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Mr. Kissinger/The President
- 2 -
shades of even though we don't think they will want to stay and all
that sort of thing; that they're going in or occupying territory -- that
it would be rather than the air action, just from their standpoint, and
ours, too -- but rather than if you just hit in the air
at
the
outset
at least
That's one thing, but of course they wouldn't
comprehend this, I suppose, but the idea of Israel invading Jordan
that's the point, see. That's the point I think they may be missing.
K:
Right. Well, their view probably is that they want to be sure
that if they move militarily at all, they better succeed and that they
probably have
P:
That's true, too.
K:
They probably have only a limited time to do it, and Haig said
to me last night they won't move without ground and I said, 'well, let's
see. 1
P:
Would it not be well to find out what the Jordanian reaction to
that is? Is that something we could find out?
K:
Well
to ground action?
P:
We don't know for sure, do we, on their part.
K:
My own instinct is that it presents two kind of problems:
(1) it presents a massive security problem because we are communicating
with the Jordanians on the open radio; and (2) even if it were secure, it
presents a massive problem
P:
Yeah, well, we'll just have to guess what their reaction.
K:
of the King. The King's position, I think it's safe to say,
for his own survival will have to be to disassociate himself from any
action, but more even from the ground action, of course, than
P:
Okay, yeah. Well, that's the point.
in
K:
But/either event he will, to some extent, disassociate himself.
But it's a decision that can hold, say, three or four hours -- closer to
three than to four, because it probably takes from 12 to 24 hours to get
ready.
P:
Well, I think it.
The point is what is the decision, though?
If the Israelis are putting it to us in terms where we don't do this. You
understand?
K:
That's right.
CNLN
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