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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n-3-\nand role of our military facilities in Spain and in their relationship to\nour security interests in Western Europe and the Mediterranean area.\nWe must determine in which direction we prefer Spain to move and assess\nour ability to influence its development. The ultimate decisions on our\npolicy toward Spain -- and on the base negotiations in particular -- will be\nseen by the Europeans, the Soviets and the Congress as providing an in-\ndication of the President's thinking on our military posture abroad generally,\nand US interest in the Mediterranean area and NATO-related issues more\nspecifically.\nNSSM 46, originally issued in April] is nearing completion. In the\ncurrent draft, the NSSM presents three broad alternative policy options.\nThe first places the the preservation of US military facilities and rights\nparamount in our policy; all other policy considerations support our military\ninterest. Thus, we should be willing to be helpful to Spain with respect\nto the EEC trade arrangement, cooperate in educational and scientific aid,\nsupport the Spanish pblitical elements favoring a strong US military re-\nlationship, and offer as much military assistance as possible to whatever\ndegree is necessary to achieve the fullest possible security interests.\nA second alternative is to eliminate entirely the military relationship with\nSpain, with the possible exception of retaining transit rights and perhaps\nre-entry rights (if they can be obtained for a non-military quid pro quo).\nOur economic policy would be completely flexible and determined on its\nown merits; politically, we would offer perceptible encouragement to the\nmore liberal elements in Spain. Great emphasis would be placed on co-\noperating with Spain in educational reform and technological advancement.\nThe third general option falls between the other two, and involves a reduced\nmilitary relationship and an increase in non-military cooperation.\nThough these options are somewhat obvious, each has some support\nwithin the bureaucracy. Naturally, DOD strongly favors the first, State\nseems inclined toward the third (though there is some interest in the first\nand second), and Commerce and Treasury seem leaning toward the second\n(especially in the trade sphere). The present draft of the NSSM is not\nparticularly analytic or precise. It falls between a negotiating position\npaper and a general paper offering a long-range perspective. Nevertheless,\nit would seem important to move it forward to an NSC meeting in order to\nget the President's focus and broad judgment as soon as possible. Con-\nsideration of negotiating positions can be developed subsequently, perhaps\nin the Under Secretaries Committee. Unless the general picture is presented\nto the President without much further delay, we may be faced with negotiating\nissues and a replay of last year's fumbling without the firm base of a\nPresidential decision.\nSECRET"
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