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29
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7
RESTRICTION CODES
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E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
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TELCON
12/4/71 (From the Residence)
President/Kissinger
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Yes, Henry.
K:
I just wanted to bring you up to date on what happened. First, we
positioned Ziegler with a pretty tough statement for his press briefing
to make clear where you stood and on that basis
P:
They are all aware of the fact that I am in complete touch with it all
the time.
K:
Well, that's what I
Frankly, State had put out a story this morning
that you were just being kept generally aware so we had Ziegler say
that you ordered the thing.
P:
Which is true.
K:
Which is exactly true. You talked to me 6 times yesterday.
P:
And a half a dozen times today.
K:
That's right.
P:
And ordered what? You mean on the cut-off of arms?
K:
Oh, on the move to the Security Council.
P:
Right, yes.
K:
I mean that you gave the go-ahead.
P:
Right.
K:
And then on the basis of that Sisco gave a backgrounder which I
understand is playing very well positioning the thing. We've drafted
a very tough speech for Bush.
P:
Good.
K:
And he's on the floor now. He tells me that at the Preparatory Meeting
the Chinese jumped all over the Russians and Indians and apparently
the Indians wanted to put on the agenda only the item of problems of
East Pakistan and the Chinese said "No, let's call it problems of
India. 11 And that's all right if they all brawl with each other.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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2
P:
Good. Let the liberals choose now between China and India. That'll
be very good.
K:
Exactly.
P:
Very good. Boy, this really
you know, we don't like this but
you realize this is causing our liberal friends untold anguish, Henry.
K:
And, Mr. President, actually in terms of the political situation, first
of all we won't take any much immediate flak, but in six months the
liberals are going to look like jerks because the Indian occupation of
East Pakistan is going to make the Pakistani one look like child's
play.
P:
Yes. Well, the main thing we're not going to do is be suckered by the
Indians into a huge aid program. Now that I want clearly understood.
You know after they have screwed this thing up, by God, I can't em-
phasize too strongly how I feel. We told Mrs. Gandhi we're going to
cut off that aid and we're going to do it. Has the word gone out?
K:
The word has gone out, Mr. President, and on Monday morning -
We've already told the banks to hold it and on Monday morning it's
going to be effective. I mean nothing can happen before Monday.
P:
I see. And you're examining every other possibility of how we can
squeeze India right now.
K:
That is right, Mr. President.
P:
It's to be done. Everything is to be held up. Everything is to be
dragged. Everything else. They cannot get away with this and
well, they will get away with it, but we can't allow them to without
knowing our displeasure.
K:
But what we have to reconsider now is whether it is in our interest
to be the chief development - source of development capital - of a
country that has performed such actions.
P:
That's right. Oh, you mean next year's aid program?
K:
That's right.
P:
That's what I want now, though. The way I want that handled is for
people like Passman and some of our friends in the House and the
Senate, even the more liberal types, to come out and say cut aid to
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3
India. Get my point.
K:
Absolutely.
P:
Let them take the lead rather than have us take the lead.
K:
Right.
P:
Can we do that?
K:
Certainly.
P:
Well, can we put somebody to work on it so that it'll be discreetly
done. I just want
K:
I've already talked to Passman in that sense.
P:
Well, Passman, but there are others - there's got to be a whole plan.
K:
Well, Passman thought we should go easy until we've got the present
aid program through the budget.
P:
Yes.
K:
Through the Congress.
P:
Yes. And then what would he do? Then he would go after.
K:
Next year's appropriation.
P:
Is that what you're talking about - next year's?
K:
I'm talking about what we put into the budget for '73.
P:
Well, it's going to be goddamn little that's for sure.
K:
Well, that's what we should do, Mr. President. And this year's we
can also cut.
P:
I want it cut what we are doing now in fact. And as far as next year's
is concerned we just cut that, but I don't want to cut Pakistan's. We're
going to play this fair now. I just hope we can get someone on the story
now. Did you get Scali turned loose so that he has a
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4
K:
We gave Scali the facts yesterday, but we couldn't locate him today.
But we've been thumping out the facts all day and I think you will
find that the combination of the statement we got Ziegler to make,
the Sisco backgrounder and what Bush is going to say tonight is going
to be quite a massive dose.
P:
It will put us on the side of trying to restrain India.
K:
That's right.
P:
That's what I really feel we've got to get across. Now I haven't
been following the editorial comments, what are the Times and Post
and those jackasses saying?
K:
Well, the Times hasn't said anything yet. The Post is bleeding
about it's going to the Security Council which we've done.
P:
Well, of course, but are they blaming India or Pakistan, or both,
or neither?
K:
Well, they are trying to be pretty even-handed. They're blaming
India. They are blaming India for the military actions and then,
of course, they are bleeding about the refugees. But it's beginning
to tilt against India.
P:
We've got to make it tilt more because we know they are totally to
blame. We know that. We know the Paks don't want this.
K:
That's right. Well, the Paks don't want it. The Paks accepted every
proposal of ours. I told the Indian Ambassador before he left that we
would work out a complete program with them for political autonomy
within a year if they.
P:
You've gotten out the fact that, for example, it may be that you ought
to have a backgrounder tomorrow. Are you in New York?
K:
No, I'm in Washington.
P:
A backgrounder tomorrow where you can point out that we told Mrs.
Gandhi that the Paks were prepared to withdraw from the border.
And that we said we would be willing to look at this and that, in spite
of this they haven't done it. I think it's very important to put the
burden on India on this, Henry. I just don't feel that we can.
now
the other side of it that you can say, well, there's 400 million people
who have their.
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5
K:
Well, but we haven't got them anyway, Mr. President.
P:
We've got their enmity anyway. That's what she's shown in this
goddamn thing, hasn't she?
K:
I mean it isn't that we are losing an ally. They were the ones that
made a treaty with the Russians. They are the ones that are now
establishing the principle that forces the only method - the principle
method for settling disputes and it isn't that we're losing anything.
In fact, if we do it the right way, we can still get them to come back
to us, to get back in our good graces. The Russians aren't going
to give them $700 million in development money.
P:
The only thing, it is very important to get the P.R. thing across.
I do want you to try to find Scali and get him to work on the thing.
K:
Right, Mr. President.
P:
But he's not in town, you say?
K:
Well, I don't know. We've been trying all day. And we are con-
tinuing to try.
P:
All right. But what do you think about your doing a backgrounder,
or is that overkill?
K:
I think it'd be overkill tomorrow, but what I might do, if you agree,
Mr. President, and we think it's necessary. I worked out with
Ziegler a procedure which we've always wanted to try where I step
into his briefing. I mean, he calls me in when questions start falling
and says, - why don't we get Henry on background on this - and I
just step into his briefing.
P:
Why don't you do that?
K:
Monday morning. By that time.
P:
I'm having that day with NBC that day. You could pop in and I could
say Ziegler could come in and approve it and so forth, I guess.
K:
I thought one of the things I might do, Mr. President, I've got ten
minutes with you in the morning, to brief you on the India situation.
P:
Sure, sure. Or anything you want, I mean
K:
I know, but
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P:
We're going to play that by ear. It may be 30 minutes, if I decide
it. I'm not going to play it by the goddamn television. But, you
know what I mean. We'll talk about India and several other things.
K:
That's right.
P:
Let me ask you about a couple other things. Of course, they can
only use a couple minutes in the program but we have got to give
them enough, then they'l pick the good things. What is the situation
now with Rogers? He's perfectly content to stay out of it, I suppose,
because he sees it's a loser. Is that right?
K:
Well, he's content not to be - not to have gone on television announcing
the thing.
P:
That wouldn't have been any good at all because we're not sure it's
going to work.
not'.
K:
No, but it would have been good for him to set up a command post in
New York conducting this operation.
P:
And working with the Chinese because they wouldn't understand him
at all.
K:
That's right and that's what the
oh, not at all
and the Chinese
are in any case programmed. They don't want to be involved in our.
They want to be able to say that they are not colluding with us.
P:
I see.
K:
So Rogers is happy with this and he did give the backgrounder under
great protest. He wouldn't have given it if we hadn't got.
P:
You mean Sisco did.
K:
Sisco did. Rogers didn't want it until we put out that statement at
Key Biscayne and then he figured he better get State into the act.
P:
Oh, that's what did it?
K:
Yes.
P:
Now Ziegler made a very good public statement, huh? What was Ziegler's
statement?
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7
K:
Well, Ziegler's statement said the President has been following
this hourly. At 10:30 this morning after receiving the latest
report he gave the go-ahead to the State Department to take the
case to the Security Council. The President is dismayed by the
use of Indian troops in Pakistan and then he was asked, "Does
that mean you are giving up your neutral role in this conflict?"
And he said it means that the Indians have said they are now on
an all out invasion of East Pakistan and this we have always said
that the American people would not understand. And that played
very well, very strong and Sisco is playing off that.
P:
Now how did Sisco handle it? Did he do what you told him that I
told him he was to do this?
K:
Exactly. Well, at first he didn't want to do it and Rogers didn't
want him to do it, but then when they saw the Ziegler thing which
featured your role then they decided they better get some State
Department line out too.
P:
Is that what did it?
K:
Yes. Which is OK. We don't want them to.
P:
Of course, you got the Ziegler played, that was very good.
K:
Right.
P:
And then Sisco did give a good backgrounder?
K:
He did give a good ba ckgrounder citing chapter and verse of all the
things the Indians have refused to do: no UN observers, no acceptance
of the.
P:
Did he also cite what we have done - that we have given $250 million
in aid and all that.
K:
Oh yes, oh yes.
P:
We're getting all that across, are we?
K:
Yes, and anything that needs to be done I can do Monday morning.
P:
I think what probably needs to be done, that Monday you may have
to give - basically, rather than having a white paper put out; that
what you ought to do is look over the facts very, very carefully and
then go out and give a hard hitting briefing.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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8
K:
Yes, but I ought to do that on background.
P:
Oh absolutely, on background. On the thing that we've just talked
to the President, we've examined the whole thing, now here are
the facts. I think that could have an enormous effect.
K:
Right. I think that's right.
P:
It would pit world opinion against these people.
K:
Right.
P:
Is that the way you feel about it?
K:
That's exactly the way I feel about it. Because that puts us-then
we have to have a basis for the actions in the economic field we
are taking.
P:
Now insofar as those actions are concerned, we haven't had any
squeals from the Indians, have we?
K:
No, no. See that's again where State was wrong. The Indians
have no interest in escalating this with us. Not a squeal. They
will start squealing next week when the economic aid is cut off.
P:
Now understand, I don't want any nonsense about this. I really
want it cut down to - anything that can be cut is got to be cut next
week. Anything that can be cut and I want Hannah brought on the
carpet. And I want Currans and everybody - so that everything
is cut, Henry. That's the only way the Indians are going to under-
stand this - if it all is cut and they know it. Don't announce a thing.
Just do it.
K:
Exactly.
P:
Now is that all understood.
K:
That's all understood, Mr. President.
P:
And Connally understands it, of course.
K:
Connally has played beautiful ball. He knows how to do these things
without the knife showing.
P:
Incidentally, tell him, if you will - now he's at the gridiron tonight -
but in the morning, if he has an opportunity to stick the knife in India
in any public statement that he makes, to do it.
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9
K:
OK.
P:
That would be a good thing to have done.
K:
Because he could do it from a development point of view.
P:
That's right. That's right. That we are going to have to reexamine
our aid. I mean I think we should play a very tough game. I don't
think the American people want to aid a country that is an aggressor.
K:
Well, and as consistently. It was bad enough when, with our money,
they dragged us around in the UN, when have these bastards ever
supported us?
P:
Never.
K:
What can they do to us that they aren't doing now? I mean if they
want to be Russian stooges and have the Russians spend a billion
dollars there a year, we can't prevent it.
P:
Right. Ok. Well, this is the way to play it. We'll take a look
Monday to see whether we want to have you go. Oh, in reading
the news summary I saw a little squib to the effect that some White
House aide said that the State Department was concerned because
you were on the record on your
K:
Well, that's.
P:
Now who the hell puts out a thing like that?
K:
I don't know, Mr. President, because after all this is
P:
I áidn't hear anything - did anyone from State object?
K:
No. No, and you know it played very well in the press.
P:
It was excellent, but I mean I just wondered why anybody from the
well, somebody I guess
K:
Well, there's always some sorehead in the woodwork.
P:
Yes. But I thought it played very well. You didn't have any
complaints?
K:
I had not a word. Not one word.
P:
Because they knew you had to brief on the trip. Who else could?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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10
K:
Well, I phoned him before I did it and he didn't raise an objection.
P:
Well, I wish there was some more we could do here but.
They'l run out of gas - both sides - won't they in about two weeks.
K:
Yes, but of course, another thing we have done is to send a back-
channel to the Shah from you saying that, trying to find out whether
he wanted to give some support to Pakistan and saying if he did
we would look to see whether we could find a way of letting, of
replacing his.
P:
Are you sure that backchannel is safe?
K:
Yes.
P:
I wouldn't do it through MacArthur.
K:
No, no, that's why I didn't do it that way and we didn't put it as a
message. We put it as talking points so it can be disallowed.
P:
Good, well we'll have some fun with this yet. God, you know what
would really be poetic justice here is if some way the Paks could
really give the Indians a bloody nose for a couple of days. The
fighting, any report on that?
K:
Well, the fighting - we got reports in East Pakistan that the Indians
are surprised at the intensity of the Pakistan resistance. But of
course they outnumber them there eight to one.
P:
How about West Pakistan?
K:
In West Pakistan the Indians don't seem to have gotten very far.
And there I think they're not going to be able to win except by wearing
them down. They outnumber them there five to one. They've been
bombing Karachi and burning the oil installations.
P:
Isn't that awful. That terrible. The Indians are bombing Karachi?
K:
Yes.
P:
Oh, for Christ's sake, isn't that.
and Rawalpindi I notice is on
the list, too.
K:
Yes. Well, of course, they've been playing a terrific game these
last years. Every time one tank was shipped to Pakistan the Indians
would carry on like maniacs, but they've been getting big shipments
from India, they've been getting big shipments from India, rather
their own armaments industry.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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11
P:
Well, we've got to get across the point that as far as our aid to
Pakistan is concerned that first it was minimal. Second, that our
mistake was, and I think that's the thing you want to make in your
backgrounder, was that we didn't give more.
K:
That's right. Oh, the military aid thing, Mr. President, is so
absurd. We gave $3.8 million dollars worth of spare parts.
P:
As I look at this thing for the future, Henry, I have the feeling that
they're going to try to build it up - again we've got to think of what
the media will try to do. End of Tape 1.
Tape 2
P:
Let the Indians squeal. Let the liberals squeal. What's wrong
with that?
K:
Well, uh.
P:
I'm not sure, you know that we may not be playing it boldly enough.
K:
Well, we can look at that. On Monday morning we can.
P:
I want to see that kind of a suggestion because I would be prepared
to go out and say in view of this action that we regretfully cut off
until this action desists all economic aid to India stops, period.
They're in the business of being the aggressors - course they are the
aggressors. I really feel - oh, I know all the arguments that well
then we're choosing up sides, we're not neutral. Of course, we're
not neutral. Neither are the Indians. They're always neutral
against us.
K:
That's right and you said that's what you'd do.
P:
I think we ought to do it.
K:
Well, we can certainly, Mr. President, on Monday morning cut
off this $100 million dollar slice.
P:
Well, but you see all this is salami stuff. I think that what is really
needed is a jolt. We have given $10 billion worth of aid to India.
So you tell the American people that I'm cutting off all aid to India.
Make a bold play. You talk to Connally about that tomorrow.
K:
OK.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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12
P:
All right, we've got $10 billion and we're cutting off all aid to
India until this war stops. That might have some effect.
K:
Right.
P:
Don't you agree?
K:
I think that
no, I'm very - I find it very attractive. Our
experience has been
also
P:
It'll be very attractive to the American people.
K:
That's right.
P:
They would like it. You say, "Look, we've given $10 billion in
aid. Now they are going forward with this aggression, we're cutting
off all aid to them until they stop. "
K:
And evacuate any territory they have occupied.
P:
That's right. Well, get me a plan like that and I'll go for it, okay?
K:
Right, Mr. President.
P:
All right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
General Haig/Mr. Kissinger
December 4 or 5, 1971
K:
Hello, Al.
H:
Yes, Henry.
K:
Did you get that straightened out?
H:
Yeah, Joe said he didn't know how it could have happened; he doesn't
even recall it. And I said, well, just give Van Hollen a call up there
because they haven't tabled it yet.
