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    "ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n1\nTelcon\nHAK and Kenneth Rush (4 pp.)\n3/30/74\nB\nSANITIZED\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations\n25\nFOLDER TITLE\n1974 23-30 march 6)\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential ibrary\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED 1989-235-084/00024\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMiss Peer/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n9:20 A.M.\nK: Hello.\nP: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.\nK: How are you?\nP: This is very heroic of you when you are just about to leave, and I will\nmake it very fast.\nK; I am leaving later in the day.\nP: Yes, I know, but I really do appreciate it because it is terrible\nhelpful to the story and it is very gracious of you. The cover we are\ndoing is a very long profile which means both professional and sorta\npersonal look at Barbara. The first thing I would be interested in\nknowing, is how you evaluate her as a journalist--how tough an interviewer\nis she ?\nK: I think she is very persistent interviewer, and quite tough. She has a\ngreat ability to get to the heart of the question and not to quit.\nP: Has she ever asked you on television a question that you really did not\nwish to answer?\nK: Yes.\nP: Which one?\nK: I don't won't to tell you. No but several times.\nP: She several times what?\nK: She several times asked me questions that I really didn't want to answer.\nP: But you did.\nK: Well I, Yes, because she wouldn't let me get away any evasion.\nP: Is she, taking the last interview for example when you about a year ago,\nI am told privately that you had said privately to people at CBS. Barbara\ntold me this and said it was all right to pursue it with you, that her questions\nwere tougher than Marvin Kalb's. Is this anything I can use newsworthy?\nK: No. I don't want to make individuals\nP: No I can appreciate that. One of the problems of the story is trying\nto\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPeer/Kissinger\n-2-\nher\nK: Well/questions, incidentally on what basis are we talking here?\nP: On the record.\nK: Well then will you read back to me whatever quotes you are going to use ?\nP: Yes, I will. Would you like for me to start right now?\nK: No, let's get through and you can then tell me what quotes you are going to use.\nHer questions were more personal.\nP: Than what?\nK: Than some of the other interviews that I have had.\nP: Do you as the interviewee consider that a good or bad thing?\nK: I am very fond of Barbara, so I, its, I don't say, you know it makes\nit a different interview.\nP: In what sense ?\nK: Because it's more personal.\nP: It is my thesis in writing the piece is that this is one of the reasons\nshe gets particularly in her long interviews with people some of the\nnews that she does get because it is a human interview as well as a news\ninterview. Would you share that?\nK: I think that , yea, that makes sense.\nP: How do you see Barbara as a woman?\nK: She is a very good hearted, warm person and she has been very good\nfriend.\nP: Are there any particular examples when she has gone out of her way\nto be\nkind or do something for you.\nK: She has always been a good friend.\nK: I think I have said as much as I am going to say.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nPeer/Kissinger\n3/23/74 9:20 AM\nP: Let me just ask you two last questions. I don't know you if in you\nbusy life in the White House and State have had time to read the longer\npieces that have been written about Barbara.\nK: No.\nP: A lot of them have been very one dimensional sorta Sammy gleb\nWalters what makes her run. What do you think the people at large\nwho don't know her don't understand about this woman? or don't\nappreciate.\nK: Well, I think she is an exceptionally warm-hearted person and a\nwith a great capacity for friendship and not at all a pushey aggressive\ngirl.\nP: You say this even after an interview?\nK: Even after an interview.\nP: Uh, let's see.\nK: OK, I've got to run.\nP: One last question. You have been renowned in Washington for\nyour success and power obviously, and the fact that in Washington\nas we all know, power makes, tends to make a man very attractive\nand sorta sexy. Do you think it does in a woman? Is success or\nsuccess in power do they enhance a woman's attractions.\nK: Not to me. I don't think SO.\nI mean, certainly not power. I don't think that has anything to do with it.\nCertainly not in my relation with here. That is her power.\nP: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. Do you want me to read back\nwhat I have taken down?\nK:\nK: Well, would you call me and just read me the quotes you want to use\nafter you have taken it down?\nP: OK. I don't think there is, certainly the calibre I can well appreciate\nthat it is\nK: Look, why don't you call me back and just check the quotes.\nP: OK,\nK: Good. Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nP: Thank you so much. Have a goodetrassified\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nG. Hauge/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n10:00 a.m.\nK: I am calling you about the Under Secretary position for Economic Affairs\nin the Department and as you know Casey has left to become head of the EXIM\nBank. And one of my big problems is to get a better relationship between\npolitical and economic objectives. And we haven't ever really been organized\nwell in the State Dept. to do this. And with Shultz leaving it becomes even\nmore important. I was wondering if whether by any wild chance one might\nbe able to induce you to take this?\nH: Well, I think it would be an exceedingly wild chance Henry. I am in the\nmidst here of a very considerable operation. I have been Chairman for\nabout 2 1/2 years. I have got about four plus some to go.\nK: Four years to go.?\nH: For some years to go for retirement. I turned 60 years old Henry.\nI am getting to be an ancient of days. And so, I am pretty well ruted\nin here I think for the duration.\nK: Well I am sorry to hear that.\nH: I took over when Mr. McNeal retired and I have got a good young\npresident, but he isn't ready to take over yet by any means.\nHe is 41 years olds, he is best president in the business. But you know\nhow it is this is a small operation compared to some of those down there\nbut.\nK: I know, but it is an important one.\nH: And not a simple one to operate.\nK: That I am certain of.\nH: But Henry I certainly will put my mind to this immediately to see if\nI have any thoughts. being useful to you.\nK: But could you? It almost has to be somebody who knows something\nabout Washington, don't you think.\nH: Yes, indeed.\nK: There are a lot of bright businessmen one knows, but they couldn't\nreally do it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\n-2-\nHauge/Secretary Kissinger\nH: And in addition I think somebody who can cope with Treasury.\nK: Exactly.\nH: The State Department hasn't been able to do that for a long.\nK: And deservedly so, because it hasn't since Dillon they haven't really\nhad anyone here.\nH: Precisely. Henry, I will turn my mind to this and are you leaving\nshortly.\nK: I am leaving tonight, but you can call Ken :Rush.\nH: I'll call Ken Rush. I know him very well.\nK: I would appreciate it. very much.\nH: Right to Henry. All the best.\nK: Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n12:34 PM\nK: Hello\nS: Yes sir.\nK: If the Fahmy letter has been cleared I have not seen it.\nS: Well there is one I read in the pink this morning, Mr. Secretary.\nLet me recheck it again.\nK: Can you get it sent in here.\nS: Sure, right a way.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\nK: That isn't the letter I wanted. I wanted a friendly letter you know\ntelling him that we would, we are under great preassure from the\nSoviets, but that no matter what noises he hears from Moscow,\nto believe only what I tell him. You see what I mean.\nS: Yes. All right. We will get that to you.\nK: And that we are staying on the course we had indicated.\nS: Around the course.\nK: You understand.\nS: Yes, I understand what you are saying.\nK: Good Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n1:00 PM\nD: Hello\nK: Communications from your Government which Eagleburger has handed\nto me. Let me make a number of points: First of all, I am sending it\nback to you, I refuse to accept it, and you can tell them that.\nD: This is not the communications that I was suppose to hand to you.\nK: At any rate. Just tell them I have refused to accept the first part\nof it in any form in which it has been communicated. Secondly, if you\nthink if it is in your interest to bring this matter to a head while I am\nin Moscow, you go right ahead and do it.\nD: But we don't think it is in our interest to bring it to a head.\nK: Thirdly, if Dayan doesn't come, I'll radraw from the negotiation\nand state publicly what has happened and you do what you want.\nAnd then we will put somebody else in charge here. We have now\ncommunicated to other Governments that Dayan is coming. Your behavior\nis\noutrageous and frivolous and you know dam well we have told Sadat\nthey should be removed by the time we fly our next plane. you know very\nwell that he has told us the tanks would be removed and has not refused\nto withdraw the artillery. I have communicated with Fahmy yesterday\nSO it is entirely up to you, if you want to play domesticate politics\nyou go ahead and do it, but I think and you just communicate this to the\nPrime Minister, I don't care to debate it. I cannot accept this communication\nin any of its points. We are talking about 72 lousy artillery piéces which\nwe have told you we would get removed and if you can't understand why\nwe wanted to get to Sadat personally for the first time we flew a mission\nand why it was so desir able to do if after the embargo had been lifted\nthen and why we wanted to have the military photographer interpreter\nthere who could explain it to him.\nD: We understand this.\nK: So then the first part of your thing is just totally unacceptable but\nif you don't like our reconnaissance you do your own reconnaissance,\nwe would be delighted to stop it.\nD: Can I say something Mr. Secretary.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nDinitz/Kissinger 3/23\n-2-\nK: YOu can say something but I don't want to debate it.\nD: I would not say it for the sake of debate of an argument. I think\nyour reply to me now is based on the wrong assumption. It is assumed\nthat we don't come or that we are looking for a reason not to come.\nThe fact of the matter is so the Prime Minister and the Minister of\nDefense are very anxious to carry these negotiations and for DAyan\nto come. The point is that we are asking your help in moving\nK: You have my help. I sent a cable last night in which I made\nessentially the points you asked me to except I didn't make them\nconditional and I still don't believe I 've told you for months not to\nink\nlength Syria and Egypt together.\nD: We are not lengthing Syria and Egypt together, but you will have\nto understand Mr. Secretary the situation in Isareal there is now\nquestioning these violations and a question of creditability of the\ngovernment.\nK: If by the time you get ready to settle it, there is still violations\nthen you have a point. If at a time when you have been assured by the\nU.S. Government one, that the tanks would be withdrawn; two, that\nwe are in active discussion with the Egyptians about the artillery being\nwithdrawn; three, when you have the backing of the Government to get\nit withdrawn, but when we are pleading with you not to make an issue\nof it with the Egyptians, who are under attack from the Soviets alreay.\nD: Yes, but this is not the question we are making an issue with the\nEgyptians. We are really appealing to you to help us.\n1\nK: That we are doing. I have already done it last night and if after\nthe next flight they are still there then we have a real problem. I have\nin any case told them to remove it as quickly as possible.\nD: Isn't it possible Mr. Secretary they can remove it by Tuesday\nwhen the\nexpects\nK: Maybe it is. I am not saying it isn't. The method we used was the\nright one. The method you using is wasting a lot prestige for nothing.\nD: We are not using any method, but we are under attack and we are only\ncommunicating with you. We have not communicated with public ly\non any of these methods. We are trying to bring the situation, to rectify\nthe situation SO that everything can proceed, this is our only interest.\nWe have no interest in\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDinitz/Kissinger\n3/23\n-3-\nK: I told you, you could say that we have told you that by the next time.\nWell you can't use the reconnaissance publicly.\nD: I called the Prime Minister after our conversation last night.\nK: Well at any rate, I sent message to the Egyptians last night. No we\nhave made all the points you wanted us to make.