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    "ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n\\\nTelcon\nHAK and the President (7 pp.)\n9/5/71\nB\nDEC\nLASSIF\nED per Hr. 5 Feb. 07 E012958\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-14/1\n2\nTelcon\nHAK and the President (14 pp.)\n9/21/71\nB\nNLN 05-A-14/2:\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-14/2\nExempted\nSANITIZED persec 3.3(b)(1), Hr. 8/11/2009\nper sec. 1.4 (c) (d) to 3.3(b)(1)(b)\nE012958 Hr. 5 Feb. 07\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nFOLDER TITLE\nkissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations\n29\nHome may 1971 Nov. 1971 10)\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nGPO:1989-235-084/00024\nNA\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n\\\nTelcon\nHAK and the President (7 pp.)\n9/5/71\nB\nDEC\nLASSIF\nED per Hr. 5 Feb. 07 E012958\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-14/1\n2\nTelcon\nHAK and the President (14 pp.)\n9/21/71\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-14/2\nExempted per sec. 1.4 (c) (d) & 3.3 (b)(1)(b)\nE012958 Hr. 5 Feb. 07\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nkissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations\n29\nFOLDER TITLE\nHome may 1971 - Nov. 1971 1\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED 1989-235-084/00024\nNA (4.85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelephone Conversation\nMay 17, 1971 Dr. Kissinger/General Haig\nK: Where are you, in the office?\nH: No I just walked in the door here.\nK:\nWell, I see. The leader of the Western world has had me on\nthe phone. He wants me to call Dobrynin again. I think it is insane.\nH:\nI think it would be too.\nK:\nI won't do it. I don't see what I can add to it, now do you.\nH:\nNo, I just think it would look so damn goosey, that it would be\nunproductive.\nK:\nCan you conceive what would go wrong. I just don't know what\nthey would tell us.\nH:\nI don't either. I dont think that there would be anything that\ncould go wrong. I just dont believe it.\nK:\nThe only other mistake I could have made was to ask for that other\nW ord.\nH:\nNo that's easy for you to worry about now, but in the long wun,\nthat will be exactly what you want. Probably since you have such a goosey\nmatter there. This can't be any problem.\nK:\nLook, Breshnev was in Tifflis. He probably just came back today.\nDon't you think-\nH:\nI think there is a good chance of that--there is also a good chance\nthat they are just taking their sweet time. If he has to slip the priority,\nthat is no calamity.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nK: That is what I think.\nH:\nI would wait until tomorrow at about maybe 10:00 and then I would\ntell him that because of timing, that we are going to slip it to Friday.\nK:\nTo Dobrynin?\nH:\nYes\nK:\nHell, that's another exchange -- I will wait until 5:00 in the evening.\nWe can handle it with if we get it as late as Wednesday morning.\nH\nThat's right, but that is an excuse for a little more squeeze.\nK:\nIf I don't hear from them by 4:00, I will call and tell him that\nwe will slip it until Friday. But if we don't hear from him by 9:30\nthe next morning, we have to slip it.\nH:\nYes, that is what I would do and then that's coordination- that\nis all that is.\nK:\nOkay, fine.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTape brought in Tuesday, May 18\nMay 17, 1971 10:45 p. m.\nConversation with the President/Mr. Kissinger\nP:\nI was thinking that if we don't get the reply until tomorrow well\nif you get then we can still make our Thursday date.\nK:\nWell, if they agree, Mr. President, it would be a nuisance to\nchange it again.\nP:\nThat's right, if they agree. The difficulty is that if they didn't\nagree until Wednesday, it would be almost impossible for us to get our--\nK:\nNo, we could do it. I have reviewed all my telephone conversations\nwith D., and have asked Haig to review them and we just don't see that\nit is probable or completely conceivable that anything could go wrong.\nK:\nAnd he is just being super-meticulous being after all just wanting\nto make absolutely sure that it is in order.\nP:\nParticularly, if the way you put it that you said we agreed, but\nwould like to check this other thing, I suppose---\nK:\nThat's right, and I told him specifically not to put to the government,\njust to do it if the Foreign Minister has that authority.\nP: Well, that may be, of course, but by the time they get it translated-\nK:\nWell you see, I got through talking to him at 6:00 on Thursday,\nit was already 1:00 in the morning in Moscow Friday. So even if you\nput it on the wire right then and there, it couldn't have arrived there\nbefore Friday noon. Breshnev was in Tifflis he didn't get back until\ntoday.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nP:\nWhat I mean't is that it may be that they or I can see why, even\nwith that kind of suggestion, they would check it in the government--\nand it just takes time. They know very well that we have got to know\nabout 48 hours in advance of an announcement- it a difficult situation.\nLet me put it this way: I think that probably -- not in terms of appearing\nanxious or anything, that you probably should call Dobrynin tomorrow\nby noon (I wouldn't do it before then) - that gives him time to get\nK:\nWell I just think, Mr. President, that as soon as he has something\nhe'll call me.\nP:\nThe reason I would call him only is tosay look if we are going\nThursday, we have got to know. Don't'you think\nK:\nWell, I have already called him twice today. I called him first\nto see if he had an answer and then I called him back to say look if the\nhold up has anything to do with that word, just forget about the word,\nbut I didn't say forget about the word, I said give us an answer first\nabout the date--we don't have to have the answer on the word until\nit for\nWednesday. Too much depends on/them, Mr. President to screw it up\nnow, it is just inconceivable. If they screw it up now, they know they\nlose Berlin.\nP:\nWell, they goddamn well will, but they know it, because we can\nmake them lose it--\nK:\nNow we can still kill it. That's why I delayed the meeting from the\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\n19th to the 27th.\nP:\nWell, okay. Then I would not call him - he should call you tomorrow\nThe only thing that I see is that --let's suppose you don't hear anything\ntomorrow -- you have got to call to find out whether we are going to go\nThursday. You know we've got too damn many things--\nK:\nWell, if I don't hear from him tomorrow, then I call him at 9: 30\non Wednesday to say whether we shouldn't. what he thinks about\n&\nP:\nYou may want to call him tomorrow only for the purpose of saying\nlook- do you want to slip it a day or what the hell is going on? That's\nthe point that I see. I wouldn't do it until--late in the day.\nK:\nAnd that gives him a chance to get another cable out to Moscow--\ntell him we are all prepared and ready to go on Thursday so we have got\nto know - I think that is a very reasonable thing to have and he has\nindicated that he has no or rather that that's the way it is to be.\nK:\nOh yes. I just can't conceive the text is all agreed, we went through\nit word for word fo make sure the English conformes to the Russian,\nthe announcement is their announcement and SO I just don't see where\nthe slip up could be unless they are trying to accommodate you on that\nword and that word we are just doing for the record so that we don't\nget screwed up there and people accuse us of sloppy drafting, but we\nare still protected by their exchange.\nP:\nYes. I would say then by tomorrow afternoon at 3:30-X-that's\n10:30 Moscow time--well there is a transmiss ion time and decoding and stuff\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 4 -\nlike that.\nK:\nThat's right, that's what I told him this afternoon.\nP:\nIt is the day that we are worried about - we need to know about that.\nK:\nThat's what I told him this afternoon.\nP:\nWe have other problems ourselves about what we schedule\non Thursday and what we schedule on Friday.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President - Good-bye\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nPresident/Dr. Kissinger\nSunday, May 23, 1971 2:30 p.m.\nPresident Speaking from Key Biscayne\nK:\nMr. President\nP:\nJust as a thought- we got the Post right here and after seeing that story\non Resor I thought my God I wonder if he may have been screwing up that thing\nout there. Did you see the story on him?\nK:\nOh, yes indeed!\nP:\nSaid he wasn't sure about the war and so forth. What in the name of\nGod you know. It shows you the problems of keeping these hold overs.\nK:\nThat's the trouble we've had.\nP. Laird has got to really be taken to task. He's got to say now goddamnit\nhe's got to shape those people up over there is there are any more like this\nget them out now.\nK:\nAbsolutely, I mean.\nP.\nYour point being that next year there be all these people coming out\nof the woodwork, and we don't want them in the government at that time.\nK:\nNo question about it. Next year, particularly if it looks close, they\nare going to leak and talk.\nP:\nThey'll do it anyway, you know, because they figure they can make it\nthat way-\nK:\nBut here is a fellow who is still in office and the day after he already\ngoes through this exercise. Anyone who knows him, I think, does not\ntake him particularly seriously. The NYT didn't cover it much. In fact, I\ndidn't find it in the NYT at all.\nP:\nWell, the Post did because it was in line with their usual kind of\nstuff. But my God, for him to pull this kind of stuff is unbelievable. And\nyou can see now how he screwed up Mylai and everything else. He is really\nbad news.\nK:\nWell he is a protege of Lanz and Clifford he's on the same wave length.\nP.\nHe is the same as that fellow they had in the UN - - Yost.\nK:\nWho has had another article in there either today or yesterday on\nVietnam again. Not as bad as before, but still--it's just the height of\nbad taste. I can't understand the morality of serving an Administration\nand then before it or one is out for a week or lèss than a month\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\npublishing an article-- it is highly improper to publish one in the whole\nterm of that Administration.\nP:\nI thought Laird ought to tell Resor to pipe down, because if\nhe doesn't well\nhim some.\nK: And the hell of it is, that you just recently have written him a\nparticularly nice letter.\nP:\nAnd I said \"special regret\" or something like that--the sun of a\ngun goes out and pulls a thing like this. I think Laird should call\nhim this afternoon.\nK:\nBut unfortunately, I tried to reach Laird this morning when I read\nit, because I had the same thought. He is gone to Europe, but I may\ncall him there tomorrow.\nP:\nIs there anyone else who could talk to Resor\nK:\nWell, Packard is now the Acting Secretary, but I guess in his\npresent state of mind, I don't know if that is a good thing to do.\nP:\nOh no, we don't want to burden him--he's been a good soldier.\nIt's just one of those things--it's a blip, that's all.\nK:\nIt's a blip, it doesn't make any real difference- because as long\nas it appears only in Washington. Everyone in Washington knows already\na. that Resor is a lightweight and b. what Resor thinks. So this is\nnot going to come as any great surprise to anyone.\nP:\nYou ought to have Visca (?) as the Secretary of Army, no wonder\nyou have got problems with no discipline, no morale or anything. If\nyou have a strong Secretary, it might be a different situation. Leadership\nat the top, and of course, Westmoreland hasn't proven to be any tower\nof strength either.\nK:\nWestmoreland is completely played out. All he remembers is what\nhappened in Vietnam and how he nearly won the war at TET. All that\ngeneration of Army officers is a tragedy. And Abrams is finished.\nP:\nHe sure is; Abrams had his great opportunity and muffed it--not\nonly because of what was done was so fundamentally right--that it is going\nto look all right in the end.\nK:\nBut if it had been done with any degree of competence and\nprecision, we'd have broken up the Vietnam War. It hasn't hurt any\nof our other game it hasn't hurt Soviets and the Chinese thing.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nK:\nYesterday, Mr. President, I didn't have a chance to talk to you\nabo ut it, because we were both in transit. We have reports that the\nIndians are massing troops at the Pakistan border--\nP:\nWhich one, East or West?\nK:\nEast. and I asked Alex let Keating tell the Indians that whatever\nthe problem is and while we were keeping our hands off and while we\nwere willing to help humanitarian efforts, we were strongly opposed\nto military action.\nP:\nWe certainly will; if they go in there with military action, by\nGod we will cut off economic aid.\nK:\nAnd that is the last thing we can afford now to have the Pakistan\ngovernment overthrown, given the other things we are doing.\nP:\nAnd also they have got to know that if what is in jeopardy here\nis economic aid. That is what is in jeopardy.\nK:\nAnd there is absolutely no justification for it they don't have\na right to invade Pakistan no matter what Pakistan does in its territory.\nBesides the killing has stopped.\nP:\nIt has quieted down.\nK:\nOh yes. It may not be a tenable situation in the long term, but\nagain that is not for India to decide.\nP;\nWasn't that a loaded question based on a completely erroneous\nquotation that Gallup used this morning. Where is said \"Do you\nagree with President Nixon's statement that the end of the war will\nbring a generation of peace--God, I never said that--\nK:\nThe most you have ever said is that it will contribute to it and that\nthis is your goal in the whole context of your policy.\nP\nThis has to do with Soviet policy, relations with the Chinese,\nthe Mid-East--everything else. But this is one thing that is essential--\nWe must not have this in a way that will jeopardize.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 4\nK:\nWell, first of all, everybody who doesn't believe that believe there\nwill be a generation of peace, no matter what you do, is going to vote\nagainst that, so that you have 50% against you to start with.\nP:\nBut to put in the question that something the President never\nsaid is -- the difficulty -- see that is one of the reasons we poll,\nbecause we know we get the truth. But the diff iculty with the polling\ngroups, you see Henry, is that they are all up there at Princeton\nand feeding each other, so they load those damn questions every time\ndon't they?\nK:\nAbsolutely. But I don't think it is going to have any effect- -\neveryone will think that this happened before recent development. I\ntalked to a friend from Harvard about an hour ago, who has just come\nback from Europe and he said that last week was really a sensation.\nHe knows all the top leaders there. He said first of all, yourfight on\nthe Mansfield Amendment established you even further as one of the\nstrong men over there, and made a tremendous impact and also the\nSALT thing went over very well.\nP:\nSure the sophisticates will all understand it - it will take quite\na lot of time before people begin to react.\nK:\nWell, this polling must have been done before either of those\nannouncements-.\nP:\nYes, the polling was done a month ago.\nK:\nIt still soaked you with a popularity of 59%--\nP:\nNo it didn't poll presidential popularity\nK:\nThe POST article said compared to President Johnson, you were\nstill 59% to 46% at a comparable period.\nMaybe\nI\nmisread\nit,\nit\ncould be 50%.\nP:\nAnyway it is irrelevant.\nK:\nBut I think that question is essentially an irrelevant question that\ndoesn't test anything. And there are many people who doubt that there\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 5\ncan be a generation of peace ever regardless of Vietnam.\nP:\nOh, absolutely this is a goal - - that is all we are saying . But\nHaldeman going to think of a way to have our top man go over to\nhave a little heart-to-heart talk with these people and say now look\nwe have these goals too, Try to get them to ask other questions because\nthey really should in the public interest.\nK:\nIt is not right to have this misleading impression.\nP:\nOkay, wèll'see you later.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMay 29, 1971 4:00 p.m.\nPresident/Dr. Kissinger\nP:\nYou really missed a great day up there. That was magnificant.\nDid you ever see them do it? A magnificant ceremony.\nK:\nI understand Haig was almost beside himself. He thought it was\na tremendous speech, the best thing that has ever happened to\nWest Point in its recent history and apparently you went into the mess\nhall.\nP:\nOh sure, that's routine. But the point is that is was as it turned\nout a damn good speech--it really hit the right thing and some things\nthat needed to be said. Of course, the press will play up seeds of\npeace germinating, but on the other hand, the Corps and if we can get\nit broadly circulating, people in the Armed Services should read this\nand get a little hope. We have got to reestablish confidence in the military.\nGoddamn it, you know, I think Laird should do a better job on this\nK:\nAnd the military ought to keep their pride in themselves.\nP:\nI don't know if Laird is going out and making this kind of speech--\nI guess he is.\nK:\nLaird has the problem that no one takes him seriously, no matter\nwhat he says.\nP:\nThat is what is needed. Somebody has got to inspire these men.\nGive them a little feeling. We gave them a little inspiration today.\nK:\nWell, I understand that it was a tremendous success, and it turned\nout to be a good speech too.\nP:\nWell, it wouldn't get any play--but that is irrelevant--t point is\nthat it affected them, and they will circulate it.\nP:\nOkay, you are all set for your trip, huh?\nK:\nI am all set--we agreed on that speech exactly as you suggested.\nI am going to get right to the point--\nP:\nYou will just lay it right in there, and as the other things come along,\nyou sort of zing em in whenever you feel it is the right time, you know.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nK:\nYou know you are absolutely right. What we have to do is to con-\nvince the other side, that this is indeed our final offer. And we can't do\nthat by talking around the point.\nP:\nTalking around the point, and saying that well, we are ready to be\nflexible again, and we have proved our good faith, etc. --the hell with all\nthat--they don't have any good faith we don't either. Now we have got\nan offer you can take it or leave it. This is it.\nK:\nIn fact, I put in that there is not time left for philosophy and long\nexpositions. We both know others views, here is our final offer.\nP:\nGreat. And I think it will read well historically. It may work,\nwho knows, it may shake them. But if they go back and turn it down, we\nknow what our course is. But listen, if they turn it down, don't just\nthink we're going back and make a peace offer. I am going to use\nwhatever goddamn bombs we've got and we are going to bomb a hell of\na lot in the North.\nK:\nThey may in fact turn it down Monday, Mr. President. Because\nthey must have a pretty good idea what it is going to be.\nP:\nIf they turn it down Monday, then we are in a perfect condition\nto go forward and crack them. And crack them pretty damn good.\nK:\nThat's right. So I think we will be in a better position Monday,\nwhich ever way it turns.\nP:\nGood luck, Henry. Have a good flight.\nK:\nThank you and congratulations.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\nP:\nHello, Henry?\nK:\nMr. President, I just this second got in.\nP:\nWhere are you? In your office?\nK:\nNo, I'm at home.\nP:\nYeah, are you tired?\nK:\nWell, it's about 5 hours later.\nP:\nYeah, yeah. You must have had quite a drill. You went to\nboth places, huh?\nK:\nI went to both places, yes. First, at the Vietnamese that\ntook about 5 hours and they still can't make up their minds on the\npolitical issue. To all practical purposes, we have settled every other\nquestion. We went through every point in great detail, and they've\nsubstantially conceded us most of our points; for example, of how\nthe ceasefire should operate, how the POW's should be released, a list\nshould be handed over, and things like that. But on the political one,\nthey are ;in a state of confusion. I mean they are making so many\ndifferent demands -- sometimes they say we should just let Minh win\nor help Minh win. Other times, they say we should make a private\ndeal with them to overthrow Thieu which wouldn't be published, and\nthat would be enough. Then they say we have to replace the whole\noutfit. I think what is happening is they have three problems: (1) this\nis really a searing thing for them because they have fought for 25 years\nand now for them to sign a document which has no political sauces is\nvery tough; (2) their Prime Minister is ill Pham Van Dong -- who\nplays about the same role as Chou En-lai; and (3) that Peking trip has\ngiven them quite a shock. So, as I told you before we left, I didn't\nexpect them to settle this time. So at the end, I said several times,\n'you know, if you want us to overthrow him, it just isn't on and there\nis no sense in having another meeting. I Le Duc Tho said 'no, no, we\nneed one other meeting; I want to reconsider it. I want to come up with\na new proposal.' So I decided to give them one more meeting.