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K:
OK. Well, I've got to talk to him.
S:
Because I think the moment they became aware and I think from that
moment on they began trouble making.
K:
Yeah. Even if that is so it's water under the bridge.
S:
Indeed it is and there is no effort here to second guess an expoert on it.
But the important point Henry Is that I think that the Chinese here all
along have under-estimated the militancy of the Algerians on this
and are not yet experienced enough to deal with the Algerians and
and Algerians decide that they are going to bring along the hole and
athe line with it and it's partly in expedious despite all of the good will
and sincerity they have and readiness to stand up for the deal but this
presents us with an exceedingly difficult as you may have noted from
the last two cables that we have sent because our
and
particularly the Koreans are dreadfully worried that the Chinese
despite their good intent will not be able to deliver.
K:
It looks that way now.
S:
And we kept reassuring them that well, give the Chinese a chance.
K:
In this message the Chinese are blaming it all on the Soviets.
S:
Well, I don't doubt that at all. But if it's the Soviets, the Soviets
are working very closely with the nonalign namely the Algerians and
the rest.
K:
No question.
S:
And this makes whatever alternative strategy we persue that much more
risky because.
K:
Well, there was no way the Soviets could not learn about it was there.
S:
But that's water over the bridge.
K:
Well, how was that.
S:
Because this was a deal we had cut very exclusively and secretly
with the Chinese. On all sorts of honor that it would not be disclosed
to anyone.
K:
OK Jo hn, I just wanted you to know where the ghing stood.
S:
Well, all I can say Henry is I am willing to try any avenue and of
course we'll seek any alternative way of pulling this thing out
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"ocrText": "K:\nOK. Well, I've got to talk to him.\nS:\nBecause I think the moment they became aware and I think from that\nmoment on they began trouble making.\nK:\nYeah. Even if that is so it's water under the bridge.\nS:\nIndeed it is and there is no effort here to second guess an expoert on it.\nBut the important point Henry Is that I think that the Chinese here all\nalong have under-estimated the militancy of the Algerians on this\nand are not yet experienced enough to deal with the Algerians and\nand Algerians decide that they are going to bring along the hole and\nathe line with it and it's partly in expedious despite all of the good will\nand sincerity they have and readiness to stand up for the deal but this\npresents us with an exceedingly difficult as you may have noted from\nthe last two cables that we have sent because our\nand\nparticularly the Koreans are dreadfully worried that the Chinese\ndespite their good intent will not be able to deliver.\nK:\nIt looks that way now.\nS:\nAnd we kept reassuring them that well, give the Chinese a chance.\nK:\nIn this message the Chinese are blaming it all on the Soviets.\nS:\nWell, I don't doubt that at all. But if it's the Soviets, the Soviets\nare working very closely with the nonalign namely the Algerians and\nthe rest.\nK:\nNo question.\nS:\nAnd this makes whatever alternative strategy we persue that much more\nrisky because.\nK:\nWell, there was no way the Soviets could not learn about it was there.\nS:\nBut that's water over the bridge.\nK:\nWell, how was that.\nS:\nBecause this was a deal we had cut very exclusively and secretly\nwith the Chinese. On all sorts of honor that it would not be disclosed\nto anyone.\nK:\nOK Jo hn, I just wanted you to know where the ghing stood.\nS:\nWell, all I can say Henry is I am willing to try any avenue and of\ncourse we'll seek any alternative way of pulling this thing out"
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