\nD: Can I say to the Prime Minister that you have asked the Egyptians\nto remove the artillery and that you last night sent message to the\nEgyptians asking them to remove the artillery and rectify the violations\nas quickly as possible?\nK: Yes, but that is the second time we have done it.\nD: It is the second time you have done it and the\nK: And they have never refused to do.\nD: And they have not refused to do it. And\nK: I have no question that they will do it. Why should they want to cheap\nwith 72 artillery pieces?\nD: I don't understand it either. That is why Dayan says that he thinks\nthat a strong plea by you would be responded by them. He doesn't think\nit is a major method for them to move these\nK: We have made a strong plea. Now I will not tell this to the President\nuntil 6 p.m. tonight, when I talk to him. Now if you want to get me a\nreaction from Israel, you can do it up until then.\nD: I will communicate to the Prime Minister and Dayan.\nK: But I must say two things, one, it cannot be in your interest to have\na public confrontation with Sadat.\nD: Mr. Secretary. this is the one point.\nK: Secondly, you cannot want to emphasize violations while I am in Moscow\nfor god's sakes.\nD: That is why we want to solve the thing before you go. I mean if we\nhave this assurance that you have done all what you could.\nK: You have the assurance, you can tell them that we have personally\nintervened with the Egyptians. However, it isn't helpful to have all of\nthis in your gd knitze(?) Well then it will be on every Moscow radio station\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDinitz/Kissinger 3/23\n-4-\nto the Middle East.\nD: But that is not up to us, Mr. Secretary. When the opposition\ntables a motion for the agenda as they did, We can't stop it.\nI can assure you we are intereted in a debate or in foreign affairs\nsecurity because that is the last thing in the world we are interested,\nand this is not a threat, Dayan ask me to tell you; tell the Secretary\nwe are not threating him, we are not using C\nleverage. But it\nwould be physically impossible for me if I have to debate and give evidence\nand the thing is not rectified. They say the Minister of Defense of the\ncountry does not leave when the agreement is violated and believe me\nMr. Secretary\nK: But look I am holding this thing together against all probability\nhere. If he doesn't come, I'm going on vacation. If the Middle East\nexplodes in a nuclear war, I've canceled too many visits. If haveasked\nthe Syrians to come here on April 11. If this whole scenario which has\nbeen designed in order to give xoxgi you the maximum amount of time\nfalls apart and you make the Egyptians who are trying to help us\nfor this, then I can't do any more.\nD: But is it so difficult for them to do this before Tuesday? Then\neverything is set in motion again. I mean really if surely.\nK: I don't know whether it is that difficult for them because I can't go\nto Sadat every other day. I now have to go to kx Fahmy. Fahmy is\nmuch tougher on these things than Sadat.\nD: I understand. But if you have asked for Sadat to do this then he\nowes you an answer.\nK: What I asked Sadat was, thinking that we were dealing with rational\npeople, that by the next time our planes would flixghtx fly, 6 or 7 days,\nI expected that they would not find these things there. I didn't ask\nhim to reply to it, because I wanted to do it in a face saving way\nSO that the next time we could report they weren't there. I have\nattempted precisely to avoid having him to back down. This is\nexactly my strategy.\nD: I understand.\nK: Now when we are flying next È. I don't know but it will certainly be\nnext week.\nD: I understand this but this is, we are also\nrectify this out of the\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDinitz/Kissinger 3/23/74\n-5-\nK: And therefore, I know we are flying next week sometime because\nI have just approved it. I don't know the exact ate date on which we are\nflying. But it will take two days to get the pictures after that.\nD: Maybe if you fly on Tuesday and then we can get the pictures by\nThursday and then he can leave on Thursday and be here on Friday.\nI am simply trying to find a way out of a situation that is really\nimpossible. Not that we are looking for it, Mr. Secretary after\nall, we really have meticulously done everything in the agreement.\nif\nK: Yes, but I am confident that/the Egyptians violate the agreement\nthey won't do it with 72 artillery pieces and you know it too.\nD: That is correct and that is\nK: And therefore, we are not talking about anything but a technical\nviolation which I am sure will be rectified if you do it in our way\nand if you put Israel on war footing over there then keep the defense\nminister there and fake a great crisis.\nD: No we are\nK: When you have Syria to worry about then you can go right ahead\nand do it.\nD: Mr. Secretary, but you surely believe me that it is not to our\ninterest either to make a crisis out of this or to put The Secretary\nof the country in a war or delay coming of the Secretary of Defense\nnor of which is to our interest and not only you and I understand it\nbut Golda and Dayan understand it. What we want is a way that all\nthese things would not happen. If the thing is out in the public\nIt has all been kept secret, that is a differenct situation. SX But since\nthe thing is all in the public, we are trying to find a way in which\nthe Minister can come as scheduled which the Egyptians will rectify\nthe situation and in which we can rectify the Syrian situation. I mean\nthis is precisely what to do. The Prime Minister says we gave credit\nhere, continue to give credit and\nwith Sadat. We really want\nto do S this and I said to Larry Dayan told me on the telephone he\nhadn't even thought about our second line defense after we would lose\nSinai because we don't want to make it a permanent line. And as a\nresult of it wait for nobility there. I mean, I passed it on to Larry\nas a kick of information. And this just shows to what phase we are\nmeeting. Now we have a very serious public situation to face and\nthis is not of our making. And this other question Mr. Secretary\nyou tell me you can't be concerned with gd domestic politics, it is\nnot domestic.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDinitz/Kissinger\n-6-\n3/23/74\nK: Oh, come on if you can't explain that you have been asked by the\nU.S. Government to that all we are talking about are 72 artillery\npieces and that you want to wait axxix until another inspection after\nwhich you will of course pay the different thing. Really if the public (Israeli)\nis SO stupid not to understand that then WXEX I think we are in bad trouble.\nFor all I know they may be gone by next Tuesday. We didn't ask him.\nWe avoided what you are forcing us into.\nD: Well we are not really forcing you into any Mr. Secretary.\nK: Well, look, it is up to you. The fact is , his not coming will become\nknown just as I will being leaving Moscow, which is going to be tough enough\nas it is.\nD: No, No, I don't think we should face a situation\nIt is best for us\nWe are trying\nK: I regret that I have already put in I have sent a long cable to Fahmy\nyesterday after our discussion explaining to him that 6 batteries is 36 pieces\nnot 72 and I said it would be unfortunate in deed if this matter were to cast\na cloud over the excellent record so far metitously observed at the disengagement\nagreement. Then at the end I said you should tell Fahmy that the Israelis\nhave just contacted me with an urgently that the artillery fleet in excess of 36 pieces\nbe withdrawn.in order prevent this discussion from becoming a major political\nissue in Israeli with all the unfortunate repercussions and complications\nthat cause for what we are seeking to accomplish together in preparing\nthe atmosphere and way for the ongoing peace effort with Syria. So I have\nmade the\nD: That is correct Mr. kSecretary. The only thing that maybe I can suggest\nis that if this things can be achieved before the session of the UN that would\nremove the whole issue from the public line and would facilitate the whole\noperation. I mean this is only one point that\ncan make\nbecause I think that will allow us to\nK: I will make that point today. It is a grave mistake. It is a grave mistake\nyou are forcing us into and you\nD: Why, Mr. Secretary?\nK: It is a mistake because I am certain the next time we fly the gd things\nwon't be there. I know Sadat; he isn't going to risk his relations with us\nfor 72 artillery pieces. You are now forcing us to force them to back\ndown in writing.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDinitz/Kissinger\n-7-\n3/23/74\nD: They don't to put it down in writing.\nK: I cannot ask our Ambassador to see Sadat three times a week.\nTherefore, it has to go through channels, therefore, there will be a\nwritten recored of it.\nD: Suppose you make reconnaisance Tuesday then send it\nK: I don't know when our reconnaisance is flying. I am going to find that out.\nD: I am just trying to find a way\nThere is no need to make a crisis.\nIt is no good to any of us. Iam trying to convey and be as honest as I can\nK: Look I know you were honest about. Look, I won't tell the President\nuntil about six o'clock, if there is anything you want to modify fine, or\notherwise I will have to send a piece of paper to him in a synopsis form.\nD: (inaudible) Well I be talking again with my Minister.\nK: I would not recommend however that we be in a position when he is\nworried about what the Israelis do while I am out of town. I do not think\nthat is any bodby's interest.\nD: No, definitely not. (Inaudible) And Dayan said to me to tell the Secretary\nwhat we are doing is a\ntoday we have another causlty\nExcept for his diplomatic effort we would have never reacted the way we did.\nK: That I believe. Look we have this immediate problem in which your\nproposition is unacceptable. Now is we can. First part. If we had wanted\nto g cover up for it we could have done it easily and the second part is\nunacceptable.\nD: Was not in a document questioning relationship between.\nIt was a description of the situation. Which authorizes us to\nto ask you to help us rectify it.\nK: That we. I have read you what I said.\nD: I understand.\nK: I will now send another one.\nD: That is the only thing--if you can possibly send reconnaisance.\nK: I'll find out when the gd reconnaisance is.\nOK Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGeneral Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n1:17 PM\nK: Brent.\nS: Yes sir.\nK: Brent, do you know when we are flying that reconnaissance thing?\nS: The 26th, if the weather is right, that is Tuesday.\nK: Can you find out whether we can make sure that we are going to fly\nit on the 26th and whether we can get the films back by the 27th?\nIf we can let the Israelis have the problem with their parliament, and\nin fact if we could fly it on the 25th it would be that much better.\nS: I don't think. I'll check I don't think we can. It takes that much time.\nK: All right. Will you make sure it flys on the 26th and that we get a read out\non the artillery piece S xith right away.\nS: OK\nK: And hopefully on the 27th early.\nS: Sure. I think I can probably get a read out on that specific thing.\nK: OK. Thank you.\nS: Sure.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n1:25 PM\nD: Solve the problem I think.\nK: It may or may not. In either event I think you should not draw any\nconsequences until we have had a chance to work with Egyptians.\nD: No. I wouldn't\nK: I am confident when Sadat's personal emmissary was over here\nand I told him we suspected violations. And he said there is no problem,\nwe will take care of it.\nD. Yes. Well that is all what we want Mr. Secretary. We don't want\nany confrontation.\nK: Well let me know by 6 pm what I should tell the President, if any thing.\nBut you can tell the Prime Minister that we are flying weather permiting\non Tuesday.\nD: OK. And you will let the Egyptians know.\nK: I am sending a message now. I'll say we are taking the unusual step\nof letting them know so that they can take the step.\nD. Fine, I appreciate it Mr Secretary.\nK: OK\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger\n1:25 PM\nMarch 23, 1974\nK: Communication from your Government which Eagleburger has handed to me.\nLet me make a number of points: First of all, I am sending it back to you.\nI refuse\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n1:30 PM\nD: Hello.\nK: Anatoliy\nD: Oh yes, Henry, how are you?\nK: Ok\nD: Eleven o'clock?\nK: Eleven o'clock.\nD: Henry, I have list of where your children to go and how.\nK: I saw something from our Embassy. It sounded very good to me.\nD: Yes, because I received it yesterday from Gromyko and this is the\nwhole list. And if you and they want something to add there is no\nproblem.\nK: I notice you have me down for ballet again but I know I will never\nget there.\nD: The ballet is up to you to make a decision. There is no problem.\nAnything you would like to see.\nK: No, No, you had me down on my schedule for a ballet., but I don't\nthink I'll ever see it.