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n- 2 -\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\nP:\nWhat about the date of it?\nK:\nWell, they wanted four weeks which is actually -- in this\nsense, it's a good sign because it means they have to go back to Hanoi,\nbut I gave them only three. The point is they are not stringing us\nalong because they are not keeping us from doing anything we want\nto do.\nP:\nUh huh. Well, of course, does it appear that the Chinese\nmay have talked to them?\nK:\nThere's just no way.\nThey made an elliptical reference\nto it saying 'you won't settle it by taking trips; you have to settle it\nwith us. Don't go on trips; come to us. I Stuff like that. Except on\nthe political point, they were very forthcoming and on that, they\nwere more confused than tough.\nP:\nOf course, the political point is so fundamental, Henry, that\nI suppose the other things don't really matter, do they? In a sense\nK:\nThat's essentially true.\nP:\nWhen you really come down to it.\nK:\nWhat we have gotten out of it we have now with these\ndamn doves, it doesn't help you much, but we have a superb public\nrecord because we've offered everything that could conceivably be\noffered except making a coup against Thieu. We've offered neutrality,\nwe've offered limitations on military aid, we've offered a withdrawal\ndeadline, we've offered 'hands-off' in the election -- so there's really\nnothing that even McGovern would ask for that we haven't offered, and\nno one can say we ought to make a coup.\nP:\nNo; I don't think so. They might, but.\nK:\nAnd I don't exclude\nI think it's still 50-50. I think, frankly,\nthey just haven't been able to decide this. They have a collective\nleadership. They've had a terrible blow with this Peking visit and\nPham Van Dong has been very ill.\nP:\nAnd I think it goes without saying, too, that they're not having\ntoo damn much success militarily.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 3 -\nK:\nThat's right. I mean when I kept saying\nP:\nI think Laos is\nyou know, used to revive that debate but,\nfor God's sake, when you look at the level of fighting all over Southeast\nAsia, I mean, of course, weather is part of it, but they are just not\ndoing what they did last year.\nK:\nYeah, but weather\nlast year, we had 50 casualties in the\nsame weather.\nP:\nMore like 90, wasn't it? Well, maybe 50.\nK:\nOr 75. I don't know when it started dropping.\nP:\nYeah, they were 75 to 90.\nK:\nAnd when I say to them, you might as well settle because you\nare asking us to do something which we are less able to do next year\nand you are less able to enforce, they don't say, 'no, you've lost the\nwar and so forth,' as they always used to say.\nP:\nWell, there's nothing we really can offer on the political side,\nHenry, is there? We can't offer to overthrow Thieu.\nK:\nI think it really would be too much, Mr. President.\nP:\nNot only would it really be too much, we couldn't do it because,\nGood God, we've got enough on our plates on the other same things we\nhave to do.\nK:\nExactly. I've looked at it\nP:\nEvery friend we have in the world would just be petrified with\nthat sort of a thing.\nK:\nExactly, Mr. President.\nP:\nWe're not going to do it.\nK:\nI've looked at it, you know, just to make sure that I would know\nwhat is involved, but I really\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 4 -\nP:\nNo, no, no. We just can't do it, and so that's that. So we'll\njust stand firmly for principle, but then it seems to me after the next\nmeeting -- and we, of course, can talk about it -- we then have to\nreally make a decision to go public and say what we have offered.\nK:\nWell, one thing they did offer firmly was they would settle\nprisoners for withdrawal. Now that's no good to us before the election\nin Vietnam, but it might be something that come October you might\nwant.\nP:\nYeah, but would they do it then?\nK:\nWell, we don't know. It's too high a price before the election\nbecause it might topple Thieu.\nP:\nYeah, yeah, unless it were extended beyond a certain date.\nI mean suppose their date was\nK:\nWell, they won't give us\nP:\nNo, no, no -- prisoners for withdrawal. That won't do. We've\ngot to have ceasefire in it.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nThat looks like just a straight trade-off.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nNo, we would never do that.\nK:\nI talked to the others who were extremely cordial, except the\nguy has absolutely no power. All he can do is pass messages. They\nthink that around October 15th is the earliest they can handle a visit\nby me. I had proposed September 15th, as you remember, when we\ntalked which was maybe a little too eager to begin with. But extremely\nfriendly and cordial.\nP:\nBut if October 15th.\nthat still wouldn't preclude the other.\nK:\nNo.\nP:\nOur own coming December\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 5 -\nK:\nI wouldn't think so.\nP:\nWell, as a matter of fact, that's what they've already talked\nabout, haven't they?\nK:\nWell, December -- we've never actually given them a date.\nBut I think it would be too early, Mr. President, to give them a date.\nWe mustn't appear that eager.\nP:\nNo, no. I meant the talk we were thinking of.\nK:\nNo, that's what they had said to begin with, so that was nothing\nnew.\nP:\nYeah, they had said\n...\nyou have already discussed with them\nthe possibility of going as early as December.\nK:\nNo, what they had said was anytime in '72. So when I said, well,\nwhat if the President's schedule turns out to be more convenient earlier,\nthey said, well, maybe as early as December 1.\nP:\nYou see, the difficulty with '72 is really a very real one -- to\ngo over there at a time that we have to make the State of the Union and\nthe Budget and so forth would not be right. I couldn't do that.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nI couldn't go in January, and so\nK:\nI think towards the end of August, we ought to propose December.\nP:\nAnd propose December 15th even, you know. The Christmas\nperiod is not too bad either.\nK:\nRight, right. But I don't have any sense that there's any problem\nabout that.\nP:\nNo, I don't either.\nK:\nBut they must have had a searing time. I've seen a report\nthey sent out to the plane of all the press reactions in North Vietnam\nand North Korea, and they really gave them a beating. Did you see\nthe Sidey article this week?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 6 -\nP:\nNo, I didn't, Henry -- in LIFE -- no, I didn't.\nK:\nYeah, he puts in all this business about comparing.\nIt says\nKissinger found many similarities between the Chinese Premier and\nthe President. Chou spoke softly like Nixon; he did not nitpick, a\ndiplomatic device that Nixon scorns too. Chou expounded his idea on\nwith fervor but it never overwhelmed realism. Nixon\ndoes the same, and so on and so forth. Chou did not have to use a\nnote in 20 hours of conversation. That's the way Nixon talks.\nP:\nWell, you got your points made very well, didn't you?\nK:\nThe man in Peking and the man in Washington are infinitely\nfar apart on issues and goals but in a curious way they will not meet\nas strangers. In fact, he got everything in -- about the caligraphy,\nhe got that in.\nP:\nWell, anyway, you have now tried your Paris channel and\nthat's good.\nK:\nWell, I think, Mr. President.\nP:\nAnd, incidentally, we are not going to be eager, but they do\nwant a public visit before the other visit.\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nThat's definite, isn't it?\nK:\nThat is definite.\nP:\nWell, October is fine.\nK:\nAnd I think we needed, Mr. President, so that we can work out\nthe agenda so that you are not caught any surprise, and this guy in Paris\nP:\nThat gives us two\nK:\nis a hell of a nice guy, but he has absolutely no authority.\nP:\nWell, just like Dobrynin -- he's got no authority. Not one damn\nbit. None of these guys have, and so that's all there is to it. So what\ndid you pass on to him -- anything this time?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 7 -\nK:\nNo, I passed on to him something about the political visit.\nFirst, I did something which was a little devious. I said, well, we\nare under tremendous right-wing attack and I said you have to remember\nthe only man who can keep the right wing under control here is the\nPresident. I said you play too much with the left, the right will get\neven more inflamed, and that limits our abilities.\nP:\nGood. Did you throw in the possibility of Mansfield?\nK:\nI didn't put it that way -- I didn't mention any names. I said\non visits, of course, any time a Presidential candidate gets invited,\nthat's a political issue. On the other hand, there are people like the\nSenator Majority Leader -- well, I did say it -- who would not present\nthe same problem. Although, on the whole, I said it would be best if\nthe President were the first senior American to talk to the Chinese.\nP:\nIt's just as well to make the point. Then, if they do us in on\nit, they owe us one.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nYou know, I don't think we do any good by just rolling over on\neverything.\nK:\nOh, no. Absolutely not.\nP:\nIt's a rather interesting thing, though, that Kennedy group\nbeing cancelled in Japan. That might have been the group they were\ntalking about.\nK:\nThat's right. Well, they certainly haven't rushed into it.\nP:\nWell, they haven't yet, but they've got plenty of time. And if\nthey do, they do, but it isn't going to\nK:\nWell, we kept them out from April on.\nP:\nThis isn't going to be the same thing, let's face it.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nThis is August already.\nK:\nThis is August and by October we have another shot and then by\nDecember you'll be there.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 8 -\nP:\nThat's right. As far as the October thing, I think the thing\nto do there -- the only thing I would suggest is that should probably\nbe announced perhaps three weeks\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nP:\nI would think that would have to be announced about September 15th.\nK:\nThey expressed some concern about Bruce, and I don't know whether\nwe should insist on that.\nP:\nBecause of the\nK:\nVietnam thing.\nP:\nYeah. Well, I sort of wondered if that isn't a little awkward,\nfrankly.\nK:\nBecause it really has to look as if we are putting\nP:\nAs a matter of fact, too, I think it handles a little easier with\nState if it seems so natural for them to say we want you to come over\nto work out the agenda.\nK:\nThat's right. Absolutely.\nP:\nYou made the first visit\nK:\nSo I didn't make an issue of it.\nP:\nAnd we'll give Bruce a crack at something later.\nK:\nAbsolutely. He's a great soldier.\nP:\nHow did he\nhe's thinking of leaving August 1st?\nK:\nYes, about August 3rd, I think.\nP:\nGood. Well, you tell him to get in shape.\nK:\nAnd I told the other side that that was the case.\nP:\nWell, so, it's really left now that\nK:\nIt's left that we'll absolutely have to know at the next meeting.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 9 -\nP:\nI guess\nYou see, the thing about the reason I think we\nhave to know is that what the hell is left -- I mean, it's almost too\nlate then, isn't it?\nK:\nThere's practically nothing left to talk about, Mr. President,\nat these meetings. We've, for all practical purposes\nand if they\nwant to affect the elections, they've got to do it next time. And then\nwe may need another session if they agree just to draft the damn thing.\nP:\nYeah, but if they want to affect the election.\nyou didn't give\nthem a date this time. You just said it would be\nor did you say\nnine months after we sign the agreement.\nK:\nI said nine months after we sign the agreement, which gave\nthem terrific heartburn, because they want a fixed date, and I said,\n'yes and then you'll still be considering our other points while the\ndate runs around, and they laughed.\nP:\nI think that makes sense -- nine months. That's a pretty good\noffer, isn't it?\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nI mean that's pretty hard for the doves to crack that, too.\nK:\nWhat can they say?\n\"\nSo that's four or five months after their fixed date. So we have\nreally offered a date, haven't we?\nK:\nWe have offered a date. No, we've given them everything.\nP:\nWell, the record is there now.\nK:\nThe record is there which is\nP:\nWould it be your view that -- and the way it feels now that\ncome August that wouldn't be the date -- what would be the date\nof your next trip?\nK:\nAugust 16th, Mr. President.\nP:\nWell, it would be your view then that after that one, we'd.\nK:\nWell, we can either go public or hold it until after the Vietnam\nelection and try the fixed deadline for prisoners and then go public with\nour final announcement.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 10 -\nP:\nThe question being\nThen the fixed deadline can be put.\nwell, it's got to be\nI think it really has to be the first of May.\nThat's approximately what we are thinking of.\nK:\nThat's a little early, but we can.\nP:\nWe don't want it; as I told you, we can't have it too much.\ntoo\nclose into that convention time.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nOn the other hand, as we move.\nwell, we'll be down to only\n184, 000 by that time anyway.\nK:\nThat's not something that we absolutely\nThe reason against\ngoing public in August is that it will churn up Vietnam all over again\nat a time when people may not be talking about it.\nP:\nYeah, well, we'll just see what people feel about it at that\npoint, particularly if this level of activity is so low, I would just let\nit ride. I think the doves at the present time are just -- they may\nchange -- but they are damned goosey about taking on anything on\nVietnam. They know damn well something is going on.\nK:\nThat's right, and that's why it's dangerous for us to make\nan announcement of a failure. I think we\nP:\nWe might as well play it out.\nK:\nWe ought to couple it with something we are doing.\nP:\nWe still have a problem as you know which is a recurring\nproblem [End of tape]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape 2)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n[Beginning of tape]\nK:\ndoveshave written to me thanking me for the China move.\nThey think it's related.\nP:\nThey are working like hell on this thing, I know. Well,\nreally their long vigil is about over. It's going to go one way or andher.\nI suppose our real problem, Henry, is that you look after the elections\nand let's suppose Thieu wins that's what we really come down to,\nisn't it?\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nThen we offer all right, we'll get out and fix a date for POW's.\nI suppose they could just sit there and thumb their noses at you, couldn't\nthey?\nK:\nWell.\nYeah, they could do it, but they don't know how long\nwe are going to stay then.\nP:\nWe could hang around and also\nI would think, too, that the\nceasefire idea must have some appeal because we are still getting\nquite a few raps of bombing, aren't we?\nK:\nOh, yes.\nP:\nThat's one card we've still got, and we've got to continue that.\nK:\nThat's right, and particularly the bombing on the Laotian\ninfiltration trail.\nP:\nThat's what I meant, and over the DMZ and the rest of it,\nthey'd like to get that stopped.\nK:\nOh, yes, very much. No, I think, Mr. President.\nmy\nimpression is I've never seen them so insecure. All our intelligence\nreports confirm it, and if they only knew how to settle it, I think if\nHo Chi Minh were there, they'd settle now. But they have a divided\nleadership, and their Chou En-lai is ill.\nP:\nOh, I suppose that's right. I suppose one question is whether\nwe want to enlist the Chinese on this at all.\nK:\nOn Vietnam?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 2 of tape 2 -\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nI think we've enlisted them as much as we can.\nP:\nBut I mean on a more specific basis, saying here's the\nproblem. I suppose there's nothing they can do.\nK:\nWell, I don't think there's much they will do in the light of.\nP:\nThey can't.\nK:\nAnd we don't what they may be doing. Chou En-lai did say\nhe would talk to them.\nP:\nIt may be that he's urging them to be reasonable, and they\ndon't know how the hell to be reasonable.\nK:\nThat's right, and also it will take them ten days -- 12 days\nis really all they had since the last meeting which isn't a hell of a lot.\nP:\nThat's right. I must say, though, you certainly got the\nimpression that the fact that you walked in there from Peking shocked\nthem, huh?\nK:\nOh, God, yes. Their whole tone towards me is completely\ndifferent, Mr. President, in this series than it has been in any other\nseries of meetings. And they are wavering. If they don't settle,\nit will be a very close decision. And I expect them to go through at\nleast one and perhaps two sessions, just proving to themselves that\nthey can't get it. I was absolutely brutal at the end.\nP:\nYou told them that we would under no circumstances\nK:\nThat's it. I told them this is it. If that's all you've got to\nsay, that's it.\nP:\nAnd then they said, no, we'll go back and take another look.\nK:\nThat's right. I said, frankly, if that's all you want to discuss,\nthere's no point in another meeting, and then Le Duc Tho said, no,\nwhy don't we look at the position again and see whether we can come\nup with a new formulation.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 3 of Tape 2 -\nP:\nWell, one thing, Henry, I know, whatever the formulation\nis we cannot\nagain because of the world repercussions\nand the repercussions everyplace from Indonesia to Korea over. and etc.\nThailand - - you just can't play any games on tossing Thieu/ That's\nhow this whole miserable thing We ought to\nremember it was a coup.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nAnd by God, we are not going to end it that way.\nK:\nExactly, Mr. President. And also the impact we've already\nhad with the Peking thing, we would just lose any credibility and moral\nstanding if we now did this.\nP:\nThat's right. Right now, we can hold our own but on this we\njust let 'er go. That's the way to do it. And, frankly, let's face it,\nas we said, it just may be that/they don't settle, we just wind it down\nthe way we have.\nK:\nAnd that's what they're afraid of.\nP:\nIt would be bng-term, and we'll just continue to wind 'er down\nand get out in our own good time, but we will be out. But we will still\ngo forward shortly after the election and before the visit, we'll just\nannounce our terminal date. That I think we should do.\nK:\nAfter the election?\nP:\nThat's what I mean. I mean before the trip.\nK:\nOh, yes. Oh, certainly before the trip.\nP:\nBut after the election.\nXXXX\nWe don't want to have this thing\nhanging over us as we go to the trip. This is something that should\nbe bargained out there. They can't\neverybody will expect them\nto just say, all right, this is it; we announced our withdrawal and we\nwould hope at that point.\nI\nsuppose the real problem is how can you\nannounce it? You would announce the withdrawal except for residual\nforce for prisoners. Is that, in effect, what you would do?\nK:\nSomething like that. All volunteers.\nP:\nYeah, we could sure talk about volunteers then. Well, it's\ncertainly not dull. You know one thing that you can be thinking about,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 4 of Tape 2 -\nP:\n(cont'd) Henry, -- and you get a little sleep -- I was reading\nover the weekend the memorandum you sent me but you do not put\nthe name on wasn't that by the same fellow that wrote one about\ntwo\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nKaplan -- what's his name?\nK:\nKraemer.\nP:\nKraemer. I thought so. I could tell from his style.\nK:\nHe tends to go a little bit in the apocalytic direction.\nP:\nBut he really paints a rather gloomy picture, doesn't he?\nK:\nWell, he goes a little bit too far, but there's something in\nwhat he says if we don't play it very carefully.\nP:\nWell, his point is\nof course, like he says Berlin.\nhe\nthinks Berlin is a surrender.\nK:\nWell, he doesn't know what's going on.\nP:\nGermany is being\n.\nK:\nWell, that's true, but not because of what we do.\nP:\nThat's right. That's good. And then he goes on and says,\nhere we are all over Asia pulling out and getting out and so forth.\nBut it does show you, doesn't it, Henry, the real dangers we're playing\nwith here. Of course, the other side of this coin whichwe have to\nconsider\nis that if we hadn't done something and we'd\nbeen tossed out, everything would have come apart at the seams, and\nall we're doing is to frankly buy some time and to turn around if we\ncan still turn around. Is that about it?\nK:\nWell, I think the big move eased all the problems he describes.\nI mean, every one of the problems he describes was happening anyway.\nP:\nYeah, that's right, too. And it does ease them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 5 of Tape 2 -\nK:\nBut we shouldn't overlook.\nI mean, those other problems\nare very real.