K:
Take out the word "political".
H:
Take out the word "political" if it's in there.
K:
In the fourth paragraph.
H:
In the fourth paragraph.
K:
Okay, I tell you these crooks are unbelievable.
H:
Yeah. You know, I believe him but one of his henchmen might have
done it.
K:
But how is this thing playing -- his background? The President
is calling raving.
H:
What about?
K:
He wants to cut off all aid; he thinks I'm too soft. (laughter)
H:
Well, this is that twilight hour.
K:
Yeah.
H:
No, I think it is)playing very well; it's going very strong against
the Indians.
K:
Is it? Good.
H:
Yeah, yeah.
K:
Well, that's what we want.
H:
The Paks asked for a copy of Ziegler's transcript. Janka said we
never do. I said give them the goddamn thing.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
General Haig/Mr. Kissinger
K:
Okay, fine. Yeah, I think we are gonna put some paws into this
operation yet.
H:
Yeah, well.
K:
Not into the military. If we had acted like this two weeks ago, they
would have had second thoughts.
H:
That's what I think, that's what I think.
K:
Don't you?
H:
You have got to move boldly when you move, that's the goddamn
problem. And getting those people to do anything over there is just
too much.
K:
If we had done it two weeks ago when they started, -- when they
wanted us to press to release Mujib (sp?).
H:
That's right, that's right; that's exactly what their solution was.
K:
If we had moved this boldly two weeks ago, if we had cut off economic
aid and military aid a week earlier, it might have made a difference.
Before she got all committeed.
H:
That's right, that's exactly right.
K:
Okay, fine, thank you.
H:
All right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON (Home)
Ambassador Afshar (Iran)/Mr. Kissinger
12/4/71
A:
This is Ambassador Afshar from Iran.
K:
Oh, yes.
A:
How are you, sir?
K:
Okay.
A:
You must be so terribly busy and tired, I'm sorry to bother you.
K:
No, no, it's all right. No, I just tried to call you on behalf of the
President. He would be interested on a personal basis to get the
Iranian assessment of the Pakistan situation. Not through channels.
A:
Yes.
K:
But maybe from the Shah to you and then directly to me.
A:
All right, I will do that, Mr. Kissinger. Right away. And as you know
we are very much concerned about the whole thing and when President
Podgornyy was in New York, the Shah talked to him and also the Shah
talked to President Tito. I have delivered the three long pages telegram
from his Majesty to Marshall Tito when he was here in the United States.
K:
Yes.
A:
To discuss that with the President about the situation in Pakistan. And
we are really very much concerned and now we see a real escalation in
the war and I will send a cable right now to His Majesty.
K:
Yes, but we want to keep -- this is a personal message from the President.
A:
That's right.
K:
And we don't want it in regular diplomatic channels.
A:
All right.
K:
Because we are sympathetic to anything you can do to give help there.
A:
Thank you very much. You mean the message is the oral message, yes,
which I have just to deliver.
K:
Yes, and give it to me personally and to no one else.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Home)
Ambassador Afshar (Iran)/Mr. Kissinger
12/4/71
A:
Thank you very much. It is not a written message of the President.
K:
No.
A:
No, all right. I will call His Majesty. I will talk to His Majesty, I
will talk to His Majesty and I will be in touch with you personally.
K:
Good, thank you.
A:
I do that, yeah.
K:
Thank you.
A:
You are always very helpful. Thank you very much, I hope you can
do your best, you know, because they are in a pretty bad shape.
K:
We'll do our best and we always stick by our friends in Iran and in
Pakistan.
A:
Thank you very much, sir.
K:
Goodbye.
A:
Goodbye, thank you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Continued)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
(Same as Tape 2 of previous, 00.11-12)
December 4 or5, 1971
P:
Let the Indians squeal; let the liberals squeal. What's wrong
with that?
K:
Well --
P:
I'm not sure, you know, we may not be playing it boldly enough.
K:
Well, we can look at that.
P:
Well, I want to see that kind of a suggestion because I would be
prepared to go out to say, "In view of this action that we regretfully
cut off, until this action desists, all economic aid to India stops
period. " They're in the business of being the aggressors. Of
course, they are the aggressors. I really feel -- I know all the
arguments that well, then we are choosing up sides; we're not neutral.
Of course, we're not neutral; neither are the Indians. They're always
neutral against us.
K:
That's right. And you said that's what you would do.
P:
I think we ought to do it.
K:
Well, we can certainly, Mr. President, on Monday morning cut off
this $100 million slice.
P:
No, but you see all this is salami stuff. I think that what is really
needed is a jolt. We've given $10 billion worth of aid to India, so
you tell the American people "I'm cutting off all aid to India. 1! I
mean a bold play. You talk to Connally about that tomorrow.
K:
Okay.
P:
All right, we've cut $10 billion worth of all aid to India until this
force stops. You know that might have some effect.
K:
Right, right.
P:
Don't you agree?
K:
I think -- No, I'm -- I find it attractive.
P:
You see.
K:
Our experience has been --
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
P:
It would be very attractive also to the American people.
K:
That's right.
P:
They would like it. You say, "Look, we've given $10 billion in aid.
Now they are going forward with this aggression, we're cutting off
all aid to them until they stop. "
K:
And, and, and evacuate any territory they've occupied.
P:
Exactly. Well, get me a plan like that and I'll go for it.
K:
Right, Mr. President.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (HOME)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 (??)
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Hello. It's all directly on just what we discussed.
K:
And what are they going to do?
P:
Stick with the ceasefire and withdrawal and give nothing at all on that.
That he says is the Pakistan's position.
K:
Exactly.
P:
The Somalia Resolution basically.
K:
Exactly.
P:
And he said that was what we would do and we would stick right with it
and I said, "Absolutely
"
He said that was what he was going to
do and I said that's what I wanted done. So, that's that.
K:
Terrific, Mr. President.
P:
Now, I asked him what the hell we could do about the British, the
French. He said nothing. So dammit, I think well, the British I
guesswant to get alòng with India in the future. I said to him that I didn't
think there was a hell of a lot that he said that the British had to be
on the winning side as you said because they figured they had to get along
with India in the future. I said, "Well, maybe it means something to
them but it doesn't mean anything to us except a $10 billion drag in
foreign aid over the last 20 years." I said, "Maybe let the Russians
pick up that tab. 11 Well, that sort of shook him. He said, well, we
really didn't want to get that out too much because you know it will look
I said, no, I'm just referring to what we do and that's
what I mean. I don't think even you, Henry, how tough I feel about that
aid business. We are not going to aid countries that engage in aggression
and then don't do a goddamn thing when we ask them to get out.
K:
Mr. President, if we don't act this toughly, I'm completely aboard.
This is going to be a dress rehearsal for the Middle East in the spring.
P:
That's right, that's right.
K:
And I'm much more worried about the impact on the Russians.
P:
Right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (HOME)
2 I I
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 (??)
K:
And in fact we ought to consider seriously getting Vorontsov in and
telling him if the Russians continue this line, these talks on the Middle
East and others just aren't going to be possible.
P:
Yeah. Well, get him in. Why don't you send a letter from me to
Brezhnev?
K:
All right.
P:
Why not play it a little tougher and just say that I have very good talks - -
I've got an idea, just let me look at it tomorrow -- I had very good talks
with Mrs. Meir when we were here and that we can make progress on
this matter at our further discussions there possibly. However, I must
tell you that in the event that this present situation goes on in Pakistan
that that will seriously jeopardize those talks.
K:
Excellent, I think you should.
P:
And a letter from me to him. Let's see what happens.
K:
Or at least a message.
P:
Huh? What's that?
K:
I think that's right.
P:
It may or may not help but let's -- but that will pass on. See, in other
words, do it in a way that we are passing on to him that we have made
very good progress. Now, Mr. Chairman, we would like to know what
you are going to do on this, we are keeping our side but I am very
distressed after the talks I've had with Mr. Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger
has had with Mr. Dobrynin to see what is the developments here in
India and Pakistan. Now, the point is, what do we want the Russians
to do though? You know, about India and Pakistan.
K:
They could get it stopped. They could at least take a more helpful line
in the UN.
P:
Yeah. Well, how about getting that message to him immediately. Now,
that should not be public, you understand. I don't want that to be out in
the public.
K:
Oh, no, no. We could do that as an oral message.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (HOME)
- 3 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 (?
P:
An oral message. But to who, that stupid Dobrynin.
DCM_
K:
No, no; to Vorontsov here. Dobrynin 15
P:
Well, I want it to be from me to Brezhnev.
K:
You don't want it in writing, do you?
P:
It doesn't bother me, if that will help. Whatever will help the most
do.
K:
Well, let me draft something and show it to you first thing in the
morning.
P:
Why, what would be the dis -- well, the main thing -- rather than
waiting a day, if it's going to be oral, get him in today.
K:
Okay, why don't I get Vorontsov in today.
P:
Get him in today and tell him I've just talked with you on the phone;
that the President would send this in writing but he wants this oral
message to go from him; I don't want to use the hotline; you know, give
him a little of that crap and that, Mr. Chairman, we have developed
this very good relationship, I'm delighted but I must be very frank with
you on first in the Mid-East we made very great progress and I would
be interested to discuss this -- Dr. Kissinger will discuss with Dobrynin
when he returns. Then, now, on India-Pakistan we find your attitude
very hard to understand and what are you going to do? And we have
got to play it with that with them on that and the same true, Henry, on
the -- it will make them realize that's where our three-day strike is
also going to help.
K:
Exactly.
P:
You see, we have just got to -- and Bill to my surprise, I didn't do
any convincing so apparently whatever the WSAG meetings or something,
he got
K:
Oh, yeah, I gave it very hard to Sisco so he got it from Sisco
....
P:
He was totally on board.
K:
Good.
P:
But all he said was, he says I'm glad -- I told him what a good job Sisco
had done but that didn't seem to -- he said, well, fine; we couldn't have
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TELCON (HOME)
- 4 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 (??)
P:
(cont'd) done it until now though because we wouldn't have had the
public opinion on our side.
K:
Yeah.
P:
That's wrong, of course, we should have done it earlier.
K:
Right, we should have done it earlier.
P:
But, nevertheless, it was well worth doing now rather than not at all.
K:
Exactly.
P:
But, Henry, don't feel that the whole thing is lost yet --
K:
Oh, I don't think it's lost if we play it hard.
P:
And incidentally, when I say play it hard, let me understand, we are
not going to roll over after they have done this horrible thing. They are
not going to roll over and say, "Now, India, everything will be like it
was and we'll come help you again." And I mean we will cut the gizzard
out and let the Russians come help the Indians.
K:
Right.
P:
The arguments from the New York Times and others will be "we will
buy ourselves a century or decades of hatred and suspicion from the
Indian people. 11 Bullshit! What is $10 billion of foreign aid bought us?
K:
Exactly.
P:
But hatred and suspicion from the Indian people.
K:
Exactly.
P:
Tell me one friend we've got in India, do you know any?
K:
Exactly.
P:
How about putting it that way? Just as cold as that. Let's start getting
some top anti-Indian propaganda out.
K:
And that won't be unpopular in America.
P:
That's right. I want to be sure that you fill Connally in on this.
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TELCON (HOME)
- 5 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 (?)
K:
I'm seeing him tomorrow morning.
P:
Now, I have decided that what we will do is to have a meeting. I'm
going to call Haldeman, you don't do anything about it.
K:
Right.
P:
But I have decided to have a meeting to start at 1:30 so we will have an
hour and a half meeting tomorrow on the damn thing.
K:
Terrific.
P:
I think we better. I think that Connally should be there due to the aid
part of it, don't you agree?
K:
Absolutely.
P:
I don't want Mitchell there; I don't think it's that sort of a thing. I
think Laird should be there if he is around. If not, --
K:
Packard would be good.
P:
Packard, right. And that's it.
K:
And Moorer, I guess Moorer.
P:
Yes, to report on the military situation.
K:
Right.
P:
Um-humm.
K:
The same group as which we did the Middle East thing with the addition
of Connally.
P:
Yeah.
K:
Connally to replace Mitchell really.
P:
Well, now, let's ask -- maybe we shouldn't have Connally, what do you
think?
K:
I think Connally would be good.
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TELCON (HOME)
- 6 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 (2)
P:
Yeah. Well, I think he would be good for the discussion, yeah, because
he will be tough as hell. Yeah. Because this will be a subject for
discussion; I'm not going to have those cameras for the whole meeting,
only for the first 10 minutes.
K:
Right.
P:
All right, that's that. On this Trudeau meeting, I guess there's really
not much to do there.
K:
I have sent down a book for you, Mr. President.
P:
Oh, I'm not going to read that book. Hell, I just saw it.
K:
There's nothing in there.
P:
I mean I am going to read the briefing paper but God, I'm not going to
spend -- waste 10 minutes on the damn Canadians.
K:
Yeah.
P:
The main thing I want to know is what line to take on the economic thing,
is that all covered?
K:
Yeah. No, Connally is getting a paper over for you first thing in the
morning and I think you should stay out of the details. And he is meeting
simultaneously with Benson who is their Finance guy. And I think the
way to leave it is if there is any problem that those two can't solve, they
should report that in to you. The issues are really quite technical and
they are not big policy issues.
P:
Yeah.
K:
There are four issues -- I don't have the paper in front of me. One of
them it is in the briefing paper that I gave you. One having to do with
exemptions for American citizens and so. forth.
P:
Yeah.
K:
And I think we have settled three out of four of them.
P:
Yeah. Well, now getting back to this thing on India, there was no question
at all -- I mean I didn't lean him at all, I was trying to see what the
Position was but Bill is completely on board.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON (HOME)
- 7 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 (?)
K:
Terrific.
P:
No, no, -- he said, no give at all on this resolution; we can't do it.
And that's that. He's told Bush to pass the word around that that's
the line that we're going to -- and he said we would veto another
resolution - - - another ceasefire alone. I said, fine; you bet your life
we will veto it.
K:
Good, good. I told that to Sisco and Bush this morning and they must
have brought him around. And tha t WSAG meeting.
P:
All right.
K:
Good, Mr. President.
P:
Fine, bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON (Home)
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally
December 5, 1971 (??)
K:
Mr. Secretary.
C:
Yes, sir.
K:
How are you?
C:
Fine; I believe I'm going to live.
K:
You believe you're gonna live?
C:
Yeah. My God, I tell you getting in from Rome on Friday night and
as you know we went to that National Symphony Ball and last night
I went to the Gridiron dinner and had to make a speech and we had
a brunch yesterday and then all our Texas guests left about one
o'clock today and by God, I went to sleep.
K:
(laughter) I bet you are; I bet you did.
C:
I've been a tired Indian but otherwise I feel great.
K:
A houseful of Texas guests is a handful by itself.
C:
That's right.
K:
Without having taken a trip.
C:
That's what I figure.
K:
John, I wanted to call you because the President is going to assemble
a group of the NSC tomorrow at 1:30 about the India-Pakistan situation
so if you don't mind, why don't we have our lunch at the White House.
C:
That's fine; or we can cancel it, Henry, if you want to. You'll be busy
as hell; why don't we just cancel it?
K:
Well, because you will be over there anyway. No, I'll have 45 minutes
or so.
C:
All right or we can do it anytime. I'll be at the White House anyway
SO hell that makes more sense; I'm going to be there till 12:15 or
so. So when I leave the President's office, I'll just come right to your
office.
K:
Good, but in case I don't in case something happens that does make
-- cause either of us to cancel it.
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TELCON
- 2 -
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally
December 5, 1971 (??)
C:
Just don't worry about it.
K:
Well, let me tell you what the issues are.
C:
All right.
K:
And where the President tends to be leaning but that's not in any
way to prejudice your judgment. The basic problem is now that the
Indians have launched a full-scale attack into East Pakistan, how we
should tilt. Now the argument that State is making is doesn't make
any difference anyway, it's too late. Secondly, we will just drive the
Indians into the Soviet arms if we get tough.
C:
them I'd like to. Go ahead.
K:
(laughter) Well, you're talking my language. The thing that
concerns the President and me is this; here we have Indian-Soviet
collusion, raping a friend of ours. Secondly, we have a situation
where one of the motives that th e Chinese may have had in leaning
towards us a little bit is the fear that something like this might happen
to them.
C:
Yep.
K:
So that some demonstration of our willingness to stand for some
principals is important for that policy. Thirdly, if the Soviets get
away with this in the Subcontinent, we have seen the dress rehearsal
for a Middle Eastern war.
C:
Yep.