\nD: Well when you were there as a matter of fact three evenings or four\nK: Well the first it is very difficult. So three\nD: Well maybe some good performances.\nK: Anatoliy, I had two minor things, one on. I don't know whether you\ncan help with this. My ex-wife is a little worried about too many pictures\nbeing taken of my children with all these terrorists and kidnappers around.\nIf your people at the airport could discourage pictures of my children,\nI would appreciate it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\n-2-\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974 - 1:30 PM\nD: Only the problem is with your Americans correspondents there SO\nyou would like, or you may do it in a different way. There is no problem\nwith us because if we have some photographs we will just give it to you\nwithout showing.\nK: Sure. That doesn't bother me.\nD: It is more from American side, but if you don't mind we could do it\nthis way for instance if you go out, they will stay in longer for say\nthree minutes later. -- Not to come with you.\nK: Exactly.\nD: Then they will take separate car by our security men where you will stay.\nK: I think that is better.\nD: Then there is no problem. One of our men will come from our\nForeign Ministry and pick them up and the security car will bring them\nto your residence.\nK: There is no ceremony is there ?\nD: No.\nD: So in this case I could arrange they arrive you come down and meet\nsee your children and someone will come to airplane and bring them to you.\nK: Don't you think that is better.\nD: I leave it up to you. Yes I think it is better. You shake hands and\nsomeone will accompany and then they will come.\nK: Should I make a few remarks when I arrive ?\nD: Your own people may ask you. We will not press you to make or not to\nmake. But it is really for you and your pressmen.\nThere will be no forward statement but you'll stop half a minute to chat\nwith them.\nK: Right. OK. Good.\nD: What else ?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n-3-\n3/23/\nbAN\nK: That is all. On the press band. I don't think we can have a moratorium\nBut we would be prepared to discuss a threshold.\nD: About\nK: Whether I have not really I cannot proceed without having seen that\nstudy which is not yet completed.\nD: I see.\nK: Let's put that in abeyance for the time being.\nD: Yes. Could you get it during stay in Moscow?\nK: I'll try.\nD: If not, it goes on another page and on this troops deduction is an\nidea not to go into details because you will.\nK: Well, what we discussed the other day say anything between\n5 and 10 % US/USSR we would be willing to discuss.\nD: Just as initial step, but with understanding.\nK: But with a link to a second step which would include national forces.\nD: OK, so long as those lines we discussed. He may. annoying\nnegotiations maybe as I mentioned to you just a number of troops which\nyou put there along figures I mentioned toyou privately, but those are the\nsame we understand and agreed. Half year and other half from there.\nK: Well that is more difficult.\nD: Why you don't won't to have any.\nK: No, but because we have never discussed that with any of our allies.\nD: Oh, I see.\nK: As soon as you can discuss it.\nD: OK this doesn't make issue really in this meeting.\nK: We will have chance to talk on the plane.\nD: OK, SO at eleven o'clock.\nK: Eleven O'clock.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n-4-\n3/23/74 1:30PM\nD: Yes\nK: Right\nD: Fine\nK: Bye\nD: Thank you very much.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nHHumphrey/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n1:53 PM\nK: Hello\nH: Henry.\nK: Hubert, how are you?\nH: Fine, my friend.\nK: I am going off to Moscow tonight. But I wanted to talk with you about\none matter which I know you disagree with some of the thinking here.\nWhich has to do with some use of some development loans for Viet Nam.\nH: Yea.\nK: The problem is that the oil bill alone for Viet Nam has risen by a\n$125 million as a result of the rise in prices and that almost all their\ndifficulties are caused by world inflationary treasures.\nH: I had a talk yesterday with Gen. Van Dong and the Ambassador that\nwas in here.\nK: Right.\nH: And I do understand that problem, Henry, but here is what I was worried\nabout, Henry. In fact, I am not adversed trying to help as much as possible\nin these matters, but the problem that I see and I had Gail Magee in here;\nWe got worried if you start to transfer it just stirs up such ungodly\ntroubles over here as all of my colleagues, I don't know whether we would\nbe able to get another bill out that is all.\nK: Yes.\nH: As I told Mr. Parker, you can do it this year, you got the authority\nto do it, the law is clear, you can do it.\nK: Right\nH: But right away just between us you will have Frank Church, Ted Kennedy,\nand Cranston and Abourezk and all these fellows jumping up and raising hell,\nand the Chairman of the Committee and Mansfield and all of them.\nK: Yes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHHumphrey/Kissinger\n-2-\n3/23 1:53 PM\nH: And I just got to worry about whether the short term gain was\nworth the long term risk.\nK: Well, that is a point I understand very well. I have two problems\nI don't expect you to give us the go ahead but some of our people here\nare worried if we do do it as a last resort that your willingness to\nmanage the AID Bill would be affective and that of course would be\nvery bad blow to us.\nH: Henry, I am not a petulant young man about stuff like that. I want\nto work with you. I mean I am a soldier in the ranks in things I believe\nin and I know we have some obligations there. I am not going to jump.\nK: After all the agony we went through, all of us and you perhaps more\nthan anyone, to let it all slide down now because of what is not a huge\nsum that's what bothers us.\nH: Now you have got a $54 million request in here for economic to\ntry to get that sub up to the organization.\nK: Right.\nH: Now, uh,\nK: Of course, if we got that we would not have to do the loan.\nH: I think that its my judgment that we can get most of that over here.\nThat's if we really work at it, because it isn't a large enough sum of\nmoney and it was authorized. You know we did authorize it, and we\nauthorized it with a pretty good majority, better majority than we did\nwith appropriations.\nK: Well, why don't I do this Hubert. Let's hold off a few more weeks\nto see how that supplemental goes.\nH: Right.\nK: And then if we get absolutely against it then we may have to do the loan.\nH: I understand that.\nK: And you and I am not asking for your public support at that time but for\nyour sympathy that we have to do it despite of your preference.\nH: Well, now let me assure you of this. If you have to do it, which I\nknow that, that is something that you will have to weigh very carefully\nbecause the only reason I told Parker that I looked with opposition on it\nwas because I was worried about fiscal 75 because I thought we had\nthings colled down on SEA but they are still at it. It's got us like we're\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\non heroin. You know. It is unbelie here that we get hooked on this.\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nHHumphrey/Kissinger\n3/23 1:53 PM\nK: Then they are going to crank it up again.\nH: Yes, they are trying to crank it up again. If you got to do it, just have\nyour man, just tell us when you got to do it and I'll, I'm not going to raise\nany hell about it. I am not going to join the pack.\nK: That is really all we can ask for.\nH: But I would like us to pursue the course of the supplemental if we can\nand see if we can do it the regular way.\nK: Well, why don't we hold off for 2 or 3 weeks.\nH: Yes.\nK: And see what the situation is then.\nH: I had a heart to heart talk with the Deputy Prime Minister here and\ntold him exactly what was being said around here in terms of Congress\nof you know what it is, but I have to be very honest with you, I think\nyou are wasting ammunition. You have to be frugal and you have got\nnot to over react. And you have to show some progress in your country\nin economic development, even though it is minor you have got to be able\nto show it, of course they don't get any good press here, it is impossible.\nK: It is awful. Because they are really working hard and they are caught\nby the world economic situation. Look India is taking a beating. Every\ncountry is caught by these high raw material prices.\nH: Of course, and this is the worse problem we have right now.\nAll right Henry.\nK: Good Hubert, when I get back from the Soviet Union I would like\nto sit down with you on SALT at some point because I know you have\nalways been interested in this problem.\nH: I have been. You know what, just before you go, let me say this,\nI talked the other day here with some of our people on this Jackson\namendment business. I wish we would get that damn thing off the MFN\nand MFN ought to be done really on the basis of a rather normal thing\nand if we got any argument with him it ought to be on credits. You know\na banker has a right to say before you get my money, we would like to\ntalk with you about certain things. But on MFN it seems to me that that\nis a normalized relationship that this world in this year of 1974 requires.\nAnd I think that means more to the Soviets in many ways than even the\nmoney. Because there are other places to get money. I see they\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHHumphrey/Kissinger\n-4-\n3/23/74 1:53 pm\nH: got a billion dollar plant from Germany coming up.\nK: Yea. Of course, the credits they already got, SO if they were cut off\nthat too would be taken unfriendly - as an unfriendly jesture.\nH: Well, we are not going to let that happen but\nK: But I think we could come to an understanding with the Congress\nabout the rate of lending.\nH: Yes:\nK: And that it won't go beyond a certain point unless there are certain\nthings that the Soviet Union does.\nH: Yes, I think people understand that. They really I mean a banker will\nsay to you like to they say to PANAM and PENN Central and a few others\nunless you do certain things in management we are not going to continue\nthe money.\nK: Well let's see what they are going to come up with on the immigration\nissue when I am there.\nH: Well, good luck to you, my dear friend.\nK: Thank you Hubert, and I look forward to seeing you. How is your\nhealth?\nH: Ch listen, I am feeling just great and I am so grateful I can't tell you.\nI really do. And I want to help you in any way I can.\nK: Well, you know your admirers are all praying for you.\nH: I know that. Well you do SO much, I really worry about you just between us.\nThe Lord blessed you with all kinds of strength and vitality.\nK: Well, I was very fortunate that way.\nH: Good luck on this journey friend.\nK: Thank you.\nH: You bet, Henry.\nK: Bye\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMcGeorge Bundy/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n2:23PM\nK: Mac, how are you.\nB: You're on your way aren't you?\nK: I'm on my way this evening, but since all my letters are written by others\nI wanted you to hear from me personally how much I appreciated your letters.\nB: Well, you are nice to take the time with all you've got on\nK: No, I thought it was extremely thoughtful. What you said about George Ball\nalso crossed my mind.\nB: I found myself snickering to McCloy about it SO I thought I would share it\nwith you.\nK: But I agree with your basic point. I think now that a shot has been fired\nacross the bow we can all.\nB: I think it worked better than I was afraid it would, you know I think you\nhave other people to do work for you now.\nK: That's right. I think now no European government it going to vote on\nsomething that effects our interest without getting it to us : one way or\nanother.\nB: That's right.\nK: I have had incidentally, I've had the, our own records checked on what\nwe were told when. We were told some of these things, but in such a\npeculiarly inconclusive way.\nB: They may have been. It is isolutely characteristic of the Germans.\nThey are doing it now with the French. You can see they are not being as\nfirm in conveying what they would like of the French as they are conveying\nto us what they would like to convey to the French.\nK: Yes. But, I think we can cool the confrontation.\nB: I think you already have.\nK: Exactly.\nB: I think it is four or five days better off than when I was scribbling that.\nK: But I appreciated it very Reproduced much. at What the Richard I Nixon Presidentral like to working out\nat some point in the near future is how DECLASS you gentlemen down here and\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nBundy/Kissinger\n-2-\n3/23/74\nget you read into some things SO that it is more a consultation.\nB: I think that the way to do that is, is not to put so much of your own\ntime in it. If you wanted to delegate somebody that you had confidence in,\nthen people, could come in and out as they were able to get to Washington\nand\nK: Let me work that out when I get back from the Soviet Union, because on\nthe two big issues which are going to be SALT II and the MidEast we'll\nneed every scrap of public support we can get and every bit of advice we\ncan get.