\nP:\nWe have to bear ;in mind is that as we handle that.\nyou\nknow as you read all the editorials and other things from, as I said,\nparticularly from those who are for it for the wrong reason - like\nMansfield who thinks this means we are getting out in the world\nand that we are going to get along with everybody and so forth and\nso on but you realize that the enormous importance of our playing\nit our way. But I think that it's\nif you consider your conversation\nwith Chou En-lai, you made that crystally clear that there was no\nquestion of our continuing to play an Asian role.\nK:\nNo doubt about it.\nP:\nAnd that's the point. And I think they understand that. As a\nmatter of fact, I rather think they'd like for us to continue to play\n'em.\nK:\nThey didn't say so, but they certainly didn't fight it when I\nsaid it.\nP:\nWell, the reason that I think so -- even though they wouldn't\nsay so is that they aren't in any position in XXXX time to handle\nsome of the people and some of their\nlike the Japanese and the\nrest. I mean we're pretty useful to them.\nK:\nOh, and we of all the great powers are the ones that threatened\ntheir territory least.\nP:\nYes, we've threaten ed them the least and also, if we are\nwithdrawn to the coasts of California, we are a hell of a long way off\nfrom their big neighbor on the west.\nK:\nYes, that's right. They are realists; they know that that can't\nhappen.\nP:\nThat's right. But I had quite a chance over the weekend to\nread this stuff, and it's really an amazing thing that the\nthe way\nthis thing has shocked.\nparticularly our usual critics. They just\nhave a hell of a time knowing how to handle it, don't they?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 6 of tape 2 -\nK:\nAbsolutely; they haven't dared to pick on it yet.\nP:\nSome of the problems are beginning to surface. I mean, the\nIndonesians, I noticed, are expressing concern. I read that report\nin the news yesterday expressing some concern about being consulted.\nK:\nI haven't seen the Indonesians expressing concern.\nP:\nWell, expressing concern about Chinese subversion.\nK:\nOh, oh.\nP:\nIt was in that report that you gave me, you know.\nK:\nOh, yes, yes.\nP:\nI think it was in one that I saw. And the Thais and so forth.\nBut that's natural.\nK:\nWell, and we have to play it hard. We can't roll over for the\nChinese now.\nP:\nNo, sir. They are not going to roll over for us.\nK:\nThey certainly aren't.\nP:\nAnd that's one of the reasons\nI had a very interesting talk.\na couple of things will interest you. Colson got a report from the\nhard-hats -- Brennan and his group in New York his amazement\nthat they were at their convention were very strongly for what we were\ndoing.\nK:\nIsn't that amazing.\nP:\nAnd Fitzsimmons, the head of the Teamsters, called him --\nhe's sort of an illiterate fellow and he told Colson\nhe says, 'you\nknow/the what President said about going to Pekun, and he said that's good.\nYou see, these hardhats and these sort of earthy fellows, they see what\nthe real game is. They can see the Russian thing. Any sensible person\ndoes. And I also talked to Rockefeller today -- he was up there and I\nsaid, and you were so right -- he's just ecstatic.\nK:\nOh, he's beside himself.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nca 12:00 m., July 26, 1971\n- 7 of tape 2 -\nP:\nHe says that he thinks that the Democratic candidates must\nbe slipping their\nnow. He says he's just never seen\nsomething\nThe mood really in the country has significantly changed.\nK:\nAnd that's what we all said\nP:\nthe right-wing. There is a substantial right-wing thing\nbut not nearly as much as you would normally expect.\nK:\nNo.\nP:\nBut on the other hand, what has happened ;is that the left --\nthe liberals, the peacenik types -- they are just up a wall. They don't\nknow what the hell to do with this.\nK:\nExactly. And that in itself is a major diplomatic feat.\nP:\nWell, what it does, Henry, it buys us time gracefully and to\nbring Vietnam to some kind of an honorable conclusion. And I don't\nthink we would have ever made it otherwise.\nK:\nWe'd never have made it. Congress would have killed us.\nP:\nAnd it also may buy us some time on a few other things.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nIt'll be ; interesting to see what our Russian friends do now.\nK:\nI think they are going to be\nCertainly at SALT, they have\nbeen easier than any previous meeting.\nP:\nIt will also be interesting to see what they want to do about a\nvisit.\nK:\nI think that's going to come certainly.\nP:\nWell, have a good night's sleep.\nK:\nRight. Thank you, Mr. President. Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in August 3, 1971\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHi, Henry.\nK:\nI'm sorry about before.\nP:\nI know you are; you were busy\nK:\nFulbright had invited members of his Committee to his house\nin order to make peace. You know he has been screaming Executive\nPrivilege and asking me to come up there, and I've refused. So he\nwent back to something we had done two years ago; namely, meet\nat his house. MacGregor had strongly supported it, and it was really\nan amazing session. There was only one question on Vietnam; 60%\nwas on China; about 20% on the Soviet Union; a % little on Japan;\nand they were\nFulbright started nagging and Aiken would jump\non him or Javits and Church was very positive. They said how do\nyou know what is going to come out of the meeting. I said that's not\nour problem; certainly something is going to come out of the meeting.\nThe problem is\nBut the most important achievements won't be\ninthe communique. It's these nations re=establishing contact. Church\nsaid, \"Absolutely right. \" The mood -- when one things about how\nthey behaved six weeks ago was unbelievably different.\nP: Yeah, uh-huh. That's very interesting.\nK: And Henry Brandon called up today. He is doing -- you know that\nbook on foreign policy and unless he is soft-soaping me, he said the\nmore he reads it the more he thinks yours is going to go down as the\ngreatest foreign policy administration in this century.\nP: If we can just get a few breaks -- a few more.\nK: One more -- you were right. If we get one more the rest will take\ncare of themselves.\nP: Yeah, yeah. As a matter of fact, you just need another one and uh.\nK: That's right. And if we break open that Vietnam one\nP: Well, of course, that's critical but if you don't then we got to get\nsomething else.\nK: That's right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\n- 2 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in August 3, 1971\nP:\nAnd we might too.\nK:\nWell, we will get the Soviet one I'm pretty sure now. And we\ngot the Berlin one pretty well sewed up, that's just a question\nof weeks now.\nP:\nAnd SALT seems to be rolling around.\nK:\nSALT, yeah, that will take maybe until next Spring to get it\nall done. But that's no tragedy because it fits it better into the\nsummit plans.\nP:\nRight, well we'll umm - - I was just looking over the briefing\nmaterials, certainly there is really not much we can answer in\na press conference.\nK:\nNo.\nP:\nGot to be extremely guarded about virtually everything.\nK:\nBut I think you'll find that they are not going to press you very\nhard.\nP:\nYeah. That doesn't make any difference, I'm not going to tell\nthem anything.\nK:\nI wouldn't get into any debates on Vietnam, it will just give --\nP:\nOn Vietnam, I'm not going to answer any questions on it.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nI'm just not going to cover that. I'll say I've nothing to say about\nthat than what we've already said.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nJust let it lie. No, I have no problem on that. Pakistan is a\nlittle sticky.\nK:\nThat's another subject I discussed with him. And I told him that\nRogers was going to announce it -- I've worked out something with\nRogers on relief and on refugees. And as you predicted -- and your\ntalk with him yesterday was extremely useful.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Tape)\n- 3 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in August 3, 1971\nP:\nCause he wants now to play it like he did Biafra.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nThats the thing to do, let him lead the charge.\nK:\nThat's right. That was a good way of putting it.\nP:\nSo that he can -- and let him --\nK:\nAnd I told him all of his people were screaming for political\naccommodation. I said now, Bill, assuming Yahya came to you\nand said I want a political accommodation, what would you recommend\nto him and he said he admits that he didn't have any idea and there\nwasn't any idea so he said he is going to sit on them.\nP:\nWe've just got to give plenty of relief, that's all. And his idea\nI think -- apparently did he mention to you about the UN deal.\nK:\nYeah, yeah. He's going to write -- we're going to do both, we're\ngoing to write a letter to -- or he is going to write a letter to\nU Thant in the next two or three days and then we're going to - -\nP:\nWe'll really have to work that into the answer then -- in view of\nyour conversations with him, would you like to prepare another\nbrief answer. I don't want to get into Pakistan into any detail but --\nK:\nRight, I will prepare it tomorrow.\n/\nJust prepare\nP:\nA very brief answer. I'm going to in this conference I'm going to\nbe very short on everything, just try to get by on 20-25 minutes\nyou know and not get any --\nK:\nRight, right, right.\nP:\nBecause there is just nothing to be gained by talking on any of these\nsubjects.\nK:\nThat's what I think.\nP:\nI mean a lot of the press now will understand why.\nK:\nI don't know unless the press has switched this now again. In all\nof your previous meetings they were really trying to make you look\nbad, now there is a sneaking admiration there.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\n- 4 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in August 3, 1971\nP:\nWell, of course they have to go after some things but they --\nK:\nI think they will concentrate on the domestic side.\nP:\nEconomy, sure. Yeah.\nK:\nI think that's uh --\nP:\nWell, we'll fumble them on that.\nK:\nI had lunch with -- was Connally today, just to bring him up-to-date\non some things and of course he is fully with us.\nP:\nHe understands.\nK:\nOh, yeah, he is --\nP:\nYou know Agnew had a long talk with Ehrlichman and I must say\nhe is awfully difficult. He really feels he should be brought in and\ntold everything and everything should be discussed with him and\nhe should help make the decisions, that's rèally what his gripe is\nhe says.\nK:\nWell, God, no Viee President in history has ever had that role.\nP:\nWell, no Vice President has ever had as much as he has.\nK:\nThat's right. And you have really -- I saw how Kennedy treated\nJohnson and how Johnson treated Humphrey and you've treated him\nwith a delicacy - -\nP:\nWell, we've had him in on - - well, we've had him in on everything\nwe can but my God, can you imagine having Agnew in when we are\ndiscussing things like this. Jesus, he just doesn't --\nK:\nWell, he is time-wasting and he is just not subtle enough.\nP:\nThat's right. And you just can't have that many people in on the\ndeal.\nK:\nThat's right. I called Reagan about the UN thing.\nP:\nGood.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\n- 5 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in August 3, 1971\nK:\nAnd he says no problem with him.\nP:\nHe's going there, he's going to Taiwan, you know.\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nI think that's not a bad idea frankly.\nK:\nNot at all.\nP:\nDon't you? He goes there as my representative and shows --\nK:\nIt doesn't hurt anyway to show a little toughness to the Chinese.\nP:\nThat's right. I mean after all they haven't done anything for us\non Vietnam as far as we know so --\nK:\nWell, we wouldn't know that.\nP:\nI know but my point is that there is something in it here for\neverybody.\nK:\nThat's right and of course they did a hell of a lot for us just by\nagreeing to the announcement.\nP:\nThat's correct, that's correct and they know that.\nK:\nAnd they took the 7 points off the front page and there is one other\ninteresting thing --\nP:\nOf course, it means a hell of a lot -- I couldn't agree more.\nBut what I meant is that in terms of what the public sees, they\nhaven't done anything for us, we haven't done anything for them.\nK:\nThat's right, exactly. And that is something in fact that ought\nto be said.\nP:\nCorrect. I've noticed no conditions on either side.\nK:\nRight. Incidentally, there were two announcements today. One\nfrom Moscow and one from Peking about their talks with Le Duc Tho.\nAnd actually the Moscow one is a shade stronger. The one from\nMoscow says that they pledged their support to comrade\nLe Duc Tho to help Hanoi win its just victory and Le Duc Tho thanked\nhim for the unwaivering support. Peking radio simply announced it\nLe Duc Tho and Chou En-lai spoke in an atmosphere of comradely\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\n- 6 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in August 3, 1971\nK:\n(cont'd) and unity and one other hatchet it warns. But there was\nno -- they didn't say anything about victory and they didn't say\nanything about Le Duc Tho thanking them. And then it said after\nthe talks comrade Chou En-lai gave a banquet for Le Duc Tho.\nSo its uh -- in this Aesopian language it is a little more guarded.\nP:\nUh-humm.\nK:\nI won't draw too profound conclusions from it but there is this\nshade of difference.\nP:\nWell, when is the next meeting?\nK:\nTwo weeks from today, Mr. President.\nP:\nBut uh -- well, we'll see. Le Duc Tho as you say, he --\nK:\nWell, if you want me to, I could let you see -- could send it\ntomorrow, the actual verbatim of the last conversation. Iread\nit and you'll see that at the end I was almost brutal.\nP:\nSure, that's the way to do them.\nK:\nAnd they came back very soft. And I sent a copy to Bunker and\nhe read it and he said it's amazing that they agreed even to meet\nafter that again.\nP:\nUh-humm.\nK:\nThey might be stringing us along but it isn't clear to me for what.\nI think what they may want to do is to agree to a statement of principles\nwith us now and then if Thieu -- in order to bring down Thieu in\nthe election. If he wins it, they may not implement it. But then\nit would have the great advantage of giving us another 6 months and\nthen we can use those principles to move from there to withdrawal\nand prisoners.\nP:\nHummm ! Well, we shall see. Okay, thank you.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n[Brought in 8/5/71]\nP:\nHello.\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHi, Henry. What is that story about the Swedes?\nK:\nThere is absolutely nothing to it that I have been able to discover.\nP:\nGerry Warren came in and told me in the middle of Theatre\nand I just said my God and see what Kissinger says and put it out that\nway. It seems to me they are not going to be foolish to do anything\nsilly like that.\nK:\nWell, I don't exclude, Mr. President, that they may make a\ngesture on something like that day which is just four days before their\nmeeting with me.\nP:\nWell, yeah, they might make a gesture.\nK:\nBut not of that magnitude.\nP:\nYeah. I didn't know -- Oh, they were going to do it on what\nday? Have they said?\nK:\nOn the 12th.\nP:\nAnd your meeting is when?\nK:\nThe 16th. But for them to let 183 go is a pretty big step.\nP:\nYeah. For what reason would they be doing it then?\nK:\nSupposing they come back to us with an offer on Thieu that is\nnot yet acceptable but is a small step in our direction. If they were to\nsay that as a sign of their goodwill and their eagerness to get the thing\nsettled they are letting these go and then even made it public, It would\nput us into a pretty tough spot.\nP:\nYep.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\n-2-\nK:\nBut that's the only plausible way I can see it.\nP:\nWhat is this? This isʳreport that somebody chartered a plane?\nK:\nWell, the story came from a Swedish newspaper and we are\ntrying to track that down.\nP:\nThe minute I hear that I become suspicious.\nK:\nExactly! It was from a Swedish newspaper which gave no\nsources, which said that through super-secret negotiations, 183\nprisoners are going to be released on August 12. That these are\ngoing to leave on a chartered SAS plane that had been secretly\nchartered at the request of the U. S. military. Well, of course, we\nimmediately had checked with Saigon; we checked with every conceivable\nagency; then I thought maybe Perot had pulled a little deal.\nP:\nYeah, hell yeah.\nK:\nAnd we called him and there is nothing to that. So any base\nthat we are familiar with has been covered. Of course, they also might\nhave thought that this is the way to get themselves back on the front\npage.\nP:\nThat's a pretty cheap way; I mean that's a way that isn't going\nto help them.\nK:\nThat's what I think.\nP:\nUnless they can produce.\nK:\nOh, no -- if they were going to do it. If they don't do it then I\nthink it will hurt them to play like this.\nP:\nSure.\nK:\nSo we have put out a statement because we didn't want these\nwives climbing walls. That we have no information about this report,\nno U. S. agency has been involved and that no plane from SAS or any\nother line has been chartered by the Government.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\n-3-\nP:\nAnd that we still continue to work for the release of all the\nprisoners.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nIt would be a horrible thing to put\nK:\nThis is verbatim, Mr. President, of what we put into the state-\nment.\nP:\nYeah, that's what Warren told me. He gave it to me briefly.\nThat was fine. You handled it just right. Just right.\nK:\nWell, tomorrow we will go after the Swedes. We didn't want\nto call there in the middle of their night.\nP:\nNo. Of course you have such a jackass government there that\nyou don't know what they are up to.\nK:\nWell, then it is not totally impossible that they'll do something\nlike this.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nCause in which case -- something is clearly going on,\nMr. President, there is just no doubt.\nP:\nLet me say this, I don't think this is what they are going to\ndo though. This just sounds phony to me, I may be totally wrong.\nK:\nNo, I would not have predicted this.\nP:\n90%, I think. If it comes off, I'll be 90% surprised.\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\n10% chance but I don't think so.\nK:\nI would not have predicted this.\nP:\nOn the other hand may be lo oking for a clever move and that\ncould be a clever move.\nK:\nWell, you know, this Chinese move has knocked them off the\nfront pages.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\n- 4 -\nP:\nIt's just amazing, it's just amazing. It's the reason that the whole\nthing really -- today, I got one question on Vietnam.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nOne question.\nK:\nAnd I had dinner with Red Blount tonight and of course, he is\necstatic but he said he has either a son or -- it must be a son -- - who is\nnow in --\nP:\nVietnam.\nK:\nNo, who is now in Europe who had been a dedicated Democrat,\nworked his head off for Humphrey and who has now written him a letter\nsaying he is going to vote for you in the next election.\nP:\n(laughter) Isn't that interesting.\nK:\nAnd he said that this just shows the complete change in attitude.\nP:\nEspecially among the young.\nK:\nEspecially among the young.\nP:\nAnd also really in the middle class -- upper middle class.\nK:\nAnd also among the knowledgeable people, Mr. President.\nEverybody now believes. In fact, they may give us too much credit for\ngreat design in foreign policy.\nP:\nWell, as a matter of fact I think the way we have been putting it --\nyou put it in your backgrounder and the way I put it today -- nobody can\nexpect too much.\nK:\nNo, that was beautifully done.\nP:\nEverybody, Henry, has got to say it was right because you know I\nreally said about the same thing about them that we have been saying about\nthe Russians.\nK:\nWell, there are so many changes. Jerry Weisner, whom you remember.\nP:\nOh, yeah.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 5 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\nK:\nHe called up from Cambridge to say that he just came back from\nEngland, he just wanted me to know how enthusiastic he was about\nour China thing and he wanted me to make sure to tell you. And\nI said we particularly appreciate this from people like you who we\nknow aren't going to vote for us but who are needed to give us the\nsupport.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nHe said, \"What makes you think I'm not going to vote for you? I\nstarted out in this as an Independent. \"\nP:\nThat's interesting.\nK:\nI don't think he is going to vote for us but a year ago, Jerry Weisner\nwouldn't have said this even as a joke. Then I ran into Arthur\nSchlesinger today; he is in town working on the Kennedy papers.\nP:\nI've never met him; I don't know what he is like.\nK:\nWell, actually, he is a rather good-hearted fellow.\nP:\nWell, I didn't read his book either but people tell me he is an\ninteresting guy.\nK:\nYeah, he is sort of like Bill Buckley on the Liberal side.