K:
So our -- what the Presi dent's tentative view is is to start throttling
the economic aid program to India. We don't get a hell of a lot; what
do we get from them? We've put $10 billion into it.
C:
We don't get a goddamn thing.
A
K:
nd when people say that we're driving them into Soviet arms, what
does that mean operationally?
C:
That's right.
K:
What more can they do than what they are doing?
C:
That's right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
- 3 -
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally
December 5, 1971 (??)
K:
And I think we have to show that it's too risky to kick us in the teeth.
C:
You know I'll agree with that position.
K:
Well, you've been so soft in the last few weeks - -
C:
(laughter)
K:
- - that I've just wanted to check around.
of course
C:
Well, / you know it's a very practical matter. It seems to me that
India as an ally is an enormous liability under any circumstances
political and economic and military liability.
K:
Yeah, yeah.
C:
By what ever means we can divorce ourselves from them, the better
off we are, regardless of where they go.
K:
That's right. Well, then where the hell are they going go. They
have their reasons to be independent. There is as good a chance
that they will try to win their way back into our favor as there is --
C:
I agree with that.
K:
Because if we -- now, no matter what we do, we can't do as much for
them as the Soviets have already done on the thing that interests them
which is to rape Pakistan.
C:
Yep, yep.
K:
So that is the way the issue may come up, it may not come up that
way but that's at any rate where the President is leaning at this
moment. And he wanted me just to explain why we have done the
things we have.
C:
All right.
K:
And, of course, you will hear the rest of it there.
C:
Good.
K:
But let 's try to get together for lunch. I'd like to hear what happened
in Europe.
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TELCON
- 4 -
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally
December 5, 1971 (??)
C:
All right, fine.
K:
Good, John.
C:
Thank you, Henry.
K:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Home)
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird
6:30 p. m., December 5, 1971
L:
Hi, Henry.
K:
Mel, how are you? I thought you were off.
L:
No, no; I was just gone last night. I spoke at the National Convention
of the Navy League; I was just gone last night.
K:
I see. Weren't you going to Europe?
L:
Yeah, I'm leaving tomorrow noon. Bill went ahead but I didn't
want to stop their --
K:
Bill didn't go.
L:
Well, he was going to go ahead at one time, you know, that's when
we planned to go on a Saturday and then I had this Navy League so
I'm not going to go until tomorrow noon.
K:
Right.
L:
But I was just gone last night. I was at the Navy League National
Convention but when the plan really was set up once there was this
Iceland stop but that --
K:
That is right. That' was the original idea.
L:
Yeah, that was the original idea when I talked to you about - -
.
K:
Oh, were you going to go with Bill then?
L:
Yeah, yeah.
NLN 05-33/13 peR 3.3(b)(1) and HR. 2/5/10
K:
I see.
Date 6/2/2010
L:
Then I went to the Navy League thing instead, which was a good idea;
it was a good thing.
K:
Good, good.
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
CPP. 1 of 6]
L:
Say what I wanted to check -- I wanted to make sure that everybody
DECLASSIFIED
was -- understood you were kind of upset thai DIA wasn't giving you goc
By WILH NARA,
information for you.
K:
No. Jesus, I yell enough about legitimate things; I have no complaints
about DIA.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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TELCON
- 2 -
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird
6:30 p.m., December 5, 1971
L:
On the India-Pakistan border thing, that's what I was concerned about.
K:
No, no; what I want but that isn't a criticism, is an hour by hour
breakdown so that we can figure out who started what the first day.
L:
Oh, yeah.
K:
But I have no complaint about what's been produced.
SANITIZED COPY
L:
Well,
PeR 3.3 (b)(1)
DIA are getting that all lined up and by, you know,
all the
everything else and I think that will be --
K:
What is your judgement of the situation as long as I've got you on
the phone.
L:
Well, I think that there's not a hell of a lot that we can do about it
right now. I think India can walk through there if they want to in a
week, you know in two or three weeks on the East.
K:
Yeah.
L:
And I think we just got to make the best kind of a case, the toughest
one we can make and that's about all we can do, Henry.
K:
But tilt it against India.
L:
Yeah, oh, sure, absolutely.
K:
Because that's what the President wants.
L:
Well, we should too. My God, we should.
K:
Because you know, if a Soviet-Indian cooperation there can just
brutalize another country, then we are going to see that in a lot.
L:
Well, you'll see it going on all over that area too and I think we have
got to make the case. I think everything's been done right so far;
we got to keep going that way.
K:
You know the President has called a meeting for 1:30 tomorrow with
the same group that handled the Middle East things but you'll be gone.
L:
You think I should wait?
K:
Well, you know, if you --
NLN 05-23/13 at the Richard [pp Nixon 2 Presidential of 6] Library
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TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird
- 3 -
6:30 p. m., December 5, 1971
:
L
Dave could come over I thought.
K:
Yeah, no, no, Dave can:come over; it's not essential, I just wanted
you to know that you are invited.
L:
Oh, I know about that but I talked to Dave about going.
K:
There actually no huge decisions to be made --
L:
No.
K:
Except that State doesn't want us to do anything to offend the Indians.
L:
Well, you've got to -- Geez, it's important to make a record on this
thing because of the kind of cooperation that -- you let the Soviets
and Indians operate this way and get away with it with no world opinion,
it's a loser for us.
K:
Another thing the President wants to do is to start cutting down on
aid for India, does that bother you?
L:
Doesn't bother me a bit.
K:
And State is bleeding all over the place on that too.
L:
Well, I know that Keating is too but I don't -- but that doesn't bother
me.
K:
That doesn't?
L:
No.
K:
And politically they can't make a hell of a lot with that can they?
L:
Hell no! No, not politically. at all.
K:
That's not our primary concern but from a point -- a policy? point
of view, you think it's the right thing?
L:
Why sure it's the right thing, it's the right thing politically too.
K:
Okay, Mel. What kind of a party are you giving December 17th,
I keep getting phone calls from your office to bring girls. (laughter)
L:
You know --
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[PP.: 3 of
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TELCON
- 4 -
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird
6:30 p.m., December 5, 1971
K:
You just are hoping I'm going to bring Gloria Steinem.
L:
(laughter) No, Henry, but Dave is leaving the 15th you know and
we haven't said anything to anybody about this, and we've asked that
the President meet with him just --
K:
Oh, sure.
L:
And I think that he should because Dave leaves the 15th you know.
K:
Yeah. No, no; the President will of course meet with him.
L:
And I think Bob Pursley has been talking to A1 about trying to
have an appointment
K:
No question about it.
L:
Sometime within the next week I think he ought to because you know
Dave wanted to leave in July and he stayed on this long and he's going
to leave the 15th of December.
K:
Yeah, well, there's no question about it.
L:
I don't think the President really believed me when I told him that
but he is.
K:
Well, no, he believes it all right. He doesn't like your suggestion.
L:
I've spent a lot of time with those people over there.
K:
Yeah.
L:
And we have gone over now a total of 35 people and I have interviewed
them all.
K:
You've never offered it to me; I've always wanted that limousine.
L:
You know, you come over and you can have it. (laughter)
No, but Dave has been in on some of these interviews too. This
isn't easy; these guys don't want to have to do what they have to do
in that job as far as -- Right now
:
K:
I'll get him an appointment; there's no question about that.
NLN 05-33/13
[pp. 4 of 6]
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TELCON
- 5 -
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird
6:30 p.m., December 5, 1971
L:
But that's just a little party Barbara and I were having to sort of
say goodbye to Dave. We haven't announced it that way; you're the
only one that really knows what it's all about because we've -- you
know this has been held pretty well, don't you think?
K:
Excellent. Excellent.
L:
And you know it's going to get out sooner or later because -- but
we have held it damn well and Dave just keeps right on the job.
K:
Yeah, well, it's -- he's a marvelous man. I'll really miss him.
L:
Yeah.
K:
Okay, Mel.
L:
Okay, fine, Henry.
K:
Have a good trip. When will you be back?
L:
I'll be back Friday.
K:
Okay, and I'll get that memo about the budget ?
L
Yeah, I'm working on that right now; that's what I'm going over right
now.
K:
You're not letting me have it between the eyes. You don't know what
I'm saving you from with George Shultz.
L:
Oh, no, I'm not doing anything like that but I'm trying to give you a
strong position.
K:
Good.
L:
But I'll see that you have that --
K:
Tuesday afternoon; I can't do anything with it before then.
L:
All right.
K:
Have a good trip, Mel.
L:
Fine, and Dave will go to that meeting; I just don't --
NLN 05 -33/13
[PP. 5 of b]
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TELCON
- 6 -
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird
6:30 p.m., December 5, 1971
K:
That's fine but will you get him programmed the same way we've
just spoken?
L:
Oh, he's programmed that way; I've talked to him.
K:
That's his attitude anyway.
L:
Sure, sure.
K:
Okay.
L:
I tell you it's important that we program it that way right now,
we can't do anything else. That's about all we can do.
K:
Yeah.
L:
Okay.
K:
Right. Bye, Mel.
NLN/05-33/13
[PP. 6 of b]
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7
15/5/71
TELCON
1971
The President/Mr. Kissinger
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Well, what's the news today on our various adventures.
K:
Right, Mr. President. Well, that backgrounder of Sisco's which
we finally beat out of them.
P:
Yeah.
K:
Played very well. I don't know whether you have seen it.
P:
No, I didn't look at the stuff; you see, I don't have a news summary
down here.
K:
It was one of the key items on every television program.
P:
Maybe Sisco and Rogers -- Rogers probably wished he had done it,
didn't he?
K:
Well --
P:
Tell me this, are they pleased now they did it?
K:
Oh, yeah.
P:
State is, good.
K:
Oh, yes.
P:
And how does it play, it plays good?
K:
On front page in the New York Times and Washington Post.
P:
And what line did they take it?
K:
That India is largely to blame for the outbreak of hostilities and it
lists all the things the Indians have rejected.
P:
Good.
K:
And it's just what you wanted.
P:
It got across though that who's to blame?
K:
Oh, yeah.
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TELCON
- 2 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
P:
And heavily played?
K:
And heavily played.
P:
Ziegler got his statement out too?
K:
Well, Ziegler's statement triggered this one because without -- until
Ziegler put out his statement
P:
They wouldn't say anything.
K:
They refused to say anything.
P:
Yeah, yeah. That's great, that's great.
K:
Where we are now, Mr. President, we had a Security Council meeting.
P:
What happened there? I heard something on the radio that the Russians
want to blame the Pakistanis.
K:
Well, we put in a Resolution of ceasefire and withdrawal.
P:
Right.
K:
The Russians put in a Resolution which blamed everything on Pakistan
and just called for a political accommodation in East Pakistan.
P:
Yeah.
K:
At any rate, it wound up with an 11 to 2 vote for us with the Russians
vetoing it. Only the Soviet Union and Poland voted for the Russian
Resolution.
P:
Right.
K:
Even Syria, Somalia, and so forth.
P:
Huh.
K:
The Chinese voted with us, for our Resolution.
P:
You know, that's pretty good, Henry, to have the Russians get that
few votes.
K:
That's right. But so now, of course, there is no Resolution.
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- 3 -
TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
P:
Right.
K:
So they are going back at it again today.
P:
To get a Resolution that they can all approve.
K:
Right, which will be impossible unless it's anti-Pakistan because the
Russians will veto it.
P:
I see.
K:
If it's anti-Pakistan, the Chinese will veto it.
P:
(Laughter) You know, this, Oh, Boy. But anyway, you feel a little
better about what our position is.
K:
Right. Now, what the Russians this morning have launched a blistering
attack on Pakistan in TASS and in affect, have warned the Chinese
against getting involved. What we are seeing here is a Soviet-Indian
power play to humiliate the Chinese and also somewhat us.
P:
Yeah, yeah.
K:
I think we ought to have a meeting of some of your key advisors
tomorrow. I know you've got your day pretty full with the television
taping. The reason I mention it is because Rogers has been talking
about how we are sacrificing; he's on this Chinese kick again.
P:
Sacrificing what?
K:
Well, our position to China and he wants a careful consideration;
what good do all these moves do. Of course, the opposite --
P:
What move would he make then himself?
K:
I asked exactly this question. He says he is just raising questions,
he's not giving answers; these are questions he wants to have considered.
P:
Okay, I'll consider them.
K:
I think if we don't, there will be leakages that we just acted impetuously.
P:
Well, let's see we could do something around --
K:
You've got him on the schedule at 2:30 anyway.
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TELCON
- 4 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
P:
We might move it to 2:00 maybe. Well, we would have that; we
wouldn't have the television in on that -- we'll let them take a
picture and then get out.
K:
I think that's right.
P:
Who would you have?
K:
Connally, Rogers, Laird, if he is in town; Helms, and Mitchell if
you want it.
P:
I wouldn't have Mitchell on this one.
K:
All right.
P:
No, no. I think Connally because it involves some military -- I
mean economic and so forth.
K:
The basic problem, Mr. President, is it's clear that we can't do
anything directly to change the situation but to set it up on the ground
that we are sacrificing our friendship to India; there is no friendship
left. There is nothing operational we are sacrificing in India by our
present course. All we are -- what we are risking is to add the
content of the Soviets and the Chinese to a direct challenge in which
a country is being dismembered.
P:
The point is that I want to see from State what their option is; if
they've got a better one, I'd like to know what it is. And you know,
I have seen any suggestions of any different.
K:
Their suggestion is always to release Mujibur; that's in effect the
Russian position.
P:
Yeah. Well, but Pakistan won't do that will it?
K:
No. Well, now it's outdated; it's too late for that anyway. But it
would have been -- the Indians were determined, Mr. President, they
attacked at the earliest possible moment they could. There was a
rainy season from May to the end of September. Then they had to get
their troops into position; then they had to train the Bengali. All this
talk about Russian restraint that we heard all summer was complete
poppycock.
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TELCON
- 5 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
P:
Um-humm.
I don't know; in everything we've done, everything
we've said to the Russians and Indians had no effect, is that really
what we're saying?
K:
Our trouble was that we have been caught -- maybe if we had been
much tougher but for that we had no domestic position but certainly
everything we have said has been without effect and they have geared
it towards a humilation - -- towards a dismemberment of Pakistan.
P:
Yeah.
K:
And the effect of that will be on all other countries watching it is
that the friends of China and the United States have been clobbered
by India and the Soviet Union. And I don't see how we escape that
by tacking towards India now.
P:
Nope. Well, are they now with the Mujib thing out of the way, what
is State suggesting that we do?
K:
They're not; they are refusing to make a suggestion.
P:
What?
K:
They are not making a suggestion.
P:
They are just saying we ought to review our situation, huh?
K:
Right. And that we shouldn't act impetuously.
P:
What the Christ are we impetuous about, I don't know of anything
impetuous.
K:
I asked the same question.
P:
Like what, cutting off the arms? A little prinking thing like that, why
what about the cutting off of arms to Pakistan, that was impetuous too,
huh? You know, it's ridiculous; there's nothing impetous about any
of this stuff.
K:
I think it's a carefully considered policy, Mr. President.
P:
What we are doing?
K:
If we collapse now, I admit it's not a brillant position but if we collapse
now, the Soviets won't respect us for it; the Chinese will despise us
and the other countries will draw their conclusions.
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TELCON
- 6 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
P:
Well, what about the British position and how they're playing it?
K:
Well, they abstained.
P:
They abstained on this?
K:
Yeah.
P:
That sort of figures doesn't it?
K:
Yeah.
P:
French?
K:
They abstained.
P:
Humph. The French abstained too, huh?
K:
Yeah.
P:
What do you think the real game there on the British and the French --
afraid to make Russia mad, isn't that it?
K:
That's right; they are trying to position themselves between us and
the Russians.
P:
Um-humm.
No,
K:
/I am beginning to think one of the worse mistakes we made was to
push Britain onto the Common Market.
P:
Yeah, yeah.
K:
I mean that wasn't our Administration, we --
P:
I know that. That decision was made long before we got here but we
continued to push it, that's for sure.
K:
Well, we couldn't have stopped it by then.
P:
No.
K:
We acquiesced in it.
Heath -- And, of course, and
P:
Yeah, sure. That was Heath's position long before
...
became
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TELCON
2 I I
The President/Mr. Kissinger
K:
No, no; the mistakes of that were made in the Kennedy Administration.
P:
It's done now.
K:
That's where it could have been stopped easily.
P:
You got a little cold?
K:
No, maybe I've been talking a lot on the telephone.
P:
You have, huh? (laughter)
K:
Yeah.
