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(1 oF 3) oF 3) DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION Telcon HAK 2 Ylazhak Rabin (2pp.) 9/20/70 M DECLASSIFIED in lir 19 Dec 2007 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/13 Istion HAR nd pp. DECLASSIFIED pn ltr 19 Dec 2007 9/20/70 3 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/14 Two HATE and Yitzhare Rabin pp.) DECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007 9/20/70 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/15 Telass HAK ) John PP.) 9/20/70 B DECLASSIFIED pa ltr 19 Dec 2007 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/16 Telean HAR and Xitzhck RAbin (2 (ap.) 9/20/70 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2001 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/17 Telson HA K and William Rogers CT p.) 9/21/70 B DECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/18 7 Telcon HATE and the President (2 pp.) 9/21/70 D MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/19 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007 Tacon HAR and william Rogers, Joseph SISCO (Tp.) 9/21/70 B DECLASSIFIED pu ltr 19 Dec 2007 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST LN 05-03/20 Tcicon YitzHAK RISM'S message/ Alexinder Hrig and 9/21/70 M MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/21 FILE GROUP TITLE DECLASSIFIED pu ltr 19 Dec 2007 BOX NUMBER Kissinger Transcripts Telephone Conversations 30 FOLDER TITLE Jordan 20-25 Sept 1970 (4) RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NA 14021 (4-85) U.S.GPO; 989-235-084/00024 (2af3) DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION Tabson HAR and Yitzhak RxSin PP.) 9/21/70 B MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/22 DECLASSIFIED pu ltr 19 Dec 2007 Klcon HAK and Joseph Sisco (1 p.) 9/21/70 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST LN 05-03/23 Terson HAL and Joseph Sisco (2 pp.) 9/21/70 B MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NAN 05-03/24 DECLASSIFIED pu etr 19 Dcc 2007 13 Jolcon .HAK and William Rogers <1 p.) 9/21/70 B DECLASSIFIED pu. ltr 19Dec2007 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/25 Telcon HAK and Joseph Sisco ( 1 p.) 9/21/70 B MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/26 DECLASSIFIED pu ltr 19 Dec 2007 Teleon HAE ) H.R. Haldeman (Tp.) p.) 9/21/70 3 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/27 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007 Taken HAK and Joseph Sisco (1p.) 7/21/70 4 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/28 DECLASSIFIED pn ltr 19 Dec 2007 Telcon HAR and yit shak Rasin C4 p.) 9/21/70 B MANDATORY REVIEW NLN 05-03/29 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007 Tolion HAK 700 Joseph Sisco ( 2 pp.) 9/21/70 B MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/30 FILE GROUP TITLE DECLASSIFIED per lir 19 Dec 2007 BOX NUMBER kissings Transcripts Telephone Conversations 30 FOLDER TITLE Jordan 20-25 Sept. 1970 (4) RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION DECLASSIFIED 1989-235-084/00024 NA 14021 (4-85) This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. (3 of 3) DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 19 Tckon HAK and Yitzhek Rabin (Tp.) 9/21/70 Ф MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NIN 05 - 03/31 DECLASSIFIED Dn ltr 19 Dec 2007 28 Telcon HAR mg Roger Davies ( Ip.) MANDATORY REVIEW PROUMOM NLN 05-03/32 DECLASSIFIED 9/21/70 B pm itr 20A Telcon HAR and Ernst Van der Bengel (3pp.) v 9/22/70 D 19Dec 2007 Tilcon HAKEND Joseph Sisco () PP.) SANITIZED Flak 9/22/70 M DECLASSIFIED pn ltr 19 Dec 2007 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/83 200 Taken HAL and Juseph Sisco (2pp) 9/22/70 B DECLASSIFIED PG ltr 19 Dec 2007 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/34 23 Telcon HAL Yitzhak Rabin (2pp) 9/25/70 B DECLASSIFIED pu ltr 19 Dec 2007 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/35 FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER Kissinger Transacipts - Telephone Conversations 30 FOLDER TITLE Jordan 20-25 Sept. 1970 (4) 4 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon returned non-historical material. DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Secretary Rogers 9/20/70; 6:58 p.m. R: I have been out of, touch for the last 2 hours. What is the latest? Are you having the meeting? K: Yes. There is nothing of great consequence that has happened. The Israelis said if we want anything we have got to be loud and clear, but we don't want anything. R: Yes, be soft and obscure. K: The President has come to the view if any action it should not be by us. What was the latest information you had? R: Pretty much how you and I last talked. What is the meeting going to consider? K: Just update everybody on what has happened and pros and cons of American vs Israeli action. If the Syrians come back. (General Haig walked into HAK's office and Mr. Kissinger asked him what had happened in the last 3 hours.) K: (Continuing) Our Embassy is still isolated. We have got Israeli intelligence report about armored battle between Syrian and Jordan armies. Essentially there isn't anything of consequence. No actions have been taken by anybody as far as I know. Your statement was played very well on TV this evening, with your picture. R: Oh, well, but that isn't K: I just wanted you to know. I will call you as soon as the meeting is over. R: All right. ms Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon The President 9/20/70; 7:25 p.m. P: What time will the meeting [WSAG] be finished? K: In 15 minutes probably, or maybe a half hour. We have already been meeting for about 30 minutes, P: I will come over in a few minutes. I want to get a feel for what's going on. K: Fine, Mr. President. P: I will just sit in for the last part of it. K: Terrific, Mr. President. ms Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Ambassador Rabin 9/20/70; 10:10 p.m. K: Mr. Ambassador, I have Joe Sisco here too. I just wanted to pass on some information to you. We have just got a request from the Jordanians via the British which requests an Israeli air strike on Syrian troops which allegedly have takenIrbid and are heading south and massing. R: I understand what was requested. I understand against whom. I didn't understand which area. K: They have taken the town in the area of Irbid and an there are Syrian troops massing there and heading south. R: Heading south of Irbid? K: Yes this is the request we want to pass on to you. We have no independent information of our own and we wanted to ask you whether it would be possible for you on a urgent basis to undertake some reconnaissance to confirm this and then just get in touch with us. R: Fine. I can assess when it comes to the reconnaissance. I don't see any problem. I just got a cable from our people talking about 200 Syrian tanks in the area of Irbid. The main thrust was a gainst Irbid about 8 hours ago. According to what I got here they haven't yet reached Irbid but they were heading towards Irbid. That is what I got from Israel I think at about 4:00 'clock there. I understand exactly what you ask us. K: And could you do it on the most urgent basis? R: First I will go to the Prime Minister here. She leaves tonight. Sisco: When will she be back in Israel? R: I think it will be evening there tomorrow. Sisco: You will bear in mind that we got this from the British because our Embassy was out of touch with the King so the King asked the British to pass the request to you and the British in turn have asked us to pass the request to you. You ought to know another thing, namely that this request according to the British came first this morning to them and then it was reconfirmed again at 1830 Jordan time this evening. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/13 per ltr 19 Dec 2007 By CIM NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009 Fp. 1827 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- R: Do you look favorably to this request? What is your position? S: I think we want to exchange views with you on this as soon as you are able to give us a picture of how serious you think the situation is there. R: It looks to be quite serious after I got the cable about 200 tanks and forces -- quite a sizable force -- if it is true and I sent a cable back and asked for more information, but now I will send another one. But I am sure that the first question that the Prime Minister will ask me. that the Government will ask. SxxWectkiex (A copy of a cable was brought into Mr. Kissinger's office) S: Wait a minute - we have just got something else. K: You had better call us back in 10 minutes. Can you do that? R: Yes. S: Because we have a further message here that requires a further exchange with you. R: I see. All right. ms Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has INLN 05-03/12 INLN 05-03/12 INTN 05-03/12 [NIN 05-03/126 DECLASSIFIED 2,27 1-31 Telcon Secy Secretary Rogers (Asst/Sisco in office with Mr. Kissinger) 9/20/70; p.m. K: We have a message here Joe should read to you. We were talking to Rabin when that message came in and we told him we would talk to him shortly. S: W Here is what came in Mr. Secretary, from the King at 3:00. "Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion. Northern forces disbanded. occupied. Having disastrous effect. I request immediate intervention, both air and land to safeguard independence of Jordan. Immediate airstrike from any quarter plus air cover are imperative 11 What I am not clear from this is whether he is asking for British intervention or not. R: Intervention by us or Israel? By anybody? S: It obviously leaves both options open, in my judgment. K: The way I read it air strikes from any quarter and the ground forces from us. S: And they would also like British intervention. In light of this my own feeling would be that we now amend what we were going to tell Rabin and obviously Henry will have to check this with the President. (1) Give Israelis essence of the information in this message and go beyond merely a request for reconnaissance but to say the to them that we would look favorably if they took this action. In fact, as we were talking and this message came in Rabin said there was no difficulty, butthe first question the Israelis would ask is would the Americans agree we should do this. And we fenced, but this is an understandable question on their part. R: My view is that we should favor it because if the King goes down the drain then the GD thing is a total mess. This way it will be a mess, but if they can save the King there is some advantage. S: One would hope that whatever the Israelis did is sufficient. R: I think the question of whether we should land troops is different, As long as we are sure the King is requesting Israeli air support. S: Well Mr. Secretary here is a previous message - let me read it so you will feel completely confident. (Read the British message) So the request to Israel for the air strike precedes this second one. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/14 per ltr 19 Dec 2007 By CIM NARA, Date Apr 2009 [p.1002] Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Secy Rogers (C. .td) -2- R: We have a request to the British and to us both so there is no doubt about it. K: And we were not giving Rabin any satisfaction. In fact, Joe was doing the talking when at that precise moment the other message came in. The fact seems to me to be that if there isn't an air strike the whole thing may come apart. I don't think we have any choice. R: No, I don't think we have any choice. What it amounts to is Israel is just doing it now at the right time. S: Bear in mind that the Russians are behind the Syrians. R: I don't think we have any choice. Let's go ahead. ms Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential Library INLN 05-03/13 P. 2027 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Ambassador Rabin 9/20/70; 10:35 p.m. K: We have had another message and another conversation with the President. I will first give you the essence of the message and then the request of the President. Sisco and Haig are on the line. This is the message from our Ambassador who says he had a phone call from the King at 3:00 a. m. local time pointing out that the situation was deteriorating dangerously. A massive invasion. The northern forces were disbanded. Irbid occupied. That is the information we have from the King. This was having a disastrous effect on the troops in the capital. He therefore requests immediate physical intervention, both air and land. Especially he wants immediate air strikes on invading forces from any quarters. In light of your information we have discussed with the Secretary of State and the President and we can now assure you under these circumstances we would look favorably on your actions and the President has asked me to tell you if you undertake such action we would of course make good any materiel problems that might arise as a result of these actions and we are cognizant of the fact we would have to hold the situation under control vis-a-vis the Soviets. R: I would like to make it clear that the President looks at it favorably. K: That is correct. R: Second, if there would be a question of materiel you would find ways to compensate what would be the outcome. K: We promise that. R: Third, if there would be certain problems with the Soviets we can rely on you. K: That is exactly correct and we are taking some immediate precautionary measures to put ourselves into this position.) R: Give me two or three minutes and I will bring it to Prime Minister Meier and I will discuss it with her and be in a position to tell you. K: And you will call me at the White House board. Just a second - I would like you to talk to my associates who are on the phone to make sure I don't leave anything out, but this has been discussed with the Secretary of State and has the personal endorsement of the President. Hold on. (Discusses with people in room.) We will call the British and inform them also, Mr. Ambassador. We will inform the British of this conversation. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/15 per ltr 19 Dec 2007 By CM NARA, Date I Apr Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Amb, Rabin Co: ) -2-- R: If you find it necessary to inform the British it is up to you, but once the * decision will be taken by us I think it is only between you and us. K: We will not tell them of your decision, we will tell them of our discussions with you. [R: Since the last I had an opportunity to talk to the Prime Minister -- when it comes to the reconnaissance there is no problem. I can't say for the time being anything about the second part. K: You will call us back about that? R: Yes. ms Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential Library [NLN 05-03/15 P. 282] This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Amb. Freeman 9/20/70; 10:45 p.m. K: We have some news for you which confirms all you passed to us earlier. We had a message from Amman (reads message). Passing on request of King Hussein. Asked us to pass it nn to the British. F: Which I think you have done. K: We are doing $ it now. We have passed this message in substance to the Israeli Ambassador and he said he would take it under advisement. That is where the matter stands now. F: Quite. Now I will pass that message. You are not thinking of ringing up Greenhill immediately. K: I would be glad to. S: We have flashed it to London and we could have our people there in the Embassy take a copy right over. F: That would be helpful. I think they would like to see the gext. K: Joe, do you know how many British nationals in Jordan? F: I think the figure is 160 un less there has been some change in the last few days. K: Well we will be in close tough with you bexxxxxe and keep you informed of any information that we might get. F: You haven't yet got any information about how you are going to react to this? K: No. F: Are you considering this a matter of urgwncy? You have had this formidable request addressed to you and the next question is what are you going to answer. K: We xxx have not had a formal request to land troops. We have not made any decisions about how we will respond for ourselves. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/16 per ltr 19 Dec 2007 By CIM NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009 [p.1.2] Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Amb Freeman ( ntd) -2- F: One more question to make sure I understand the text. At the end he said this request may come to you very quickly for air strikes. I will pass the gist of it on. K: And we will get the text of it right away. ms Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential [NLN Library 05-03/15:p. 202] DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Kissinger/Moose (Private Secretary for PM) September 20, 1970 11:15 p.m. K: Hello, can you hear me? M: Can you hear me? K: Not very well. I have just talked to your Ambassador and I would like to use this occasion to pass on this message received from our Ambassador in Amman. M: Yes K: It read as "The King phoned me at 3:00 a.m. He said he wanted me to pass the following most urgent message directly to the President. Message follows: Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion. Northern forces disjointed. Irbid occupied. This having disastrous effect on tired troops in the capital and surroundings. After continuous action and shortage of supplies.. " Why don't we do this then. We will tell our Embassy to deliver it to you immediately. That's the way to do it, I have read it to Mr. Freeman. ? ? ? from any quarter including from you because we are asked to pass this message to you. M: I see. That's similar to the message we passed to you. K: Stronger than the message you passed. M: The same meaning. K: As I have told your Ambassador, we have informed the Israelis of this message, and your Ambassador as on other information. M: Thank you very much. K: You will tell Dennis Greenhill this? M: Will tell them what you have told me. Have you any other comment? K: We are discussing our own course of action which we have confined to but we have not made any decision M: Are you considering at this time? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Kissinger/Moose September 20, 1970 11:15 p.m. - 2 - K: We are considering but will not do this precipitously. M: I have great difficulty hearing you. K: We are considering the message but we will not precipitate action. You will hear from us. Give my best regards to Dennis. Good bye. M: Good night, Dr. Kissinger mlc / Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. X-33 TELCON Amb. Rabin/Kissinger 11:30 p.m. 9/20/70 R: First, leaving immediately to have reconnaissance over the area when- ever possible in daylight. K: That should be in a few hours. R: Transfer the results of these to Washington. According to what she had from Israel the situation is quite unpleasant to put it mildly. K: What do you mean? 'R" There's a massive Syrian force in the area. K: So you agree with us. R: When it comes to the facts and implications, we don't not agree. The people there are not sure if air alone will be sufficient at the present. Anyhow, she has instructed to look into the matter favorably your point of view but no decision before we know exactly what's going on. K: Will you be in touch with me? R: Yes. I have no air communication back to Washington, If Gen. Haig could help me. K: We will get you back. Let's get through our business and lhe will take it up. [R: She has exchanged views with the Defense Minister and she is sending a cable detailing everything we talked about but we cannot promise you anything now. In the morning perhaps. Now it's 5:35 a. m. and after more light 1 K: Our time or your time? NLN 05-03 per ltr 19 Dec 2007 NARA, Date 2009 R: It's morning there. As soon as possible air reconnaissance will be carried out. K: Stay in your hotel room. Or do you have to see her off? R: It's not a question it doesn't matter. XX The sooner back to Washington-- DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 K: Stay there and we will tell you where to go and how to get back. Now I will [pil sum it up. Reconnaissance if ordered. You will transfer results to us immediately By CIM Your infomation is that there are massive forces in the Irbid area and therefore you confirm information from the other side. Your people are not convinced air alone is suffieient. They have been ordered to look into our proposition favorably Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Rabin/Kissinger 11:30 p.m. 9/20/70 -2- K: (cont) but cannot give final views until they have studied what they have. You will be back in touch. We XXEX will get you back to Washington. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED [NLN 05-03/17 P. 2002] This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON X35,1 Rogers/Kissinger 12:45 a.m. 9/21/70 K: I really don't have a hell of a lot. Sisco has told you most of it. I wanted to touch base to make sure we are together. You have heard of Rabin's reply? R: No. K: He called back and said they are doing reconnaissance, They will tell us the resutls. Independent information was there was massive forces including tanks. Mrs. Meir had talked to Dayan and orged to do it favorably. They will let us know in light of reconnaissance in early morning our time what they will do. He said, without indicating it was a request, that some of their people weren't sure air alone is sufficient, The President was in the office. I didn't tell Rabin. He siaid that if they come back to say to do what was necessary and get it over quickly. I just met with Joe, Alex, Moorer and Packard. They are sitting on a contingency basis. That's where we stand. R: Fine and thank you. K: You have no problem? R: No. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/18 per ltr 19 Dec 2007 By CIM NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009 [p.1.81] [p. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. X-36 TELCON President/Kissinger 1:10 a. m. 9/21/70 K: I was told you were still up and I wanted to tell you. We have gone over everything at that meeting and Alex Johnson is preparing a diplomatic scenario for first thing in the morning if the Israelis go. We will call in the Soviets. The second possibility that State favors is if withdraw, we would ask the Israeli's to withdraw. P: I think the best thing is to say aothing and let them come to us. No reason to tell them. K: The only argument for that is to warn them to stay out. They know the Syrians have been bad boys. P: Under no circumstances. But to warn them to stay out -- K: That might be $ useful. P: This is happening because Syrians are there and we want you to stay out, All right. K: We will report to our allies our general for attitude but so X no ones nose gets out of joint. Moorer is preparing xis contingency. Soviets probably knew about this and they will have a starchier reply then we now have. They may attack the Israelis from the air and we may have to fly air cover over Israelix against the Soviets. P: We will see. K: The major thing is to go in and come out -- P: I understand. We know its' a possibility. We will now find out. K: Packard has been -- we are getting together an assistance package for Jordan NLN 05-03/19 per ltr 19 Dec 2007 NARA, Date 2009 in case they need it and Israel for losses. We are telling the Jordanians that we have passed on messages to all people they wanted and question of assistance is being urgently and sympathetically considered. We are phrasing it con- structively. As you said, the moral of the King is important. P: Hewill tell his troops. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 K: We will advise the Shah just to show him consideration. P: What about the Arabs? By CIM K: We should keep queit. They won't tell them. There's some feeling you Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. President/Kissinger 1:10 a. m. 9/21/70 -2- K: (cont.) might call in Congreasional leaders tomorrow to advise them. If you want to consider evacuationxxxx scheme, you might want to inform them and it gives them flexibility. P: We will consider it but late in the day. K: On the check list. If it breaks. Otherwise, everyone is tracking. We are meeting agains in the morning and everyone will work down. P: Russians flying with air strikes? I don't believe it. K: Not normally but their behavior lately .they are either incompetent or forcing a showdown. If they are incompetent, we will have an easy vistory. P: We will see what's happening in the morning. K: You pulled them together. Haig and I feel that. Your calm and got to the heart of it. When they heard the Commander in Chief say this. P: In the office we hadn't had messages yet from the situation and they came in later and we were considering the contingency. Know we have told them there's no question. The Secy. of State has spoken and the U.S. is committed. K: I-called Bill couldn't reach Laird and he is content with exxecxpixingx everything. This *hingxx time everyone is together. P: We hope for the best. Thank you, Henry, and good night. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED [NLN 05-03/19: P. 282] This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 7-40 TELCON Rogers7Kissinger/Sisco 10:22 a, m. 9/21/70 R: Joe's on the line too. We have to touch base on how we will do this discussion with Rabin. K: I think State should do it, Joe, so you will not -- R: Hewill do it and hevill ask him to come in now. Hewill tell you exactly what we will say. S: What do you think we should say? K: What the Secy. proposes we agree in principle and would like to review later in the day. We have passed it to the King and if he disagrees, we would want to consider that. It must succeed and we have preference for air action but ifit must be coupled we will go with that. And confine it to Jordan. S: That's all the points I have. R: We haven't conveyed it to the King. We are conveying it. K: Bill, you may not have seen it, We have a flash from Brown which says that inthe King's mind, ground action is different. We need the King's thinking exactly R: We will pass this message right away and it should take care of it. K: Send out the flash and try to get the King's thinking. By the meeting this afternoon. R: We will if we can reach the King. I can't believe the King will without knowing the intentions of the troops. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/20 per ltr 19 Dec 2007 By CIM NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009 [p. I of Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Rabin's Message - Monday, September 21, 1970 - 5:15 a. m, 1. No specific report of reconnaissance yet; will be available two hours from now. 2. Israelis consider air strikes alone not adequate for situation. 3. Israelis believe ground action will be necessary. 4. Israel would like United States view on this within two or three hours. General Haig spoke to Ambassador Rabin again at 6:45 at which time the Ambassador added the following information: X-10 1. Israeli reconnaissance had observed some Syrian units south of Irbid, but they were not certain whether these units represented security forces or were the vanguard for a move south. 2. The Israelis estimate that the King can maintain his position for at least another day or more in Amman. 3. The Israelis have no territorial ambitions vis-a-vis Jordan, however they do believe that an attack in support of the King must have "some political goal" and that some adjustments (presumably territorial) will have to be made as a result of their attack to preclude certain technical difficulties. 4. In essence, Israel believes if they are to reestablish the authority of the King they must have some assurance from him that he will subsequently establish and maintain order within Jordan. 5. The Israelis wish to emphasize the importance of the U.S. handling the Russian situation. They are especially concerned about this in view of recent actions along the Canal (presumably the missile violations and Soviet aircraft in Egypt). DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/21 pu ltr 19Dec2007 By CIM NARA, Date Apr 2009 [p.10f] [p. