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TELCON
- 4 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
P:
We might move it to 2:00 maybe. Well, we would have that; we
wouldn't have the television in on that -- we'll let them take a
picture and then get out.
K:
I think that's right.
P:
Who would you have?
K:
Connally, Rogers, Laird, if he is in town; Helms, and Mitchell if
you want it.
P:
I wouldn't have Mitchell on this one.
K:
All right.
P:
No, no. I think Connally because it involves some military -- I
mean economic and so forth.
K:
The basic problem, Mr. President, is it's clear that we can't do
anything directly to change the situation but to set it up on the ground
that we are sacrificing our friendship to India; there is no friendship
left. There is nothing operational we are sacrificing in India by our
present course. All we are -- what we are risking is to add the
content of the Soviets and the Chinese to a direct challenge in which
a country is being dismembered.
P:
The point is that I want to see from State what their option is; if
they've got a better one, I'd like to know what it is. And you know,
I have seen any suggestions of any different.
K:
Their suggestion is always to release Mujibur; that's in effect the
Russian position.
P:
Yeah. Well, but Pakistan won't do that will it?
K:
No. Well, now it's outdated; it's too late for that anyway. But it
would have been -- the Indians were determined, Mr. President, they
attacked at the earliest possible moment they could. There was a
rainy season from May to the end of September. Then they had to get
their troops into position; then they had to train the Bengali. All this
talk about Russian restraint that we heard all summer was complete
poppycock.
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"ocrText": "TELCON\n- 4 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nP:\nWe might move it to 2:00 maybe. Well, we would have that; we\nwouldn't have the television in on that -- we'll let them take a\npicture and then get out.\nK:\nI think that's right.\nP:\nWho would you have?\nK:\nConnally, Rogers, Laird, if he is in town; Helms, and Mitchell if\nyou want it.\nP:\nI wouldn't have Mitchell on this one.\nK:\nAll right.\nP:\nNo, no. I think Connally because it involves some military -- I\nmean economic and so forth.\nK:\nThe basic problem, Mr. President, is it's clear that we can't do\nanything directly to change the situation but to set it up on the ground\nthat we are sacrificing our friendship to India; there is no friendship\nleft. There is nothing operational we are sacrificing in India by our\npresent course. All we are -- what we are risking is to add the\ncontent of the Soviets and the Chinese to a direct challenge in which\na country is being dismembered.\nP:\nThe point is that I want to see from State what their option is; if\nthey've got a better one, I'd like to know what it is. And you know,\nI have seen any suggestions of any different.\nK:\nTheir suggestion is always to release Mujibur; that's in effect the\nRussian position.\nP:\nYeah. Well, but Pakistan won't do that will it?\nK:\nNo. Well, now it's outdated; it's too late for that anyway. But it\nwould have been -- the Indians were determined, Mr. President, they\nattacked at the earliest possible moment they could. There was a\nrainy season from May to the end of September. Then they had to get\ntheir troops into position; then they had to train the Bengali. All this\ntalk about Russian restraint that we heard all summer was complete\npoppycock."
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