNo, although it's sort of leaning towards it.\nT:\nLeaning towards it at 11 o'clock.\nK:\nI guess 11:30.\nT:\n11:30. All right.\nK:\nOkay, Nick.\nT:\nThank you for calling back and again I say it, I don't like to press you all\nthe time. I mean, I -- when I ask to see you or --\nK:\nNo, no; you can be sure when you ask to see, I'll try to do it in a reasonable\ntime.\nT:\nThat's why I try to be stearing that way.\nK:\nRight.\nT:\nOkay.\nK:\nBye.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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