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Amb. Rabin/Kissinger 10:25 a, m. 9/21/70 K: We have asked Sisco to talk to you in a few minutes and you will be getting a call from him. He will give you a reply which in principle is yes but I would like to make the following suggestion. The less you say in reply, the better. Just say you will communicate with your government and then come in and see me. It's terribly important that we know who says what to whom and I will give you guidelines on that. R: In the meantime I have instructions too. More detailed. K: Can you give them to me? R: The gist after the decision that took place extimates that our military activity to prevent Syrian and Iraqi taking over in Jordan would require activation and operation of a relatively large force on our part. Second, we have to assume that as a result there might be resumption of hostilities even along the Suez Canal. It would be a clear cut Israeli intervention against another intervention in Jordan. As a result even though the attitude is positive as a result of our experience of the last few months I have been instructe to make clear certain points. The first, will the U.S. approach Israel formally in this matter. Second, will the King agree to request our assistance and undertake methods of communication andiorduation Third, a little more clarification WII how will U.S. prevent Soviet participation. Fourth, is it understood that the U.S. will side with us in as international political arend including U.N. vetothat included Syria threatens Israel and not only Jordan. We might find ourselves in and they will order our withdrawal immediately. The fifth question is it clear that Israel will not be held responsible for the fate of the hostages. And 6th, I think this on the political side any public statement made by U.S. in regard to this question we hope to know about it beforehand. I know it's K: Is it possible for you to separate these questions in your meeting with Sisco or can you wait until after? R: I have put them to you. I can get Sisco's answer and communicate it back and then wait. K: And then communicate back to Sisco? R: No, get Sisco and then in the meantime if I get clarification from you, I will be able to know what to do else. K: I cannot work just get Sisco's answer and we will discuss make the first point to him. That's been our great contention here and it's important they hear it from you. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 By NLN CIM 05-03/22 per ltr 19Dec2007 NARA, Date Apr Reproduce 2009 at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Rabin/Kissinger 10:25 a. m. 9/21/70 -2- R: Fine. K: You will have to follow my recommendations. I may ask you to put them into channels. Receive communications and make the first point, Then call Haig and make an appointment here. You will have to assume what I tell you is M&X in the interest of everybody. The questions will get to the President. On the basis of his answer I may ask you to give the list to Sisco. R: I have a calbe that says if wer have positive answers the tendency of the Cabinet is to respond positively. K: That's second. What's the first point? R: This is not a question. It's a statement. Any military activity -- K: That's what I want you to communicate. Just that much, no more. R: I will do it. K: Then come in and go back to him. I will decide how to handle it. R: I will come when you are free. K: You see Sisco and then come over heze. Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential Libran[NLN 05-03/22:p 282] This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Kissinger 10:30 C. a. 9/21/70 P: How long do we have to make our plans because of the number of people who are depending on this trip. It comes apparent that nothing will happen that will change the situation now. K: We can decide by the end of the day. P: You said Wed. K: No, we should cancel before someone cancels us. After the meeting this afternoon, we can probably make that decision. P: hmmh-hummh. We might hear from Tito on this. Nothing will happen on that. I don't see anything that XXXX will change it by the end of the day. K: Unless the king stabilizes the situation. P: Then it would be important to go. We could wait until this afternoon or tomorrow. K: Right. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Joe Sisco 9/21/70 10:45 a. m. S: Those were numbers 5007 and 5008. K: You'll have to tell me the gist of them. S: They are somewhat encouraging. The situation at noon is somewhat better. The first telegram I have just dictated. K: The flash one to Amman? S: Yes, When I call Rabin in, in addition to what you and Rog ers and I agreed on I think I should know on this latest information. it gives it a little bit less urgency. There were some difficult points in that meeting this morning, but it was a good one I think. I didn't feel bad at all that you didn't support my hawkish views. I thought an air strike this afternoon might be good, but in view of this K: But don't indicate that we don't want him to do anything. S: Oh exactly, I'll call back in five minutes with this telegram. E.O. NLN 12958, DECLASSIFIED 05-03/23 as amended, Sect per 35 ltr 19 Dec 2007 By CIM NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009 [p.1.g1] Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Joe Sisco 9/21/70 11:10 a. m. K: Has the flash message gone to Amman? S: That's what I'm going to read to you right now. [Sisco read the message; did not take it verbatim but the substance follows. "The Ambassador should contact the palace and pass the message from the Prime Minister to the King. He should encourage the King to set up a meeting between Jordanian and Israeli since this is the best way for the Israelis and Jordanians to concert together. We have received your cal 1 in which you expressed your judgment that the King's request for land action was limited to the U.S. and U.K. I have not confirmed by reconnaissance that the Syrians around Israel are considerable. Israel, considering air strikes and ground action, thinks air strikes alone are insufficient. They will be consulting with us. You should take this opportunity to ask the palace its view regarding Israeli air strikes and/or Israeli ground intervention. It is important that before any action is taken by Israel, the King feel that one or both of the above is necessary. The best thing would be for the King to handle this himself, since any kind of intervention, whether by Israel or the U.S., to save the King would have adverse effects on the King's position with the Arab world. We are obviously not suggesting that you say this to him. In short, we are anxious for you to pass the Israeli message on to Jordan and to get for us the King's thoughts on possible Israeli assistance in the air and/or ground. We believe it adviable for the Jordanians and Israelis to consult urgently. K: First, we have a new flash message in from Brown, Amman #5015. [Mr. Kissinger read the cable. My first suggestion, let's get your flash done. S: I can cut out a lot of this. NARA, Date 2009 K: Yes, I think you can cut out the lecture at the end. S: It's not a lecture. This man is in a compound and has no flavor on our thinking. K: If he has no flavor he isn't in the foreign service. I could E.O. 12958, as amended, DECLASSIFIED Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/24 pultr tell you what the flavor is [p.10f2] S: But you aren't in a compound. Well, I can say "You should encourage the King to set up a meeting ", just the first paragraph. That the Ambassador should contact the palace and pass the message from the Israeli Prime Minister to Hussein concert together to By Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Joe Sisco 9/21/70 11:10 a.m. page 2 consult one another. 11 "We note your judgment that it is limited to U.S./U.K. Wou should ask the King how he feels about this other. 11 Send it out that way with no more editorializing. K: Exactly, and then let's get back to each other. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library INLN05-03/24:p.282 2002 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Rogers/Kissinger 11:25 a.m. 9/21/70 R: Have you seen 5015? (Amman's 5015 -- re Syrian moves, possible Israeli strike, and King's preference for a U.S. strike.) You better show this to the President. It's just the opposite. K: I will send them all in. R: This one is 180 degrees opposite. K: They break so fast and it depends when you pick it up. R: But it's the same fellow. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/25 per ltr 14 Dec 2007 By CIM NARA, Date I Apr 2009 [p.1061] Fp. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Sisco/Kissinger 11:50 a.m. 9/21/70 K: Have you had Rabin in? S: He is on his way in, K: The President just asked me. S: We called him 15 mins. ago. He must be at the Secy's office. I think the Secy. will have me ₫0 it. K: That's better. S: I think that's how it will work out. K: Freeman is on his way in to see the Secy. Did you get that flash out? S: Yes. We agree in principle air and ground subject to review later in the day. We have passed the message to the King and urged the King to get in touch with the Israelis. We have asked the King what he thinks of Israeli ground action. Air action is . If he disagrees we would want to take that into account. Governing prinsiples which must succeed. How do we define the objective? To force Syria from Jordan. K: Exactly. S: We prefer air action but we defer to Israel's judgment. We strongly prefer in Jordan which is the source rather than in Syria. I will get a cable out reporting it. To Tel Aviv and Amman. K: Are you coming to the WSAG? S: Eventually. K: What about 5015? S: Sit tight. We have two cables in 1 and half hours and they are diametrically opposed. K: OK. I will wait. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Seet 3.5 NLN 05-03/26 pu ltr 19Dcc2007 By CIM NARA, Date I Apr 2009 Lp. [p.1001] Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Joe Kraft 9/21/70 11:55 a. m. JK; I'm calling because Mrs. Meir at lunch said something about a personal statement by the President to take up Soviet missiles. K: She must have had in mind that we promised her we would not drop the issue. JK; I see. It was interpreted by some of us as an indication of movement toward communication at the highest level. K: No, there was no such. She must mean that we said we would raise it and continue to raise it and not acquiesce in it. JK: I see. Is there any sign that the Russians are stopping the Syrians. K: There's no sign that the Russians are doing anything. We get a different report every hour on what the situation really is in Jordan. The Soviet behavior is not easy to understand JK; It's quite easty in light of what General DeGaulle once said to you, about trying to restore credibility in the most visible way. K: But it's not easy in light of what they are saying about trying to help with a settlement. JK: Okay. I would like to see you, K: It's a bad week, but I would love to see you. JK; Okay. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. $ 16 TELCON X-39 Haldeman/Kissinger 2:15 p.m 9/21/70 K: (picked up in middle of conversation) strongly than I. The situation is getting worse and out of control. I think it's too late to do it. H: Send Israel in? K: Yes. And that bullshit of the Secy's that we were stampeding the President. Every cable is worse. H: What's he going to do? K: He is still waiting. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/21 pultr 19 Dec 2007 By CIM NARA, Date Apr 2009 Lp. [p.1181] 1] Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Secretary Rogers 9/21/70 3:50 p.m, R: I'm calling about a totally different subject. K: Thank God. R: Yes, your backgrounder. Gerry Smith is concerned about something on page 13, regarding the SALT talks. You said "Proposals 11 K: I was afraid you were going to praise me for a minute. R: Said, "Proposals have been carefully prepared on our side, and the Soviet proposals have provided a basis for negotiation. " Gerry Smith doesn't think they do. K: That's an unhappy formulation. R: What he asked about was whether this had been released. K: Yes it has. The intention was to say were not unreasonable." It was badly put. R: He is afraid it might be seen as a signal to the Russians that we want to negotiate on their proposals. K: It hasn't been picked up in the press like that. R: What we should do, he thinks, is to have somebody say just the opposite, not to refer specifically to it, but have somebody ask us and say no. K: That's okay as long as it doesn't look like a frontal attack on me. That's not a good formulation, I agree. R: Okay. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Joe Sisco 9/21/70 3:57 p.m. S: I would like to send out another telegram in reply to Amman 5023 in which the King K: I have seen it. S: What bothers me is paragraph 3: "I made the point to Rifai He said ground operations are fine in the area as well as K: Yes, I read it. S: What I want to say is "I have received your telegram and note that Rifai says ground operations are fine in the area as well as in Jordan. Did you make clear that tentative Israeli thinking is that air strikes in Jordan are not sufficient, and also require ground action in Jordan?" K: Well not, wait on this. It's conceivable that we will have your plan. Let's hold off on that. The more I think about it the more I conclude S: We are better with them hitting (?) in Syria. K: Yes, there's less of a problem getting them out of there. S: Okay, we will send out one sentence telling our Embassy to eon- veyx the written message and nothing more to the Israelis for the moment. The Secretary just called; apparently he and the President and you have thlked. He said the President wants to explore the other alternative. K: The Syria one? E.O. NLN 12958, 05-03/28 3.5 pullt 19Dec2007 By NARA, [p.101] Date 2009 S: Yes. I said to him 'You call in Rabin right away and ask what he thinks of it politically and militarily. I K: He himself shouldn't do this, S: All right, so far he hasn't. as amended, DECLASSIFIED Sect K: You want to convey to Rabin also this message? S: Okay, I just wanted to make sure we agreed. We all aboard? K: Yes, we are cooperating beautkfully. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON N. Rockefeller/Kissinger 5:20 p,m, 9/21/70 R: I wanted to thank you for what you did in relations to the visit. K: I hope it was all right. R: Did you see the NYTimes? Fantastic! K: I gave the ambassador a talk on where their interests are. R: Arther left the dias and joined his wife in the audience, he was so furious. K: I told them a co-religionist wouldn't do them any good. R: She's a great woman. We need her in our country. K: That's what the President said. R: I told her to take the job here. I K: We are trying to move in the first team but before we are through they will know they have bitten something off. Things have turned a lot. R: It's exactly what you said two months ago. K: ktel was convinced that I made myself extremely unpopular here by saying thi would lead to war rather than peace. It's like lions, you blink once with the Arabs and they are all over you. R: Does he understand what Rogers has been doing? K: I think. We will are really pouring power in there now. More going on this week. R: She said, and rightly, that Hussein wouldn't have done without encouragement. You needn't comment. The other thing is on the shipment of equipment which I hope is taking place. K: It's ordered about 3 times a month but then it's like punching pilbow S. R: She said one week technicians were sent and things were rolling and then it wasxmxx turned off, But you know. K: Too well. R: Thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. N. Rockefeller/Kissinger 5:20 p.m. 9/21/70 --2- K: Your support has always meant an enourmous amount to me. You have walke the line well. We are slowly digging ourselves out of the morass but if this blows you are not coming through Washington during the campaign? R: I may. K: If you should, there are some things of interest to you which you can't use in the campaign but show a rough time, R: Does it look like a trip? K: I guess no. R: If there were, you would go? K: Yes. R: I had a feeling that with the problems and crises that another trip -- K: It was a good move to go to the 6th Fleet to show se meant it but now so much has ask happened and now it will be hard. R: I hope Hussein doesn't go under. K: That's essential. We are more in control with things here than two weeks ago. R: You know, she never criticized in public or private. Really great. K: A great woman. R: Well, people up here are happy. K: How is your campaign going? R: Too well. Too long between now and elections. Job of keeping the momentun I am going up-state this week. K: I need hardly tell you I am for you. R: You have been very helpful and John Mitchell has been helpful. K: He likes you. Did you see where he popped off, after a few drinks, in W omen's Wear Daily? He said Winthrop can buy the votes SOW why worry. R: I think he will lose. He was fabulous when I brough those blacks down. K: He is great, (last seemed to refer to Mitchell). Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Kissinger 5:55 p.m. 9/21/701 P: Did you have anything before this meeting at 6:00? K: I could drop by. P: Did we have Helms? K: You decided last night not to have him. P: I meant this morning. K: OK, I will see that he is invited from now on. Anyway, he is in Alabama. P: Good, then we don't need him. K: May I raise a trip question with you? I spoke to the Ambassador about Mrs. Nixon. The & Queen is going to ask to be invited to lunch with you and Mrs. Nixon at Chequers and afterwards Lady Home would take care of her at her country house. It's so unprecedented that K it would be awkward to turn down. P: That's right. K: You would have a meeting with Heath before lunch. She would join after and then you'd meet with Heath after lunch. We could make Shannon later. P: That's right. Check with Haldeman because Mrs. Annenberg was working on something. I told them that the Queen took precedence. K: Freeman said it's unprecedented. P: I hope we can make the trip. Maybe we can. K: We don't have to be precipitous on this. P: Let's get this going on time. These people have been working hard and they need a good night's rest. Bring us up to date on developments during the day. You and Sisco. K: Vorontsov is in to see Sisco now. He had a message. P: Probably worning us . K: That's all we have to do now. (?) P: Has anyone talked to Rabin about going through Sryia? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Kissinger 5:55 p.m. 9/21/70 -2- K: I did and Sisco and they are exploring it, P: Nothing new. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Amb. Rabin 198 9/21/70 7:05 p.m. K: There is a point of clarification I want to raise with you. What did you tell Sisco this afternoon about the alternate plan we mentioned to you this afternoon, the alternate courses of operations? R: He raised the question. He said they estimated that Jordan didn't want ground operations in Jordan and he asked about the pos- sibility of carrying out diversionary action in Syria. He asked my opinion. I made it very clear that diversionary operations cannot achieve anything unless the purpose is to eliminate the forces in Jordan. K: I want to get one things clear. Did I understand you correctly when we talked this afternoon that if a major operation was carried out in Syria, from a military point of view this was a feasible operation? You and I have to be meticulous in our understandings for this reason. What you tell me I report to the President. When another version is reported, my version must be the correct one. Otherwise there is no sense in my talking to you. I reported my understanding of the con- versation this afternoon--from a purely military point of view you expressed the thought that this might be an effective and probably the effective way of do ing it. R: Exactly. K: We were told this evening that it was your judgment that from a military point of view it was not feasible. R: This time it is recorded. He talked about diversionary tactics. I went into detail and explained to him. I said to him you don't have diversionary K: You don't have to explain any more than that. R: It is unbelieveable. K: The only essential thing is that any time you deviate, even in the slightest- which you didn't do I want to know when I say in a meeting 'It is my belief that this is the Israeli point of view, 1 I want to be exactly right. R: I didn't deviate. He doesn't understand the difference between diversionary and military (?) actions. E.O. 12958, DECLASSIFIED as amended, Sect 3.5 By CIM NLN 05-03/29 pn ltr 19Dcc 2007 NARA, Date Apr 2009 [p.1004] Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Amb. Rabin 9/21/70 7:05 p.m. page 2 K: I understand, Mr. Ambassador, Yes he does, but I understand. R: It's really unbelieveable. K: I'll straighten it out, You should be getting your answers this evening. But when you get them, check them with me, will you? R: When I asked Joe "If the Jordanians don't want ground operations in Jordan is it your estimate or have you information? 11 He said "we don't have information; it's just our estimate. 11 to K: He didn¹t give you the note kxora Allon? R: He gave me the note but without the part about the Jordanians preferring not to have it on their own grounds. Since he started to talk about diversionary K: It is perfectly plain to me. R: I said "what do you mean by diversionary? 11 K: I understand. R: I said nonsense. They have decided to move that force because they have a reason to do so. They are willing to take the risk. I don't believe in diversionary. K: I fully understand. R: There were at least two people on their part and one on our part, and he came to me and said K: But they were not at the meeting with the President. R: It becomes something that's impossible to work. K: It will be straightened out. R: I tried to find out to Haig after I came back. I wanted to explain the concept of diversion. K: You should have done that. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential DECLASSIFIED Library 05-03/29 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Amb. Rabin 9/21/70 7:05 p.m. page 3 R: I couldn't reach him. K: Then you should have left word. R: I did and was told he would call me back. K: It doesn't matter; no one is blaming you. Relax Mr. Ambassador. We will be back to you tonight. R: Very strange. I didn't write it down--someone else did. K: We'll confuse everybody if we keep this up. Someone has just come in. Goodbye. [The President had walked into Mr. Kissinger's office with Mr. Haldeman. ] 7:20 p.m. [After the President left Mr. Kissinger's office] K: The President wants, on an urgent basis, the assessment of your government of the plan of a major attack in that region and on a diversionary attack. R: Fine. K: On your seven questions, it would make the second irrelevant. Isn't that true? R: I don't understand. asked K: Because you have been asking for air, and you would now have to be asked for ground under these conditions. Your second question is whether the Jordanian government will ask you. R: Anyhow we might have to reach (?) Jordan. K: Of course, but at any rate it would give a different complexion to the question. Can you give us your assessment on the feasibility of a major operation? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED 05-03/29: p. 30f4] This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Amb. Rabin 9/21/70 7:05 p.m. page 4 R: I would have to send it back to my country, to my ggvernment. K: Of course, you are being asked by the President to produce it. Tonight you will get the answers to the seven questions. Most of them will be unambiguously positive; the ones that are not are not because of us. I will get you the answers. R: When? K: Well, you aren't the only one who has to deal with Sisco. It will be within an hour or so. R: All right. Otherwise it would not be practical to put the first one. K: Okay. I'll get the answers to you. But keep in mind some of the advise I gave you this afternoon--about cleverness. R: Okay. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential DECLASSIFIED LINLN 05-03/29: P- 484] This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissinger Joe Sisco 9/21/70; 7:20 p.m. K: The first thing you should get to me is the answer to these questions which the President would like to get out tonight. S: I have done a preliminary draft of the answer to these questions. There is a problem -- I have done a companion piece re Question #2, Will the king agree to request our assistance and undertake to institute methods of communications between us? I feel simultaneously with drafting these answers we could get a flash to Amman right away on this question. XXXX Here is what I have drafted: As you have been previously informed, the Israelis have under action consideration the question of air and ground action in Jordan. We have informed them, the Israelis, as previously reported to you that the "US agrees in principle to the Israeli operation by air in Jordan subsequent to the review of this matter. 11 The Israelis have not taken any decision and are awaiting a reply to the seven questions put to you. One question is as follows: Will the king agree to request our assistance and undertake to institute methods of communications between us? We know the exchange of message betwen Allon and the King leaves the matter of liaison in abeyance for the moment. We note also revised that Government of Jordan would recommend (?) ground action outside of Jordan, meaning Syria. We have not taken this refined statement as considered Jordanian judgment because we are not clear from your report as to whether you have put to the king what his view is with respect XIX to a ground xxxxxx operation by the Israelis in Jordan. Since the Israelis have posed the question, we ask that you ascertain views anxix of the king on this precisely. K: No! I just will not hold up answer to the Israelis any longer. S: Tell me what you want me to say. You should make it clear to the king that Israelis have this matter under active consideration DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/30 pu 19 Dec 2007 and that no decision has been made by them. By NARA, [p.1 02] Date 2009 K: What was this in response to? S: In a previous telegram we sent to them, asked the king what his attitude was with respect to a ground operation in Jordan since the Israelis felt the air strike was insufficient. My judgment is that Brown has not put the thing precisely and that this was a quick discussion between Rifai and Brown. He said Israelis were thinking of taking action in this area and they believed it necessary to conduct both air and ground action he does not say in Jordan. K: What area do you think he was talking about? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissinger Joe Sisco 9/21/70; 7:20 p.m. -2- S: I hope he was talking about Jordan, but he may have been talking about Syria. He said ground operations are fine in the area as long as they are not here in Jordan. Tell me what you want? K: We want an answer to those seven questions to go out in the next hour and a half. feg Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library [NLN 05-03/30 P. 202] DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON (President spoke very softly -- The President/Mr. Kissinger very difficult to hear) 7:43 p.m., September 21, 1970 K: You say you are leaning to keeping the trip on, P: In every possible way, we are not going to be in position to be in the middle of it. K: I think we should go full speed ahead, Mr. President, P: Just because the Israelis are having a little battle with the Syrians, we are not going to be moding around. K: Would expect that the Soviets would make some sharp move under these conditions. P: We have got to go on as if the world is still turning. K: The fleet will have to leave its station around the 26th, 5 days from now, SO we have plenty of time. P: We don't have to have exercises, just knock that off -- don't have to have the whole fleet over there. K: Have most of the fleet there. P: We don't have to go to the carrier you understand. -72222222 Think you should continue the plan as if the trip was going to go on and we could cancel but not before Wednesday evening. Everybody will understand if we knock it off. K: Have you had a chance to talk to Bob about the Queen? P: ?????? K: We ought to invite the Annenbergs. P: That's fine, that's fine, it would be very nice for Mrs. Nixon to see Checquers. wgh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger 8:20 p.m., September 21, 1970 S: What I will do if you agree, Roger will clear simultaneously with the Secretary. K: You will give the answers to Rabin tonight? S: If you clear and the Secretary clears the way I formulated it. It will be over in 5 minutes. I have arranged with Haig to call Roger Davies who is on duty and give him any changes that you may have. Will communicate these to Robbey. Think I have reflected the meeting pretty well. K: You always do. wgh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. *-22 TELECON The President/Mr. Kissinger 9:10 p. m., September 21, 1970 P: Henry, I am going to bed early -- I am meeting with Congress in the morning. K: Think it is going to be quiet tonight. I won't disturb you unless -- P: If you hear anything, let me know. K: Haven't given them the answers. When I talked to Rabin there were so many conflicting signals -- I think by tomorrow morning we will have answers. P: We will have additional intelligence on where it all stands. K: Think noon tomorrow is a good time for this group to meet. I think the Jordanian psychological end is stronger, more than their physical strength. P: More than they are showing on their nerve. K: They might still pull it out. P: I hope so but whatever, if the thing quiets down, this trip would be a reinforcement. K: If the Israelis don't move by Thursday, the thing will settle down. P: Okay Henry. wgh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Ambassador Rabin/Mr, Kissinger X-50 9:15 p.m., September 21, 1970 K: If you won't move on Jordan, how about moving on Foggy Bottom. R: Foggy Bottom? K: Get yourself a map of Washington and find out what buildings are located in Foggy Bottom. R: Buildings? ? K: Joe Sisco is located there. R: At what time? K: I am joking the answers will be delivered to you no later than 10:30. To be sure nothing is verbal, we are putting it in written form. Let me see if we got them -- have we got them both? Okay, tell you what I will do, will go over the questions and the answers and they should be delivered to you by 10:30. R: 10:30? K: Tonight, R: XXXX I am at home and I will be available whenever they decide to call me. K: You will get for the President the other. R: Will I get the answers to the questions? K: You will get them very soon. wgh DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/31 per ltr 19 Dec 2007 By CIM NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009 [p. 181] Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. X-24 TELECON X53 Roger Davies/Mr. Kissinger 9:20 p. m., September 21, 1970 K: I have suggestions - changes - in only the first three questions, the last four are okay. In the first one, I would like where it is indicated in the second sentence "it should be on the basis of these conversations and the fact that our common interest would be served". In the next question at the beginning of the third sentence, would add "with respect to ground operations the only indication we have". Would add at the end of that paragraph "Israeli air strikes have been requested and approved previously on several occasions by the King". Do you agree with these? D: Yes, they certainly fill out. K: "How will the U.S. 11 would go through. That is a separate issue and try to leave without. D: Trying to put in a quote from one of the President's statements. K: Okay, leave in "within defensible border" but add here "in the present erisis the United States has augumented the 6th Fleet. It has also taken other readiness measures". D: At the end of the paragraph? K: No, after the phrase "defensible border". That is, clearly imply a decision not to permit Soviet intervention against Israeli in the conditions under discussion. Then the next sentence would be "As for the specific measures, the United States may take". Then I would have "to prevent" and take out "in the future" but to prevent and then add as a last sentence after the time we have contingency plans for these eventualities." D: Will make the changes and ask the Israelis to come in and pick up a copy. I will wire Tel Aviv and Amman and tell them. I will call Joe and get back to you. K: Good, then maybe I can get some sleep. D: I hope so. DECLASSIFIED wgh E.O. 12958, as amended, Seet 3.5 NLN CIM 05-03/32 per ltr 19 Dec 2007 By NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissing Roger Davies 9/21/70; 9:30 p.m. x-54 K: Would you read the last paragraph again. D: In the recent crisis the U. S. has augmented the Sixth Fleet. It has also taken other readiness measures clearly implying a decision not to permit Soviet intervention against Israel in the conditions under discussion. As for the specific measures the U. S. may take to prevent Soviet intervention we have contingency plans for these eventualities. K: No, what I was going to say -- these would depend on circumstances that exist at the time, D: That these depend upon the circumstances of the situation that exist at the present time we have contingency plans for these eventualities. K: Do you agree it sharpens it? D: Yes, sir. K: You will be pleased to know that I am clearing the other cable as it is. I appreciate the cooperation of everyone in your organization. D: Thank you very much. I will pass that on to the boys. K: Seeley impressed me in particular today. He did a superb job in drafting considering the pressure he was under. D: He turns out a great deal of good work. K: He impressed the hell out of me. D: I will be pleased to pass that on to him feg Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER SANITIZED A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 20A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER. A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Van der Beugal/Kissinger 9:26 m. 9/22/70 V: How are you? K: Busy but fine. V: Good. We won't see each other this time. K: You can't come down? V: The arrangement with the house is that I am in NY. It's a safer feeling and I don't want to move around. K: Of course. Though you can be reached down here. V: But I have made the arrangement at home. K: V: SANITIZED K: V: K: V: K: I am worried about your being here. Last time it was the decision on Cambodia and now it's Jordan. V: If a I am helpful staying away, tell me. Is it bad? K: It looks better. V: Will Hussein hold? K: He has a chance. V: We have long that that guy doesn't . K: That's true. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Van der Beugal/Kissinger 9:26 a.m. 9/22/70 -2- V: If that is the pinnacle of our hope, where are we going? K: It look S a little better and we have acted strongly. V: We are moving from a complete overestimation to a complete underestimation and now possibly to normalcy on this country. K: We have taken some strong actions in the last few weeks and the President isn't easy to be pushed off course. We have quieted down the VN outcry. V: It isn't even in the news. I always met a lot of political bastards here and it's striking how different the atmosphere is. It's a completely different atmos- phere. They don't love Washington but they see it more now. In May we had the feeling of a country falling apart but IXXXX no longer. K: After all, Cambodia has worked. VN is out of the news. Soft policies on the M. E. have been discredited. V: The only thing that is an absolute non-entity is Europe. K: We will turn to that after we are above water. V: I cannot give you any hopeful prediction about Europe. It's a parocchial non-existing community. Led by dopes or operatòrs. K: How about the new British Government? V: I have great confidence in Heath but he is not on the map. Maybe that's his style. A man of enourmous integrity, brass takks and courage. K: Maybe just not a little. V: How is Nancy? K: Fine. V: And you are in good shape. You are coming to Europe with the President? K: If it comes off. V: That's only the South. K: Yes but London, October 3. V: That's a rush visit. I will be here in December and I will come down. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Van der Beugal/Kissinger 9:26 a.m. 9/22/70 -3- K: I have a great new office. V: I saw it when it was planned. K: It was decorated by a homosexual so it's good for a boudoir. V: You got my note on the *Doxok Dutch thing? K: Yes. V: That's not until November. Miekwe sends her love. K: And I will try to send her a note. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Laird/Kissinger 10:35 a.m. 9/22/70 K: You were a great soldier at these meetings. On the little things you fight 1 a maniac but xxxx on the big things you are always there. senh L: I wartxthat package over on the supplemental. K: I haven't seen it yet, L: A draft decision memo and statement to Congress. K: I will dig it out. We have been preoccupied. L: State wants to work out a military assistance package now. It's okay to me with them, isn't it. K: Ales says you are no longer interested in a supplemental. He must have misunderstood. L: That's not true. K: May I send someone? L: Sure. It's XXX all in that package. Look at it if you have a chance. I know you have a took lot to look at. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Rogers/Kissinger 10:55 a.m. 9/22/70 R: I notice you are going to Paris to talk to Habib and Bruce. K: I just thought I would go a day early. No significante. R: I would appreciate X if you would let me know before you get in touch with m people. K: The President mentioned it and thought since I hadn't had a chance - - he kne R: You should let me know. K: I thought it would go through Sullivan. R: I mean it comes to me after Bruce and Habib know about it. Are you doing anything about stopping Ky's visit? K: I won't see him or talk to him. Only see Bruce and Habib. R: What's the President's position on Ky? K: He wants to keep him away. R: We have done what we can. K: I understand there's a guy close to Mclintyre who urged him strongly not to come. Haldeman has handled this. R: We have done a lot. We couldxix.ssix insist he not come. That would be a problem. It's becoming a k problem. K: I think we have done what we can. R: I will talk with the President. K: I have no intention of seeing Ky or anyone else. I thought this was a routine matter that would come to your attention. Haig tells me we called someone in th Secretariet and let you know. We didn't think it important enough to talk to you directly. R: I will find out who he talked to. They attributed it to the Ky visit, K: I will see no one except Bruce and Habib. It was the sort Like of thing that the President said see those guys and get a sense of them. xbet Sullivan did it when he went to Asia. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Rogers/Kissinger 10:55 a.m. 9/22/70 -2- R: I think the sense of the team is the same. I think Bunker's conversation with Thieu is encouraging. K: It will show we are working at it when he makes the statement. R: We haven't gotten an answer from the Israelis but I think they will act. K: If it stabilizes we will not be that anxious. R: If it stabalizes we should caution them to wait. If Hussein could pull it off it would be a hell of a thing. They are right up there. K: From intelligence reports they are moving where they said they wouldn;t. R: And with our support they can use that. After our meeting we should discu that. It will be 6:00 there and they won't do it that late. Xxx We haven't heard from the King. We should because we don't want to do something against his wishes. K: If they go through Syrai we won't have that problem but a diffèrent one. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Joe Alsop 9/22/70 11:15 a. m. A: I need a few minutes of your time. Could you fit me in tomorrow morning or late this afternoon? K: I'll try. A: I know it's tough. You were advertised as such in this week's New Republic by Mr. Osborne. K: Complainingly? A: No. But do you think you could see me? K: This is a rough time. A: I know. If Hussein loses, the Israelis will end by invading Jordan. K: No question. They may invade without Hussein losing. A: To help save him. K: At any rate, we've come out of our period of torpor. A: We can't go on being torpid when somebody sticks a large pin in our rear. K: It's been known to happen. A: How about 6:30 this evening? K: Let me call you later. I just have to be sure. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Sisco/Kissinger 11:33 xx a.m. 9/22/70 S: I don't want you to undermine my staff. You are passing out toomany compliments. K: Do you think the Israelis will attack without coming back to us? S: I don't think SO without answering number 2. Do you think I should call Rabin and say I assume nothing will happen before hearing from you. I thought of this an hour ago. K: It's better if you do it than I. If you have any quesitons -- S: Before any buttons are pushed, you will be back in touch with us. That sort of thing. K: You will be in touch again with me. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Secretary Rogers 9/22/70 3:20 p.m. R: I would appreciate it if in the morning on this German question you would call on Hillenbrand, He is very knowledgable and has just come back from there. I don't think there's an intelligence question invelved here. K: Okay. The President wanted originally to spend an hour on that and half an hour on Jordan. But I see no sense in talkinb about Jordan now. R: No, I think it is a good idea to have a meeting just for him to hear it first-hand, but there is nothing much for him to decide. K: That was the purpose of it to lay out the issues. R: Okay. I will tell Marty. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified TELCON Sisco/Kissinger 5:11 p.m. 9/22/70 S: Tomorrow I have been asked to brief the Senate Foreign Relations and I want to be sure I don't miss anything in the meeting today. Was there any question with the President and the Leadership if there was a request from Jordan for us to interfere. K: The President didn't address that and he said we willx are considering it in the evacuation context only. S: That's very helpful. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MSS D-IV LIB CONG. X-28 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON INFORMATION SECRET/SENSITIVE September 22, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER FROM: Al Haig 0 SUBJECT: Conversation with Ambassador Rabin I had the following phone message from Rabin just as you departed for the Sans Souci. He stated: ; The Syrians again launched attacks south at 10:00 a. m. Jordanian time this morning. They ran into heavy artillery fire from the Jordanians and suffered casualties and as of 1:30 pm were withdrawn. There is no sign of new attacks this afternoon. : The above report is effective 1:30 p.m. local. -- Rabin said that heavy fire is still going on in Amman. -- Yesterday, there were several C-130 and Antonov-12 flights from Libya to Syria and today there were Antonov-12 flights from Egypt to Syria. The Israelis estimate that a battalion size Libyan force is being introduced into Syria. They also now believe that Egypt may be sending elements of the Palestinian Army into Syria. : Rabin stated that they are watching Iraqi forces closely and that there are some indicators of an imminent Iraqi attack (contrary to Secretary Rogers' estimate this morning, the Israelis had previously reported that Jordanian forces have already placed artillery on Iraqi forces with some casualties). -- Rabin stated that he expects the cable resulting from today's Cabinet Meeting and in response to our communication of last night to arrive between 4:00 pm and 5:00 pm this afternoon. He will call here as soon as it arrives and let us be the first to see it. SECRET/SENSITIVE Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MSS DIV LIB CONG. X-30 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Lite E/S-HK-G43 X-59 TOP SECRET Septembe MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER FROM: Al Haig 2 SUBJECT: Israeli Matter Attached at Tab A is the substance of the Israeli response. Attached at Tab B is the elaboration which you obtained from Rabin. Rabin called at 7:15 p.m. with the following message: (1) The Syrians tried to attack south again this afternoon and were badly mauled and lost 20 tanks, (2) Rabin has read the essence of the Israeli Cabinet message to Sisco over the phone and will deliver a written copy in about 20 minutes. (3) The Israelis met with Pranger this afternoon at Defense and were told that their only authorization was for additional ammunition if they had any shortages. I told Rabin that we had a Presidential directive which I was confident would untangle the problems at Defense. Attachments TOP SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. X-24 TELECON Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger 7:15 p.m., September 22, 1970 S: We have just gotten the Israelis response. K: They sent a copy here too. S: They are faster than I thought. K: I haven't seen it yet, just trying to save you reading it to me. S: May I read it to you anyway and let you hear my sultry voice? K: Could I call you back in 10 minutes, I've got some people here who I'm trying to get started on a paper. S: I am trying to do the same thing myself. K: All right, go ahead. S: What the paper says in two sentences is that they would intend to act by air but if the situation requires, also on the ground. If the air action doesn't lead to Syrian withdrawal, air and ground would be against Syrian forces on the ground. Meeting with the King K: with the Jordanians S: to coordinate as soon as possible. With regard to the containment of Soviet intervention in question three, we want you to confirm to us our interpretation to our position with reference to our answer understand intervention to mean Soviet actions and measures against them including the Suez Canal front and the sea. Moreover, would not be restricted to time of operations undertaken with reference to the Jordan-Syrian situation, bearing in mind the possibility that Soviet reaction may be a delayed reaction. K: Forceful enough. S: Some relevance to the timeframe. Goes on to say, with regard to equipment, the operation may lead to resumption of hostilities in the Suez Canal in addition to the Syrian and Jordanian fronts. We shall therefore want to approach you on a number of concrete items DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/33 per etr 19 Dec 2007 By CIM NARA, Date I Apr 2009 [p.1.2] [p. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger Page 2 -- 7:15 p.m., September 22, 1970 of equipment and expect to get better treatment than we have. They also intend to send a message to the King through you. My instinct is to propose that we would take a little ???? on this tonight. No such answer should go tonight -- you and the others should discuss this very carefully in light of the situation that exists. Just call the Secretary on the essence of this ??? feeling that we should consider this very carefully. K: Hold on a second -- S: Now, got a little dilemma. The NSC meeting on Jordan tomorrow ????? K: No, no. S: I am supposed to go to the Senate Foreign Relations. K: Bureaucracy is trying to inundate everybody. NSC was on Germany but the President is now going to use it for the issue of preparing an answer. I just tool told him that an answer had come in. ?? Can't you delay your appearance with the Foreign Relations. Call the Secretary and see. S: If I can't get out of this Senate Foreign Relations Committee ???? 9:30 is awfully early - - there should be some preliminary discussion before going into a big NSC meeting. K: It is not a big NSC meeting, it is the same group that met before. Just calling it an NSC. ??? S: ???? a suggested reply. K: You and I have to be in touch on that. S: Discuss what should be drafted and coordinate it then. K: I will have a word with the Secretary. wgh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library [NLN 05-03/33: P. 21g2] DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. X-59 Telecon Mr. Kissinger Secretary Rogers 9/22/70; 7:20 p.m. K: I have not had a chance to study the text of this reply and we just told the President that there has been a reply and I thought that we should meet on it tomorrow rather than try to fire one off tonight, He wanted to use the 9:30 - 10:30 period, He thinks the German issue interesting but not crucial right now so I just wanted to let you know and we will confine it to the same group that has been meeting. R: Will you have someone let Ted Eliot know. That other matter, are we going to discuss that, too? K: Yes. I was to check with everybody to see whether there was anything else to be discussed. There is nothing we need to do tonight. R: Right. Let's all try to get a night's sleep. Poor Joe, he is groggy. Okay, we'll see you in the morning at 9:30. feg Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Sisco/Mr. Kissinger 7:30 p.m., September 22, 1970 S: You and the Secretary will talk on this and draft a reply. K: For your and my information, it would help if you and I could agree informally. S: I am going home to eat something, why don't you give me a call. K: If I had as pretty a wife as you have, I would do the same. S: I can see that you say this feelingly. K: If you are good to me, I will take care of you on the West Coast. S: Give me a call when you are free and we can talk orally. K: Going to the UAR Embassy tonight. S: You go there and you are off my list. K: I thought that would throw off. S: Stay home. I will see about getting the Senate Relations thing cancelled either that or send Roger Davies. wgh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissi. ,er Secretary Packard X-33 9/22/70; 7:50 p.m. K: We have been trying to get an assistance package together for Israel in case it has to move. We are going through the same song and dance that always happens. P: Look, I have one on my desk that is okay with me. K: The Israelis called today and said all he said he could discuss was additional total ammunition. We need two packages: one for the northern front and one for the southern front. Not to be delivered but to be ready in case circumstances require it. P: I have one on my desk but I don't know if it is adequate. I will get on it. K: We need a package for the southern area and a package for the northern with the clear understanding that these are on a contingency basis. He does not have to tell the Israelis what we are going to do. We have to know what we can do. He was supposed to straighten it out with their military attache but he told them he could not discuss it. If you are satisfied that we have a package for both contingencies, that's fine. P: Okay. K: Okay. feg Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon X-63 Mr. Kissinger Amb. Rabin 9/22/70; 8:50 p.m. K: At a reception at an Embassy I ran into John Chancellor who said that Valeriano had been told by an Israeli official that joint planning was going on for an Israeli attack. R: Total XXXXXXX nonsense. I don't believe that any Israeli said so. I will tell you what happened. In Israel it appeared on some papers that the Government of Israel has no intentions to take the chestnut out of the fire for the Americans. K: Just make sure that none of your people. R: I had an opportunity to talk to John Chancellor because he attended the luncheon for the Prime Minister and I don't believe that anybody said so. K: He said it was said to Valeriano. R: I don't believe anyone said that. I know exactly what I said and what I I instructed everyone to say. I can check it because our spokesman is here. K: Don't bother. I take yourword for it. R: The whole problem came about with the news that Israel is not going to do anything. This is what happened in our newspapers. We had a lot of questions why Israel is waiting. Why they are not doing anything that's 90% of the questions. May I ask you another thing? When do you believe you will be in a position to tell me something? K: Before noon tomorrow. I know what the President is going to decide but we want to do it with the others, R: It is very interesting because my own Ambassador (?) is after me. K: I ran into the Soviet Charge at this Embassy reception and they seem to be extremely nervous, R: He phoned my Ambassador at least ten times. I am sure it is not true what Chancellor told you and the problems we have had today since all the newspapers in Israel came out that Israel is not going to do anything - --we are getting a lot of questions Why Israel sits idle and doesn't react. K: Okay. feg Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON X-64 Mr. Sisco/Mr. Kissinger 9:50 p.m., September 22, 1970 K: - - possibility of a reply. S: What's your thoughts? K: I asked you first. S: I think that we ought to go back in the course of tomorrow and first we ought to make a judgment that we give to them before I say what we say, let me tell you what the problem is. The Jordanian point of view and from our point of view, we are trying to get the king to do this by himself. If not by himself, in order for the Israeli's to be responsive in order to be helpful to the King and yet with the least possible adverse repercussions to this. If the situation warrants our presence, will be nothing there on down but the Israelis or if they need help from the Jordanian point of view, minimal air strikes as a way to help Hussein do the job himself. Now from the Israeli point of view, Israelis getting the Syrians out and if need be hold on to a certain chunck of territory for a certain period of time as the best way to assure against Israel/Iraq . The Jordanians are thinking much more in terms of an Israeli strike in areas. The Israelis are thinking much more in terms ??? as a way of achieving the withdrawal of forces. I have overstated both positions for obvious reasons for purposes of clarifying our own thinking. ??? have said that looking at the situation tomorrow morning and if we ??? to the Jordanians. We should continue the dialogue with the Israelis. K: How do you continue the dialogue? S: Answer their questions, keep the option and try to facilitate a get together between the Israelis and the Jordanians. We agree in principles but we ought to know before they go and we ought to know [the results]. Ought to be responsive to the Jordanian request. K: How much more clear can they be than air request? S: Read the Annenberg cable about Hussein's complaint about the fedayeen. K: It is conceivable S: It is conceivable but not certain. Are you sure in your own mind DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/34 pu ltr 19 Dec 2001 By CIM NARA, Date Apr 2009 uced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger 9:50 p.m., September 22, 1970 - - page 2 K; I am sure in my own mind that we are going one way or the other. Hussein is going to collapse. S: I don't at the moment think the facts sustain that. K: I am not talking about tomorrow, how are you going to keep the Israelis in play by answering their questions? S: I am not quarrelling with that. K: You can't give it to them carte blanche. S: They ought to go to them but then say before you do, we want to be consulted. Don't suggest that you don't answer their questions. If you don't respond positively in principle, you lose your option. K: How do we answer their questions? S: Don't know. Got this paper and want to reflect on it. Think we say the Jordanians are obviously trying to do this job by their own means. Very anxious to have the two of you to get together because both of you obviously feel there has got to be coordination and think one of two ways the Jordanians indicate that the grounds ??? The Israelis are ready to go or give a yes txtra and pass along that contact between the two regardless of what the discussions are, we want an opportunity to consult before the final move is made. K: What did you say, either want an opportunity to consult or the other come S: If we go along, we then ought to send a message to the Jordanians, make the response and let them send the message to indicate to the Jordanians what we are prepared to do and if we say this is what we are prepared to do, we would still say to the Israelis, after you talk to the Jordanians, we would still want you to come back and talk to us. I may have some further thoughts as I reflect on this tonight. Frankly, I haven't consulted anyone. K: I have scheduled a WSAG for 8:00 in the morning just to bring ourselves up-to-date. S: Okay Henry, see you in the morning. wgh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library ENLN 05-03/34: p282] DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Amb. Rabin 9/22/70 p.m. R: I got a response from the government and would like to come as soon as possible. K: How long will it take you to get here? R: 15 minutes. K: Okay. I have to see the President, but you just wait for me. R: I think it's a matter of principle. We are ready but another operation tofollow it up. I think I have to explain it in detail to you. Where should I come? K: The Map Room. R: And Young will be there? K: Yes. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON X-356 Sisco/Kissinger 9/23/70 X-66 11:21 a. m. K; When can we see a draft? S: I just dictated a draft. I will skerr want to go over it myself and see the Secy. I think within an hour, K: OK. I am wondering if I should call that group together. S: The Secy. has just called me. It's 11:30. If at 2:00 or something. K: I will be back to you. S: I can judge better after seeing the Secy. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Sen. Stennis/Kissinger 2:47 p.m. 9/23/70 K: I am sorry I have been so hard to get to. S: We gaxrex have this Israeli amendment. It's acceptable to me, of course. The questions is whether or not to put a ceiling on it. K: Our objective on this is -- S: I want that in a confidential way. K: We would prefer no cxexlix celing because it will be understood as actual aid. The Arabs will be and the Soviets could use it. If it's low it might be misunderstood as less commitment. We prefer that no ceiling be put on it. S: That's fine. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. S DIV LIB CONG. Department of St. = ONLINE INDICATE: STATE'S of TELEGRAM CHARGE TO *-4° 2.3.Stg70 22 AMENBASSY, TEL AVIV PRIORITY DISTINBUTION ACTION: AMENBASSY, AMMAN PRIORITY 23 LONDON PARIS " !!! ROME " MOSCOW " BEIRUT 11 USINT CAIRO !! USUN NEW YORK !1 AMENBASSY KUWAIT 11 JIDDA 11 RABAT " NNN TUNIS = STATE 156646 NODIS September 23, 3:00 p.m. EDT 1. Rabin called Sisco/to convey categoric assurance that Israel would not move unilaterally against Syrian forces in Jordan without prior consultations with the US. northern 2. Rabin NH characterized the situation in NOTICE Jordan in optimistic kx terms and said that their information confirms that all Syrian tanks had been withdrawn from Jordan or were in the process of being withdrawn. In XS response. to Sisco's query as to what factors were responsible for this Syrian withdrawal, Rabin gave the following four in the exdx order given below: DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT. APPROVED BY: NEA: JJSis: mth 9/23/70 29586 Joseph J. Sisc S/S. - Mr. Curran SPORTS /HODIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MSS DIV LIB CONG. Classifrcation Department of State INDICATE: UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM COLLECT CHARGE TO DISTRIBUTION ACTION: PAGE 2 of TEL to TEL AVIV, AMMAN, etc. First and foremost, Rabin said, there was the Jordanian Army, loyal to the King, which gave the Syrians a real beating. Rabin recalled that GOI view has always been that Jordanian Army has the capability and is effective provided King showed resolve. Rabin was laudatory as to how comported Jordanian Army has Exempented itself in recent crisis. Second factor, according to Rabin, was Syrian Government realization that in order to press attack further against solid Jordanian resistance more Syrian Government involvement and regular Army involvement would be x4xxqn required, which in turn carried increased risk of confrontation with Israelis. Moreoever, no longer could Syrians maintain that fedayeen were doing the fighting. Third, was the American posture in the Middle East which said Rabin sais was very helpful in situation. Rabin felt that steps taken by US amounted to a credible threat and signal to USSR. DRAFTED BY: DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT. APPROVED BY: CLEARANCES: NODTS 05-322 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MSS DIV LIB CONG. DEPAI STATE Classification Department of State INDICATE: UNITED STATES OF Associated TELEGRAM COLLECT CHARGE TO DISTRIBUTION ACTION: PAGE 3 of TEL to TEL AVIV, AMMAN, etc. 7 Fourth, and of least significance in Rabin's view, was the Soviet role. He cautioned US on giving QTE Soviets too much credit UNQTE. In his judgment, it is not clear what subordinate Soviets did in Damascus and whatever they did, was swhexindsze above and kess less important than shouse the above three factors. He is convinced that Syrians could not have moved 200, tanks across border into Jordan without knowledge of USSR. In any event, whatever Soviets may have done in Damascus was inconsequential in his view, if compared to principal reason for Hussein's success, namely, real beating which Jordanian Army gave to Syrians. GP-3 END NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T. ROGERS DRAFTED BY: DRAFTING DATE TEL.EXT. APPROVED BY: CLEARANCES: SECRET/NODIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MSS DIV V LIB CONG. is Department of St. the CHILD 2 INDICATE: STATES or THUGRAM COLLECT X-65 CHARGE TO 238Γp70 ? 10:03: 03: DISTRIBUTION ACTION: Amembassy THL AVIV IMMEDIATE INFO: Amenbassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE STATE 156260 NODIS REF: State 156157 Sisco has just called Rabin to inform him that reply how being prepared to September 22 Israeli Note Verbale (+oftel). Sisco said he under instructions to state that, particularly in view of apparently improved situation in Jordan, we want Israel's assurance that there will be no unilateral Israoli move of any kind into Jordan while our reply is under and without further prior consultation with US. preparation/ Rabin said that he thought it was clear from September 22 Note Verbale that Israel would take no action pending US reply and until there had been meeting between GOI and GOJ representatives. Nevertheless, he would immediately pass this request for formal assurance to his government. GP-3 Note: Passed White House by OC/T ROGERS END BY: DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT. APPROVED BY: NFA:ALAtherton. Jr. :nob 9/23/70 29464 NEA - Jose CLEAMANCES: S/S - Mr. Curran LIC Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Laird/Kissinger X-68 4:13 p.m. 9/23/70 K: I just wanted to tell you what I told the President 5 mins. ago. We think we hav broken the back of this crisis. I told him that you, Packard and Moorer really pulled their weight. You are heart really great patriots. When the chips were down you really delivered. Pranger/wasn't in it but he dsvk delivered like a great man. I have needled him from time to time and I wish you would get word to him that he is a tower of strength. And Dave. And you. L: Thanks. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Phil Potter - Baltimore Sun 9/23/70 5:30 p.m. P: Is there any chance of getting over to see you? K: No. P: What I wanted to ask today was, the word out of State is some- what ambiguous with regard to the withdrawing of Syrian tanks. K: That's correct. We have some indications that they might be withdrawing, but we want to look at it more carefully. P: Did you by any chance see Sherman's piece in the Star today? K: What does it say? P: It says something to the effect that you were assured by the second man in the Soviet Embassy last night that when they said no foreign intervention they explicitly told you Syria was included in that, K: Where? At the SexietxEx UAR Embassy? P: Yes. K: Well, he sort of suggested that they were using their influence to get the Syrians well, he was a little ambiguous, either to with- draw or not to advance or whatever. You know the Middle East. P: Yes. K: Therefore, it is just too premature to draw any conclusions. If the Syrian tanks have withdrawn some of the air is out of the tension and with some of the air out of it the tension will have been reduced. We have some reports that Syrian tanks are withdrawing, but Sunday night we had a report they had withdrawn across the border and before we knew it they were back that night. This time, if they have withdrawn it is unlikely that they will come back. But it is unwise to throw our hats in the air yet. I am telling you exactly what we in the White House think. If at this time tomorrow the Syrian tanks are out we'll be a little more optimistic. P: What about the Cairo posture toward Hussein? K: They follow the events. At first they were on his side; then they didn't want to be outdone by Syria. They have not been in a leading Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Phil Potter 9/23/70 5:30 p.m. page 2 position. Today again they are acquiescing. I would say they are on the side of the Fedayeen on the whole. But they are almost more con- cerned with making a record than with doing anything decisive. P: They have wavered with the flow of events? K: That's right. P: What do you think accounts for this? The Israeli role on the flank is a reason for Syrian withdrawing? Soviet influence? K: The Israeli's obvious mobilization, or readiness measures, and the unexpectedly strong resistance of Jordan probably account for a lot. I would put Soviet influence last. They didn't exercise any real influence we noticed till all these others came into plan. The Soviet role over thekx last few weeks has not been very helpful. They've been pouring things into the standstill zone. P: Okay. Thank you very much. K: Right, Phil. P: I would love tosee you one of these days. K: I would like to see you. There's an unfortunate bias toward the irresponsible journalists who need to be straightened out. Are you going to be on the trip? P: No, I would love to be, but I cannot take it away from the White House correspondent. K: Okay. I'll see you when we get back. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. X-40 X TELCON Argov/Kissinger 6:00 p.m. x 9/23/70 K: The President asked me to call the Ambassador but since he is not here to tell you, the Prime Minister will hear that we will not forget your behaviour this week and we feel very lucky that Israel was there. A: That's very kind. K: That may effect some of the things later. A: I think so too. K: Do you think it's 8 broken now? A: That's what the information was. The Syrians are out. The Jordanians are moving tanks into Irbid and the situation in Amman is under control. Only a few nests. Now I suppose he will move into a haggling with the characters he has visiting him. They came to him and he didn't go to Cairo and that's a better position than he has had for years. K: That's better for you toon. A: Yes, if he plays his cards well. K: ????? his attitude towards what you have done. Al Haig has some advice for you that he will pass on later. I am glad we have had a chance to discus; things. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified + X-70 TELECON Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco 8:10 p.m., September 23, 1970 S: I've only got a minute, I am calling from home. Going off to the Lebanese Embassy tonight. They are giving a dinner for our new ambassador. Wanted to say two things to you -- hope that some of the heat on all of us is off. It has been a pretty good day. Henry, I really wanted to tell you you have done an outstanding job, you have raised a lot of tough questions that haven't been very easy to answer. You have been tremendous throughout, K: Without you it couldn't have been done. I appreciate the delicate position you have been in, S: The whole team has pulled very well together. All of us have served the President well. I wanted to call you from home because I didn't want to call you from the State Department. K: Joe, this means a lot to me, We will be friends for a long time. wgh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Laird/Kissinger 11:47 a. m. 9/24/70 K: The President appreciated your suggestion on the carrier and he ageeed withit. L: I thought hulshould check with you on this visit to Turkey. I have an invitation I am accepting and I don't want to give the impression that it's something we asked for. I am just trying to get State to turn it off and meet with the Defense Minister. K: You don't want Sisco. L: In Turkey, fine, but he is poison in Greece. They think he is the reason for the hold up in aid. I am accepting Turkish Defense minister's invitation. K: How can they think a thing like that. Would he do anything contrary to the President's wishes? We were trying to get rid of him. L: Send him home. K: Tell him that he must stay on top of the M.E. L: Can't have everyone out of town at the same time. K: I will tal take the blame. I will tell him the Presi dent wants him back here. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Joe Sisco 9/24/70 12:10 p.m. S: There were three things I wanted to mention: first, I am send- ing to you for your clearance a simple one-page suggestion as to two or three oral points that might be made to Rabin to put a ribbon on our recent effort. K: The President wants to do that very warmly. S: Wait till you see it; I have done it very warmly. And if you like, I can make it warmer. Secondly, I have just finished a suggested talking papermx for the President for use with the Mediterranean ambassadors, which was rather presumptuous of me. K: Not at all. That's what I wanted you to do. S: Am very anxious for him to see this. I think it's got the kind of view which the President and you and I would like to have reflected to the Ambassadors. I will put it in the usual bureancratic way into the book, but I hav e also sent you an extra copy. K: Good. S: Third, I just got a call in from the field. Palmer suggested, and I think it's very good, that I should brief all the Ambassadors on the Mid- dle East before the President at 11:00. K: That's a good idea. S: I thought it was; I just wanted to be sure. I would do it-at 9:00. K: That's terrific. If the Secretary agrees we are strongly in favor, and I don't see how he can not want you to. There were two things I wanted to mention to you/ The President is thinking that you ought to go back after Naples; he wants you here to watch things: we are not that much out of the woods yet. S: And Laird thinks my presence would give it too much an a Middle Eastern flavor. K: That I hadn't heard. XXX S: Let's leave it at that one day in Naples, then I'll come back. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Joe Sisco 9/24/70 12:10 p.m. page 2. K: We're sending Haig back for that reason. S: Fine, maybe Al and I can team up to come back. K: The other thing is strictly personal: I had a visitor today who was saying that Bergus is talking about me in a very vicious way. S: I will take care of that. K: It's awful for an American minister to talk that way. And he takes credit for starting that campaign on "expel. 11 S: Let me take care of it. You don't do a thing. I promise you I'll take care of it. K: Good. Thank yoji. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. X TELCON Dobrynin/Kissinger 3:04 p.m. 9/24/70 D: You didn't keep your word not to organize anything during my absence. K: Don't speak about who isn't keeping his word. You stayed away a lot longer then we thought. Let's not go into this on the phone. D: I amxxx calling today if it's possible to see the President about two point S-- The summit and things about Jordan. K: I will talk to him. His schedule is very full. Can you talk to me? D: Yes but the questions is when I left Moscow they said ? ? ?. Today or tomorr really. It could wait until tomorrow and it's not urgent. K: I understand. I will have to ask him. D: Understand and the timing. 20-25 mins. and then I could talk to you on a more detailed basis. K: You understand we are leaving town next week. D: Sunday. K: Probably, yes. D: hat's why I am calling. I just arrived late last night. f K: I will theck with the President. D: Let me know when it's possible to arrange it. K: I will let you know. Will you be seeing others before you see the President? D: No. Nobody. You are the first I am to call. Perhpas half an hour before I coul talk with you. K: I have no particular need to talk with you. I have to see if the President has time and if not, you may have to talk with me. Today I know is impossible. D: Tomorrow is no problem. I am not going to see anyone before that. I will awai your call. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissinger/The President 9/24/70; 6:40 p.m. -2- P: On the Dobrynin thing, let me leave it to your judgment. Take the message and tell him if the message justifies my seeing him you will work it out. K: Right, Mr. President. P: Right. Say, Mr. Ambassador, he is leaving and is cleaning out several things -- which is true, Okay? K: Right. feg Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Mr. Kissinger X-74 The President 9/24/70; 6:40 p.m. K: I had a call from Dobrynin this afternoon and he said he had a message for you on that Summit and also on the Jordanian situation. I was very cool to him and said I didn't know if your schedule permitted you to see him. P: I will not see him. If he wants to give a message, he can see you. I didn't give him K: I handed him the first and Haig handed Vorontsov the second. If you want to come to Map Room after and get P: I am not going to go to him and take a message unless it is positive - - I am not going to waste my time, K: Why don't I tell him you should give me the message? P: Tell him you would like to take a look at it and that you would look at my schedule. I don't think we want to appear that everytime he comes back I am going to slobber over him. Tell him if there is something substantive that would justify my seeing him, I will, but if it is just routine I can't do it. Let's put it that way. K: Good, I will call him. Ihad lunch with the Time people -- I think it went very well, I gave them the same I gave this morning. P: You think I ought to spend a few minutes with Sidey? K: I don't think it would hurt. P: Okay, fine, Henry. We will see you you are coming tonight. K: I will be there by 9:00 p.m. P: Do about the same as you did. K: About 20-25 minutes. P: About 25 minutes like you did this morning. No other new developments? K: No. The army seems to be continuing to clean out the Fedayeen. Some reports that the Iraquis are changing into Fedayeen uniform. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Ambassador Dobrynin 9/24/70 7:00 p.m. D: You were playing golf with the President? K: No, I don't play. I just talked to the President and he is extremely occupied tomorrow and is going to Camp David tomorrow night. What he wonders is if you could give me the messages. If there is anything warranting a personal reply from him he will see you later in the day. That's his position. D: I have to check it with Moscow, if you don't mind. K: No. D: In this particular case when I left they asked me to ask for an audience with him. I would have to ask my government in this case. K: I understand, but you recognize that he is leaving Friday night for Camp David. D: That's why they asked me to come earlier back to Washing- ton. But it's up to the President. K: If a written reply is needed we will give that; if something else But under no circumstances will he have much time. Why don't you ask Moscow if you can tell me, then we can have 15 minutes later in the day for you to get his reactions. D: It is up to Moscow; it is nptt up to me. This is really the question. I can't decide myself. It is not that they don't want me to speak with you. K: Of course, if there is something in your communication that warrants his reaction, he will, of course, see you, but not for long. D: The question is how he will react on this, not XLK just telling him the things and nothing else. K: If it requires a significant reaction he will react, but first he wants to see what it is. Call me in the morning and see if you can give it to me; if so, I propose 10:30. D: I will check with Moscow. When will he be back? K: October 6. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Ambassador Dobrynin 9/24/70 7:00 p.m. page 2 D: He is not going anyplace after the 6th? K: He willb e in and out. We told you his schedule was very crowded for October and November. November is the political cam- paign and he will be taking several trips. D: I understand, but it is a question of a 10-minute talk. K: We don't reject the idea of a 10-minute talk. We just want to see if there's something to talk about. D: All right. I will check with Moscow and call you tomorrow morning before 10:00 to clarify the situation from my side. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. PRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES X-44 TELCON Rabin/Kissinger X-75 4:33 p.m. 9/25/70 R: First, in response to what you transmitted WX two days ago when I was not here and you told Argov I have a cable from the Prime Minister and she wants to thank the President for the message and second, she hopes in the last weeks better understanding has been established as a result of the last developments between the U.S. and Israel. Third, she hopes that this understanding will be continued for the future. K: We will do our best and why don't you type it up and send it over here. It's a pleasure to eschange friendly messages for a change. R: A more practical point, you know in Copenhagen there's a meeting of the World Bank and Board of Governors all over the country and it's We have close contacts with them. We taxlex talked to you of the problem of $250 million as German loans which the U.S. as part of the German/U.S. offset agreement. The Germans stress time and again that if they get any hint from you that will be welcome in bringing this issue in discussion between you and us - K: They tell us the opposite. R: If you xxxxx indicate you are willing to use it favorably, not commit yourselve they would send a representative here to discuss it. No commitment on your part. Who would K: Xxxxxxxx make this communication to them? R: Can I we have a direct contact to Brandt. K: Could you send one of your economics men to Bergsten, my assistant to explain the problem to him and then I will let you know. R: You will not be here. K: Yes. R: Can we just tell them if they ask you to tell only to Brandt K: I don't understand the problem well enough and I shouldn't do it now in light of other things I have to do this week without economic advice. R: We talked to Mr. Samuels K: May I call you back? In half an hour? There's something I must do absolutely urgently. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5 NLN 05-03/35 pu ltr 2007 By FIM NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library This document 5.10.27 has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DECLASSIFIED X-44 TELCON Rabin/Kissinger X-75 4:33 p.m. 9/25/70 R: First, in response to what you transmitted WX two days ago when I was not here and you told Argov I have a cable from the Prime Minister and she wants to thank the President for the message and second, she hopes in the last weeks better understanding has been established as a result of the last developments between the U.S. and Israel. Third, she hopes that this understanding will be continued for the future. K: We will do our best and why don't you type it up and send it over here. It's a pleasure to eschange friendly messages for a change. R: A more practical point, you know in Copenhagen there's a meeting of the World Bank and Board of Governors all over the country and it's We have close contacts with them. We taxlex talked to you of the problem of $250 million as German loans which the U.S. as part of the German/U.S. offset agreement. The Germans stress time and again that if they get any hint from you that ****** will be welcome in bringing this issue in discussion between you and us K: They tell us the opposite. R: If you xxxxx indicate you are willing to use it favorably, not commit yourselves they would send a representative here to discuss it. No commitment on your part. Who would K: Xxxxxxxx make this communication to them? R: Can I we have a direct contact to Brandt. K: Could you send one of your economics men to Bergsten, my assistant to explain the problem to him and then I will let you know. R: You will not be here. K: Yes. R: Can we just tell them if they ask you to tell only to Brandt - K: I don't understand the problem well enough and I shouldn't do it now in light of other things I have to do this week without economic advice. R: We talked to Mr. Samuels - K: May I call you back? In half an hour? There's something I must do absolutely urgently. (dupe of 1st page) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Librar DECLASSIFIED INLN 05-03/35: P. 20,2] This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President/Kissinger 9:50 a.m. 9/25/70 K: Did you get my message about hostages? They have released 20. That means a real victory. But no Americans. P: The King is surviving well. It's the hard game. K: No question. P: Can you get anx that across? Are you having your backgrounder today? K: Yes. I am leaving tonight. P: I will see you after you see Dobrynin. K I am briefing at 10:00. Dobrynin at 10:30 and I will se e you after Dobrynin. I will make it very short with Dobrynin. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Governor Dewey 9/25/70 6:00 p.m. D: Welcome back to the East. They warmed up the atmosphere for you a bit didn't they? K: They sure did. I think we've made it. D: I spent last evening at the Council with Abba Eban, just a small group, 25 or so. He's quite a different fellow from the last meeting. K: They've had some scaring influences. D: He glitters as beautifully as ever, you've seen him. K: No, he hasn't been in Washington, or if he was I haven't seen him. D: Oh he wasn't with Golda? K: No, I don't think he and she get along very well. D: He glitters with charm, but he almost sounds a little shrill and less convinced. K: They are in a tough spot, and realize they have to do something. D: They are realizing that a war of attrition with them isn't working. You can't really and Arab. K: Not when you have two million and they have 80. I think events of the last two weeks have helped. D: They must have. And the hijackings I think are the best thing to happen to the Israelis. Most importantly they made the world hate the Fedayeen. And they made the Fedayeen realize that the Israelis aren't by themselves. Anyhow I called to say that Lucius and I would like to come down at a convenient time. K: Let me get David Young to call you next week and we'll set a date for after we get back. D: Okay. I spoke to Lucius today and he thought the 8th or the 9th of October would be okay for him. K: At this point, one looks as good as the other. Why don't we say the 8th no, the 9th. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Governor Dewey 9/25/70 6:00 p.m. page 2 D: Thatit is. When are you coming back? K: The 5th. D: When do you leave? K: Tonight. D: Tonight! Sorry, go pack your bags and have a wonderfully success- ful visit. K: Thank you. Let's plan for lunch on the 9th. Will you contact Lucius or should we? D: I'll take care of it. K: Good. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