P:
Well, on this thing my view is to play this -- I'll get them in and
have a little meeting. That's a pretty good idea. But this idea of
it's the same old story, Henry, that we have such things as troop
withdrawals, Cambodia, Laos or virtually everything we have done,
everybody comes in and raises questions.
K:
And it's this --
P:
Well, goddammit; if they've got a better answer, fine but I don't
see -- They raise the questions and that makes a good historical
record, doesn't it?
K:
That's right and it's this phony wisdom; we ought to consider things
carefully. Of course, we ought to consider things carefully.
P:
That's right, that's right.
K:
What good does our action do? On that basis, we just have to roll
over every time a superior country moves. What is the long-term
effect? Of course, we have to consider the long-term effect.
P:
Yeah.
K:
The proper
[End of Tape]
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Deeps
?
TELCON (Home)
12/5/71
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
R:
Hello.
K:
Bill.
R:
Yeah, Henry.
K:
How are you?
R:
Fine, thank you.
K:
I wanted to bring you up-to-date on just one item that happened late
yesterday afternoon, and I called you earlier. We had suggested
to the Chinese a while ago that maybe we should establish direct
contact in New York.
R:
U-humm.
K:
They have now come back and said they don't want that.
R:
U-humm.
K:
And that anything can be done through the Pakistanis or other friends.
R:
That's the way George has been working.
K:
Right. It's nothing, I just wanted you to be aware of that.
R:
U-humm.
NLN pu sec 1.4 (c) ltr 22 May 2008
K:
Otherwise, I don't have anything. I called you earlier just to find
out how things --
R:
Yeah. I think the fighting is exaggerated in the press. Cause there
By CIM NARA, [p.1.84] Date 2 2 Apr 2009
seems to be a lot less in the --
K:
In the West.
R:
No, in the press I say there is --
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 35
K:
No, no, I think -- but you mean in the West or in the East?
R:
Well, both. In other words, although I am not talking about the
movement of forces now but I am talking about casualties and losses
and so forth. My military people say that plane losses, for example,
so far we haven't had too many confirmations. We are inclined to
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SANITIZED COPY
TELCON (Home)
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
R:
(cont'd) think it is roughly 15 on either side in that area. The
Indians have admitted 11
SANITIZED 1.4 (c)
K:
Yeah.
R:
Well, I'll be in touch with you in a little while. We're going over the
fix now as we see it and then we will want to talk a little later about
the Security Council. I thought it went very well yesterday.
K:
I think actually it's come out well, I think the backgrounder played
very well.
R:
Yeah, it did. You know, it's just really a question in the long run.
We didn't accomplish really what we wanted to do and that is to
convince everybody that we have taken all the right moves. But we
performed the other task the President wanted performed, that is
to condemn India.
K:
No, and I think it lays the basis for establishing the fact that we have
taken the right moves. You know, you don't expect the New York Times
ever to like anything we did.
R:
Yeah. Well, I think we have got a major decision if this thing continues
to grow and that is whether we want to burn our bridges behind us or
not with India.
K:
Well, the other question is what do we gain by tacking towards them
now?
R:
Well, it isn't really tacking towards them now. It's just a question
of how much do we want to get involved in the public mind with the
war itself and it's something we want to ask ourselves thoughtfully
it seems to me now.
K:
Well, no one is against discussing anything thoughtful.
R:
That's all I am saying. In the long run do we want to go all out and
take the exact Chinese position or do we want to be somewhere in between
At the moment we are somewhere in between -- between the Soviet
Union and China.
K:
Well, our present position is to try to be say two-thirds of the way
towards China but notall the way but above all what we have here is
a Soviet-Indian naked power play to dismember a country.
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TELCON
- 3 -
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
R:
Yeah.
K:
Which must have profound consequences in other parts of international
areas.
R:
I'm not challenging that. I'm just saying that I think the President
should think through very carefully each step from now on; particularly,
because it is the kind of thing that if it continues to grow sort of
shadows our position of a more peaceful world and maybe that's the
only course. Maybe there is nothing we can do about it.
K:
Well, what do you think we can do about it?
R:
At least we can talk about it. In other words, I think the President
should get involved now. I think we should have the Security Council
discuss it and I think he should --
K:
There is no question about that.
R:
Yeah, that's all I'm saying. It has, as you said, it has profound
repercussions and it may blow over or it may be that --
K:
It won't blow over.
R:
I don't think so, I never have thought so. As you know, I --
K:
There's no conceivable way it can blow over.
R:
I don't think so. Well, it's conceivable, it can blow over the way it
did the last time although, even the last time it lasted quite a while.
K:
Well, there's no way it can blow over without East Pakistan being
separated from Pakistan.
R:
No, I don't think so either.
K:
I mean that's going to be the outcome and the question is in part,
what we have here is an Indian-Soviet -- I mean however this issue
started and whatever the pros and cons of the local situation were,
it's gone far beyond that.
R:
I see. Which is what we thought all along and I think we have to ask
ourselves where we want to be a year from now, at least at the time
of the election and two years from now, three years from now and
whether there is much we can do to affect the course of events.
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TELCON
- 4 -
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
K:
Yeah, but there are always two problems, one is do we affect the
immediate course of events and secondly, how do we position ourselves
even if we can't affect the course of events.
R:
I agree.
K:
Because if you say we affect - - that anybody who can create a
fait accompli, we then say we can't affect the course of events and
we'll not challenge it.
R:
Oh, I don't
seem to be suggesting, Henry, that I am drawing
a conclusion from my. questions. I'm asking the same questions you
are asking --
K:
No, I thinkthere should be a National Security -- I don't know
whether it should be a whole National Security Council meeting
or a meeting of some of the close advisors.
R:
Well, I think that maybe that's better but I think we should and as I
say, because I asked the questions I'm not drawing the conclusions,
I'm asking the questions and I think the President should ask the
questions.
K:
Absolutely.
R:
I think we shouldn't act just in petulance, Christ, obviously it's
annoying and obviously she's been a bitch.
K:
Well, so far he hasn't acted in petulance.
R:
No, no; but I say it's one of those things where we ought to think
about it and talk about it and get the other fellow's point of view.
My own view would be that we ought tomorrow.
K:
Yeah, the trouble tomorrow is that he's got that whole goddamn day
scheduled with that television thing.
R:
Well, I think we ought to be careful about that. In other words, I
think that's one of the reasons I think we ought to have a meeting.
If major war is broken out and he spends the whole day taping a
television show, I'm not sure that's the best posture for him.
K:
No, I think we have to have a meeting tomorrow.
R:
Yeah, I think so. Okay, Henry, I'll be back in touch.
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TELCON (HOME)
Mr. Kissinger/The President
December 5, 1971 - 10:30
K:
granted you had got us anything from the Indians.
P:
Is editorial opinion building up in India's favor or is it about the
same as it was?
K:
There is nothing in the Post, nothing in the Star. There's a sort of
a wailing editorial in the New York Times that says we are to blame
for not forcing Yahya into a political settlement.
P:
Well, that comes from the State now. How do we answer that?
K:
We answer by listing all the steps we have urged Yahya to take
and that he took.
P:
Yeah.
K:
And that the Indians wouldn't give us three or four months to work
it out.
P:
Um-humm.
K:
Oh, we can kill them. When Yahya -- when the Indian Ambassador
left, he came in to say goodbye, I said, "Look, work out a timetable
with us for a political accommodation. Our conclusion is that there
will be political autonomy. It is just a question that we can not agree
to the forcible solution of it. "
P:
Um-humm.
K:
I think we are except -- and then, of course, Mr. President, things
will be so much worse in East Pakistan by next summer that the liberals
will be totally discredited.
P:
Yeah. Um-humm. Oh, boy, it will be worse, won't it?
K:
Yes.
P:
Well, they may be discredited but on the other hand there will be -- we
have to understand they will try to push it off -- they always blame us
for whatever goes wrong, Henry.
K:
Exactly.
P:
So we will probably get blamed for that too. But in the meantime we
will have to do some other things. Well, there's nothing further we can
do
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TELCON (HOME)
- 2 -
Mr. Kissinger/The President
December 5, 1971 - 10:30
K:
No, I mean they are cutting off that aid part of it tomorrow.
P:
You mean the --
K:
P:
K:
Well, no, the letters of credit that I mentioned to you yesterday.
P:
Yeah. Well, that's nothing public I understand.
K:
No, but it will leak out.
P:
Yep. The line that may be developed that we have to anticipate in
that meeting tomorrow is that well, -- Incidentally, has it been taken
up with State about cutting off the letters of credit and what do they say
about that?
K:
No, so far they haven't said anything about it.
P:
Um-humm.
K:
It's been taken up and it's being done.
P:
Okay. Well, I just can't understand this idea though that they are trying
to say that we are not -- that we are doing this precipitantly. I don't
know what the hell they are talking about. Well, that hasn't come out
publicly yet?
K:
No, and Mr. President, we have had two WSAG meetingsa day where
every agency has been represented.
P:
Um-humm.
K:
We have had four WSAG meetings in the last three days. I mean, I
don't know what anyone can say it hasn't been adequately considered.
P:
Um-humm. Well, Rogers has had his say and he has indicated what
he wants.
K:
Well, it's just awfully hard to run these crisis, Mr. President, when
you get one Department out to position themselves in opposition to their
President all the time.
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TELCON (HOME)
- 3 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 - 10:30
P:
Yeah. That's right. Well, I think the meeting is a good idea, I'll
set up the time on it.
K:
But the meeting I think is important.
P:
Yeah. I'll set up the time. Okay.
K:
Right.
P:
All right, fine.
K:
Bye.
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TELCON (HOME)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 - 11:00
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Hello. I have here -- it just came in a call from Rogers with
regard to the Security Council meeting, he wants to talk before 2 o'clock.
Now, what is the guidance on that? I thought that it was pretty well
settled but what is the situation?
K:
Oh, the situation in the Security Council?
P:
No, what he wants he wants to talk to me to see what guidance I
want to give before the Security Council meeting.
K:
That's right, that's what I'm
P:
So I am going to call him. My point is what do we want to say?
K:
Well, here is the issue. There is going to be a ceasefire and withdrawal
resolution that the Argentines are putting forward. That one we can
support. Then, that will be vetoed by the Russians. Then, it will
probably move towards a ceasefire resolution alone and on that one
I think we should be very leery. The Chinese will be violently opposed,
the Pakistanis are proably going to be opposed but we could conceivably
abstain from that.
P:
A ceasefire alone.
K:
The trouble with a ceasefire alone is that it would leave half of East
Pakistan in Indian hands.
P:
Um-humm. Well, has that been discussed with Rogers and so forth
as to what these issues are?
K:
It has been discussed with Bush and it's been -- Rogers has been I've
discussed it with Sisco, Rogers has been dancing around with me and
has not been going into that much detail.
P:
Um-humm.
K:
I must underline, Mr. President, if we collapse now in New York, the
impact on this international situation, we're going to do away with most
of the gains of the last two years. The way Rogers keeps putting the
issue the Russians are playing for big stakes here. When all the
baloney all the New York Times editorials are said and done if the
Soviets and Indians get away with this, the Chinese and the United States
will be standing there with eggs on our face. And they will have made
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (HOME)
- 2 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 - 11:00
watered
K:
(cont'd) us back down and if we have ordered down our own Resolution
from yesterday that had an 11 to 2 majority so that it becomes a pretty
incipit thing, our only hope in my judgment, we'll never get it through
State, is to become very threatening to the Russians and tell them that
if they are going to participate in the dismemberment of another
country, that will affect their whole relationship to us.
P:
Um-humm.
K:
Right now they still want the Middle East from us.
P:
Um-humm.
K:
And other things. If we just play this in this nice incipit way, we are
going to get through this week all right then but we are going to pay for
it -- this will then be the Suez '56 episode of our Administration.
P:
Um-humm.
my
K:
That is what in view is at stake here now and that's why the Russians
are playing it so toughly and if we have made any mistake in the last
two weeks it's this -- if we had over-reacted in the first two or three
days as we wanted to in the White House, it might at least have scared
the Russians off, not the Indians, but it might have scared the Russians
off. We are pretty well committed anyway, we can't take the curse
off it now. The problem - - I know it will always be put on the ground
that we want to save the China trip but these people don't recognize
that without a China trip, we wouldn't have had a Moscow trip.
P:
No, that's just small stuff. I know what they have put in on that --
that's just sour grapes crap.
K:
If the Chinese come out of this despising us, we lose that option.
If the Russians think they backed us down, we will be back to where
we were in May and June.
P:
Well, I'm going to call him right now. The main thing is all I have to
know is is he pushing for us to back down from our Resolution, that's
what I need to know, Henry.
K:
Probably. The best would be that we should stick with our Resolution
and go back no further than withdrawal and ceasefire.
P:
Withdrawal and ceasefire.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
- 3 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 - 11:00
K:
That any ceasefire should be coupled with a withdrawal.
P:
Um-humm. And they have to decide that at 2 o'clock today, huh?
K:
Right.
P:
Does Rogers have any regrets that he didn't go to New York to make
the presentation himself?
K:
I don't know; I don't think so.
P:
Probably saw the point of that, huh?
K:
Right.
P:
Yeah. Well, we will - -
K:
If someone could give me some word what was decided because it is
going to be hard for me to monitor Bush.
P:
Oh, don't worry, I'll call you back as soon as I find out what the hell
he's -- what the point is, I don't know what it is even.
K:
Right.
P:
I just assume that they were all set in the UN thing tomorrow - - - I mean,
today, you know. Incidentally, that wasn't discussed at your meeting,
huh?
K:
It wasn't. well, no. I discussed it with Bush and Sisco but he is
apparently trying to run around me.
P:
I see. That's all right, I'll have to find out what the score is and I'll
find out.
K:
right.
P:
And I'll call you back.
