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SECRET -15- (3) Would preserve a relationship with the Spanish military while allowing for a somewhat more flexible posture in relation to Spanish internal politics during a period of uncertain transition. (4) Will reduce the visibility of the US bases, and by making our military presence less controver- sial may place it on a more durable basis. (5) Reductions of US personnel in Spain might offset pressures to reduce our NATO-committed forces. (DOD contends that bases in Spain permit us to support NATO commitments and that personnel reductions there would require compensating increases elsewhere in Western Europe if the : present capabilities of NATO-committed forces are to be preserved). Disadvantages: (1) Some diminution in military capabilities available to support present strategy. (2) Substantial quid pro quo still required. Any mitigation of US opposition to a GOS-EC preferential trade agreement is likely to lead to at least some of the adverse consequences referred to in Disadvantage 2, Option I (see above). (3) Some risk of offending elements of the Spanish military who may retain important influence in the post-Franco period. (4) Additional political dependence and/or demands for rental payments from third countries into which we may wish to relocate particular facilities. SECRET

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