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SECRET -13- (2) Probably requires US acquiescence in a GOS-EC preferential trade agreement which will be contrary to our fundamental commercial policies and would damage our trade interests, endanger the movement toward freer trade, encourage other countries to seek preferential ties to the EC that would be discriminatory to our commerce, and precipitate demands on the US for preferential trading arrange- ments from those excluded from EC arrange- ments. (3) Will require additional quid pro quo in MAP funds, credit for military sales, financial support for Spanish educational programs, and/or political concessions difficult to obtain during a period of declining defense and foreign aid budgets. OPTION II Retain some military facilities and rights in Spain, but place primary emphasis on other than defense aspects of our bilateral relationship. This option is based on the premise (which enjoys greater currency in State than Defense) that full retention of present US bases in Spain is not realistic. It pre-supposes that while some capabilities might be abandoned, compensation for the loss of others could be assured through relocation or the procurement of additional forces. Within this option there is a substantial range of choice as to which facilities and functions we might attempt to retain. Thus there is scope for bargaining. The Spanish Government will naturally seek compensation commensurate with the rights accorded us. A detailed definition of the value to be assigned the retention of particular functions has not yet been jointly formulated by State and DOD. Both Departments have acknowledged, however, that their ordering of priorities corresponds generally with the following list arranged in descending order of strategic values. SECRET

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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n-13-\n(2) Probably requires US acquiescence in a\nGOS-EC preferential trade agreement which\nwill be contrary to our fundamental\ncommercial policies and would damage our\ntrade interests, endanger the movement\ntoward freer trade, encourage other\ncountries to seek preferential ties to\nthe EC that would be discriminatory to\nour commerce, and precipitate demands on\nthe US for preferential trading arrange-\nments from those excluded from EC arrange-\nments.\n(3) Will require additional quid pro quo in\nMAP funds, credit for military sales,\nfinancial support for Spanish educational\nprograms, and/or political concessions\ndifficult to obtain during a period of\ndeclining defense and foreign aid budgets.\nOPTION II\nRetain some military facilities and rights in Spain,\nbut place primary emphasis on other than defense aspects\nof our bilateral relationship.\nThis option is based on the premise (which enjoys\ngreater currency in State than Defense) that full retention\nof present US bases in Spain is not realistic. It\npre-supposes that while some capabilities might be\nabandoned, compensation for the loss of others could\nbe assured through relocation or the procurement of\nadditional forces.\nWithin this option there is a substantial range of\nchoice as to which facilities and functions we might attempt\nto retain. Thus there is scope for bargaining. The\nSpanish Government will naturally seek compensation\ncommensurate with the rights accorded us. A detailed\ndefinition of the value to be assigned the retention of\nparticular functions has not yet been jointly formulated by\nState and DOD. Both Departments have acknowledged, however,\nthat their ordering of priorities corresponds generally\nwith the following list arranged in descending order of\nstrategic values.\nSECRET"
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