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    "ocrText": "(1 oF 3) oF 3)\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nTelcon\nHAK 2 Ylazhak Rabin (2pp.)\n9/20/70\nM\nDECLASSIFIED in lir 19 Dec 2007\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/13\nIstion\nHAR nd pp.\nDECLASSIFIED pn ltr 19 Dec 2007\n9/20/70\n3\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/14\nTwo\nHATE and Yitzhare Rabin pp.)\nDECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007\n9/20/70\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/15\nTelass\nHAK\n)\nJohn\nPP.)\n9/20/70\nB\nDECLASSIFIED pa ltr 19 Dec 2007\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/16\nTelean\nHAR and Xitzhck RAbin (2 (ap.)\n9/20/70\nDECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2001\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/17\nTelson\nHA K and William Rogers CT p.)\n9/21/70\nB\nDECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/18\n7\nTelcon\nHATE and the President (2 pp.)\n9/21/70\nD\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/19\nDECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nTacon\nHAR and william Rogers, Joseph SISCO (Tp.)\n9/21/70\nB\nDECLASSIFIED pu ltr 19 Dec 2007\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST LN 05-03/20\nTcicon\nYitzHAK RISM'S message/ Alexinder Hrig and\n9/21/70\nM\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/21\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nDECLASSIFIED pu ltr 19 Dec 2007\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Transcripts Telephone Conversations\n30\nFOLDER TITLE\nJordan 20-25 Sept 1970 (4)\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NA 14021 (4-85)\nU.S.GPO; 989-235-084/00024\n(2af3)\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nTabson\nHAR and Yitzhak RxSin PP.)\n9/21/70\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/22\nDECLASSIFIED pu ltr 19 Dec 2007\nKlcon\nHAK and Joseph Sisco (1 p.)\n9/21/70\nDECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST LN 05-03/23\nTerson\nHAL and Joseph Sisco (2 pp.)\n9/21/70\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NAN 05-03/24\nDECLASSIFIED pu etr 19 Dcc 2007\n13\nJolcon\n.HAK and William Rogers <1 p.)\n9/21/70\nB\nDECLASSIFIED pu. ltr 19Dec2007\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/25\nTelcon\nHAK and Joseph Sisco ( 1 p.)\n9/21/70\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/26\nDECLASSIFIED pu ltr 19 Dec 2007\nTeleon\nHAE ) H.R. Haldeman (Tp.) p.)\n9/21/70\n3\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/27\nDECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nTaken\nHAK and Joseph Sisco (1p.)\n7/21/70\n4\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/28\nDECLASSIFIED pn ltr 19 Dec 2007\nTelcon\nHAR and yit shak Rasin C4 p.)\n9/21/70\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW NLN 05-03/29\nDECLASSIFIED per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nTolion\nHAK 700 Joseph Sisco ( 2 pp.)\n9/21/70\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/30\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nDECLASSIFIED per lir 19 Dec 2007\nBOX NUMBER\nkissings Transcripts Telephone Conversations\n30\nFOLDER TITLE\nJordan 20-25 Sept. 1970 (4)\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED 1989-235-084/00024\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n(3 of 3)\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n19\nTckon\nHAK and Yitzhek Rabin (Tp.)\n9/21/70\nФ\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NIN 05 - 03/31\nDECLASSIFIED Dn ltr 19 Dec 2007\n28\nTelcon\nHAR mg Roger Davies ( Ip.)\nMANDATORY REVIEW PROUMOM NLN 05-03/32 DECLASSIFIED 9/21/70 B pm itr\n20A\nTelcon\nHAR and Ernst Van der Bengel (3pp.) v\n9/22/70\nD 19Dec 2007\nTilcon\nHAKEND Joseph Sisco () PP.)\nSANITIZED Flak\n9/22/70\nM\nDECLASSIFIED pn ltr 19 Dec 2007\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/83\n200\nTaken\nHAL and Juseph Sisco (2pp)\n9/22/70\nB\nDECLASSIFIED PG ltr 19 Dec 2007\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/34\n23\nTelcon\nHAL Yitzhak Rabin (2pp)\n9/25/70\nB\nDECLASSIFIED pu ltr 19 Dec 2007\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-03/35\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Transacipts - Telephone Conversations\n30\nFOLDER TITLE\nJordan 20-25 Sept. 1970 (4) 4\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon returned non-historical material.\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nSecretary Rogers\n9/20/70; 6:58 p.m.\nR: I have been out of, touch for the last 2 hours. What is the latest? Are\nyou having the meeting?\nK: Yes. There is nothing of great consequence that has happened. The\nIsraelis said if we want anything we have got to be loud and clear, but\nwe don't want anything.\nR: Yes, be soft and obscure.\nK: The President has come to the view if any action it should not be by us.\nWhat was the latest information you had?\nR: Pretty much how you and I last talked. What is the meeting going to\nconsider?\nK: Just update everybody on what has happened and pros and cons of\nAmerican vs Israeli action. If the Syrians come back.\n(General Haig walked into HAK's office and Mr. Kissinger asked him what\nhad happened in the last 3 hours.)\nK: (Continuing) Our Embassy is still isolated. We have got Israeli\nintelligence report about armored battle between Syrian and Jordan armies.\nEssentially there isn't anything of consequence. No actions have been\ntaken by anybody as far as I know. Your statement was played very well\non TV this evening, with your picture.\nR: Oh, well, but that isn't\nK: I just wanted you to know. I will call you as soon as the meeting is over.\nR: All right.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nThe President\n9/20/70; 7:25 p.m.\nP: What time will the meeting [WSAG] be finished?\nK: In 15 minutes probably, or maybe a half hour. We have already been\nmeeting for about 30 minutes,\nP: I will come over in a few minutes. I want to get a feel for what's going\non.\nK: Fine, Mr. President.\nP: I will just sit in for the last part of it.\nK: Terrific, Mr. President.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nAmbassador Rabin\n9/20/70; 10:10 p.m.\nK: Mr. Ambassador, I have Joe Sisco here too. I just wanted to pass\non some information to you. We have just got a request from the\nJordanians via the British which requests an Israeli air strike on\nSyrian troops which allegedly have takenIrbid and are heading south\nand massing.\nR: I understand what was requested. I understand against whom. I\ndidn't understand which area.\nK: They have taken the town in the area of Irbid and an there are Syrian\ntroops massing there and heading south.\nR: Heading south of Irbid?\nK: Yes this is the request we want to pass on to you. We have no\nindependent information of our own and we wanted to ask you whether\nit would be possible for you on a urgent basis to undertake some\nreconnaissance to confirm this and then just get in touch with us.\nR: Fine. I can assess when it comes to the reconnaissance. I don't\nsee any problem. I just got a cable from our people talking about\n200 Syrian tanks in the area of Irbid. The main thrust was a gainst\nIrbid about 8 hours ago. According to what I got here they haven't\nyet reached Irbid but they were heading towards Irbid. That is what\nI got from Israel I think at about 4:00 'clock there. I understand\nexactly what you ask us.\nK: And could you do it on the most urgent basis?\nR: First I will go to the Prime Minister here. She leaves tonight.\nSisco: When will she be back in Israel?\nR: I think it will be evening there tomorrow.\nSisco: You will bear in mind that we got this from the British because\nour Embassy was out of touch with the King so the King asked the\nBritish to pass the request to you and the British in turn have asked us\nto pass the request to you. You ought to know another thing, namely\nthat this request according to the British came first this morning to\nthem and then it was reconfirmed again at 1830 Jordan time this\nevening.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/13 per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nBy CIM\nNARA, Date 1 Apr 2009\nFp. 1827\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nR: Do you look favorably to this request? What is your position?\nS: I think we want to exchange views with you on this as soon as\nyou are able to give us a picture of how serious you think the situation\nis there.\nR: It looks to be quite serious after I got the cable about 200 tanks\nand forces -- quite a sizable force -- if it is true and I sent a cable\nback and asked for more information, but now I will send another one.\nBut I am sure that the first question that the Prime Minister will\nask me.\nthat the Government will ask.\nSxxWectkiex\n(A copy of a cable was brought into Mr. Kissinger's office)\nS: Wait a minute - we have just got something else.\nK: You had better call us back in 10 minutes. Can you do that?\nR: Yes.\nS: Because we have a further message here that requires a further\nexchange with you.\nR: I see. All right.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has INLN 05-03/12 INLN 05-03/12 INTN 05-03/12 [NIN 05-03/126\nDECLASSIFIED\n2,27\n1-31\nTelcon\nSecy\nSecretary Rogers (Asst/Sisco in office with Mr. Kissinger)\n9/20/70; p.m.\nK: We have a message here Joe should read to you. We were talking\nto Rabin when that message came in and we told him we would talk\nto him shortly.\nS: W Here is what came in Mr. Secretary, from the King at 3:00.\n\"Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive\ninvasion. Northern forces disbanded.\noccupied. Having\ndisastrous effect.\nI request immediate intervention, both air\nand land to safeguard independence of Jordan. Immediate airstrike\nfrom any quarter plus air cover are imperative\n11 What I am not\nclear from this is whether he is asking for British intervention or not.\nR: Intervention by us or Israel? By anybody?\nS: It obviously leaves both options open, in my judgment.\nK: The way I read it air strikes from any quarter and the ground\nforces from us.\nS: And they would also like British intervention. In light of this my\nown feeling would be that we now amend what we were going to tell\nRabin and obviously Henry will have to check this with the President.\n(1) Give Israelis essence of the information in this message and go beyond\nmerely a request for reconnaissance but to say the to them that we would\nlook favorably if they took this action. In fact, as we were talking and\nthis message came in Rabin said there was no difficulty, butthe first\nquestion the Israelis would ask is would the Americans agree we should\ndo this. And we fenced, but this is an understandable question on\ntheir part.\nR: My view is that we should favor it because if the King goes down the\ndrain then the GD thing is a total mess. This way it will be a mess, but\nif they can save the King there is some advantage.\nS: One would hope that whatever the Israelis did is sufficient.\nR: I think the question of whether we should land troops is different,\nAs long as we are sure the King is requesting Israeli air support.\nS: Well Mr. Secretary here is a previous message - let me read it so\nyou will feel completely confident. (Read the British message) So the\nrequest to Israel for the air strike precedes this second one.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/14 per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nBy CIM NARA, Date Apr 2009\n[p.1002]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecy Rogers (C. .td)\n-2-\nR:\nWe have a request to the British and to us both so there is no\ndoubt about it.\nK: And we were not giving Rabin any satisfaction. In fact, Joe was\ndoing the talking when at that precise moment the other message came\nin. The fact seems to me to be that if there isn't an air strike the\nwhole thing may come apart. I don't think we have any choice.\nR: No, I don't think we have any choice. What it amounts to is\nIsrael is just doing it now at the right time.\nS: Bear in mind that the Russians are behind the Syrians.\nR: I don't think we have any choice. Let's go ahead.\nms\nReproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential Library INLN 05-03/13 P. 2027\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nAmbassador Rabin\n9/20/70; 10:35 p.m.\nK: We have had another message and another conversation with the\nPresident. I will first give you the essence of the message and then\nthe request of the President. Sisco and Haig are on the line. This\nis the message from our Ambassador who says he had a phone call\nfrom the King at 3:00 a. m. local time pointing out that the situation\nwas deteriorating dangerously. A massive invasion. The northern\nforces were disbanded. Irbid occupied. That is the information we have\nfrom the King. This was having a disastrous effect on the troops in the\ncapital. He therefore requests immediate physical intervention, both\nair and land. Especially he wants immediate air strikes on invading\nforces from any quarters. In light of your information we have\ndiscussed with the Secretary of State and the President and we can now\nassure you under these circumstances we would look favorably on\nyour actions and the President has asked me to tell you if you\nundertake such action we would of course make good any materiel\nproblems that might arise as a result of these actions and we are\ncognizant of the fact we would have to hold the situation under control\nvis-a-vis the Soviets.\nR: I would like to make it clear that the President looks at it favorably.\nK: That is correct.\nR: Second, if there would be a question of materiel you would find ways\nto compensate what would be the outcome.\nK: We promise that.\nR: Third, if there would be certain problems with the Soviets we can\nrely on you.\nK: That is exactly correct and we are taking some immediate precautionary\nmeasures to put ourselves into this position.)\nR: Give me two or three minutes and I will bring it to Prime Minister\nMeier and I will discuss it with her and be in a position to tell you.\nK: And you will call me at the White House board. Just a second -\nI would like you to talk to my associates who are on the phone to make\nsure I don't leave anything out, but this has been discussed with the\nSecretary of State and has the personal endorsement of the President.\nHold on. (Discusses with people in room.) We will call the British\nand inform them also, Mr. Ambassador. We will inform the British\nof this conversation.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/15 per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nBy CM NARA, Date I Apr Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmb, Rabin Co: )\n-2--\nR: If you find it necessary to inform the British it is up to you, but\nonce the * decision will be taken by us I think it is only between you and\nus.\nK: We will not tell them of your decision, we will tell them of our\ndiscussions with you.\n[R: Since the last I had an opportunity to talk to the Prime Minister --\nwhen it comes to the reconnaissance there is no problem. I can't\nsay for the time being anything about the second part.\nK: You will call us back about that?\nR: Yes.\nms\nReproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential Library [NLN 05-03/15 P. 282]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nAmb. Freeman\n9/20/70; 10:45 p.m.\nK: We have some news for you which confirms all you passed to us earlier.\nWe had a message from Amman (reads message). Passing on request of\nKing Hussein. Asked us to pass it nn to the British.\nF: Which I think you have done.\nK: We are doing $ it now. We have passed this message in substance to\nthe Israeli Ambassador and he said he would take it under advisement.\nThat is where the matter stands now.\nF: Quite. Now I will pass that message. You are not thinking of ringing\nup Greenhill immediately.\nK: I would be glad to.\nS: We have flashed it to London and we could have our people there\nin the Embassy take a copy right over.\nF: That would be helpful. I think they would like to see the gext.\nK: Joe, do you know how many British nationals in Jordan?\nF: I think the figure is 160 un less there has been some change in the\nlast few days.\nK: Well we will be in close tough with you bexxxxxe and keep you\ninformed of any information that we might get.\nF: You haven't yet got any information about how you are going to react\nto this?\nK: No.\nF: Are you considering this a matter of urgwncy? You have had this\nformidable request addressed to you and the next question is what are you\ngoing to answer.\nK: We xxx have not had a formal request to land troops. We have not\nmade any decisions about how we will respond for ourselves.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/16 per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nBy CIM\nNARA, Date 1 Apr 2009\n[p.1.2]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmb Freeman ( ntd)\n-2-\nF: One more question to make sure I understand the text. At the\nend he said this request may come to you very quickly for air strikes.\nI will pass the gist of it on.\nK: And we will get the text of it right away.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential\n[NLN Library 05-03/15:p. 202]\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nKissinger/Moose (Private Secretary for PM)\nSeptember 20, 1970\n11:15\np.m.\nK: Hello, can you hear me?\nM: Can you hear me?\nK: Not very well. I have just talked to your Ambassador and I would\nlike to use this occasion to pass on this message received from our\nAmbassador in Amman.\nM: Yes\nK: It read as \"The King phoned me at 3:00 a.m. He said he wanted\nme to pass the following most urgent message directly to the President.\nMessage follows: Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian\nmassive invasion. Northern forces disjointed. Irbid occupied. This\nhaving disastrous effect on tired troops in the capital and surroundings.\nAfter continuous action and shortage of supplies.. \" Why don't we do this\nthen. We will tell our Embassy to deliver it to you immediately. That's\nthe way to do it, I have read it to Mr. Freeman. ? ? ? from any\nquarter including from you because we are asked to pass this message\nto you.\nM: I see. That's similar to the message we passed to you.\nK: Stronger than the message you passed.\nM: The same meaning.\nK: As I have told your Ambassador, we have informed the Israelis\nof this message, and your Ambassador as on other information.\nM: Thank you very much.\nK: You will tell Dennis Greenhill this?\nM: Will tell them what you have told me. Have you any other comment?\nK: We are discussing our own course of action which we have confined\nto\nbut we have not made any decision\nM: Are you considering at this time?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nKissinger/Moose\nSeptember 20, 1970 11:15 p.m.\n- 2 -\nK: We are considering but will not do this precipitously.\nM: I have great difficulty hearing you.\nK: We are considering the message but we will not precipitate action.\nYou will hear from us. Give my best regards to Dennis. Good bye.\nM: Good night, Dr. Kissinger\nmlc\n/\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nX-33\nTELCON\nAmb. Rabin/Kissinger\n11:30 p.m.\n9/20/70\nR: First,\nleaving immediately to have reconnaissance over the area when-\never possible in daylight.\nK: That should be in a few hours.\nR: Transfer the results of these to Washington. According to what she had from\nIsrael the situation is quite unpleasant to put it mildly.\nK: What do you mean?\n'R\" There's a massive Syrian force in the area.\nK: So you agree with us.\nR: When it comes to the facts and implications, we don't not agree. The people\nthere are not sure if air alone will be sufficient at the present. Anyhow, she\nhas instructed to look into the matter favorably your point of view but no decision\nbefore we know exactly what's going on.\nK: Will you be in touch with me?\nR: Yes. I have no air communication back to Washington, If Gen. Haig could\nhelp me.\nK: We will get you back. Let's get through our business and lhe will take it up.\n[R: She has exchanged views with the Defense Minister and she is sending a cable\ndetailing everything we talked about but we cannot promise you anything now. In\nthe morning perhaps. Now it's 5:35 a. m. and after more light 1\nK: Our time or your time?\nNLN 05-03 per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nNARA, Date 2009\nR: It's morning there. As soon as possible air reconnaissance will be carried\nout.\nK: Stay in your hotel room. Or do you have to see her off?\nR: It's not a question it doesn't matter. XX The sooner back to Washington--\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nK: Stay there and we will tell you where to go and how to get back. Now\nI\nwill\n[pil\nsum it up. Reconnaissance if ordered. You will transfer results to us immediately\nBy CIM\nYour infomation is that there are massive forces in the Irbid area and therefore\nyou confirm information from the other side. Your people are not convinced air\nalone is suffieient. They have been ordered to look into our proposition favorably\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRabin/Kissinger\n11:30 p.m.\n9/20/70\n-2-\nK: (cont) but cannot give final views until they have studied what they have. You\nwill be back in touch. We XXEX will get you back to Washington.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\n[NLN 05-03/17 P. 2002]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nX35,1\nRogers/Kissinger\n12:45 a.m.\n9/21/70\nK: I really don't have a hell of a lot. Sisco has told you most of it. I wanted\nto touch base to make sure we are together. You have heard of Rabin's reply?\nR: No.\nK: He called back and said they are doing reconnaissance, They will tell us\nthe resutls. Independent information was there was massive forces including\ntanks. Mrs. Meir had talked to Dayan and orged to do it favorably. They\nwill let us know in light of reconnaissance in early morning our time what they\nwill do. He said, without indicating it was a request, that some of their people\nweren't sure air alone is sufficient, The President was in the office. I didn't\ntell Rabin. He siaid that if they come back to say to do what was necessary\nand get it over quickly. I just met with Joe, Alex, Moorer and Packard.\nThey are sitting on a contingency basis. That's where we stand.\nR: Fine and thank you.\nK: You have no problem?\nR: No.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/18 per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nBy CIM NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009\n[p.1.81] [p.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nX-36\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n1:10 a. m.\n9/21/70\nK: I was told you were still up and I wanted to tell you. We have gone over\neverything at that meeting and Alex Johnson is preparing a diplomatic scenario\nfor first thing in the morning if the Israelis go. We will call in the Soviets.\nThe second possibility that State favors is if\nwithdraw, we would ask\nthe Israeli's to withdraw.\nP: I think the best thing is to say aothing and let them come to us. No reason\nto tell them.\nK: The only argument for that is to warn them to stay out. They know the\nSyrians have been bad boys.\nP: Under no circumstances. But to warn them to stay out --\nK: That might be $ useful.\nP: This is happening because Syrians are there and we want you to stay out,\nAll right.\nK: We will report to our allies our general for attitude but so X no ones nose\ngets out of joint. Moorer is preparing xis contingency. Soviets probably\nknew about this and they will have a starchier reply then we now have. They\nmay attack the Israelis from the air and we may have to fly air cover over\nIsraelix against the Soviets.\nP: We will see.\nK: The major thing is to go in and come out --\nP: I understand. We know its' a possibility. We will now find out.\nK: Packard has been -- we are getting together an assistance package for Jordan\nNLN 05-03/19 per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nNARA, Date 2009\nin case they need it and Israel for losses. We are telling the Jordanians that\nwe have passed on messages to all people they wanted and question of assistance\nis being urgently and sympathetically considered. We are phrasing it con-\nstructively. As you said, the moral of the King is important.\nP: Hewill tell his troops.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nK: We will advise the Shah just to show him consideration.\nP: What about the Arabs?\nBy CIM\nK: We should keep queit. They won't tell them. There's some feeling you\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPresident/Kissinger\n1:10 a. m.\n9/21/70\n-2-\nK: (cont.) might call in Congreasional leaders tomorrow to advise them. If\nyou want to consider evacuationxxxx scheme, you might want to inform them\nand it gives them flexibility.\nP: We will consider it but late in the day.\nK: On the check list. If it breaks. Otherwise, everyone is tracking. We\nare meeting agains in the morning and everyone will work down.\nP: Russians flying with air strikes? I don't believe it.\nK: Not normally but their behavior lately .they are either incompetent or\nforcing a showdown. If they are incompetent, we will have an easy vistory.\nP: We will see what's happening in the morning.\nK: You pulled them together. Haig and I feel that. Your calm and got to\nthe heart of it. When they heard the Commander in Chief say this.\nP: In the office we hadn't had messages yet from the situation and they came in\nlater and we were considering the contingency. Know we have told them there's\nno question. The Secy. of State has spoken and the U.S. is committed.\nK: I-called Bill couldn't reach Laird and he is content with exxecxpixingx\neverything. This *hingxx time everyone is together.\nP: We hope for the best. Thank you, Henry, and good night.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\n[NLN 05-03/19: P. 282]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7-40\nTELCON\nRogers7Kissinger/Sisco\n10:22 a, m.\n9/21/70\nR: Joe's on the line too. We have to touch base on how we will do this\ndiscussion with Rabin.\nK: I think State should do it, Joe, so you will not --\nR: Hewill do it and hevill ask him to come in now. Hewill tell you exactly what\nwe will say.\nS: What do you think we should say?\nK: What the Secy. proposes we agree in principle and would like to review\nlater in the day. We have passed it to the King and if he disagrees, we would\nwant to consider that. It must succeed and we have preference for air action but\nifit must be coupled we will go with that. And confine it to Jordan.\nS: That's all the points I have.\nR: We haven't conveyed it to the King. We are conveying it.\nK: Bill, you may not have seen it, We have a flash from Brown which says that\ninthe King's mind, ground action is different. We need the King's thinking exactly\nR: We will pass this message right away and it should take care of it.\nK: Send out the flash and try to get the King's thinking. By the meeting this\nafternoon.\nR: We will if we can reach the King. I can't believe the King will\nwithout knowing the intentions of the troops.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/20 per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nBy CIM NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009\n[p. I of\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRabin's Message - Monday, September 21, 1970 - 5:15 a. m,\n1. No specific report of reconnaissance yet; will be available\ntwo hours from now.\n2. Israelis consider air strikes alone not adequate for situation.\n3. Israelis believe ground action will be necessary.\n4. Israel would like United States view on this within two or\nthree hours.\nGeneral Haig spoke to Ambassador Rabin again at 6:45 at which time\nthe Ambassador added the following information:\nX-10\n1. Israeli reconnaissance had observed some Syrian units south\nof Irbid, but they were not certain whether these units represented\nsecurity forces or were the vanguard for a move south.\n2. The Israelis estimate that the King can maintain his position\nfor at least another day or more in Amman.\n3. The Israelis have no territorial ambitions vis-a-vis Jordan,\nhowever they do believe that an attack in support of the King must have\n\"some political goal\" and that some adjustments (presumably territorial)\nwill have to be made as a result of their attack to preclude certain\ntechnical difficulties.\n4. In essence, Israel believes if they are to reestablish the\nauthority of the King they must have some assurance from him that\nhe will subsequently establish and maintain order within Jordan.\n5. The Israelis wish to emphasize the importance of the U.S.\nhandling the Russian situation. They are especially concerned about\nthis in view of recent actions along the Canal (presumably the missile\nviolations and Soviet aircraft in Egypt).\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/21 pu ltr 19Dec2007\nBy CIM NARA, Date Apr 2009\n[p.10f] [p.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmb. Rabin/Kissinger\n10:25 a, m.\n9/21/70\nK: We have asked Sisco to talk to you in a few minutes and you will be getting\na call from him. He will give you a reply which in principle is yes but I\nwould like to make the following suggestion. The less you say in reply, the\nbetter. Just say you will communicate with your government and then come\nin and see me. It's terribly important that we know who says what to whom\nand I will give you guidelines on that.\nR: In the meantime I have instructions too. More detailed.\nK: Can you give them to me?