K:
Right, Mr. President.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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"ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n!\nTckon\nHAK and Melvin Laird CL pp.)\n12/5/71\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-33/13\nSANITIZED\nPeR\n3\n(b)(1)\nHR.\n2/5/2010\n2\nTclcon\nHAK and william Rogers C4 pp)\n12/5/21\nM\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05 - 33 / 14\nSANITIZED per sec 1.4(c) ltr 22 May 2008\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations\n29\nFOLDER TITLE\nHome Dec. 1971\nL\n1\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION DECLASSIFIED GPO; 1989-235-084/00024\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n{\nTckon\nHAK and melvin Laird C6 pp.)\n12/5/71\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-33/13\n2\nTclcon\nHAR and william Rogers C4 PP.)\n11/5/21\nM\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05 - 33 / 14\nSANITIZED per sec 1.4(c) ltr 22 May 2008\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations\n29\nFOLDER TITLE\nHome Dec. 1971\n7\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential I ibrary\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED 1989-235-084/00024\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n12/4/71 (From the Residence)\nPresident/Kissinger\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nYes, Henry.\nK:\nI just wanted to bring you up to date on what happened. First, we\npositioned Ziegler with a pretty tough statement for his press briefing\nto make clear where you stood and on that basis\nP:\nThey are all aware of the fact that I am in complete touch with it all\nthe time.\nK:\nWell, that's what I\nFrankly, State had put out a story this morning\nthat you were just being kept generally aware so we had Ziegler say\nthat you ordered the thing.\nP:\nWhich is true.\nK:\nWhich is exactly true. You talked to me 6 times yesterday.\nP:\nAnd a half a dozen times today.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nAnd ordered what? You mean on the cut-off of arms?\nK:\nOh, on the move to the Security Council.\nP:\nRight, yes.\nK:\nI mean that you gave the go-ahead.\nP:\nRight.\nK:\nAnd then on the basis of that Sisco gave a backgrounder which I\nunderstand is playing very well positioning the thing. We've drafted\na very tough speech for Bush.\nP:\nGood.\nK:\nAnd he's on the floor now. He tells me that at the Preparatory Meeting\nthe Chinese jumped all over the Russians and Indians and apparently\nthe Indians wanted to put on the agenda only the item of problems of\nEast Pakistan and the Chinese said \"No, let's call it problems of\nIndia. 11 And that's all right if they all brawl with each other.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nP:\nGood. Let the liberals choose now between China and India. That'll\nbe very good.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nVery good. Boy, this really\nyou know, we don't like this but\nyou realize this is causing our liberal friends untold anguish, Henry.\nK:\nAnd, Mr. President, actually in terms of the political situation, first\nof all we won't take any much immediate flak, but in six months the\nliberals are going to look like jerks because the Indian occupation of\nEast Pakistan is going to make the Pakistani one look like child's\nplay.\nP:\nYes. Well, the main thing we're not going to do is be suckered by the\nIndians into a huge aid program. Now that I want clearly understood.\nYou know after they have screwed this thing up, by God, I can't em-\nphasize too strongly how I feel. We told Mrs. Gandhi we're going to\ncut off that aid and we're going to do it. Has the word gone out?\nK:\nThe word has gone out, Mr. President, and on Monday morning -\nWe've already told the banks to hold it and on Monday morning it's\ngoing to be effective. I mean nothing can happen before Monday.\nP:\nI see. And you're examining every other possibility of how we can\nsqueeze India right now.\nK:\nThat is right, Mr. President.\nP:\nIt's to be done. Everything is to be held up. Everything is to be\ndragged. Everything else. They cannot get away with this and\nwell, they will get away with it, but we can't allow them to without\nknowing our displeasure.\nK:\nBut what we have to reconsider now is whether it is in our interest\nto be the chief development - source of development capital - of a\ncountry that has performed such actions.\nP:\nThat's right. Oh, you mean next year's aid program?\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nThat's what I want now, though. The way I want that handled is for\npeople like Passman and some of our friends in the House and the\nSenate, even the more liberal types, to come out and say cut aid to\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nIndia. Get my point.\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nP:\nLet them take the lead rather than have us take the lead.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nCan we do that?\nK:\nCertainly.\nP:\nWell, can we put somebody to work on it so that it'll be discreetly\ndone. I just want\nK:\nI've already talked to Passman in that sense.\nP:\nWell, Passman, but there are others - there's got to be a whole plan.\nK:\nWell, Passman thought we should go easy until we've got the present\naid program through the budget.\nP:\nYes.\nK:\nThrough the Congress.\nP:\nYes. And then what would he do? Then he would go after.\nK:\nNext year's appropriation.\nP:\nIs that what you're talking about - next year's?\nK:\nI'm talking about what we put into the budget for '73.\nP:\nWell, it's going to be goddamn little that's for sure.\nK:\nWell, that's what we should do, Mr. President. And this year's we\ncan also cut.\nP:\nI want it cut what we are doing now in fact. And as far as next year's\nis concerned we just cut that, but I don't want to cut Pakistan's. We're\ngoing to play this fair now. I just hope we can get someone on the story\nnow. Did you get Scali turned loose so that he has a\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nK:\nWe gave Scali the facts yesterday, but we couldn't locate him today.\nBut we've been thumping out the facts all day and I think you will\nfind that the combination of the statement we got Ziegler to make,\nthe Sisco backgrounder and what Bush is going to say tonight is going\nto be quite a massive dose.\nP:\nIt will put us on the side of trying to restrain India.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nThat's what I really feel we've got to get across. Now I haven't\nbeen following the editorial comments, what are the Times and Post\nand those jackasses saying?\nK:\nWell, the Times hasn't said anything yet. The Post is bleeding\nabout it's going to the Security Council which we've done.\nP:\nWell, of course, but are they blaming India or Pakistan, or both,\nor neither?\nK:\nWell, they are trying to be pretty even-handed. They're blaming\nIndia. They are blaming India for the military actions and then,\nof course, they are bleeding about the refugees. But it's beginning\nto tilt against India.\nP:\nWe've got to make it tilt more because we know they are totally to\nblame. We know that. We know the Paks don't want this.\nK:\nThat's right. Well, the Paks don't want it. The Paks accepted every\nproposal of ours. I told the Indian Ambassador before he left that we\nwould work out a complete program with them for political autonomy\nwithin a year if they.\nP:\nYou've gotten out the fact that, for example, it may be that you ought\nto have a backgrounder tomorrow. Are you in New York?\nK:\nNo, I'm in Washington.\nP:\nA backgrounder tomorrow where you can point out that we told Mrs.\nGandhi that the Paks were prepared to withdraw from the border.\nAnd that we said we would be willing to look at this and that, in spite\nof this they haven't done it. I think it's very important to put the\nburden on India on this, Henry. I just don't feel that we can.\nnow\nthe other side of it that you can say, well, there's 400 million people\nwho have their.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nK:\nWell, but we haven't got them anyway, Mr. President.\nP:\nWe've got their enmity anyway. That's what she's shown in this\ngoddamn thing, hasn't she?\nK:\nI mean it isn't that we are losing an ally. They were the ones that\nmade a treaty with the Russians. They are the ones that are now\nestablishing the principle that forces the only method - the principle\nmethod for settling disputes and it isn't that we're losing anything.\nIn fact, if we do it the right way, we can still get them to come back\nto us, to get back in our good graces. The Russians aren't going\nto give them $700 million in development money.\nP:\nThe only thing, it is very important to get the P.R. thing across.\nI do want you to try to find Scali and get him to work on the thing.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nP:\nBut he's not in town, you say?\nK:\nWell, I don't know. We've been trying all day. And we are con-\ntinuing to try.\nP:\nAll right. But what do you think about your doing a backgrounder,\nor is that overkill?\nK:\nI think it'd be overkill tomorrow, but what I might do, if you agree,\nMr. President, and we think it's necessary. I worked out with\nZiegler a procedure which we've always wanted to try where I step\ninto his briefing. I mean, he calls me in when questions start falling\nand says, - why don't we get Henry on background on this - and I\njust step into his briefing.\nP:\nWhy don't you do that?\nK:\nMonday morning. By that time.\nP:\nI'm having that day with NBC that day. You could pop in and I could\nsay Ziegler could come in and approve it and so forth, I guess.\nK:\nI thought one of the things I might do, Mr. President, I've got ten\nminutes with you in the morning, to brief you on the India situation.\nP:\nSure, sure. Or anything you want, I mean\nK:\nI know, but\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\nP:\nWe're going to play that by ear. It may be 30 minutes, if I decide\nit. I'm not going to play it by the goddamn television. But, you\nknow what I mean. We'll talk about India and several other things.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nLet me ask you about a couple other things. Of course, they can\nonly use a couple minutes in the program but we have got to give\nthem enough, then they'l pick the good things. What is the situation\nnow with Rogers? He's perfectly content to stay out of it, I suppose,\nbecause he sees it's a loser. Is that right?\nK:\nWell, he's content not to be - not to have gone on television announcing\nthe thing.\nP:\nThat wouldn't have been any good at all because we're not sure it's\ngoing to work.\nnot'.\nK:\nNo, but it would have been good for him to set up a command post in\nNew York conducting this operation.\nP:\nAnd working with the Chinese because they wouldn't understand him\nat all.\nK:\nThat's right and that's what the\noh, not at all\nand the Chinese\nare in any case programmed. They don't want to be involved in our.\nThey want to be able to say that they are not colluding with us.\nP:\nI see.\nK:\nSo Rogers is happy with this and he did give the backgrounder under\ngreat protest. He wouldn't have given it if we hadn't got.\nP:\nYou mean Sisco did.\nK:\nSisco did. Rogers didn't want it until we put out that statement at\nKey Biscayne and then he figured he better get State into the act.\nP:\nOh, that's what did it?\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nNow Ziegler made a very good public statement, huh? What was Ziegler's\nstatement?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7\nK:\nWell, Ziegler's statement said the President has been following\nthis hourly. At 10:30 this morning after receiving the latest\nreport he gave the go-ahead to the State Department to take the\ncase to the Security Council. The President is dismayed by the\nuse of Indian troops in Pakistan and then he was asked, \"Does\nthat mean you are giving up your neutral role in this conflict?\"\nAnd he said it means that the Indians have said they are now on\nan all out invasion of East Pakistan and this we have always said\nthat the American people would not understand. And that played\nvery well, very strong and Sisco is playing off that.\nP:\nNow how did Sisco handle it? Did he do what you told him that I\ntold him he was to do this?\nK:\nExactly. Well, at first he didn't want to do it and Rogers didn't\nwant him to do it, but then when they saw the Ziegler thing which\nfeatured your role then they decided they better get some State\nDepartment line out too.\nP:\nIs that what did it?\nK:\nYes. Which is OK. We don't want them to.\nP:\nOf course, you got the Ziegler played, that was very good.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nAnd then Sisco did give a good backgrounder?\nK:\nHe did give a good ba ckgrounder citing chapter and verse of all the\nthings the Indians have refused to do: no UN observers, no acceptance\nof the.\nP:\nDid he also cite what we have done - that we have given $250 million\nin aid and all that.\nK:\nOh yes, oh yes.\nP:\nWe're getting all that across, are we?\nK:\nYes, and anything that needs to be done I can do Monday morning.\nP:\nI think what probably needs to be done, that Monday you may have\nto give - basically, rather than having a white paper put out; that\nwhat you ought to do is look over the facts very, very carefully and\nthen go out and give a hard hitting briefing.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n8\nK:\nYes, but I ought to do that on background.\nP:\nOh absolutely, on background. On the thing that we've just talked\nto the President, we've examined the whole thing, now here are\nthe facts. I think that could have an enormous effect.\nK:\nRight. I think that's right.\nP:\nIt would pit world opinion against these people.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nIs that the way you feel about it?\nK:\nThat's exactly the way I feel about it. Because that puts us-then\nwe have to have a basis for the actions in the economic field we\nare taking.\nP:\nNow insofar as those actions are concerned, we haven't had any\nsqueals from the Indians, have we?\nK:\nNo, no. See that's again where State was wrong. The Indians\nhave no interest in escalating this with us. Not a squeal. They\nwill start squealing next week when the economic aid is cut off.\nP:\nNow understand, I don't want any nonsense about this. I really\nwant it cut down to - anything that can be cut is got to be cut next\nweek. Anything that can be cut and I want Hannah brought on the\ncarpet. And I want Currans and everybody - so that everything\nis cut, Henry. That's the only way the Indians are going to under-\nstand this - if it all is cut and they know it. Don't announce a thing.\nJust do it.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nNow is that all understood.\nK:\nThat's all understood, Mr. President.\nP:\nAnd Connally understands it, of course.\nK:\nConnally has played beautiful ball. He knows how to do these things\nwithout the knife showing.\nP:\nIncidentally, tell him, if you will - now he's at the gridiron tonight -\nbut in the morning, if he has an opportunity to stick the knife in India\nin any public statement that he makes, to do it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n9\nK:\nOK.\nP:\nThat would be a good thing to have done.\nK:\nBecause he could do it from a development point of view.\nP:\nThat's right. That's right. That we are going to have to reexamine\nour aid. I mean I think we should play a very tough game. I don't\nthink the American people want to aid a country that is an aggressor.\nK:\nWell, and as consistently. It was bad enough when, with our money,\nthey dragged us around in the UN, when have these bastards ever\nsupported us?\nP:\nNever.\nK:\nWhat can they do to us that they aren't doing now? I mean if they\nwant to be Russian stooges and have the Russians spend a billion\ndollars there a year, we can't prevent it.\nP:\nRight. Ok. Well, this is the way to play it. We'll take a look\nMonday to see whether we want to have you go. Oh, in reading\nthe news summary I saw a little squib to the effect that some White\nHouse aide said that the State Department was concerned because\nyou were on the record on your\nK:\nWell, that's.\nP:\nNow who the hell puts out a thing like that?\nK:\nI don't know, Mr. President, because after all this is\nP:\nI áidn't hear anything - did anyone from State object?\nK:\nNo. No, and you know it played very well in the press.\nP:\nIt was excellent, but I mean I just wondered why anybody from the\nwell, somebody I guess\nK:\nWell, there's always some sorehead in the woodwork.\nP:\nYes. But I thought it played very well. You didn't have any\ncomplaints?\nK:\nI had not a word. Not one word.\nP:\nBecause they knew you had to brief on the trip. Who else could?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n10\nK:\nWell, I phoned him before I did it and he didn't raise an objection.\nP:\nWell, I wish there was some more we could do here but.\nThey'l run out of gas - both sides - won't they in about two weeks.\nK:\nYes, but of course, another thing we have done is to send a back-\nchannel to the Shah from you saying that, trying to find out whether\nhe wanted to give some support to Pakistan and saying if he did\nwe would look to see whether we could find a way of letting, of\nreplacing his.\nP:\nAre you sure that backchannel is safe?\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nI wouldn't do it through MacArthur.\nK:\nNo, no, that's why I didn't do it that way and we didn't put it as a\nmessage. We put it as talking points so it can be disallowed.\nP:\nGood, well we'll have some fun with this yet. God, you know what\nwould really be poetic justice here is if some way the Paks could\nreally give the Indians a bloody nose for a couple of days. The\nfighting, any report on that?\nK:\nWell, the fighting - we got reports in East Pakistan that the Indians\nare surprised at the intensity of the Pakistan resistance. But of\ncourse they outnumber them there eight to one.\nP:\nHow about West Pakistan?\nK:\nIn West Pakistan the Indians don't seem to have gotten very far.\nAnd there I think they're not going to be able to win except by wearing\nthem down. They outnumber them there five to one. They've been\nbombing Karachi and burning the oil installations.\nP:\nIsn't that awful. That terrible. The Indians are bombing Karachi?\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nOh, for Christ's sake, isn't that.\nand Rawalpindi I notice is on\nthe list, too.\nK:\nYes. Well, of course, they've been playing a terrific game these\nlast years. Every time one tank was shipped to Pakistan the Indians\nwould carry on like maniacs, but they've been getting big shipments\nfrom India, they've been getting big shipments from India, rather\ntheir own armaments industry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n11\nP:\nWell, we've got to get across the point that as far as our aid to\nPakistan is concerned that first it was minimal. Second, that our\nmistake was, and I think that's the thing you want to make in your\nbackgrounder, was that we didn't give more.\nK:\nThat's right. Oh, the military aid thing, Mr. President, is so\nabsurd. We gave $3.8 million dollars worth of spare parts.\nP:\nAs I look at this thing for the future, Henry, I have the feeling that\nthey're going to try to build it up - again we've got to think of what\nthe media will try to do. End of Tape 1.\nTape 2\nP:\nLet the Indians squeal. Let the liberals squeal. What's wrong\nwith that?\nK:\nWell, uh.\nP:\nI'm not sure, you know that we may not be playing it boldly enough.\nK:\nWell, we can look at that. On Monday morning we can.