\nP:\nYeah, yeah, yeah; I see.\nK:\nSame sort of fellow.\nP:\nI wonder -- he's a very interesting -- someday when he comes in,\nyou should bring him in just so I can meet him.\nK:\nOh, I'd be delighted.\nP:\nYou know what I mean.\nK:\nWell, he says foreign policy is dead and he is telling all the Democrats\nto lay off it because he says a lot of them are now hoping the meeting\nwill disintegrate but he says, and I think he is absolutely right, that\nthe Chinese haven't made this step in order to humiliate us now. And\nactually, I have been having a study made of their propaganda and\nwhat's happening is that our newspapers pick up every conceivably\ncritical thing but if you read it carefully --\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 6 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nFirst of all in their attack on the UN statement --\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nThey have followed the same line as with Taiwan. They have\nattacked the State Department, they have stayed away from you.\nUh -- it's unfair in this case but it gives them a good way out.\nSecondly, on Vietnam, they have stayed away from asking us to\noverthrow Thieu.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nAll they have asked us to do is withdraw our forces.\nP:\nYeah. That's easy.\nK:\nThat's easy. That we have told them we are doing. The whole tone\nof their statements is really -- then they published a long series of\narticles. I have just read them.\nP:\nUm-mmm.\nK:\nQuoting Mao about the 1945 negotiations in which he said one has\nto negotiate and one has to be willing to make concessions, in order\nto provesthat they are consistent.\nP:\nHumph.\nK:\nSo I think they are beginning to position themselves.\nP:\nWell, I think on this whole thing -- I really think the most shameful\nconduct is that of that jackass, Teddy Kennedy.\nK:\nOh, he is.\nP:\nTo say what he did to the Paks; to have the gall. And then of course\nto suck around the Chinese this way. You know, to condemn what we\nare trying to do. For God's sakes --\nK:\nYeah, but he isn't going to impress --\nP:\nI'll tell you though that I don't think -- it may impress the Chinese.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 7 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\nK:\nOh, no, they are sophisticated.\nP:\nThey may think -- if they are smart, they will see exactly what\nhe is trying to do.\nK:\nHe hasn't got the votes as far as they are concerned. You represent\nthe real power forces.\nP:\nAnd there is the other thing.\nK:\nAnd besides when he goes to India and the Indians start sucking\naround him, he is going to lose points every time he opens his mouth.\nP:\nSure. The Chinese sure don't like the Indians, do they?\nK:\nThey hate the Indians.\nP:\n(laughter)\nK:\nThere is nothing but contempt for the Indians.\nP:\nWhich is one thing were our interests are the same.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nOr at least our observations are the same, not our interests.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nThat's very interesting, very interesting. Well, this rep ort we\nwill take a look at in the morning but it's always best to check.\nK:\nNo. We touched all the bases. We called Dole to make sure that\nhe didn't go running off at the mouth, giving his interest in prisoners, and\nwe made sure that all of the departments followed the same line. Wₑ\nchecked out all the agencies that could possibly --\nP:\nThey just may think -- you know, another reason this sort of report\nis likely to create get some credence at the present time, after the China thing\nthey may think we're up to lots of things, you know. And, of course, we want\nto leave that impression.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 8 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nBut on the other hand, this one is just too far out, Henry. It\njust doesn't make any damn sense.\nK:\nThat's how it looks to me.\nP:\nBut it's just I think some guy sucked around there and just -- you're\nsure Perot has nothing to do with it?\nK:\nI called him. We talked to him personally.\nP:\nHe said it's not him.\nK:\nHe says he was in Vienteanme but he had nothing to do with it. He\nhas not talked to any airplanes. Of course, the guy might be just sly enough\nto --\nP:\nOh, no, no.\nK:\nBut that would be just too rugged. I don't see what's in it for him.\nP:\nThat's right. Well, we shall see.\nK:\nBut I think within a month we will -- I think there is a good chance\nthey will accept some sort of statement of principles.\nP:\nThat would be quite an achievement.\nYeah.\nK:\n/\nIt depends how they read --\nP:\nFiguring that the statement of principles would hurt Thieu.\nK:\nYeah. In this respect, what you said today; maybe they think we\nare doing it anyway to try to knock off Thieu but I don't really think so.\nP:\n(laughter) As a matter of fact, our emotions are a mixture as you\nknow.\nK:\nYeah, but we shouldn't knock him off without getting something,\nMr. President, because --\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 9 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\nP:\nOh--h, Christ.\nK:\nWe'd be left with nothing.\nP:\nNo, my point is our emotions with regard to the -- are mixed in\nso far as how the election comes out.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nOn that, frankly, I want him to win. Because, frankly, he has got the\nvotes.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nWe've got to be absolutely -- we're absolutely down the middle and\nThieu expects that too, doesn't he? He doesn't expect us to publicly support\nhim.\nK:\nNo, no, no.\nP:\nIf we did, it would kill him.\nK:\nNo, no -- well, it wouldn't kill him but it would kill us at home.\nhere\nP:\nWell, that's what I meant. He is already dead, but he would be\ndeader than Kelsey's nuts if we began to get involved. We've got to be\nlike Caesar's wife.\nK:\nRight, right, absolutely.\nP:\nWe don't know yet about Ky; did he get in or out?\nK:\nIt looks as if he didn't make it and he is now going to try to go to\ncourt to get on the ballot.\nP:\nBoy, they really take their democracy seriously!\nK:\nYou know it is a little ridiculous for our Liberals to start\nscreaming that a two-man race is undemocratic when in this country\neverytime a third party appears, we are worried about its preventing a\nclear outcome.\nP:\nOf course. Oh, no, I'll tell you the double standards that they\napply to everything is just unbelievable.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 10 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\nK:\nI mean 90% of our elections have been in two party races and third\ncandidates have usually screwed matters up.\nP:\nAlways, always; they are a disaster. Well, they have a double\nstandard and we shall see as we go along. You know, I'm very curious\nthough what our Russian friends will be up to. You say Dobrynin says\nthey were having a meeting this week, huh?\nK:\nThat's right. Actually from our point of view its a little early for\nthem to be coming through.\nP:\nWell, I don't think they will. They might, they might.\nK:\nI think they will, Mr. President. They are really sucking around.\nNow, I have that letter for your signature tomorrow to Brezhnev.\nP:\nGood.\nK:\nAnd he is really panting for it. We're not saying anything in it that\nwe haven't said before.\nP:\nGood.\nK:\nBut what he can do is wave it to his colleagues as a direct line\nto you.\nP:\nGood. I tell you I think this line that we're now adopting and we're\ntalking to anybody, you know. Except that son-of-a-bitch, Castro, that's one\nI draw the line on. Understand now, don't let State -- sort of apply the line\nwell, if we have broken with China, why not with Castro. That's a very\ndifferent situation.\nK:\nRight, absolutely.\nP:\nAll right. But except for that, we talk to anybody.\nK:\nBut I think the way to play it strategically, Mr. President, is if we\nare going to Moscow after Peking, it puts the heat on Peking for them to behave\nthemselves because they don't know what we are going to do in Moscow.\nP:\nThat's right.\nK:\nIf we have been in Moscow, Peking gets its last shot at us.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 11 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\nP:\nYep.\nK:\nAnd on the other hand, we have enough business with Moscow that\nthey won't do a hell of a lot to us.\nP:\nI see no reason, incidentally, why the Moscow visit could not come\nvery soon after the other.\nK:\nNo.\nP:\nWhat I mean is if your Peking thing can't get on - - I mean I don't\nknow what it will be but if it isn't. But the Moscow one, I would prefer\nbasically, as we've talked before, just if it ever -- the best time for\nMoscow is about the 15th of May.\nK:\nI think that's absolutely right, Mr. President.\nP:\nIt's about the right time and so forth and so on. The best time for\nPeking is actually I think the middle of February if we could make it.\nK:\nThat's right. I think we can make that.\nP:\nThe Lincoln Day period and all the rest is a good time for us to go.\nK:\nI think we can make that. Connally thinks, Mr. President, that we\nshould put it not before March 1st. Anytime from March 1st on but he puts\nit purely politically.\nP:\nIt's closer to the election.\nK:\nNo, he figures if you have a good domestic program, that's going to\ncarry you through February.\nP:\nHe's correct, yeah.\nK:\nAnd with the trip to Peking coming up, they are going to be like\nlambs anyway. And right after they reconvene so why shoot that wad too\nearly in February?\nP:\nUh-humm. Well, that would be all right. March isn't bad.\nK:\nNo, March -- well, from climate which is not bad, we could do it.\nAnd, of course, they will all be running around New Hampshire.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\n- 12 -\nP:\nYeah, that'd be nice. They might be there for the time of\nthe primary if we can work it. I am not among those -- I mean,\nI'm like you, that they think that they're just in a/fit of pique say,\n\"Well, no, we are going to knock this thing out.\nK:\nNo, too big a thing for them.\nP:\nWell, they've come this far, and now.\nalso, we can play\nsome games. After all, if they want to play it, then we'll just toughen\nup, too.\nK:\nBut playing with Moscow is in itself a warning to them, and your\nseeing Hirohito. Now, one thing\nP:\nThat's worked out?\nK:\nYeah, that's worked out.\nP:\nWe are going at midnight, huh?\nK:\nWell, it's going to be around 10:00 in the evening, but it would\nbe midnight your time.\nP:\nI don't give a damn about that. That's a nice thing, though.\nK:\nOh, yes, and they' appreciate that enormously. Now, one\nthing, Mr. President. Scali, in order to get Agnew into NEWSWEEK\nhas written an article for him which is essentially on China policy.\nP:\nOh, for Christ's sake.\nK:\nAnd I really don't think\nIt's a fairly harmless article. I've\nknocked out three paragraphs which make it.\nBut I don't Agnew should\npop off on China policy at all.\n-\nP:\nNo,\nno,\nno.\nScali should have consulted.\nHe hasn't shown\np. it to him yet, has he?\nK:\nWell, he has, but I'll take responsibility for knocking it off if\nyou agree.\nP:\nYeah. It should not be on China policy. I think he should write\nit on\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\n- 13 -\nK:\nOn his trip.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nBecause the thing that worries me, Mr. President.\nP:\nAnd, also, he's got to build the trip up. He doesn't know\nany\n[End of Tape 1]\n[Beginning of Tape 2]\nP:\nI really think that's what it should be. And America's friends\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nIt's going to be very exciting.\nK:\nWell, I'd rather have no article from him because one of the\nproblems also is that I've.\nthe Chinese are just beginning to moderate\nsome of their writings and we've sent a message to them saying this\nwould help and that we are following that line so, having said this, we\nare hitting them a few shots that they won't like -- they didn't like the\nUN statement.\nP:\nOf course not.\nK:\nThey will intensely dislike your seeing Matak from Cambodia\non Monday.\nP:\nBut you've explained that to them.\nK:\nBut still they have to do some yelling about it. Actually, I\nhaven't\nexplained because\nP:\nWell, the hell with it, though; we've got to see Matak and we\nare going to. We don't like their seeing Le Duc Tho.\nK:\nThat's right, and that's why I didn't explain it to them.\nP:\nI see.\nK:\nBut they still won't like it, so if on top of that, Agnew starts\npopping off, I really feel we ought to kill that article altogether. And\nI'll take the blame for it -- I'll explain it to him.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\n- 14 -\nP:\nYeah; I personally don't think\nYou know what I think we\nought to say. I don't agree with this tactic that, while the way to\nhandle NEWSWEEK is to get a good piece on our side. I think the\nthing to do is to kick them and make them apologize for the article\nthey wrote.\nK:\nAnd then say\nP:\nJust say that I don't want to dignify them with an article.\nK:\nThen Scali claims it's helpful to us to have Agnew supporting\nyour China policy. Well, he can do that ;in news conferences. The\nChinese will read it when he slobbers over it -- as if our right\nis impotent, and as far as the Chinese are concerned, we'd rather\nhave a frightful right.\nP:\nYou might eventell Agnew that -- that it's just as well to\nlet them think that there are some people that don't like the policy\nand for him to be a little silent there.\nK:\nThat's right.\nhim\nP:\nAnd also tell/that we do not want him to lose his influence\nwith the right, and this would hurt him. Why don't you tell him a\nlittle of that.\nK:\nI'd be strongly in favor of any other article.\nP:\nI don't know that I want to dignify the God-damn magazine.\nTell him that I think that such a filthy sheet -- and you just say,\nmy view is that such a filthy sheet I don't think he ought to be in it.\nTell him, for example, that I would never give them an article.\nThey've asked me for one, and I've refused. And I've refused the\nNEW YO RK TIMES; I refused THE WASHINGTON POST; and I've\nrefused TIME magazine. And I never will! I prefer the freeze--\njust say it that way. I think we ought to freeze them.\nK:\nYou had promised Chalmers Roberts an interview in May,\nand I've been knocking it off. I don't know whether you want to go\nthrough with it.\nP:\nWell, I tell you, we've got lots of time on that. Just say I\nhave it inmy mind. He's still alyoung fellow -- I mean he's still got\nlots of time. There'll be a good time when there's a more newsworthy\nthing. All he'll be interested in is China, and I don't want to talk about that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\n- 15 -\nK:\nThat's right. I think we ought to wait.\nP:\nTell him that there' be another time; there'll be a time\nwhen I think there's a good news period -- that I'll be glad to see\nhim then.\nK:\nI think that's right.\nP:\nTell him I definitely have it in mind. It's a promise and I'll\ndo it like I did with that fellow, Cy Sulzburger.\nK:\nRight. Okay, that will hold him.\nP:\nYou promise him -- say that the commitment is made and that\nright now, for reasons he may understand, we don't want to say too\nmuch.\nK:\nRight. I think that will hold him. In fact, thatgoes further\nthat he think's you'd go. It's really fantastic -- for example, from\nthe LOS ANGELES TIMES, Bob Donovan and Kraslow want to write\nabout your secret search for peace in Vietnam. Now it's too early\nfor that, too.\nP:\nYeah, yeah. What are they basing that on?\nK:\nWell, they are just assuming there's a hell of a lot going on\nand they said, if you gave them access, they'd write a really, good,\nthoughtful piece.\nP:\nYeah, of course, they would.\nK:\nWhich I think they would do.\nP:\nBut the point is that when that comes out, that's for everybody.\nK:\nExactly. I don't see why we should shoot it.\nP:\nWhy give it to them -- the secret search for peace in Vietnam.\nBoy, we've got a helluva record, and I'll tell you, it's just as well to\nkeep everybody loose on that. We've got Mansfield damn loose on\nVietnam now. He is damn loose.\nK:\nRight. But now we should clam down and not say any more\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Brought in 8/5/71)\n- 16 -\nP:\nWe shouldn't say another damn thing.\nK:\nBecause they are already digging like crazy and I'm afraid\nsomebody's going to blow it.\nP:\nWe should just keep it quiet. Okay.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAug\nTELECON (at home)\nSecretary Rogers\nR: Hope I didn't wake you up.\nK: No, no, I was up; I was out with my kids on the porch.\nR: Oh nice. How are they emjoying it?\nK: Oh this is terrific, perfect weather.\nR: Wonderful. Say, couple of things. One, are we going to meet -- I\nthink we should, the Security Council or at least we should meet with the\nPresident before this meeting with the Japanese minister. Have you got one\nscheduled.\nK: I hadn't scheduled it yet but I think we should do it because there are\nreally two entirely basic trends defeloping\nR: I know.\nK: One is the one of Alex Johnson and State and the one I tend to agree\nwith. And I just don't know what the economic agencies really have in mind.\nR: No, I don't either and although I don't think we've got a panic on it I\ndo think we ought to start getting it clarified, at least to help us formulate\nthe tenor of what we say.\nK: I talked to Alex about it on Friday because I was concerned. We can\ndo it in one of two ways. One, I can try to get a Security Council scheduled\nfor Tuesday, the 7th, because the President won't really, in effect, be back\nbefore the 7th.\nR: I see.\nK: The other, that I propose to him as a\nis that he prepare for your\nsignature a paper of what ought to be done a's the meeting which I will then get\nthe President to approve, if he agrees with it and distribute to all the other\nagencies saying this is our line.\nR: Yeah, okay. Well, I think the important thing is to be prepared because\nobviously Japan is coming here well prepared\nas well prepared as they\ncan be under the circumstances, and they are very fearful and I'm sure that\nif we appear to be vague as hell and we don't give them any signals at all and\nI'm not talking about substance, but at least the direction we're thinking about\nthey're going to be terribly upset.\nK; Right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Rogers\nR: I think if we can coordinate our efforts, that's what counts.\nare on\nK: Well actually I think an NSC meeting\nthe meeting XXXXX the 9th\nand 10th. Wouldn't a 7th have some uses?\nR: Yes, I think so.\nK: If everybody\nif the President could just hear everybody and\nindicate a general direction\nR: That's right. Maybe\nwell, I'll talk to John Connally ahead of\ntime. I think we ought to\nmaybe we ought to help the\nI suppose\nthe President really doesn't have a conblasion in mind; he's probably looking\nto us to help him formulate one.\nK: That's right. Well, twe have the problem, he would like to restore our\nrelations with Japan, or put them on a new basis. But not so blatantly that the\nChinese will start thinking it's irrevocable, and to navigate between these two\nextremes.\nR: Okay. In that connection, I'm going to send out a speech for the\nPresident and you to take a look at on the American Legion because I'm\ntalking about several subjects including China, the China trip and Japan,\npretty much in a way to paraphrase what we've said in the past, but I want\nto be sure that he doesn't think there's anything in there that\nK: Is that coming out today?\nR: Yeah, I'll just have the first draft typed.\nK: Good.\nR: It's tough\nthe American Legion to say something that will\nmake sense to them.\nK: It's a hell of a thing. When are you making it?\nR: Tuesday.\nK: Where is that?\nR: Houston Texas. The President asked me to make it.\nK: Oh yes, I know you had been asked to make it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecre;ary Rogers\nR: I think we have got to be a little bit more forthcoming in what we say\nbecause, Christ knows, the Chinese are, and the Russians are. And I\nthink if we say a few things which are not\nI hope not exacerbating but\nstill show that we've got our problems with our allies too.\nK: I think, on the whole, it's helpful to show them, all A that we have our\nproblems, but two, that we just don't throw them/over for ankoreigxxinvitation.\nR: Right, well, take a look at this. And as I say, it's sort of a combination\nof some substance and a little bit of ham, but I think it's the kind of thing the\nPresident would want me to say to the American Legion. And you might let\nhim glance at it if you have any questions.\nK: I will\nR: I wonder about Vietnam do we have a meeting on Vietnam coming up?\nDidn't you have a Security Council meeting?\nK: We should have one within a week of getting back.\nR: Yeah. It's a tough deal. We've been quiet about it so far\nthat's\nall we can do for the mome nt.\nK: Well, those sons of bitches have shot themselves in the leg.\nR: They really have. It will start dawning on the President I think when\nCongress gets back.