\nR: The gist after the decision that took place extimates that our military\nactivity to prevent Syrian and Iraqi taking over in Jordan would require\nactivation and operation of a relatively large force on our part. Second, we\nhave to assume that as a result there might be resumption of hostilities\neven along the Suez Canal. It would be a clear cut Israeli intervention against\nanother intervention in Jordan. As a result even though the attitude is\npositive as a result of our experience of the last few months I have been instructe\nto make clear certain points. The first, will the U.S. approach Israel formally\nin this matter. Second, will the King agree to request our assistance and\nundertake methods of communication andiorduation Third, a little more\nclarification WII how will U.S. prevent Soviet participation. Fourth, is it\nunderstood that the U.S. will side with us in as international political arend\nincluding U.N. vetothat included Syria threatens Israel and not only Jordan. We\nmight find ourselves in and they will order our withdrawal immediately.\nThe fifth question is it clear that Israel will not be held responsible for the\nfate of the hostages. And 6th, I think this on the political side any public\nstatement made by U.S. in regard to this question we hope to know about it\nbeforehand. I know it's\nK: Is it possible for you to separate these questions in your meeting with\nSisco or can you wait until after?\nR: I have put them to you. I can get Sisco's answer and communicate it back\nand then wait.\nK: And then communicate back to Sisco?\nR: No, get Sisco and then in the meantime if I get clarification from you, I\nwill be able to know what to do else.\nK: I cannot work just get Sisco's answer and we will discuss make the\nfirst point to him. That's been our great contention here and it's important\nthey hear it from you.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nBy\nNLN CIM 05-03/22 per ltr 19Dec2007\nNARA,\nDate\nApr\nReproduce 2009 at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRabin/Kissinger\n10:25 a. m.\n9/21/70\n-2-\nR: Fine.\nK: You will have to follow my recommendations. I may ask you to put them\ninto channels. Receive communications and make the first point, Then call\nHaig and make an appointment here. You will have to assume what I tell you\nis M&X in the interest of everybody. The questions will get to the President. On\nthe basis of his answer I may ask you to give the list to Sisco.\nR: I have a calbe that says if wer have positive answers the tendency of the\nCabinet is to respond positively.\nK: That's second. What's the first point?\nR: This is not a question. It's a statement. Any military activity --\nK: That's what I want you to communicate. Just that much, no more.\nR: I will do it.\nK: Then come in and go back to him. I will decide how to handle it.\nR: I will come when you are free.\nK: You see Sisco and then come over heze.\nReproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential Libran[NLN 05-03/22:p 282]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n10:30 C. a.\n9/21/70\nP: How long do we have to make our plans because of the number of people\nwho are depending on this trip. It comes apparent that nothing will happen that\nwill change the situation now.\nK: We can decide by the end of the day.\nP: You said Wed.\nK: No, we should cancel before someone cancels us. After the meeting this\nafternoon, we can probably make that decision.\nP: hmmh-hummh. We might hear from Tito on this. Nothing will happen on\nthat. I don't see anything that XXXX will change it by the end of the day.\nK: Unless the king stabilizes the situation.\nP: Then it would be important to go. We could wait until this afternoon or\ntomorrow.\nK: Right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoe Sisco\n9/21/70 10:45 a. m.\nS: Those were numbers 5007 and 5008.\nK: You'll have to tell me the gist of them.\nS: They are somewhat encouraging. The situation at noon is\nsomewhat better. The first telegram I have just dictated.\nK: The flash one to Amman?\nS: Yes, When I call Rabin in, in addition to what you and Rog ers\nand I agreed on I think I should know on this latest information. it gives\nit a little bit less urgency. There were some difficult points in that\nmeeting this morning, but it was a good one I think. I didn't feel bad at\nall that you didn't support my hawkish views. I thought an air strike this\nafternoon might be good, but in view of this\nK: But don't indicate that we don't want him to do anything.\nS: Oh exactly, I'll call back in five minutes with this telegram.\nE.O. NLN 12958, DECLASSIFIED 05-03/23 as amended, Sect per 35 ltr 19 Dec 2007\nBy CIM NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009\n[p.1.g1]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoe Sisco\n9/21/70 11:10 a. m.\nK: Has the flash message gone to Amman?\nS: That's what I'm going to read to you right now. [Sisco read\nthe message; did not take it verbatim but the substance follows.\n\"The Ambassador should contact the palace and pass the message\nfrom the Prime Minister to the King. He should encourage the King\nto set up a meeting between Jordanian and Israeli since this is the\nbest way for the Israelis and Jordanians to concert together. We have\nreceived your cal 1 in which you expressed your judgment that the\nKing's request for land action was limited to the U.S. and U.K. I\nhave not confirmed by reconnaissance that the Syrians around Israel\nare considerable. Israel, considering air strikes and ground action,\nthinks air strikes alone are insufficient. They will be consulting\nwith us. You should take this opportunity to ask the palace its view\nregarding Israeli air strikes and/or Israeli ground intervention. It\nis important that before any action is taken by Israel, the King feel\nthat one or both of the above is necessary. The best thing would be\nfor the King to handle this himself, since any kind of intervention,\nwhether by Israel or the U.S., to save the King would have adverse\neffects on the King's position with the Arab world. We are obviously\nnot suggesting that you say this to him. In short, we are anxious for\nyou to pass the Israeli message on to Jordan and to get for us the\nKing's thoughts on possible Israeli assistance in the air and/or\nground. We believe it adviable for the Jordanians and Israelis to\nconsult urgently.\nK: First, we have a new flash message in from Brown, Amman\n#5015. [Mr. Kissinger read the cable. My first suggestion, let's\nget your flash done.\nS: I can cut out a lot of this.\nNARA, Date 2009\nK: Yes, I think you can cut out the lecture at the end.\nS: It's not a lecture. This man is in a compound and has no\nflavor on our thinking.\nK: If he has no flavor he isn't in the foreign service. I could\nE.O. 12958, as amended, DECLASSIFIED Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/24 pultr\ntell you what the flavor is\n[p.10f2]\nS: But you aren't in a compound. Well, I can say \"You should\nencourage the King to set up a meeting\n\", just the first paragraph.\nThat the Ambassador should contact the palace and pass the message\nfrom the Israeli Prime Minister to Hussein\nconcert together to\nBy\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoe Sisco\n9/21/70 11:10 a.m. page 2\nconsult one another. 11\n\"We note your judgment that it is limited\nto U.S./U.K. Wou should ask the King how he feels about this\nother. 11 Send it out that way with no more editorializing.\nK: Exactly, and then let's get back to each other.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nINLN05-03/24:p.282 2002\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRogers/Kissinger\n11:25 a.m.\n9/21/70\nR: Have you seen 5015? (Amman's 5015 -- re Syrian moves, possible Israeli\nstrike, and King's preference for a U.S. strike.) You better show this to the\nPresident. It's just the opposite.\nK: I will send them all in.\nR: This one is 180 degrees opposite.\nK: They break so fast and it depends when you pick it up.\nR: But it's the same fellow.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/25 per ltr 14 Dec 2007\nBy CIM NARA, Date I Apr 2009\n[p.1061] Fp.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSisco/Kissinger\n11:50 a.m.\n9/21/70\nK: Have you had Rabin in?\nS: He is on his way in,\nK: The President just asked me.\nS: We called him 15 mins. ago. He must be at the Secy's office. I think the\nSecy. will have me ₫0 it.\nK: That's better.\nS: I think that's how it will work out.\nK: Freeman is on his way in to see the Secy. Did you get that flash out?\nS: Yes. We agree in principle air and ground subject to review later in the\nday. We have passed the message to the King and urged the King to get in\ntouch with the Israelis. We have asked the King what he thinks of Israeli\nground action. Air action is\n.\nIf he disagrees we would want to take\nthat into account. Governing prinsiples which must succeed. How do we\ndefine the objective? To force Syria from Jordan.\nK: Exactly.\nS: We prefer air action but we defer to Israel's judgment. We strongly prefer\nin Jordan which is the source rather than in Syria. I will get a cable out\nreporting it. To Tel Aviv and Amman.\nK: Are you coming to the WSAG?\nS: Eventually.\nK: What about 5015?\nS: Sit tight. We have two cables in 1 and half hours and they are diametrically\nopposed.\nK: OK. I will wait.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Seet 3.5\nNLN 05-03/26 pu ltr 19Dcc2007\nBy CIM\nNARA, Date I Apr 2009\nLp. [p.1001]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoe Kraft\n9/21/70 11:55 a. m.\nJK; I'm calling because Mrs. Meir at lunch said something\nabout a personal statement by the President to take up Soviet missiles.\nK: She must have had in mind that we promised her we would\nnot drop the issue.\nJK; I see. It was interpreted by some of us as an indication\nof movement toward communication at the highest level.\nK: No, there was no such. She must mean that we said we\nwould raise it and continue to raise it and not acquiesce in it.\nJK: I see. Is there any sign that the Russians are stopping the\nSyrians.\nK: There's no sign that the Russians are doing anything. We\nget a different report every hour on what the situation really is in\nJordan. The Soviet behavior is not easy to understand\nJK; It's quite easty in light of what General DeGaulle once said\nto you, about trying to restore credibility in the most visible way.\nK: But it's not easy in light of what they are saying about trying\nto help with a settlement.\nJK: Okay. I would like to see you,\nK: It's a bad week, but I would love to see you.\nJK; Okay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n$ 16\nTELCON\nX-39\nHaldeman/Kissinger\n2:15 p.m\n9/21/70\nK: (picked up in middle of conversation)\nstrongly than I. The situation\nis getting worse and out of control. I think it's too late to do it.\nH: Send Israel in?\nK: Yes. And that bullshit of the Secy's that we were stampeding the President.\nEvery cable is worse.\nH: What's he going to do?\nK: He is still waiting.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/21 pultr 19 Dec 2007\nBy CIM NARA, Date Apr 2009\nLp. [p.1181] 1]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Rogers\n9/21/70 3:50 p.m,\nR: I'm calling about a totally different subject.\nK: Thank God.\nR: Yes, your backgrounder. Gerry Smith is concerned about\nsomething on page 13, regarding the SALT talks. You said \"Proposals\n11\nK: I was afraid you were going to praise me for a minute.\nR: Said, \"Proposals have been carefully prepared on our side, and\nthe Soviet proposals have provided a basis for negotiation. \" Gerry\nSmith doesn't think they do.\nK: That's an unhappy formulation.\nR: What he asked about was whether this had been released.\nK: Yes it has. The intention was to say were not unreasonable.\" It\nwas badly put.\nR: He is afraid it might be seen as a signal to the Russians that we\nwant to negotiate on their proposals.\nK: It hasn't been picked up in the press like that.\nR: What we should do, he thinks, is to have somebody say just the\nopposite, not to refer specifically to it, but have somebody ask us and\nsay no.\nK: That's okay as long as it doesn't look like a frontal attack on me.\nThat's not a good formulation, I agree.\nR: Okay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoe Sisco\n9/21/70 3:57 p.m.\nS: I would like to send out another telegram in reply to Amman\n5023 in which the King\nK: I have seen it.\nS: What bothers me is paragraph 3: \"I made the point to Rifai\nHe said ground operations are fine in the area as well as\nK: Yes, I read it.\nS: What I want to say is \"I have received your telegram and note\nthat Rifai says ground operations are fine in the area as well as in\nJordan. Did you make clear that tentative Israeli thinking is that air\nstrikes in Jordan are not sufficient, and also require ground action in\nJordan?\"\nK: Well not, wait on this. It's conceivable that we will have your\nplan. Let's hold off on that. The more I think about it the more I\nconclude\nS: We are better with them hitting (?) in Syria.\nK: Yes, there's less of a problem getting them out of there.\nS: Okay, we will send out one sentence telling our Embassy to eon-\nveyx the written message and nothing more to the Israelis for the\nmoment. The Secretary just called; apparently he and the President\nand you have thlked. He said the President wants to explore the other\nalternative.\nK: The Syria one?\nE.O. NLN 12958, 05-03/28 3.5 pullt 19Dec2007\nBy NARA, [p.101] Date 2009\nS: Yes. I said to him 'You call in Rabin right away and ask what\nhe thinks of it politically and militarily. I\nK: He himself shouldn't do this,\nS: All right, so far he hasn't.\nas amended, DECLASSIFIED Sect\nK: You want to convey to Rabin also this message?\nS: Okay, I just wanted to make sure we agreed. We all aboard?\nK: Yes, we are cooperating beautkfully.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nN. Rockefeller/Kissinger\n5:20 p,m,\n9/21/70\nR: I wanted to thank you for what you did in relations to the visit.\nK: I hope it was all right.\nR: Did you see the NYTimes? Fantastic!\nK: I gave the ambassador a talk on where their interests are.\nR: Arther left the dias and joined his wife in the audience, he was so furious.\nK: I told them a co-religionist wouldn't do them any good.\nR: She's a great woman. We need her in our country.\nK: That's what the President said.\nR: I told her to take the job here.\nI\nK: We are trying to move in the first team but before we are through they will\nknow they have bitten something off. Things have turned a lot.\nR: It's exactly what you said two months ago.\nK: ktel was convinced that I made myself extremely unpopular here by saying thi\nwould lead to war rather than peace. It's like lions, you blink once with the\nArabs and they are all over you.\nR: Does he understand what Rogers has been doing?\nK: I think. We will are really pouring power in there now. More going on this\nweek.\nR: She said, and rightly, that Hussein wouldn't have done\nwithout\nencouragement. You needn't comment. The other thing is on the shipment of\nequipment which I hope is taking place.\nK: It's ordered about 3 times a month but then it's like punching pilbow S.\nR: She said one week technicians were sent and things were rolling and then it\nwasxmxx turned off, But you know.\nK: Too well.\nR: Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nN. Rockefeller/Kissinger\n5:20 p.m.\n9/21/70\n--2-\nK: Your support has always meant an enourmous amount to me. You have walke\nthe line well. We are slowly digging ourselves out of the morass but if this blows\nyou are not coming through Washington during the campaign?\nR: I may.\nK: If you should, there are some things of interest to you which you can't use\nin the campaign but show a rough time,\nR: Does it look like a trip?\nK: I guess no.\nR: If there were, you would go?\nK: Yes.\nR: I had a feeling that with the problems and crises that another trip --\nK: It was a good move to go to the 6th Fleet to show se meant it but now so\nmuch has ask happened and now it will be hard.\nR: I hope Hussein doesn't go under.\nK: That's essential. We are more in control with things here than two weeks\nago.\nR: You know, she never criticized in public or private. Really great.\nK: A great woman.\nR: Well, people up here are happy.\nK: How is your campaign going?\nR: Too well. Too long between now and elections. Job of keeping the momentun\nI am going up-state this week.\nK: I need hardly tell you I am for you.\nR: You have been very helpful and John Mitchell has been helpful.\nK: He likes you. Did you see where he popped off, after a few drinks, in\nW omen's Wear Daily? He said Winthrop can buy the votes SOW why worry.\nR: I think he will lose. He was fabulous when I brough those blacks down.\nK: He is great, (last seemed to refer to Mitchell).\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n5:55 p.m.\n9/21/701\nP: Did you have anything before this meeting at 6:00?\nK: I could drop by.\nP: Did we have Helms?\nK: You decided last night not to have him.\nP: I meant this morning.\nK: OK, I will see that he is invited from now on. Anyway, he is in Alabama.\nP: Good, then we don't need him.\nK: May I raise a trip question with you? I spoke to the Ambassador about\nMrs. Nixon. The & Queen is going to ask to be invited to lunch with you and\nMrs. Nixon at Chequers and afterwards Lady Home would take care of her\nat her country house. It's so unprecedented that K it would be awkward to turn\ndown.\nP: That's right.\nK: You would have a meeting with Heath before lunch. She would join\nafter and then you'd meet with Heath after lunch. We could make Shannon later.\nP: That's right. Check with Haldeman because Mrs. Annenberg was working\non something. I told them that the Queen took precedence.\nK: Freeman said it's unprecedented.\nP: I hope we can make the trip. Maybe we can.\nK: We don't have to be precipitous on this.\nP: Let's get this going on time. These people have been working hard and they\nneed a good night's rest. Bring us up to date on developments during the day.\nYou and Sisco.\nK: Vorontsov is in to see Sisco now. He had a message.\nP: Probably worning us .\nK: That's all we have to do now. (?)\nP: Has anyone talked to Rabin about going through Sryia?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n5:55 p.m.\n9/21/70\n-2-\nK: I did and Sisco and they are exploring it,\nP: Nothing new.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmb. Rabin\n198\n9/21/70 7:05 p.m.\nK: There is a point of clarification I want to raise with you. What\ndid you tell Sisco this afternoon about the alternate plan we mentioned\nto you this afternoon, the alternate courses of operations?\nR: He raised the question. He said they estimated that Jordan\ndidn't want ground operations in Jordan and he asked about the pos-\nsibility of carrying out diversionary action in Syria. He asked my\nopinion. I made it very clear that diversionary operations cannot\nachieve anything unless the purpose is to eliminate the forces in Jordan.\nK: I want to get one things clear. Did I understand you correctly\nwhen we talked this afternoon that if a major operation was carried out\nin Syria, from a military point of view this was a feasible operation?\nYou and I have to be meticulous in our understandings for this reason.\nWhat you tell me I report to the President. When another version is\nreported, my version must be the correct one. Otherwise there is\nno sense in my talking to you. I reported my understanding of the con-\nversation this afternoon--from a purely military point of view you\nexpressed the thought that this might be an effective and probably the\neffective way of do ing it.\nR: Exactly.\nK: We were told this evening that it was your judgment that from\na military point of view it was not feasible.\nR: This time it is recorded. He talked about diversionary tactics.\nI went into detail and explained to him. I said to him you don't have\ndiversionary\nK: You don't have to explain any more than that.\nR: It is unbelieveable.\nK: The only essential thing is that any time you deviate, even in\nthe slightest- which you didn't do\nI want to know when I say in a\nmeeting 'It is my belief that this is the Israeli point of view, 1 I want\nto be exactly right.\nR: I didn't deviate. He doesn't understand the difference between\ndiversionary and military (?) actions.\nE.O. 12958, DECLASSIFIED as amended, Sect 3.5\nBy CIM\nNLN 05-03/29 pn ltr 19Dcc 2007\nNARA, Date Apr 2009\n[p.1004]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmb. Rabin\n9/21/70 7:05 p.m. page 2\nK: I understand, Mr. Ambassador, Yes he does, but I understand.\nR: It's really unbelieveable.\nK: I'll straighten it out, You should be getting your answers this\nevening. But when you get them, check them with me, will you?\nR: When I asked Joe \"If the Jordanians don't want ground operations\nin Jordan is it your estimate or have you information?\n11\nHe said\n\"we don't have information; it's just our estimate. 11\nto\nK: He didn¹t give you the note kxora Allon?\nR: He gave me the note but without the part about the Jordanians\npreferring not to have it on their own grounds. Since he started to talk\nabout diversionary\nK: It is perfectly plain to me.\nR: I said \"what do you mean by diversionary? 11\nK: I understand.\nR: I said nonsense. They have decided to move that force because\nthey have a reason to do so. They are willing to take the risk. I don't\nbelieve in diversionary.\nK: I fully understand.\nR: There were at least two people on their part and one on our part,\nand he came to me and said\nK: But they were not at the meeting with the President.\nR: It becomes something that's impossible to work.\nK: It will be straightened out.\nR: I tried to find out to Haig after I came back. I wanted to explain\nthe concept of diversion.\nK: You should have done that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential\nDECLASSIFIED\nLibrary 05-03/29\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmb. Rabin\n9/21/70 7:05 p.m. page 3\nR: I couldn't reach him.\nK: Then you should have left word.\nR: I did and was told he would call me back.\nK: It doesn't matter; no one is blaming you. Relax Mr. Ambassador.\nWe will be back to you tonight.\nR: Very strange. I didn't write it down--someone else did.\nK: We'll confuse everybody if we keep this up. Someone has\njust come in. Goodbye.\n[The President had walked into Mr.\nKissinger's office with Mr. Haldeman. ]\n7:20 p.m. [After the President left Mr. Kissinger's office]\nK: The President wants, on an urgent basis, the assessment of\nyour government of the plan of a major attack in that region and on a\ndiversionary attack.\nR: Fine.\nK: On your seven questions, it would make the second irrelevant.\nIsn't that true?\nR: I don't understand.\nasked\nK: Because you have been asking for air, and you would now have\nto be asked for ground under these conditions. Your second question is\nwhether the Jordanian government will ask you.\nR: Anyhow we might have to reach (?) Jordan.\nK: Of course, but at any rate it would give a different complexion\nto the question. Can you give us your assessment on the feasibility of\na major operation?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\n05-03/29: p. 30f4]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmb. Rabin\n9/21/70 7:05 p.m. page 4\nR: I would have to send it back to my country, to my ggvernment.\nK: Of course, you are being asked by the President to produce it.\nTonight you will get the answers to the seven questions. Most of them\nwill be unambiguously positive; the ones that are not are not because\nof us. I will get you the answers.\nR: When?\nK: Well, you aren't the only one who has to deal with Sisco. It will\nbe within an hour or so.\nR: All right. Otherwise it would not be practical to put the first\none.\nK: Okay. I'll get the answers to you. But keep in mind some of the\nadvise I gave you this afternoon--about cleverness.\nR: Okay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential\nDECLASSIFIED\nLINLN 05-03/29: P- 484]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nJoe Sisco\n9/21/70; 7:20 p.m.\nK: The first thing you should get to me is the answer to these\nquestions which the President would like to get out tonight.\nS: I have done a preliminary draft of the answer to these questions.\nThere is a problem -- I have done a companion piece re Question #2,\nWill the king agree to request our assistance and undertake to institute\nmethods of communications between us? I feel simultaneously with\ndrafting these answers we could get a flash to Amman right away on\nthis question. XXXX Here is what I have drafted: As you have been\npreviously informed, the Israelis have under action consideration\nthe question of air and ground action in Jordan. We have informed\nthem, the Israelis, as previously reported to you that the \"US agrees\nin principle to the Israeli operation by air\nin Jordan subsequent\nto the review of this matter. 11 The Israelis have not taken any\ndecision and are awaiting a reply to the seven questions put to you.\nOne question is as follows: Will the king agree to request our\nassistance and undertake to institute methods of communications\nbetween us? We know the exchange of message betwen Allon and\nthe King leaves the matter of liaison in abeyance for the moment.\nWe note also revised\nthat Government of Jordan\nwould recommend (?) ground action outside of Jordan, meaning\nSyria. We have not taken this refined statement as considered\nJordanian judgment because we are not clear from your report\nas to whether you have put to the king what his view is with respect\nXIX to a ground xxxxxx operation by the Israelis in Jordan. Since\nthe Israelis have posed the question, we ask that you ascertain\nviews anxix of the king on this precisely.\nK: No! I just will not hold up answer to the Israelis any longer.\nS: Tell me what you want me to say. You should make it clear to\nthe king that Israelis have this matter under active consideration\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/30 pu 19 Dec 2007\nand that no decision has been made by them.\nBy NARA, [p.1 02] Date 2009\nK: What was this in response to?\nS: In a previous telegram we sent to them, asked the king what his\nattitude was with respect to a ground operation in Jordan since the\nIsraelis felt the air strike was insufficient. My judgment is that\nBrown has not put the thing precisely and that this was a quick\ndiscussion between Rifai and Brown. He said Israelis were thinking\nof taking action in this area and they believed it necessary to conduct\nboth air and ground action he does not say in Jordan.\nK: What area do you think he was talking about?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nJoe Sisco\n9/21/70; 7:20 p.m.\n-2-\nS: I hope he was talking about Jordan, but he may have been talking\nabout Syria. He said ground operations are fine in the area as long as\nthey are not here in Jordan. Tell me what you want?\nK: We want an answer to those seven questions to go out in the next\nhour and a half.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library [NLN 05-03/30 P. 202]\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\n(President spoke very softly --\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nvery difficult to hear)\n7:43 p.m., September 21, 1970\nK:\nYou say you are leaning to keeping the trip on,\nP:\nIn every possible way, we are not going to be in position to be in\nthe middle of it.\nK:\nI think we should go full speed ahead, Mr. President,\nP:\nJust because the Israelis are having a little battle with the Syrians,\nwe are not going to be moding around.\nK:\nWould expect that the Soviets would make some sharp move under\nthese conditions.\nP:\nWe have got to go on as if the world is still turning.\nK:\nThe fleet will have to leave its station around the 26th, 5 days from\nnow, SO we have plenty of time.\nP:\nWe don't have to have exercises, just knock that off -- don't have to\nhave the whole fleet over there.\nK:\nHave most of the fleet there.\nP:\nWe don't have to go to the carrier you understand. -72222222\nThink you should continue the plan as if the trip was going to go on\nand we could cancel but not before Wednesday evening. Everybody\nwill understand if we knock it off.\nK:\nHave you had a chance to talk to Bob about the Queen?\nP: ??????\nK:\nWe ought to invite the Annenbergs.\nP:\nThat's fine, that's fine, it would be very nice for Mrs. Nixon to see\nChecquers.