\nP:\nI want to see that kind of a suggestion because I would be prepared\nto go out and say in view of this action that we regretfully cut off\nuntil this action desists all economic aid to India stops, period.\nThey're in the business of being the aggressors - course they are the\naggressors. I really feel - oh, I know all the arguments that well\nthen we're choosing up sides, we're not neutral. Of course, we're\nnot neutral. Neither are the Indians. They're always neutral\nagainst us.\nK:\nThat's right and you said that's what you'd do.\nP:\nI think we ought to do it.\nK:\nWell, we can certainly, Mr. President, on Monday morning cut\noff this $100 million dollar slice.\nP:\nWell, but you see all this is salami stuff. I think that what is really\nneeded is a jolt. We have given $10 billion worth of aid to India.\nSo you tell the American people that I'm cutting off all aid to India.\nMake a bold play. You talk to Connally about that tomorrow.\nK:\nOK.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n12\nP:\nAll right, we've got $10 billion and we're cutting off all aid to\nIndia until this war stops. That might have some effect.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nDon't you agree?\nK:\nI think that\nno, I'm very - I find it very attractive. Our\nexperience has been\nalso\nP:\nIt'll be very attractive to the American people.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nThey would like it. You say, \"Look, we've given $10 billion in\naid. Now they are going forward with this aggression, we're cutting\noff all aid to them until they stop. \"\nK:\nAnd evacuate any territory they have occupied.\nP:\nThat's right. Well, get me a plan like that and I'll go for it, okay?\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nP:\nAll right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nGeneral Haig/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 4 or 5, 1971\nK:\nHello, Al.\nH:\nYes, Henry.\nK:\nDid you get that straightened out?\nH:\nYeah, Joe said he didn't know how it could have happened; he doesn't\neven recall it. And I said, well, just give Van Hollen a call up there\nbecause they haven't tabled it yet.\nK:\nTake out the word \"political\".\nH:\nTake out the word \"political\" if it's in there.\nK:\nIn the fourth paragraph.\nH:\nIn the fourth paragraph.\nK:\nOkay, I tell you these crooks are unbelievable.\nH:\nYeah. You know, I believe him but one of his henchmen might have\ndone it.\nK:\nBut how is this thing playing -- his background? The President\nis calling raving.\nH:\nWhat about?\nK:\nHe wants to cut off all aid; he thinks I'm too soft. (laughter)\nH:\nWell, this is that twilight hour.\nK:\nYeah.\nH:\nNo, I think it is)playing very well; it's going very strong against\nthe Indians.\nK:\nIs it? Good.\nH:\nYeah, yeah.\nK:\nWell, that's what we want.\nH:\nThe Paks asked for a copy of Ziegler's transcript. Janka said we\nnever do. I said give them the goddamn thing.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nGeneral Haig/Mr. Kissinger\nK:\nOkay, fine. Yeah, I think we are gonna put some paws into this\noperation yet.\nH:\nYeah, well.\nK:\nNot into the military. If we had acted like this two weeks ago, they\nwould have had second thoughts.\nH:\nThat's what I think, that's what I think.\nK:\nDon't you?\nH:\nYou have got to move boldly when you move, that's the goddamn\nproblem. And getting those people to do anything over there is just\ntoo much.\nK:\nIf we had done it two weeks ago when they started, -- when they\nwanted us to press to release Mujib (sp?).\nH:\nThat's right, that's right; that's exactly what their solution was.\nK:\nIf we had moved this boldly two weeks ago, if we had cut off economic\naid and military aid a week earlier, it might have made a difference.\nBefore she got all committeed.\nH:\nThat's right, that's exactly right.\nK:\nOkay, fine, thank you.\nH:\nAll right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Home)\nAmbassador Afshar (Iran)/Mr. Kissinger\n12/4/71\nA:\nThis is Ambassador Afshar from Iran.\nK:\nOh, yes.\nA:\nHow are you, sir?\nK:\nOkay.\nA:\nYou must be so terribly busy and tired, I'm sorry to bother you.\nK:\nNo, no, it's all right. No, I just tried to call you on behalf of the\nPresident. He would be interested on a personal basis to get the\nIranian assessment of the Pakistan situation. Not through channels.\nA:\nYes.\nK:\nBut maybe from the Shah to you and then directly to me.\nA:\nAll right, I will do that, Mr. Kissinger. Right away. And as you know\nwe are very much concerned about the whole thing and when President\nPodgornyy was in New York, the Shah talked to him and also the Shah\ntalked to President Tito. I have delivered the three long pages telegram\nfrom his Majesty to Marshall Tito when he was here in the United States.\nK:\nYes.\nA:\nTo discuss that with the President about the situation in Pakistan. And\nwe are really very much concerned and now we see a real escalation in\nthe war and I will send a cable right now to His Majesty.\nK:\nYes, but we want to keep -- this is a personal message from the President.\nA:\nThat's right.\nK:\nAnd we don't want it in regular diplomatic channels.\nA:\nAll right.\nK:\nBecause we are sympathetic to anything you can do to give help there.\nA:\nThank you very much. You mean the message is the oral message, yes,\nwhich I have just to deliver.\nK:\nYes, and give it to me personally and to no one else.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Home)\nAmbassador Afshar (Iran)/Mr. Kissinger\n12/4/71\nA:\nThank you very much. It is not a written message of the President.\nK:\nNo.\nA:\nNo, all right. I will call His Majesty. I will talk to His Majesty, I\nwill talk to His Majesty and I will be in touch with you personally.\nK:\nGood, thank you.\nA:\nI do that, yeah.\nK:\nThank you.\nA:\nYou are always very helpful. Thank you very much, I hope you can\ndo your best, you know, because they are in a pretty bad shape.\nK:\nWe'll do our best and we always stick by our friends in Iran and in\nPakistan.\nA:\nThank you very much, sir.\nK:\nGoodbye.\nA:\nGoodbye, thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Continued)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n(Same as Tape 2 of previous, 00.11-12)\nDecember 4 or5, 1971\nP:\nLet the Indians squeal; let the liberals squeal. What's wrong\nwith that?\nK:\nWell --\nP:\nI'm not sure, you know, we may not be playing it boldly enough.\nK:\nWell, we can look at that.\nP:\nWell, I want to see that kind of a suggestion because I would be\nprepared to go out to say, \"In view of this action that we regretfully\ncut off, until this action desists, all economic aid to India stops\nperiod. \" They're in the business of being the aggressors. Of\ncourse, they are the aggressors. I really feel -- I know all the\narguments that well, then we are choosing up sides; we're not neutral.\nOf course, we're not neutral; neither are the Indians. They're always\nneutral against us.\nK:\nThat's right. And you said that's what you would do.\nP:\nI think we ought to do it.\nK:\nWell, we can certainly, Mr. President, on Monday morning cut off\nthis $100 million slice.\nP:\nNo, but you see all this is salami stuff. I think that what is really\nneeded is a jolt. We've given $10 billion worth of aid to India, so\nyou tell the American people \"I'm cutting off all aid to India. 1! I\nmean a bold play. You talk to Connally about that tomorrow.\nK:\nOkay.\nP:\nAll right, we've cut $10 billion worth of all aid to India until this\nforce stops. You know that might have some effect.\nK:\nRight, right.\nP:\nDon't you agree?\nK:\nI think -- No, I'm -- I find it attractive.\nP:\nYou see.\nK:\nOur experience has been --\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nP:\nIt would be very attractive also to the American people.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nThey would like it. You say, \"Look, we've given $10 billion in aid.\nNow they are going forward with this aggression, we're cutting off\nall aid to them until they stop. \"\nK:\nAnd, and, and evacuate any territory they've occupied.\nP:\nExactly. Well, get me a plan like that and I'll go for it.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 5, 1971 (??)\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHello. It's all directly on just what we discussed.\nK:\nAnd what are they going to do?\nP:\nStick with the ceasefire and withdrawal and give nothing at all on that.\nThat he says is the Pakistan's position.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nThe Somalia Resolution basically.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nAnd he said that was what we would do and we would stick right with it\nand I said, \"Absolutely\n\"\nHe said that was what he was going to\ndo and I said that's what I wanted done. So, that's that.\nK:\nTerrific, Mr. President.\nP:\nNow, I asked him what the hell we could do about the British, the\nFrench. He said nothing. So dammit, I think well, the British I\nguesswant to get alòng with India in the future. I said to him that I didn't\nthink there was a hell of a lot that he said that the British had to be\non the winning side as you said because they figured they had to get along\nwith India in the future. I said, \"Well, maybe it means something to\nthem but it doesn't mean anything to us except a $10 billion drag in\nforeign aid over the last 20 years.\" I said, \"Maybe let the Russians\npick up that tab. 11 Well, that sort of shook him. He said, well, we\nreally didn't want to get that out too much because you know it will look\nI said, no, I'm just referring to what we do and that's\nwhat I mean. I don't think even you, Henry, how tough I feel about that\naid business. We are not going to aid countries that engage in aggression\nand then don't do a goddamn thing when we ask them to get out.\nK:\nMr. President, if we don't act this toughly, I'm completely aboard.\nThis is going to be a dress rehearsal for the Middle East in the spring.\nP:\nThat's right, that's right.\nK:\nAnd I'm much more worried about the impact on the Russians.\nP:\nRight.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\n2 I I\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 5, 1971 (??)\nK:\nAnd in fact we ought to consider seriously getting Vorontsov in and\ntelling him if the Russians continue this line, these talks on the Middle\nEast and others just aren't going to be possible.\nP:\nYeah. Well, get him in. Why don't you send a letter from me to\nBrezhnev?\nK:\nAll right.\nP:\nWhy not play it a little tougher and just say that I have very good talks - -\nI've got an idea, just let me look at it tomorrow -- I had very good talks\nwith Mrs. Meir when we were here and that we can make progress on\nthis matter at our further discussions there possibly. However, I must\ntell you that in the event that this present situation goes on in Pakistan\nthat that will seriously jeopardize those talks.\nK:\nExcellent, I think you should.\nP:\nAnd a letter from me to him. Let's see what happens.\nK:\nOr at least a message.\nP:\nHuh? What's that?\nK:\nI think that's right.\nP:\nIt may or may not help but let's -- but that will pass on. See, in other\nwords, do it in a way that we are passing on to him that we have made\nvery good progress. Now, Mr. Chairman, we would like to know what\nyou are going to do on this, we are keeping our side but I am very\ndistressed after the talks I've had with Mr. Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger\nhas had with Mr. Dobrynin to see what is the developments here in\nIndia and Pakistan. Now, the point is, what do we want the Russians\nto do though? You know, about India and Pakistan.\nK:\nThey could get it stopped. They could at least take a more helpful line\nin the UN.\nP:\nYeah. Well, how about getting that message to him immediately. Now,\nthat should not be public, you understand. I don't want that to be out in\nthe public.\nK:\nOh, no, no. We could do that as an oral message.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\n- 3 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 5, 1971 (?\nP:\nAn oral message. But to who, that stupid Dobrynin.\nDCM_\nK:\nNo, no; to Vorontsov here. Dobrynin 15\nP:\nWell, I want it to be from me to Brezhnev.\nK:\nYou don't want it in writing, do you?\nP:\nIt doesn't bother me, if that will help. Whatever will help the most\ndo.\nK:\nWell, let me draft something and show it to you first thing in the\nmorning.\nP:\nWhy, what would be the dis -- well, the main thing -- rather than\nwaiting a day, if it's going to be oral, get him in today.\nK:\nOkay, why don't I get Vorontsov in today.\nP:\nGet him in today and tell him I've just talked with you on the phone;\nthat the President would send this in writing but he wants this oral\nmessage to go from him; I don't want to use the hotline; you know, give\nhim a little of that crap and that, Mr. Chairman, we have developed\nthis very good relationship, I'm delighted but I must be very frank with\nyou on first in the Mid-East we made very great progress and I would\nbe interested to discuss this -- Dr. Kissinger will discuss with Dobrynin\nwhen he returns. Then, now, on India-Pakistan we find your attitude\nvery hard to understand and what are you going to do? And we have\ngot to play it with that with them on that and the same true, Henry, on\nthe -- it will make them realize that's where our three-day strike is\nalso going to help.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nYou see, we have just got to -- and Bill to my surprise, I didn't do\nany convincing so apparently whatever the WSAG meetings or something,\nhe got\nK:\nOh, yeah, I gave it very hard to Sisco so he got it from Sisco\n....\nP:\nHe was totally on board.\nK:\nGood.\nP:\nBut all he said was, he says I'm glad -- I told him what a good job Sisco\nhad done but that didn't seem to -- he said, well, fine; we couldn't have\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\n- 4 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 5, 1971 (??)\nP:\n(cont'd) done it until now though because we wouldn't have had the\npublic opinion on our side.\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nThat's wrong, of course, we should have done it earlier.\nK:\nRight, we should have done it earlier.\nP:\nBut, nevertheless, it was well worth doing now rather than not at all.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nBut, Henry, don't feel that the whole thing is lost yet --\nK:\nOh, I don't think it's lost if we play it hard.\nP:\nAnd incidentally, when I say play it hard, let me understand, we are\nnot going to roll over after they have done this horrible thing. They are\nnot going to roll over and say, \"Now, India, everything will be like it\nwas and we'll come help you again.\" And I mean we will cut the gizzard\nout and let the Russians come help the Indians.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nThe arguments from the New York Times and others will be \"we will\nbuy ourselves a century or decades of hatred and suspicion from the\nIndian people. 11 Bullshit! What is $10 billion of foreign aid bought us?\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nBut hatred and suspicion from the Indian people.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nTell me one friend we've got in India, do you know any?\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nHow about putting it that way? Just as cold as that. Let's start getting\nsome top anti-Indian propaganda out.\nK:\nAnd that won't be unpopular in America.\nP:\nThat's right. I want to be sure that you fill Connally in on this.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\n- 5 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 5, 1971 (?)\nK:\nI'm seeing him tomorrow morning.\nP:\nNow, I have decided that what we will do is to have a meeting. I'm\ngoing to call Haldeman, you don't do anything about it.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nBut I have decided to have a meeting to start at 1:30 so we will have an\nhour and a half meeting tomorrow on the damn thing.\nK:\nTerrific.\nP:\nI think we better. I think that Connally should be there due to the aid\npart of it, don't you agree?\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nP:\nI don't want Mitchell there; I don't think it's that sort of a thing. I\nthink Laird should be there if he is around. If not, --\nK:\nPackard would be good.\nP:\nPackard, right. And that's it.\nK:\nAnd Moorer, I guess Moorer.\nP:\nYes, to report on the military situation.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nThe same group as which we did the Middle East thing with the addition\nof Connally.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nConnally to replace Mitchell really.\nP:\nWell, now, let's ask -- maybe we shouldn't have Connally, what do you\nthink?\nK:\nI think Connally would be good.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\n- 6 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 5, 1971 (2)\nP:\nYeah. Well, I think he would be good for the discussion, yeah, because\nhe will be tough as hell. Yeah. Because this will be a subject for\ndiscussion; I'm not going to have those cameras for the whole meeting,\nonly for the first 10 minutes.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nAll right, that's that. On this Trudeau meeting, I guess there's really\nnot much to do there.\nK:\nI have sent down a book for you, Mr. President.\nP:\nOh, I'm not going to read that book. Hell, I just saw it.\nK:\nThere's nothing in there.\nP:\nI mean I am going to read the briefing paper but God, I'm not going to\nspend -- waste 10 minutes on the damn Canadians.\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nThe main thing I want to know is what line to take on the economic thing,\nis that all covered?\nK:\nYeah. No, Connally is getting a paper over for you first thing in the\nmorning and I think you should stay out of the details. And he is meeting\nsimultaneously with Benson who is their Finance guy. And I think the\nway to leave it is if there is any problem that those two can't solve, they\nshould report that in to you. The issues are really quite technical and\nthey are not big policy issues.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nThere are four issues -- I don't have the paper in front of me. One of\nthem it is in the briefing paper that I gave you. One having to do with\nexemptions for American citizens and so. forth.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nAnd I think we have settled three out of four of them.\nP:\nYeah. Well, now getting back to this thing on India, there was no question\nat all -- I mean I didn't lean him at all, I was trying to see what the\nPosition was but Bill is completely on board.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\n- 7 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 5, 1971 (?)\nK:\nTerrific.\nP:\nNo, no, -- he said, no give at all on this resolution; we can't do it.\nAnd that's that. He's told Bush to pass the word around that that's\nthe line that we're going to -- and he said we would veto another\nresolution - - - another ceasefire alone. I said, fine; you bet your life\nwe will veto it.\nK:\nGood, good. I told that to Sisco and Bush this morning and they must\nhave brought him around. And tha t WSAG meeting.\nP:\nAll right.\nK:\nGood, Mr. President.\nP:\nFine, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Home)\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally\nDecember 5, 1971 (??)\nK:\nMr. Secretary.\nC:\nYes, sir.\nK:\nHow are you?\nC:\nFine; I believe I'm going to live.\nK:\nYou believe you're gonna live?