\nK: Well it's dawned on him now. One thing that I did do that I have not\nyet had a chance to mention to you is I sent a very tough backchannel to Bunker\nto tell him that the President really meant it when he said he didn't want this\nelection to be a farce. It isn't anything substantive; it just backed up the cables\nthat had come out of the Department.\nR: Yeah. Well, there's no doubt that Bunker came to that conclusion\nbecause he told me that that's why\nremember I called you and\nK: Yeah. No, no I'm afraid it was a little too late. In retrospect where\nwe dropped the ball was in not insisting that Ky go on the ballot.\nR: That's right. Well he did that at the end you know.\nK: Yeah, he did it at the end but it was already\nR: Too late.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Rogers\nK: Too late. Because with Ky on the ballot they baxxex might have both\nwithdrawn anyway.\nR: But they wouldn't have had the same excuse.\nK: And it wouldn't have looked so ridiculous to have one guy withdraw\nand suddenly the law turns out to be very flexible after all.\nR: That's right. Well, you know as far as we are concerned we\nsent out (when I say \"we\" the whole government). We sent aut all the\nnecessary instructions. It just happens that Ellsworth didn't put them across.\nK: Oh yeah. On the record, we sent out a cable saying it's hard to explain\nhow the Vice President of a country shouldn't qualify for an election.\nR: That's right.\nK: And tx you toughened up the talking points which were pretty tough to\nbegin with\nR: But even before that, you go back and look for months ahead of time\nwe had Ellsworth talking to Thieu in very stiff terms.\nK: Well, I have no doubt that if there is a Congressional look into this\nour public record looks pretty good.\nR: Yes, yes, except the results don't look so good.\nK: Well, that's what's worrying me, yeah.\nR: Okay Henry.\nK: Bill, as long as I've got you on the phone I was going to call you\ntomorrow. John Scali claims that some of the press\nState Department\npress\nare restless because there's no information at all coming out of\nState. I have no way of judging that.\nR: Well it is true.\nWe just sort of put the clamp on becau se\nand\nI think we ought to loosen up a little bit\nK: Well that's\nMy instinct would be they'll get so mad that they'll\ntake it out on us some other way.\nR: Right. Actually what I thought I'd try to do is have a press conference\non Thursday or Friday of this week.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Rogers\nK: I think that would be an excellent idea.\nR: And I do think we've gone overboard a little bit on the short trip (?)\nI want to be sure the President realizes we are cooperating with him.\nK: Oh, we uh\nR: Christ, nobody dares say good morning over there now.\nK: You've really\nyou've done something which I frankly didn't think\ncould be done.\nR: That's right. It's never been this\nIt's more secure\nin the State Department than in the whole history of the Department.\nK: And it doesn't really, you know, the fact that they'll complain a little\njust shows it's effective.\nR: Honestly, I can take it off by having a press conference.\nK: I was going to say that if you had a press conference that would go a\nlong way because that would start news flowing out of the Department again.\nR: Right. Well as a matter of fact, I've got a\nbriefing books are\nbeing prepared now for a press conference, and I thought I'd probably do it\nThursday.\nK: Right, you're speaking\nR: Tuesday.\nK: Tuesday, yeah.\nR: Okay. Have a look at this. It probably won't be out for 4 or 5 hours\nbut take a look at it and give me a call if you have anythoughts.\nИ: Good, I'll call you as soon as I've read it.\nR: Excuse the ham. I've got a few\nK: That's all right. You need fhat for the American Legion.\nR: That's right. A few perorations for the Legion. Thank you Henry.\nK: Right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\n(Tape from Home -- San Clemente)\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\nSeptember 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.\nK:\nHello. I had some children to get rid of who I don't think need to hear\nall these details. So, you know, we understand why you don't want it in the\nsame way as the other one.\nD:\nYes. You see I think it's a little because to make it in some other form\nK:\nWell, we just want to make clear, we don't want you to say that you\nproposed the summit. That we agree should be phrased neutrally. But when\none visits a country, one has to be invited.\nD:\nWell, I think it's agreed, it is clear that they agree on that one. On\nwhy, of course, he couldn't come without an invitation it's very clear. The\nPresident could say to himself, \"well, I'm coming to you\" and to say, \"No\"\nand he's still coming\nK:\nWell, do you want to say in the light of recent advances President Nixon\nhas agreed to visit Moscow? But that makes it look bad.\nD:\nWhat do you suggest second?\nK:\nI don't think that's so good for you. In the light of recent advances and\nso forth, President Nixon has agreed to visit Moscow.\nD:\nWell, I think the President has agreed for a visit, I think it is practically\nthe same.\nK:\nIf you want to say that President Nixon has agreed to visit Moscow --\nD:\nWell, I think it is rather neutral instead it has been agreed\nK:\nNo, no, what we prefer is it has been agreed that President Nixon will\nvisit Moscow in the latter part upon the invitation of the Soviet Government.\nD:\nYeah. Well, I really don't know what to tell you. Of course, I could tell\nthem what you say because there is no problem for me to understand with the\nPresident's visit. Do you have any other\nK:\nNo, that's the only suggestion. The only other point we have is October 10th\nis a very bad day for us.\nD:\nWhy?\nK:\nBecause it's a Sunday and we would prefer it either the 6th or the 7th.\nD:\n6th or 7th?\nK:\nYes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nPage 2\n(Tape from Home -- San Clemente)\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\nSeptember 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.\nD:\nOctober?\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nI don't think that is a very big thing\n....\nK:\nOr we could do it the 12th, but for us the 6th or 7th is the best.\nD:\nThe best.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nOkay, I will check it. But couldn't you say - - I am sure you have the\ntext, how was it solved with the Chinese?\nK:\nThe Chinese -- I haven't got the text here.\nD:\nI haven't either.\nK:\nBut as I remember it, it went like this. It said \"Knowing of President\nNixon's interest to visit China (or something like this), Prime Minister Chou En-Lai,\non behalf of the Government of the PRC has extended an invitation to\nD: As a suggestion could we say something along those lines, \"Knowing\nhis interest and so on?\"\nK:\nWell, that would make it identical with the Chinese one and that's\nwhat we - -\nD:\nThat's right. Then they think along those lines because otherwise it\nlooks like you have additional changes but just something along those lines \"knowing\nhis interest\", not exactly the same phrase but something like this one which is a\nrather neutral proposal just to keep both sides on the same balance. I tried to put\nit in some form to make it the same balance both ways.\nK: Yeah.\nD:\nMaybe you know some other.\nK:\nWell, if we make two sentences out of it. You know, if we say \"it has\nbeen agreed upon that such a meeting should now take place\", you see. And then\none could say \"the Soviet Government extended an invitation for the President to\nvisit Moscow for this purpose and the President has accepted.\"\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nPage 3\n(Tape from Home -- San Clemente)\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\nSeptember 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.\nD:\nI don't know really, I doubt it very much but we could sound like the\nChinese do and do it for you as a\nK:\nWell, we would rather not have it exactly like the Chinese and I'm sure\nyou would rather not have it --\nD:\nI am sure about it too but maybe on the basis of this\nI am\nnot prepared to give you because of outstanding reasons but I am thinking along the\nmain idea not really the circumstance; I'm sure you know the\nfor them but the right to propose it to\nor whatever\nit was about the President\nabout\nas an\nidea not exactly worded.\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nAs you express it.\nK:\nWell, the only one that of course I have discussed with the President --\nyou know, I don't consider what we are suggesting such a tough problem because\nall we are --\nD:\nNor myself really.\nK:\nBecause all I am saying -- we're not saying that you have proposed a meeting;\nall you have proposed is the location.\nD:\nYes, I know.\nK:\nI mean it is agreed that both sides want the meeting.\nD:\npoint. Maybe it works this way, have agreed on the point\nthen maybe they can make it two phrases.\nK:\nThat's what I think. That such a meeting will take place before the end of\nMay.\nD:\nThat such a meeting\nK:\nShould take place in the second half of May.\nD:\nShould take place in the latter part.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nIn the latter part of May. Yes and then say it was decided to go to Moscow\nand\ninvited there. Something like this one.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nPage 4\n(Tape from Home -- San Clemente)\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\nSeptember 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.\nK:\nSomething like this. O r the Soviet Government invited the President to\nvisit Moscow for this purpose and he accepted.\nD:\nK:\nRight, The only problem is, how are we going to get it settled?\nD:\nGood question.\nK:\nWith you gone.\nD:\nWell, I think in any case I will be back by 20th\n.\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nThe one about 6th or 7th, I will be back on 20th. If not then, the 21st.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nSo we will settle this; by this time I am sure I will get settled the\nsuggestion.\nK:\nRight. And can you\nBut could you let us know the date before then\nbecause we really have to make our schedule.\nD:\nI will try to get the date first and then the formulation\nK: Good.\nD:\nAll right?\nK:\nGood. That is fine.\nD:\nOkay. So long. Let's put it this way. I will try to get the date all ready.\nI will try to do my best.\nK:\nOkay. And on other business, the President has just asked me to XXX\nreiterate again that his conviction which we've often told you that we think that\nthe peace depends on the relation between our two countries and that we will\nnot go on byways if your side adopts the same attitude.\nD:\nAll right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\n(Tape from Home -- San Clemente)\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\nPage 5\nSeptember 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.\nK:\nAnd that we should both seek not to complicate each other's positions\nin other areas of the world.\nD:\nUh huh. All right. All that you have mentioned to me.\nK:\nThat I've mentioned to you before.\nD:\nYeah; I understand. You have not yet scheduled the date for the other\nmeeting?\nK:\nNo. If that should get settled while you are gone, I would like to let\nyou know. How do I do that?\nD:\nYou mean you think it will be settled before the 20th?\nK:\nThat we settle it?\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nI think that's unlikely. But I just want always to be prepared. It's\nextremely unlikely. But what do I do?\nD:\nWell, you might tell Vorontsov or just give me notice through.\nCould you do it through your embassy without telling what about -- just telling\ndates, nothing WK else.\nK:\nWell, I'll figure out a way of doing ft. I'd rather tell it to Vorontsov.\nD:\nOkay. Just let him know in this case. But as of now, it is not yet.\nK:\nAs of now, it is not yet and\nD:\nThe problem is next year.\nK:\nThat is almost certain.\nD:\nNext year -- yeah.\nK:\nI mean, in fact, that is certain.\nD:\nYes, next year.\nK:\nBut that is strictly between you and me.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\n(Tape from Home -- San Clemente)\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\nPage 6\nSeptember 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.\nD:\nOh, I understand.\nK:\nExactly. But if for some reason it should get settled before you return,\nI will let you know. I will just say to Vorontsov that the date that we discussed\nis in this.\nD:\nYes, without saying what it is about.\nK:\nAnd he will know what it is about.\nD:\nYes, he will send me the telegram\nthe date and\nK:\nRight. Now can I also assume that our discussions on the subject we are\ntalking now will not be fed back to anybody else in our Government until you and I --\nD:\nNo, no, no, on this positive.\nK:\nRight. Even after Gromyko gets here.\nD:\nNo, no, no -- what do you mean after? No, when he will be here. He will\nnot say to anybody except President and you.\nK:\nExactly.\nD:\nOn this I am positive.\nK:\nAll right.\nD:\nAnd I will give another one for him.\nK:\nRight. You just make sure that this happens.\nD:\nNo, no, only all of this is going through you only. This I am give you\n100% on this.\nK:\nRight, right, because it would be very embarassing for --\nD:\nNo, no, this happens. And this was very simply even without this thing\nit appears simply a document you will tell me there is a discussion\nK:\nWell, I don't think it will happen. We are just talking now about a very\nremote possibility.\nD:\nI understand. All right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nPage 7\n(Tape from Home -- San Clemente)\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\nSeptember 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.\nK:\nAnd you will be back on the 20th or 21st.\nD:\nYes, not later.\nK:\nOkay.\nD:\nNot later. And then I will meet with you about what we discussed in\nthe\nroom.\nK:\nYes, and I think we should prepare again an agenda like last time.\nD:\nWe will meet and we will discuss how it was done last year. I think it\nwas very good.\nK:\nWell, it will be done exactly again the same way.\nD:\nOkay.\nK:\nAnd if he wants to talk to me while he is here, perhaps we can work that\nout but I leave that up to you.\nD:\nYeah, I understand. I think it is a good idea but we will discuss later on.\nK:\nThat's entirely up to you.\nD:\nYeah. Okay.\nK:\nGood, have a good trip back.\nD:\nThank you very much, Henry, and best wishes.\nK:\nAnd I hope we have a successful year together.\nD:\nYeah, I hope too. Quite frankly\nK:\nI think we have in fact achieved a few things.\nD:\nI think so and when the pieces finally\nthen it will be much more on the right track I think.\nK:\nI can't imagine that we can't come to an agreement on this.\nD:\nNo, no, I am sure it will come and then everything will be in a very\nclear perspective. This is important.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nPage 8\n(Tape from Home)- San Clemente)\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\nSeptember 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.\nK:\nWell, that's our attitude and you can assure your government that that\nis the attitude with which we will approach matters.\nD:\nYeah and I think thi S is important.\nK:\nI am going to send over to you a brief note on the SALT question, on our\nunderstanding of it but its main point is that it isn't going to be settled with legal\nyou know, by legal interpretations but by the goodwill of our both sides and we\nare going to approach it in that spirit.\nD:\nWe are trying to approach it the same.\nK:\nI know, it's not a critical note. It's just a reply to yours.\nD:\nWell, I rather prefer to have it when I am here, not when I am out.\nK:\nNo, you will get it yourself.\nD:\nWhen, when?\nK:\nTomorrow morning.\nD:\nOh, that's fine.\nK:\nNo, no, I will not send anything sensitive unless there is a major crises\nwhich I don't expect.\nD:\nNo, no, I understand, no.\nK:\nNo, no, I will hand it to -- I will have it sent to you by General Haig\ntomorrow morning.\nD:\nOkay.\nK:\nFor you personally.\nD:\nOkay.\nK:\nAnd we will give it to nobody else.\nD:\nHave you given idea to this idea which I left because\none of\nseveral representatives there. He still presents idea or two\nto his\narea.\nK:\nYeah.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (San Clemente)\nPage 9\n(Tape from Home)\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\nSeptember 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.\nD:\nBut he didn't introduce there what I told you --\nK:\nYes, I know he didn't.\nD:\nThis is really\nfrom our side --\nK:\nBut it isn't -- at this point, we want to review the whole situation. It\ndoesn't help our basic problem decisively.\nD:\nBut\nK:\nBecause our basic problem is Congressional and other difficulty.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nAnd if we can get authorization for the capital, we don't need an ABM\nsite.\nD:\nIn one case, one idea, one capital.\nOh,\nK:\n/And then the other two capitals -- two ABMs.\nD:\nNo, no, the proposal now is --\nK:\nIs one capital, one ABM.\nD:\nYes, yes, this is right. That's our proposal there, but I told you before.\nK:\nI understand. Well, is he going to make it formally soon?\nD:\nIt will be\nbut it is really a response to your last appeal.\nK:\nYeah. No, I recognize that it is an effort to be helpful.\nD:\nYes, that's exactly along those lines.\nK:\nAnd we would like to study it a little bit.\nD:\nOkay, okay.\nK:\nBut I consider it a sign of -- that you are trying to response.\nD:\nThis is it exactly.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nPage 10\n(Tape from Home -- San Clemente)\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\nSeptember 2, 1971 -- 6:30 p.m.\nK:\nExactly. And we didn't consider it in a bad spirit at all.\nD:\nAll right. If you get something soon, maybe some question\nIf by that time you hear\nK:\nOkay, fine.\nD:\nIn any case, I would like to wish you the very best and I wish to see you\nsoon.\nK:\nThat same to you and with all our problems, it's always a pleasure to\ndeal with a real professional.\nD:\nIt is mutual.\nK:\nGood, Anatoliy.\nD:\nThank you very much.\nK:\nGoodbye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Home - San Clemente)\nMr. Kissinger / Colonel Kennedy\nSeptember 3, 1971\nHAK:\nI've just talked to the President and he's relaxed about this\ndefector. The problem he feels though now is that we better get\nsomething out of Thieu and his press conference.\nRTK:\nRight.\nHAK:\nAnd could you do a backchannel to Bunker?\nRTK:\nRight.\nHAK:\nSaying that the President feels very strongly that it would be most\nhelpful for Thieu to make clear how he intends to conduct the\nreferendum.\nRTK:\nRight.\nHAK:\nIt would be hard -- it would be folly to underestimate the depths\nof public reaction here. And it is essential that Thieu indicate\nsome implementing measures which make clear that it is a real\nreferendum and not just an abstract publicide.\nRTK:\nRight.\nHAK:\nDon't you think?\nRTK:\nI think so. This is the matter we raised with him the other day,\nremember?\nHAK:\nYeah. I mean, lay off what he is going to do after he --\nRTK:\nRight.\nHAK:\nAnd that some of the ideas we outlined to him should be incorporated.\nCan you do that?\nRTK:\nYes, sir.\nHAK:\nThank you.\nRTK:\nBefore you go, we are all set now on this memo. We took out that\nquestion of the satellites.\nHAK:\nFine.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Home - San Clemente)\n- 2 -\nMr. Kissinger/Colonel Kennedy\nSeptember 3, 1971\nRTK:\nDo you want me to initial this memo off for you then?\nHAK:\nYeah, but it's still got to go to the President.\nRTK:\nRight, that's right.\nHAK:\nYeah.\nRTK:\nI'll initial it off to go to the President. Now, I don't think we ought\nto send it up to Camp David.\nHAK:\nNo, no; Tuesday morning.\nRTK:\nDeliver it Tuesday morning.\nHAK:\nRight.\nRTK:\nAnd hopefully have it signed then so that you would have it for the\nTuesday afternoon meeting.\nHAK:\nRight.\nRTK:\nOne other thing, I just got a call from State. The Secretary has just\nsigned off a memo to the President transmitting over here a draft\ncable on the China-UN Rep problem. And he is very anxious to get\nclearance on it. Said it might be he thought it might be something\nthat you could take up verbally with the President or just go ahead\nand clear it with the President's permission.\nHAK:\nWhat's the hurry, why can't it wait until Tuesday morning?\nRTK:\nWell, they are very anxious --\nHAK:\nThe hell with anxious!\nRTK:\nYeah, I know; time is running short. Well, I will get --\nHAK:\nTime isn't running so short that they can't miss half a working day\non Tuesday.\nRTK:\nThat's right. What I'll do is --\nHAK:\nJust tell him you are sending it out to me.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Home - San Clemente)\n- 3 -\nMr. Kissinger, Colonel Kennedy\nSeptember 3, 1971\nRTK:\nRight, I'll do that. And I'll call John Holdridge and Marshall and\nhave them take a look at it and we can give you our thoughts on it\ntomorrow.\nHAK:\nOkay, I don't want them today.\nRTK:\nNo, right; I understand.\nHAK:\nI've been on the phone half the morning.\nRTK:\nWell, I didn't want to call back until I had everything wrapped up.