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SECRET
-16-
OPTION III
Eliminate the US defense relationship with Spain.
This option presupposes the abandonment of our military
relationship with Spain, with the possible exception of
retaining transit and reentry rights in wartime or cases
of severe military threats. While no agency appears to
desire this option, it must be considered because it cannot
be ruled out as a realistic possibility. Should the Spanish
badly misjudge our ability to provide quid pro quo or should
we miscalculate the value they attach to our continued
military presence there, abortive negotiations could result
in our withdrawal from the bases.
Advantages:
(1) Would eliminate the need for quid pro quo to
Spain.
(2) Would enable our response to Spanish-EC tariff
negotiations to be governed by the general
principles of our global commercial policy.
(3) Would permit us to manage our relations with a
regime confronting a period of uncertain
evolution without the encumbrance of troops on
their soil.
(4) Advantage 5, Option 2. Would lend additional
plausibility to the contention that we were
reducing force levels in Europe without directly
affecting basic NATO commitments. (Same DOD
objections as in Advantage 5, Option 2 above)
Disadvantages:
(1) Would entail maximum reduction of military
capabilities to support regional strategy and
loss of access to our investment in military
facilities in Spain.
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n-16-\nOPTION III\nEliminate the US defense relationship with Spain.\nThis option presupposes the abandonment of our military\nrelationship with Spain, with the possible exception of\nretaining transit and reentry rights in wartime or cases\nof severe military threats. While no agency appears to\ndesire this option, it must be considered because it cannot\nbe ruled out as a realistic possibility. Should the Spanish\nbadly misjudge our ability to provide quid pro quo or should\nwe miscalculate the value they attach to our continued\nmilitary presence there, abortive negotiations could result\nin our withdrawal from the bases.\nAdvantages:\n(1) Would eliminate the need for quid pro quo to\nSpain.\n(2) Would enable our response to Spanish-EC tariff\nnegotiations to be governed by the general\nprinciples of our global commercial policy.\n(3) Would permit us to manage our relations with a\nregime confronting a period of uncertain\nevolution without the encumbrance of troops on\ntheir soil.\n(4) Advantage 5, Option 2. Would lend additional\nplausibility to the contention that we were\nreducing force levels in Europe without directly\naffecting basic NATO commitments. (Same DOD\nobjections as in Advantage 5, Option 2 above)\nDisadvantages:\n(1) Would entail maximum reduction of military\ncapabilities to support regional strategy and\nloss of access to our investment in military\nfacilities in Spain.\nSECRET"
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