\nC:\nYeah. My God, I tell you getting in from Rome on Friday night and\nas you know we went to that National Symphony Ball and last night\nI went to the Gridiron dinner and had to make a speech and we had\na brunch yesterday and then all our Texas guests left about one\no'clock today and by God, I went to sleep.\nK:\n(laughter) I bet you are; I bet you did.\nC:\nI've been a tired Indian but otherwise I feel great.\nK:\nA houseful of Texas guests is a handful by itself.\nC:\nThat's right.\nK:\nWithout having taken a trip.\nC:\nThat's what I figure.\nK:\nJohn, I wanted to call you because the President is going to assemble\na group of the NSC tomorrow at 1:30 about the India-Pakistan situation\nso if you don't mind, why don't we have our lunch at the White House.\nC:\nThat's fine; or we can cancel it, Henry, if you want to. You'll be busy\nas hell; why don't we just cancel it?\nK:\nWell, because you will be over there anyway. No, I'll have 45 minutes\nor so.\nC:\nAll right or we can do it anytime. I'll be at the White House anyway\nSO hell that makes more sense; I'm going to be there till 12:15 or\nso. So when I leave the President's office, I'll just come right to your\noffice.\nK:\nGood, but in case I don't in case something happens that does make\n-- cause either of us to cancel it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally\nDecember 5, 1971 (??)\nC:\nJust don't worry about it.\nK:\nWell, let me tell you what the issues are.\nC:\nAll right.\nK:\nAnd where the President tends to be leaning but that's not in any\nway to prejudice your judgment. The basic problem is now that the\nIndians have launched a full-scale attack into East Pakistan, how we\nshould tilt. Now the argument that State is making is doesn't make\nany difference anyway, it's too late. Secondly, we will just drive the\nIndians into the Soviet arms if we get tough.\nC:\nthem I'd like to. Go ahead.\nK:\n(laughter) Well, you're talking my language. The thing that\nconcerns the President and me is this; here we have Indian-Soviet\ncollusion, raping a friend of ours. Secondly, we have a situation\nwhere one of the motives that th e Chinese may have had in leaning\ntowards us a little bit is the fear that something like this might happen\nto them.\nC:\nYep.\nK:\nSo that some demonstration of our willingness to stand for some\nprincipals is important for that policy. Thirdly, if the Soviets get\naway with this in the Subcontinent, we have seen the dress rehearsal\nfor a Middle Eastern war.\nC:\nYep.\nK:\nSo our -- what the Presi dent's tentative view is is to start throttling\nthe economic aid program to India. We don't get a hell of a lot; what\ndo we get from them? We've put $10 billion into it.\nC:\nWe don't get a goddamn thing.\nA\nK:\nnd when people say that we're driving them into Soviet arms, what\ndoes that mean operationally?\nC:\nThat's right.\nK:\nWhat more can they do than what they are doing?\nC:\nThat's right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 3 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally\nDecember 5, 1971 (??)\nK:\nAnd I think we have to show that it's too risky to kick us in the teeth.\nC:\nYou know I'll agree with that position.\nK:\nWell, you've been so soft in the last few weeks - -\nC:\n(laughter)\nK:\n- - that I've just wanted to check around.\nof course\nC:\nWell, / you know it's a very practical matter. It seems to me that\nIndia as an ally is an enormous liability under any circumstances\npolitical and economic and military liability.\nK:\nYeah, yeah.\nC:\nBy what ever means we can divorce ourselves from them, the better\noff we are, regardless of where they go.\nK:\nThat's right. Well, then where the hell are they going go. They\nhave their reasons to be independent. There is as good a chance\nthat they will try to win their way back into our favor as there is --\nC:\nI agree with that.\nK:\nBecause if we -- now, no matter what we do, we can't do as much for\nthem as the Soviets have already done on the thing that interests them\nwhich is to rape Pakistan.\nC:\nYep, yep.\nK:\nSo that is the way the issue may come up, it may not come up that\nway but that's at any rate where the President is leaning at this\nmoment. And he wanted me just to explain why we have done the\nthings we have.\nC:\nAll right.\nK:\nAnd, of course, you will hear the rest of it there.\nC:\nGood.\nK:\nBut let 's try to get together for lunch. I'd like to hear what happened\nin Europe.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 4 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally\nDecember 5, 1971 (??)\nC:\nAll right, fine.\nK:\nGood, John.\nC:\nThank you, Henry.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Home)\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird\n6:30 p. m., December 5, 1971\nL:\nHi, Henry.\nK:\nMel, how are you? I thought you were off.\nL:\nNo, no; I was just gone last night. I spoke at the National Convention\nof the Navy League; I was just gone last night.\nK:\nI see. Weren't you going to Europe?\nL:\nYeah, I'm leaving tomorrow noon. Bill went ahead but I didn't\nwant to stop their --\nK:\nBill didn't go.\nL:\nWell, he was going to go ahead at one time, you know, that's when\nwe planned to go on a Saturday and then I had this Navy League so\nI'm not going to go until tomorrow noon.\nK:\nRight.\nL:\nBut I was just gone last night. I was at the Navy League National\nConvention but when the plan really was set up once there was this\nIceland stop but that --\nK:\nThat is right. That' was the original idea.\nL:\nYeah, that was the original idea when I talked to you about - -\n.\nK:\nOh, were you going to go with Bill then?\nL:\nYeah, yeah.\nNLN 05-33/13 peR 3.3(b)(1) and HR. 2/5/10\nK:\nI see.\nDate 6/2/2010\nL:\nThen I went to the Navy League thing instead, which was a good idea;\nit was a good thing.\nK:\nGood, good.\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nCPP. 1 of 6]\nL:\nSay what I wanted to check -- I wanted to make sure that everybody\nDECLASSIFIED\nwas -- understood you were kind of upset thai DIA wasn't giving you goc\nBy WILH NARA,\ninformation for you.\nK:\nNo. Jesus, I yell enough about legitimate things; I have no complaints\nabout DIA.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird\n6:30 p.m., December 5, 1971\nL:\nOn the India-Pakistan border thing, that's what I was concerned about.\nK:\nNo, no; what I want but that isn't a criticism, is an hour by hour\nbreakdown so that we can figure out who started what the first day.\nL:\nOh, yeah.\nK:\nBut I have no complaint about what's been produced.\nSANITIZED COPY\nL:\nWell,\nPeR 3.3 (b)(1)\nDIA are getting that all lined up and by, you know,\nall the\neverything else and I think that will be --\nK:\nWhat is your judgement of the situation as long as I've got you on\nthe phone.\nL:\nWell, I think that there's not a hell of a lot that we can do about it\nright now. I think India can walk through there if they want to in a\nweek, you know in two or three weeks on the East.\nK:\nYeah.\nL:\nAnd I think we just got to make the best kind of a case, the toughest\none we can make and that's about all we can do, Henry.\nK:\nBut tilt it against India.\nL:\nYeah, oh, sure, absolutely.\nK:\nBecause that's what the President wants.\nL:\nWell, we should too. My God, we should.\nK:\nBecause you know, if a Soviet-Indian cooperation there can just\nbrutalize another country, then we are going to see that in a lot.\nL:\nWell, you'll see it going on all over that area too and I think we have\ngot to make the case. I think everything's been done right so far;\nwe got to keep going that way.\nK:\nYou know the President has called a meeting for 1:30 tomorrow with\nthe same group that handled the Middle East things but you'll be gone.\nL:\nYou think I should wait?\nK:\nWell, you know, if you --\nNLN 05-23/13 at the Richard [pp Nixon 2 Presidential of 6] Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird\n- 3 -\n6:30 p. m., December 5, 1971\n:\nL\nDave could come over I thought.\nK:\nYeah, no, no, Dave can:come over; it's not essential, I just wanted\nyou to know that you are invited.\nL:\nOh, I know about that but I talked to Dave about going.\nK:\nThere actually no huge decisions to be made --\nL:\nNo.\nK:\nExcept that State doesn't want us to do anything to offend the Indians.\nL:\nWell, you've got to -- Geez, it's important to make a record on this\nthing because of the kind of cooperation that -- you let the Soviets\nand Indians operate this way and get away with it with no world opinion,\nit's a loser for us.\nK:\nAnother thing the President wants to do is to start cutting down on\naid for India, does that bother you?\nL:\nDoesn't bother me a bit.\nK:\nAnd State is bleeding all over the place on that too.\nL:\nWell, I know that Keating is too but I don't -- but that doesn't bother\nme.\nK:\nThat doesn't?\nL:\nNo.\nK:\nAnd politically they can't make a hell of a lot with that can they?\nL:\nHell no! No, not politically. at all.\nK:\nThat's not our primary concern but from a point -- a policy? point\nof view, you think it's the right thing?\nL:\nWhy sure it's the right thing, it's the right thing politically too.\nK:\nOkay, Mel. What kind of a party are you giving December 17th,\nI keep getting phone calls from your office to bring girls. (laughter)\nL:\nYou know --\nNLN 05-33/13\n[PP.: 3 of\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 4 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird\n6:30 p.m., December 5, 1971\nK:\nYou just are hoping I'm going to bring Gloria Steinem.\nL:\n(laughter) No, Henry, but Dave is leaving the 15th you know and\nwe haven't said anything to anybody about this, and we've asked that\nthe President meet with him just --\nK:\nOh, sure.\nL:\nAnd I think that he should because Dave leaves the 15th you know.\nK:\nYeah. No, no; the President will of course meet with him.\nL:\nAnd I think Bob Pursley has been talking to A1 about trying to\nhave an appointment\nK:\nNo question about it.\nL:\nSometime within the next week I think he ought to because you know\nDave wanted to leave in July and he stayed on this long and he's going\nto leave the 15th of December.\nK:\nYeah, well, there's no question about it.\nL:\nI don't think the President really believed me when I told him that\nbut he is.\nK:\nWell, no, he believes it all right. He doesn't like your suggestion.\nL:\nI've spent a lot of time with those people over there.\nK:\nYeah.\nL:\nAnd we have gone over now a total of 35 people and I have interviewed\nthem all.\nK:\nYou've never offered it to me; I've always wanted that limousine.\nL:\nYou know, you come over and you can have it. (laughter)\nNo, but Dave has been in on some of these interviews too. This\nisn't easy; these guys don't want to have to do what they have to do\nin that job as far as -- Right now\n:\nK:\nI'll get him an appointment; there's no question about that.\nNLN 05-33/13\n[pp. 4 of 6]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 5 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird\n6:30 p.m., December 5, 1971\nL:\nBut that's just a little party Barbara and I were having to sort of\nsay goodbye to Dave. We haven't announced it that way; you're the\nonly one that really knows what it's all about because we've -- you\nknow this has been held pretty well, don't you think?\nK:\nExcellent. Excellent.\nL:\nAnd you know it's going to get out sooner or later because -- but\nwe have held it damn well and Dave just keeps right on the job.\nK:\nYeah, well, it's -- he's a marvelous man. I'll really miss him.\nL:\nYeah.\nK:\nOkay, Mel.\nL:\nOkay, fine, Henry.\nK:\nHave a good trip. When will you be back?\nL:\nI'll be back Friday.\nK:\nOkay, and I'll get that memo about the budget ?\nL\nYeah, I'm working on that right now; that's what I'm going over right\nnow.\nK:\nYou're not letting me have it between the eyes. You don't know what\nI'm saving you from with George Shultz.\nL:\nOh, no, I'm not doing anything like that but I'm trying to give you a\nstrong position.\nK:\nGood.\nL:\nBut I'll see that you have that --\nK:\nTuesday afternoon; I can't do anything with it before then.\nL:\nAll right.\nK:\nHave a good trip, Mel.\nL:\nFine, and Dave will go to that meeting; I just don't --\nNLN 05 -33/13\n[PP. 5 of b]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 6 -\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird\n6:30 p.m., December 5, 1971\nK:\nThat's fine but will you get him programmed the same way we've\njust spoken?\nL:\nOh, he's programmed that way; I've talked to him.\nK:\nThat's his attitude anyway.\nL:\nSure, sure.\nK:\nOkay.\nL:\nI tell you it's important that we program it that way right now,\nwe can't do anything else. That's about all we can do.\nK:\nYeah.\nL:\nOkay.\nK:\nRight. Bye, Mel.\nNLN/05-33/13\n[PP. 6 of b]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7\n15/5/71\nTELCON\n1971\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nWell, what's the news today on our various adventures.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President. Well, that backgrounder of Sisco's which\nwe finally beat out of them.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nPlayed very well. I don't know whether you have seen it.\nP:\nNo, I didn't look at the stuff; you see, I don't have a news summary\ndown here.\nK:\nIt was one of the key items on every television program.\nP:\nMaybe Sisco and Rogers -- Rogers probably wished he had done it,\ndidn't he?\nK:\nWell --\nP:\nTell me this, are they pleased now they did it?\nK:\nOh, yeah.\nP:\nState is, good.\nK:\nOh, yes.\nP:\nAnd how does it play, it plays good?\nK:\nOn front page in the New York Times and Washington Post.\nP:\nAnd what line did they take it?\nK:\nThat India is largely to blame for the outbreak of hostilities and it\nlists all the things the Indians have rejected.\nP:\nGood.\nK:\nAnd it's just what you wanted.\nP:\nIt got across though that who's to blame?\nK:\nOh, yeah.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 2 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nP:\nAnd heavily played?\nK:\nAnd heavily played.\nP:\nZiegler got his statement out too?\nK:\nWell, Ziegler's statement triggered this one because without -- until\nZiegler put out his statement\nP:\nThey wouldn't say anything.\nK:\nThey refused to say anything.\nP:\nYeah, yeah. That's great, that's great.\nK:\nWhere we are now, Mr. President, we had a Security Council meeting.\nP:\nWhat happened there? I heard something on the radio that the Russians\nwant to blame the Pakistanis.\nK:\nWell, we put in a Resolution of ceasefire and withdrawal.\nP:\nRight.\nK:\nThe Russians put in a Resolution which blamed everything on Pakistan\nand just called for a political accommodation in East Pakistan.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nAt any rate, it wound up with an 11 to 2 vote for us with the Russians\nvetoing it. Only the Soviet Union and Poland voted for the Russian\nResolution.\nP:\nRight.\nK:\nEven Syria, Somalia, and so forth.\nP:\nHuh.\nK:\nThe Chinese voted with us, for our Resolution.\nP:\nYou know, that's pretty good, Henry, to have the Russians get that\nfew votes.\nK:\nThat's right. But so now, of course, there is no Resolution.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nTELCON\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nP:\nRight.\nK:\nSo they are going back at it again today.\nP:\nTo get a Resolution that they can all approve.\nK:\nRight, which will be impossible unless it's anti-Pakistan because the\nRussians will veto it.\nP:\nI see.\nK:\nIf it's anti-Pakistan, the Chinese will veto it.\nP:\n(Laughter) You know, this, Oh, Boy. But anyway, you feel a little\nbetter about what our position is.\nK:\nRight. Now, what the Russians this morning have launched a blistering\nattack on Pakistan in TASS and in affect, have warned the Chinese\nagainst getting involved. What we are seeing here is a Soviet-Indian\npower play to humiliate the Chinese and also somewhat us.\nP:\nYeah, yeah.\nK:\nI think we ought to have a meeting of some of your key advisors\ntomorrow. I know you've got your day pretty full with the television\ntaping. The reason I mention it is because Rogers has been talking\nabout how we are sacrificing; he's on this Chinese kick again.\nP:\nSacrificing what?\nK:\nWell, our position to China and he wants a careful consideration;\nwhat good do all these moves do. Of course, the opposite --\nP:\nWhat move would he make then himself?\nK:\nI asked exactly this question. He says he is just raising questions,\nhe's not giving answers; these are questions he wants to have considered.\nP:\nOkay, I'll consider them.\nK:\nI think if we don't, there will be leakages that we just acted impetuously.\nP:\nWell, let's see we could do something around --\nK:\nYou've got him on the schedule at 2:30 anyway.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 4 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nP:\nWe might move it to 2:00 maybe. Well, we would have that; we\nwouldn't have the television in on that -- we'll let them take a\npicture and then get out.\nK:\nI think that's right.\nP:\nWho would you have?\nK:\nConnally, Rogers, Laird, if he is in town; Helms, and Mitchell if\nyou want it.\nP:\nI wouldn't have Mitchell on this one.\nK:\nAll right.\nP:\nNo, no. I think Connally because it involves some military -- I\nmean economic and so forth.\nK:\nThe basic problem, Mr. President, is it's clear that we can't do\nanything directly to change the situation but to set it up on the ground\nthat we are sacrificing our friendship to India; there is no friendship\nleft. There is nothing operational we are sacrificing in India by our\npresent course. All we are -- what we are risking is to add the\ncontent of the Soviets and the Chinese to a direct challenge in which\na country is being dismembered.\nP:\nThe point is that I want to see from State what their option is; if\nthey've got a better one, I'd like to know what it is. And you know,\nI have seen any suggestions of any different.\nK:\nTheir suggestion is always to release Mujibur; that's in effect the\nRussian position.\nP:\nYeah. Well, but Pakistan won't do that will it?\nK:\nNo. Well, now it's outdated; it's too late for that anyway. But it\nwould have been -- the Indians were determined, Mr. President, they\nattacked at the earliest possible moment they could. There was a\nrainy season from May to the end of September. Then they had to get\ntheir troops into position; then they had to train the Bengali. All this\ntalk about Russian restraint that we heard all summer was complete\npoppycock.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 5 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nP:\nUm-humm.\nI don't know; in everything we've done, everything\nwe've said to the Russians and Indians had no effect, is that really\nwhat we're saying?\nK:\nOur trouble was that we have been caught -- maybe if we had been\nmuch tougher but for that we had no domestic position but certainly\neverything we have said has been without effect and they have geared\nit towards a humilation - -- towards a dismemberment of Pakistan.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nAnd the effect of that will be on all other countries watching it is\nthat the friends of China and the United States have been clobbered\nby India and the Soviet Union. And I don't see how we escape that\nby tacking towards India now.\nP:\nNope. Well, are they now with the Mujib thing out of the way, what\nis State suggesting that we do?\nK:\nThey're not; they are refusing to make a suggestion.\nP:\nWhat?\nK:\nThey are not making a suggestion.\nP:\nThey are just saying we ought to review our situation, huh?\nK:\nRight. And that we shouldn't act impetuously.\nP:\nWhat the Christ are we impetuous about, I don't know of anything\nimpetuous.\nK:\nI asked the same question.