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NSSM 46 [3 of 4]

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For 1.Kennely FYI NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 INFORMATION 10 MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER 13 January 1969 FROM: Peter W. Rodman SUBJECT: Card File on U.S. RELATIONS WITH SPAIN I. AUTHORS: Philip BEN, "Why Liberalization in Spain is Inevitable," New Republic, Feb. 18, 1967. Stephen CLISSOLD, Spain (1969). THE NATION, "A Little Freedom" (editorial), March 3, 1969. NATIONAL REVIEW, "Crackdown in Spain," (editorial), Feb. 25, 1969. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, Report on National Commitments Resolution, April 17, 1969. II. SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT: A. U.S. Spanish Military Pact: Pros & Cons for U.S. Policy Pros: 1. Air bases at Moron & Torrejon, & Polaris sub base at Rota, remain of immense strategic value, especially now because of Soviet thrust in Mediterranean. (NATIONAL REVIEW) 2. Generous U.S. terms on bases would contribute to future stability of Spain, & assure U.S. of dependable ally vs. Communism. (NATIONAL REVIEW) Cons: 1. We are in effect upholding the dictatorship. If we stay, & big trouble develops, bases will be worthless. They probably are anyway. We will be caught in the middle, & large sector of world opinion will blame us for supplying Franco with the arms with which he will try to reassert his authority. (THE NATION) 2. Physical presence of U.S. bases forms a quasi-commitment to defense of Franco regime, possibly even vs. internal disruption. ("Joint use" of bases means that Spain can use them without U.S. consent.) (SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE) Intermediate: 1. Facilities are still of great value to U.S. as staging posts for aerial refueling, for early warning radar system, & for Polaris subs. But value of bases has probably declined in strategic terms since development of ICBM. But Madrid will try to use them as bargaining counters to get higher price from U.S. for ec. support & political backing on Gibraltar. (CLISSOLD)

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    "ocrText": "For 1.Kennely\nFYI\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nINFORMATION\n10\nMEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER\n13 January 1969\nFROM: Peter W. Rodman\nSUBJECT: Card File on U.S. RELATIONS WITH SPAIN\nI. AUTHORS: Philip BEN, \"Why Liberalization in Spain is Inevitable,\"\nNew Republic, Feb. 18, 1967.\nStephen CLISSOLD, Spain (1969).\nTHE NATION, \"A Little Freedom\" (editorial), March 3, 1969.\nNATIONAL REVIEW, \"Crackdown in Spain,\" (editorial), Feb. 25, 1969.\nSENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, Report on National\nCommitments Resolution, April 17, 1969.\nII. SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT:\nA. U.S. Spanish Military Pact: Pros & Cons for U.S. Policy\nPros: 1. Air bases at Moron & Torrejon, & Polaris sub base at Rota,\nremain of immense strategic value, especially now because of Soviet thrust in\nMediterranean. (NATIONAL REVIEW)\n2. Generous U.S. terms on bases would contribute to future\nstability of Spain, & assure U.S. of dependable ally vs. Communism. (NATIONAL\nREVIEW)\nCons: 1. We are in effect upholding the dictatorship. If we stay,\n& big trouble develops, bases will be worthless. They probably are anyway.\nWe will be caught in the middle, & large sector of world opinion will blame\nus for supplying Franco with the arms with which he will try to reassert his\nauthority. (THE NATION)\n2. Physical presence of U.S. bases forms a quasi-commitment\nto defense of Franco regime, possibly even vs. internal disruption. (\"Joint\nuse\" of bases means that Spain can use them without U.S. consent.) (SENATE\nFOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE)\nIntermediate: 1. Facilities are still of great value to U.S. as staging\nposts for aerial refueling, for early warning radar system, & for Polaris\nsubs. But value of bases has probably declined in strategic terms since\ndevelopment of ICBM. But Madrid will try to use them as bargaining counters\nto get higher price from U.S. for ec. support & political backing on Gibraltar.\n(CLISSOLD)"
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