\nB: I think both are going to be edgy and I think on the Middle East in\nparticular there is a need not to be longly given the climate of opinion here.\nK: And that's going to be, you know that is going to get nastier and nastier.\nB: I saw Eban in the airplane coming back the same day we were down\nthere, because he had been seeing you. And he said something cryptic\nabout what a difficult day it had been and I could see that you had begun the\neducational process.\nK: Well, I am trying to avoid a head on confrontation for as long as possible.\nB: Well, you are absolutely right. First place you would break up the\ngovernment and then it would be your fault.\nK: Exactly. Exactly. But on Syria for example, they have just got to give\nup a slice of the Golan Heights. It won't be\nB: Told\nBerlin about that who understands them better than almost\nanybody I know and he thinks they will, when they really.\nK: I think they will too. It they can figure out how to stick us with the blame\nfor it.\nB: And if they can decide if Counatry(phonetic) doesn't really matter, I\ndon't know if that is the one that doesn't really matter or not. But all\nthey have to do is find a piece of property that they, that their generals\ncan most easily part.with and you have a bargain going.\nK: That is what I think. That is what I hope any way, but even if we don't\nget a bargain going, I will then be able to split the Egyptians away from\nthe Syrians.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nBundy/Kissinger\n-3-\n3/23/74\nB: You can get the Egyptians away from the Syrians, but I'm sure\nhow far you can get them from the Saudis, which is why I worry\nabout Jerusalem.\nK: On Jerusalem something has to happen. Jerusalem, on Jerusalem\nthe Saudis will not give up.\nB: Exactly right.\nK: I hope the next move after Syria can be a major settlement with Egypt.\nB: Well if Sadat will go. It depends a little bit how far he can go and still\nsay he is keeping the solid front that he always talks about.\nK: As long\nB: He probably knows better than we do.\nK: As long as we don't call it peace I think it can go quite a distance.\nB: Yea. Well that gets theological with the Israelis.\nK: That's right. But I think the Israelis are so. if the Israelis had any\nsense they would offer the 67 porters to Egypt. And get them out of the\nwar, because for that they could get anything.\nB: I'm sure that is right. That is what you said to us the other day and\non reflection I am convinced of it. It's the government that is not\ncapable of thinking for itself though it is much the same proposition\nthat applies there that you applied to the Soviets in the context of SALT.\nK: Yea.\nB: You have to give them the menu because it is just an act against nature\nfor them to design it.\nK: But if they are not willing to give up all the territory, then maybe they\nshould settle for not getting all the peas.\nB: Well. They will do much better the other way around and their own\ndoes know that but, but.\nK: They would do a lot better the other way around because whether they\nget those 10 or 15 miles.. makes no difference in history.\nB: None.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4-\nBundy/Kissinger\n3/23/74\nK: An Som Mosaisic has become irrelevant because they can close Bal Ba Monday(?)\nB: Absolutely. All clear. You know a lot of them have begun to say it.\nI think you are right to negotiate with Dayan because at least you can say\nthat kind of thing to him.\nK: He is the only one of them who really has some strategic grasp.\nBut he may not last through that report of the investigating committee.\nB: Well, that is the trouble. How long will you be gone ?\nK: I'll be back Thursday night.\nB:\nsays you look forward to boar hunting.\nK: Inhuman. And I tell you the last time I participated in that sport, where\nI refuseded to shoot, but when you sit up in that stand, it makes you doubt\nthat prudence pays because they put out the food and about 80 boars arrive\nsimultaneously and there was one extraordinarily cautious and looked behind\nevery tree arrived late, searched the ground before he put his foot down\nand it of course got it. I'll call you when I get back.\nB: OK Have a good trip.\nK: Thank you Mac and thank you for your letter.\nB: Right.\nK: Bye\nB: Bye\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n3:35 PM\nK: But this is Saturday.\nD: I know but it is almost in our minds, the Russians, we are\nSaturday and Sunday. So it is Friday and Saturday in Russia, they are\nnot working. Henry I just received a telegram with a text of letter\nfrom Brezhnev to the President. This is an answer to his letter which\nyou mentioned to me, you remember.\nK: Yes.\nD: I will read it and then it is rather short and then would you like me\nto take it on the plane or just send it within half an hour to your office.\nK: Send it in half and hour to Scowcroft.\nD: To Scowcroft, yes.\nK: Yes.\nD: I will just read it just for you to know.\nDear Mr. President: Thank you for your message of March 21 which I\nhave read with great interest. First of all, I would like to tell you\nMr. President, that I highly appreciate and\nyour\nof the historic importance of what we have already managed to do in\nthe last year, in improvement of relations betwen the Soviet Union\nand the United States. I agree with you that our forth coming meeting\ncan and I would say should demonstrate that the relations are mutually\nbeneficial cooperation between our two people are really becoming a\npermanent factor for the general peace. General peace this is a goal\nworthy to work for. It is concrete situation listed in your letter undoubtedly\nmay\nconsideration and I am confident that exists ample opportunity to\nprovide both sides demonstrate necessary elimination realistic\napproach to come to a mutually acceptable agreement which would give\nappropriate importance to our new meeting. We will thoroughly discuss\nthe situation with your Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger,\nproceeding from then the sayings that he will have as before all necessary\npowers or\nfrom you\nD: What?\nK: You devil, you are up to it again.\nD: Well, as before necessary powers from you for reaching some\nagreements.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\n-2-\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n3/23/74 3:35 PM\nK: I know you.\nD: Please accept, Mr. President, my best wishes to you\nMarch 25\nmatters to you\nwith reservations.\nThank you.\nK:\nD: CK\nK: Anatoliy, incidentally for your information, the M. Goldman is\nrunning around town saying that you told him Moscow has lost confidence\nin me.\nD: oh,\nK: And that the only person that, that you are the only person left to\nhave any confidence in me.\nIn the present it is Washington that helps me so it doesn't, I'm not a\naffected.\nD: No, no, it is nonsense. Are you serious\nK: That 's what he said, I don't believe it, but that is what he said.\nD: How does he know?\nK: Because he said, he saw you.\nD: Yes, but we did not discuss you at all.\nK: Well\nD: In no way.\nK: No, no\nD: He knows I would be the last person to say kinds of things.\nK: Exactly.\nD: You know me for many years.\nK: Anatolivy.\nD:\nI would tell you personally but never to anybodyelse.\nat the Richard Nixon\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\n-3-\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n3/23/74 3:35 PM\nK: Look, I know that. You don't have to convince me. I just wanted to\ntell you.\nD: He is real\nMy impression he hasn't really been an admirer\nK: Ch, yes. He doesn't mean any harm.\nD: No, no.\nK: He just likes to be important.\nD: This I would agree with you. And when I will see you, I should say\nsomething else to discuss , but it is not specifically important\nK: I will see you tonight.\nD: Yes at eleven. I hope you will\nbut not at 1 AM or 2 AM.\nK: No, no I will be on time.\nD: I hope you will go to a nightclub before.\nK: Absolutely. No, my children will be here.\nD: Oh, yes.\nCK\nK: See you then.\nD: Bye, Bye\nK: Bye\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n3:40 P. M.\nS: Hello Henry.\nK: Jim, I just wanted to call you before I left and really only have one item\nof business but in general the situation is the way we left it and if anything\ncomes up I will see to it that you get informed through Scowcroft.\nS: Right. Incidentally, Henry, I heard that the MBFR meeting was not\na thing of joy and enlightenment.\nK: No.\nS: I wanted to\nK: It was a sorta disaster.\ncut\nS: I wanted to remind you that the discrepancy/between US and Soviet Union\nforces is just based on 15% cut on both sides.\nK: Ch, no that I did not object to. What I objected to was you know if you\ntake out the Soviet tank army with equipment for 29, 000 Americans without\nequipment it is a little hard to sell.\nS: Well, I think you are going to have to sweeten it up with tragment(?)\nK: Exactly. As long as that is understood. And what we may have to do\nis\nS: See we have those 7,000 weapons in Europe some of which we don't know\nwhat the hell we would do with.\nK: Another problem, Jim, we aught to consider is that when you begin\nanalyzing these equipment ceilings you don't really know whom they work for\nbecause if you take out their men they probably have to take some of their\nequipment with them and if you put a ceiling on theirs and a ceiling on ours\nyou breed another disparity.\nS: I think the best. It sounds right, I'd have to look at it more closely.\nK: I don't expect to get into that in any detail in Moscow. The only thing\nthat may come up in Moscow, but this is simply a guess, I have no knowledge\nof this, is they may resurrect again the idea of five to eight percent cut\nwhich would work out to about 12 for us and 29 for them.\nS: That's all right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSchlesinger/Kissinger\n-2-\n3/23/74\nK: And in a way since we are not held to taking forces out.\nS: Listen I think we can get that kind of stuff out of our headquarters and what not.\nK: Exactly. It might even be a be tter way of doing it.\nS: Yea. We have positioned ourselves in negotiations far better than the\nRussians have in that regard, we've got more fat.\nK: Jim, one final thing.\nS: Maybe that's a disadvantage being so combat heavy.\nK: I have the impression of some foot dragging by the Navy on that mine\nclearance and Ebare(sp?) has now raised a number of questions.\nS: Well Ebare(?)\nK: Which I think the Navy put him up to.\nS: I don't think the Navy put them up to that. Ebare (?) we misses a\nbet there, and I don't know whose fault it is. At the time that State made\nthat announcement we should have informed him previously.\nK: Oh sure.\nS: And a lot of that stuff I think is just a resentment of the bureaucratic\nsituation. Now he is raising two questions. One question is, how can we\nsend our sons to die on foreign soil. And the other question is, who the\nhell is going to fund this. Now on the funding side I think we will have to\nfind a way of getting it out of the AID budget.\nK: Ch, Jim, the President is calling me on the other line.\nI will call you right back.\nS: Righto.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 23, 1974\n3:52 PM\nK: Hello\nS: Hello, Henry.\nK: Jim, On this, I agree that was a stupidity on Ebair(sp?). The reason\nSadat wants us to do it, he can get it from the Russians and from the\nBritish.\nS: I know, but there are two things that have to be done. First, the foreign\npolicy (inaudible)\nK: OK I'll do it when I get back.\nS: And secondly, I could do it.\nK: Or you do it, if you want to.\nS: I could do it in part for you, but I can't substitute entirely, I think\nyour personal ways\nK: I'll call him Friday.\nS: Secondly, we want the Navy to go up there and explain the nature of\nthat operation and that there is really very little risk. Virtually no\nrisks at all to US personnel.\nK: Both would be good.\nS: And the Navy is perfectly happy to do this. The Navy is fully supported\nby the operation. I'm not sure the Navy would want the\nto come out\nof its hide.\nK: About $10 million for Christ's sake.\nS: It is fully support of the operation. I think we can show\nGetty around.\nK: Good.\nS: Now what else is there' ? We are having real problems on the massive increase\nand that's in trouble. I trust we will be able to get an agreement with the Thais\nthat we are studying the reduction.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON 3/23/74\n-2-\nSchlesinger/Kissinger\nK: I have signed off on that thing on that paper and that should be coming over\nto you on Monday.\nS: Yea. But the stuff for the negotiations. They are making an\nannouncement that we are starting negotiations.\nK: That's fine.\nS: And with that I think I can generate support.\nK: Look, I have\nS:\nWe are in trouble on that. The Mehone Committee is taking a very\ntough attitude on it and they have been willing to go with a $200 million\nincrease and that's all and that leaves us short of what we need let alone\nshort of what we asked for.