\nP:\nLike what, cutting off the arms? A little prinking thing like that, why\nwhat about the cutting off of arms to Pakistan, that was impetuous too,\nhuh? You know, it's ridiculous; there's nothing impetous about any\nof this stuff.\nK:\nI think it's a carefully considered policy, Mr. President.\nP:\nWhat we are doing?\nK:\nIf we collapse now, I admit it's not a brillant position but if we collapse\nnow, the Soviets won't respect us for it; the Chinese will despise us\nand the other countries will draw their conclusions.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 6 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nP:\nWell, what about the British position and how they're playing it?\nK:\nWell, they abstained.\nP:\nThey abstained on this?\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nThat sort of figures doesn't it?\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nFrench?\nK:\nThey abstained.\nP:\nHumph. The French abstained too, huh?\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nWhat do you think the real game there on the British and the French --\nafraid to make Russia mad, isn't that it?\nK:\nThat's right; they are trying to position themselves between us and\nthe Russians.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nNo,\nK:\n/I am beginning to think one of the worse mistakes we made was to\npush Britain onto the Common Market.\nP:\nYeah, yeah.\nK:\nI mean that wasn't our Administration, we --\nP:\nI know that. That decision was made long before we got here but we\ncontinued to push it, that's for sure.\nK:\nWell, we couldn't have stopped it by then.\nP:\nNo.\nK:\nWe acquiesced in it.\nHeath -- And, of course, and\nP:\nYeah, sure. That was Heath's position long before\n...\nbecame\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n2 I I\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nK:\nNo, no; the mistakes of that were made in the Kennedy Administration.\nP:\nIt's done now.\nK:\nThat's where it could have been stopped easily.\nP:\nYou got a little cold?\nK:\nNo, maybe I've been talking a lot on the telephone.\nP:\nYou have, huh? (laughter)\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nWell, on this thing my view is to play this -- I'll get them in and\nhave a little meeting. That's a pretty good idea. But this idea of\nit's the same old story, Henry, that we have such things as troop\nwithdrawals, Cambodia, Laos or virtually everything we have done,\neverybody comes in and raises questions.\nK:\nAnd it's this --\nP:\nWell, goddammit; if they've got a better answer, fine but I don't\nsee -- They raise the questions and that makes a good historical\nrecord, doesn't it?\nK:\nThat's right and it's this phony wisdom; we ought to consider things\ncarefully. Of course, we ought to consider things carefully.\nP:\nThat's right, that's right.\nK:\nWhat good does our action do? On that basis, we just have to roll\nover every time a superior country moves. What is the long-term\neffect? Of course, we have to consider the long-term effect.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nThe proper\n[End of Tape]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDeeps\n?\nTELCON (Home)\n12/5/71\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\nR:\nHello.\nK:\nBill.\nR:\nYeah, Henry.\nK:\nHow are you?\nR:\nFine, thank you.\nK:\nI wanted to bring you up-to-date on just one item that happened late\nyesterday afternoon, and I called you earlier. We had suggested\nto the Chinese a while ago that maybe we should establish direct\ncontact in New York.\nR:\nU-humm.\nK:\nThey have now come back and said they don't want that.\nR:\nU-humm.\nK:\nAnd that anything can be done through the Pakistanis or other friends.\nR:\nThat's the way George has been working.\nK:\nRight. It's nothing, I just wanted you to be aware of that.\nR:\nU-humm.\nNLN pu sec 1.4 (c) ltr 22 May 2008\nK:\nOtherwise, I don't have anything. I called you earlier just to find\nout how things --\nR:\nYeah. I think the fighting is exaggerated in the press. Cause there\nBy CIM NARA, [p.1.84] Date 2 2 Apr 2009\nseems to be a lot less in the --\nK:\nIn the West.\nR:\nNo, in the press I say there is --\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 35\nK:\nNo, no, I think -- but you mean in the West or in the East?\nR:\nWell, both. In other words, although I am not talking about the\nmovement of forces now but I am talking about casualties and losses\nand so forth. My military people say that plane losses, for example,\nso far we haven't had too many confirmations. We are inclined to\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSANITIZED COPY\nTELCON (Home)\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\nR:\n(cont'd) think it is roughly 15 on either side in that area. The\nIndians have admitted 11\nSANITIZED 1.4 (c)\nK:\nYeah.\nR:\nWell, I'll be in touch with you in a little while. We're going over the\nfix now as we see it and then we will want to talk a little later about\nthe Security Council. I thought it went very well yesterday.\nK:\nI think actually it's come out well, I think the backgrounder played\nvery well.\nR:\nYeah, it did. You know, it's just really a question in the long run.\nWe didn't accomplish really what we wanted to do and that is to\nconvince everybody that we have taken all the right moves. But we\nperformed the other task the President wanted performed, that is\nto condemn India.\nK:\nNo, and I think it lays the basis for establishing the fact that we have\ntaken the right moves. You know, you don't expect the New York Times\never to like anything we did.\nR:\nYeah. Well, I think we have got a major decision if this thing continues\nto grow and that is whether we want to burn our bridges behind us or\nnot with India.\nK:\nWell, the other question is what do we gain by tacking towards them\nnow?\nR:\nWell, it isn't really tacking towards them now. It's just a question\nof how much do we want to get involved in the public mind with the\nwar itself and it's something we want to ask ourselves thoughtfully\nit seems to me now.\nK:\nWell, no one is against discussing anything thoughtful.\nR:\nThat's all I am saying. In the long run do we want to go all out and\ntake the exact Chinese position or do we want to be somewhere in between\nAt the moment we are somewhere in between -- between the Soviet\nUnion and China.\nK:\nWell, our present position is to try to be say two-thirds of the way\ntowards China but notall the way but above all what we have here is\na Soviet-Indian naked power play to dismember a country.\nSANITIZED the Richard Nixon Presidential\nDECLASSIFIED\nLibrary ENLN 05-33/14 284]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 3 -\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\nR:\nYeah.\nK:\nWhich must have profound consequences in other parts of international\nareas.\nR:\nI'm not challenging that. I'm just saying that I think the President\nshould think through very carefully each step from now on; particularly,\nbecause it is the kind of thing that if it continues to grow sort of\nshadows our position of a more peaceful world and maybe that's the\nonly course. Maybe there is nothing we can do about it.\nK:\nWell, what do you think we can do about it?\nR:\nAt least we can talk about it. In other words, I think the President\nshould get involved now. I think we should have the Security Council\ndiscuss it and I think he should --\nK:\nThere is no question about that.\nR:\nYeah, that's all I'm saying. It has, as you said, it has profound\nrepercussions and it may blow over or it may be that --\nK:\nIt won't blow over.\nR:\nI don't think so, I never have thought so. As you know, I --\nK:\nThere's no conceivable way it can blow over.\nR:\nI don't think so. Well, it's conceivable, it can blow over the way it\ndid the last time although, even the last time it lasted quite a while.\nK:\nWell, there's no way it can blow over without East Pakistan being\nseparated from Pakistan.\nR:\nNo, I don't think so either.\nK:\nI mean that's going to be the outcome and the question is in part,\nwhat we have here is an Indian-Soviet -- I mean however this issue\nstarted and whatever the pros and cons of the local situation were,\nit's gone far beyond that.\nR:\nI see. Which is what we thought all along and I think we have to ask\nourselves where we want to be a year from now, at least at the time\nof the election and two years from now, three years from now and\nwhether there is much we can do to affect the course of events.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has ININ 05-33/14:2 been determined to be declassified.\nDECLASSIFIED\n3\nTELCON\n- 4 -\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\nK:\nYeah, but there are always two problems, one is do we affect the\nimmediate course of events and secondly, how do we position ourselves\neven if we can't affect the course of events.\nR:\nI agree.\nK:\nBecause if you say we affect - - that anybody who can create a\nfait accompli, we then say we can't affect the course of events and\nwe'll not challenge it.\nR:\nOh, I don't\nseem to be suggesting, Henry, that I am drawing\na conclusion from my. questions. I'm asking the same questions you\nare asking --\nK:\nNo, I thinkthere should be a National Security -- I don't know\nwhether it should be a whole National Security Council meeting\nor a meeting of some of the close advisors.\nR:\nWell, I think that maybe that's better but I think we should and as I\nsay, because I asked the questions I'm not drawing the conclusions,\nI'm asking the questions and I think the President should ask the\nquestions.\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nR:\nI think we shouldn't act just in petulance, Christ, obviously it's\nannoying and obviously she's been a bitch.\nK:\nWell, so far he hasn't acted in petulance.\nR:\nNo, no; but I say it's one of those things where we ought to think\nabout it and talk about it and get the other fellow's point of view.\nMy own view would be that we ought tomorrow.\nK:\nYeah, the trouble tomorrow is that he's got that whole goddamn day\nscheduled with that television thing.\nR:\nWell, I think we ought to be careful about that. In other words, I\nthink that's one of the reasons I think we ought to have a meeting.\nIf major war is broken out and he spends the whole day taping a\ntelevision show, I'm not sure that's the best posture for him.\nK:\nNo, I think we have to have a meeting tomorrow.\nR:\nYeah, I think so. Okay, Henry, I'll be back in touch.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\n[NLN 05-33/14\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\nMr. Kissinger/The President\nDecember 5, 1971 - 10:30\nK:\ngranted you had got us anything from the Indians.\nP:\nIs editorial opinion building up in India's favor or is it about the\nsame as it was?\nK:\nThere is nothing in the Post, nothing in the Star. There's a sort of\na wailing editorial in the New York Times that says we are to blame\nfor not forcing Yahya into a political settlement.\nP:\nWell, that comes from the State now. How do we answer that?\nK:\nWe answer by listing all the steps we have urged Yahya to take\nand that he took.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nAnd that the Indians wouldn't give us three or four months to work\nit out.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nOh, we can kill them. When Yahya -- when the Indian Ambassador\nleft, he came in to say goodbye, I said, \"Look, work out a timetable\nwith us for a political accommodation. Our conclusion is that there\nwill be political autonomy. It is just a question that we can not agree\nto the forcible solution of it. \"\nP:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nI think we are except -- and then, of course, Mr. President, things\nwill be so much worse in East Pakistan by next summer that the liberals\nwill be totally discredited.\nP:\nYeah. Um-humm. Oh, boy, it will be worse, won't it?\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nWell, they may be discredited but on the other hand there will be -- we\nhave to understand they will try to push it off -- they always blame us\nfor whatever goes wrong, Henry.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nSo we will probably get blamed for that too. But in the meantime we\nwill have to do some other things. Well, there's nothing further we can\ndo\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\n- 2 -\nMr. Kissinger/The President\nDecember 5, 1971 - 10:30\nK:\nNo, I mean they are cutting off that aid part of it tomorrow.\nP:\nYou mean the --\nK:\nP:\nK:\nWell, no, the letters of credit that I mentioned to you yesterday.\nP:\nYeah. Well, that's nothing public I understand.\nK:\nNo, but it will leak out.\nP:\nYep. The line that may be developed that we have to anticipate in\nthat meeting tomorrow is that well, -- Incidentally, has it been taken\nup with State about cutting off the letters of credit and what do they say\nabout that?\nK:\nNo, so far they haven't said anything about it.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nIt's been taken up and it's being done.\nP:\nOkay. Well, I just can't understand this idea though that they are trying\nto say that we are not -- that we are doing this precipitantly. I don't\nknow what the hell they are talking about. Well, that hasn't come out\npublicly yet?\nK:\nNo, and Mr. President, we have had two WSAG meetingsa day where\nevery agency has been represented.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nWe have had four WSAG meetings in the last three days. I mean, I\ndon't know what anyone can say it hasn't been adequately considered.\nP:\nUm-humm. Well, Rogers has had his say and he has indicated what\nhe wants.\nK:\nWell, it's just awfully hard to run these crisis, Mr. President, when\nyou get one Department out to position themselves in opposition to their\nPresident all the time.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\n- 3 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 5, 1971 - 10:30\nP:\nYeah. That's right. Well, I think the meeting is a good idea, I'll\nset up the time on it.\nK:\nBut the meeting I think is important.\nP:\nYeah. I'll set up the time. Okay.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nAll right, fine.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 5, 1971 - 11:00\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHello. I have here -- it just came in a call from Rogers with\nregard to the Security Council meeting, he wants to talk before 2 o'clock.\nNow, what is the guidance on that? I thought that it was pretty well\nsettled but what is the situation?\nK:\nOh, the situation in the Security Council?\nP:\nNo, what he wants he wants to talk to me to see what guidance I\nwant to give before the Security Council meeting.\nK:\nThat's right, that's what I'm\nP:\nSo I am going to call him. My point is what do we want to say?\nK:\nWell, here is the issue. There is going to be a ceasefire and withdrawal\nresolution that the Argentines are putting forward. That one we can\nsupport. Then, that will be vetoed by the Russians. Then, it will\nprobably move towards a ceasefire resolution alone and on that one\nI think we should be very leery. The Chinese will be violently opposed,\nthe Pakistanis are proably going to be opposed but we could conceivably\nabstain from that.\nP:\nA ceasefire alone.\nK:\nThe trouble with a ceasefire alone is that it would leave half of East\nPakistan in Indian hands.\nP:\nUm-humm. Well, has that been discussed with Rogers and so forth\nas to what these issues are?\nK:\nIt has been discussed with Bush and it's been -- Rogers has been I've\ndiscussed it with Sisco, Rogers has been dancing around with me and\nhas not been going into that much detail.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nI must underline, Mr. President, if we collapse now in New York, the\nimpact on this international situation, we're going to do away with most\nof the gains of the last two years. The way Rogers keeps putting the\nissue the Russians are playing for big stakes here. When all the\nbaloney all the New York Times editorials are said and done if the\nSoviets and Indians get away with this, the Chinese and the United States\nwill be standing there with eggs on our face. And they will have made\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (HOME)\n- 2 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 5, 1971 - 11:00\nwatered\nK:\n(cont'd) us back down and if we have ordered down our own Resolution\nfrom yesterday that had an 11 to 2 majority so that it becomes a pretty\nincipit thing, our only hope in my judgment, we'll never get it through\nState, is to become very threatening to the Russians and tell them that\nif they are going to participate in the dismemberment of another\ncountry, that will affect their whole relationship to us.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nRight now they still want the Middle East from us.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nAnd other things. If we just play this in this nice incipit way, we are\ngoing to get through this week all right then but we are going to pay for\nit -- this will then be the Suez '56 episode of our Administration.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nmy\nK:\nThat is what in view is at stake here now and that's why the Russians\nare playing it so toughly and if we have made any mistake in the last\ntwo weeks it's this -- if we had over-reacted in the first two or three\ndays as we wanted to in the White House, it might at least have scared\nthe Russians off, not the Indians, but it might have scared the Russians\noff. We are pretty well committed anyway, we can't take the curse\noff it now. The problem - - I know it will always be put on the ground\nthat we want to save the China trip but these people don't recognize\nthat without a China trip, we wouldn't have had a Moscow trip.\nP:\nNo, that's just small stuff. I know what they have put in on that --\nthat's just sour grapes crap.\nK:\nIf the Chinese come out of this despising us, we lose that option.\nIf the Russians think they backed us down, we will be back to where\nwe were in May and June.\nP:\nWell, I'm going to call him right now. The main thing is all I have to\nknow is is he pushing for us to back down from our Resolution, that's\nwhat I need to know, Henry.\nK:\nProbably. The best would be that we should stick with our Resolution\nand go back no further than withdrawal and ceasefire.\nP:\nWithdrawal and ceasefire.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\n- 3 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 5, 1971 - 11:00\nK:\nThat any ceasefire should be coupled with a withdrawal.\nP:\nUm-humm. And they have to decide that at 2 o'clock today, huh?\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nDoes Rogers have any regrets that he didn't go to New York to make\nthe presentation himself?\nK:\nI don't know; I don't think so.\nP:\nProbably saw the point of that, huh?\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nYeah. Well, we will - -\nK:\nIf someone could give me some word what was decided because it is\ngoing to be hard for me to monitor Bush.\nP:\nOh, don't worry, I'll call you back as soon as I find out what the hell\nhe's -- what the point is, I don't know what it is even.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nI just assume that they were all set in the UN thing tomorrow - - - I mean,\ntoday, you know. Incidentally, that wasn't discussed at your meeting,\nhuh?\nK:\nIt wasn't. well, no. I discussed it with Bush and Sisco but he is\napparently trying to run around me.\nP:\nI see. That's all right, I'll have to find out what the score is and I'll\nfind out.\nK:\nright.\nP:\nAnd I'll call you back.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
}