\nI did talk to Al who shares our thoughts that it would be well for you\nto be here for those Japan meetings. I've been unable yet to reach\nWalters but I am trying to do so. As soon as I do, I'll let you know\nhis view.\nHAK:\nWell, why don't you see whether he can shift it without making waves.\nRTK:\nRight, that's what I'll ask him.\nHAK:\nIf it presents any difficulty, he should stick with the 11th.\nRTK:\nRight.\nHAK:\nBut he should put it to both of his clients on the ground that it would\nbe an enormous convenience to me.\nRTK:\nAll right, fine. And if he thinks he can do that, shall I tell him just\ngo ahead and do it then?\nHAK:\nYeah.\nRTK:\nAll right, fine.\nHAK:\nAnd let us know.\nRTK:\nWill do.\nHAK:\nThank you.\nRTK:\nAll right, sir.\nHAK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (San Clemente)\nMr. Kissinger/Secy. Rogers\nSeptember 3, 1971 - - p.m.\nR:\nHi, Henry.\nK:\nHi, Bill, how are you?\nW\nR:\nhere are you?\nK:\nI'm still in San Clemente,\nR:\nOh, are you?\nK:\nYeah, I'm not coming back until Monday.\nR:\nOh, I see, I didn't realize that. Well, I just wanted to talk to you\nessentially about Vietnam. I think it is awfully important that we\nare fully coordinated from now on because we could be facing a\nstormy period.\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nR:\nAnd I would hope that the President doesn't decide to do something\nwithout telling anybody. You know, it's a tough situation.\nK:\nWhat could he be doing?\nR:\nWell, you know -- you know, sending a backchannel message or\nsomething like that. Not that I -- what I'm saying is that I think we\nshould know about it; we should be coordinated.\nK:\nRight.\nR:\nI'm sure you feel the same way too.\nK:\nI will keep you fully informed. He wouldn't send a backchannel\nmessage that I wouldn't know abo ut.\nR:\nGood.\nK:\nAnd I would talk to you about it.\nR:\nGood. I think so far we are doing about all we --\nK:\nI thought, incidentally, in your press conference was very well done.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (San Clemente)\n- 2 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers\nSeptember 3, 1971 -- p.m.\nR:\nWell, it's not easy but I think it came out all right. He was pleased;\nI got a message from him about it. The other thing I was going to\nsuggest -- I was going to talk to Al but I think I better talk to you\nabout it -- is when from now on I would appreciate it if he decides,\nfor example, that nothing should on a subject or somebody want S\nto investigate, if Al or you could just call me and let me put out the\ninstructions.\nK:\nMy understanding is that Al tells Eliot and no one else.\nR:\nWell, in some cases he has called directly to our investigators and\nthen in other\nK:\nTo your investigators?\nR:\nYeah.\nK:\nAl?\nR:\nYeah. It's all right; I'm not complaining about the past. All I'm saying\nis two things: One, talk to Ted Eliot or me, and secondly, if there is an\norder from the President, let me send it out as mine rather than having\nhim do it.\nK:\nThat's in our interest.\nR:\nThat's right. But what happens now, it's a minor detail but it becomes\nimportant.\nK:\nNo, but it's in our mutual interest that we don't give orders in your\nDepartment with which you are not associated.\nR:\nMore than that, what I am saying is this -- what happens now is that\nthe President tells Al, for example, or you, usually A1, that if he sees\na story in the paper that makes him mad and then he says, Goddammit\ntell everybody in the Government to shutup on this issue. Then A1\nusually sends out a little note --\nK:\nBut that should go to Ted Eliot to the best of my knowledge.\nR:\nIt does but it's really better if you don't put it by way of a note just\ncall me.\nK:\nI understand that. You want it to be discussed with you directly.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (San Clemente)\n- 3 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers\nSeptember 3, 1971 -- p.m.\nR:\nYes or let us put out -- what happens now, the order comes through\nsigned by you or A1; then people in the building see it.\nK:\nYeah.\nR:\nThen it says the White House is --\nK:\nI understand and those stories are very unfortunate.\nR:\nThat's right. As a result of my press conference yesterday, it\ncame out quite well, I am going to continue to have meetings with my\nown people and tell them it's their problem, it's not my problem.\nGoddammit, if the State Department is to survive as an institution\nit has to learn to be quiet. And what I am going to say to them is that\nI will give guidance on what's to be said and then I expect everybody\nto follow that guidance.\nK:\nI think -- you know, this has nothing to do now with the President but\nI think it's essential for the Department.\nYes,\nR:\n/\nI do too.\nK:\nBecause every President I have known has lost confidence in the\nDepartment no matter who the Secretary was because of this goddamn\nleaking.\nR:\nThat's right.\nK:\nAnd it's in their own interst. Now, first of all, when such an order\nexists, A1 will call Eliot or I will call you.\nR:\nGood.\nK:\nGenerally, I don't like to bother you with orders like this so that's why\nI think it's better if Al calls Eliot unless it's an overwhelmingly important\nthing.\nR:\nThat's right.\nK:\nAnd we will not put it out as a White House order, we will let you put\nit out as a State Department order.\nR:\nRight.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (San Clemente)\n- 4 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers\nSeptember 3, 1971 -- p.m.\nK:\nAnd I think it's essential for the Department.\nR:\nWell, I do too. As a matter of fact, Henry, we're doing really a lot\nbetter.\nK:\nYou are doing much better and the press screams a little but that's\ngood.\nR:\nThat's right.\nK:\nThey have been spoiled.\nR:\nI know it. And I think what's happened has been very good for the\nDepartment and I think that we can now with minor exceptions I think\nyou will find that we will conduct ourselves damn well. The Foreign\nService is very upset about it because they realize it's their problem.\nK:\nYeah.\nR:\nIn fact there's an article which I stimulated in the Foreign Service\nJournal right on that point this month saying that this is our problem;\nthis isn't the President's problem, and the Secretary of State's problem.\nK:\nIt isn't exactly right that the President -- I mean I say this as a\ncompliment to you, you yourself put some of the more recent\nstringent orders.\nR:\nOh, sure I have but I want to take the responsibility.\nK:\nYeah.\nR:\nI don't want people in the Department to say well, the President is\ndoing what Johnson did and you know this is a reign of terror and all\nthat kind of stuff. Now, if I do it, they won't say that about me because\nas long as --\nK:\nIt's a funny group because in a way they have more institutional loyalty\nto the Secretary than to the President.\nR:\nThat's right.\nK:\n(laughter) You know.\nR:\nThat's a fact.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (San Clemente)\n- 5 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers\nSeptember 3, 1971 -- p.m.\nK:\nIt is a fact.\nR:\nWell, it's a natural thing because they get to know him better and\nthere's always a little friction between the President and the State\nDepartment in that neither quite thinks the other gets sufficient credit\nfor what happens and what I would like to teach everybody is that\nthere's plenty of credit if things go well, Christ.\nK:\nHell, if our policy goes well, a year from now no one will know the\ndifference.\nR:\nThat's right.\nK:\nWho got the newspaper credit; it will be the credit for everybody.\nR:\nI read a statement on the Four Power Talks which I thought was damn\ngood which I really think we should learn as a model and that is, I\npraised the President for what he had done and then I praised Rush\nand his Assistant and then I praised Marty Hillenbrand and his Assistant.\nK:\nWell, you notice I took out of Rush's statement where he said everything\nis due to the President --\nR:\nYeah.\nK:\nI took that out at midnight when I saw it because for the same reason.\nR:\nWell, in the first place it makes everybody looks silly.\nK:\nWell, it' S unnecessary; the President gets the credit.\nR:\nSure.\nK:\nHe doesn't have to have called every last -- he doesn't have to be the\nwater boy to get the credit.\nR:\nThat's right. And it looks small; it's looks as if -- the same thing\nthe Russians do, claim they invented everything.\nK:\nExactly. The one thing in this connection that I was going to mention\nto you; there sometimes are people in the Department who keep nitpicking\naround at me. Tom Braden told me he was told by a very high source\nthat I personally had impounded the Klein study on Reaction to the\nChinese thing and then he printed it and I didn't even know the goddamn\nstudy existed.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (San Clemente)\n- 6 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers\nSeptember 3, 1971 - p.m.\nR:\nYou didn't even know about it; I did it and I was madder than a\nson-of-bitch because it was about the day after I told everybody\nincluding Cline that I didn't want any studies made until I asked for\nthem.\nK:\nAnd yesterday there was an article in the Wall Street Journal that\nsaid that I personally called German Ministers and summoned them\nto Washington and the Germans were madder than hell.\nR:\nYeah.\nK:\nWell, we checked because I have never called a German Minister,\nsummoned him to Washington or done anything else of the kind.\nR:\nYeah.\nK:\nAnd that too came from somebody at State they told us.\nWell, it doesn't matter; I would have raised it sometime in a\nconversation because basically it's gotten way down that sort of\nnitpicking.\nR:\nYeah, it has. But I think even on that the fewer things the Department\nknows about in terms of what the President has asked us to do, the\nbetter. Let me put it out. In other words, I think because the people\nin the Department tend to see things from Al and you, quite often --\nwhich in effect, gets circulated through the Department either by word\nof mouth or in fact, -- the word gets out that you're calling signals\nand you get blamed for things, for example, the Cline thing. You didn't\nknow a goddamn thing about.\nK:\nI didn't even know the thing existed.\nR:\nI was sore about it because I had just the day before said look, we are\ngoing to ask for studies and separations for the China trip when the\ntime comes. We'll ask for it, let me ask you; please don't volunteer\nthings.\nK:\nNo, you told me about -- you didn't tell me about the Cline study but\nyou told me about your general attitude.\nR:\nWell, it was right after that that I got word and I called Cline and said,\nGoddammit, you follow orders. Anyway, that's the way it happened.\nIncidentally, on the China trip I've got a very small group working on it;\nnobody knows they exist. They are people you will trust and we'll have\nthings done which will not be addressed to anybody and then sometime,\nthe President, you and I can talk about it. I think there again we ought\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (San Clemente)\n- 7 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers\nPM, September 3, 1971\nR:\n(cont'd)\nto sort of coordinate our efforts.\nK:\nOh, absolutely.\nR:\nI don't\ngive you anything at the moment and I don't want that\nto go through the Secretariat or anything else. Anything that I get\nwill come to me and then I will talk to you and the President about it.\nK:\nWell, if you and I could meet about that from time to time.\nR:\nGood.\nK:\nJust so that we know what the basic position is as we begin preparing\npapers for it.\nR:\nGreat. I think we should as a matter of afact. And this one I don't\nthink we should put on paper and I have told them not to circulate anything\nthrough the Secretariat, not to send anything that way; anything that\nis sent to the President, I will hand directly. We'll work it out so\nwe do it together.\nK:\nRight. Well, when we are all together back in town, I will see if\nyour schedule permits that we get together once a week even if we\ndon't have anything.\nR:\nOkay.\nK:\nJust so that we can catch up. But both of these points are very well\ntaken.\nR:\nDid you notice the attention that the American Legion speech\ngot in Russia and Japan.\nK:\nYes, yes; terrific.\nR:\nDean (?) said that it showed --\nK:\nI didn't notice it in Japan but I noticed it in Russia that they specially\nfeatured what you said they shouldn't be concerned with was a very\nhelpful thing.\nR:\nDean's (?) telegram to us -- you might take a look at it -- said that\nit had gotten more attention in the Soviet press, both in\n,\nthan any other statement by an American for several\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (San Clemente)\n- 8 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers\nPM, September 3, 1971\nR:\n(cont'd)\nyears and he interrupted that as don't worry because he\nthought that it did allay their concerns about our Peking trip.\nK:\nRight.\nR:\nAnd it showed that they had finally decided that they were not going\nto cause too much trouble about it.\nK:\nRight.\nR:\nInteresting enough their present position, if you noticed today's papers,\nyou haven't seen it probably, but what they are doing about the President's\ntrip to Peking they are attacking PRC; they are not attacking us at all.\nIn fact, in the statements that came out yesterday they said they under-\nstood that we wanted to improve relations with the PRC but they\nresented very much the PRC's attitude towards this visit because it\nwas being billed as an anti-Soviet mission.\nK:\nYeah, Oh, I have no doubt that they are going to try to isolate the PRC\nbut that helps us.\nR:\nSure it does. That means that both of them are saying the United States\nis okay.\nK:\nAnd it also forces both of them, especially Peking to behave themselves\non the trip.\nR:\nRight. No, in Japan we have really got really massive attention.\nK:\nThat I haven't picked up yet.\nR:\nBecause they are so concerned and also\nreassuring.\nK:\nWell, I think it's a damn good speech and I thought the press conference\nI haven't seen the full text but I saw a lot of excerpts.\nR:\nIt wasn't particularly good because he spent so much goddamn time\ntalking about the entire investigation but it --\nK:\nThat part I actually didn't see.\nR:\nBut the total impact was good. Okay, Henry.\nK:\nAll right, Bill, thank you.\nR:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (San Clemente)\nAmbassador Ushiba (Japan)\nMr. Kissinger\n6:00 p.m. (Pacific time), September 3, 1971\nK:\nMr. Ambassador\nU:\nYes, how are you?\nK:\nOkay.\nU:\nWell, I have just arrived back from Tokyo.\nK:\nI see.\nU:\nYes, and the friend is very, very happy that the President is going\nto meet with the Japanese Emperor.\nK:\nRight.\nU:\nYes, he is very, very deeply touched and he asked me to convey to\nthe President his very deep gratitude for that.\nK:\nYou can be sure I will convey that to the President.\nU:\nIn about two weeks the\nsituation in Japan is now very\ndifficult particularly with respect to the China problem and of course\nis coming to Washington and he will meet with the\nPresident but I am opposed so I would like to see you as soon as\npossible.\nK:\nYes. Now I will be in Washington on the 7th.\nU:\nThe 7th, I see.\nK:\nYes.\nU:\nI have to go to San Francisco to meet the Minister.\nK:\nYes.\nU:\nIf you will give me the exact time, I would like to come back to\nWashington.\nK:\nYou will come back to Washington?\nU:\nYes, I can if you will give me the exact time.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (San Clemente)\n- 2 -\nAmb. Ushiba/Mr. Kissinger\n6:00 p.m. (Pacific time), Sep 3, 1971\nK:\nI will see you on the 7th if you would like me to.\nU:\nOn the 7th, huh?\nK:\nOr the 8th, which is more convenient to you?\nU:\nAll right, the 8th may be more convenient.\nK:\nWell, then we will do it the 8th.\nU:\nAll right, fine. Then I will be back in Washington on the 8th, yeah.\nK:\nAnd we will let your office know the exact time.\nU:\nFine, thank you. I understand you are going to see Momoi.\nK:\nI'm going to see Momoi, yes.\nU:\nThat's right.\nK:\nI tell you the truth, Mr. Ambassador, I can never make out who\nspeaks for whom in Japan.\nU:\nOh, I see.\nK:\nNow whom does Momoi represent?\nU:\nI don't know but he is a very good friend, of course.\nK:\nYes.\nU:\nAnother friend of the bosses of the Party SO I think he'll -- I don't\nknow exactly what he is but certainly he speaks for the\nK:\nYes.\nU:\nAll of a sudden confusion now in the brain, huh.\nK:\nWell, I will see Mr. Momoi and I will see you on Wednesday and\nI suppose everything can wait until then.\nU:\nYes, all right.\nK:\nIf we could avoid public statements about who visits whom, I think\nit would help.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (San Clemente)\n- 3 -\nAmb. Ushiba/Mr. Kissinger\nSeptember 3, 1971, 6:00 p.m.\nU:\nOh, of course, we are very conscious of that.\nK:\nBecause it always creates then confusion.\nU:\nSurely, surely; yes.\nK:\nBut I will talk that whole situation over with you when I see you.\nU:\nAll right, fine, thank you.\nK:\nAnd I look forward then to seeing you on Wednesday.\nU:\nOn Wednesday.\nK:\nGood, Mr. Ambassador.\nU:\nBye.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/HAK\nSeptember 5, 1971\n11:00 AM\nPres: Henry?\nHAK: Mr. President.\nPres: Well, what's the news on the western front?\nHAK: Well, things are still fairly quiet. We had yesterday a little flip\nin Moscow. There is a 20 year old student who got into the\nEmbassy and requested asylum, but it wasn't clear at all that\nhe wasn't sent in there to cause trouble. We would have no\nway of getting him out and then he left when we explained the\ndifficulty of the situation to him. We didn't force him out.\nWe have never given asylum at our Embassy in Moscow because\nwe had no way of getting him out and we didn't really know anything\nabout this boy. I just wanted you to know about it on the offchance\nthat it could hit the paper.\nPres: Fine, that's okay.\nHAK:\nThe Chinese have called back all of their ambassadors to prepare\nthem for your visit and they have leaked out some fairly conciliatory\nstuff that there were no conditions and that they recognized the\nnormalization or relations would take a long time.\nPres: How do we know they are being called back to prepare for the visit?\nHAK: Well, they didn't announce it but it came out of London and it said\nthat Chinese sources have said that and they gave 8 points that they\nthought would be discussed some of which are pretty close to the\n8 points we did discuss. But in a very conciliatory way. I think it\nis the Russian attack, actually this thing is working very well and\nwe've just got to keep those two hyenas in phase with each other.\nPres: Yeah. Let's see they might be calling back - well I guess they have\nalready decided on that on the time thing. Or have they?\nHAK: Well, my guess is, Mr. President they have decided on the time thing\nand they are informing them.\nPres: Then they will inform you and you will go over.\nHAK: That is my guess.\nPres: That's probably right.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 5Feb.07\nReproduced at the Richard By Nixon residential/thArPate 50t.07\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nHAK: They don't want to do it by cable.\nPres: I would hope that they would get that done when you go because\nthat would enable us to make that announcement before the\nRussians do.\nHAK: I will make it clear to them -- I'll hint very strongly.\nPres: Well they are quite aware of the fact that we are considering\na Russian announcement.\nHAK: They are aware of that. I told them that the last time. But I\nhaven't given them any timeframe.\nPres: We could say that we have delayed the Russian announcement\nuntil maybe the middle of October that we would like to get\ntheirs first. They would like that.\nHAK: That's right. Well its got to be before the Russian announcement,\nMr. President, because if that trip at the end of October -- to that\nthey have already agreed. They have already agreed to the second\nhalf of October they just haven't agreed on the announcement and\nthe date -- the exact date.\nPres: Well, I suspose that one other possibility would be that they would\nonly agree to the announcement of the trip in the middle of October\nbefore the Russian announcement, and announce their date afterwards.\nHAK: Yes, but they've got to announce my trip fairly soon.\nPres: I understand that.\nHAK: It would be a hell of alot better to announce yours together with it\nso that people don't believe there's something wrong that needs\nstraightening out.\nPres: Well, I think they plan to do that.\nHAK: So far, Mr. President, they have played it absolutely straight.\nLloyd Shearer from Parade Magazine, just to give you an example,\ncalled the other day saying that he had interviewed a girl student\nwho had talked to Chou En-lai, she was among this group of\nstudents. She said that Chou En-lai had told that girl that the\nPresident and Mr. Kissinger are the two most honorable Westerners\nhe has ever dealt with. And that is actually quite interesting if\nhe did say that. And Lloyd Shearer wouldn't have the brains to\nmake this up.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be\n05-14/112\n3\nPres: No,\nHAK: And if he made things up it would apt to be in the opposite direction.