\nK: What did we ask for?\nS: I am going to try to get Mehone off that and get Stennis to weigh in.\nBut it is very helpful to me if I can say well look fellows we are trying\nto adjust our problem in SEA where we have got exces resources\nwe are going to reduce them as we plan to do in Thailand, but on the\nother hand on the Vietnamese side , because we have taken our forces\nout we need additional money to support the Vietnamese.\nK: Absolutely, you can do that. And I will strongly back. And if you\nwant me to call Mehong I'll do it.\n:\nS: No, I don't think that is necessary. I may call you in at a later date.\nNow the other thing is that John Stennis and some others have taken a\nvery tough attitude on Diego Garcia.\nK: Stennis I talked to him the other day and he told me he was going to\ncome around.\nS: OK. That one is going to be very tricky to put through.\nK: The thing they are all having trouble with is why it has to be in the\nsupplemental.\nS: The answer to that is quite clear. Because we want to get an additional\n6 month head start prior to the time they reopen the Canal.\nK: Yea. Well\nS: OK, Henry.\nK: Well, OK, Jim and I'll Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON 3/23/74\n-3-\nSchlesinger/Kissinger\nS: Have a good trip and I think that there is some possibilities if you\nthink about it of holding up the option on MBFR or SALT and that\nyou want to have some movement on one or the other. I'm not sure\nhow they feel about MBFR, but some ways that may be a more\npromising area and shows a sense of diplomatic momentous.\nK: Well, I'm not dying to get you know to ram SALT through. Let's\nsee what happens.\nS: Yea:\nK: Do you think Zumwalt wants me to raise home porting in Odessa?\nI think that is a more reliable place to homeport than is Athens.\nOK Jim.\nS: OK\nK: Bye\nS: Bye, Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 29, 1974\n3:10 PM\nK: Hello.\nS: Hi, Henry.\nK: Jim, how are you?\nS: Ch, pretty good. How are you?\nK: Well\nS: A little\nI assume.\nK: Yes, but the major problem isn't that. The major problem is that we have\nnothing left to offer the Soviets and therefore detente is just in bad shape\nS: You mean on the MFM and equivalent?\nK: Yes. Imean SALT isn't all that surprising to me and the press is building it\ninto a crisis.\nS: Who is building it into a crisis.\nK: Well the press is building into a crisis.\nS: Ch, the press is. They were after me.\nK: Into a failure. You know, given our proposal we haven't got - you know when you\nlisten to the Soviet version, our proposal looks pretty silly.\nS: Why is that?\nK: Their version is that what we're saying is we're starting off with 6, 000 warheads\nwhich we're banking volarisis (sp), on poseidon. They're giving us per boat, then\nwe're banking all the air delivered RV's and then we want to restrict their ICBM's\non a ratio that's unfavorable to them in the overall.\nS: I think that conceptually that has some merit, on the other hand as you stressed,\nyou just can't do with SOBM's what you can with IC's.\nK: But then I said, you know, you'll be able to destroy our ICBM's and he said, yes\nand leave you with 9, 000 warheads to hit every village in the Soviet Union. It's\nnot an absurd arugment.\nS: No, it's not, except our preference isn't necessarily to hit every village.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSchlesinger - page 2\nK: I agree. All I'm saying is, when you hear their version - I think we would like\nan agreement. Their proposal now is 1100 to 1, 00 MERV missiles. No sublimits\nbut they will tell us what the sublimits are. I will ask - you're not free for\nbreakfast are you.\nS: Henry, I'm going to take a little rest if you don't mind. I'm going off to Bermuda\nfor two days.\nK: OK, I just want a little work donw while I'm gone, I'll have some of my people\ndo it. Maybe they could get together with yours so that it doesn't leak out.\nS: Sure. Just have them call Paul.\nK: Whether any sublimits are conceivable that we could live with. Always keeping\nin mind what the situation will be without an agreement.\nS: Right. OK. How's everything else ?\nK: Otherwise, things are going along CK.\nS: Did somebody shape your senior State Department official conferences on the\naircraft? I'd like to know what you say.\nK: What I said was\nS: I'm just asking if there is a transcript.\nK: But I can tell you what I said. I said some progress was made but not enough\nto constitute a breakthrough and we now have to analyse it.\nS: Well, I guess I was quite consistant with that when they asked me about it\nyesterday.\nK: That's all I did say.\nS: OK. Good. Now on the question of Suez. There's a very delicate situation,\nas you know Herbert was opposed to that. I went up to see him, I guess after\nyou left, and he has now backed off and he indicates that he is willing to support\nthe operation as long as we give him a way of crawling back off the limb, which we\nthink we've given him. He says it is improper, illegal for the DOD to fund this\ndirectly. So the position that I've taken is that the administration will seek from\nthe operation in other ways. You can either look around in the aid budget or if\nyou don't have it in the aid budget send a supplemental to the Hill or indicate that\nyou're going to have a supplemental to the Hill. If the supplement doesn't fly\nthen of course we will have done the work already.\nK: My nightmare is that with the Egyptians going so far outt on a limb for us, if\nwe mow get the same problem with the Egyptians that we did with the Soviets.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSchlesinger - page 3\nS: No, I agree with that. I agree with your nightmare and I think the way to do that\nis to proceed - the only way that we're going to be able to launch the C-141s, which\nwe would like to be prepared to do essentially today, issue the execute order, is\nthat is Herbert, Stennis and Mahon are satisfied that the administration is not\nintending to use DOD funding for this, after we've launched and executed, then you\ncan go back to the drawing board, if you can't raise the money some other way.\nAt this point with them raising those questions and Herbert being very stoney about\nit, Stennis I think probably could be talked around, not Herbert.\nK: Do you think the Navy has put Herbert up to this?\nS: No, I do not. I think the Navy wants to do this and I think they regard this\nas useful to the Navy's image in the world, sort of an all purpose service and so on.\nI took Zimwalt (phonetic) up to the Hill with me and he was quite useful in bringing\nHerbert around on the concept that we are not sending American boys to die on\nforeign soil, which was the line that Herbert initially started off with. As long as\nthe indication to the Hill is the administration will seek to do this outside of the DOD\nbudget if we ultimately fail in that regard after we have executed the operation then\nthat's a new ball game. But I don't think we can start the ball game if we say\nnow that the DOD is going to eat it, in fact, I know damn well we can't.\nK: OK, good.\nS: S: Is there some other things on the back of my mind that is a problem area?\nNo, I can't of it at the moment. I shall be in Bermuda, you can get me at the Naval\nStation there, if by any chance you need me. Bill Clemmens will be available.\nK: Good. I'll be on vacation myself.\nS: Ch, good. Where are you going.\nK: Acapulco.\nS: How long?\nK: About a week.\nS: You taking off on Sunday\nK: Saturday.\nS: OK, good.\nK: I'll see you then when I get back.\nS: Is there any other area we haven't - oh, Henry, get your people to take a look\nat the Soviet-Iranian border. The Soviets have conducted some maneuvers up\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSchlesinger - page 4\nthere, that are kind of odd and unusual and they're putting some pressure up there\non the Iranians.\nK: CK.\nS: I believe that the watch committee is kind of, said, let's not stir anyone up\nabout that, but I think that you ought to be informed on that because it looks like\neither a little muscling in the political area and it's obviously related to their\nthreats that the Iranians should stop supporting the\n.\nThat could be a problem.\nK: OK, let me take a look at that.\nS: OK.\nK: Good.\nS: Bye. Welcome home.\nK: Thank you.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGeorge Vest/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 29, 1974\n3:26 PM\n(Missed first part)\nK:\ntheir negativism continues.\nV: I think so, sir. I think they are built in negative, that's my sense of it from\ntheir talks - from talking to them before and after. I think the biggest part of it\nthey derive from your own briefing to them from Moscow to London. At least that's\nthe way they interpret it.\nK: That's amazing. Was that so negative ?\nV: They draw that conclusion from it.\nK: But you were there, weren't you?\nnegative\nV: I did not draw it that worthy of that total/degree of negativism. If you try to\npush it further I think it will have a rebound rather than, you know go and make it\nany further.\nK: I wasn't aware I was SO negative.\nV: There were terms like unacceptable, failure and so on. They were used in a\nlimited context. The problem for them is they take that context and make it a\nbroader one than it was in fact, indeed the fact.\nK: OK, thank you.\nV: Right, sir.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nRobert McNamara/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 29, 1974\n4:07 PM\nK: Bob?\nM: Hi, Henry, how are you?\nK: OK.\nM: Welcome home.\nK: Now that you're through being my recruiting agent, how would you like to be\na speech writer.\nM: Well, that's beyond my capacity but I know you've got to do something at the UN,\nis that what you're thinking about.\nK: Yes, and we have a draft which is a great term paper. I wanted you to - the\nspeechwriter is just sitting here - I don't want you to think I'm talking behind his\nback. I would appreciate it Bob if you would just - we're sending it over to you -\nJoe Sisco is. If you don't - I'm obviously not asking to re -write it - but what\nother things do you think need saying.\nM: Yes.\nK: What I would like to do at this speech is to say, look, there is a problem of\ndevelopment but for God's sake don't let's discuss it in terms of a confrontation\nbetween the developed and developing nations, but in terms of the complete issues\nthat confront us. In which on major points there is a communitive interest and\nwhere there isn't a communitive interest you certainly can't extort it from us.\nM: I think that's a good theme to put forward.\nK: That doesn't come through in the speech but if you could jot down just the issues\nwhich from your perspective seem to be the dominant ones. I can't compete with\nthe demagoguery of\nand Jobert. I have to have a rational and careful approach.\nM: OK, send it over and - I just walked into the office, I've been away for the week.\nK: You take - we don't need a reaction this afternoon. We can have it by Tuesday\nor Wednesday of next week.\nM: OK, I'll definitely do it. It's a hell of a mess, I can tell you that.\nK: That's why I'd like to say something that's not the usual baloney. We have in\nthat whole speech, you will see, not one reference in any meaningful way to these\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMcNamara - page 2\naccumulating surpluses of\nthat you've been concerned with.\nM: I was in Algeria this week on Monday and Tuesday and I spent two hours\nwith\n.\nK: He's an impressive guy.\nM: He's a very impressive guy. He's hard, tough, intelligent. He fought 8 years\nfrom '54 to '62 and he bears the scars, psychologically and otherwise. They have\nabsolutely no plan. At least they had none then for the UN session.\nK: Yes, that's right. I don't think they have one now. That's why actually I think\nwe have an opportunity, we can get ourselves to say something sensible.\nM: Well, send it on over and I'll receive it and I'll get something back to you.\nK: Many thanks.\nM: OK, Henry. Nice to have you back.\nK: Thank you.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSenator Adlai Stevenson/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 29, 1974\n7:25 PM\nS: Hello, Mr. Secretary.\nK: How are you?\nyou're\nS: I'm fine and I know/tired and busy.\nK: That's all right.\nS: Thank you for returning my call. The economic - the importt control legislation\nand also the Eximbank legislation is in a subcommittee that I'm the - the subcommittee\nis banking this committee and I'm the Chairman of it. Both the Export control\nadministration act and the Exim legislation expires at the end of this fiscal year,\nJune 30. We held some hearings and we're planning a resumption of the hearings\nnext week. What we want to focus on at this time are the foreign policy implications\nfor both export controls and export credits. That of course raises the Jackson\namendment but it's an example of a larger question, GAC opinion that a nu; mber of\nproposals one way or another, or bartering food principally for other commodities.