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    "title": "February 27-28, 1973",
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    "ocrText": "Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger\n- 2 -\n6:32 p.m., February 28, 1973\nR:\n(cont'd) to the 25%. It would hurt us there very seriously because I\nknew that would not appeal to her. But I did mention that all of our\npeople felt that our vote against it also would probably result in very\naction by the Libyans against our installations in Libya and\npossibly attacks on our aircraft. But she felt quite emotional about it\nand obviously had not been briefed at all by her people on it. They just\ntold her about it. Now the interesting thing is, Henry, when she came\nin, we went to my office and had a very pleasant discussion about -- I told\nher all about our talks with Ismail and also with Hussein. We then threw\nthe lunch. Rabin whenever Mrs. Meir was talking, both before we went\ninto lunch and afterward, he kept saying this is a business lunch. He\nwould shuffle his papers and look at his watch when she was talking, you\nknow she likes to talk, and he would interrupt her at one point after\nanother. We took up the production of planes, the supply of planes, the\nIraqi treatment of Jews and to what degree could we help and the exit\ntax and the entire problem with regard to Russia. All in all, this went\nalong very well. We had very nice toasts. They grasped it well and then\nshe just brought up this. Up to that time she showed no -- she knew all\nabout it all the time. It wasn't something she just learned. She knew it\nwhen she came in.\nK:\nWell, I thought I would hear something from her during the day. When\nI didn't, I thought it was all worked out.\nR:\nWell, we thought it was too.\nK:\nWell, okay. Don't let's worry about it, it's done.\nR:\nI don't know what else we could have done really, Henry.\nK:\nYeah. I don't know either. Look, Cromer called me and said that\nRumsfeld was as anesthetic today as ever.\nR:\nWell, he was not supposed to have been.\nI'm sending a cable out\ntonight, which your office is resisting and I told them if they did resist\nit, for you to call me. Sending a cable out telling them that our big\nproblem has been that we wanted to avoid a stalemate, which we felt\nsure we would lose with the Russians, and if we turned it into a publicity\nitem which we are sure to have to give way, it would mean of course\nthat we enter the negotiations looking over-anxious and weak. This\nprocedural thing -- this should be treated as a procedural thing, although\nwe do know it's substantive, of course, and not be turned into a big issue.\nBut now it turns out, we say in the cable, that instead our allies are\nmisinterpreting this somewhat and feeling that we are bringing pressure\nto bear on them and that this we do not want to do and we're not going to\nmake any more demarches in capitals for the time being. We will take"
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