\nNougen Van Thieu\nPres: Yeah, sure. Well that's fine. What about the/ Xxbax press conference?\nHAK: That should be early this week.\nPres: Have we got Scali pumping out the other ticker. ????\nHAK: I'm sure he has, I've talked to him\nPres: That's a good\nfor him too.\nHAK:\nThat's right.\nPres: And Rogers pumped it out alright too.\nHAK: Rogers did well with it, yes.\nPres: That's good.\nHAK: I mean the press is playing the negative aspects of what he\nsaid.\nPres: What is that?\nHAK: Well, that we were disappointed -- which was alright. He didn't\nsay we were disappointed in Thieu but that's the way the press\nplayed it. The Press is out to destroy Thieu if one thinks what\nthey did to Ky last year and now he is suddenly their hero. Ky\nhas spoke back from that coup he is now saying he doesn't\nintend to make one.\nPres: Well, he has got anybody to make it with in my opinion.\nHAK: No, he hasn't got anybody.\nPres: Bunker I hope has laid it right to him that if they have a coup\nthey're finished. Really the real tragedy of this Thieu thing\nis that we suddenly can't just work out a coalition between the\ntwo of them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to\n[N20_05 - 14/ 1:3]\n4\nHAK: Well, Mr. President, the tragedy is that if these maniacs in\nSaigon had behaved with even a slight sense of responsibility\nand I include all three of them, we would have settled it this\nsummer because I think no one has read the record of these\nconversations on July 12 and 26 who didn't become convinced\nthat they would tittering towards an agreements. Now of course\nthey want to see how that part is going to boil. I agree with\nConnally, though, who said when I briefed him in July he thought\nit would make the agreement a little more slowly but but more sure.\nPres: He thought what would?\nHAK: Well, he thought that the China trip would slow up the agreement\nbut make it more certain. And I think that that is still probably\nthe case.\nPres: Yeah, there were quite a few POW wives when I spoke in Dayton\nand they seem to be holding reasonbly fast.\nHAK: Oh the wives, well at least the ones I've talked to are in pretty\ngood shape right now.\nPres: This whole press move on Thieu . - - it isn't just Thieu they': re after\nbut they realize that if they knock Thieu off they will start the same\nmiserable chain reaction of coup after coup after coup and finish\n?????????\nHAK: The New York Times and company know very well that if we do\nto Thieu what was done to Diem it would lead to a communist takeover.\nThere is no way of putting that thing together again.\nPres: No. Well as a matter of fact we realize that Thieu is a hell of alot\nstronger than Diem was at that time.\nHAK: Oh, we would find it a hell of alot harder to do it.\nPres: The countryside, that's the whole point, the countryside is the type\n?????????\nHAK: Well I know don't know whether you have read the Novak column\nPres: Today?\nHAK: I think a day or so ago. He's been in the countryside and he in effect\nalso says that it is a xxxxxxyx victory, that a military victory has been\nachieved. That the only uncertainties are political ones.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\n[NLN 05 - 14 / 1:47\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nPres: Yep. Cambodia seems to hold fairly well, too, doesn't it?\nHAK: Cambodia is absolutely quiet now because of the flood. And we\nmay have gotten a break Mr. President in the sense that there\nhave been massive floods in North Vietnam. That is going to\nkoxx slow up their resupply, we would guess, by at least a month.\nPres: Yeah, Laos the same?\nHAK: Laos is very quiet now too. And I think we are going to have\nvery low casualties again this week probably lower than nineteen.\nPres: Well, hell, nineteen, fifteen, twenty -- that's nothing to talk about.\nHAK: That's right. I think it is going to be lower but it\nPres: One thing that has occurred to me that immediately after the\nelection whenever that may be, whatever happens, I do think that\nwe have to even though we are not ready to announce\n- -\nwe have got to announce the end of the combat ground role.\nHAK: Yes, that we can do.\nPres: That would be my suggestion, even though it has been announced\nabout eighteen times already by Laird.\nHAK: But it won't be the same until you announce it.\nPres: We'll announce it. We can announce if we have to a two-month\nwithdrawal.\nHAK: I think you can do three things early in November, Mr. President,\nend of ground combat, end of draftees and a two-month withdrawal.\nPres: Oh we'll make the announcement whenever it happens.\nHAK: And then if we can't get the thing settled by negotiation by December 15\nthen we will just do it unilaterally.\nPres: Well\nfor prisoners.\nHAK; That's right. That's what I mean. Their counter proposal is\ngoing to be that we stop the bombing then and we've got to keep\narming the supply lines through the dry season or the whole thing\nis going to collapse next year. That's really the major thing that\nwe must have.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\n[NLN 05 - 14 / 1:5]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\nPres: What do K you think then is the possibility if they will not\nturn over\nHAK: That's probably what they will come back with. Well, we may\njust have to delay -- for every month we can get of bombing\nthat's really what it comes down to. Last year they could\nget only 15% of their supplies through and that would mean\nthat they couldn't launch another major offensive. If we can\nhold this.\nPres: What we probably will have to do is simply look at the worst side\nof it and maybe then we'll get the deal too. But if we don't get\nthe deal the worst side of it in December we will have to announce\nour unilateral withdrawal at a certain time.\nHAK: That may be. We could keep the unilateral withdrawal a little\nbit fussed up. I don't think Mr. President anyone is going to\nsay anything about ten to fifteen thousand £ volunteers.\nPres: No, provided wexxauld they are there peacefully.\nHAK: That's what I mean. That's going to be a hell of a wicker to be on.\nPres: Well, it may come out better than you think.\nHAK: Between the Russian announcement and I thought that when\nDobrynin gets back we might talketo him and say look with\nPODGORNY ? going there. The one thing that distorts our\nrelation is this war and sort of imply that if would effect our\nwhole attitude towards China if they were helpful. Since they\ndon't know what we are planning with China, anything we do\nwe can claim is less than we intended.\nPres: We still believe that the Chinese are interested in a summit don't\nwe?\nHAK: Oh yes, there is no question about it. In this news leak out of\nLondon they said they have offered -- they have told Hanoi that\nthey would not negotiate with us about Vietnam but they would\ncertainly discuss it. Now that's going pretty far already. And\nHanoi has continued to scream and we have just got a Pakistan\nIntelligence report from Peking which they of course don't know\nwe have which also speaks of Hanoi's uneasiness.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\n[NLN 05-14/1:6]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7\nPres: Okay, Well, we'll have our various programs on\nHAK: But of course we are going to get quite a bit of play out of this\naccidental war treatment which hasn't been announced yet.\nPres: Yeah, I meant the play on Vietnam. I think on the other things\nthey're all possibilities, the annoying issue is going to be\nVietnam. When we get to the end of the year because right now\nwe've got all of our people off-balance but at the end of the\nyear they know damm well that we've got to get out.\nHAK: No, I am absolutely persuaded, Mr. President, that your instinct\non this was right.\nPres: They won't bother us until then, but then we've got to beat them\nto the punch.\nHAK: Well and I think we can do it Mr. President and I think that\nwe may still break it with Hanoi and if not we can always do it\nunilaterally.\nPres: Okay! Is the weather good?\nHAK: Perfect.\nPres: Good. Enjoy the rest of the weekend.\nHAK: Right, thank you, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\n[NLN 05-14/1:7]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger\nThe President\n9/21/71, 11:00 pm\nP:\nHenry.\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nAny later reports?\nK:\nNo, I have spent a good part of the evening reading the\nIntelligence Reports and I have written a memorandum which\nyou will get first thing in the morning of my assessment of\nthe situation. I have also asked CIA to prepare one but I have\nnot seen that yet.\nP:\nYes.\nK:\nMy instinct tells me, Mr. President, whatever it is it isn't\nthe death of Mao,\nEO 12958\n3.3 (b)(1)\nNow we know it was not us and we\nknow it is not anyone we are watching so it may have been the\nSoviets. So it may have a military significance. There could\nhave been a clash or they may genuinely think that the Soviets\nare getting ready to jump them.\nP:\nRight.\nK:\nYou remember t---\nP:\nAbout this time of the year would be the time to do it, wouldn't\nit?\nK:\nThat's right. And when I was there, they told me that was one\nof their concerns that after the announcement of your trip they\nthought that their neighbors might jump them and we know\nEO 12958\nfrom XXXXXX a particular source. we have\nwhich is infallible\n3.3 (b)(1)\nP:\nRight.\nK:\nThat they went on full alert the day that they announced your\nvisit. So it may be that. Of course, it may also be a Leadership\nDECLASSIFIED in part\nAuthority\nMR Appeal NLN 05-A-14 #2\nReproduced at the Richard NARA Nixon Date Pres dential Library\nBy.\nDECL\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nstruggle. They may not want that many people in Peking for\na parade while the struggle is going on.\nP:\nYes.\nK:\nI think there is the skight possibility Mao is dead to but there just\nisn't any reliable there is no news at all XIXIX all practical\npurposes,. except for these fragments like the ones thatxkitx I\nEO 12958\nread you this afternoon or the later one, only in terms of it\ncoming to my attention -\nthat\n3.3(b)(1)\ngives them about four days warning of an air stand-down which\ndoes not sound like a death to me.\nP:\nYes. Okay. Well, of course, we should have a contingency\nin the event - well, any contingency in the event that their\nannouncement affects our x operation.\nK:\nExactly. I am going to get a group together tomorrow to do\nexactly that.\nP:\nIt could well be that they are just jittery about the Russians.\nK:\nIt could well be that Mr. President.\nP:\nIt may-be they would be well advised to - - -\nK:\nWell, if they were jittery about the Russians and if that is all\nthis is, then it actually means our game is succeeding.\nP:\nYes.\nK:\nAnd that will help the later evolution quite a lot. It does\nindicate how sensitive we have to be to their requirements\non announcements and so forth.\nP:\nYes. I think rather indicates why they wanted the 14th.\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nThey must have known this at the time they requested the 14th.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nK:\nOh yes. They stood down starting the 10th.\nP:\nThey told you on the 13th.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nI see. You didn't know on the 13th they ordered the stand-down?\nK:\nWell, I knew either on the 13th or shortly afterwards, Mr.\nPresident, but at that point it seemed like perhaps a normal\nprecautionary exercise. But this protracted stand-down --\nbut even that -- the stand-down by itself would not have been\nSO decisive unless it were very much longer protracted but\nit was the cancellation of the October 1st parade which is\ntotally unprecedented in any Communist country. In the Soviet\nUnion once they cancelled the military part of the parade but\nthey have never cancelled the celebration.\npublicly\nP:\nAnd in this instance, they have actually/ordered the cancellation\nof the parade, have they?\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nThat is why people are reading a significance into it.\nK:\nThat is why. I did, for example, get a report last week saying\nthat all pictures of Mao were beginning to disappear but that\nagain Mr. President would not be consistent with his death.\nWhat interest would anyone have after he is dead to do anything\nwith him except to build him up as a Diety?\nP:\nYes. And of course reports about his pictures disappearing\nmay have been Taiwan-oriented.\nK:\nExactly. This is why I didn't feel I should run into you with\nevery agent report. These were agent reports. These were\nnot evaluated reports. At that time, I was watching the\nstand-down. That seemed interesting to me, but we have gone\nthrough those periods before -- not on the Chinese side but on\nthe Russian side in 1969. They stood down for two weeks in\nEO 12958\nSiberia\n3.3 (b)(1)\nand it may be just a war of nerves.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4-\nP:\nMy view is the Russians would never think of jumping, having\nin mind our trip.\nK:\nWell, of course, they had a Summit announcement set for\n1968 but that was with a Lame Duck President on the day\nthey invaded Czechoslavakia. But that was with a Lame Duck\nPresident. Unless they jump them Mr. President, then we\nwould have to go hard right.\nP:\nOn the Russians?\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nOh hell yes. We are not going to have any damned condiminium\nwith the Russians, don't you agree.\nK:\nAbsolutely all If they did that, we should rally our allies and\nknock off detente and build up the defense budget and rally the\nAmerican people and the war in Vietnam brutally.\nP:\nYes. Well, good.\nK:\nBut I don't think that is going to happen.\nP:\nNo. I am inclined to think it is going to work out in some way.\nK:\nWell, SO far we have no evidence that anything backbappenexkx\nis happening.\nP:\nYou may get a reply from them too. However, I would say now\nthat if you don't get a reply within a week then there is something\nscrewed up. I would say about a week, wouldn't you say?\nK:\nYes. If by the middle of next week if we have not had a reply\nthen we are getting into a zone where it is going to be technically\ntough to arrange.\nP:\nAs far as your trip is concerned?\nK:\nYes. But something is clearly screwed up. That you can tell\nalready because they have always been meticulous in their reply.\nIt is very fast or at least if they didn't reply they did something\nplanned.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nP:\nYou could have a group of younger officers that -- - - you know after\nall the country is in a sort of miserable condition, let's face it\nand it just may be that a group of younger officers came to\ntheir senses - hardliners and said well the hell with them,\nwe'll throw them out.\nK:\nYes and if it has we wouldn't know any of them.\nP:\nWe wouldn't know any of them on and they -- if they are hardliners,\nthey are going to hardline /the Russians too.\nK:\nThere is no question that a reconciliation with the Russians seems\nto me the least likelyx outcome.\nP:\nThat, in my view, would be the greatest danger.\nK:\nYes, but that is the least likely outcome. You remember, everytime\nwe have thought we thate drawing closer the opposite has happened.\nAnd I don't believe /stx if the cultural revolutionists are making\na coup, then they will be very hardline to the Russians. They will\nalso be hardline to us. Of course, one other possibility, Mr.\nPresident, on the more hopeful side, is that Chou-En lai is\ncleaning out the cultural revolutionists preparatory to your visit.\nP:\nSure.\nK:\nI mean that would for fit the evidence too -- that Chou En-lai knowing\nof my visit which he wants to be ready and of your visit, is\nconsolidating his position. And if that is the case, all the signs\nare consistent with that too. And he would want to make sure -\nP:\nYes but certainly, too, they must have read I think my press\nconference came at a very important time because he - whatever\nis happening - **hink they read that and I think if anything that\nwould strengthen his hand.\nK:\nThat is right and Chou En-lai is the only leader who has been\nseen performing his normal functions in the last week.\nP:\nHas he still been performing them?\nK:\nWell, he has been seen running around Peking in his normal way\nand none of the military leaders have been seen anywhere.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-6-\nP:\nHe has been seen?\nK:\nHe has been seen and their Acting Foreign Minister has been\nseen, which would tend to strengthen the position that maybe\nif a purge is going on it is by Chou En-lai of his opponent.\nP:\nYes. You know on the Vietnam side. I have really been cogitating\na lot about that. I become more and more intrigued with the\nidea that rather than thinking in terms of an announcement in\nJanuary that we might announce in Dece ~mber or November a\npulldown to 100, 000 for whatever date we want to select - -\nand just say we will have another announcement later.\nK:\nThat is another possibility.\nP:\nYou know put it - that would be February I suppose.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nAnyway, and then having said that we say that I also think\nin January that if these fellows are still as intransigent as hell,\nwe just might risk the whole ball you know the more I think\nof it we might just risk the whole ball on the idea that if they\nare still screwing around with the prisoners rather than to go\non the deal while prisoners for Thieu's head rests that we just\nsimply say, \"now look here, we got enough, we have heard\neverything, you know give out the whole record. Say now we\ngive them an ultimatum. Get these prisoners or - that is\nuntil we do we are going to blockade them. By that I mean\nby blockade I mean maybe it is mining and the cutting of that\nrailroad and take out those power plants. Goddamnit, you\ncould have a lot of public sentiment for that.\nK:\nWell, with respect to the first, Mr. President, as much time\nas we can buy in November the better off we will be. With\nrespect to what we do I think in any event whenever you\nannounce your final thing we ought to break off in Paris and\njust keep a liaison team there. At that point, there would be\nno sense in keeping Porter in Paris.\nP:\nYes. We would say withdraw our Ambassador. And we will\njust have a liaison office there. That they have refused --\nK:\nWhich in itself will be a tremendous thing for the prisoners.\nP:\nAnd that in the meantime that our patience is running out on\nthat. We are going to retain forces until we get the prisoners\nand, then I would go I really think there is one place for\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-7-\nthe American people and it would serve a double purpose to\nsupport us and that is it would cause ripples with the Chinese\nand Russians but maybe not SO much as we think. We would\nsimply say now damnit we want those prisoners and then by\nblockading or quarantining is the word I'd use and we will lift\nthe quarantine when we get the prisoners. Now that really\nvery seriously limits their ability to wage a spring offensive.\nK:\nRight. It will depend, Mr. President, on how our relationship\nto the Chinese and Soviets has developed at that point.\nP:\nTrue. True.\nK:\nAnd if we have to give a lot of way to one or the other. But\ncertainly it is an option that we should keep very much in mind.\nP:\nYes. Well, I want that prepared.\nK:\nRight Mr. President. It will be done.\nP:\nAnother thing. It seems to me that we might try a little war of\nnerves. You know, we went through that business of the loading\nthose damned mines and moving the carriers and all that sort\nof thing - - the mine sweepers, etc.\nK:\nRight. I remember - in 1969.\nP:\nWell. Let's try it again. I would like to see Moorer have that\non salvo again.\nK:\nRight Mr. President.\nP:\nWe could move planes and a helluva lot of other things around\nif we are ready for a helluvan offensive.\nK:\nI will talk to Moorer first thing in the morning.\nP:\nAnd another thing is that I do think that the more I think about\nit - having gotten away with this strike as apparently we have --\nK:\nOh yes. Easily.\nP:\nAs soon as this weather clears, I would go back and clean out the\nrest of that stuff.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nK:\nI think that we should do Mr. President.\nP:\nI just think we ought to do it.\nK:\nBut not while you are traveling - - or do you think?\nP:\nOh hell, that wouldn't bother me a bit.\nK:\nIt doesn't bother you. Well then we can just give them the\nauthority\nP:\nAs soon as the weather clears for a day, to go in, but\ngoddamnit, tell them I want some results.\nK:\nWell, they had pretty good results today Mr. President because\nwe intercepted North Vietnamese communications in which they\nreport themselves very extensive damage.\nP:\nAre those reliable?\nK:\nOh yes. I mean that is just to themselves.\nP:\nDamage to what -- just oil tanks?\nK:\nThey reported heavy damage to POL and they are using this\narea for the fuel for the trucks that go down the Ho Chi Minh\nTrail and so that has to be - -\nP:\nBut as I understand there are trucks and supply depots and other\nthings and I would just knock the bejesus our of them.