\nThe general purpose is to get into the foreign policy implications of export policies\nand we're starting with some administration witnesses, Casey is going to come up\nbut I would hope at some point we might come in on you to testify in this phase of\nthe hearings.\nK: My trouble is I'll be on vacation next. How long are these hearings going to\nrun?\nS: They'll run through the month and maybe into May.\nK: I don't think I'll be able to do it before May if that's still time.\nS: No, that might be better. I'm in no position to say, but we'll be continuing\ncertainly in early May.\nK: I'll be on vacation and then there's that special assembly in N. Y. which brings\nso many foreign ministers here. Then we have an CAS meeting in Atlanta. If you\nwould let me wait until May I would appreciate it.\nS: By all means, it will suit your convenience. I do think you and you almost alone\ncould speak authoritatively on this aspect. At some point hope very much.\nK: As long as I have you on the phone, I wouldn't havebothered with it, the newspapers\ntoday all ha ve stories about a failure of the SALT negoations in Moscow and that's\ntotally wrong.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nStevenson - page 2\nS: Ch, really.\nK: They picked out a phrase I used two weeks ago saying it was time for a\nconceptual breakthrough, so they asked me was there a breakthrough, I said\nno, there wasn't a breakthrough there was progress, but they only heard no\nbreakthrough. Today the Soviets papers all printed what I believe to be correct\nthat there is a chance of coming to an agreement this year.\nS: I haven't seen today's stories.\nK: I just say this so that in your own considerations of credits you don't do it in\nthe context of a failing detente.\nS: I don't want to do anything at this point. I have no position myself and I would\nhope - what I really want to do is ventilate the issue and get started on it because\nwe're under time restraints now and I don't know where you stand with the Jackson\nbut from a little what I've heard there's no a great deal of progress on that in\nconnection with the Trade Bill, in Congress whether there will even be a Trade Bill.\nIn the meantime the Exim Bank is getting up closer and closer to it's ceiling and\nwe're approaching the June 30 date. I would hope without polarizing the issue but\nhandling it in a responsible way we can begin to ventilate this thing and Jackson\namendment is just a part. Begin to move towards some kind of a compromise.\nI'm complete sympathetic with the motion for using export controls and credits for\npolitical purposes.\nK: Ch, no. So do I. That doesn't bother me.\nS: That doesn't bother me one bit.\nK: There's no disagreement by me, with us on that.\nS: They're arguing the other side. They say withhold the credits for political\npurpose. Others, some of them in the Jewish communicate. Marshall Shullman\ncoming out and say give them to Kissinger for political purposes. That's the -\nthat in a very large sense is the question, I think we ought to start ventilating it.\nSeriously and with no dispostion on my part. I suspect on the part of the others,\nthe banking committee, to reach any premature decisions. We do have one\nimmediate problem, I don't know to what extent this enters in your problems, but\nthat GAO opinion, notwithstanding the Attorney General, -does raise the validity\nof exim credits and guarantees into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. I don't\nknow what the attitude of the export is and the banks are. I thought they would have\nseri ous doubts about exposing themselves, until that question gets resolved. Either\nit gets resolved by the Congress or in the courts. Nothing I can do about that one\nat the moment.\nK: Let me aim for testifying in early May.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nStevenson - page 3\nS: OK.\nK: Good, nice to talk to you.\nS: We'll be back in touch with your office with more specifics and if possible a date.\nK: Good.\nS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.\nK: Bye.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGeorge Vest/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 29, 1974\n7:45 PM\n(Missed first part)\nV:\nMoscow. He has the report that the Soviets complained that Gromyko\ntried to get in tough with you while you both were in the Middle East and did not\nget an explanation.\nK: Total nonsense.\nV: He got that from Soviet sources.\nK: Tell them it it total absolute nonsense.\nV: CK.\nK: That Gromyko made no effort to get in touch with me. I think they're all going\ncrazy. Tell him for me it was a successful meeting.\nV: I did that, just a moment ago.\nK: He doesn't believe.\nV: He seemed to be taking the point and thinking about it. I will tell him from you\nas well.\nK: CK.\nV: On this one, our position is that Gromyko did not make an effort to get in touch\nwith you.\nK: None what so ever. Is he at home?\nV: I have his phone number.\nK: Why don't you give me his phone number.\nV: His phone number is 362-9040. If you're going to call him I won't.\nK: OK.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nJerry Schecter/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 29, 1974\n8:00 PM\nK: Hello.\nS: Henry.\nK: Jerry.\nS: Hi. Did you see the Star tonight\nK: Yes.\nS: There's a wonderful cartoon.\nK: I tell you this reporting from this trip is the weirdest I've ever seen. There\nmust have been something wrong with my briefing. Have you seen that Moscow has\nnow denied these stories and both have said there is a possibility of achieving an\nagreement.\nS: Then you used us right.\nK: I didn't use you. I tried to tell you guys the truth, which is no break through,\nbut progress. Nobody seemed to hear the latter part. Really, let me tell you for\nyour own guidance. You will not look bad if you do not howl with the pack. I'm\nnot telling you there will be an agreement by June, right now, I'd say the chances\nare 50/50. They made a proposal which if it is suitably clarified, could be the\nbasis of an agreement. If we don't get the required clarifications then it cannot\nan agreement in June. But it is a definite movement. For thefirst time we're talking\nabout the same thing. I don't give a damn whether one week says it's bad, in fact\nit's slightly helpful with the Soviets. The truth is literally what I said but you guys\nwere so focused on the break through that when I said no break through, you didn't\nh ear there was progress.\nS: I guess so. Everybody's - the other thing is that you've, you went on such an\nupswing that everybody I think over reacted because of that. You know what I mean.\nThe fact at least everytime you go someplace\nK: Jerry, take out the communique from every previous pre-summit meeting. Com-\npare it and make up you own mind. I wanted to tell you about that thing George Vest\nmentioned to me. It is total nonsense. Gromyko did not get in touch with me on\nthe whole trip through the Middle East.\nS: He was obviously expecting to meet you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSchecter - page 2\nK: Jerry. That anybody can say now. There was no communication to me from\nthe Soviets at all during that trip. There was a communication by me to them\nbefore I went on the trip saying I would be available for consultations by their\nAmbassadors, in every place I visited, that was before I knew he would be in\nDamascus. I never received a reply to that.\nS: Why should they say that he brought Sukhodrev along with him because he was\nexpecting to see you.\nK: Jerry. Don't you think the way to have done that would be send me a message\nsaying he was prepared to meet me. I'm telling you we received no message of\nany kind from him, from the Embassy, we received no Soviet message of any kind\nabout his travel.\nS: Did you see any Soviet Ambassadors?\nK: No, because they never replied to my message.\nS: In Moscow they were saying Gromyko got a lot of heat from Brezhnev because\nhe's dore SO well in the Middle East.\nK: That is conceivable. But this may be his way of covering himself.\nS: In other words, what's confusing to me why did he bring Sukhodrev with him.\nThe timing of your visits were so close. They're saying you never consulted with\nthem. You never explained why you didn't see him.\nK: That is true since I didn't know he wanted to see me. Today we announced my\ntrip to the Middle East. We sent a letter to Gromyko. A personal letter from me\nexplaining how the trip had come about and saying I hoped he would instruct his\nAmbassadors in each capitol to be available for consultation because would get in\ntouch with them if he agreed. Then a never heard from him again.\nS: The next thing was you heard he was coming to the Middle East.\nK: The next thing I heard he was coming.\nS: I picked up some stuff around town here about possible compromises on MFN,\nlike no natural gas - postponing the natural gas deal but they would, the Russians,\nwould make some progress on the hardship list and maybe increase the numbers.\nK: I don't want to go into that.\nS: Well, I have to go into it. I just wondered if\nK: I wouldn't speculate on any hard and fast deal tomuch because it's a more\nfluent situation than that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSchecter - page 3\nS: But if I raised those things as possibilities would that be an embarrassment?\nK: The gas deals, I haven't heard that discussed at all. The thing you have to keep\nin mind, Jerry, there's a sort of lemming suicidal impulse right now. People\nthrow away what we've got as if it's nothing. Three years of peace with the Russians\nisn't nothing. That's my big worry. Our domestic uproar is so confusing people\nthat they don't look at it.\nS: I must say that the crescendo is getting louder. The other thing, for example,\nI heard today that the date for the meeting would probably be the end of May or early\nJune because otherwise it wouldn't be feasible from the go.\nK: The date will be as we announce it, as we told you.\nS: Which is what, end of June ?\nK: Not before that.\nS: Last ten days of June.\nK: In that general area.\nS: In other words, the end of June.\nK: In that general area.\nS: They told me that you'd probably go down to the Black Sea.\nK: Who told you that.\nS: The Russians.\nK: That's one of the possibilities, on that there hasn't been a decision.\nS: I'm sure you know this but if you don't I think it's interesting. The reason that\nwas given to me that it would be easier for Brezhnev to go down there and see the\nPresident one on one. And as he did in Moscow again, then he has to worry about\nthe other two guys because it's a more formal situation. Where if he meets with\nthe President at\nit's easier for him to be number one down there.\nK: And if he's lucky, I may not be there.\nS: Now, I'm not going to sleep tonight. You shouldn't make jokes like that.\nK: No, he may keep me in Moscow.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSchecter - page 4\nS: I meant Kosygin, not you.\nK: I know what you meant. OK. On this Gromyko visit, believe me there's nothing\nto do. All he had to do was suggest it and we would have worked something out.\nS: I need some kind of quote for the story can I say no break through but progress.\nK: You can say it, no break through, but definite progress.\nS: OK. Can we say - I thought the fairest estimate that you gave that says, no\nbreak through - you said it was inclusive.\nK: Yes. I tried to be fair. That is true. It is inconclusive means that there is\na chance, but no guarantee.\nS: Why don't we say that, there's a chance but no guarantee. That's nice.\nK: You can use that.\nS: That puts the ball in the other court, nicely, I think. Are you going tomorrow.\nK: Almost certainly.\nS: How is Dayan?\nK: It was alright.\nS: I heard he was - he didn't come with much.\nK: You know you guys are conducting my negotiations now.\nS: We spend so much time with you\nK: I am quite confident we will work that thing - that we will come up with a\nreasonable position. Always compared it with the trend. I am perfectly relaxed.\nIt was a good meeting.\nS: OK. good. Have fun down there. We'll see you when you get back.\nYou really deserve a rest. I think you did a hell of a job on this thing. Obviously\nyou don't need me to say this, but I wouldn't be too upset by the reaction. I don't\nthink it's - it looks awful but you can already see the Russians are upset. The\nthing that fascinates me is that they were really unsure of themselves this time.\nThis time they' re in a different kind of league then they' ve been in before. Normally\nthey just go in and bully people and now they really have to think about what they\nwant and where they' re going to go and I think it's driving them to distraction.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSchecter - page 5\nK: It isn't that they didn't try to bully me.\nS: No, I'm sure of that. I think obviously they want to buy some time but I think.\nK: Look, basically given all the problems we are having, it was a damn good meeting\nit really way. None of us who was there compared it unfavorably with last year's\nin Zavidovo.\nS: Right. Good.\nK: OK.\nS: Thank you.