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- 6 -
be much easier for us to oppose the more limited type of arrangement
they are contemplating (as per Option 3, Page 13). In short, it would be
a positive position which would provide the basis for a negative one if it
failed.
There are two additional steps we could take, either in addition to the
foregoing or as alternatives in case we decided to be completely negative
toward the preferential planning at the outset:
-- We could inform Spain that we would support its eligibility for
tariff preferences under the generalized preferences scheme now being
negotiated. Spain wants badly to be treated as an LDC for this pumpose
but we have neveryindicated that we agree. In fact, Spain would not be
eligible under the conditions we have announced so far if it extended
"reverse preferences" to the EC, as it is now planning to do. Spain
would probably come out about as well economically from the global
preferences (which would of course include some preferences in the EC)
as from the special deal with the EC. However, this would eliminate any
"special" move toward Europe and would not have the political implications
envisaged by the Spanish government. (This is probably the overriding
drawback to Option 4, page 14, which would have us condone EC preferences
to Spain now as a "advance" on the generalized scheme but oppose Spain's
preferences to EC goods. I understand however that State has tentatively
decided to support this option.)
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n- 6 -\nbe much easier for us to oppose the more limited type of arrangement\nthey are contemplating (as per Option 3, Page 13). In short, it would be\na positive position which would provide the basis for a negative one if it\nfailed.\nThere are two additional steps we could take, either in addition to the\nforegoing or as alternatives in case we decided to be completely negative\ntoward the preferential planning at the outset:\n-- We could inform Spain that we would support its eligibility for\ntariff preferences under the generalized preferences scheme now being\nnegotiated. Spain wants badly to be treated as an LDC for this pumpose\nbut we have neveryindicated that we agree. In fact, Spain would not be\neligible under the conditions we have announced so far if it extended\n\"reverse preferences\" to the EC, as it is now planning to do. Spain\nwould probably come out about as well economically from the global\npreferences (which would of course include some preferences in the EC)\nas from the special deal with the EC. However, this would eliminate any\n\"special\" move toward Europe and would not have the political implications\nenvisaged by the Spanish government. (This is probably the overriding\ndrawback to Option 4, page 14, which would have us condone EC preferences\nto Spain now as a \"advance\" on the generalized scheme but oppose Spain's\npreferences to EC goods. I understand however that State has tentatively\ndecided to support this option.)\nSECRET"
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