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Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger
- 4 -
6:32 p.m., February 28, 1973
R:
Well, that's the point.
K:
of locale but not of person.
R:
I'm afraid
K:
But you will be Acting Secretary that day, won't you because --
R:
I will be Acting Secretary.
Well,
/
K:
That makes it possible.
R:
We will be able to eat in the Secretary's dining room.
K:
Okay.
R:
Henry, I might just tell you this -- in case you want to see the President.
I'm writing this to you -- The Israelis pressed very, very hard with
regard to producing planes. I told them that we were studing it very
carefully, that there were many angles involved and that frankly, I
thought in this emotion-charged atmosphere of the Libyan planes, to
announce this would not be to their advantage or to our advantage but
that that had nothing to do with our studing it and that we were studing
it very sympathetically and while we couldn't say yes as of now, certainly
we were not being negative in any way. That this is an issue of course
that would reach the President. They also pushed very hard with regard
to trying to get the 36 Thou from the 30 Phantoms. You know, our plan
is to say --
K:
Yeah, I know it.
R:
I told them that the big thing was for us to try to supply on a steady basis
whatever is sufficient to keep them strong because their strength has kept
the Middle East ceasefire in effect. And that we might even want to study
instead of the sporadic crisis things, which have been true in the past,
the program over the next four years or five years or over a longer
period. We might not think this advisable but it should be studied. And
that we therefore were not in the position to give a decision right now
but that politically and every other way, there was no change and we
intended to support them and be steadfast in their support. Now it could
very well be that if the President sees fit to do so, because of this Icao
thing and in order that she can take som ething back with here, the
President would want to tell them now that we are going to -- if they want
to go ahead, as she says they do want to, on the production of the planes,
we will see to it that they do get an affirmative answer in the proper time.
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"ocrText": "Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger\n- 4 -\n6:32 p.m., February 28, 1973\nR:\nWell, that's the point.\nK:\nof locale but not of person.\nR:\nI'm afraid\nK:\nBut you will be Acting Secretary that day, won't you because --\nR:\nI will be Acting Secretary.\nWell,\n/\nK:\nThat makes it possible.\nR:\nWe will be able to eat in the Secretary's dining room.\nK:\nOkay.\nR:\nHenry, I might just tell you this -- in case you want to see the President.\nI'm writing this to you -- The Israelis pressed very, very hard with\nregard to producing planes. I told them that we were studing it very\ncarefully, that there were many angles involved and that frankly, I\nthought in this emotion-charged atmosphere of the Libyan planes, to\nannounce this would not be to their advantage or to our advantage but\nthat that had nothing to do with our studing it and that we were studing\nit very sympathetically and while we couldn't say yes as of now, certainly\nwe were not being negative in any way. That this is an issue of course\nthat would reach the President. They also pushed very hard with regard\nto trying to get the 36 Thou from the 30 Phantoms. You know, our plan\nis to say --\nK:\nYeah, I know it.\nR:\nI told them that the big thing was for us to try to supply on a steady basis\nwhatever is sufficient to keep them strong because their strength has kept\nthe Middle East ceasefire in effect. And that we might even want to study\ninstead of the sporadic crisis things, which have been true in the past,\nthe program over the next four years or five years or over a longer\nperiod. We might not think this advisable but it should be studied. And\nthat we therefore were not in the position to give a decision right now\nbut that politically and every other way, there was no change and we\nintended to support them and be steadfast in their support. Now it could\nvery well be that if the President sees fit to do so, because of this Icao\nthing and in order that she can take som ething back with here, the\nPresident would want to tell them now that we are going to -- if they want\nto go ahead, as she says they do want to, on the production of the planes,\nwe will see to it that they do get an affirmative answer in the proper time."
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