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 30, 1974\n9:23 AM\nS: Good morning, Sir.\nK: We have a cable here the SOB Russians apparently have tol d the Syrians\nthat there's no hope of leaving the Golan Heights. That that's the conviction\nthey got from our talks.\nS: I saw that this morning and we should kill that very very categorically.\nK: Well, do a message to Asad will you. Just say we just had a report that they\nmay have gained this impression, I want them to know the issue of Golan Heights\nwas never raised and no discussions of frontiers ever took place and our\nposition is exactly what I told him.\nS: OK, I'll do that.\nK: OK?\nS: Yes.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGeneral Haig/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 30, 1974\n10:05 AM\nH: Yes, Henry.\nK: A1, I'm meeting with Dayan today and you know on that Syrian things what needs\nto be done. But one of their problems is that we've been dragging our feet on the\narms supply. He's the only man who understands in Israel what needs to be done.\nSo I think it's important he come back from here with some understanding of his\nposition. One of his problems is the Soviet have put about 800 tanks into Syria\nsince the war. We've only replaced 225 out of the 600 they lost. He feels he\nmust have tanks which the army says they don't have, except by taking them from\nunit. I think that we just have to do that. And the same with ACPs.\nH: How many of those do they need?\nK: 500.\nH: OK.\nK: I'm going to have Brent work with Schlesinger but I would like to you, if you\nwould, if we have anyproblem, I would like Dayan when he sees Schlesinger on\nMonday afternoon to be told he's getting this. So that he can go back to Israel\nas the man who produced it. That will then help us in the subsequent talks.\nH: OK. Do you want me to wait until Brent tells me the way in or to move anyway.\nI can do it either way.\nK: What do you think?\nH: Maybe it's better not to undercut Brent, let him just start and if he finds there's\na problem.\nK: OK, I'll have Brent work it this weekend and get in touch with you if there's any\nproblem. And you might just say the President is interested in Dayan having some -\nthing to take home with him.\nH: Exactly. I understand the picture, Henry, we'll just put the arm on him. It\nhas to be done. We can fool with it.\nK: Have you seen that the Soviets have now put out a statement denying these press\nreports.\nH: No, I didn't.\nK: The Soviets have put out a statement saying it is totally wrong to say it was\na failure and that an agreement by June is quite possible.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHaig - page 2\nH: That's great. These damn press people are really something.\nK: Put out a very laudatory article in the\nand another one in another leading\njournal.\nH: That's good. When are you leaving.\nK: 3 or 4 this afternoon. OK, Al.\nH: OK, Henry, you're in our thoughts today.\nK: Many thanks.\nH: Bye.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 30, 1974\n10:42 AM\nK: How's Bermuda?\nS: Very rainy.\nK: Is it rainy How is your moral?\nS: Splendid.\nK: That it can rain there that is why I go to Mexico, always you can be sure of good\nweather.\nS: Yes.\nK: Jim, this isn't a good line on which to talk, but you are seeing Dayan on Monday.\nS: That's the plan.\nK: Right. We are going over, with him the various disengagement schemes. He's\nreally been the man who on the Egyptian disengagement and on the Syrian one has\nbeen the one who has carried the intellectual ball. I would be very useful if he\ncould come back with sone positive news on some of his concern. I don't have the\nlist here in front of me so I don't want to go over individual items with you. If\nBrent could work with somebody, whom should he work with over the weekend.\nS: He could work with John Whickem on that.\nK: OK, I'll have him work with Whicken and I talked to the President about it\nyesterday, again not on items but as a general idea and he is sympathetic. too.\nSo can Brent work with Whickem and if you could in your conduct when you see\nhim, do it from that point of view it would be very helpful.\nS: You want to give him something?\nK: Yes, definitely.\nS: You know the cobra is something they been insisting on\nK: If you feel you could spring a few of those that might be a good gesture and it\nmight also help in other context.\nS: The problem is that the others will reach for the cobra.\nK: Yes, but wouldn't that be a good way of doing it?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSchlesinger - page 2\nS: If you give the cobra to them you have to give it to the Jordanians, you may\nhave to give it to the Jordanians, just elevated the capabilities. I don't know\nwhether that's a worrysome point or not.\nK: Why don't you raise that with him.\nS: Right.\nK: I don't want to go into individual weapons now, I'm more talking about the\ngeneral attitude.\nS: But you want to be forthcoming.\nK: Exactly.\nS: No problem, we can go as far as you want.\nK: Let me - Brent has the list - let me go over the list with Brent. Let him\ntalk to Whickem. I just wanted you to know my attitude.\nS: OK. The Israelis are being fairly cooperative then.\nK: Frankly it will have to go through a process and again frankly we are counting\nvery much on Dayan's support in this process.\nS: OK. Very good.\nK: The more he can be strengthened the better it will be.\nS: OK, we shall attempt to strengthen him.\nK: Good. Many thanks. Have a good rest.\nS: Bye.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nSANITIZED\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n/\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\nContains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Rush/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 30, 1974\n11:45 AM\nR: Hello, Henry.\nK: Hi, Ken, how are you?\nR: I'm fine thanks.\nK: I'm sorry we couldn't get together this morning and now I'm off for a vacation.\nR: I know you are, you certainly deserve one, Henry and you should have. I think\nyou have received most of the things I had in mind.\nK: You had to go home. There wasn't any mixup about getting together today.\nR: No. I just finished up everything and so I can home.\nK: Did they tell you - you know, there's no reason for you to have stayed.\nR: I wanted to, I had some things I wanted to do.\nK: You wanted to go home.\nR: No, I had some things I wanted to do in the office.\nK: They did tell you I was going to see you right after Dayan.\nR: No, they didn't. No one told me that.\nK: Alright, never mind.\nR: I thought you'd probably be with Dayan tœmuch.\nK: NO.\nR: When do you leave, Henry - at 1:00?\nK: Yes - there's no sense for you to come in, it isn't that important. Did you make\nclear to Kosciusko-Morizet that we infact did have evidence along the line that these\narticles said?\nR: Yes we did. As a matter of fact, Henry, I played golf with him and with Mel\nLaird and with Jim Hutson just after you had seen him and he was telling me about\nh is talk with you. I said we did have evidence, Jacques, some of your Ambassadors\nhad been urging the Arabic countries, I won't tell you which ones, not to lift the\nboycott. He said well that can't be. I said, well it is, that's the evidence we had.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRush - page 2\nI said obviously it's indirect evidence, but we have the evidence. Then he came\nofficially to giv e me the demarche. When I called him back in as you requested,\nI told him this over again that we did have indirect evidence to that effect. He\ndenied it, he said that would be stupid of us. He said obviously that would mean\na continued curtailment of production and that in turn would mean we would not -\nthe price would stay high and it would hurt our economy very seriously. I said\nI don't know about that but certainly your Ambassadors are reputed to urge the\ncontinuance of the boycott and I assume they don't do anything that Jobert doesn't\ntell them to.\nK: Basically it wasn't so much that they urged them the continuation of the boycott\nb ut they told them after the boycott was lifted they would see we'd go back to our\npro-Israeli policy.\nR: That was the point. I told them that was the reason that they urge the continuation\nof the boycott because the boycott was the only thing that kept us from going.\nK: Some people say that - I've heard one story that said that Morizet said that I\np ut out that story and that you didn't contradict him. Is there anything to that?\nR: No, Itold him that the thing was unauthorized. In essence I told him what you\ntold me to. He told me that he - I knew nothing of his talk with you on Friday. He\ntold me at the golf game the next day on Saturday afternoon, that he was sure that\nyou had been the one who gave Marilyn Berger her information. I said what makes\nyou think that? He said, well I just assumed that. When I called him in\nK: I never even saw the Marilyn Berger article.\nR: That was the one that came out - she made it low key. That came out before\nthe Evans and Novak article. Evans and Novak came out in the morning, that I\nsaw Morizet - that was the day after you had seen Morizet. He said he thought\nEvans and Novak had received the information from you. I said I'm sure that was\nnot the case. He then - I then told him on that second meeting, because I didn't\nknow where that article in the AEP(?) had come from, that I had been in touch with\nyou and I was authorized to see that anything in connection with the State Department,\nexcept an official saying anything attributed to the State Department, except what\nour official spokesman said, was unauthorized. He just accepted that, or at least\nhe said nothing about it.\nK: There's not much we can do about it, but basically I think we ought to freeze\nour relations with these guys for the time being.\nR: I think frankly, Henry, they have somewhat been encouraged, the fact they\nhave been treated SO well as they got worse and worse. They think they can carry\non what India did with you. The more we did for India, the worse they got. I\nthink they feel the same way.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRush - page 3\nK: Yes.\nR: Henry, coming to another subject, we have, I think, got to put it up to Bill\nDonaldson. Either to devote his time to security assistance or to energy. The\nsecurity assistance thing is - thank God we're putting George Vest in now to take\nSy Weiss' place. Sy is not moving in. I talked to both of them, I talk three talks\nnow to Donaldson.\nK: Well, what does Donaldson say ?\nR: He said he's getting on top of it. I'd tell him about the personnel problem - he's\ngetting on top of it. I asked him to come back and report to me, and I'm just not\ngetting the reports back. I've just decided he's so completely wrapped up in energy\nthat's he's not going to be able to get on top of security assistance.\nK: Basically, he ought to be able to do them both.\nR: He's certainly wrapped completely around energy now. With George Vest in,\nPM is supposed to be, in essence, the staff for the Under Secretary for Security\nAssistance. We'll see how that goes, but I'm very sceptical that Bill can handle\nboth jobs. At least he's not doing it now and he's been in there for 6 months.\nK: He ought to be told he must.\nR: I've told Ihim three times now. I'll tell him again next week. I think I'll call\nhim again and tell him he may have to make a choice. See what his reaction is.\nI don't think he quite has the capacity to spread himself over those two bigs jobs.\nI think he's so deeply in on security - on energy. He's traveling too, quite a bit\non it. The security assistance thing, we just have to take up ourselves that Joe\nis helping out on the Middle East. Did Joe see you, by the way, about Jordan.\nK: Not yet.\nR: On the 12 million five for Jordan, I just sent it back into Joe. On the 12 million\nfive, Henry, both AID and Holton think, they in essence told the committees, that\nthe Vietnam was the mass supplemental we were coming in on. They think it will\nhave a very bad reaction in the Congress on the whole thing if we go back in for an\nextra supplemental of 12 and a half for Jordan. That the thing to do is to include\nthe Jordanian 12 and a half next year. That Jordan's cash position is very strong\nnow and they don't need the cash and that we might jeopardize even Vietnam if we\ngot back in additional supplemental request on Jordan. They've had a very bad\nreaction in the Congress on Vietnam but I hope we'll get that through. I'm inclined\nto think we ought to let Jordan go into the '75 budget at 12 and a half million. Is\nthat alright\nK: Yes.\nR: Good. Now I left with Larry a new group of names for the Under Secretary for\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRush - page 4\nEconomic Affairs. If you want me to I can get busy on some of these.\nK: Let me check those names and I'll leave my recommendations with you.\nR: Good. I've got one last thing. I talked to Jim Schlesinger again. Jim\ninsists he talked to you three times or four, about Bill Porter continuing as the\nnegotiator for the Icelandic negotiation. I told him it's just imposible, I think.