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    "ocrText": "2.\nCromer/kissinger\nC: I discussed with.\nK: If they are not even prepared to see what we can do, then no guarantees\nby us will have the slightest significance. If the Soviets don't join us in\nquieting things down, you have to assume collusion before\nWe are not prepared to take them on. It is in the interest of everybody,\nincluding Western Europe, not to run across us in this particular\ninstance.\nC: When would the Security Council me et?\nK: I have called Dobrynin. We have had already a reply from the\nSoviets. -- and I will not give anybody else the full flavor of this --\nIf the General Assembly turns into a propaganda battle, we will be\nunreachable for the rest of the week. No matter what beautiful speeches are\ngiven in New York. We will not then be as easy to deal with as we are now. On\nthe other hand, we are willing to cooperate now to proceed on a neutral\nline.\nC: Sure.\nK: We will wait\n-- I have given him until 5:00 an we will wait an extra\nhour until 6:00 this evening, to produce a reply from Moscow. If not, I\nhave been asked by the President to ask Ambassador Scali to call for a\nSecurity Council meeting. We will not be condemnatory at the meeting unless the\nSoviets turn towards the Arabs. Wewill be very grateful. If your representative\ncould be instructed to coordinate support.\nC: will get on this right away.\nK: Let me know what your representative is instructed to do?\nC: Was this completely out of the blue, as it is to me?\nK: Oh, yes, the first time -- and this is for your Prime Minister\nwe were requesting intelligence reports, even called in the Israeli\nAmbassador to check our intelligence, they predicted fully defensive pre-\nparations. I got a report this morning. They were still maintaining that\nlast night. We received the first confirmation this morning. Then I got\non the telephone, gave assurances to everybody\nbut three hours later it\nstarted.\nC: You have got friends, like in North VietNam and other parts of\nthe world, they are a little unreliable.\nK: In Moscow, you mean?"
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