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nJoe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger\n8:20 p.m., September 21, 1970\nS:\nWhat I will do if you agree, Roger will clear simultaneously with the\nSecretary.\nK:\nYou will give the answers to Rabin tonight?\nS:\nIf you clear and the Secretary clears the way I formulated it.\nIt will be over in 5 minutes. I have arranged with Haig to call\nRoger Davies who is on duty and give him any changes that you may\nhave. Will communicate these to Robbey. Think I have reflected\nthe meeting pretty well.\nK:\nYou always do.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n*-22\nTELECON\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n9:10 p. m., September 21, 1970\nP:\nHenry, I am going to bed early -- I am meeting with Congress in the\nmorning.\nK:\nThink it is going to be quiet tonight. I won't disturb you unless --\nP:\nIf you hear anything, let me know.\nK:\nHaven't given them the answers. When I talked to Rabin there were\nso many conflicting signals -- I think by tomorrow morning we will\nhave answers.\nP:\nWe will have additional intelligence on where it all stands.\nK:\nThink noon tomorrow is a good time for this group to meet. I think\nthe Jordanian psychological end is stronger, more than their physical\nstrength.\nP:\nMore than they are showing on their nerve.\nK:\nThey might still pull it out.\nP:\nI hope so but whatever, if the thing quiets down, this trip would be\na reinforcement.\nK:\nIf the Israelis don't move by Thursday, the thing will settle down.\nP:\nOkay Henry.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Rabin/Mr, Kissinger\nX-50\n9:15 p.m., September 21, 1970\nK:\nIf you won't move on Jordan, how about moving on Foggy Bottom.\nR:\nFoggy Bottom?\nK:\nGet yourself a map of Washington and find out what buildings are\nlocated in Foggy Bottom.\nR:\nBuildings? ?\nK:\nJoe Sisco is located there.\nR:\nAt what time?\nK:\nI am joking the answers will be delivered to you no later than\n10:30. To be sure nothing is verbal, we are putting it in written\nform. Let me see if we got them -- have we got them both? Okay,\ntell you what I will do, will go over the questions and the answers\nand they should be delivered to you by 10:30.\nR:\n10:30?\nK:\nTonight,\nR:\nXXXX I am at home and I will be available whenever they decide\nto call me.\nK:\nYou will get for the President the other.\nR:\nWill I get the answers to the questions?\nK:\nYou will get them very soon.\nwgh\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/31 per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nBy CIM NARA, Date 1 Apr 2009\n[p. 181]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nX-24\nTELECON\nX53\nRoger Davies/Mr. Kissinger\n9:20 p. m., September 21, 1970\nK:\nI have suggestions - changes - in only the first three questions, the\nlast four are okay. In the first one, I would like where it is indicated\nin the second sentence \"it should be on the basis of these conversations\nand the fact that our common interest would be served\". In the next\nquestion at the beginning of the third sentence, would add \"with respect\nto ground operations the only indication we have\". Would add at the\nend of that paragraph \"Israeli air strikes have been requested and\napproved previously on several occasions by the King\". Do you agree\nwith these?\nD:\nYes, they certainly fill out.\nK:\n\"How will the U.S. 11 would go through. That is a separate issue and\ntry to leave without.\nD:\nTrying to put in a quote from one of the President's statements.\nK:\nOkay, leave in \"within defensible border\" but add here \"in the present\nerisis the United States has augumented the 6th Fleet. It has also\ntaken other readiness measures\".\nD:\nAt the end of the paragraph?\nK:\nNo, after the phrase \"defensible border\". That is, clearly imply a\ndecision not to permit Soviet intervention against Israeli in the conditions\nunder discussion. Then the next sentence would be \"As for the specific\nmeasures, the United States may take\". Then I would have \"to prevent\"\nand take out \"in the future\" but to prevent and then add as a last\nsentence after the time we have contingency plans for these eventualities.\"\nD:\nWill make the changes and ask the Israelis to come in and pick up a\ncopy. I will wire Tel Aviv and Amman and tell them. I will call Joe\nand get back to you.\nK:\nGood, then maybe I can get some sleep.\nD:\nI hope so.\nDECLASSIFIED\nwgh\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Seet 3.5\nNLN CIM 05-03/32 per ltr 19 Dec 2007\nBy\nNARA, Date 1 Apr 2009\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissing\nRoger Davies 9/21/70; 9:30 p.m.\nx-54\nK: Would you read the last paragraph again.\nD: In the recent crisis the U. S. has augmented the Sixth Fleet. It\nhas also taken other readiness measures clearly implying a decision\nnot to permit Soviet intervention against Israel in the conditions under\ndiscussion. As for the specific measures the U. S. may take to prevent\nSoviet intervention we have contingency plans for these eventualities.\nK: No, what I was going to say -- these would depend on circumstances\nthat exist at the time,\nD: That these depend upon the circumstances of the situation that exist\nat the present time we have contingency plans for these eventualities.\nK: Do you agree it sharpens it?\nD: Yes, sir.\nK: You will be pleased to know that I am clearing the other cable as it is.\nI appreciate the cooperation of everyone in your organization.\nD: Thank you very much. I will pass that on to the boys.\nK: Seeley impressed me in particular today. He did a superb job in\ndrafting considering the pressure he was under.\nD: He turns out a great deal of good work.\nK: He impressed the hell out of me.\nD: I will be pleased to pass that on to him\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nSANITIZED\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 20A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\nContains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nVan der Beugal/Kissinger\n9:26 m.\n9/22/70\nV: How are you?\nK: Busy but fine.\nV: Good. We won't see each other this time.\nK: You can't come down?\nV: The arrangement with the house is that I am in NY. It's a safer feeling and\nI don't want to move around.\nK: Of course. Though you can be reached down here.\nV: But I have made the arrangement at home.\nK:\nV:\nSANITIZED\nK:\nV:\nK:\nV:\nK: I am worried about your being here. Last time it was the decision on Cambodia\nand now it's Jordan.\nV: If a I am helpful staying away, tell me. Is it bad?\nK: It looks better.\nV: Will Hussein hold?\nK: He has a chance.\nV: We have long\nthat that guy doesn't\n.\nK: That's true.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nVan der Beugal/Kissinger\n9:26 a.m.\n9/22/70\n-2-\nV: If that is the pinnacle of our hope, where are we going?\nK: It look S a little better and we have acted strongly.\nV: We are moving from a complete overestimation to a complete underestimation\nand now possibly to normalcy on this country.\nK: We have taken some strong actions in the last few weeks and the President\nisn't easy to be pushed off course. We have quieted down the VN outcry.\nV: It isn't even in the news. I always met a lot of political bastards here and\nit's striking how different the atmosphere is. It's a completely different atmos-\nphere. They don't love Washington but they see it more\nnow. In\nMay we had the feeling of a country falling apart but IXXXX no longer.\nK: After all, Cambodia has worked. VN is out of the news. Soft policies on the\nM. E. have been discredited.\nV: The only thing that is an absolute non-entity is Europe.\nK: We will turn to that after we are above water.\nV: I cannot give you any hopeful prediction about Europe. It's a parocchial\nnon-existing community. Led by dopes or operatòrs.\nK: How about the new British Government?\nV: I have great confidence in Heath but he is not on the map. Maybe that's his\nstyle. A man of enourmous integrity, brass takks and courage.\nK: Maybe just not a little.\nV: How is Nancy?\nK: Fine.\nV: And you are in good shape. You are coming to Europe with the President?\nK: If it comes off.\nV: That's only the South.\nK: Yes but London, October 3.\nV: That's a rush visit. I will be here in December and I will come down.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nVan der Beugal/Kissinger\n9:26 a.m.\n9/22/70\n-3-\nK: I have a great new office.\nV: I saw it when it was planned.\nK: It was decorated by a homosexual so it's good for a boudoir.\nV: You got my note on the *Doxok Dutch thing?\nK: Yes.\nV: That's not until November. Miekwe sends her love.\nK: And I will try to send her a note.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n10:35 a.m.\n9/22/70\nK: You were a great soldier at these meetings. On the little things you fight 1\na maniac but xxxx on the big things you are always there.\nsenh\nL: I wartxthat package over on the supplemental.\nK: I haven't seen it yet,\nL: A draft decision memo and statement to Congress.\nK: I will dig it out. We have been preoccupied.\nL: State wants to work out a military assistance package now. It's okay to me\nwith them, isn't it.\nK: Ales says you are no longer interested in a supplemental. He must have\nmisunderstood.\nL: That's not true.\nK: May I send someone?\nL: Sure. It's XXX all in that package. Look at it if you have a chance. I know\nyou have a took lot to look at.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nRogers/Kissinger\n10:55 a.m.\n9/22/70\nR: I notice you are going to Paris to talk to Habib and Bruce.\nK: I just thought I would go a day early. No significante.\nR: I would appreciate X if you would let me know before you get in touch with m\npeople.\nK: The President mentioned it and thought since I hadn't had a chance - - he kne\nR: You should let me know.\nK: I thought it would go through Sullivan.\nR: I mean it comes to me after Bruce and Habib know about it. Are you doing\nanything about stopping Ky's visit?\nK: I won't see him or talk to him. Only see Bruce and Habib.\nR: What's the President's position on Ky?\nK: He wants to keep him away.\nR: We have done what we can.\nK: I understand there's a guy close to Mclintyre who urged him strongly not to\ncome. Haldeman has handled this.\nR: We have done a lot. We couldxix.ssix insist he not come. That would be a\nproblem. It's becoming a k problem.\nK: I think we have done what we can.\nR: I will talk with the President.\nK: I have no intention of seeing Ky or anyone else. I thought this was a routine\nmatter that would come to your attention. Haig tells me we called someone in th\nSecretariet and let you know. We didn't think it important enough to talk to you\ndirectly.\nR: I will find out who he talked to. They attributed it to the Ky visit,\nK: I will see no one except Bruce and Habib. It was the sort Like of thing that\nthe President said see those guys and get a sense of them. xbet Sullivan did it\nwhen he went to Asia.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRogers/Kissinger\n10:55 a.m.\n9/22/70\n-2-\nR: I think the sense of the team is the same. I think Bunker's conversation\nwith Thieu is encouraging.\nK: It will show we are working at it when he makes the statement.\nR: We haven't gotten an answer from the Israelis but I think they will act.\nK: If it stabilizes we will not be that anxious.\nR: If it stabalizes we should caution them to wait. If Hussein could pull it\noff it would be a hell of a thing. They are right up there.\nK: From intelligence reports they are moving where they said they wouldn;t.\nR: And with our support they can use that. After our meeting we should discu\nthat. It will be 6:00 there and they won't do it that late. Xxx We haven't heard\nfrom the King. We should because we don't want to do something against his\nwishes.\nK: If they go through Syrai we won't have that problem but a diffèrent one.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoe Alsop\n9/22/70 11:15 a. m.\nA: I need a few minutes of your time. Could you fit me in\ntomorrow morning or late this afternoon?\nK: I'll try.\nA: I know it's tough. You were advertised as such in this\nweek's New Republic by Mr. Osborne.\nK: Complainingly?\nA: No. But do you think you could see me?\nK: This is a rough time.\nA: I know. If Hussein loses, the Israelis will end by invading\nJordan.\nK: No question. They may invade without Hussein losing.\nA: To help save him.\nK: At any rate, we've come out of our period of torpor.\nA: We can't go on being torpid when somebody sticks a large\npin in our rear.\nK: It's been known to happen.\nA: How about 6:30 this evening?\nK: Let me call you later. I just have to be sure.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSisco/Kissinger\n11:33 xx a.m.\n9/22/70\nS: I don't want you to undermine my staff. You are passing out toomany\ncompliments.\nK: Do you think the Israelis will attack without coming back to us?\nS: I don't think SO without answering number 2. Do you think I should call\nRabin and say I assume nothing will happen before hearing from you. I thought\nof this an hour ago.\nK: It's better if you do it than I. If you have any quesitons --\nS: Before any buttons are pushed, you will be back in touch with us. That sort\nof thing.\nK: You will be in touch again with me.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Rogers\n9/22/70 3:20 p.m.\nR: I would appreciate it if in the morning on this German question\nyou would call on Hillenbrand, He is very knowledgable and has just\ncome back from there. I don't think there's an intelligence question invelved\nhere.\nK: Okay. The President wanted originally to spend an hour on that\nand half an hour on Jordan. But I see no sense in talkinb about Jordan now.\nR: No, I think it is a good idea to have a meeting just for him to hear\nit first-hand, but there is nothing much for him to decide.\nK: That was the purpose of it to lay out the issues.\nR: Okay. I will tell Marty.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTELCON\nSisco/Kissinger\n5:11 p.m.\n9/22/70\nS: Tomorrow I have been asked to brief the Senate Foreign Relations and\nI want to be sure I don't miss anything in the meeting today. Was there any\nquestion with the President and the Leadership if there was a request from\nJordan for us to interfere.\nK: The President didn't address that and he said we willx are considering\nit in the evacuation context only.\nS: That's very helpful.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMSS D-IV LIB CONG.\nX-28\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nINFORMATION\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nSeptember 22, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nAl Haig\n0\nSUBJECT:\nConversation with Ambassador Rabin\nI had the following phone message from Rabin just as you departed\nfor the Sans Souci. He stated:\n;\nThe Syrians again launched attacks south at 10:00 a. m.\nJordanian time this morning. They ran into heavy artillery fire\nfrom the Jordanians and suffered casualties and as of 1:30 pm\nwere withdrawn. There is no sign of new attacks this afternoon.\n:\nThe above report is effective 1:30 p.m. local.\n--\nRabin said that heavy fire is still going on in Amman.\n--\nYesterday, there were several C-130 and Antonov-12\nflights from Libya to Syria and today there were Antonov-12 flights\nfrom Egypt to Syria. The Israelis estimate that a battalion size\nLibyan force is being introduced into Syria. They also now believe\nthat Egypt may be sending elements of the Palestinian Army into\nSyria.\n:\nRabin stated that they are watching Iraqi forces\nclosely and that there are some indicators of an imminent Iraqi\nattack (contrary to Secretary Rogers' estimate this morning, the\nIsraelis had previously reported that Jordanian forces have\nalready placed artillery on Iraqi forces with some casualties).\n--\nRabin stated that he expects the cable resulting from\ntoday's Cabinet Meeting and in response to our communication\nof last night to arrive between 4:00 pm and 5:00 pm this afternoon.\nHe will call here as soon as it arrives and let us be the first to\nsee it.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMSS DIV LIB CONG.\nX-30\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nLite\nE/S-HK-G43\nX-59\nTOP SECRET\nSeptembe\nMEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nAl Haig\n2\nSUBJECT: Israeli Matter\nAttached at Tab A is the substance of the\nIsraeli response.\nAttached at Tab B is the elaboration which\nyou obtained from Rabin.\nRabin called at 7:15 p.m. with the following\nmessage: (1) The Syrians tried to attack south\nagain this afternoon and were badly mauled\nand lost 20 tanks, (2) Rabin has read the\nessence of the Israeli Cabinet message to\nSisco over the phone and will deliver a\nwritten copy in about 20 minutes. (3) The\nIsraelis met with Pranger this afternoon at\nDefense and were told that their only\nauthorization was for additional ammunition\nif they had any shortages. I told Rabin that\nwe had a Presidential directive which I was\nconfident would untangle the problems at\nDefense.\nAttachments\nTOP SECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nX-24\nTELECON\nJoe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger\n7:15 p.m., September 22, 1970\nS:\nWe have just gotten the Israelis response.\nK:\nThey sent a copy here too.\nS:\nThey are faster than I thought.\nK:\nI haven't seen it yet, just trying to save you reading it to me.\nS:\nMay I read it to you anyway and let you hear my sultry voice?\nK:\nCould I call you back in 10 minutes, I've got some people here\nwho I'm trying to get started on a paper.\nS:\nI am trying to do the same thing myself.\nK:\nAll right, go ahead.\nS:\nWhat the paper says in two sentences is that they would intend\nto act by air but if the situation requires, also on the ground. If\nthe air action doesn't lead to Syrian withdrawal, air and ground\nwould be against Syrian forces on the ground. Meeting with the\nKing\nK:\nwith the Jordanians\nS:\nto coordinate as soon as possible. With regard to the containment\nof Soviet intervention in question three, we want you to confirm to\nus our interpretation to our position with reference to our answer\nunderstand intervention to mean Soviet actions and measures against\nthem including the Suez Canal front and the sea. Moreover, would\nnot be restricted to time of operations undertaken with reference\nto the Jordan-Syrian situation, bearing in mind the possibility that\nSoviet reaction may be a delayed reaction.\nK:\nForceful enough.\nS:\nSome relevance to the timeframe. Goes on to say, with regard to\nequipment, the operation may lead to resumption of hostilities in\nthe Suez Canal in addition to the Syrian and Jordanian fronts. We\nshall therefore want to approach you on a number of concrete items\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/33 per etr 19 Dec 2007\nBy CIM\nNARA, Date I Apr 2009\n[p.1.2] [p.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nJoe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger\nPage 2 -- 7:15 p.m., September 22, 1970\nof equipment and expect to get better treatment than we have.\nThey also intend to send a message to the King through you.\nMy instinct is to propose that we would\ntake a little\n???? on this tonight. No such answer should go tonight -- you\nand the others should discuss this very carefully in light of the\nsituation that exists. Just call the Secretary on the essence of\nthis ??? feeling that we should consider this very carefully.\nK:\nHold on a second --\nS:\nNow, got a little dilemma. The NSC meeting on Jordan tomorrow\n?????\nK:\nNo, no.\nS:\nI am supposed to go to the Senate Foreign Relations.\nK:\nBureaucracy is trying to inundate everybody. NSC was on Germany\nbut the President is now going to use it for the issue of preparing\nan answer. I just tool told him that an answer had come in. ??\nCan't you delay your appearance with the Foreign Relations. Call\nthe Secretary and see.\nS:\nIf I can't get out of this Senate Foreign Relations Committee ????\n9:30 is awfully early - - there should be some preliminary discussion\nbefore going into a big NSC meeting.\nK:\nIt is not a big NSC meeting, it is the same group that met before.\nJust calling it an NSC. ???\nS:\n???? a suggested reply.\nK:\nYou and I have to be in touch on that.\nS:\nDiscuss what should be drafted and coordinate it then.\nK:\nI will have a word with the Secretary.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library [NLN 05-03/33: P. 21g2]\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nX-59\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nSecretary Rogers\n9/22/70; 7:20 p.m.\nK: I have not had a chance to study the text of this reply and we\njust told the President that there has been a reply and I thought that\nwe should meet on it tomorrow rather than try to fire one off tonight,\nHe wanted to use the 9:30 - 10:30 period, He thinks the German issue\ninteresting but not crucial right now so I just wanted to let you know\nand we will confine it to the same group that has been meeting.\nR: Will you have someone let Ted Eliot know. That other matter,\nare we going to discuss that, too?\nK: Yes. I was to check with everybody to see whether there was\nanything else to be discussed. There is nothing we need to do tonight.\nR: Right. Let's all try to get a night's sleep. Poor Joe, he is groggy.\nOkay, we'll see you in the morning at 9:30.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Sisco/Mr. Kissinger\n7:30 p.m., September 22, 1970\nS:\nYou and the Secretary will talk on this and draft a reply.\nK:\nFor your and my information, it would help if you and I could\nagree informally.\nS:\nI am going home to eat something, why don't you give me a call.\nK:\nIf I had as pretty a wife as you have, I would do the same.\nS:\nI can see that you say this feelingly.\nK:\nIf you are good to me, I will take care of you on the West Coast.\nS:\nGive me a call when you are free and we can talk orally.\nK:\nGoing to the UAR Embassy tonight.\nS:\nYou go there and you are off my list.\nK:\nI thought that would throw\noff.\nS:\nStay home. I will see about getting the Senate Relations thing cancelled\neither that or send Roger Davies.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissi. ,er\nSecretary Packard\nX-33\n9/22/70; 7:50 p.m.\nK: We have been trying to get an assistance package together for\nIsrael in case it has to move. We are going through the same song\nand dance that always happens.\nP: Look, I have one on my desk that is okay with me.\nK: The Israelis called today and said all he said he could discuss was\nadditional total ammunition. We need two packages: one for the northern\nfront and one for the southern front. Not to be delivered but to be\nready in case circumstances require it.\nP: I have one on my desk but I don't know if it is adequate. I will get\non it.\nK: We need a package for the southern area and a package for the\nnorthern with the clear understanding that these are on a contingency\nbasis. He does not have to tell the Israelis what we are going to do.\nWe have to know what we can do. He was supposed to straighten it\nout with their military attache but he told them he could not discuss\nit. If you are satisfied that we have a package for both contingencies,\nthat's fine.\nP: Okay.\nK: Okay.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nX-63\nMr. Kissinger\nAmb. Rabin\n9/22/70; 8:50 p.m.\nK: At a reception at an Embassy I ran into John Chancellor who said that\nValeriano had been told by an Israeli official that joint planning was going\non for an Israeli attack.\nR: Total XXXXXXX nonsense. I don't believe that any Israeli said so. I\nwill tell you what happened. In Israel it appeared on some papers that the\nGovernment of Israel has no intentions to take the chestnut out of the fire\nfor the Americans.\nK: Just make sure that none of your people.\nR: I had an opportunity to talk to John Chancellor because he attended the\nluncheon for the Prime Minister and I don't believe that anybody said so.\nK: He said it was said to Valeriano.\nR: I don't believe anyone said that. I know exactly what I said and what I\nI instructed everyone to say. I can check it because our spokesman is here.\nK: Don't bother. I take yourword for it.\nR: The whole problem came about with the news that Israel is not going to\ndo anything. This is what happened in our newspapers. We had a lot of\nquestions why Israel is waiting. Why they are not doing anything that's\n90% of the questions. May I ask you another thing? When do you believe\nyou will be in a position to tell me something?\nK: Before noon tomorrow. I know what the President is going to decide but\nwe want to do it with the others,\nR: It is very interesting because my own Ambassador (?) is after me.\nK: I ran into the Soviet Charge at this Embassy reception and they seem to\nbe extremely nervous,\nR: He phoned my Ambassador at least ten times. I am sure it is not true\nwhat Chancellor told you and the problems we have had today since all the\nnewspapers in Israel came out that Israel is not going to do anything - --we\nare getting a lot of questions Why Israel sits idle and doesn't react.\nK: Okay.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nX-64\nMr. Sisco/Mr. Kissinger\n9:50 p.m., September 22, 1970\nK:\n- - possibility of a reply.\nS:\nWhat's your thoughts?\nK:\nI asked you first.\nS:\nI think that we ought to go back in the course of tomorrow and\nfirst we ought to make a judgment that we give to them before\nI say what we say, let me tell you what the problem is. The\nJordanian point of view and from our point of view, we are trying\nto get the king to do this by himself. If not by himself, in order\nfor the Israeli's to be responsive in order to be helpful to the King\nand yet with the least possible adverse repercussions to this. If\nthe situation warrants our presence, will be nothing there on\ndown but the Israelis or if they need help from the Jordanian point\nof view, minimal air strikes as a way to help Hussein do the job\nhimself. Now from the Israeli point of view, Israelis getting the\nSyrians out and if need be hold on to a certain chunck of territory\nfor a certain period of time as the best way to assure\nagainst Israel/Iraq\n.\nThe Jordanians are thinking much\nmore in terms of an Israeli strike in areas. The Israelis are\nthinking much more in terms ??? as a way of achieving the\nwithdrawal of forces. I have overstated both positions for obvious\nreasons for purposes of clarifying our own thinking. ??? have\nsaid that looking at the situation tomorrow morning and if we ???\nto the Jordanians. We should continue the dialogue with the\nIsraelis.\nK:\nHow do you continue the dialogue?\nS:\nAnswer their questions, keep the option and try to facilitate a get\ntogether between the Israelis and the Jordanians. We agree in\nprinciples but we ought to know before they go and we ought to\nknow [the results]. Ought to be responsive to the Jordanian request.\nK:\nHow much more clear can they be than air request?\nS:\nRead the Annenberg cable about Hussein's complaint about the\nfedayeen.\nK:\nIt is conceivable\nS:\nIt is conceivable but not certain. Are you sure in your own mind\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/34 pu ltr 19 Dec 2001\nBy CIM NARA, Date Apr 2009 uced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nJoe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger\n9:50 p.m., September 22, 1970 - - page 2\nK;\nI am sure in my own mind that we are going one way or the other.\nHussein is going to collapse.\nS:\nI don't at the moment think the facts sustain that.\nK:\nI am not talking about tomorrow, how are you going to keep the\nIsraelis in play by answering their questions?\nS:\nI am not quarrelling with that.\nK:\nYou can't give it to them carte blanche.\nS:\nThey ought to go to them but then say before you do, we want to\nbe consulted. Don't suggest that you don't answer their questions.\nIf you don't respond positively in principle, you lose your option.\nK:\nHow do we answer their questions?\nS:\nDon't know. Got this paper and want to reflect on it. Think we say\nthe Jordanians are obviously trying to do this job by their own means.\nVery anxious to have the two of you to get together because both of\nyou obviously feel there has got to be coordination and think one of\ntwo ways the Jordanians indicate that the grounds ??? The Israelis\nare ready to go or give a yes txtra and pass along that contact\nbetween the two regardless of what the discussions are, we want an\nopportunity to consult before the final move is made.