\nK: I tought at that time it was only one more session.\nR: I was think about this. They don't want Joe to do it, that's the point. I\nmentioned Bob McCloskey. He said maybe that would be a good out. What we could\ndo is get Joe and Bob both in on the thing. I'm afraid Joe is going to take a beating\nfrom them if anything goes wrong because they haven't wanted him, you see.\nK: Why don't you explain that to Joe.\nR: And sort of dilute it between Joe and McCloskey. I thought also to suggest to\nmake Jim happy, I might for this one session to bring Bill Porter down from Canada\nand let him sit in on this last one negotiating session. To wash himself out. What\nwould you think of that ?\nK: OK, good. I think that's a good idea.\nR: That will satisfy Jim to a certain degree and then push it on over.\nK: Good.\nR:\nSANITIZED\nK: OK, well then let McCloskey handle it after the next meeting.\nR: Good, well thanks a lot Henry.\nK: Thank you.\nR: Hope you have a good vacation, you certainly deserve it.\nK: Thank you.\nR: Bye.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nFrank Mankiewicz/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 30, 1974\n12:00 noon\nK: Frank, how are you?\nM: Well, other than recovering from the flu, but otherwise I'm fine. Are you going\nto Syria or Acapulco?\nK: I'm going to Acapulco.\nM: I thought this morning, Holly said she thought you were going to Syrian and then\nsomebody came over and said that Francie Bremer says that you're going to Acapulco.\nK: That is right.\nM: Then I figured she knowsbest. I had a couple of things I wanted to raise with you.\nOne before you went down to the Latin American meeting, but I don't know whether\nyou've done anything with it or not, concerning a fellow Chon Chol. Ever heard\nof him?\nK: NO.\nM: Well, he was the Chilean Agricultural Minister. You know, an agricultural\neconomist, but apparently a very high class intellectual academic fellow and in jail.\nIt struck me from what I heard about it and the kind of people who were calling about\nit, that it would be an awfully effective thing if somehow we could put some pressure\njust in respect to him, because it would look awful good and he's a kind of a\nGalbraith (?).\nK: Do have his name here.\nM: Chon Chol. C-h either a-n or o-n. C-h-o-l.\nK: OK, we're making a representation about somebody else, so I'll include it.\nM: The first name is Jacque. As near as I can figure out, he's pure academic and\nvery respected here. You know, in a non-political sort of agricultural agronomist\nfellow. I'm sure he probably isn't thatpure if he served, but I'm also sure it would\nlook awful good if something could be done. How long are you going to be gone down\nthere.\nK: About a week.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMankiewicz - page 2\nM: Well, when you get back, let's talk because I may be going on my visit. To the\nCaribbean.\nK: Oh. OK, good. Will you call me when I'm back?\nM: Yes, I'll call you when you get back.\nK: And I hope you feel better soon.\nM: Well, I'll be alright. Also maybe we can get together then on a date for our\nseminar sometime.\nK: May would be possible. April is impossible.\nM: Well, why don't you get your people to think about a date in May.\nK: OK.\nM: Talk to - oh who is it we' ve been talking to ? Miss\nK: Andrews?\nM: No.\nK: Rothe?\nM: Yes.\nK: OK.\nM: Or Eagleburger.\nK: Eagleburger would be the best, but I think they can't pick a date until I'm back\nbecause - not until I've talk to Syria and it's fallen into place there.\nM: Yes. The way you're going it will fall into place. Just a quick nudge. I tell you\nthere's nothing like it. I even like the setback.\nK: The setback isn't actually SO bad compared to what the papers said.\nM: That's right. I can see that coming along too.\nK: It is coming along. Actually the papers got carried away. I told them there\nwasn't a breakthrough, but I did say there was progress.\nM: They want a miracleaa day.\nK: But they're now so used to homeruns that they won't settle for doubles.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMankiewicz - page 3\nM: That's right. Exactly.\nK: Frankly given the situation with the Chiefs, I couldn't get a homerun, but I\ncouldn't have - but I would have tried to avoid hitting one if I could have had one.\nM: I must say I think those guys - they want only the superlative. I thought if\neven you read between the failure lines you see success. I'm sure the stories\naren't very well written anyway.\nK: No, they over wrote them.\nM: I'll tell you who's not fooled by the failures is F. Edward Herbert, if I read the\npaper correctly.\nK: Who ?\nM: Did you see that story - Herbert who is the House Armed Service\nK: Oh yes, did he pop off?\nM: Oh, yes. He's setting up a separate subcommittee.\nK: Oh, on disarmament.\nM: To study these terrible disarmament agreements that you're about reach.\nK: No, he isn't fooled. We have no interest in high profile right now.\nM: Well, he doesn't see you as failing, I'll tell you that. I think it's all just fine.\nBut I'll call you when you get back.\nK: Good, wonderful.\nM: And we'll talk to Eagleburger on a May date.\nK: Good. I want to talk to you at any rate about where the liberal Democrats are\ngoingin foreign policy. I think 'they're killing themselves.\nM: Well, I want to talk to you about that, because where they're going is in a very\nstrong position.\nK: Well, that's alright. That they have a right to do.\nM: But you've got to undercut that somehow.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMankiewicz - page4\nK: But what they're also doing is in a hard line position.\nM: The way to head that off is on the human rights area. You can't let this\nbecome a confrontation between, you know, with them on the human rights question.\nI thought you had won that day and I hope I can tel 1 you this, that was the day.\nTerrible. You can't get into that position again.\nK: I'll tell you the truth. I wasn't prepared for the questions.\nM: That was obvious.\nK: Whic is another stupidity.\nM: You should have waited. Waited till you saw the statement and so forth.\nK: I agree with you.\nM: Let's talk about that question because I think that can be blunted and then you\ncan let the liberal democrats go where they want. If they want to be hardmind\nRichard Nixon 1950 anti-Communist, that's fine. Because they're not going any\nwhere with it.\nK: OK. Hope to see you soon Frank.\nM: Yes. Bye.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger\nMarch 30, 1974\n12:45 PM\nK: Hello?\nD: Dr. Kissinger.\nK: Mr. Ambassador. Look I'm writing a letter to the Prime Minister of some of\nmy thoughts which I thought I'll have Sisco give to you on Tuesday, so that it gets\nthere about the time Dayan does. What do you think?\nD: Dayan told me about this and I think it cannot hurt. In fact, I think it's a good\nidea.\nK: I'm not pressing her. She doesn't have to do anything for a few weeks.\nD: Right. No, I understand. I think its - and I relied that you put it in such a\nmanner that in which it explains the motivation, though it does not.\nK: Why don't I tell Sisco to go over it with you and you edit it.\nD: That would be highly irregular, Mr. Secretary. Especially to do it with Sisco.\nBut I'm willing - maybe Eagleburger shows it to me and then I will tell Eagleburger\nif I think something should be changed. But that should remain only between us.\nK: I thought I'd tell it to Marilyn Berger.\nD: Marilyn Berger grabbed me in the corridor before we left and she asked me\nif it's true that the Secretary's getting married today. I said that was one of the\nbilateral issues that wasn't discussed.\nK: She is an absolute pain in the neck.\nD: Are you, Mr. Secretary?\nK: Listen, if you don't know, it can't be true.\nD: I'm not sure anymore. I think my information is slipping.\nK: You know that these things wouldn't ever happen without you.\nD: I wanted to tell you but whatever you decide to do, Mr. Secretary, my blessing\ngoes with you. I really mean it.\nK: Thank you. I hope you don't mind my teasing you. It is really a sign of great\naffection.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDinitz - page 2\nD: I really appreciate it, it's mutual, I can assure you, Mr. Secretary.\nK: I know that. You've been a friend beyond the call of duty.\nD: I like you as a human being and I think you're doing a great job for the free world.\nThat is my main thesis about you.\nK: The crowd is gaining on me, you know it.\nD: You say what I did with the Soviet press for you, Mr. Secretary.\nK: I know. I didn't know you had a gang there. Actually I found that very interesting.\nD: I think they realized that they undermining their own cause by this. They don't\nwant to weaken the President, they don't certainly want to weaken your position.\nK: No, my position they'd love to weaken.\nD: I don't think so, Mr. Secretary. I had a very interesting luncheon with the\neditors of the U.S. News and World Report the other day - while you wer e in Moscow.\nWe were discussing this question of detente and I was trying to convince them that\nbecause of their interest in perpetrating the President's position. I really\nbelieve it. I think the biggest catastrophe that can happen to them is if there's\na change here, because when there is going to be a change, it will also be a radical\nC hange toward Soviet detente. They know it, so therefore - I mean I don't say that\nthey\nK: I'm not sure that's true.\nD: I think it is. I think they are very much interested in keeping the\nK: Why should Ford change his policy ?\nD: Because they don't know. It's a new element, it will take\nanother two years\nto study him and all his friends and all his motivations. They don't know what power\nbase he will have around him.\nK: It's an element of uncertai nty.\nmadu Ford,\nD: They know that in any event Congress will be stronger on the fort because\nhe comes from there and he is dependent on them. They know that Congress is\nnot particularly sympathetic to them, SO all these considerations, I think,\nindicate to them. Besides they have great respect for your ability and\nK: Since they now know that ability is not working for them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDinitz - page 3\nD: Well, I think they still think that they can best advance detente under you then\nunder anyone else. I don't mean it critically, I mean I think that you are trying\nto get the best things for America out of detente. That is obvious, but I think that\nthey would see new mobility to advance than anybody else. I know, and they realize\nthat they instructions you came with on SALT were not sufficient. They know, I\npresume they even surmized that if it were up to you individually you would gone\nfurther.\nK: No, not much. A little.\nD: More than I would say on material things.\nK: I think we're not pursuing an insane course which will lead.\nD: to confrontation in the front.\nK: No, that eventually too, but at first it will lead to Soviet military superiority\nbecause we're not going to increase our budget enough to - but that's a different\nproblem, we can discuss it some other time. OK.\nD: Dayan flew to New York and I'm joining him this evening and he will be coming back\nfor meet the press. I think their meeting was good, the meeting today. It put him\ninto a better frame of mind. And he is now afraid that by Monday it will not all be\ntoppled down while the Secretary is going to be in Acapulco. I said, I think that the\nSecretary will see to it before he leaves that he closes all the avenues so that nobody\nwill run away with the show.\nK: No question.\nD: And he explained to me what you told him that we have to give the credit to\nSchlesinger that you don't want to\nK: That's why I maneuver in such a way.\nD: Yes, I understand. When you come back and we will have one of those personal\ntalks, I will tell you some of the things that are happening town. I don't want you\never to misunderstand me, Mr. Secretary. I'm not saying it to you in order to play\ninto the Departmental game. I don't play those games. Not with you any how, but I\nthink you ought to know what is goi ng around town and his talks with Congressman and\nhis talks with professors. I'm not saying he S talking against you, but he's building\nit on constituency. He's building a constituency which is based on the line then\nthe one you take. He does not speak against you except on specific issues. He's\nspeaking about the need for stronger American and for a less compromising America.\nHe has attraction to these circles because he is intellectual, he's the only one in\nthat Administration that\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDinitz - page 4\nK: Particularly since it works against the Administration.\nD: Well, yes, but that is a secondard. Yes, that is why it is attractive to some\nelement, sure.\nK: OK, I'll see you when I get back.\nD: Fine, have a nice vacation, Mr. Secretary.\nK: Thank you.\nD: Bye.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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