\nK:\nBut we didn't get the supply dumps other than POL near a port\nbecause we were afraid to hit the civilian population when we\ncouldn't bomb visually. And that would be the most lucrative\netxkthex when the weather clears.\nP:\nI am not so goddamned concerned about the civilian population.\nI am not so concerned about it.\nK:\nWell, it would give them a lot of pictures they could use.\nP:\nMaybe. Maybe. Well I think you ought to lay it on -- just\nthinking it through I don't think it is going to affect either the\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-9-\nChinese or the Russians.\nK:\nWell, if we did it-regularly --\nP:\nOn the DMZ thing. We just sort of get in the habit of it that\nabove the DMZ we are just not going to tolerate this kind of\nbuildup.\nK:\nWell, I think we can get away with one more Mr. President.\nThen I would put a pause in of a few weeks.\nP:\nLet's make the one more damned good.\nK:\nThat's right Mr. President.\nP:\nSo would you tell Moorer.\nK:\nI will tell him first thing in the morning. Well, they would have\ntomorrow if the weather had been better.\nP:\nAlright.\nK:\nBut if we can tell them on the first clear day one more maximum\neffort in that area.\nP:\nProvided they think there are significant targets etc. It does not\nhave to be limited to that area. If you want to hit a few passes\nat the same time.\nK:\nThey are not in operation yet.\nP:\nAlright.\nK:\nThey won't start going for another few weeks. We should save\nthat until the end of October.\nP:\nWell, let me say that in October we will do it. I am not about\nto do it. Both the Russians and the Chinese have got to know\nthat we mean his business.\nK:\nAbsolutely. That's why this strike yesterday was so important.\nP:\nI have a feeling that was the case and just know that that is --\nif there is any psychological benefit left to what the hell we\nare doing to those people, this is going to do it. Okay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-10-\nYou are going to meet with Connally when?\nK:\nThursday morning.\nP:\nWhat are you going to call it?\nK:\nWe are not going to call it anything.\nP:\nYou can just say you are meeting with them to look over some\nof the - what excuse will you give to Peterson when he is not\ninvited?\nK:\nI don't have to tell him anything. I said that Connally and I\nwere talking and we just decided to bat it around a bit.\nP:\nHe wanted some of your views and you thought you ought to\npass his views on to him as you had to him.\nK:\nThat's right. I think we can handle that. I must say, Mr.\nPresident after having thought about it more, I am becoming\nmore and more of your view that we shouldn't give up the\nsurcharge very easily.\nP:\nGood. Well, I guess domestically it is dynamite to give it up.\nBut beyond that from a foreign policy standpoint, what in the\nname of God do we get for it?\nK:\nI think what we have to do is change our tactics a little bit. We\nhave XXXX shown our deeds. Now we have to speak in a somewhat\nmore fatherly way. Because this is a tremendous domestic wrench\nfor a lot of these countries.\nP:\nSure. Well, that is what I told Byrnes - to prepare some material\nfor me on that score.\nK:\nAnd that way we can break away - the British -- I had a long\ntalk with Cromer tonight.\nP:\nDo you think you can break them away?\nK:\nWell, I think we can get them not to - -\nP:\nAccording to Connally they are hopeless.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n11\nK:\nI don't know. I think we could get the British to put forward\nas their idea sweething some things we can live with.\nIf there is a showdown between us and the common market,\nuntil they are fully in, they have to back the common market.\nP:\nThat's correct.\nK:\nThat is why we have to avoid a formal showdown and see\nwhether inside the common market they could put forward\nas theirs something we can live with.\nP:\nYes. But we have got to give them something we will live\nwith.\nK:\nWell, we have to give them some idea of what we want which\nwe have not done yet.\nP:\nYes. As you know, Byrnes' view is to go back one way or\nanother - - he is hepped on the idea of raising the price of gold.\nAnd that\nK:\nBut that will just - - that is like SDRs Mr. President. It would\nget us three or four years and then we will be right back where\nwe were. It will get us whatever the time additional currencies\nwill get us. But it doesn't save the basic imbalance. Basically\nall it does is increase our reserves.\nP:\nWhich is not what we are really interested in.\nK:\nWell, it buys us whatever time is involved when you have\nlarger reserves.\nP:\nBut it doesn't help us on our trade balance.\nK:\nIt does not help us on our trade balance. It is, in fact, counter-\nproductive. Because it is a way of perpetuating the present\nproblems.\nP:\nYes. Well, I wonder if Byrnes realizes that?\nif\nK:\nWell, he figures/there is more liquidity we can turn it around\nby domestic policies.\nbut\nP:\nOh Christ. That is what the Europeans tell us/-xxkha our\ndomestic policies aren't going to work that soon.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-12-\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nWell, as you talk, try to get some position I can take.\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nP:\nBecause I will have to address myself at least briefly to the\nsubject and I am the one that should be out making some\ngenerous damned statement and not say something that willx\nwe have Connally have a major statement at the time of\nthe IMF Meeting. Another way I can finesse Detroit is to say\nwell the Secretary of Treasury (and this is what you might\ndiscuss in the morning) will be addressing this subject at\n(if we want to say that) -- at the IMF Meeting and that we\nare looking for a solution but both sides have got to participate\nin it. We just can't be one sided.\nK:\nWell, I think if you put it on the basis of the - that we treasure\nour close relationships to our allies, that it is painful to us\nthat this has developed.\nP:\nYes. I had a very interesting talk with Paul Hoffman. He is\na nice fellow. He made an interesting point. He was the first,\nas you know, to go to the Marshall Plan. He made this point.\nHe said now look, you can talk all you want about the Marshall\nPlan but as a result of the economic features of the Marshall\nPlan, the economic success of the Marshall Plan very very\nsignificantly reduced (and he put it in even more dramatic terms)\nhe said it removed the possibility of conflict between the\nWestern European nations who have been fighting -- fought two\nwars in a half a century The other point he made is this. He\nsaid, looking at the world there can never be one world politically.\nHowever, what we should work for is one world economically.\nThat's not bad.\nK:\nThat's a good way of putting it.\nin Detroit\nP:\nEconomically thatsgood. Another thing I want to be able to say/\nif I can. I would like to give them some hope on East-West\ntrade.\nK:\nYes. That you can do Mr. President because you can point out\nI will get you the figures -- that this year alone we have\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-13-\nalready approved over $. 5 billion, in addition to the other\nprograms, and there is more in the works.\nP:\nWell, the Kama River thing. They are terribly interested\nin that you know and anything we can say on that in positive,\nI would like to say out there if I could.\nK:\nWell, the problem is on that Mr. President. We are not\nthe problem. The problem is that this whole thing is getting\nrenegotiated. But there is one contract in for Swindler-Dresser\nCorporation for some $285 million on top of the foundry which\nwe have already approved, which is part of the Kama River\nproject. You will be able to tell them that we have given close\nto $400 million -- I mean approved that for one project\nalone.\nP:\nWell, why don't you do a little talking point on that particular\nmatter about East-West trade and what the prospects are for\nthe future. Will you do that?\nK:\nExactly. Of course. I will do it first thing in the morning.\nP:\nI won't need it until late in the afternoon.\nK:\nRight Mr. President.\nP:\nI'll be working tomorrow in the EOB and if anything develops\nyou can reach me.\nK:\nOf course. I will let you know the second we know anything.\nThis may be a false alarm Mr. President. This may be a purely\nmilitary exercise. Or it could be a purge of Chou of his\nopponent.\nP:\nOr it could be a purge of Chou by his opponent. Although his presence\ndoesn't seem to me --\nK:\nThat is inconsistent with his presence.\nP:\nThat is right.\nK:\nOne would have to assume that he is the stronger of the people\nright now. I mean having ridden through the cultural revolution\nit would be hard to know what would weaken him now.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-14-\nP:\nYes. But you remember Mr. K went when nobody expected him\nto.\nK:\nThat's true.\nP:\nSo you never know what is happening in the goddamned countries,\ndo you?\nK:\nThat is true but he had had a whole series of failures. XXX\nP:\nChou, in my view, is looking pretty damned good in the world\ntoday. You know he has been seeing Western people. He is\ngetting a helluva of a press in the world and you know, that\nought to impress these people.\nK:\nThat's right. And he is damned near indispensable Mr.\nPresident. He has run the goddamned country.\nP:\nAnd the Chinese -- - they are getting, in my view, as most\nsophisticated observers are saying, a helluva lot out of their\nmeeting with us. I notice where some jackass from the American\n?\nService Committee said that Chou would insist that the\nU.S. withdraw from Asia.\nK:\nOh that is total nonsense. He has read the Reston interview.\nP:\nYes. Well, we finished that interview off.\nK:\nThat is the truth.\nP:\nWell, let's get Moorer to work on some contingency plans, will you?\nK:\nRight Mr. President.\nbut\nP:\nAlso, /in any event, as far as contingency plans, let's have a few\nnaval maneuvers up from there.\nK:\nRight Mr. President.\nP:\nThe Navy can move around and put some mine sweepers up there\nand a few other little odds and ends.\nK:\nI will talk it over with Moorer the first thing in the morning.\nP:\nOkay.\nK:\nRight Mr. President. Goodbye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President\n11/19/71 11:27am\nP: How did the meeting go with him last night?\nK: It was actually quite interesting. I was tough with him on Vietnam\nand his point was that they were pretty sure there would be no North Vietnamese\noffensive this year.\nP: That's not enough.\nK: I know. But this means no Tet-type attack.\nP: That's good, but that's not enough.\nK: And he said they urged acceptance of our proposition. I'm not sure\nthat's true, but that's what he said.\nP: All right.\nK: On the Middle East he has now made two other propositions which moved\nthe thing in a forward direction. He is going back to the Soviet Union now and\nwon't be back for three weeks or so, so we don't have to make a decision now.\nP: He knows we are working on it though.\nK: Yes, and I told him, in reference to your seeing Golda Maix Meir\nI connected it with our talke, which is not true.\nP: I know, that's good.\nK: I told him on SALT no final agræement would be reached until you get to\nMoscow.\nP: So it was a good meeting then.\nK: Very good meeting.\nP: But I am thinking about this other proposition. You've got reports in\nOver the weekend would be the bedt time to do it.\nK: Yes, but I have developed serious doubts about it. They have still\ngot trucks in, so it's a good target, but these targets are right around Hanoi.\nThe Senate is upset as it is and in two weeks they will be out of town. I know\nthat you are willing to run great risks.\nP: But it might\nthe bastards to do it.\nK: That is true.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President\n11/19/71 11:27 a. m. p. 2\nP: I also want to make the Tito trip credible.\nK: I think if we haven't met in two weeks from now\nP: Then crack it. After the China announcement, that's fair enough.\nK: After the China announcement and after the Senate is out of town. I\nam really concerned about them.\nP: It's really something. We are doing the best we can\nK: It's an unbelievable situation and it's a tribute to you your considering this.\nP: We are going to do it. You know what we are considering, much more\nthan this. We will not allow this to go on. By the way, wasn't it Agnew wh O\nwas against the Ambassador in Singapore for some reason?\nK: Yes.\nP: Reagan said he's the best, and objected because we are moving him.\nK: Really?\nX P: Yes. Will you check that out? Reagan thought he was great and objected\nto our moving him. Make a note. Haig was there, you get the dope.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador brynin\n11/19/71 12:10 p.m.\nD: Thank you very much for your book.\nK: I don't know whether you should bring such a conservative book into the\nSoviet Union.\nD: I think I can.\nK: Remember it was written in 1954.\nD: It is a rather old subject, but it's still interesting. There was a time\nwhen I was interested in that period.\nK: One of your historians, Kwaslov (1 ) -- he once sent me the diplomatic\nducuments of that period from the Russian Foriegn Office it was about 8\nvolumes. They were in French at the time.\nD: Most of them.\nK: So I could read them and did.\nD: He is now in the Academy of Sciences section dealing with hsitory.\nIf I see him\nK: Give xhim my best regards. We used to have long talks about Germany.\nOne thing I wanted to tell you about I had a talk with the President who is in\nKey Biscayne this morning about our dinner. He asked me to reaffirm all that\nI had said to you, that what I said to you reflected: his thinking. The only\narea in which I wanted to give you his precise inside thinking so that you would\nknow it had to do with Vietnam. I mentioned to him what we discussed, and\nabbut the absence of an offensive action\nand he said, and this is a direct\nquote\nthe absence of one isn't enough. We have got to have some movement\non the Prisoners. If there should be any escalation by us on the scale of Laos\nor Cambodia, that would not be done WXXX as a surprise to you.\nD: I think it would be a surprise.\nK: We would not do it\nbut what I'm saying is that we would give you some\nindication that something of this magnitude was geing prepared if it was.\nD:\nK: This is consistent with what I told you.\nD: I hope we are on the cautious side.\nK: We will be restrained.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmb. Dobrynin\n11/19/71 12:10 p.m. p. 2\nD: I will keep this in mind when I see them.\nK: But he thought our discussionw EXE were on a positive course.\nD: Thank you very much.\nK: Have a good trip. I don't know whether I should wish you to get back early.\nD: I hope to be there a month.\nK: Then you will be back soon after the first?\nD: Yes.\nK: Then I would adjust any possible vacation plans I might have also.\nD: Okay.\nK: What we generally discussed yesterday was in the right area, but\nthat is only for Breshnev.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nDobrynin\n11/19/71 4:45 p.m.\nD: I have to go in 15 minutes. But two points: one is the question,\nrather three. About my residence,\nK: Yes.\nD: Today on a low lever we were told without explanation that the State\nDepartment couldn't approve it.\nK: Give me the address of it.\nD: 1101 Crest Lane, McLean, Virginia\nK: Until yesterday, I didn't know you were looking at a residence.\nD: It was a dealer recommended by State Department. I would like on a\npersonal basis for you to look at it if possible. I would like to ask it as a\npersonal favor. Second, anything new from\n.\nK: No.\nD: Even now?\nK: Not today.\nD: I have a egram, signed not by a man who deals with American affairs,\nsaid it looks like they are preparing some kind of report to give you. This was\njust for my own information. So there is nothing.\nK: No.\nD: So I will urge Moscow to recheck.\nK: And if they make public a reply to a private communication, that will\nbe the end of any negotiations with them.\nD: Nothing is clear in the gelegram.\nK: We informed them today that I wouldn¹t come to meet with their subordinates\nD'' Why now have their subordinates come here to meet with you?\nK: I would be delighted, but I doubt that they are willing to come. If they\ncan I will arrange a plane and total secrecy.\nD: It was just a question.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmb. Dobrynin\n11/19/71 4:45pm\np. 2\nK: We have had no communication since they told us Le Duc Tho was not\ncoming.\nD: I understand. And last, personal communication to you from Gromyko.\nHe asked if you could spare a half hour to look at our proposal at the UN about\nthe moon.\nK: What about it?\nD: A certain treaty.\nK: You can assure him I will take personal look at it.\nD: No specific objections, but your delegation is saying\nI don't know\nwhy he is so interested in this treaty\nK: Maybe he bought some land on the moon. I'll look into it.\nD: Then just let your other people there know.\nK: Why don't I send you a message through Vorontsov on what I find.\nI take is you want us to support you?\nD: Yes, but Vorontsov could tell you.\nK: Why doesn't Vorontsov send over to me what you W ant. And I promise\nyou I will look into it and by the middle of next week tell you.\nD: Okay, I will tell Gromyko.\nK: Good. Any request of his will receive my personal attention. We' 11\n1 look into it and tell you before I lleave for the West Coast.\nD: And look into the matter about my house?\nK: I will. If its is a bureaucratic boondoggle I will take care of it.\nD: Okay.\nK: You want me to let you know through Vorontsov about that?\nD: Definitely\nin Moscow asking them for about a million dollars.\nExpecting to make oral presentation.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmbassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger\n7:55 p.m., November 19, 1971\nR:\nI will get the answer for each one of the two options tomorrow.\nK:\nRight.\nR:\nIt seems that the first reaction is not in favor of the third.\nK:\nThat's okay. I haven't cleared it with the President yet but it\nseems possible.\nR:\nI see.\nK:\nThere is a slight chance there will be a problem but I don't\nexpect it.\nR:\nI sent a cable and said these are the two options. I got an answer\nthat not for the time being for the third and favor the 11th.\nK:\nThat would be good.\nR:\nAnd means consideration would be\nbefore the meeting.\nK:\nWhat are you going to do at the meeting, attack us?\nR:\nWhich one?\nK:\nOn the 11th.\nR:\nI don't believe under any circumstances the President would be\nattacked.\nK:\nIt is okay. I understand.\nR:\nAnyhow I hope there will be no reason for it.\nK:\nGood.\nR:\nThen I will be in contact with you about 10:00 in the morning.\nK:\nI will be here until 11:30.\nR:\nI have been promised an answer by 9:00 here which is 4:00 there.\nK:\nAll right. I will here from you then?\nR:\nRight. Thank you very much.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nThanksgiving Day, November 25, 1971\nP:\nHow are you feeling? I hope I didn't get you up; I've been up\nsince 5:00.\nK:\nThis time change always. You stay on your old time.\nP:\nIt's particularly true, I think, as you get a little older. I used\nto come out\nI woke up at 5:00 and there was no use to go back.\nK:\nNO. It's the same thing with me. I've been up since 6:30.\nP:\n6:30. Well, I didn't get up.\nK:\nWell, I've been awake since 6:30.\nP:\nI had a very good talk I just did it on a hunch -- with Heath\non the phone. I just called him.\nK:\nOh, isn't that great.\nP:\nAnd I just had an idea. I don't know what your schedule is.\nCould you come overand we have a little chat. I want to fill you in on it.\nI told him a little about India. I was going to\nin fact, tried to get\nyou before I made the call, but then I thought\nI knew it would be\nall right.\nHe told you\nK:\n/ I had already talked to Cromer.\nP:\nOh, everything was fine, but we went through Rhodeaia and\nwe went through India, and I told him I wanted the place in Bermuda\nthat we'd have it informal no black tie. And all that. I decided\nwe'd do that.\nK:\nOh, marvelous. Excellent.\nP:\nBut when you've got some time, why come over.\nK:\nI'll come over within the next half-hour or so?\nP:\nOh, no, take your time; take your time.\nK:\nIncidentally, Mr. President, before you pick it up in the\nnewspapers my son yesterday on the airplane, horsing around with\nthe press, when he was going to the bathroom, -- they said \"when are\nthey going to China, 11 said March. That he had heard it on the radio,\nso they are all going crazy. It's on the \"Today\" show. It's in the\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n- 2 -\nThanksgiving Day, November 25, 1971\nnewspapers.\nP:\nI'll be damned.\nK:\nAnd we've been trying to turn them off all night -- Ziegler\nand I -- we've said don't go with that story, but they think they're\nonto a really hot one.\nP:\nThat's all right. That's not bad. He's only a month off.\nK:\nIt proves he doesn't know anything.\nP:\nThat's good. That's great. I love it; I love it. It doesn't\nbother me at all. It won't bother the Chinese.\nK:\nOh, no; they know it's wrong.\nP:\nRight; okay. Good-bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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