\nK:\nWhat did you say, either want an opportunity to consult or the other\ncome\nS:\nIf we go along, we then ought to send a message to the Jordanians,\nmake the\nresponse and let them send the message to\nindicate to the Jordanians what we are prepared to do and if we\nsay this is what we are prepared to do, we would still say to the\nIsraelis, after you talk to the Jordanians, we would still want you\nto come back and talk to us. I may have some further thoughts\nas I reflect on this tonight. Frankly, I haven't consulted anyone.\nK:\nI have scheduled a WSAG for 8:00 in the morning just to bring\nourselves up-to-date.\nS:\nOkay Henry, see you in the morning.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nENLN 05-03/34: p282]\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmb. Rabin\n9/22/70 p.m.\nR: I got a response from the government and would like to come\nas soon as possible.\nK: How long will it take you to get here?\nR: 15 minutes.\nK: Okay. I have to see the President, but you just wait for me.\nR: I think it's a matter of principle. We are ready\nbut\nanother operation tofollow it up. I think I have to explain it in detail to\nyou. Where should I come?\nK: The Map Room.\nR: And Young will be there?\nK: Yes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nX-356\nSisco/Kissinger\n9/23/70\nX-66\n11:21 a. m.\nK; When can we see a draft?\nS: I just dictated a draft. I will skerr want to go over it myself and see the\nSecy. I think within an hour,\nK: OK. I am wondering if I should call that group together.\nS: The Secy. has just called me. It's 11:30. If at 2:00 or something.\nK: I will be back to you.\nS: I can judge better after seeing the Secy.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSen. Stennis/Kissinger\n2:47 p.m.\n9/23/70\nK: I am sorry I have been so hard to get to.\nS: We gaxrex have this Israeli amendment. It's acceptable to me, of course. The\nquestions is whether or not to put a ceiling on it.\nK: Our objective on this is --\nS: I want that in a confidential way.\nK: We would prefer no cxexlix celing because it will be understood as actual aid.\nThe Arabs will be\nand the Soviets could use it. If it's low it might be\nmisunderstood as less commitment. We prefer that no ceiling be put on it.\nS: That's fine.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nS DIV LIB CONG.\nDepartment of St. =\nONLINE\nINDICATE:\nSTATE'S\nof\nTELEGRAM\nCHARGE TO\n*-4°\n2.3.Stg70\n22\nAMENBASSY, TEL AVIV\nPRIORITY\nDISTINBUTION\nACTION:\nAMENBASSY, AMMAN\nPRIORITY\n23\nLONDON\nPARIS\n\"\n!!!\nROME\n\"\nMOSCOW\n\"\nBEIRUT\n11\nUSINT\nCAIRO\n!!\nUSUN\nNEW YORK\n!1\nAMENBASSY KUWAIT\n11\nJIDDA\n11\nRABAT\n\"\nNNN TUNIS\n=\nSTATE 156646\nNODIS\nSeptember 23, 3:00 p.m. EDT\n1. Rabin called Sisco/to convey categoric assurance that\nIsrael would not move unilaterally against Syrian forces\nin Jordan without prior consultations with the US.\nnorthern\n2. Rabin NH characterized the situation in NOTICE Jordan in\noptimistic kx terms and said that their information\nconfirms that all Syrian tanks had been withdrawn from Jordan\nor were in the process of being withdrawn. In XS response.\nto Sisco's query as to what factors were responsible for\nthis Syrian withdrawal, Rabin gave the following four in the\nexdx order given below:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nNEA: JJSis: mth\n9/23/70\n29586\nJoseph J. Sisc\nS/S. - Mr. Curran\nSPORTS /HODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMSS DIV LIB CONG.\nClassifrcation\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nUNITED STATES OF\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: PAGE 2 of TEL to TEL AVIV, AMMAN, etc.\nFirst and foremost, Rabin said, there was the Jordanian\nArmy, loyal to the King, which gave the Syrians a real\nbeating. Rabin recalled that GOI view has always been\nthat Jordanian Army has the capability and is effective\nprovided King showed resolve. Rabin was laudatory as to how\ncomported\nJordanian Army has Exempented itself in recent crisis.\nSecond factor, according to Rabin, was Syrian Government\nrealization that in order to press attack further against\nsolid Jordanian resistance more Syrian Government involvement\nand regular Army involvement would be x4xxqn required, which\nin turn carried increased risk of confrontation with\nIsraelis. Moreoever, no longer could Syrians maintain that\nfedayeen were doing the fighting.\nThird, was the American posture in the Middle East which\nsaid\nRabin sais was very helpful in situation. Rabin felt that\nsteps taken by US amounted to a credible threat and signal\nto USSR.\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nNODTS\n05-322\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMSS DIV LIB CONG.\nDEPAI\nSTATE\nClassification\nDepartment of State\nINDICATE:\nUNITED STATES OF Associated\nTELEGRAM\nCOLLECT\nCHARGE TO\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION:\nPAGE 3 of TEL to TEL AVIV, AMMAN, etc.\n7\nFourth, and of least significance in Rabin's view, was\nthe Soviet role. He cautioned US on giving QTE Soviets too\nmuch credit UNQTE. In his judgment, it is not clear what\nsubordinate\nSoviets did in Damascus and whatever they did, was swhexindsze\nabove\nand kess less important than shouse the above three factors.\nHe is convinced that Syrians could not have moved 200, tanks\nacross border into Jordan without knowledge of USSR. In\nany event, whatever Soviets may have done in Damascus was\ninconsequential in his view, if compared to principal\nreason for Hussein's success, namely, real beating which\nJordanian Army gave to Syrians.\nGP-3\nEND\nNOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.\nROGERS\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL.EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nCLEARANCES:\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMSS DIV V LIB CONG.\nis\nDepartment of St.\nthe\nCHILD\n2\nINDICATE:\nSTATES\nor\nTHUGRAM\nCOLLECT\nX-65\nCHARGE TO\n238Γp70 ? 10:03: 03:\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION: Amembassy THL AVIV\nIMMEDIATE\nINFO: Amenbassy AMMAN\nIMMEDIATE\nSTATE 156260\nNODIS\nREF: State 156157\nSisco has just called Rabin to inform him that reply how\nbeing prepared to September 22 Israeli Note Verbale (+oftel).\nSisco said he under instructions to state that, particularly\nin view of apparently improved situation in Jordan, we want\nIsrael's assurance that there will be no unilateral Israoli\nmove of any kind into Jordan while our reply is under\nand without further prior consultation with US.\npreparation/ Rabin said that he thought it was clear from\nSeptember 22 Note Verbale that Israel would take no action\npending US reply and until there had been meeting between\nGOI and GOJ representatives. Nevertheless, he would\nimmediately pass this request for formal assurance to his\ngovernment.\nGP-3\nNote: Passed White House by OC/T\nROGERS\nEND\nBY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT.\nAPPROVED BY:\nNFA:ALAtherton. Jr. :nob\n9/23/70\n29464\nNEA - Jose\nCLEAMANCES:\nS/S - Mr. Curran\nLIC\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\nX-68\n4:13 p.m.\n9/23/70\nK: I just wanted to tell you what I told the President 5 mins. ago. We think we hav\nbroken the back of this crisis. I told him that you, Packard and Moorer really\npulled their weight. You are heart really great patriots. When the chips were down you\nreally delivered. Pranger/wasn't in it but he dsvk delivered like a great man.\nI have needled him from time to time and I wish you would get word to him that he\nis a tower of strength. And Dave. And you.\nL: Thanks.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nPhil Potter - Baltimore Sun\n9/23/70 5:30 p.m.\nP: Is there any chance of getting over to see you?\nK: No.\nP: What I wanted to ask today was, the word out of State is some-\nwhat ambiguous with regard to the withdrawing of Syrian tanks.\nK: That's correct. We have some indications that they might be\nwithdrawing, but we want to look at it more carefully.\nP: Did you by any chance see Sherman's piece in the Star today?\nK: What does it say?\nP: It says something to the effect that you were assured by the\nsecond man in the Soviet Embassy last night that when they said no\nforeign intervention they explicitly told you Syria was included in that,\nK: Where? At the SexietxEx UAR Embassy?\nP: Yes.\nK: Well, he sort of suggested that they were using their influence\nto get the Syrians\nwell, he was a little ambiguous, either to with-\ndraw or not to advance or whatever. You know the Middle East.\nP: Yes.\nK: Therefore, it is just too premature to draw any conclusions.\nIf the Syrian tanks have withdrawn some of the air is out of the tension\nand with some of the air out of it the tension will have been reduced.\nWe have some reports that Syrian tanks are withdrawing, but Sunday\nnight we had a report they had withdrawn across the border and before\nwe knew it they were back that night. This time, if they have withdrawn\nit is unlikely that they will come back. But it is unwise to throw our\nhats in the air yet. I am telling you exactly what we in the White House\nthink. If at this time tomorrow the Syrian tanks are out we'll be a little\nmore optimistic.\nP: What about the Cairo posture toward Hussein?\nK: They follow the events. At first they were on his side; then\nthey didn't want to be outdone by Syria. They have not been in a leading\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nPhil Potter\n9/23/70 5:30 p.m. page 2\nposition. Today again they are acquiescing. I would say they are on\nthe side of the Fedayeen on the whole. But they are almost more con-\ncerned with making a record than with doing anything decisive.\nP: They have wavered with the flow of events?\nK: That's right.\nP: What do you think accounts for this? The Israeli role on the\nflank is a reason for Syrian withdrawing? Soviet influence?\nK: The Israeli's obvious mobilization, or readiness measures,\nand the unexpectedly strong resistance of Jordan probably account for\na lot. I would put Soviet influence last. They didn't exercise any real\ninfluence we noticed till all these others came into plan. The Soviet\nrole over thekx last few weeks has not been very helpful. They've\nbeen pouring things into the standstill zone.\nP: Okay. Thank you very much.\nK: Right, Phil.\nP: I would love tosee you one of these days.\nK: I would like to see you. There's an unfortunate bias toward\nthe irresponsible journalists who need to be straightened out. Are\nyou going to be on the trip?\nP: No, I would love to be, but I cannot take it away from the\nWhite House correspondent.\nK: Okay. I'll see you when we get back.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nX-40\nX\nTELCON\nArgov/Kissinger\n6:00 p.m.\nx 9/23/70\nK: The President asked me to call the Ambassador but since he is not here to tell\nyou, the Prime Minister will hear that we will not forget your\nbehaviour this week and we feel very lucky that Israel was there.\nA: That's very kind.\nK: That may effect some of the things later.\nA: I think so too.\nK: Do you think it's 8 broken now?\nA: That's what the information was. The Syrians are out. The Jordanians are\nmoving tanks into Irbid and the situation in Amman is under control. Only\na few nests. Now I suppose he will move into a haggling with the characters he\nhas visiting him. They came to him and he didn't go to Cairo and that's a better\nposition than he has had for years.\nK: That's better for you toon.\nA: Yes, if he plays his cards well.\nK: ????? his attitude towards what you have done. Al Haig has some\nadvice for you that he will pass on later. I am glad we have had a chance to discus;\nthings.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\n+\nX-70\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco\n8:10 p.m., September 23, 1970\nS:\nI've only got a minute, I am calling from home. Going off to the\nLebanese Embassy tonight. They are giving a dinner for our new\nambassador. Wanted to say two things to you -- hope that some of\nthe heat on all of us is off. It has been a pretty good day. Henry,\nI really wanted to tell you you have done an outstanding job, you have\nraised a lot of tough questions that haven't been very easy to answer.\nYou have been tremendous throughout,\nK:\nWithout you it couldn't have been done. I appreciate the delicate\nposition you have been in,\nS:\nThe whole team has pulled very well together. All of us have served\nthe President well. I wanted to call you from home because I didn't\nwant to call you from the State Department.\nK:\nJoe, this means a lot to me, We will be friends for a long time.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nLaird/Kissinger\n11:47 a. m.\n9/24/70\nK: The President appreciated your suggestion on the carrier and he ageeed withit.\nL: I thought hulshould check with you on this visit to Turkey. I have an invitation\nI am accepting and I don't want to give the impression that it's something we asked\nfor. I am just trying to get State to turn it off and meet with the Defense Minister.\nK: You don't want Sisco.\nL: In Turkey, fine, but he is poison in Greece. They think he is the reason for\nthe hold up in aid. I am accepting Turkish Defense minister's invitation.\nK: How can they think a thing like that. Would he do anything contrary to the\nPresident's wishes? We were trying to get rid of him.\nL: Send him home.\nK: Tell him that he must stay on top of the M.E.\nL: Can't have everyone out of town at the same time.\nK: I will tal take the blame. I will tell him the Presi dent wants him back here.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoe Sisco\n9/24/70 12:10 p.m.\nS: There were three things I wanted to mention: first, I am send-\ning to you for your clearance a simple one-page suggestion as to two or\nthree oral points that might be made to Rabin to put a ribbon on our recent\neffort.\nK: The President wants to do that very warmly.\nS: Wait till you see it; I have done it very warmly. And if you like,\nI can make it warmer. Secondly, I have just finished a suggested talking\npapermx for the President for use with the Mediterranean ambassadors,\nwhich was rather presumptuous of me.\nK: Not at all. That's what I wanted you to do.\nS: Am very anxious for him to see this. I think it's got the kind of\nview which the President and you and I would like to have reflected to the\nAmbassadors. I will put it in the usual bureancratic way into the book,\nbut I hav e also sent you an extra copy.\nK: Good.\nS: Third, I just got a call in from the field. Palmer suggested, and\nI think it's very good, that I should brief all the Ambassadors on the Mid-\ndle East before the President at 11:00.\nK: That's a good idea.\nS: I thought it was; I just wanted to be sure. I would do it-at 9:00.\nK: That's terrific. If the Secretary agrees we are strongly in\nfavor, and I don't see how he can not want you to. There were two\nthings I wanted to mention to you/ The President is thinking that you\nought to go back after Naples; he wants you here to watch things: we\nare not that much out of the woods yet.\nS: And Laird thinks my presence would give it too much an a\nMiddle Eastern flavor.\nK: That I hadn't heard. XXX\nS: Let's leave it at that one day in Naples, then I'll come back.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoe Sisco\n9/24/70 12:10 p.m. page 2.\nK: We're sending Haig back for that reason.\nS: Fine, maybe Al and I can team up to come back.\nK: The other thing is strictly personal: I had a visitor today\nwho was saying that Bergus is talking about me in a very vicious way.\nS: I will take care of that.\nK: It's awful for an American minister to talk that way. And\nhe takes credit for starting that campaign on \"expel. 11\nS: Let me take care of it. You don't do a thing. I promise you\nI'll take care of it.\nK: Good. Thank yoji.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nX\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n3:04 p.m.\n9/24/70\nD: You didn't keep your word not to organize anything during my absence.\nK: Don't speak about who isn't keeping his word. You stayed away a lot longer\nthen we thought. Let's not go into this on the phone.\nD: I amxxx calling today if it's possible to see the President about two point S--\nThe summit and things about Jordan.\nK: I will talk to him. His schedule is very full. Can you talk to me?\nD: Yes but the questions is when I left Moscow they said ? ? ?. Today or tomorr\nreally. It could wait until tomorrow and it's not urgent.\nK: I understand. I will have to ask him.\nD: Understand and the timing. 20-25 mins. and then I could talk to you on a more\ndetailed basis.\nK: You understand we are leaving town next week.\nD: Sunday.\nK: Probably, yes.\nD: hat's why I am calling. I just arrived late last night.\nf\nK: I will theck with the President.\nD: Let me know when it's possible to arrange it.\nK: I will let you know. Will you be seeing others before you see the President?\nD: No. Nobody. You are the first I am to call. Perhpas half an hour before I coul\ntalk with you.\nK: I have no particular need to talk with you. I have to see if the President has\ntime and if not, you may have to talk with me. Today I know is impossible.\nD: Tomorrow is no problem. I am not going to see anyone before that. I will awai\nyour call.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n9/24/70; 6:40 p.m.\n-2-\nP: On the Dobrynin thing, let me leave it to your judgment. Take the message\nand tell him if the message justifies my seeing him you will work it out.\nK: Right, Mr. President.\nP: Right. Say, Mr. Ambassador, he is leaving and is cleaning out several\nthings -- which is true, Okay?\nK: Right.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nX-74\nThe President\n9/24/70; 6:40 p.m.\nK: I had a call from Dobrynin this afternoon and he said he had a message for\nyou on that Summit and also on the Jordanian situation. I was very cool to him\nand said I didn't know if your schedule permitted you to see him.\nP: I will not see him. If he wants to give a message, he can see you. I didn't\ngive him\nK: I handed him the first and Haig handed Vorontsov the second. If you want\nto come to Map Room after and get\nP: I am not going to go to him and take a message unless it is positive - - I\nam not going to waste my time,\nK: Why don't I tell him you should give me the message?\nP: Tell him you would like to take a look at it and that you would look at my\nschedule. I don't think we want to appear that everytime he comes back I am\ngoing to slobber over him. Tell him if there is something substantive that\nwould justify my seeing him, I will, but if it is just routine I can't do it. Let's\nput it that way.\nK: Good, I will call him. Ihad lunch with the Time people -- I think it went\nvery well, I gave them the same I gave this morning.\nP: You think I ought to spend a few minutes with Sidey?\nK: I don't think it would hurt.\nP: Okay, fine, Henry. We will see you you are coming tonight.\nK: I will be there by 9:00 p.m.\nP: Do about the same as you did.\nK: About 20-25 minutes.\nP: About 25 minutes like you did this morning. No other new developments?\nK: No. The army seems to be continuing to clean out the Fedayeen. Some\nreports that the Iraquis are changing into Fedayeen uniform.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmbassador Dobrynin\n9/24/70 7:00 p.m.\nD: You were playing golf with the President?\nK: No, I don't play. I just talked to the President and he is\nextremely occupied tomorrow and is going to Camp David tomorrow\nnight. What he wonders is if you could give me the messages. If\nthere is anything warranting a personal reply from him he will see\nyou later in the day. That's his position.\nD: I have to check it with Moscow, if you don't mind.\nK: No.\nD: In this particular case when I left they asked me to ask for\nan audience with him. I would have to ask my government in this case.\nK: I understand, but you recognize that he is leaving Friday\nnight for Camp David.\nD: That's why they asked me to come earlier back to Washing-\nton. But it's up to the President.\nK: If a written reply is needed we will give that; if something\nelse\nBut under no circumstances will he have much time. Why\ndon't you ask Moscow if you can tell me, then we can have 15 minutes\nlater in the day for you to get his reactions.\nD: It is up to Moscow; it is nptt up to me. This is really the\nquestion. I can't decide myself. It is not that they don't want me to\nspeak with you.\nK: Of course, if there is something in your communication that\nwarrants his reaction, he will, of course, see you, but not for long.\nD: The question is how he will react on this, not XLK just telling\nhim the things and nothing else.\nK: If it requires a significant reaction he will react, but first he\nwants to see what it is. Call me in the morning and see if you can give\nit to me; if so, I propose 10:30.\nD: I will check with Moscow. When will he be back?\nK: October 6.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmbassador Dobrynin\n9/24/70 7:00 p.m. page 2\nD: He is not going anyplace after the 6th?\nK: He willb e in and out. We told you his schedule was very\ncrowded for October and November. November is the political cam-\npaign and he will be taking several trips.\nD: I understand, but it is a question of a 10-minute talk.\nK: We don't reject the idea of a 10-minute talk. We just want\nto see if there's something to talk about.\nD: All right. I will check with Moscow and call you tomorrow\nmorning before 10:00 to clarify the situation from my side.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES\nX-44\nTELCON\nRabin/Kissinger\nX-75\n4:33 p.m.\n9/25/70\nR: First, in response to what you transmitted WX two days ago when I was not\nhere and you told Argov I have a cable from the Prime Minister and she wants to\nthank the President for the message and second, she hopes in the last weeks\nbetter understanding has been established as a result of the last developments\nbetween the U.S. and Israel. Third, she hopes that this understanding will be\ncontinued for the future.\nK: We will do our best and why don't you type it up and send it over here. It's\na pleasure to eschange friendly messages for a change.\nR: A more practical point, you know in Copenhagen there's a meeting of the\nWorld Bank and Board of Governors all over the country and it's\nWe have close contacts with them. We taxlex talked to you of the problem of\n$250 million as German loans which the U.S. as part of the German/U.S. offset\nagreement. The Germans stress time and again that if they get any hint from\nyou that will be welcome in bringing this issue in discussion between you and us -\nK: They tell us the opposite.\nR: If you xxxxx indicate you are willing to use it favorably, not commit yourselve\nthey would send a representative here to discuss it. No commitment on your\npart.\nWho would\nK: Xxxxxxxx make this communication to them?\nR: Can I we have a direct contact to Brandt.\nK: Could you send one of your economics men to Bergsten, my assistant to\nexplain the problem to him and then I will let you know.\nR: You will not be here.\nK: Yes.\nR: Can we just tell them if they ask you to tell only to Brandt\nK: I don't understand the problem well enough and I shouldn't do it now in light\nof other things I have to do this week without economic advice.\nR: We talked to Mr. Samuels\nK: May I call you back? In half an hour? There's something I must do\nabsolutely urgently.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5\nNLN 05-03/35 pu ltr 2007\nBy FIM\nNARA, Date 1 Apr 2009\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nThis document 5.10.27 has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDECLASSIFIED\nX-44\nTELCON\nRabin/Kissinger\nX-75\n4:33 p.m.\n9/25/70\nR: First, in response to what you transmitted WX two days ago when I was not\nhere and you told Argov I have a cable from the Prime Minister and she wants to\nthank the President for the message and second, she hopes in the last weeks\nbetter understanding has been established as a result of the last developments\nbetween the U.S. and Israel. Third, she hopes that this understanding will be\ncontinued for the future.\nK: We will do our best and why don't you type it up and send it over here. It's\na pleasure to eschange friendly messages for a change.\nR: A more practical point, you know in Copenhagen there's a meeting of the\nWorld Bank and Board of Governors all over the country and it's\nWe have close contacts with them. We taxlex talked to you of the problem of\n$250 million as German loans which the U.S. as part of the German/U.S. offset\nagreement. The Germans stress time and again that if they get any hint from\nyou that ****** will be welcome in bringing this issue in discussion between you and us\nK: They tell us the opposite.\nR: If you xxxxx indicate you are willing to use it favorably, not commit yourselves\nthey would send a representative here to discuss it. No commitment on your\npart.\nWho would\nK: Xxxxxxxx make this communication to them?\nR: Can I we have a direct contact to Brandt.\nK: Could you send one of your economics men to Bergsten, my assistant to\nexplain the problem to him and then I will let you know.\nR: You will not be here.\nK: Yes.\nR: Can we just tell them if they ask you to tell only to Brandt -\nK: I don't understand the problem well enough and I shouldn't do it now in light\nof other things I have to do this week without economic advice.\nR: We talked to Mr. Samuels -\nK: May I call you back? In half an hour? There's something I must do\nabsolutely urgently.\n(dupe of 1st page)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Librar\nDECLASSIFIED\nINLN\n05-03/35:\nP.\n20,2]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident/Kissinger\n9:50 a.m.\n9/25/70\nK: Did you get my message about hostages? They have released 20. That\nmeans a real victory. But no Americans.\nP: The King is surviving well. It's the hard game.\nK: No question.\nP: Can you get anx that across? Are you having your backgrounder today?\nK: Yes. I am leaving tonight.\nP: I will see you after you see Dobrynin. K I am briefing at 10:00. Dobrynin\nat 10:30 and I will se e you after Dobrynin. I will make it very short with\nDobrynin.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nGovernor Dewey\n9/25/70 6:00 p.m.\nD: Welcome back to the East. They warmed up the atmosphere for you\na bit didn't they?\nK: They sure did. I think we've made it.\nD: I spent last evening at the Council with Abba Eban, just a small\ngroup, 25 or so. He's quite a different fellow from the last meeting.\nK: They've had some scaring influences.\nD: He glitters as beautifully as ever, you've seen him.\nK: No, he hasn't been in Washington, or if he was I haven't seen him.\nD: Oh he wasn't with Golda?\nK: No, I don't think he and she get along very well.\nD: He glitters with charm, but he almost sounds a little shrill and\nless convinced.\nK: They are in a tough spot, and realize they have to do something.\nD: They are realizing that a war of attrition with them isn't working.\nYou can't really\nand Arab.\nK: Not when you have two million and they have 80. I think events of\nthe last two weeks have helped.\nD: They must have. And the hijackings I think are the best thing to\nhappen to the Israelis. Most importantly they made the world hate the\nFedayeen. And they made the Fedayeen realize that the Israelis aren't\nby themselves. Anyhow I called to say that Lucius and I would like to come\ndown at a convenient time.\nK: Let me get David Young to call you next week and we'll set a date\nfor after we get back.\nD: Okay. I spoke to Lucius today and he thought the 8th or the 9th\nof October would be okay for him.\nK: At this point, one looks as good as the other. Why don't we say the\n8th\nno, the 9th.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nGovernor Dewey\n9/25/70 6:00 p.m. page 2\nD: Thatit is. When are you coming back?\nK: The 5th.\nD: When do you leave?\nK: Tonight.\nD: Tonight! Sorry, go pack your bags and have a wonderfully success-\nful visit.\nK: Thank you. Let's plan for lunch on the 9th. Will you contact\nLucius or should we?\nD: I'll take care of it.\nK: Good.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
}